


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JAIL OFFICER'S
TRAINING MANUAL



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FOREWORD

The National Sheriffs' Association has developed the *Jail Officer's Training Manual* through a grant from the National Institute of Corrections. The material was compiled and written by experts in corrections and other disciplines. It will stimulate a number of you to want to pursue the subject further.

Completion of this Jail Officer's Training Course is an important part of your professional development.

The key to success on your job and in pursuing a course of independent study like this is self-discipline. You have to work at it on a regular basis when at times you would prefer to relax.

Make no mistake about it. The position of jail officer has assumed an importance that was not recognized even ten years ago. In the next decade you will see the training requirements and courses of study for those who would aspire to a career in corrections equal in length to the training and study required for other people in law enforcement.

The way of the world is change. For the professional jailer this fact means a continued life-long career of study and continuous training. This course is but a necessary first step.

Ferris E. Lucas
Executive Director
National Sheriffs' Association

Dear Participant:

To be fully informed on how to carry out the requirements of the *Jail Officer's Training Manual* program, please read the following instructions carefully before beginning the course.

Your *Jail Officer's Training Manual* consists of thirty chapters. The chapters are divided into four sections.

- First, complete the personal history form in the front of the manual. This information must be complete to assure continuity throughout the course. RETURN THIS FORM WHEN YOU SUBMIT THE EXAMINATION ANSWERS FOR SECTION ONE.
- All correspondence will be mailed to your home address unless you indicate in writing that you wish it to be sent elsewhere.
- Your name and social security number (which is your participant number) must be included in the space provided on the first and third pages of each examination.
- Begin the course by reading each chapter in the first section, and answering the multiple choice questions at the end of each chapter. (You have been mailed only the examinations to the chapters in section one.)
- Indicate your answer to each question by circling the letter preceding the answer.

Sample

1. An appeal of a conviction argues:
 - a. The facts of the case
 - b. Errors of law during the trial.
 - c. Both a and b.
- There is only one correct answer to each question, and there are no "trick questions."
- Erase any corrections completely. Do not scratch out the previous answer.
- After you have completed the examinations to each chapter in section one, mail the examinations to:

National Sheriffs' Association
Jail Operations Section
1250 Connecticut Ave. N.W., suite 320
Washington, D. C. 20036

DO NOT FORGET TO INCLUDE YOUR PERSONAL HISTORY FORM WITH YOUR ANSWERS TO SECTION ONE.

- Your examination will be graded. The questions that have been answered incorrectly will be marked with an "X." The page number that contains the correct answer to the question will be included in the response.
- The examination evaluations will be returned to you along with the examination questions to the next section. You can then continue by following the same procedure you did in completing section one.
- This procedure will be continued throughout the course until you have completed the entire thirty chapters (four sections).
- An overall average of seventy percent (70%) is necessary to receive a passing grade for the program.
- You will receive your final grade after you have completed all the examinations.
- Those participants who successfully complete the Jail Officer's Training Program will receive a certificate of merit.
- Be sure you have included your name and social security number on each examination.
- Any questions you might have concerning the course should be directed to:

National Sheriffs' Association
Jail Operations Section
1250 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Suite 320
Washington, D. C. 20036

or

Monday through Friday (8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.) phone:

(202) 872-0422.

PERSONAL HISTORY INFORMATION

(Please print or type).

NAME: _____ Social Security No.: _____

HOME ADDRESS: _____
_____ ZIP: _____

PHONE: _____

EMPLOYER: _____

EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS: _____
_____ ZIP: _____

COUNTY: _____

CITY: _____

JOB POSITION: _____

SIGNATURE: _____

DATE: _____

The *Jail Officer's Training Manual* is the product of a number of contributors. Five people deserve special recognition:

- Peggy Jenkins, National Sheriffs' Association, Washington, D. C.
- Dr. Betty Bosarge, Criminal Justice Consultant, Washington, D. C.
- Dr. Andrew C. Crosby, Educational Psychologist, Washington, D. C.
- Dr. Ken Kerle, Corrections Consultant, Boonsboro, Maryland
- Frank Saunders, Research Assistant, Springfield, Va.

They spent untold hours in the writing, rewriting, editing, organizing, proofing, and critiquing of chapters and preparing the examination questions. They constituted an energizing force and spirit on which the Project Director relied in bringing forth a training text designed to assist the correctional jail officers across the country in their continued pursuit to attain professional excellence.

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Finally, my heartfelt thanks to the Jail Operations Advisory Board for their continual dedication and perserverance throughout the development and publication of this manual.

Francis R. Ford
Project Director

JAIL OFFICER'S TRAINING MANUAL

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
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Section I

Basic Issues



The American Jail: Its Origins & Development
Legal Rights and Responsibilities
Within the Corrections Environment
Litigation Procedure
Written Communications
Role Concepts, Attitudes, & Interpersonal Communication
Dealing With Stress

Section I

CHAPTER ONE

THE AMERICAN JAIL: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

From the day the first explorer set foot upon the land that was to become known as the United States of America, citizens have faced the problem of dealing with crime. There were many criminals among the early settlers - *some European nations used North America as a penal colony*. As the new nation grew, its crime rate also expanded dramatically. The history of the United States is a violent one.



Prominent landowners were appointed sheriff.

In order to deal with crime and criminals, the settlers in the original 13 colonies established criminal justice systems similar to those in England. The first law enforcement agencies were the sheriff's office

and the "watch and ward." In the early days of colonial development, sheriffs were appointed from among the more prominent landowners, but by the time of the War of Independence, most counties were electing the sheriff. The sheriff's duties included law enforcement and court administration, as well as collecting taxes and supervising elections. The "watch and ward" system of law enforcement used volunteers, supervised by a constable, to stand guard in the cities, prevent crimes, and apprehend criminals.

The early American court system was based upon the English system of *common law*, with local officials appointed by the king or colonial governor to serve as judges. Punishments ranged from public hangings to suspended sentences in which the guilty person was ordered to make restitution and reform his habits. These early courts also provided for release on personal recognizance of suspects who promised not to flee before their trial date.


The criminal justice system as it exists today consists of four major components: police, jails, courts, and corrections. Roles of the individual components can be defined as follows:

- *Law enforcement*: Responsible for the prevention of crime, investigation of crimes that have occurred, and the apprehension of criminals.
- *Jails*: Responsible for detention of accused persons prior to trial and, in some cases, for short sentence confinement and rehabilitation.
- *Courts*: Responsible for determination of guilt or innocence and type of sentence.
- *Corrections*: Responsible for long-term confinement and rehabilitation.

These four components of the criminal justice system must cooperate closely with each other if the system is to work smoothly and efficiently.

THE ORIGINS OF JAILS

Detention centers for people accused of crimes were first used in Biblical times, although it was not until centuries later that prison terms would be considered as appropriate punishment for criminal acts. The *Magna Carta*, signed in England in 1215, defined the rights of the accused person and prescribed jailing as a form of punishment for the first time in recorded history.



The stocks were also used as punishment.

The houses of correction were established to give London's beggars and vagrants a chance to improve themselves, provide an industrial school for young people, serve as a place of refuge for the old and sick, and confine the poor who could not get work.

The Development Of Jails In America

Because the first British settlers in the American colonies utilized what they had known back home, the county jail, the house of correction, and the workhouse all had an impact upon the development of a corrections system in this country. In 1717 the British Parliament enacted a law declaring that the American colonies were to serve as a penal colony for

The more traditional types of punishment, such as *flogging*, *amputation*, *blinding*, *beheading*, and *branding*, are still used in some nations, but the use of incarceration as punishment gradually increased in popularity throughout the civilized world.

Experimentation with different types of jails began in England in the Middle Ages. In addition to the county jail, the English established workhouses and houses of correction. The workhouses detained minor offenders, such as vagrants, petty thieves, prostitutes, and disorderly persons. They were exactly what the name implies - inmates were assigned work. These workhouses quickly became popular with the government. When the British Parliament saw that the streets were being swept clean of people it considered to be "socially undesirable," it legislated the establishment of a workhouse in every English county. By the seventeenth century, the workhouse concept had spread to Holland, Belgium, the German states, and finally to the British colonies in America. County workhouses still exist in some of the original 13 states.

England, a situation which continued until the American Revolution in 1776. It was during this period that the Quakers of Pennsylvania turned their backs on the brutal, barbaric ways of punishment and substituted work in houses of correction as a more humane method of treatment. The leader of this movement was William Penn, but after his death the Pennsylvania Assembly reimposed the English Criminal Code decreed by King George I. This code listed 12 *capital crimes* which were punishable by death and allowed whipping and other types of physical punishments common to the colonies.

While the colonists were fighting the Revolutionary War, the City of Philadelphia built the Walnut Street Jail. By 1790 the Quakers were able to convince the Pennsylvania Legislature to set aside a wing of the new jail for a "penitentiary," where convicted felons would do "penitence" (show regret for their sins) and work in solitude. The jail also had a large room to confine people who were awaiting trial and another room to house misdemeanants and debtors. John Howard, an English sheriff who had visited many European institutions, influenced the architecture of the jail when his proposal for single cells was incorporated into a cell block.

Caleb Lowmes, an iron merchant and a member of the Philadelphia Society, a very active prison reform group, took charge of several sheds in the jail yard, where prisoners worked at shoemaking, weaving, tailoring, beating hemp, and sawing and polishing marble. But, by 1801, a flood of new prisoners overcrowded the cellhouse and disrupted the work program, causing Lowmes to resign in disgust.

Despite these setbacks, the Walnut Street Jail influenced jail construction in several states. A prominent New Yorker, Thomas Eddy, modeled the Newgate Jail in New York City after the Walnut Street Jail, and Massachusetts, Maryland, and New Jersey built similar jails. Although sheriffs in the new states would stage an occasional public hanging, a definite preference for sentencing convicted persons to serve time in jail began to gain acceptance.

Most experts considered the Walnut Street Jail to be the first penitentiary in the United States because it was used to house convicts who had lengthy sentences. In the early 1800s more prisons were constructed in Pittsburg (Western Penitentiary), Philadelphia (Eastern Penitentiary), and Auburn (New York State Prison). Under the Auburn system the inmates lived in solitary confinement but worked together in workshops, although they were not allowed to talk to each other. In the Pennsylvania system, the prisoners lived and worked in solitary confinement. Eventually the Auburn system became the model for prisons throughout the country, and the jails were used only for pretrial individuals and those serving short sentences.

Types of Prison Structure



Floor plan of early prisons.

What were these nineteenth century jails like? A man who inspected New York's Whitesboro Jail in 1839 was repulsed by the smell and called it a "wretched old jail." The jail held an average of 23 prisoners in its three rooms at a time, with about 400 inmates passing through its doors each year, although at one point during the year 41 prisoners were crowded into the three cells. Female prisoners, housed separately from the men, got the best cell. The cells weren't comfortable, according to the inspector: they were about 15 feet square, with two small windows. "The rooms were filthy in the extreme," he wrote, and "beds - what there are - are on the floor."

These jails housed misdemeanants, felons, alcoholics, the mentally ill, and children, although some of the inmates were eventually transferred to insane asylums, orphanages, reformatories, and penitentiaries. Near the end of the century, male and female prisoners were segregated, but most jails did not employ women as matrons. Occasionally, a jailor's wife acted as a supervisor.

Jails In The Twentieth Century

Prison reform efforts of the nineteenth century did nothing for the jails, as the Illinois State Charities Commission explained in its First Annual Report in 1910: "Waste, extravagance, inhumanity, inefficiency, neglect, indifference, and petty partisan and factional politics are making gains of unfortunates; *the jails are schools of crime*...these (conditions) were found in 1870 by the State Board of Charity, and they were found (again) in 1910 by the State Charities Commission."

By the 1930s little had changed. A national study of jails and lock-ups by H. H. Hart found nine major defects in the nation's 11,000 local places of incarceration. Hart described firetrap jails and lockups where prisoners had been cremated. Many buildings he visited were old, unsanitary, and lacked proper lighting, heating, ventilation, and plumbing.

There were few attempts made to segregate women, witnesses, and young people. Cruel and unusual punishment, sometimes torture, was inflicted upon people being held for trial. According to Hart, inmates frequently slept on bunks without mattresses or blankets.

In the 1970s the lawsuits which had been successfully started in the 1960s and won by inmates in the nation's penitentiaries began to impact upon the jails. These issues concerned matters such as adequate health, diet, right to practice religion, right to communicate with legal counsel and family, right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to fresh air and exercise. The courts intervened so many times on behalf of incarcerated people that the elected officials recognized a national jail crisis and two *National Assemblies* on the Jail Crisis were held in 1977 and 1978. Professional bodies such as the National Sheriffs' Association, the American Bar Association, the American Medical Association, the American Correctional Association, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the National Commission on Accreditation for Corrections began working together to develop and publish national jail standards. The National Institute of Corrections, a small governmental agency, began to supplement the meager training offered by the states and counties for correctional officers who work in the nation's jails.


The keynote speaker at the 1977 National Assembly on the Jail Crisis pointed out that, next to the police, the nation's jails deal with the largest number of people who come into contact with the criminal justice system. Logically, then, it follows that jails should receive a large share of criminal justice resources to work out solutions to their problems and improve conditions for inmates, but this has not happened. The speaker noted that because few people actually are concerned about the jail or will assume responsibility for its operation, the problems eventually will need to be resolved by the courts. Courts, however, are only equipped to handle the most severe and immediate problems, such as overcrowding or lack of medical care. Thus, the problems facing the nation's jails today involve those who come into the system, the development of good alternatives to placing so many people in jail, and the need for dramatic changes in the public's attitudes about who should be jailed.

One of the major challenges faced by public officials for the remainder of the twentieth century is to convince the general public that it must accept the responsibility for this nation's jails and assume the task of momentous change after 200 years of neglect.

JAILS IN THE 1980s


In the 1970s the number of persons being held in the nation's jails began to increase significantly. By 1978, more than 158,000 people were in jail, a 12 percent increase over the 1972 total of 141,600, according to a

survey conducted by the U.S. Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The jails generally held persons awaiting trial and those serving sentences primarily for misdemeanor convictions. Prison overcrowding also prompted some states to hold in jails persons who were convicted of more serious crimes.



These inmates were being held in 3,493 jails in 1978 - down from 3,921 jails in 1972. The LEAA survey showed this profile of the inmates:

The vast majority were young men in their twenties. Three of five had not completed high school, and 43 percent were jobless prior to admission. The median income was \$3,255 per inmate during the year prior to arrest. One in four had a record of military service, most during the Vietnam era. Sixteen percent were regular heroin users, while 10 percent had used heroin occasionally. Approximately one in five unconvicted inmates did not have a lawyer. Eighty-two percent of those who had counsel were represented by court-appointed lawyers, public defenders, or legal aid attorneys. About three-fourths of the convicted inmates entered guilty pleas, of which three of every 10 agreed to plead guilty after plea bargaining. Four of every 10 inmates were being held awaiting trial. Of the unconvicted, four of five, or a third of all jail inmates, were in jail even though the courts had set bail.



INMATE STATISTICS
Average Age 20's

What do these statistics mean to the jail officer of the 1980s? The statistics show that jails are more and more being recognized as a vital component of the criminal justice system. Jails can no longer be ignored. The 1980s are showing that there is a strong trend in the United States to improve conditions in the jails, both for the inmates and jail officers. Courts have begun acting out of necessity to require jails to adhere to the safeguards provided to all citizens by the Constitution.

At the same time, judges, police officers, district attorneys, and corrections officials are recognizing that jail officers are professionals *equal* in status and importance to themselves in the effective administration of justice. The days when jail officers were treated as "unequal partners" in the criminal justice system are rapidly diminishing.

But along with professional recognition, jail officers today also realize that they must assume more professional responsibilities. For the first time in the nation's history, emphasis is being placed upon rehabilitating jail inmates and helping them return to society as law-abiding citizens. As a professional, the jail officer has a responsibility to help an inmate build up his self-esteem, especially an inmate who is behind bars for the first time, when the jail experience can be most frightening.

Along with the new and hard-won recognition as full-fledged criminal justice professionals, jail officers are also being rewarded for *improving their skills*. Cities and counties throughout the nation are making steady progress in upgrading salaries, and officers are being provided with *many training and educational opportunities to develop expertise in specialized*

areas. Some jurisdictions are now giving jail officers incentive pay because administrators feel that officers who work inside the jail hold more important positions than road deputies; they base this decision on the fact that jail officers have to know how to deal effectively with complex human behavior problems. As a former police administrator commented: "If I had been given an opportunity to work in the jail *before* I became a patrol officer, I would have been a much better officer because of the understanding I would have gained in the jail about human behavior."

Jails are no longer looked upon as a place where a road deputy "serves his penance." The new rule is: If an officer can't work well in the jail, then he can't work as effectively on the street because he doesn't know how to deal with the complex problems people have. Working inside the jail tests an officer's ability to cope with tense situations, and administrators are now recognizing this.

Despite these significant advances, there are still many problems in the jails that have to be overcome. These problems result from inequities in the other components of the criminal justice and social welfare systems. Many jurisdictions do not attempt to find proper assistance for society's problem people - vagrants and alcoholics - and police officers have no place to take these people except the jail. Added to the problem of providing housing for society's outcasts is the problem of overcrowding in the prisons: because of a lack of cell space in the prisons, inmates who have received sentences must often be detained for lengthy periods in local jails.



Jail officers have to know how to deal effectively with complex human behavior problems.

These problems, however, are being remedied bit by bit. More money is being made available by state and local governments for new jail facilities and for renovations of outdated facilities. Money is also being given to the jails for inmate rehabilitation programs and to establish such services as detoxification centers.

With these improvements, jail officers today can be proud of their chosen profession. The jail officer of the 1980s is a true professional who is providing a much needed service to society.

SUMMARY

1. Despite a long history of being ignored by state and local governments, jails are now being recognized as vital components of the nation's criminal justice systems.

The days when jail officers were treated as "unequal partners" in the criminal justice systems of the United States are rapidly disappearing. Judges, police officers, district attorneys, and corrections officials are recognizing that jail officers are professionals equal in status and importance to themselves in the effective administration of justice. But along with professional recognition, jail officers also are realizing that they must assume more professional responsibilities. As professionals, jail officers have a responsibility to help inmates return to society as law-abiding citizens.

2. Even though there was significant progress made in the 1970s to improve the nation's jails, there are still many problems which need to be overcome.

There has been a strong trend in recent years to improve conditions in the nation's jails, despite a long history of neglect. However, the number of inmates being held in jails continues to increase significantly and, because conditions in many jails where these inmates are detained remain poor, the courts are beginning to intervene to force the public to assume responsibility for the improvement of jails. The problems facing jails today involve such basic issues as overcrowding and poor medical care. Although these problems are being remedied bit by bit in many jurisdictions, there is still a long way to go before American jails meet recommended national standards.

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CHAPTER TWO

LEGAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE CORRECTIONS ENVIRONMENT

Legal rights and responsibilities are determined by the laws of the jurisdiction involved, and these differ from state to state. The contents of this chapter refer to rights and responsibilities generally applicable in most states. A jail officer having responsibilities in a corrective system should comply with the rules and regulations of his own institution, recognizing that they are based upon the applicable laws of his jurisdiction.

The daily work of a jail officer is, in many ways, closely tied to the actions, decisions, and responsibilities of many other people in the criminal justice system: attorneys, police, probation officers, and - of special importance - judges. Contact between the jail officer and inmates is a crucial part of a long and complex process by which society attempts to deal responsibly with persons who have allegedly or actually offended some behavioral standard of conduct established by the criminal ordinances and laws of local jurisdictions, states, and the Federal Government.

Thus, it is particularly important for jail officers to understand that courts no longer take a "hands off" approach to the small details of daily jail operations and procedures. The "hands off" attitude which prevailed for so long simply meant that inmates who believed their legal rights had been violated by jail procedures, or by jail officials, could expect very little help from the courts. The basic attitude of the courts was that jail officers and administrators were more competent to deal with the complex problems of running a jail than judges were. Because of this attitude, inmates who did succeed in getting their complaints before a court of law generally did not win. The courts consistently would defer to the judgment and expertise of jail officials, and would almost universally conclude that the contested behavior of the jail officers had been proper. Until the 1960s there was very little of what is now called the "law of corrections."

But this is no longer true. A jail officer can no longer assume that the courts will leave him alone, or that he and his superiors will

not be defendants in a lawsuit. This does not mean that inmates are always right when they claim that their legal rights have been violated; nor does it mean the jail officer is always wrong when such claims are made. It does not mean that the jail officer must compromise himself when he assumes daily responsibility for the security, order, and well-being of an entire jail community.

All this change of attitude really means is that the courts will no longer stand aside and be uninvolved in the problems faced by inmates and jail officers. Courts are now concerned not only about the rights and responsibilities of the inmate, but also with those of the jail officer and other professionals working in the jail, such as psychologists, teachers, and counselors. From the standpoint of the jail officer, this change from a former court policy of non-involvement to a present policy of involvement and concern about the jails should be a welcome change. An awareness of *everyone's* rights and responsibilities, coupled with the involvement of the courts, will make the jail officer's daily work easier and much more productive.

The courts have now defined the role of the jail officer: his job is to maintain order and security in a community of non-law-abiding citizens by treating them lawfully. If the jail officer follows these guidelines, the likelihood of lawsuits originating in his jail facility will decrease. Why? The answer to this question is based upon common sense. When a jail officer demonstrates hourly and daily that he respects inmates' rights, then these actions will generate and strengthen the inmates' respect for the officer's rights, and for the whole legal process which holds our society together.

SOURCES OF CORRECTIONS LAW

Jail officers would find it difficult, if not impossible, to learn the exact details of *all* the laws that affect, influence, and control their daily work. But it is important to know that these laws originate from several sources - local, state, and federal lawmaking bodies (legislatures) which derive their lawmaking powers from state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution.

State constitutions normally provide for a state department of corrections through "enabling" statutes. The authority given to a state correctional agency includes the power to make rules for the governing of inmate behavior in the correctional facilities of that state or rules relating to local facility inspections. Because the authority behind these rules is found both in the state constitution and in acts of the state legislature, the rules become part of the law itself, administered by state or local agencies. Similarly, there are federal agencies created to administer and interpret laws passed by the U.S. Congress. Thus, state and federal correctional agencies have deep

roots in constitutional and statutory provisions, which explain why correctional agency rules and regulations are equally as important to the jail officer as the laws or statutes passed by a legislative body.

The courts are another source of the laws governing the daily work of jail officers. If, for example, an inmate loses a case in a trial court, he can appeal that case all the way through the state or federal court systems. If a higher court of appeals reverses the judgment of a lower trial court, declaring in the inmate's favor, the higher court will give its written reasons (its opinion) for the reversal. In so doing, the appeals court will probably make a rule or "holding" which could influence judges in the future in that jurisdiction. This means that judges in future cases may follow the former rule when inmates make claims arising from similar circumstances. It works like this: if an inmate in a correctional facility sues a jail officer, his superiors, or the department of corrections for an alleged violation of rights, that inmate's attorney will argue that the rule an appeals court applied to some other inmate's *similar* situation is the applicable law in this inmate's situation. If the facts in this inmate's case are found to be sufficiently similar to the facts in a former case in which an appeals court made a rule, that former courtmade rule *may* be applied to the present situation with all the force of law, unless it offends some higher applicable law or violates a constitutional right.

There is a final important source of influence on correctional law which affects jail officers: new standards being developed and applied to jails and prisons. Many governmental and nongovernmental agencies and institutions do not make binding "laws" such as those described earlier. But several agencies, including the National Sheriffs' Association, the National Institute of Corrections, the American Bar Association, the American Correctional Association, the Boston University Center for Criminal Justice, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, and the National Commission of Accreditation in Corrections are conducting on-going in-depth studies of the entire criminal justice system. They have been adopting general principles and detailed guidelines - "standards" - which deal with the most minor details of operating procedures in correctional facilities. These standards are minimum requirements which their creators believe should be applied in the daily operating procedures and policies of correctional facilities.

Although these carefully written standards are not law, they are frequently relied upon by judges making decisions, inmates litigating claims, and correctional administrators and governmental investigators who are seeking to make jail and prison facilities and procedures conform to minimal requirements of the law. Therefore, it is extremely important for jail officers to know, generally, what these standards demand. The most decisive standards will be described later in this chapter.

LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE AND MISCONDUCT BY JAIL OFFICERS

A jail officer can be held liable for certain situations or conduct resulting from the performance of his duties or the exercise of his authority. This liability does not extend, however, to one major type of lawsuit brought by inmates - that in which inmates seek in an appeals court to have their trial convictions reversed. These appeals do not reargue the facts of a case, but instead rely on a different interpretation of the law. Although a jail officer will not be directly involved in this type of legal action, he will have in his custody inmates who are in the process of appealing their earlier convictions. Thus, it is helpful for the jail officer to know the basic dimensions of the legal process such inmates are employing. Knowledge of those dimensions should help the officer suspend any quick or superficial personal judgments he may be inclined to make about such inmates; some of these inmates will have their convictions reversed on appeal. That high probability alone can help a jail officer develop a deep and practical insight into the nature and the meaning of the law, especially the law of corrections: namely, the law of corrections is not rigid and inflexible, but rather alive, growing, changing, developing, and always subject to more than one interpretation when applied to a particular factual situation.

Another important type of corrections lawsuit in which a jail officer may be only indirectly involved is that in which an inmate or a group of inmates challenge the conditions (policies) of their confinement in a correctional facility. In such a case the state will need for its defense the testimony of administrators within the facility. Although it is most likely that the administrators will be called to testify, line officers sometimes are summoned as witnesses. When this occurs, the jail officer will be advised by attorneys for the city, county, or state about such matters as making depositions and giving testimony at trial.

The third general type of correctional lawsuit does directly affect jail officers. This action involves a challenge to an officer's conduct in which the inmate charges that the officer is violating one of his rights protected by the U.S. Constitution, by a state constitution, or by some applicable statute or regulation. For example, the correctional authority for which an officer works, and the officer as its employee, could be sued even in a situation in which the officer's role was passive and inactive. If one inmate injures another and the injured person could prove that the jail officer knew or should have known that the injury would occur, that the officer was negligent in failing to prevent the injury, and that the injury occurred because of the officer's negligence, both the officer and his department could be held liable. The constitutions, statutes, and regulations which undergird custodial authority in the jail also make jail administrators and officers responsible for the safety of inmates.

Another increasingly common way in which a jail officer might become the defendant in an inmate's lawsuit is through what lawyers call a "1983 action." Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides remedies for persons who believe their federal constitutional rights have been violated by someone acting under "color of law." The relief that can be granted to an inmate who sues under Section 1983 can be either a court order to do something or to cease doing something, or money damages to be paid by the officer or by the government, or both.

The Jail Officer's Best Defense

Because no jail officer wants to be the defendant in a legal action initiated by an inmate, the question naturally arises: What can the officer do, day in and day out, to protect himself, in advance, against any such unwanted litigation?

The answer to that key question, from a legal standpoint, is very complex. But from a practical standpoint, there are two very helpful answers, both of which the officer can use daily. They are:

- (1) Always act in accordance with what the law calls "good faith."
- (2) Keep good records.

Acting consistently in "good faith" is crucial to a jail officer's interests, not only because so doing will help him treat inmates fairly, responsibly, and lawfully, but also because the presence or the absence of an officer's "good faith" in a given situation may determine his eligibility for indemnification (payment by the government of any judgment against the officer for money damages).

Exactly what is "good faith" conduct on the part of the jail officer? Generally, officers are acting in "good faith" if they *reasonably* believe that their conduct in a given situation is lawful. But how can "good faith" - so vaguely defined - be proved? Objective evidence of an officer's "good faith" might be his relying on a statute, an employer's order, a court decision with which he is familiar, the advice of an attorney, or working under the guidelines of "standard operating procedure."

Such evidence may not be available to the jail officer, however, when an inmate's claim against him is being considered by a court. There are many crises in which the officer may need to act immediately, if not instinctively, in order to avoid further trouble within the jail. At such times, the officer may find himself in the middle of a controversy with an inmate, or with a group of inmates, and be in real doubt as to whether a course of action he is about to take is lawful. The presence of *any doubt* should forewarn the officer, by the legal doctrine of "good faith," to shift gears, right then and there in the


middle of the crisis. The officer should solve the problem or handle the crisis in an alternative manner where the legality of his action is not in question.

"Good faith" actions can frequently be understood in terms of their opposites, that is, "bad faith" actions. In various court opinions, statutes, and regulations, types of behavior by jail officers that lack "good faith" have been understood to include those that are willfully or wantonly cruel, or grossly negligent. Also in "bad faith" are any actions suggesting the officer's involvement in malice, fraud, corruption, or any act that shocks the conscience or violates generally accepted notions of fundamental fairness. Any conduct that could be interpreted by a court as being in "bad faith" could become the source of an officer's liability in a lawsuit, or of his ineligibility for government help in paying any money judgment rendered against him.

Therefore, rule number one for an officer's daily work is to treat inmates with the same care, concern, and fairness the officer would want to receive himself if he were an inmate. If the jail officer follows this guideline, he will probably be satisfying the requirement of "good faith" conduct as it is legally understood. In doing so, the officer will protect his own interests, as well as those of the inmates.

Another basic habit every jail officer should form is that of keeping good records. Careful records should be made of all events in the jail which might possibly become the subject of an inmate's claim that individual rights had been violated by an officer or by some jail procedure or rule directly or indirectly administered by the officer. Virtually every decision the officer makes - about housing and classification procedures, transfers, academic assignments, vocational assignments, and especially about disciplinary matters - should be written down as soon as possible after the event in a clear, concise, factual report. For it is then, when the episode is fresh in the officer's mind, that he can produce the most thorough record of the event. Later on, if the reported episode becomes the subject of controversy or litigation, the written report will be of great value to the officer, his superiors, and attorneys in reconstructing what actually happened. Courts require this kind of recordkeeping as essential to the demands of due process, and judges now will generally hold that due process requirements have not been met if such records are not available.

A major point to bear in mind is that courts take this position, and make these demands, not only to protect the rights of inmates, but also to protect the rights of officers and help officers defend themselves against unwarranted inmate claims of injury. Even if such recordkeeping is impossibly demanding of an officer's time, and even if it is not a high priority item in the minds of his superiors, he should, in his own behalf, make it one of his *personal* high priorities. In the end, the time the officer takes to make accurate reports of all incidents will be very wisely spent, and will become one of his best investments.



Careful records should be made of all events in the jail.

All that has been suggested about "good faith" conduct and good recordkeeping really means that a jail officer should work daily in accordance with the basic principles of good common sense. Although some of the legal questions involved can be very complex, and the answers various authorities give to those questions are contradictory, confusing, and very difficult to think about in a clear way, this "fact of life" should not trouble the officer or weaken his desire to perform his daily work responsibly. All he needs to remember is to use common sense.

LEGAL RIGHTS OF INMATES

There was a time when inmates in a correctional facility were considered to have very few legal rights, or none at all. But now courts, legislatures, and corrections agencies generally recognize that inmates carry with them through the gates of a jail or prison the basic constitutional and civil rights of free citizens, and that those rights can be restricted by government only to the degree that security, order, discipline, and safety within the facility require their restriction.

But exactly what are those rights? Courts, legislatures, corrections agency officials, and many nongovernmental groups spend tens of thousands of hours each year trying to answer that question. And there are, as a result, vast libraries of material on that one subject. But

it is not necessary to understand all this material to be a competent, responsible jail officer. What the jail officer can and should do is to become aware of the general areas included in the sweeping phrase "inmates' rights." These areas include: rights cited in the First Amendment (freedom of religion, speech, and press); access to courts, attorneys, and legal materials; correspondence and visitation rights; privacy; rehabilitation and work programs; classification procedures; disciplinary procedures; and the conditions of confinement. (Inmates also have a right to medical treatment and proper health conditions, which will be discussed in a separate chapter.)

First Amendment Rights

Freedom of Religion. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of religion. This right to believe and to practice religion belongs to inmates. The right to *practice* a religion can be restricted by the rules and regulations of a correctional institution only if justified by one or more of the court-recognized purposes of the penal system, such as institutional security or order. Correctional institutions are not allowed to impose restrictions upon an inmate's religious *beliefs*.

Following the guidelines of many court cases, the rules and regulations governing a jail facility will recognize the rights of the inmates to assemble for religious services, consult and correspond with clergymen for religious purposes, receive religious literature, wear religious emblems, and observe the dietary laws of particular religious groups. These protections extend not only to the traditionally recognized religious groups, such as Jews, Muslims, Roman Catholics, and Protestants, but also to new, unorthodox, and nontraditional sects. If freedom of religion were not so expanded to include all religious groups, there would be a valid claim on the part of newer groups that they were being denied the "equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the Constitution.

Freedom of Speech. In the community outside of jail or prison, citizens have a constitutionally protected right to free speech, which means that they can say anything that does not immediately threaten public order. Inside a correctional facility inmates also have the right to free speech, which can be restricted by jail officials only when, considering all the circumstances, restrictions on inmate "expression" are "reasonable," or "rationally related" to a valid institutional interest, or required by some "compelling" institutional need for security. These "tests" established by courts are reflected in the rules and regulations of every jail, although general guidelines should be provided to officers by their supervisors. But it is the line officer who will most often be immediately responsible for implementing the rules and interpreting the guidelines. Therefore, he should be constantly aware that courts may be inclined, in the future, to expand the free speech rights of inmates rather than to restrict

them. If this expansion occurs, the officer's job will become increasingly difficult, for free speech issues are already highly controversial ones among inmate populations. It is predictable that such issues will not become less sensitive in the future - a probability that will create increasingly heavy demands on the officer's emotional maturity and on his careful exercise of discretion in dealing with free speech problems.

Freedom of the Press. The First Amendment right of a free press can also be asserted by inmates, as well as by the media. In many circumstances this right will be upheld by the courts. For example, inmates generally have a right to receive printed matter unless officials and administrators in the jail can show a compelling reason why they should not receive it. Such reasons might be that distribution of the material would create a clear danger to the maintenance of order or security, or would threaten the administrative or rehabilitation programs of the facility. If the authorities exclude a particular publication, the courts may require that inmates be permitted to see the allegedly offensive or disruptive material.

Some courts have said that inmates also have a right to publish materials for distribution within the jail or prison. Moreover, the content of such publications may include criticism of jail procedures and personnel. The officials in a jail may require prior approval for the distribution of an inmate newspaper, but they may not withhold an issue from distribution, or censor its content, without showing that the paper would, if distributed, create a clear threat to security, order, or rehabilitation.

Inmates' access to journalists, in the sense of direct interviews, can be restricted on the grounds of creating a threat to institutional security. Such interviews may help certain inmate leaders abuse their power in the jail community. But the jail officer should remember that courts are now concerned about protecting not only the First Amendment rights of inmates but also the right of the public to know about the facts of life inside jails and prisons. Therefore, when restrictions are placed on media interviews of inmates, courts will generally rule that the restrictions are valid only if alternative lines of communication are kept open, such as correspondence between reporters and inmates. With certain restrictions, reporters have a right to tour jail facilities and to ask questions of inmates. These tours are subject to reasonable regulation by the jail administrator, following the properly promulgated rules concerning visitation.

Access To Courts, Attorneys, And Legal Materials

Inmates have legally protected rights of access to courts, attorneys, and legal materials. A jail officer may not prevent an inmate from seeking judicial relief for his complaints. The rules and regulations

of each jail should spell out what this restriction means in specific situations.

Generally, jail officers may not use inspection of inmates' outgoing mail to attorneys to slow down or delay the inmates' efforts to seek legal help. Nor can a jail officer punish inmates for asserting their legal rights of access to judicial process. Inmates also have the right to be visited by their attorneys of record in the jail, subject only to reasonable regulations concerning the time and length of the visits. Inmates may also be visited by representatives of organizations that provide legal assistance and by law students and investigators working for their attorneys of record.

Often there will not be enough attorneys available to inmates in an institution to meet inmate needs. When this happens, the inmates have a *limited* legal right to seek help by consulting "jailhouse lawyers," that is, fellow inmates who have some degree of specialized legal knowledge and who are able to assist with the preparation of legal documents and provide certain legal reference books for the use of inmates so that they can research their own problems and find out what their rights really are. Some of the "standards" mentioned earlier provide titles of legal books that must be made available to inmates. In general, the jail officer should attempt to help inmates with all matters pertaining to their rights of access to courts, attorneys, and law books by being sure that the access rules in his institution are understood by the inmates and used by them to the greatest degree possible.

Correspondence And Visitation

All inmates are concerned about their rights with respect to mail. Outgoing letters should ordinarily not be opened or read, nor should there be unreasonable limitations on the number of letters an inmate writes or on the identity of persons receiving them. Inspection of incoming mail, even if it does not improperly restrict the inmate's rights, has been held to be an impermissible limitation of the First Amendment rights of the persons on the outside who send the mail to the inmate. A jail officer should not open letters that the inmate receives from his attorney. However, incoming mail may be inspected for contraband.

Inmates have clearly established legal rights to be visited by friends, family, attorneys of record, ministers, and public officials. These rights are, of course, subject to the limitations of a reasonable jail schedule and other legitimate institutional requirements. Jail administrators have the right to regulate the time and number of such visits and a corresponding duty to minimize the inmate's felt isolation by facilitating as many visits as can be reasonably scheduled. With respect to visitation rights, inmates must be treated equally: visitation rules must be uniformly applied because evenness of application is

guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection of the laws. But beyond the purely legal right to visitation, the inmate also has what may be an even deeper "human" right. Direct communication with family, friends, and others from the world outside the jail is one of the inmate's best ways of valuing and, ultimately, of reentering the world outside as a responsible citizen.

Privacy

The right to refuse treatment is rooted not only in what the courts call due process and a generally understood constitutional right of "privacy," but also in the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures. Clearly, jail officials have the right to search the cells of inmates, and also their persons, when the search is conducted in accordance with reasonable and fair regulations, or occurs under emergency circumstances. But the jail officer should always remember that a search which is clearly abusive, or is unrelated to any clear need for institutional security, could become the source of his being found liable in a lawsuit brought by an inmate in his custody.

Rehabilitation And Work Programs

Closely related to inmates' rights arising in the context of classification procedures are those rights of inmates to participate in the rehabilitative programs of correctional facilities. Many states have laws that identify the rehabilitation of the inmate as a primary purpose of the corrections system, along with security and order. On the basis of these state laws, some courts have upheld an inmate's right to rehabilitation, although such a right has not yet been affirmed as being grounded in the Constitution.

The U.S. Supreme Court has established the right of involuntarily committed patients in mental hospitals to have medical treatment. Inmates now use this analogy to argue before the courts that "treatment" through participation in programs of rehabilitation is not a mere privilege, but a legal right. Some courts have held that the absence of such programs is an important factor in determining whether confinement in a particular facility amounts to the cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.

Because rehabilitation and work programs of any kind may seem to be a privilege offered to inmates, the jail officer should realize that inmates do not necessarily feel the same way about these programs. In a growing number of cases, inmates are asserting - not only on Eighth Amendment grounds - their right to refuse treatment; some inmates are now arguing that they have a right *not* to participate in institutional programs intended for their benefit. And some courts have upheld these claims when the programs themselves, in actual administration, have

been found to be inherently cruel, or unduly destructive of the inmate's fundamental right to be left alone.

A jail officer should do all he can to help inmates participate in the programs available in his facility. But he should not forget that there is an emerging recognition of inmates' rights to refuse treatment in certain situations. This is particularly applicable when detained, but not convicted, inmates are involved.

Classification Procedures

Classification procedures - decisions made about housing assignments, work assignments, program assignments, and treatment recommendations - are another important source of complaints from inmates who say their legal rights have been violated. Inmates express deep concern about these procedures for two very understandable reasons:

- (1) In the past, classification decisions have often been used as punishment rather than to insure the best use of the facility's programs.
- (2) Many vital aspects of the inmate's whole future - the amount of "good time" earned, the date of parole, personal safety while incarcerated, and the kind of job available upon release from jail - are significantly dependent on how that inmate is "classified."

Because so much is at stake in the making of classification decisions, courts are increasingly inclined to require that jails deal with classification problems through procedures that are fair and are based on adequate facts, and that give inmates an opportunity to request reclassification at a properly conducted hearing, with the exception of inmates who are high security risks.

Disciplinary Procedures

Although the jail officer must be familiar with all the general approaches through which inmates can assert their rights, perhaps no other approach is more decisive, for the officer, than "disciplinary procedures." Both the officer and the inmates are dealing with such procedures day in and day out.

It is imperative that every jail has rules of conduct for inmates, and that officers have the authority to enforce them in return. Inmates who violate the rules must be subject to appropriate punishment. If these provisions were not made, order and security within jails would break down, and those persons in charge would have failed to carry out their responsibilities. For example, a jail officer has the right to use reasonable force to stop a disturbance if, in his best

judgment, property or lives (including his own life) are in danger. But he will be violating an inmate's right if he uses corporal punishment to deal with a specific act, as distinguished from the use of reasonable force to maintain order and security. Force used in any kind of vindictive retaliation for a specific act by an inmate would be a violation of that inmate's right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Or, depending on the nature of the officer's act, its provocation, and the attending circumstances, the use of force could be a violation of the inmate's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.

Whenever any disciplinary action is taken against inmates, such as depriving them of privileges, placing them in isolation, causing them to lose "good time," or changing their status, the officer should understand that jail administrators do have the legal right to impose such disciplinary measures. But the inmates also have a corresponding right, under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to insist that no such disciplinary actions may be imposed on them arbitrarily. This means that courts are concerned not only with the punishments meted out by those in control of jails, but also with the manner in which disciplinary restrictions and penalties are imposed. That is why the jail officer must constantly be concerned with proper procedures.

Over the years the courts have steadily expanded the meaning, the content, and the scope of procedures required by due process. For example, when inmates are threatened with loss of "good time," or with punitive segregation, "due process" now means that they have a legally enforceable right to written notices informing them of the precise charges made against them, the right to hearings where they can answer those charges, sometimes the right to present witnesses and documentary evidence on their own behalf, and the right to written statements of the facts that gave rise to the charges, as well as explanations of the reasons for the disciplinary restrictions already placed on them. Such rights are all included in an inmate's "due process" interests, and should serve to remind the jail officer that it is not only what he does but also how he does it that will validate or invalidate the claims of the inmate. An individual's constitutionally protected rights are not taken away just because that person is an inmate. Those rights prevail, even though the inmate has been accused of violating, or has actually violated, a disciplinary rule.

The jail officer is a vital link in the criminal justice system and his relationship with the rest of the process is a function of the law as it comes to him through multiple sources. His job as caretaker of inmates is defined by the law and gross deviation from good correctional practice will force examination of the officer's behavior in a court of law. Therefore, all jail officers should be conscious of and sensitive to the regulations, cases, and statutes that contain the legal norms they are pledged to uphold. When in doubt, good common sense and

reflection will usually suggest the approach warranting the "good faith" label.

SUMMARY

1. A jail officer should work daily in accordance with the basic principles of good common sense.

Courts are taking a more active role in the administration of jails. Officers should make decisions regarding their treatment of inmates using common sense and relying upon "good faith" - taking actions which the officer believes are lawful. In addition, the officer should keep detailed records about all decisions he makes regarding an inmate.

2. Being sent to jail does not mean that an inmate loses the basic constitutional and civil rights of a free citizen.

The courts have upheld that inmates have the constitutional rights of free speech; freedom of religion; freedom of the press; the right to have access to courts, attorneys, and legal materials; correspondence and visitation rights; privacy rights; some rights to rehabilitation; and the right to due process of law. Officers and jail administrators who violate inmate rights are liable unless they can prove that the right was violated because the security of the jail was threatened and that they acted in "good faith."

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER THREE

LITIGATION PROCEDURE

The professional jail officer of today is directly involved in many of the procedures a defendant goes through and may himself have a significant impact on the outcome of the criminal justice process. Thus it is important that he understand the mechanics of the system.

This chapter sets forth a typical series of events involved in the detection and prosecution of a crime. It must be clearly understood that these events vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on the laws and procedures of individual states. Reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which a criminal violation took place or in which an arrest is made is required to establish the applicable procedures.

Criminal procedure in American courts is very diversified. While it differs greatly from contemporary English practice, much of it derives from English law, and there remain important fundamental similarities to the English system.

CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND COMMON LAW

American law is complex, based on three major branches, or "bodies of law." These are:

- (1) *Constitutional law*--the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the various individual states.
- (2) *Statutory law*--specific laws, or "statutes" enacted by the Congress or the state legislatures pursuant to the provisions of the federal or state constitutions. It is the violation of these laws that subjects most criminal defendants to prosecution.

- (3) *Common law, case law, or precedent*--mean the same thing--judge-made laws. This is the branch of law that is most similar to English law.

Constitutional law is necessarily broadly stated, and the statutes may have gaps or areas that are unclear or do not provide for all possible circumstances that might arise. For these reasons the courts undertake to interpret the law, both constitutional and statutory, and apply it as consistently as possible. In doing this they rely heavily on past decisions, or precedents.

As new cases are decided, they become precedents that evolve into general rules of application that combine to form the body of common law, or case law. An important example of this evolution of specific precedent into case law is the "exclusionary rule." In 1961 the United States Supreme Court ruled that: "whenever, during investigation, search, arrest, or interrogation, an officer breaches established procedures or in some other way violates a defendant's Constitutional rights, the evidence obtained thereby is 'excluded.' The prosecution is not allowed to make use of it in its attempt to convict the defendant."

ARREST

There are four sets of circumstances under which a law enforcement officer may make an arrest:

- (1) The offense is committed in the officer's presence. Having personal direct knowledge of the crime, he may make the arrest without first obtaining a warrant.
- (2) The officer has "reasonable cause" to believe that a felony has been committed and that the accused committed it. (NCIC "hits" are included in this category.) The officer may arrest the accused without a warrant.
- (3) The officer investigating a crime determines whom he reasonably believes committed it, and obtains a warrant to arrest from a justice of the peace or judge before making the arrest.
- (4) The officer is directed to arrest the accused on a warrant issued by a judicial officer and based upon a citizen's sworn complaint. He will be given the warrant when he is sent to make the arrest.

In all of the above circumstances there exists a large body of both statutory and common law on the subject of arrest. The important features of these laws are that they require that arrests without a warrant must be based on probable cause, that a crime was committed, and that the person arrested committed it. Also, for an arrest warrant to be issued, it must be based on probable cause.

Determination of probable cause for an arrest warrant is essentially the same as for a warrantless arrest; that is, the facts and circumstances known at the time would cause a reasonable man to believe that a crime was committed and that the accused committed it.

BOOKING

After the accused is arrested he is "booked" at the facility where he is to be detained. On completion of booking he is entitled to contact his attorney and to notify someone else of his choice that he has been arrested. He should be given all reasonable assistance in making these contacts.

The booking process includes making a record of the accused person's photograph, fingerprints, and name and a brief description of the offense for which he was arrested, plus the results of any search incidental to his arrest.

INITIAL APPEARANCE

The accused person is entitled by law to be brought before a judicial officer as soon as possible after his arrest, normally not later than overnight, holidays excepted. This "initial appearance" is for the purpose of informing him of the charges against him, of his right to a preliminary hearing, his right to be represented by counsel, and his right to remain silent if he so wishes. He normally enters no plea at the initial appearance.



The accused is entitled to a judicial hearing.

BAIL

If the accused is entitled to bail, it will be set at his initial appearance. Bail, which may be denied those accused of the most serious offenses, is designed to insure that the accused person appears at future proceedings against him. The seriousness of the offense, the accused person's record of appearance, and his ties with the community are all weighed in establishing the amount of his bail. He may be released on his own, or personal recognizance (merely his promise to appear) or on a cash bail or surety bond.

The accused has the option of posting the required cash amount with the clerk of the court or of paying a bonding company to post it for him. Bonding companies generally charge a fee of 10 percent of the bail amount to post a surety bond. The Federal Bail Reform Act allows an accused person in federal court to post only 10 percent of the bail amount directly with the court and thus avoid the bonding company's charges. This procedure has been copied by many states.

Bail schedules may be previously prepared by courts to permit release of accused persons by the arresting agency, or the bail amount may be designated on the arrest warrant by the issuing magistrate. Generally, the more serious the offense, the more likely the magistrate will be to make an individualized determination of bail. In any case, the bail is refunded after the accused person's court appearance and disposition of his case.

PRELIMINARY HEARING

The next step of the process is known as the "preliminary hearing." This may be held at the same time as the initial appearance, or, in the case of serious offenses, a few days later. A maximum of 10 days between these two appearances is allowed in federal courts. The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is "probable cause" to believe that the accused committed the crime with which he is charged.

Probable cause is not a finding of guilt; it is only a determination that a reasonable man, after examining the evidence offered by the prosecution, would believe that the accused committed the crime. This is a more liberal standard than the "reasonable doubt" test used in a trial, and if the prosecution meets this standard of probable cause, the accused will be bound over for trial.

The accused may waive the preliminary hearing, but it is to his benefit *not* to exercise this privilege. The preliminary hearing provides him with an opportunity to get an advance look at the evidence the prosecution intends to present against him at his trial.

INFORMATION AND INDICTMENT

The mechanics of the next step in American court proceedings varies among jurisdictions, but its purpose is the same in all. A formal charge must be presented to the trial court. This is accomplished in one of two ways.

Twenty states get formal charges before their criminal courts by use of a prosecutor's "information." This is a legal document, prepared by the prosecutor and filed with the court, which charges the accused with a crime or with several counts arising from the same criminal action. He is now formally charged as a defendant.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires submission of charges to a grand jury in all federal felony criminal prosecutions. The thirty other states also follow this procedure in their courts. A grand jury consists of from 13 to 23 jurors called together to hear charges and to consider evidence in support of those charges in order to determine whether there is probable cause to bind the accused over for trial.


All grand jury proceedings are secret, and generally the only parties present are the prosecutor, the grand jurors themselves, and the witness being questioned. The grand jury has broad investigative powers and may subpoena (command the presence of) witnesses. In its proceedings the grand jury may join defendants together and/or offenses and present one case for trial. Not required to reach a unanimous decision, the grand jury may indict by a majority of its members, as specified in each jurisdiction.

The formal grand jury charge against the accused is called an "indictment" or "true bill." It is *not* a finding of guilt, but is, rather, a determination of probable cause. If the grand jury does not find probable cause, the finding they return to the prosecutor is "no true bill."

In those jurisdictions that permit it, the grand jury may be used as an alternative to the preliminary hearing, and a grand jury indictment may be obtained prior to issuance of an arrest warrant and the actual arrest itself.

ARRAIGNMENT

Once the information or indictment is presented to the trial court, the court will conduct a brief and limited hearing called an "arraignment." The purpose of this stage of the proceeding is to present a copy of the information or indictment to the defendant and to receive his plea to the charges. The defendant is normally limited to a plea of guilty, not guilty (with variations in different jurisdictions), or *nolo contendere* (an agreement not to defend against the charges, but without an admission of guilt). These are the only pleas permitted by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Guilty and *nolo contendere* pleas are very frequently the result of "plea bargaining," where a defendant agrees to enter one of these pleas in return for eliminating some of the charges against him, or for reducing a single charge.



*Typical court room for Superior Court for
District of Columbia*

TRIAL

The stage is thus set for the actual criminal trial. Up to this point the law enforcement or corrections officer has been the prin-

cipal witness in the proceeding. His importance continues in the trial, and he will be subject to a concerted attack by the defense. The trial itself is separated into many separate steps. Before the trial actually begins, the defense will usually ask for pretrial hearings to discover or suppress evidence, testimony, or prior confessions or to try defendants separately. This step is the subject of considerable debate in the legal community, and is frequently a very complex and lengthy process. Once it is complete, the actual trial begins with the selection of a jury, unless the defendant waives his right to a jury trial. The trial court jury is known as a "petit" jury.

Jury selection is of great importance to both the prosecution and the defense, for each side attempts to include jurors who are philosophically inclined toward their respective arguments. Prospective jurors, called the *venire*, are questioned by the judge and/or by each attorney (a process known as *voir dire* examination). Attorneys may challenge, or dismiss, a venireman for cause, or merely because they feel the prospective juror might not be sympathetic to their case. This latter type of challenge is called a preemptory challenge. The attorney does not have to state a reason for his preemptory challenges. Such challenges are limited in number, depending on the severity of the charge against the defendant.

Once the jury is impaneled, the actual trial begins with opening statements by the prosecution and, usually, the defense. The prosecutor tells the jury what he intends to prove, and he may not include accusations that he does not intend to prove. The majority of jurisdictions hold that "jeopardy" attaches at this point and, should the trial be terminated by the prosecution prior to a verdict, the defendant may not be retried. The defense may make its statement at this time or wait until it presents its case. The burden of proving the elements of the crime alleged is on the prosecution, and it is for this reason that it proceeds first. At the conclusion of the government's case the defense will normally ask the court for a directed verdict (*demurrer*), alleging that the prosecution has failed in fulfilling its burden of proof. While this is not commonly granted, the case *could* end here in acquittal of the defendant.

The rules of evidence that guide the progress of the prosecutor's case are extensive, and suspected violations of the rules are characterized by the comment, "objection" made by either the prosecutor or the defense counsel during the trial. If the trial court judge agrees with the objection, he will "sustain" it, and if he does not agree that the actions of the opposing counsel are a violation of evidentiary rules, he will "over-rule" the objection.

The principal responsibility of the law enforcement or corrections officer during the conduct of the trial relates to his testimony as a witness. His first role is as a witness for the prosecution. The prosecutor's trial strategy is dictated by a vast body of law, and he is the best judge of what evidence is important to the development of the case, and what is superfluous or immaterial.

Once the prosecutor has concluded his "direct examination," the officer will be subject to "cross examination" by the attorney for the defense. The defense attorney will be attempting to do two things principally: develop any evidence which might be favorable to his client, and raise doubts about the accuracy or credibility of evidence damaging to his client's case.

After cross examination the prosecutor may have additional questions in a "re-direct examination," or the officer may be re-called at a later time for additional testimony.

When the prosecution has concluded its case, or "rested," the defense will have an opportunity to present its case. The defense never needs to prove the defendant is innocent, for he is presumed so until a verdict to the contrary is returned. The defense's aim is to attack the sufficiency or credibility of the evidence against the defendant and to demonstrate that there is "reasonable doubt" of his guilt.

After the defense has presented its case and after each side has been given the opportunity to present "rebuttal" evidence, the defense presents its "summation," or summary, to the jury, followed by the prosecution's summation. After this the trial court judge "charges" the jury. This is a layman's explanation of the law and guidance or "instruction" for the jury to use in reaching its verdict.

Jury deliberations are secret, and normally, although not always, their decision must be unanimous. If the defendant is convicted, or pleads guilty, and if, as in the majority of states, the judge imposes sentence, the court in more serious cases will ask for a pre-sentencing report. This report is a review of the defendant's personal, financial, and criminal history and is normally prepared by the court's probation officer. When the report is filed, the judge will hear arguments by the defense counsel and the defendant to minimize the sentence prior to imposing it.

SENTENCING, PROBATION, AND PAROLE

After hearing the pre-sentencing arguments, the judge has sev-

eral alternatives. He may suspend the sentence or even suspend the imposition of any sentence, provided the defendant maintains good behavior. He may place the defendant on probation requiring performance of certain obligations by the defendant and supervision by the court's probation officer. Or he may sentence the defendant to a term in either a jail, a reformatory, or a penitentiary.

After serving any minimum term imposed, the defendant would normally become eligible for parole. The decision to actually grant parole is generally made by the state parole board, based upon the defendant's record while in prison, and the parolee is supervised by a parole officer from that agency.

The distinguishing features of probation and parole are that probation is granted as a result of pre-conviction behavior, while parole is granted, in large measure, on post-conviction behavior.

Probation or parole is granted on a number of conditions and may be revoked if the probationer or parolee does not comply with his obligations to the agency and society. While revocation of probation or parole does not require a trial, it does require two separate hearings. The first is a preliminary probable cause hearing, and the second is a more substantive, adversary, evidentiary hearing. This second hearing is, however, much less formal than a trial. The principal witnesses will be the probation or parole officer, and the government's burden of proof is the lesser requirement of "preponderance of the evidence," or occasionally even less, instead of the "reasonable doubt" standard used at the trial.

APPEAL

If the defendant is convicted, he has the right to appeal his conviction to a higher court. The appeal will normally be to a state "appellate" court if the trial court was a state court, and to a United States Circuit Court of Appeals if the conviction was in a United States District Court. State courts are generally two-or three-level systems with trial in the district court and an appeal of right to the state supreme court in the two-level systems or to the state court of appeals in the three-level.

In the three-level system an appeal from the court of appeals to the supreme court is not an appeal of right, but rather a discretionary appeal, and the state and federal supreme courts will grant a "writ of *certiorari*" (agree to review a case) in only a small min-

ority of the cases appealed. If the Supreme Court refuses to review a case, the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals stands.

The names of the courts differ considerably depending on the state, but generally the process is as follows: If a defendant is convicted in the trial (district) court, he has an appeal or right to the state court of appeals (if one exists: if not, to the state's supreme court). If the appellate court's decision is adverse to the defendant, he may appeal to the state supreme court, but the decision to hear the appeal is discretionary with the state supreme court. If the defendant is unsuccessful in obtaining review, or unsuccessful after review, he may appeal to federal district court, alleging a "federal question" as the basis for jurisdiction by the federal courts.

If the defendant is unsuccessful in the federal district court, he may appeal to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (There are presently 11) and finally to the U. S. Supreme Court (where his chances for review are very slim).

If at any stage in this process the defendant is successful, the prosecution has the right to appeal to have the conviction reinstated. If the defendant was acquitted in the trial court, however, the prosecution will not normally appeal. If it does appeal, it will not obtain a new trial or reversal of the acquittal, for that would be a violation of the double jeopardy prohibitions of the Constitution. In the rare instances where the prosecution does appeal an acquittal, it is because it feels that the trial court has made a major error in interpreting the law, and it wants appellate court clarification for the sake of future prosecutions.

The convicted defendant may be free on bond while appealing his conviction, or he may be incarcerated. The jail officer needs to be sensitive to the inmate's constitutional rights as well as his practical need for reasonable access to counsel.

Appeals must be initiated within relatively short periods of time; otherwise the right is lost. Should the inmate fail to perfect his appeal within the time provided, his usual recourse is an application for a writ of *habeas corpus*. There are other possible writs a convicted defendant may seek, but *habeas corpus* is by far the most common vehicle used to go from the state to the federal court system. *Habeas corpus* relief may be applied for at any time, even years after conviction. The normal remedy obtained from a successful appeal or action for *habeas corpus* is a trial *de novo*, or new trial, rather than immediate release of the appellant.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OR JAIL OFFICER AS CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

Thus far we have considered the law enforcement or jail officer only in his court role as a witness in a criminal prosecution against a defendant. There also exists the possibility that the officer could himself become a criminal defendant in an action initiated as a result of alleged mistreatment of an individual he has arrested or supervised during incarceration.

The United States Code, 18 U. S. C. 242, provides criminal penalties for any person who "under color of state law" *willfully* subjects an inhabitant of the United States to a deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. This law is most often applied to law enforcement and/or corrections officers and takes the form of a criminal violation filed by a federal prosecutor.

The most important feature of this legislation for jail officers to remember is that the Supreme Court extends constitutional and statutory rights to include those more precisely defined by judicial decision, or the common law. Therefore, a reasonable understanding of constitutional law becomes even more important for the individual officer.

The officer's conduct must have been willful. That is, he must have had the "specific intent" to commit the crime with which he is charged. The court has expanded the definition of specific intent to include "irresponsible failure to act" when it is clear that someone else intends to violate a prisoner's civil rights, for example surrendering a prisoner to a mob.

A companion law, 18 U.S.C. 241, provides additional criminal penalties for officers who form a conspiracy to commit the kind of offenses described in Section 242.

The law enforcement or jail officer's most important defense to a prosecution under either or both of these statutes is to show that he acted in "good faith." That is, he did not willfully violate anyone's civil or constitutional rights, and he acted in good faith reliance on the statutes, regulations, and orders of his superiors, not out of any bias, malice, personal interest, or other unlawful motive. These criminal statutes are normally applied in only the most serious circumstances.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OR JAIL OFFICER AS CIVIL DEFENDANT

A much more common legal action directed against a law enforcement or corrections officer is a suit at civil law. Title 42 of the U. S. Code, section 1983, provides civil liability for any person who "under color of law" deprives someone of his constitutional or statutory rights.

This is companion legislation to those criminal statutes described above, and the most significant difference as far as the jail officer is concerned is that Section 1983 does not require a specific intent to deprive someone of his rights. Furthermore, the officer and his agency may be liable even if his actions are "in the line of duty," if he acts in excess of his legal authority.

The officer may also be sued under a variety of civil actions in "tort." Very basically, a tort is a "civil wrong." It is an act or omission of an act by an individual done negligently, maliciously, or recklessly and resulting in an injury to another. The 1983 action just mentioned is a "constitutional tort." Other common tort actions against law enforcement or jail officers are for misuse of weapons, searches, operation of police vehicles, misuse of power, wrongful death, and false imprisonment (sometimes alternately known as false arrest).

If found liable the officer is not subject to imprisonment for a tort, but he is subject to monetary damages which may include compensatory damages (those that reimburse the plaintiff for actual injury and theoretically place him in the position he would have been in but for the injury). If the court finds that the officer acted maliciously or recklessly "in wanton disregard of the consequences," he may be liable for additional "exemplary" or "punitive" damages.

The concept of "punitive" damages is designed as a punishment for the civil defendant and as a deterrent to keep others from acting similarly. The courts have also held that the officer must be personally liable for punitive damages. If an insurance company or employer were permitted to indemnify the officer, the purposes of punitive damages would be subverted. This ruling has recently been held not to apply to violations of municipal ordinances in a very few jurisdictions.

The court may also issue an injunction, permanently prohibiting any continuing course of action by the officer or agency that led to the commission of the tort.

The officer's best defense to a civil suit is that he was acting in "good faith" reliance on the lawfulness of his actions. That reliance must always be "reasonable coupled with conduct," and

the officer is on very unsteady ground if he pleads ignorance of "well settled" law. He is thus under an obligation to know those aspects of constitutional and statutory law that the court considers well settled, as the courts hold that ignorance of basic constitutional rights is unreasonable. A significant number of decisions in recent years have dealt with the rights of inmates to sue and recover for injuries committed by other inmates; failure of corrections officers to properly supervise; restrictions on mail, counsel, access to courts or the press; administrative punishment; and a variety of other confinement-related injuries. "Actionable" injuries include mental distress or deprivation of rights, as well as physical injury.


The foregoing narrative has provided only a very brief overview of the criminal justice system, and each stage has been the subject of exhaustive litigation. The purpose of this section has been to acquaint the officer with the mechanics of the system as it most commonly appears. Because systems differ among states, a jail officer should contact his agency's attorney to determine the process for his individual jurisdiction, as well as how the law of his state makes its court procedures differ from the foregoing model.

The law enforcement or jail officer is not a lawyer, nor is he expected to be. However, the mechanics of the court as well as the decisions of the state and federal courts have tremendous impact on the performance of his duties. The law is subject to constant change and re-interpretation, and the officer has a continuing responsibility to insure that his methods and procedures continue to comply with the constantly evolving law. The best procedure is for the officer to have a continuing dialogue with his agency's attorney and/or his county attorney and to include a de-briefing after any action in which his agency is involved to provide the widest possible dissemination of lessons learned for the agency staff.

The section that follows contains a flow chart showing the normal process of criminal prosecutions. The defendant may be diverted from the system or released at virtually any stage of this model.

For this reason the flow chart must be recognized as an *idealized* model for the movement of an unsuccessful defendant through the criminal justice system. Following the flow chart is a glossary of legal terms most often encountered by law enforcement and jail officers.

Criminal Justice Process



ARREST TO ARRAIGNMENT ALTERNATIVES

1. Arrest — Initial Appearance — Prelim. Hearing — Arraignment.
2. Arrest — Initial Appearance — Preliminary Hearing — Grand Jury — Arraignment
3. Arrest — Initial Appearance — Grand Jury — Arraignment
4. Grand Jury — Arrest — Initial Appearance — Preliminary Hearing — Arraignment

- (a) Bail set
- (b) Prosecutor's Information
- (c) Indictment
- (d) Plea Entered
- (e) Appeal of Right
- (f) Discretionary Appeal (writ of Certiorari)
- (g) Writ of Habeas Corpus
- (h) May occur simultaneously

* Assumes Defendant is not diverted from the system or acquitted.

SUMMARY

1. The criminal justice process in the United States is complex and is based upon three major "bodies of law"--constitutional law, statutory law, and judge-made law.

Officers should be familiar with the criminal justice process, which includes the following procedural components: arrest; booking; initial appearance; bail; preliminary hearing; information and indictment; arraignment; trial; sentencing, probation, and parole; and appeal. Inmates may be released from custody at several of these procedural stages. At all stages of the process, the jail officer must be sensitive to the inmate's constitutional rights, as well as his practical need for reasonable access to counsel.

2. The possibility exists that a jail officer could become a defendant in a criminal or civil action initiated by an inmate who alleges that he has been mistreated during incarceration; because of this possibility, jail officers must always act in "good faith."

"Good faith" means that the officer does not willfully violate an inmate's civil or constitutional rights, and his actions are always based upon the statutes, regulations, and orders of his supervisors, not bias, malice, personal interest, or other unlawful motives. "Good faith" is the officer's best defense if he is charged with misconduct in a suit filed by an inmate. To prove that he acted in "good faith," the officer should carefully document his actions in writing when he encounters disciplinary or supervisory problems with inmates or if he decides to deny a particular inmate access to mail, visitors, recreation, or any other items normally provided to inmates.

GLOSSARY

Accessory. A person who has aided, abetted, or assisted a principal offender, or who has counseled and encouraged the commission of a crime.

Accomplice. A person who knowingly, voluntarily, and with a common intent with the principal offender unites in the commission of a crime.

Acquittal. A decision by a jury or judge that a criminal charge was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Administrative law. Rules, orders, regulations, and decisions by the administrative agencies that are part of the executive branch of government, often based on statutes and usually subject to court review.

Admissible. Admissible evidence is evidence that the judge must allow to be introduced at trial, not irrelevant, immaterial, or obtained illegally.

Affidavit. A written statement of facts that a person makes voluntarily and under oath before an officer having authority to administer the oath, such as a notary public.

Affirm. To declare that a judgment, decree, or order by a lower court is valid and legally correct even if the reasoning behind the judgment is rejected.

Allegation. An assertion or statement of fact made by a party to litigation that he intends to prove in the case.

Amicus Curiae. "A friend of the court." When a case raises questions of concern to organizations and individuals other than the parties, they sometimes ask permission to file briefs and oral arguments raising issues that are usually different from those raised by the parties; they enable the court to reach its decision with more information than that presented by the parties.

Answer. Defendant's written response to a civil complaint, containing his admission or denial of each of the allegations in the complaint.

Appeal. Request that a higher court review a lower court decision, either discretionary (writ of *certiorari*) or as a matter of rights.

Appellate court. (appeals court). Three or more judges sitting to review decisions of lower courts by studying the records of the trial and previous appeals, reviewing briefs, and hearing oral arguments by the attorneys for the parties.

Binding. A binding decision is a court ruling in one case that applies to or covers a later case and must be followed.

Bill of particulars. A written statement of the facts upon which a charge is brought, more specific than the complaint or information. It must be produced on the demand of a defendant.

Booking. The police process of recording a person's arrest.

Brief. An argument written by an attorney for his client (or by an *amicus curiae*) setting forth the facts and arguments of the law that could convince the judge or judges who review the document to decide in favor of his client.

Burden of proof. A requirement to present evidence that will convince the judge or jury of the truth or validity of a charge or allegation. The burden usually falls on the prosecution (or plaintiff). The law may require a party to establish a fact by a "preponderance of the evidence" or by "clear and convincing evidence," or it may require "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." The burden of proof required is much higher in criminal cases and is the "reasonable doubt" standard.

Capital crime. A crime for which the punishment may be death.

Cause of action. An occurrence which gives rise to a legal claim that contains the elements necessary to file a lawsuit and to justify a court in passing judgment on the case.

Certiorari. A petition to an appellate court asking review of a lower court decision. The court may grant or deny *certiorari* (agree or refuse to review the case) in its discretion without stating reasons.

Challenge for cause. The procedure by which the attorneys for each side in a jury trial may excuse a prospective juror from the jury by showing to the judge's satisfaction that the juror is biased against one side or in favor of the other. Unlike peremptory challenges, the number of challenges for cause is unlimited.

Change of venue. Transfer of a trial to a different geographical location by order of the trial judge on a motion by the attorney for one of the parties, usually based on excessive media coverage which may have biased prospective jurors.

Charge. 1. An accusation in a criminal case. 2. The judge's instructions to the jury on issues of law.

Circumstantial evidence. Facts and circumstances concerning a transaction from which the jury may infer other connected facts that reasonably follow according to common human experience.

Civil rights. Those rights due from one citizen to another, deprivation of which is a civil injury for which redress may be sought in a civil suit.

Civil suit. A legal proceeding by one party against another to enforce a right, to protect property, or to redress or prevent an injury.

Judgment for the plaintiff requires that the defendant perform an act or pay money in damages rather than be imprisoned as in a criminal case.

Class action. A lawsuit filed by a plaintiff on behalf of everyone in the same situation or class to redress an injury by the defendant. If the plaintiff wins, everyone in the class benefits by the judgment. A plaintiff may also file suit against one named defendant and the class he represents, so that if the plaintiff wins, he can recover from the named defendant and all others in the defendant's class.

Common law. The continually developing law of court decisions as distinguished from statutes and regulations. It is adopted from the pre-Revolutionary War English judicial system.

Companion cases. Lawsuits raising similar issues so that an appellate court hears them argued together and usually writes one opinion deciding them all.

Complainant. A party who initiates legal action; one who instigates a prosecution or accuses a criminal defendant.

Complaint. 1. The first legal paper filed by the plaintiff in a civil suit describing the actions complained of. It must state a cause of action or it is subject to demurrer. (see also demur.) 2. The document filed by a police officer or a citizen describing a crime and the person suspected of committing it.

Consensual search. The suspect voluntarily, without coercion or deceit, relinquishes the right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to demand a search warrant.

Conspiracy. An agreement plus an overt act between two or more people to commit a crime.

Contempt of court. Any intentional act designed to obstruct a judge in the administration of justice committed in or out of the presence of the judge by a party, a witness, an attorney, or any other person. The contempt may be either civil or criminal and, if criminal, a defendant's due process rights attach.

Continuance. Postponement of an action pending in court or a step to be taken in a case, usually until a specified date.

Conviction. A judgment or plea of guilty in a criminal proceeding.

Corpus delicti. The legal elements of a criminal offense.

Corroborate. To confirm evidence.

Credibility. The believability of a witness.

Cross-examination. Questioning of a witness on matters testified to by him under direct examination by opposing counsel.

Custodial interrogation. Questioning of a suspect after arrest or after he has been deprived freedom of action in any significant way.

Damages. Money a plaintiff recovers from a defendant to compensate him for physical injury, loss of rights, or property damage he suffered through the defendant's unlawful act or negligence.

Defendant. One against whom a cause of action or a charge is brought.

Defense. Arguments offered by the defendant as a reason why the plaintiff (or prosecution) has not met his burden of proof.

Demur. To argue that even if the other side's statement of the facts is true, there is no legal basis for a suit.

Deposition. A written testimony of a witness under oath before trial after giving notice to the opposing party so that he (and/or his lawyer) can attend and enter objections and cross-examine.

Direct examination. The interrogation of a witness by his counsel.

Discovery. One party of a lawsuit requires the other side to disclose, before trial, facts, documents, and other things in his knowledge or possession that are necessary to the first party in preparing his case; to take the surprise out of litigation by permitting both sides to prepare thoroughly before trial.

Dismiss. A court may dismiss a suit without a trial, if after assuming that all the plaintiff's allegations are true, the court finds that his complaint does not state a cause of action or is not a case that the court has power to decide.

Diversion. Finding alternatives to formal action in the criminal justice system.

Double jeopardy. The doctrine that a defendant cannot be prosecuted a second time for the same offense.

Due process of law. Strict adherence to procedures provided for in constitutions, statutes, regulations, court decisions, and customs. Due process is guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution. Denial of due process may permit the parties to obtain a reversal and a new trial.

Enjoin. A court order to command a person to do; or to not do; or stop doing some act. (The order is called an injunction.)

Entrap. An agent or officer of the government induced someone to commit a crime he had not intended to commit in order to bring criminal charges against him.

Evidence. Any kind of proof legally presented at trial; testimony of wit-

nesses, records, documents, physical objects, and any other exhibit by which a party tries to convince the judge or jury that his description of the facts is accurate or that his opponent's description is inaccurate or insufficient.

Exclusionary rule. The legal principle of excluding from a criminal trial any evidence that was secured illegally by the police.

Exhaustion of remedies. The requirement that a defendant use the grievance and appeal procedure of the administrative body, corporation, union, or other agency where the problem arose before going to court, or to go through all lower or all state court procedures before bringing the case to a higher or federal court.

Exigent circumstances. An emergency situation existing, or reasonably believed to exist, that justifies police officers entering the premises without a warrant. In most jurisdictions anything seen inside in plain view may be seized without a warrant.

Extradition. The delivery by an asylum state of an individual accused or convicted of a felony in a demanding state.

False arrest (imprisonment). The unlawful physical restraint of a citizen; an arrest of a civil plaintiff by an officer without probable cause. The unlawful incarceration of a person.

Felony. A serious crime that is punishable by incarceration in a state or federal prison (usually for more than one year) and/or a fine. (Compare with misdemeanor.)

Fruits. Papers, objects, names and addresses of possible witnesses, and other information obtained by the prosecution in the search of a person and his premises or in questioning him.

Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine. Evidence that is initially obtained unconstitutionally becomes the "poisonous tree." When the illegally-obtained evidence leads to other evidence, then this other evidence becomes the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and equally inadmissible as evidence.

Grand jury. An accusatory body that inquires into felonies committed within a particular district. Normally 13-23 jurors.

Habeas corpus. The name of a court order (or writ) to a jailer, or other persons having custody, commanding him to bring a person before the court for a hearing on whether he is being detained illegally, usually because of a denial of due process of law somewhere in the proceedings.

Hearsay. Evidence not coming from the witness's personal knowledge, but merely repeating what he has heard others say; such evidence is usually excluded in a trial, but not in preliminary hearings or grand juries.

Immunity. Freedom from duty or penalty; protection from prosecution.

Impeach a witness. To produce evidence that questions a witness's truthfulness or indicates that he is unworthy of belief.

Inadmissible evidence. Evidence that cannot be presented to the judge or jury for consideration in reaching a decision; for example, evidence that was obtained illegally, or is not relevant.

Indictment. A written accusation issued by a grand jury to a court charging a named person with a crime. The accused is said to be "indicted." The grand jury holds hearings at which the prosecutor presents his evidence against the suspect. If the grand jurors decide that the prosecutor has sufficient evidence to warrant a trial, they issue the indictment. A prosecutor may file an "information" as an alternative method of charging a person with a crime.

Information. A formal accusation made by a prosecuting officer to a court, charging a named person with a crime.

Injunction. A court order to a person, corporation, or government agency requiring him or it to do or refrain from doing a particular act. Failure to obey an injunction can lead to a citation for contempt of court.

Instructions. Directions given by the judge to the jury concerning the law to be applied once the jury has decided what facts were proven.

Intent. The deliberate purpose to do a specific thing.

Interrogation. Any official questioning expected to yield incriminating statements.

Judicial review. Court examination of statutes or administrative regulations for compatibility with the Constitution.

Liabile. Answerable in law to another or to society.

Litigation. A contest in court; a lawsuit.

Magistrate. An officer with power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a crime. The term generally refers to inferior judicial officers, such as justices of the peace and police justices.

Malice. Intentionally doing a wrongful act without just cause, and with an intent to inflict an injury or economic harm.

Miranda warnings. A criminal defendant's constitutionally protected rights to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney before and during any questioning, and an appointment of one if the defendant is indigent.

Misdemeanor. A minor criminal charge punishable by incarceration in a city or county jail, rather than a prison, for less than one year, and/or a fine.

Mistrial. An invalid, incomplete trial because some fundamental requirement was disregarded before trial began, or a basic error occurred during trial that cannot be corrected by instructing the jurors to ignore it, or because the jurors cannot agree on a verdict.

Motion. A written or spoken request by a party for a ruling or order from the judge.

Nolle prosequi. A formal entry on the record, by the prosecutor, that he will not prosecute the case.

Nolo contendere. A plea of "no contest" having the same effect as a plea of guilty without an actual admission.

Objection. A statement by an attorney in court indicating formal disapproval of the admission of testimony or argument being presented by the opposition. The judge must rule on each objection; if he agrees, he "sustains;" if he disagrees, he "overrules;" and, if the objector wants to be able to argue on appeal that the ruling was wrong, in many courts he must enter an "exception."

Opinion. A judge's statement of the reasons for his decision based on the admissible evidence, legislative or social history, and the law. The opinion usually explains why the court applied particular statutes, legal principles, and previous decisions, and did not apply others. It is usually written but may be delivered from the bench orally. In appellate courts it may be a concurring opinion, dissent, majority opinion, or minority opinion.

Peremptory challenge. The procedure by which the attorneys for either side may excuse a prospective juror from the jury without stating any reason (unlike challenges for cause).

Perjury. A witness's willful lie under oath in written and/or oral testimony.

Petit jury. The trial jury. Traditionally twelve, but may be fewer citizens who hear and decide the factual issues in the trial of a civil or criminal action.

Plea. A statement made by a criminal defendant in answer to the charges against him.

Preliminary hearing. A judicial examination of witnesses to determine whether or not a crime has been committed and whether the evidence presented against the accused is sufficient to warrant binding him over for trial. Bail is set at this proceeding.

Precedent. A case decided in the past which serves as a guide for deciding future similar cases. A court will follow the line of decisions of the past in deciding a case in the present unless it specifically overrules that line (stating its reasons) or distinguishes the present case by describing how it differs.

Prima facie. At first sight; on the face of it; presumed to be true. When the plaintiff presents a *prima facie* case, he will win unless his allegations are disproved by evidence to the contrary.

Probable cause. Facts that would lead a reasonably intelligent and prudent person to believe that a crime was committed and that the suspect committed it sufficient to justify an arrest or a search.

Punitive damages. Damages awarded by a jury to punish the civil defendant and deter others. In most jurisdictions neither cities nor insurance companies can indemnify an officer for punitive damages, and they cannot be discharged through the bankruptcy courts.

Rebuttal. Introducing evidence to show that previous evidence is not true.

Recognizance. A written promise by a prisoner that he will appear in court whenever ordered. Criminal defendants in some jurisdictions are released on their own recognizance pending trial instead of being required to buy bail bonds or post bail (cash or securities) to secure their release.

Record. The official, written history of the trial. It includes the papers filed in the case by the parties and written rulings by the judge (these constitute the "clerk's transcript"). In appealing from a judgment against his client, an attorney reads the entire record but uses in his argument to the appeals court only the parts showing that errors were made.

Right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right of an accused to have an attorney represent him "at every critical state" of a criminal proceeding.

Right against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment right of an accused to not be compelled to testify against himself or produce personal papers or documents that might tend to incriminate him.

Rules of evidence. The laws that determine what evidence is admissible to be used to prove allegations.

Search warrant. A legal process, issued by a judge upon a supporting affidavit, that authorizes a peace officer to search a person or place for evidence of an offense, contraband, instrumentalities, or fruits of a crime.

Sequester the jury. To order the trial jurors to be kept together in isolation from society during a trial to avoid all outside influences on them. The jury is always sequestered while it deliberates about the verdict.

Statute of limitations. The limited period of time during which a lawsuit must be begun or else the right to sue is lost. The statute of limitations varies among jurisdictions. Some criminal charges, such as murder, have no statute of limitations.

Statutory law. Laws enacted by the legislative branch of government (as opposed to case law, handed down by the judicial branch, and administrative law, issued by the executive branch).

Subpoena. A command from a court or other body ordering a witness to appear and give testimony and imposing a penalty for refusal. It may include an order to bring certain documents into court, a subpoena *duces tecum*.

Suppression hearing. A pretrial criminal evidentiary hearing, held before a judge sitting without a jury, to determine whether the incriminating evidence obtained by the prosecution was obtained lawfully.

Tort. A civil wrong or injury committed to the person or property of another and resulting in some damage or injury.

Trial *de novo*. A new trial ordered by a higher court after error was found in the original trial; it is conducted as if no trial whatever had been in the court below.

True bill. A grand jury indictment.

Venireman. A member of a panel or "venire" of prospective jurors.

Venue. The county or area in which a wrongful act was done and from which the jury to try the case is chosen.

Voir dire. The examination of prospective jurors before the trial begins to determine if they have the necessary qualifications to be fair and impartial.

Waive a jury. To knowingly give up or renounce the right to be tried by a jury in a criminal case. A plaintiff or defendant in a civil case will not have a jury trial unless he asks for one.

Writ. A formal document prohibiting or ordering some act.

Wrongful death. The death of a person through the negligence or intentional act of someone else, which gives the deceased person's survivors a right to sue the wrongdoer for damages.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER FOUR

WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS

Sheriff Glen Michaels of Refinery County is considered to be a "hard-nosed administrator" by some of his rookie officers. This reputation results from his requirement that officers submit a written report on *all* events of an unusual nature that occur in the jail.

The sheriff has a saying: "If it even *appears* unusual, put it in writing. If it isn't in writing, it probably didn't happen."

His insistence that officers document events is appreciated by senior staff members, for they know that in the last 15 years there has not been one single successful lawsuit against a jail officer or the sheriff. This is due, for the most part, to the sheriff's sophisticated system of report writing and record-keeping.

There were times when the senior members of the department resented the policy requiring that they put everything in writing, especially when an incident occurred a few minutes before quitting time. For example, right before the day shift was scheduled to go off duty, inmate Joe Schmo complained to Officer Marian Barry that he had been hit on the side of the head by inmate Slug Cohen, and he was beginning to feel dizzy. It would have been easy for Officer Barry to tell inmate Schmo that he has to expect to get hit by another inmate as long as he is in jail and to go on sick call in the morning. But from experience, Officer Barry knew that "Put-It-In-Writing" Michaels would require a report. If she didn't file one and Sheriff Michaels found out about the incident, then Officer Barry would soon be looking elsewhere for a new job.

The sheriff required those officers who did not know how to write reports properly to practice. Report writing is similar to shooting a pistol--regular practice is necessary to develop expertise.

An officer cannot continuously avoid situations that require written reports and still carry out his responsibilities adequately. *The jail officer's responsibility to maintain accurate records is equally as important as any other duties he is assigned.* Furthermore, since inmate-initiated litigation against jail officers has intensified in recent years, an officer must know how to prepare accurate written reports for his own protection.



1. Officer writing a report
2. Firing Range

Report Must Be Descriptive

The officer's report must be descriptive enough to provide the reader with a clear understanding of what took place. Case Study One is an example of a non-descriptive report that would leave the reader wondering what the inmate did to violate the jail rules.

Case Study 1:

At approximately 12:05 p.m. on November 25, 1979, while in the dining hall, inmate John Brown was very disorderly. He was returned to his cell and written up for violating jail rules.

Officer D. Klutch

Case Study Two obviously has been prepared by an officer who is an effective writer with an ability to accurately describe what has occurred. A well-written report describes the details that will make people and events come to life in the mind of the reader.

Case Study 2:

At approximately 12:05 p.m. on Thursday, November 25, 1979, while assigned to the noontime feeding detail and stationed at the main door leading into the dining room, I observed Inmate John F. Brown, male, age 25, assigned to Cell B-1 on the northwest tier, seated alone at the first table on the right as you enter the dining hall. He suddenly jumped to his feet and threw his plate of food to the

floor and shouted, "I'm sick and tired of this stuff you call food. Chicken three days in a row. On top of that it's cold. We all should refuse to eat this slop." The other twenty-five inmates did not appear to be listening to Brown and continued eating.

Inmate Brown was escorted back to his cell without incident by the undersigned officer, and he was locked in his cell.

Brown was told by the undersigned officer that he had violated rule 21-A of the inmate handbook by creating a disturbance in the dining hall. He responded by saying, "I know the rules, but I'm sick of chicken and if you serve me chicken again I'll do the same thing all over."

The other inmates were surveyed individually by myself and Officer Bill Poole. They refused to give statements concerning the offense and stated they had no complaints about the food.


The following persons were notified in person:

*Lt. Jim Young - Shift supervisor at 12:20 p.m. Nov. 25, 1979.
Sgt. Robert Grahl - Disciplinary hearing officer at 12:35 p.m. Nov. 25, 1979.*

Recorded at 1:10 p.m. on Nov. 25, 1979.

*Officer James Cool
Badge #679*

Officer Cool did not merely tell the reader that a certain inmate was "disorderly." Instead, he provided several details to help the reader visualize the inmate's behavior.



The officer's report must be descriptive enough to provide the reader with a clear understanding of what took place.

RECORDS OF INMATE ACTIVITIES

Jails and other detention facilities are undergoing increased scrutiny by the courts and the public. Inmates' complaints about violations of their rights and lawsuits filed against jail officers and administrators make it imperative that jail staff members keep accurate records of *all* inmate activities. These records are required as documentary evidence of activities or the lack of activities.


Documenting inmate activity takes time and effort; but that time and effort may pay off in a legal action if jail employees are able to be successfully defended because of careful record-keeping.

Some inmate activities which should be documented include:

- Correspondence
- Visitation
- Medical treatment
- Recreation
- Religious activities
- Misconduct and disciplinary actions
- Inmate complaints
- Court appearances and disposition of court appearances

Correspondence

All correspondence activities should be recorded. Records should be made of both incoming and outgoing mail, including the names and addresses of the persons the inmate is corresponding with, as well as the date of the correspondence. The officer recording the correspondence activity should sign his name. Careful documentation of mail activities will protect the jail against a charge of failure to permit an inmate to send or receive correspondence. Without documentation, the charge becomes simply the inmate's word against that of jail officials.



Telephone calls made or received by the inmate also should be documented. Calls may easily be recorded on the same form used to record correspondence activities. The log should contain the name of the person calling or being called, as well as the phone number. Again, the identity of the jail officer who witnesses the call should be recorded.

Visitation

A record should be made of all visitors an inmate receives, including the date, time, and name of the visitor. The record should include not only visits from family and friends, but also from attorneys, religious advisors, probation and parole agents, and other professionals. Again, careful documentation will protect jail employees against a charge of denial of rights or privileges. It also will be useful in studying visiting patterns at the jail to evaluate policies and procedures regarding visitation. In addition, accurate visitation logs have security benefits. These records often provide the investigative leads needed to apprehend escapees.



All visitors should sign in.

Some jails allow inmates to be visited only by people on a pre-approved visiting list. A well-maintained visitor log will make it easier to check identities of visitors to be sure they are on the inmate's list.

Medical Treatment

Any medical care or treatment must be carefully documented. This is very important, both for medical reasons and for the legal protection of jail staff members.

If an inmate is receiving prescribed medication, a record should be kept listing *each time* the medicine is administered. This record should show the date, exact time the medicine is administered, prescribing physician, type and quantity of medication (whether pill, capsule, or liquid; and number of pills or capsules or quantity of the liquid), name of the medication, and identity of the jail officer administering it. The importance of accuracy in keeping a record of

medication cannot be overemphasized. If the inmate becomes sick, then the physician may need to know *exactly* what sort of medication he received, as well as the dosage. The medication log for each inmate should contain this information. *Medical information should never be left to memory.*

There is always the possibility that an inmate's illness results from an overdose of prescribed medicine which he hid in his cell. If that is the case, the medication log would not indicate the source of the problem. Still, it would be necessary for the physician to know what medication the inmate received legitimately to determine whether the medicine could have caused an overdose problem. To prevent an inmate from hiding medicine, an officer should supervise the inmate to make certain that he swallows each pill or capsule he is given. A flashlight can be used to examine the inside of the inmate's mouth to make sure he is not hiding a pill or capsule under his tongue or behind his teeth.

In addition to recording data on medication which is administered, it is important to record information on *all* physician and hospital services that an inmate receives, as well as data on medical treatment administered within the jail as a result of an inmate complaint. Thus, when an inmate is given two aspirins for a headache, or a cold compress for a bloody nose, an entry recording this information should be made in the inmate's medical record.

Inmates often complain about medical problems of one sort or another. In many cases their complaints are the result of boredom or are an attempt to get attention. But these complaints may just as easily be real complaints about problems that need attention. It is not easy for an officer to differentiate between real complaints and groundless ones. Therefore, data on *all* complaints should be documented, and information on how the complaint was handled should be placed in the record.

Case Study 3:

Officer Todd Alert was supervising inmates during the outside recreation period at the Big Sky County Jail when he noticed inmate John Healthy leaning against the courtyard wall watching the other inmates play basketball. Knowing that Healthy liked to play basketball, Officer Alert asked him why he wasn't participating in the game. Healthy told Officer Alert, "That bunch is too rough for me. I fell and hit my head in a game yesterday and I've had a headache ever since."

Officer Alert told Healthy he should go on sick call and let the doctor examine him but Healthy replied, "No, I'll be OK. If I'm not better in a couple of days I'll go on sick call. I've had these headaches before."

Officer Alert did not make a record of the complaint. He completed his tour of duty and left for the beach to enjoy his two days off.

The following morning an officer went to Healthy's cell when the inmate didn't respond for the morning count. The officer found Healthy unconscious. He was taken to the County Hospital, where he was pronounced dead-on-arrival. An autopsy revealed that inmate Healthy had died from a blood clot brought on by a skull fracture.

Mary Healthy, the inmate's mother, brought suit against Big Sky County, the sheriff, and Officer Alert, alleging that the jail personnel did not provide adequate medical treatment for her son after he told them about his headaches.

Officer Alert told his attorney about the complaint he received and that inmate Healthy had refused medical treatment. But because there was no written record made at the time, the attorney admonished Officer Alert and said the court would probably state that since the offer of assistance wasn't in writing, it probably didn't happen.

If Officer Alert had taken a few minutes to make an official record of inmate Healthy's complaint, and his refusal of medical assistance, chances are the court would not have proceeded further.

Recreation

If inmates are provided the opportunity to participate in recreational activities, then their participation should be documented. Like other records of program participation, this will help administrators evaluate whether participation is sufficient to continue the program. A record of inmate recreational activities should indicate the number of inmates participating and the times of participation.

Religious Activities

All participation in religious services and other religious activities, such as counseling or the administration of sacraments, should be documented. This, too, will help in an evaluation of jail programming. In addition, such documentation is necessary in case an inmate complains or files a lawsuit claiming that his right to practice religion was restricted. Inmates must never be *required* to participate in any sort of religious activity, but they should be given an opportunity to participate. If they choose not to, that is their right. Records should indicate that the opportunity was made available and that the inmate declined to participate.

Misconduct And Disciplinary Action

Inmate misconduct in jail either may be illegal or simply a violation of jail rules. Whatever the case, such misconduct must be documented. If the activity is illegal, then the district attorney should be notified. If it is a violation of jail rules, then an informal disciplinary hearing should be held at the jail, in accordance with the requirements of due process. The jail administrator may impose three different types of punishment: segregation, loss of good time, or restriction of privileges.

To effectively deal with a disciplinary case, there must be accurate documentation of the particulars of the offense. This information is contained in the formal disciplinary report prepared by the jail officer who witnessed the event. The formal report should contain the following information:

1. Full name of the inmate.
2. Complete description of the inmate's behavior.
3. Time and place of the event.
4. Reporting officer's location at the time of the event.
5. Any witnesses.
6. The reporting officer's response to the inmate's behavior.
7. The inmate's response to the officer.
8. Past behavior of the inmate, or previous warnings given.

The report should be written in clear, straightforward language. It should state *only* the facts of the event, *not the opinions or judgments of the reporting officer*. The report will provide the persons who will judge the inmate with information about the violation and the circumstances surrounding the violation. This is true whether the case will be handled by the district attorney or by a hearing board within the jail.

In less-serious cases of misconduct, the jail officer may administer on-the-spot discipline involving immediate, short-term restriction of privileges or another punishment. Even in such cases, the facts about the incident and the punishment administered must be documented, although there is no need for a formal report. Instead, the fact that the incident occurred and a description of the action the officer took to resolve it should be recorded in the log book.

Inmate Complaints

All inmate complaints, regardless of their nature, should be recorded. These include medical complaints as well as complaints about food, noise, privileges, and so on. Actions concerning the complaints also should be noted. Again, it is not always possible to sort out legitimate complaints which deserve attention from plain, everyday griping. Thus, it is best to record all complaints to be sure that a potentially serious problem is not overlooked.

Court Appearances

Jail records must reflect all court appearances and their disposition. Many things can happen when an inmate goes to court: bail or bond may be set, a case may be dismissed, a sentence may be ordered involving specific circumstances (work release privileges, probation, etc.), an inmate may receive an order for transfer to another institution, and so on. There is always the possibility for confusion at the jail as a result of the inmate's court appearance. Therefore, jail staff must keep accurate records of what happens to an inmate *each time* he appears in court. These jail records should be made even though the clerk of courts supplies commitment orders on sentenced prisoners.

If accurate records are not kept, confusion will certainly reign. The jail may even face a lawsuit for detention of a person who, legally, should no longer have been detained. Records of court appearances should include the exact date and time of the appearance, the court, judge, and the disposition.

Inmate Property Records

The jail staff must account for all property which belongs to inmates. This requirement demands accurate record-keeping, beginning at the time of admission and continuing throughout incarceration to the time of release.

All property taken from an inmate upon admission must be documented during the booking process. Such documentation must be very exact. If the record is less than exact, there may be confusion about property ownership. Inmates should be required to sign the record of property taken away from them during the booking process to show that the record is accurate. They should sign for property returned to them upon their discharge from the jail.

All property delivered to the jail for the inmate by his family, friends, or others also should be properly documented. The inmate should be told about these records. If the inmate knows that the jail staff is keeping accurate records about his property, he will think twice

before filing false property claims. The jail staff has the right to inspect all incoming property for contraband, and a notice that such inspection occurred should be included in the record.



1. Property records.
2. "...And I'm telling you, my coat was leather, not cloth!"

In addition, accurate records must be kept of expenditures or transactions involving each inmate's money. This is especially important for inmates who participate in work release programs, since the inmate's paycheck usually goes directly to the jail and all funds are handled by jail personnel. But it is also important to keep accurate financial records for inmates who do not participate in work release programs; these inmates may purchase canteen items or may need to purchase things from outside the jail. In any case, inmates should be made fully aware of each transaction involving their money and should be kept informed about the balance of their finances.

Records On Activities Of Jail Staff

Daily records of jail staff activities must be maintained. These involve not only the kinds of records previously discussed but also such activities as inspections, counts, cell checks, food service, and laundry service. For example, the presence of all inmates should be verified *at least* once each hour. A cell block check sheet indicating the time of the count, the name of the jail officer, and any comments would sufficiently document that a count was made. Comments simply might indicate that everything was secure or that inmates from a certain cell block were participating in an exercise activity. Such a record could be made using various formats, but whatever format is chosen should allow for adequate documentation of the jail officer's activities in checking the safety and well-being of inmates.

Records of staff actions not only document information but also communicate necessary information to other staff members, especially to staff who are working on other shifts. The daily log is the vehicle for communication among staff members about all activities and occurrences, both those that are important and those that seem trivial. For example, if an inmate has a slight injury that does not really require medical attention but still should be observed, the log book should indicate that. Or, if special arrangements have been made for a visit from out-of-town relatives, the log should indicate that the arrangements were made and the visitors may be expected at a certain time. If a potential security problem develops, such as evidence that inmates have been tampering with a window, then that, too, should be noted. *In short, the jail log should reflect all activities and observations of jail staff members which ought to be communicated to other staff members.*

Verbal communication should not be depended upon; it is too easy to forget to mention something important and there would be no record of the situation to refer to later. It is best to record all noteworthy occurrences on paper, so there can be no opportunity to forget. It will be unnecessary to assume that other staff members know, or should know, about what is happening in the jail.

The exact format of the daily log will vary according to the particular jail and its needs. A large jail, for example, may require a very exact and specific daily log, with possible entries divided into rigid categories. In a smaller facility with few staff members, a notebook with lined paper may suffice. No matter what format is used, all notations in the log book should be straightforward and factual, never reflections of opinion.

MECHANICS OF REPORT WRITING

To properly and completely relate an idea, incident, or event, information and data must be collected which provide the answers to


certain basic questions. These basic questions which must be answered are known as the *essentials* of report writing.

Essentials Of Report Writing

A well-written report contains answers to the following questions:

1. Who?
2. What? (offense)
3. Where? (location)
4. When? (time)
5. How? (modus operandi)
6. Why? (motive)
7. Action?

Who? Who was involved? All persons involved in the incident should be identified. For inmates this includes: name, jail quarters assignment (all block and cell numbers, dormitory/annex, or other appropriate designation), and work assignment.



The officer writing the report might also want to consider who:

- Reported the infraction;
- Discovered the infraction;
- Is (are) the victim(s);
- Is (are) the offender(s);

- Is (are) the witness(es);
- Is (are) the accomplice(s);
- Is (are) possible suspect(s); and
- Can be contacted later for further information.

What? What offense or crime occurred? What took place that called for a report? Was it fighting, possession of contraband, attempting to escape, or assault? The officer should also consider what:

- Kind of damage was done;
- Is the value of the property lost, stolen, or recovered;
- Evidence was left at the scene;
- Crime was committed;
- Kind of weapons or tools were used; and
- Further action needs to be taken.

Where? Where did it happen? The officer should be specific rather than general: it is taken for granted that the incident occurred at the jail, but where, specifically, did it take place? The officer should also consider where:

- Was the infraction committed;
- Was the victim when the incident occurred;
- Was/were the witness(es) when the observation(s) was/were made;
- Were the tools or weapons obtained; and
- Has a similar infraction been committed (inside the jail).

When? What time did it happen? Indicate the answer by stating the time (using whatever time reference system is followed at the jail), the day, and the date. An officer should consider using such qualifying statements as "at approximately ___ p.m." and "about ___ a.m." rather than stating an *exact* time because it is unlikely that he was actually looking

at a watch and the incident at the same time. Some further considerations include when:

- Was the infraction committed;
- Was the infraction discovered;
- Was the infraction reported to the jail officer;
- Was/were the suspect(s) observed;
- How long did it take to commit the infraction; and
- Did the inmate have enough time to dispose of the evidence.

How? How did the crime or the incident occur? It pays to answer the "how" question in as much detail as possible. The answers will sometimes point out shortcomings in the operation of the jail. For example:

- How did the hacksaw blades get into the jail;
- How did the marijuana get into the jail;
- How did the inmates jam the locks on the cell doors;
- How did the fire start;
- How did the witness learn the facts; and
- How did the accident occur.

Why? In seeking an answer to the question "why," the officer attempts to determine a motive. He should ask why:

- Did it happen;
- Was the infraction committed;
- Was a certain method used;
- Was this particular victim selected;
- Was the time of commission selected;
- Was the infraction reported at a delayed time;

- Were certain or specific items taken; and
- Were certain tools or weapons used.

The officer should state only facts. He should not guess or include hearsay statements unless he qualifies each statement by saying it is hearsay. The officer should not consciously or unconsciously prejudice his report *for* or *against* the person(s) involved.

Action? What action did the officer take? What disposition was made of the evidence, inmate, victim, and witnesses involved? The officer should be certain to include all action which has been taken and list any action which is pending, such as persons to be interviewed and an analysis of evidence.

Notetaking

In order to write a complete and accurate report, the officer must take comprehensive notes when he is obtaining information about the incident. If the officer is directly participating in the incident (such as breaking up a fight), he should begin compiling his notes *as soon as the incident is over*. With a fight, for example, the officer should take the following steps to make certain he has accurate notes for a report:

1. Record the names of inmate participants and their jail quarters assignments.
2. Record the time and place the incident occurred.
3. Record the time and place the notes are being recorded.
4. Record the names and identities of witnesses.
5. Interview separately the inmate participants in the fight and record their remarks as accurately as possible.
6. Interview separately any witnesses to the incident; again record their remarks as accurately as possible.
7. If a sketch of the incident scene will be helpful in a disciplinary hearing or criminal action, make a preliminary sketch as soon as possible after the incident has occurred. Photographs of the scene should also be taken if they will be helpful in future actions against the inmate participants.

8. Record information on *all* evidence that was collected and its disposition (for example, if one inmate used a dining room knife to stab another inmate and the knife has been tagged as evidence and sent to a police laboratory, this information should be recorded in the officer's notes).
9. Record information on the disposition of the inmate participants (for example, inmate Jones was escorted to the County Hospital by ambulance to be treated for multiple stab wounds, and inmate Green was placed in Cell 27 immediately after officers broke up the fight).
10. Record chronological data on the events which occurred (for example: saw inmate Green pass by table at which inmates Jones and Watson were sitting; heard inmate Watson call inmate Green a "honkey pig"; saw inmate Green place his tray of food on the table, picking up a knife from the tray; saw inmate Green lunge at inmate Jones and begin to stab him; blew whistle; Officers Black and White rushed to assist me; along with Officer Black, grabbed inmate Green and bent his wrist back until knife fell to floor; used come-along hold on inmate Green and, along with Officer Black, escorted Green to Cell 27; returned to dining room; observed Officer White administering first aid to inmate Jones; observed inmate Jones bleeding from two puncture wounds in chest area; and so on).

The officer should record his notes in a permanent notebook which he carries with him at all times. The notebook should be either a pocket-size spiral-bound pad or looseleaf. The officer should number the pages in his notebook consecutively in case the pages pertaining to a specific incident are subpoenaed during a criminal or civil trial. Since an officer's notes can be requested by an inmate's attorney in the event of legal proceedings, the officer should exercise caution in what he writes in his notebook: *he should record facts only, not personal opinions*. For example, if an inmate pushed the officer against a wall, the officer should record in his notebook: "Inmate Checker then pushed me against the wall." This is a specific statement of fact. A statement of opinion would be: "Inmate Checker, *who obviously wanted to break my arm*, shoved me into the wall." The officer might sincerely believe inmate Checker wanted to break his arm, but he has no proof and he, therefore, should not include this *opinion* in his notebook or in his formal report.

However, if the officer has *proof* of an inmate's intentions, he should record this information as a separate entry so that it clearly stands out as a *fact* and would not, under any circumstances, appear to be the officer's opinion. Thus, the incident involving inmate Checker would be *factually* and correctly recorded in note form as follows:

Inmate Checker turned, shouted at me: "I'm going to break your arm, you rotten pig!" Checker lunged forward, knocked me off balance, pushed me against wall. When I hit wall, broke thumb on right hand. Checker punched me once, in my abdomen, used fist, his right hand. Officers Turtle, Fox, grabbed Checker.

The officer would use these notes to write his report, at which time he will "translate" the notes into complete sentences. His notes will provide him with a factual and accurate account of what occurred when he writes his formal report several hours later, since he must first go to the hospital to have the broken thumb treated. With complete, accurate notes recorded *immediately* after the incident has occurred, the officer will not forget the important sequence of events or the statement which inmate Checker made about wanting to break his arm.

Should abbreviations be used when taking notes? Officers should abbreviate only when they have developed a system for abbreviations and know what each symbol means. The only rule to follow is uniformity: each officer should develop his own system for notetaking and stick with it.

An officer's notebook becomes a permanent record. He should file his notebooks in chronological order, either at home or in his locker at the jail, since the notebook may be required in a court case months or even years after an incident has occurred.


Format In Writing Chronological Reports

When the officer has obtained information and data to provide the answers to as many of the seven essentials of effective report writing as possible, then he can write the report. The report which the officer submits to his supervisor should fulfill five requirements.

His written report should be:

1. Complete. All necessary facts should be included so that no additional information is required. If appropriate, all seven essentials of effective report writing must be answered; otherwise, the report will not be complete.
2. Concise. Do not use any unnecessary words. Use simple sentences.
3. Clear. Stick to the facts and use simple, descriptive words. Keep the report in chronological order.
4. Correct. Present only the actual facts. Make certain words, names, and numbers are spelled and listed correctly and that grammar is correct. Keep the report neat in appearance.

5. Courteous. Be cooperative and not antagonistic; be objective and fair in the presentation. Remember--the submitted report reflects the personality and training of its writer.



The proper format for writing reports about incidents which occur in the jail is referred to as a "chronological format." This is the same format used for police reports.

Some jails, like police departments, have developed standardized "face sheets" for all reports. It is almost impossible to describe a typical face sheet since each jail and police department develops its own. However, a face sheet for a jail usually contains blanks for the following important information:

- Report number
- Investigating officer's name
- Inmate victim's name
- Inmate offender's name
- Classification of offense or incident (fight, fire, theft, assault, etc.)
- Place in jail where incident occurred (cell block and cell number, booking area, jail kitchen, etc.)

- Time incident occurred
- Date incident occurred
- Nature of injuries and names of injured persons
- Name of hospital where injured victim is taken
- Date/time victim is admitted to hospital
- Name of attending physician
- Nature of treatment for injuries
- Identifying information for involved inmates (housing assignment, jail identification number, home address, etc.)
- Names of witnesses
- Identifying information for witnesses (if officer, his badge number, rank, and assignment; if inmate, his housing assignment and jail identification number)
- Evidence seized (whether marked, tagged, and sealed and where it was sent)
- Details of incident (to be written in summary form)
- Investigating officer's signature, a badge number, and his assignment
- Supervisor's signature
- Disposition of report (file, needs further investigation, etc.)
- Who was notified and when (sheriff, inmate's next of kin, etc.)

(A sample jail incident report face sheet is contained in Figure 1.)

Clearly organized incident report face sheets are of benefit to both the jail administrator and the officer. In the event that the jail administrator needs to compile reports about problems in the jail, the face sheets provide summary information on the various types of incidents that occur and make an analysis easy; face sheets also facilitate coding of data for entry into computerized record-keeping systems. For the officer, the face sheet serves as a "memory jogger." It helps him to remember to include *all* pertinent information and is especially helpful when the officer is tired. The face sheet also allows the officer's supervisor to know at a glance whether vital information has been left out of the report.

(Figure 1)

BIG SKY COUNTY JAIL
Incident Report

Investigating Officer: Kum Joyal		Report No. 79-296
Offense/Incident: Assault		Page No. 1 of 3 pages
Place of Occurrence: Entrance, Cell 26-B, N.W. Tier		Date/time of Occurrence: 10/29 19 79 at 0845 hours
Involved Inmates:		
Offender 1: George K. Duffer (M/19)	Cell Assignment: NW Tier, Cell 24-B	
Offender 2:	Cell Assignment:	
Offender 3:	Cell Assignment:	
Victim: Harold M. Dawes (M/26)	Cell Assignment: NW Tier, Cell 26-B	
Victim:		
Involved Officers:		
Rank/Assignment:		
Rank/Assignment:		
Nature of Injuries/Name of Injured: Contusions, abrasions (Inmate Dawes)		
Hospital Where Injured Taken: Big Sky County General Hospital (ER)		
Admitted: yes X No Name of Physician: Ron Wealthy, M. D.		
Date/Time of Hospital Admission/Treatment: 10/29/79 at 0915 hours		
Witnesses: None		Assignment:
		Assignment:
Evidence: Marked, tagged, sealed <input type="checkbox"/> yes <input type="checkbox"/> no		
Nature of evidence:		
Disposition: Evidence locker <input type="checkbox"/> Police laboratory <input type="checkbox"/>		
Circumstances of Incident: Inmate Dawes reported that while he was standing in the entrance to his cell, #26-B, N.W. Tier, he was approached by Inmate Duffer. Duffer accused Dawes of taking his picture of the Dallas Cowgirls cheerleaders. Dawes said he denied the accusation and Duffer then hit him on the right side of the head with an unknown object. Dawes said he fell and struck the back of his head on the footrail of his bunk. I took Dawes to the Hospital Emergency Room, and he was treated and released for contusions and abrasions to his head and face. I transferred Duffer to the S.E. Tier, Cell 5-A, pending further investigation (refer to continuation Report for sequential details).		
Badge 43 <i>Officer Kum Joyal</i>	<i>Sgt. Dick Felt</i>	Further investigation
Badge number and Inv. Officer's Signature	Approved by:	Disposition

(Figure 2)

Page 2 of 3

BIG SKY COUNTY JAIL
INCIDENT CONTINUATION REPORT

Inmate Harold M. Dawes, 26, whose home address is 310 Swann St., Thundercloud City, and who is assigned to the Northwest Tier, Cell 26-B, complained to me that at about 8:45 a.m. on Oct. 29, 1979, while he was standing in the entrance to his cell looking out onto the day area, he was approached by an inmate he identified as George K. Duffer, 19. Duffer's home address is 1331 Norfolk Ave., Thundercloud City. He is also assigned to the Northwest Tier, Cell 24-B. Dawes told me that Duffer said to him: "Why did you take the picture of the Dallas Cowgirls from the wall of my cell?" Dawes said he told Duffer he didn't take the picture. Dawes said Duffer then struck him on the right side of the head with an unknown object. Dawes said that after he was hit, he fell, striking the back of his head on the foot rail of his bunk.

I was seated at the control desk at the entrance to the Northwest Tier and at approximately 8:47 a.m., I heard someone yell, "Don't hit me again, Duffer!" I immediately went to investigate. It was inmate Dawes sitting in an upright position on the floor of his cell with inmate Duffer standing over him with his right hand doubled up into a fist. I ordered them to break it up and Duffer said to me: "I'll hit him again if he steals anything else from me!" I did not observe any object in Duffer's hands.

I summoned an ambulance from the Big Sky County Fire and Rescue Services and it arrived at the jail at 9:02 a.m. I escorted Dawes in ambulance 31-A to the Emergency Room at Big Sky County General Hospital in Thundercloud City. Dawes was treated by the emergency room physician, Dr. Ron Wealthy, for contusions and abrasions to the right side of his face and a small laceration to the back of his head. His condition was classified as "not serious" by Dr. Wealthy and I returned him to the jail in a Thundercloud City Police Dept. cruiser driven by Corporal Radar O'Reilly. We arrived back at the jail at 10:02 a.m.

Inmate Duffer refused to make any further statement concerning the altercation and I transferred him to the Southeast Tier at 10:15 a.m., but we were not able to locate any witnesses to the altercation.

I took a typewritten statement from inmate Dawes at 11:15 a.m. and it is included in this report. Inmate Dawes stated that he wishes to file criminal assault charges against inmate Duffer.

NOTIFIED:

1. Sheriff Maxwell Smart, 8:58 a.m., Oct. 29, 1979.

(Figure 2, continued)

Page 3 of 3.

2. Shift Commander Lieutenant Robin Reamy, 8:57 a.m., Oct. 29, 1979.
3. Notation was made in the jail logbook advising oncoming shifts to check the condition of inmate Dawes during the next tour of duty.
4. Jail physician Ira Dauffman was notified at 11:30 a.m., Oct. 29, 1979, and he stated he will see inmate Dawes on the morning of Oct. 30, 1979.
5. Assistant District Attorney, Walter Warren, was notified at 11:45 a.m., Oct. 29, 1979, and he advised that he will arrive at the jail between 1 and 3 p.m., Oct. 29, 1979 to discuss with inmate Dawes the filing of criminal charges against inmate Duffer.

Submitted By:

Officer Kum Joyal
Officer Kum Joyal
Badge #43
Report filed at 11:55 a.m.
October 29, 1979.

(Figure 3)

(Form SO 24-A)

RATTLESNAKE COUNTY JAIL
INCIDENT REPORT

Date: December 24, 1979

Report # 79-299

Page: 1 of 2

At about 2 a.m. on Dec. 24, 1979, while patrolling the Southwest Tier and when in front of Cell 26-S, I heard a groaning sound coming from the direction of the cell. I pointed my flashlight toward the sound and saw the occupant of the cell, inmate James Auction, 43, of 3031 Fairfax Drive, Fangville, sitting on the bunk and bleeding profusely from the left side of his neck.

I immediately summoned help by calling Duty Officer John Mummert. I used the phone located on the outside walkway wall adjacent to the cell.

We both entered the cell and laid inmate Auction on his cot. While I applied pressure to the area of the wound, Duty Officer Mummert summoned a County Fire Department ambulance, which arrived at the jail at about 2:15 a.m. Inmate Auction was transported to the Rattlesnake County Hospital in Fire Dept. ambulance 34. I escorted him in the ambulance. He was taken to the Emergency Room, where he was treated for a laceration to the left side of his neck by Dr. Raul Sangria, a hospital intern. Inmate Auction's condition was diagnosed by Dr. Sangria as "fair" and he was admitted to the hospital for observation at 2:45 a.m. on Dec. 24, 1979.

I waited at the hospital until Officer Charles Pride arrived to guard inmate Auction. I left the hospital at 3:15 a.m. and arrived back at the jail at 3:25 a.m. I then searched inmate Auction's cell. Lying on the floor of the cell adjacent to Auction's bunk was the handle of a table spoon similar to those used for the jail meal service. It had been honed to a sharp edge. The spoon had what appeared to be blood stains on it. Color photographs were taken of the spoon and the surrounding area by Jail Technician Benny Ryland at approximately 3:45 a.m. I then bagged and tagged the spoon as evidence and marked it to be sent to the State Crime Lab for analysis.

The cell was secured pending completion of the investigation by Technician Ryland.

I notified Shift Supervisor Lieutenant Knowland Village of the incident at 2:50 a.m. by calling him from the Emergency Room at the hospital.

At 4 a.m. Lt. Village advised me that he had prepared a schedule for guard duty at the hospital for upcoming shifts.


At 7 a.m. I returned to the Rattlesnake County Hospital to interview inmate Auction about the cause of his wound. He told me: "I was depressed. I've been a complete failure. What's the use of living anymore?" He said that he found the spoon taped to the underside of his bunk when he was first assigned to the cell at 1 p.m. on Dec. 22, 1979. Inmate Auction was sentenced to the jail on Dec. 22 to serve a 60-day sentence for shoplifting.

This investigation is now complete.

NOTIFIED:

1. Sheriff Wayne Higgins at his home at 2:46 a.m. on Dec. 24, 1979.
2. Shift Supervisor Lieutenant Knowland Village at 2:50 a.m. on Dec. 24, 1979.
3. Father John Paul, All Saints Church, Fangville, at 2:55 a.m., Dec. 24, 1979.
4. Mrs. Mary Auction, wife of inmate Auction, was notified by Father John Paul at 3 a.m. on Dec. 24, 1979, and she responded to the hospital along with Father Paul and her son, Andy Auction, 18, of the home address in Fangville.
5. Jail physician Morris Needle was notified at 7 a.m. on Dec. 24, 1979, and he said he would visit inmate Auction at the hospital on his morning rounds on Dec. 24, 1979.

Submitted By:



Officer Mark Twain

Badge # 17

Report completed at 9 a.m.
December 24, 1979.

The face sheet should contain a *synopsis* of the incident, clearly written and in a format which answers the questions *who, what, when, where, and how*. A *good* synopsis with a clear face sheet fully filled in will often mean that there is no need to write a continuation page.

However, in most incidents of a *complex* nature, a continuation page or pages will be necessary. A continuation report is written in narrative form, and chronologically recounts what has occurred. The officer who writes the face sheet also writes the narrative continuation. In jails which do not use face sheets, the continuation page format is used for the complete report--when this is the case, all basic factual and identifying information must be included in the narrative. (See Figure 2 for a continuation page written for the assault incident report described in Figure 1.)

How should a chronological report be written? The primary rule to follow is: *record everything in sequence of time*. What happened first? What happened next? Exact times need to be given only for major components of the incident (for example, "at about 10:05 a.m., when I was seated at the Control Desk, the fire alarm bell sounded on Cell Block B"). The officer should write his report in the past tense and, unless the sheriff objects, he should refer to himself as "I" and inmates or other officers by their names. This eliminates the confusion that often occurs when the officer refers to inmates as "subject 1," "subject 2," the "complainant," and so forth. It also eliminates the stilted, old-fashioned writing which occurs when an officer refers to himself in the third person, using such terms as the "undersigned" or the "below-named officer."

The officer writing the report should spell *every* word correctly and use short sentences and paragraphs so that the report is easier to read. In addition, this format allows each component of the event to "stand out" in the report--it not only helps the reader of the report, but enables the officer to avoid the repetition which often results when he is writing a long narrative with no paragraph breaks. Figure 3 contains a good format for a complete chronological report at a jail which does not use face sheets.

When the officer is certain that his report is *correct* and *complete*, he should add his signature at the end to indicate that the report is authentic and may be used for official purposes.

It cannot be overstated that *reports should be completed as soon after the incident as possible*. The report should definitely be written before the officer goes off duty for the day.

SUMMARY

1. The jail officer's responsibility to maintain accurate records is equally as important as any other duties he is assigned.

An officer cannot continuously avoid situations that require written reports and still carry out his responsibilities adequately. Moreover, since inmate-initiated litigation against jail officers has intensified in recent years, an officer must know how to prepare accurate written reports for his own protection. Some major areas of jail operations which require accurate and detailed record-keeping include: inmate activities (correspondence, visitation, medical treatment, recreation, and religious activities), inmate misconduct and disciplinary actions, inmate complaints, court appearances, inmate property records, and records on activities of jail staff members.

2. When an incident occurs in the jail, the officer should prepare a complete written report as soon after the incident as possible.

He should never rely on his memory. The officer should take complete notes about each incident which provide answers to the questions: who, what, where, when, how, and why. In addition, the officer should completely describe the actions that were taken by him and other officers assisting him. When writing his report, the officer should make certain that he states only facts--he should not guess or include hearsay statements, nor should he consciously or unconsciously prejudice his report for or against the persons involved. The officer's written report should be complete, concise, clear, correct, and courteous.

3. The jail officer's most important possession is his notebook, which he should carry with him at all times.

An officer's notebook becomes a permanent record. He should file his notebooks in chronological order, either at home or in his locker at the jail, since a specific notebook may be required in a court case months or even years after an incident has occurred. Because an officer's notebook might be requested by an inmate's attorney in the event of legal proceedings, the officer should exercise caution in what he writes in it, recording facts only.

Suggested Readings

- Cox, C. Robinson. *Criminal Justice: Improving Police Report Writing*. Danville, Ill.: Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1977.
- Guth, Hans. *Words and Ideas*. 2nd edition. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1965.
- International Association of Chiefs of Police. *Effective Report Writing*. (Training Key #58), Gaithersburg, Maryland: 1966.
- U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. *Getting Your Ideas Across Through Writing*. (Training Manual No. 7), Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950.

CHAPTER FIVE

ROLE CONCEPTS, ATTITUDES, AND INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

The custodial officer is the jail employee who spends the most time with inmates, and research has shown that this officer can have a significant impact on an inmate's behavior following his release. The mission of the jail depends on the judgment and ability of the jail officer.

ROLE CONCEPTS

The jail officer has four primary roles:

- Security officer
- Change agent
- "Broker"
- Community relations officer

These roles are explained in detail in the material which follows.

Role In Security

Traditionally, the jail officer's primary responsibilities were considered to be custody and security. This is accomplished by the careful supervision of inmates in virtually all their activities. Proper supervision will prevent escapes, expose contraband, insure the safety of inmates and staff, and maintain order within the facility. Though newer jails possess sophisticated television monitoring equipment, the officer

is still the key to jail safety. In many jails, the officer is in charge of transporting inmates to and from courts, doctors' offices, and other places, which poses security problems very different from those within the jail facility.

Jail officers are responsible for the working order of alarms, lights, locks, handcuffs, and control panels. Other duties may include maintaining equipment, conducting searches of the inmates, and exercising control over keys, tools, and medications. The officer may also check housing units and other parts of the jail for contraband, conduct counts, and supervise visits, meals, and recreation.

The sheriff or jail administrator should draft policies and procedures covering the security standards established by the state code if it exists. If there are not state code provisions for jail standards, these policies should reflect the model standards established by professional organizations such as the National Sheriffs' Association or the American Correctional Association. These two organizations have developed excellent reference guidelines for developing and establishing procedural policies.

Role As A Change Agent

The jail officer can be most influential in motivating change in the behavior of inmates. Counseling, education, job training, and alcohol and drug therapy programs help provide inmates with the skills and habits necessary to adjust successfully once they are returned to the community, but since the officer is constantly exposed to the inmates in virtually all aspects of their lives during incarceration, he has a great influence on inmate attitudes. The manner in which an officer functions as a change agent will often determine whether an inmate will be angry and unhappy or reasonably well adjusted during the period of incarceration, and may also affect his attitude after his release.



Nicknamed "the admiral," the operator in central control monitors movements and unlocks doors for inmates and staff in security areas. (Eugene, Oregon Jail)

An officer can be an influence without realizing it. Inmates remember the officers who treated them decently and those who did not. They also know which of the jail staff dealt with them fairly. An officer communicates his indifference toward others by his conduct and reinforces what many inmates already believe - that people are generally no good. On the other hand, if the jail officer treats the inmate as he would like to be treated, it can help to instill in the inmate respect for the officer and for others. However, no officer can hope to effect positive change in every inmate in the jail; some will probably never change no matter what anyone does for or with them. But some inmates are serious about staying out of jail in the future, and an officer's attitudes and behavior on the tier can serve as a positive model for human conduct in society.

The officer possesses authority within the jail and can command obedience to orders and directions; however, he cannot command respect. Respect is earned by example. When inmates respect jail staff, security and behavior problems become less severe, and the staff's job is made easier.

Role As A "Broker"

Inmates can experience severe emotional problems during confinement. An inmate may have family problems, require psycho-therapy, or be apprehensive about post-release employment. When the officer becomes aware of the inmate's problems, it is appropriate for him to refer the inmate to the staff person or program that can help. The officer should try to identify the needs of the inmate and then act as the agent to secure the needed services.

The "broker" function works this way: The officer notices that a normally alert and generally cheerful inmate has been severely depressed for a few days. When questioned, the inmate explains to the officer that his wife is about to be hospitalized for surgery, and she has been unable to arrange for someone to stay with the children. The officer recognizes that he cannot help with this situation, but he can contact a person who can provide assistance - the jail's clergyman, who can make arrangements for child care. The hospital social worker can also keep the inmate informed about his wife's condition following surgery. In a case like this, the officer is instrumental in finding a solution to the problem, thus reducing the inmate's tension and anxiety.

The jail officer functions as a vital link to help the inmate benefit from community resources. The officer's authority to act is defined by institutional policy. Although the actual kinds of inmate problems that the jail officer can help with directly may be limited, there will be many opportunities for him to seek assistance for troubled inmates. Helplessness and despair in jail can often create feelings of hostility and anxiety for inmates, since there is little an inmate can do to help himself if confronted with a family problem. For the jail officer, the key to effective performance is to be familiar with the resources available in the community

CONTINUED

1 OF 7

and to be able to communicate quickly with staff members who can best secure these services for inmates.

Role In Community Relations

People who work in jails are members of their community the same as anybody else. They pay taxes, send their children to school, participate in civic functions, and make use of the services the local government offers. One problem everyone in a community faces is the tendency to stereotype people. In this sense a mental picture is usually held in common by members of a group or community. This picture is focused by a person's actions and interpreted by the opinions held by others - in most cases these opinions are oversimplified. Because of the size of the world and the complexity of events, most people tend to judge nations, other people, and professions by stereotypes. The jail officer and his profession are no exception to this rule, as the following case studies illustrate.

Case Study 1:

Since her graduation from a local university two years ago, Lorna Green has worked as a jail officer. She graduated from college with honors, and participated in several professional criminal justice organizations at the state and national level. Since she began working at the jail, she has also become active in civic affairs in her community. When she started working at the jail, Lorna was at first shocked by the profanity used by the inmates and some of the jail staff. Later she repeated some of the vulgar phrases and words she had heard in the institution in front of friends and acquaintances. She rationalized that using this language marked her as a sophisticated practitioner in the real world of criminal justice. It wasn't long before people who had heard her use this language began to form a judgment (or stereotype) about women who work in institutions. "Women who work in jail talk the exact same way as the low grade floozy in the streets," her civilian friends were saying. "If they talk the same, they must act the same." In the months that followed, Lorna Green found herself forced to argue with people in the community that women in corrections were not immoral women. She never realized that her own personal choice of words months before served as the origin of the current belief in the community.

Case Study 2:

Sergeant Ralph Winter of the local jail was having marital problems with his wife of 15 years. He struck up a friendship with the sheriff's secretary, and soon they were noticed on a regular basis in several of the better known night spots in town. One of his youngsters came home from school one afternoon crying and told his mother,

"Daddy is going out with another woman!" Sergeant Winter's wife packed a suitcase and, taking the children, moved across town to her parents' house. When Sergeant Winter found this out, he and the secretary, just recently divorced, set up housekeeping in his home. His attitude as he expressed it to a fellow worker was, "It's my life, and I'll live the way I want to as long as I don't break the law." What kind of image does Sergeant Winter present to the citizens in his town?

These two examples graphically illustrate how people in the community can form negative opinions about correctional personnel from the manner in which jail officers behave in their community. The two officers in these case studies, Lorna Green and Ralph Winter, worked for the local jail and, because of the way they acted, people in the community formed the opinion that *all* jail personnel did not have good morals. One of the problems that these two officers failed to recognize is that correctional personnel too often make the mistake of defining community relations too narrowly - thinking that it only concerns relationships with organizations which might be directly involved with the jail. These professional types of relationships are an important part of community relations, but beneficial involvement with a community group working to assist in developing jail programs means that the jail personnel who deal with these citizens must realize that the jail itself will be judged by the personal life styles of its employees. The administrator of the jail would probably think twice before he asked either Ralph or Lorna to represent the institution at a public meeting or program. He knows that the institution is judged by the way the jail officers live their lives, which may be reflected in such small things as paying one's bills on time, avoiding public misconduct while under the influence of alcohol, or just plain courteous behavior. These actions will often determine what people think about the jail.

ATTITUDES

An attitude is a manner of acting, feeling, or thinking that shows one's disposition. An attitude can be called a predisposition to act. An opinion is an expression of an attitude.

Jail officers have a great influence on the attitudes of inmates, since the officer's role can be described as being a priest, social worker, psychiatrist, disciplinarian, commander, and arbitrator. The atmosphere in the jail - whether it is a calm one or a turbulent one - reflects the tone set by those in authority: the sheriff and his officers. To have a well-organized jail where the needs of both the community and inmates are met, a sheriff and his chief administrator should select officers for jail duty who have the potential to develop the many skills required to be a proficient jail employee. The ideal jail officer is a person whose attitudes

exemplify enough authority for inmates to accept his commands, while at the same time feeling that the officer is concerned about them. This is easy to say, but it is sometimes difficult to put into practice. For example, how does an officer feel who has been punched, kicked, stabbed, cursed, or had a cup of urine thrown on him by an angry, irrational inmate? No one would disagree that he would be angry and upset! These types of assaults, both verbal and physical, force the officer to deal with his own feelings. If he does not think about these problems and how he should react, he may develop attitudes toward inmates which are bitter, cynical, and contemptuous.

Unfortunately, there are people who work in jails who consider inmates to be less than human. This attitude results in part from the working jail environment, where violence and cursing seem to be part of a never ending cycle. However, it is reasonable to expect that better attitudes can prevail, leading to a better jail climate.

What can the staff do to bring this about? *The most important rule to follow is: Treat the inmate with respect! The best practice, unless local policies dictate otherwise, is to refer to all inmates, incoming or outgoing, by the titles Mr., Mrs., Miss, or Ms. This is a common courtesy which everyone expects in dealing with others. Why should someone who has been arrested or convicted expect any less? The jail officer should avoid calling inmates by their first names or by their last names only. Inmates are not children nor are they military recruits. However, those inmates who have been in and out of the local jail year in and year out might be the exception, but generally the rule holds. This rule deals with the self-esteem of the inmate (how he feels about himself). The way he is addressed and treated by the jail officer can affect the way the inmate serves his time.*

Case Study 3:

Officer Max Whitson made it a practice to act in a pleasant, but neutral manner. He didn't make friends with the inmates, but when an inmate asked him a question he always answered in a civil, polite tone. When inmates made reasonable requests he saw that these requests were conveyed to the proper authorities. One day inmate Bob Ronson asked to speak with Officer Whitson in private. He revealed that inmate John Rotter had a pistol concealed in his mattress and would attempt a breakout on the 4-to-12 shift. While the inmates were outside for their recreation period, officers entered inmate Rotter's cell and confiscated the weapon. Rotter was later brought up on charges and confessed that his grandmother had brought the weapon in over the Christmas holidays when more packages were allowed into the jail. Later inmate Ronson told Officer Whitson, "You always treated me decent, and I figured you had a right to know - I didn't want to see you get hurt if Rotter tried to escape."

Personal Problems Affect Staff Attitudes

Jail personnel have been advised to be sympathetic listeners to inmates who feel the need to talk with them. They have also been counseled not to give advice to inmates and not to divulge information to them about either staff problems or the problems of other inmates. As a matter of practice, jail officers should leave at home any personal problems which might affect their job performance. Worried, unhappy, frustrated officers have a way of communicating these negative attitudes to both inmates and other staff members.

It is a recognized human trait for a person to take out his frustrations on "substitutes," such as inmates or fellow employees. This is done by both staff and inmates. There are many resources for counseling, therapy, and psychological help for inmates who ask for it, but there is a need for this same kind of help for officers, since correctional work in jails is stress producing.

An officer who senses that something is seriously wrong with a fellow officer *has a duty* to inform his supervisor. To ignore a fellow officer's problems is foolhardy, for the officer under stress can affect the security of the institution itself. At best the officer's problem is something that can be handled successfully by counseling from his supervisors and the officer will be put back on the right track. At worst, if the officer's personal problems are extremely serious, the supervisor might be forced to conclude that the pressures of the job have burned the officer out and help should be given to him to find other employment.

Case Study 4:

Officer Barkus O'Reily drank four martinis before reporting for duty on the midnight shift. It was a quiet night and soon the officer was snoozing peacefully. His friend, Shift Commander Richard Ricard, tried to contact him during his check of the cell blocks and, getting no response, hastened to the booking area where he found Officer O'Reily asleep. The officer awoke and pleaded with the shift commander not to report the incident to Jail Administrator Bickford. Ricard refused, telling his friend, "Barkus, your irresponsible action jeopardized the lives of the staff and inmates in this institution, and it shouldn't be allowed to continue. Others have told me you have a drinking problem, but now I see it for myself." Officer O'Reily was granted a hearing by the jail administrator and ultimately he was suspended for four days. Jail Administrator Bickford suggested that O'Reily contact the local Alcoholics Anonymous chapter to see about getting some help for his drinking problem. O'Reily said he had no drinking problem and refused to go to AA. He died two days later in an automobile collision in which he was the driver. The autopsy revealed a heavy quantity of alcohol in his blood.

MINORITY RELATIONS

People in the United States whose skin color isn't white are called minorities, although certain religious and ethnic groups might also be labeled "minorities" depending on the geographical area in which they live. The two largest minorities by skin color in this nation are the blacks and the browns. In some counties the minority group is the American Indian and, in Alaska, it is the Eskimo.

"Minority" as defined in this sense refers to numbers. There are roughly 220 million people in the United States, of which 22½ million are black; and six million are brown, most of whom speak Spanish as their mother tongue, although some come from countries as far away as the Philippines, Pakistan, and India. People of oriental ancestry (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, etc.), also live in the United States, but these numbers are smaller than the blacks and browns.

Some people argue that if America could solve the problem of poverty, it could solve the problem of crime as it affects jails. Whether this is true or not will not be debated here, but it is important for a jail officer to understand the background and circumstances from which so many of the inmates in his community come. It is recommended that officers who are studying for a college degree take a course in minority relations. The sheriff or jail administrator should also provide in-service training for officers in ethnic and minority relations, including classes dealing with cultural differences.

The Importance Of Language

It should not be assumed that because two people speak English they will always understand each other. Certain words and phrases used frequently in some neighborhoods are not used in others. Thus, a black inmate from a city ghetto might use terms a middle-class white or black jail officer would not understand. These are things officers should learn in training seminars and schools; it should not be left to chance or left to be learned piecemeal on the job.

Many jails and detention centers today print the rules and regulations in Spanish as well as in English. In Multnomah County, Oregon, for example, the rules are also printed in Russian to serve a minority group in that area. Opportunities to learn a foreign language are plentiful, and in jails where many inmates speak a foreign language, the officer might want to study this language.

Officers might say, "If foreigners live in the United States, let them learn English! Why should we learn their language?" Here is where the importance of attitudes comes in. How will an inmate who can't speak English feel toward a jail officer who tries to communicate with him in his

own language? Undoubtedly, the inmate will be more receptive to this officer than to the officer who would not make this extra effort. An officer who studies another language also benefits from learning about the history and culture of another country. This knowledge provides clues which are helpful in understanding the minority inmate.

Don't Discriminate

Most people retain some prejudices even if they don't recognize it. Jail officers who deal with minority persons must be careful not to open themselves up to charges that they favor one group over another. For example, a jail which frequently houses both black and white inmates might have the following situation: All of the five trustee jobs in the kitchen and laundry are filled by whites. Trustee jobs provide extra benefits such as cigarettes, larger sleeping quarters, and a small amount of pay. Black inmates may complain of discrimination since none of them have the trustee jobs. The jail officer might explain that two black inmates released last month worked in the kitchen, that currently several black inmates in the jail can't work in the kitchen because of medical reasons, and that Bill Brown, a black inmate, is in line for a laundry job tomorrow when the person now holding the job is released. *The rule is to treat everybody fairly and never play favorites.*

Sheriffs and jail administrators whose institutions consistently house minority inmates must make an effort to recruit qualified black and brown citizens to fill some of the jail officer positions. Jail officers of minority origins can be helpful in dealing with minority inmates at the language and cultural level and play a role in the education of the white correctional staff.

Women As Officers In The Jail

Although the United States has more women than men, women are referred to as a minority because of their long history of discriminatory treatment. Women traditionally have held jobs in the jails as matrons in charge of the women's section or handling juveniles. The push for equal rights has opened new job opportunities for women and some now function as successful administrators of jails. However, one major question seems to be whether women should be permitted to work on the tiers where male inmates are housed. In some institutions they do and in others they do not.

Some male jail officers argue against the idea of women as line officers on the male tiers, suggesting that women who attempt this are vulnerable to physical and verbal abuse by the inmates. There is no evidence to show that this actually happens. The key is the *attitude* of the officer toward the inmates. If the woman officer manifests fear and uncertainty, then certainly the inmates will be inclined to exploit the situation. But this would be equally true of a male officer who showed fear and uncertainty.

If the woman officer shows by her composure that she is in charge of the situation, that by her actions she treats the inmates fairly, and that she can be trusted to keep her word, the tier will have few problems.

Case Study 5:

Officer Linda Stenson had just completed jail officer training and had been on the job for about one month. One evening just after supper when she was making her rounds on the tier, inmate Harley Rollo rushed to the front of his cell, called the officer by name, and pointed to his exposed genitals. Instead of getting flustered, Officer Stenson told inmate Rollo that he was acting like a little kid and would not be permitted to see the weekly movie in the recreation area. "Furthermore," she said, "if it happens again, you won't be permitted dining room privileges, and you can eat your meals in your cell."

Another argument against assigning women officers to the tiers is the privacy of the inmates in their quarters. A male inmate might argue that a woman has no right to be in the area where he has to change clothes, take a shower, or use the toilet facilities. Common sense is the key. A woman officer can indicate her presence on the tier by the use of her voice and, where security is not an issue, shower curtains can afford a degree of privacy.

The advantage of a woman officer in the men's section should also be considered. Any time people are segregated by sex and kept under lock and key, restricting freedom of movement, an unnatural situation is created. In all societies the two sexes function in a variety of roles. A woman officer's presence in a men's section of the jail can help maintain a better psychological climate among the male inmates.

INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION PRINCIPLES

Communication can be defined as the act of transmitting information. It can be one-sided, such as the information which comes to us by television, radio, newspapers, books, movies, and letters, or it can be interpersonal - communication between two or more people in which information is exchanged.

Communication within the jail involves the exchange of information between inmates, between jail officers, or between the officers and the inmates. To a lesser degree, information is also exchanged in the jail by officers and inmates who phone people in the community.

There is also a formal communication process in the jail - this formal process consists of written jail policies. Many jails also have a

handbook, or written list of rules and regulations, which is issued to inmates when they enter the jail. When inmates are unable to read, these rules should be explained to them verbally by jail personnel.

Most interpersonal communication in the jail is informal. For example, officers talking over lunch in the dining room or inmates chatting in their cells are participating in the process of informal communication, something all people do everyday. Anything communicated outside of official channels would be informal, the so-called "grape-vine," such as when an inmate reports to the cell block supervisor in a private conference that there are illegal drugs for sale on the tier. For the safety of the inmate, this kind of valuable, informal communication must be kept secret from the rest of the inmates who might think of this person as a "snitch."



What image do you project?

Communication By Appearance

The way a person dresses communicates a message. An officer on duty should be wearing a spotless uniform, freshly pressed, with shoes shined. Sloppy, unkempt officers set a bad example for inmates; poorly dressed officers can cause inmates to lose respect for the officers' authority.

Communication By Mood

Although some organizations stress a cheerful attitude at all times and want each employee to give everyone a smile, this would appear to be an ideal rather than reality. There will simply be days when a person won't feel like life is a bowl of cherries. However, no matter how he personally feels, every officer on duty should be expected to speak to fellow staff members and inmates in a civil tongue - even when provoked. It is poor procedure for an officer to communicate his personal bad moods to other people in the jail. When officers make a practice of verbalizing their frustrations and hostilities on the

job, it can only poison the climate of the jail. There is a time and place to ventilate these feelings and this time and place isn't on the job in front of co-workers and inmates.



Jail officers should not vent their frustrations and hostilities in the presence of inmates.

Looking at this situation realistically, jail officers will receive from inmates a certain amount of hostile comments generated by situations and circumstances which the officer is not responsible for and over which he has no control.

Case Study 6:

Inmate Jones, whose wife is divorcing him and whose lawyer failed to convince the judge to release him on bail, begins the day by griping and complaining to Officer Jenson. This situation soon degenerates into Jones making hostile remarks to the officer. The immediate reaction of Officer Jenson could be to reply in kind, letting Jones know what a rotten person he is. However, the appropriate way to deal with this is for Officer Jenson to inform Jones that his troubles can't be solved by swearing at the officer and that he should talk with the counselor or chaplain about the problem. They might be able to help him. Officer Jenson should also tell Jones that the jail has a rule against using profanity and that if he keeps it up, he will be brought up for disciplinary action.

Things To Avoid In Communication

Private business: Officers are encouraged to listen sympathetically to inmates who have problems without providing a lot of free advice. The listening posture has the healthful effect of letting an inmate air his problems. For example, inmate John O'Reilly tells Officer Drantz a sad story about his son who has cerebral palsy and is only 10 years old. Officer Drantz has a handicapped daughter about the same age and is sorely tempted to relate his tale of woe to inmate O'Reilly, for he feels a common bond with the inmate in a similar dilemma. However, Officer Drantz remembers what he was taught in training school about developing friendly, personal relationships with the inmates and doesn't tell his story. He knows that if familiarity is encouraged between inmates and officers, then the officers tend to become more lax about security and begin to overlook infractions of the jail rules. He understands that familiarity corrodes the discipline in the jail itself. An officer can be polite and helpful to inmates without involving himself in their lives or involving them in his personal affairs.

Humorous or cruel remarks at the inmate's expense: It seems unnecessary to repeat the obvious, but officers should be extremely careful of making fun at the inmate's expense or saying something to place the inmate in a position of ridicule. For example, Officer Fonz laughed at inmate Jenkins' chest tattoo with the word "mother" inscribed inside a valentine heart. Jenkins' mother had died in an auto accident the week before. Jenkins took a belligerent stance and broke Officer Fonz's nose.

Officers should be careful, too, when inmates begin teasing or verbally assaulting other inmates. This type of inmate behavior can provoke fights and disrupt routine in the institution. It is important for officers to order inmates to stop the teasing the moment it is noticed.

Case Study 7:

Officers Edward Spry and Barney York broke up two fights in one tour of duty. In both instances inmate Rusty Chamber was involved. After conferring with the shift commander, it was decided to transfer inmate Chamber to a single cell in another wing of the jail. Chamber thought of himself as tough and told the two officers that they were gutless and afraid to come into the cell block to get him. Officer York relished the idea of an encounter with inmate Chamber, but Officer Spry, exercising good judgment, told York to hold it. Spry radioed the shift commander, who soon appeared with two other officers. Inmate Chamber offered no resistance when the five officers entered the cell block after the other inmates were locked back into their cells. Later the shift commander told Officer York it was not his business to "prove to inmate Chamber" that he wasn't afraid of him. He said, "York, don't let your ego feelings get the best of you. Good control of a cell block means you only use physical force as a last resort."

You have to be smart enough not to let the inmate provoke you into a fight."



Orders from a jail officer to an inmate must be clear and concise.

Shop. You're too smart for your own damn good! Worthless people like you we can't waste our time on! You can bet your bottom dollar you don't get any more chances here. I'll fix it so you do dead time up on the tier until the trial, and I hope the judge buries you in the system for 20 years!"

At times, many jail officers feel the urge to lecture criminals who they see coming back into the system for the second, third, fourth, fifth, and twentieth time. This is clearly an unprofessional approach. It is not the duty of the jail officer to pass judgment on the inmate, whether he is a small-time recidivist or a person accused of a particularly heinous crime.

Unclear orders from staff:
To be terrific, be specific! For example, Officer Conroy told the men on B Tier that he wanted the area to look spotless. The inmates spent several hours scrubbing floors and straightening up their cells. When Conroy returned from court he lectured the inmates on their poor job of cleaning because they didn't wax the floor. Officer Conroy was at fault since he didn't tell them he wanted the floor waxed. People cannot be expected to be mind readers. When one wants orders to be carried out, they must be given in a clear, understandable manner.

The desire to moralize: Mr. Elrek and Mr. Drof stood before Booking Officer Rensom for the second time in less than a year. They had just been rearrested on charges of bootlegging, fencing stolen goods, breaking and entering, and forgery. Officer Rensom was irate. "We gave you two lousy bums every chance in the book," he told Elrek and Drof. "You got your GED here, you got eight months training in welding school, the AA counselor finally got you off the booze, and the work release director found you good jobs in the Brick Body

This is the job of the court. The function of the jail is to punish the inmate by depriving him of his freedom.

The desire on the part of officers to moralize and pass judgment can cause trouble in the institution. For example, the booking officer tells the tier runner that inmate X, who has been recently brought to the jail, is accused of molesting children. Inmate X is found unconscious the following day, the result of a terrible beating from other inmates on the cell block. Realistically, it's difficult to keep secrets in a jail setting, but the officers should never inform other inmates about what a person has been convicted of. Jails have enough problems without an additional judgment from impromptu inmate "kangaroo courts."

The debating stance: Inmate Juco spends a great deal of his spare time writing letters to the local newspaper, several of which have been published recently. The letters to the editor have focused on subjects such as the quality of the jail food, the lack of adequate recreation and medical care, and the lack of a chance to study and learn a trade. Though there is some truth in Juco's commentary, much of it is exaggerated and distorted. Officer Earl Fox confronts Juco in his cell and begins a point by point refutation of Juco's arguments. This in turn encourages Juco to rebut the officer's arguments. Soon a heated debate is underway.

A good officer will never bring up a subject such as an inmate's letter to the editor any more than he would argue national and local politics with an inmate, or comment on the outcome of any trial.

If Officer Fox feels strongly enough about the letter to the editor, he might write a letter himself for, after all, he is concerned that the reading public get another version of the situations inmate Juco described in his letters. However, it is a good idea to check with the supervisor and reread the jail policy manual before mailing a letter to the editor.

SUMMARY

1. A jail officer is not just a security guard: he can have a significant impact upon the attitudes and the behavior of inmates.

The jail officer has three other important roles in addition to security: he is a change agent, a "broker" who helps inmates with their problems, and a community relations officer. Since the jail officer spends a great deal of time with inmates, he can be most influential in motivating change in the behavior of inmates, both while incarcerated and after their release.

2. The mission of the jail depends on the judgment of the jail officer and his ability to communicate effectively with both inmates and fellow employees.

If the officer is hostile, discriminatory, and has a negative attitude, this attitude will negatively influence the behavior and attitudes of inmates and other jail employees. The mission of the jail involves returning inmates to society with positive attitudes. It is a major part of the jail officer's role to encourage the development of these positive attitudes through effective communication with inmates.


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CHAPTER SIX

DEALING WITH STRESS

The road deputy or sheriff's academy graduate newly assigned to duty in the jail really doesn't know what to expect. Other officers may have told him that the jail is a terrible place, a zoo, a large, well-populated garbage can, a mass collection of losers, a snake pit, and so on. The officer may enter the jail believing that a career in law enforcement would give him the opportunity to help at the scene of an accident, chase bank robbers, rush into a burning building to save a mother or child, or pull a baby out of a swimming pool and bring her back to life by rendering mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.



The new officer has dreams.

But once he is assigned to the jail, the officer soon realizes that he will have to fight the "big guys" without benefit of a radio

or gun. He starts to see himself as a person who is required to be "nice" and take care of inmates who have killed or hurt someone, or defied the very society the officer has taken an oath to protect and the laws he has sworn to enforce.

With some degree of resentment and considerable anxiety, the new officer shows up for work, checks his gun at the gun drawer or lock-up cabinet, hangs up his new hat, and reports to the desk sergeant for his assignment. The sergeant is busy handling desk matters or reading the paper and might only grunt as the officer reports for duty. Quick introductions to a cell block partner are made and the new officer is ready to begin work. He may be assigned to jail duty for the next 20 to 25 years or the next two years, depending upon whether his department has a fixed rotation system or whether the officer has been hired to work in the jail as a regular fulltime jail staff member.

CAUSES OF JAILER STRESS

The day shift is the least stressful for the jail officer and time will pass quickly. The officer will be supervising inmates in their personal hygiene, meals, and jail clean-up duties. Since inmates will be busy working with each other and meeting with attorneys and visitors, the jail officer will probably have little direct contact with them. In addition, many inmates will be transported to the courts for preliminary hearings, trials, or sentencing and, if they are given probation or sentenced to prison, they will be moving out. In some jails, the inmates will be involved for lengthy periods of time with work assignments, group therapy and counseling sessions, and vocational rehabilitation programs.

However, after the evening meal is served, inmates become restless since there is less to do. There is increased contact between jail officers and the inmates at this time, and some of these contacts may be hostile. Some inmates experience disappointments during the day because a visitor failed to show, a legal defense was unsuccessful, a sentence was more severe than hoped, or word was received that a wife filed for divorce. Tension, frustration, and anger mount and hostility may surface. Inmates may attack one another or the jail officer. The officer's own tension begins to mount, and he decides that he will physically intervene to stop explosive behavior as soon as he sees it coming.

On the midnight shift the atmosphere in the jail may still be tense from the afternoon shift. The cell block may look messy because inmates have thrown papers out of their cells, have stopped up toilets (especially in older jails), and have tossed wet paper everywhere. An inmate may have thrown feces or urine at someone and the stench from that aggressive behavior will stay in the officer's nose for the rest of the night, even after he has finished his shift and gone home.

As the officer makes his nightly rounds, his flashlight beam may pick up the silent form of an inmate spread-eagled on the floor where he fell after strangling himself with a bed sheet or a twisted rope he made from torn pieces of clothing. The dead inmate's eyes will stare up at the officer, his tongue will be hanging out, and he may have moved his bowels as he died, creating an unpleasant smell. No matter how personally upsetting this scene is to the officer, he will have to stay near the body until homicide investigators arrive or a supervisor orders the body to be removed. The officer may resent finding himself in this situation and, as a result, become tense and hostile.

Because nights are cooler, windows in the jail can be opened for ventilation during the midnight shift. During the day, especially during the summer, the officers and inmates in many jails may feel as if they are in a furnace. The unbearable heat makes some officers feel like tigers and their tempers begin to match those of the inmates. As a result, there is a great deal of snarling and angry exchanges between officers and inmates, making the day a little worse for everyone.

Because of the heat and the officer's general depression about having to work under such conditions, he may begin to pay less attention to his personal appearance. Then his sergeant will "get on his back" and remind him that he is working within a paramilitary structure. A natural reaction for the officer is to begin to dislike the sergeant as much as he dislikes the inmates and the jail. However, the officer can't express his hostile feelings to the sergeant. The tense officer may either decide to share his feelings with a partner on the cell block or wrongfully take out his frustrations on the inmates.

Adding to any stress the officer may feel about working at the jail are the windows broken by inmates who are frustrated and angry about being locked up, or are so hot because of the excessively warm temperature that they break a window just to get some air. The officer may not want to blame the inmates for these destructive acts because he has to breathe the same hot, stale air.

Along with the broken windows and toilets, there is the problem created by the razor blade count. When an officer passes out the blades and doesn't get the right count back, someone has a weapon. The officer is responsible and has to find those missing blades. The inmates are not going to cooperate and will hide anything because having a weapon gives them a feeling of personal power.

For the jail officer, the various types of stress-producing situations described above will be a continuous part of his daily work life.

Adding to these pressures, the officer may find that many of the rules and policies he is asked to follow are either poorly explained or written. If he interprets the rules incorrectly, he may be subject to disciplinary procedures. The supervision the officer receives may add more confusion concerning how he works and the way in which he interprets the policies and rules. Some of the officer's supervisors may also be newly assigned to the jail and are not aware of changes in policies or new governmental regulations regarding how things should be done at the jail. Perhaps the officer's supervisor considers his views to be either "too social-scientific" or "new-fangled" and impractical for handling jail administration. Perhaps the supervisor was promoted because of an "affirmative action" policy and is not actually ready for any type of supervisory or command position. Sometimes a person who had been promoted through an "affirmative action" program may feel a sense of personal triumph and practice discrimination himself; he may unconsciously exploit the situation and seek some type of revenge against the "system" through power. If a jail officer has this type of supervisor, he may find himself working under stress.

Case Study 1:

As the result of a lawsuit filed by Rattlesnake County employees charging county officials with discrimination in hiring and promotion policies, the U. S. Justice Department developed an "affirmative action plan" for the Sheriff's Department, as well as for several other county agencies. The sheriff agreed to hire black and Mexican-American officers and more women officers. He also agreed to develop fair and valid promotional examinations and procedures.

When the next sergeant's exam was given at the jail, the officer who received the highest overall score was Elizabeth Tolstoy, an eight-year veteran of the Sheriff's Department. Since sergeants serve as shift supervisors, the sheriff had no choice--he removed Sgt. Tolstoy from duty in the women's cell block and assigned her to supervise "C" squad for the entire jail.

During her many years as an officer, Sgt. Tolstoy had often been harrassed by male officers, who told her that "a woman's place is in the home" and she ought to "leave jail work to men, who have families to support." After her promotion, Sgt. Tolstoy found herself supervising several of the male officers who had made these comments. She especially disliked one of the officers on "C" Squad--Jordan Hamilton, who had been very sarcastic and rude to her.

Changing into her uniform in the locker room before starting her first day as "C" Squad supervisor, Sgt. Tolstoy told her close friend, Officer Peggy Sampson, that she was worried.

"I'm afraid Hamilton is going to try to sabotage my work as a supervisor," she said.

"Well, what you've got to do is get even with that chauvinist pig," Officer Sampson replied. "If I were in your shoes, I'd assign him the crummiest jobs on the shift, like strip-searching all the drunks and junkies who are brought in. If you're lucky, some of them will throw up on him."

"I thought about that," Sgt. Tolstoy said, "but it would probably make things worse in the long run. What I think I ought to do is kill him with kindness. He won't know how to handle that and he'll have to respond in kind or the other men will get on his back."

"Hey, Liz, maybe you've got something there!" Officer Sampson laughed. "Dumb old Hamilton won't know what hit him!"

After four weeks of supervising Officer Hamilton, a 20-year veteran, and "killing him with kindness," Sgt. Tolstoy found that he was becoming her most trusted assistant on "C" Squad. He was making an extra effort to keep the inmates orderly, and he was helping two rookie officers assigned to the squad. He also confided in Sgt. Tolstoy that he "would like to be a sergeant one of these days, but I don't do so hot on the written tests." Sgt. Tolstoy began to realize that Hamilton would make a good sergeant, now that he was taking the "chip" off his shoulder.




In addition, the jail administrator told Sgt. Tolstoy that he had heard Officer Hamilton bragging to an officer on another shift: "We got the best damn squad in this jail! You guys on the other squads got a long way to go to touch us! Our sergeant, even if she is a broad, really knows how to keep this jail running smooth!"

This case study illustrates how a sergeant, promoted on the basis of her own abilities and who found herself supervising a potentially hostile group of male officers, turned the "affirmative action" promotion into a positive situation for everyone. Sgt. Tolstoy did not permit herself to take revenge against Officer Hamilton, even though she had the "power" to do so. By her positive actions, she lessened the stress factors for the officers assigned to her squad.

The condition of the jail itself can be stress-producing. Most jails are old and are like tombs. These facilities stay that way because many government officials consider jails to be the lowest priority on their budget allocation list. In some areas, city officials or county boards of commissioners think that anything positive for the jail is equivalent to "mollycoddling" the offenders. The officer might feel that way himself, except in this instance, he shares the same poor facilities even though he didn't commit any crimes. In the colder climates officers

in old jail buildings will sweat in the winter because there is no thermostatic control. In the summer they will roast because windows must be closed during the day, especially in large cities, and there is no air conditioning. Thus, at the end of the work day the officer will be sweaty, soaked, more tired than usual, and feel "dragged out." His mounting sense of frustration brought about by inhumane working conditions may be a source of stress factors for him as well.


In addition to the temperature extremes existing in the jail, there are other stress factors produced by the work setting. The cell blocks are physically close. As the officer locks everyone in, he locks himself in as well. Others in law enforcement see a change of scenery during patrol or while transporting prisoners to court or to prison. But however long he works, the jail officer will be seeing the same scenery (bars, inmates, toilets, elevators, and heavy doors) day after day.



(Unconformable toilet area)

(Trash receptacle)


DAY ROOM



(Recombination of space)


(Violation of cell line)

WOMEN'S CELL



(Deteriorating fixtures)

DAY ROOM




(Deteriorating floor)

(Trash)

(Unsanitary conditions)

DAY ROOM



Other Sources Of Stress

The jail officer's friends, relatives, and even neighbors might not understand that what he does as a jailer is an important function of law enforcement and criminal justice. Some people feel that the jail officer is a "big, dumb brute who couldn't make it in some more esteemed profession" (the stereotyping problem described in Chapter Five). After a while the officer might begin to feel that way too for various reasons. For example, promotions may be slow. Some of the supervisors may not want to listen to the officer's suggestions about policy changes or improving conditions in the jail. The officer may begin to feel "stuck" in a job that does not permit him to learn more or to work for change. It may appear that no one really seems to care about the officer's feelings or advice. The officer might feel that he can tolerate his job if he doesn't make ripples in the pond and doesn't let others know how he feels. He may think a few drinks after work will ease the pain. If the officer handles his feelings in this manner, he will become a victim of jailer stress and lose in the long run.

Although dealing with people can be exciting, especially when some of the inmates admitted to the jail have been involved in well-publicized cases, jail inmates are generally hostile about being incarcerated, creating problems for the officers who work in the cell blocks. The inmates more than likely resent the officials who want to keep them locked up. Some inmates may want to play the role of "victim" and, after trying to deal with inmate feelings of being victimized, the officer may begin to feel like a victim himself.

The jail officer has to adjust to the reality that inmates do not share his values or live by his rules. The officer has been taught to trust people, to be friendly, and to expect that others are moral and nice. Working in the jail, he will learn not to trust anyone and not to turn his back on an inmate or visitor. While the officer is figuring out a way to keep inmates in jail, they are figuring out a way to get out. Such a situation might be stressful for the officer because it is so different from the way he lives at home, away from the jail world.

Another source of disappointment the officer may feel is that there are few opportunities for promotions at the jail. He may have friends within the sheriff's department who are on road patrol or others who work in a prison where there are better chances for advancement. Perhaps the jail in which he works is rather small and provides for few supervisors compared to other jurisdictions. Even if the jail staff is larger, there may be few supervisors who are ready to retire; thus, promotional opportunities are limited. Defining the future in terms of advancement almost stops for some officers when they begin to work in the jail. As a result the officers may feel discouraged and upset about their jail assignment.

When the officer leaves home for work or is on the way home and is in uniform (and possibly even in a scout car), he may find himself itching for action when he sees a major traffic offender driving recklessly or comes upon a crime in progress. He has a gun, radio, and uniform, and he is ready for action. The officer has even made sure he has the offender dead right, but in many cases he can't do anything about it; he may have received orders to proceed directly to his assignment and is forbidden to involve himself in any type of accident or street crime investigation. As he drives right by the scene of action, the officer will probably feel a churning in his stomach, due to the contradictory circumstances in which he has been placed. He is a member of the criminal justice system, but he can't do more than his job at the jail. Thus he asks himself: "Is this what I applied for? There I was, proud to be a peace officer when I got out of the academy. Now, here I am, a tired, discouraged, and unhappy jailer."

Adding to the stress of working conditions are the jail psychiatrists and social workers, who often consider themselves to be better than jail officers, or are perceived to think that way. Sometimes these civilians do not understand the jail officer's problems in dealing with the inmates and are not available as often as the officer would like. Sometimes they function just to see who needs medication rather than selecting out inmates who need counseling. After a while, the jail officer may realize that *he* is the person who talks to the inmates and listens to their problems, except he makes considerably less than \$50.00 an hour. If an inmate is disturbed, the mental health staff usually will expect the jail officer to handle him. The doctors and social workers may come around for an evaluation *after* the inmate is secure or they may settle for medicating him without further evaluation or counseling help. On the other hand, the jail officer may be working in a jail where even that type of mental health service looks very good. At one time, in the early 1970s, no more than 13 percent of all jails had any specific type of psychiatric consultation available. Things are changing for the better now.

The jail officer will be able to appreciate the importance of a mental health consultant not only for inmates but also for himself. Dealing with people who talk to themselves, become irrationally violent, may try to commit suicide, may chew on their own bodies, or smear or eat feces or drink urine, is nerve-racking for anyone. A jailer can expect that at least 75 percent of the jail's inmates will have some serious type of psychiatric problem. In most jails, he will be the one to control the inmates and deal with them. If there are no mental health resources for the jail, the officer will find that his work is very stressful.

At times, personal problems cause stress for the officer, especially if there is no one he can talk to. If the jail has a counselor, the officer may fear that his private problems will become a matter of public record. He might be working at a jail where the local government has not offered a major medical plan which covers private out-patient psychiatric treatment or counseling. Even if the officer can afford such care, he might find it hard to locate a psychiatrist or psychologist who can understand his problems as they relate to working in a jail or in law enforcement. Such a therapist might resort to medicating the officer, as inmates are handled in the jail, causing additional problems for the officer instead of helping him.

When the officer arrives home from work, he might decide to clam up about sharing his jail experiences with his family. This decision may come from some misguided idea that as a good husband and father, or good wife and mother, the officer should protect his or her family from the seamy side of life in the jail. The officer may find it difficult to discuss what happens in the jail on a daily basis, or he may feel that no one except another jailer could either be interested or capable of listening to such stories and feelings about working in a jail. As the officer is busy trying to protect his family members from the realities of jail work, they are becoming more angry with him because they do not know him, can't appreciate his problems at work, and see him as a "nothing person" with a soft government job in which he sits around all day and does little more than lock people up and "babysit" them. If the officer feels stressed because he can't win the respect of his family, he may have to recognize that he has played a role in bringing that situation about. Many wives of jail officers and policemen who obtain a divorce tell psychiatrists that they left their husbands because they couldn't get them to open up and share feelings or talk about work experiences. Such wives hold the view that their spouses are cold and distant.



"Don't bug me, Lucille. I've had a bad enough day already. I just don't feel like talking."

Among the many stress-producing factors for jail officers is the method in which inmates are tried for crimes. The inmate may be a cold-blooded and vicious killer or rapist who has done terrible things to other people. Yet, when he goes to court, he is no longer taking drugs, is clean-shaven, has a haircut, and is wearing a suit--the inmate now looks like a businessman or college student. The jury will not see him as he appeared at the time of the crime, and they won't see how he acts in jail either. The inmate's attorney, character witnesses, and the inmate himself will try to make a favorable impression upon the jury. His attorney will fight all efforts to introduce murder scene photographs, lurid descriptions of the victim, and a signed confession given by the inmate after he had been advised of his right to keep silent by the arresting officers.

Perhaps because of a legal technicality, a dangerous person will escape criminal responsibility. The inmate may succeed in convincing the jury that he was insane at the time of the crime although the jail officer has watched him day in and day out acting as though he never needed a psychiatrist. The officer may be very angry about what he considers to be the "injustices" of the courts and the jury system.

Even if such a dangerous criminal is convicted, the officer might see him gain probation or a sentence which the officer feels is too light for the inmate's offense and character. Thus, the outcome of a trial can be stressful and upsetting to a jail officer.

On the other hand, there may be some inmates who receive a heavy blow from the court in terms of sentencing or even a verdict of guilty when the officer thinks they are innocent. In a case like that, it may be personally difficult for the officer to assist in getting them ready for their transfer to a prison. As distressing as this will be, there are other disappointments the officer may feel about not being able to help inmates get psychiatric consultation because none is available, or not being able to offer a listening ear or actual help to distressed relatives of the inmate. The officer wanted to become a jail officer so he could help others; but in actual practice he may find that some jail policies interfere with his ability to achieve that role expectation. For example, when the young wife of an inmate visits him, and the officer senses that she is struggling with her children and their economic survival because the breadwinner is incarcerated, it would be human and effective to be able to refer her to a social worker in the jail. However, if there is no social service department and the officer is instructed not to talk to relatives other than to check them for pass privileges, he will feel frustrated about the scope of what he wants to do and *can* do.

The jail officer will know when he is under stress. In addition to the stress-producing factors described previously, his own body will tell him he may be suffering from stress. Physical problems which are often induced by stress include hypertension, severe head-

aches, stomach or intestinal trouble, diarrhea, or some neurological symptom, such as trembling hands and unexpectedly dropping things. The officer under stress might start to feel fidgety, tense, and nervous inside; he might start to nervously overeat, or conversely, lose his appetite. He might suffer from insomnia or be constantly tired and sleep too much.

Case Study 2:

Officers Lorna and David Hamburger both work for the Big Sky County Sheriff's Department and have been married for three years. Until six months ago both of them were road deputies, but then David was assigned to the jail as a cell block patrol officer.

After he had been working in the jail for five months, David began to change his behavior, which worried Lorna. When his shift ended, David went out drinking with other jail officers and then, after he arrived home, he "parked" in front of the TV with a six-pack of beer and didn't move. He usually fell asleep watching TV. He gradually lost interest in Lorna and their two-year-old son. In addition, he dropped out of college, even though he had only one semester to go before he graduated. He also began talking about resigning from the Air National Guard when his enlistment expired at the end of the year, even though Guard summer camp had always been one of his favorite activities.

Lorna finally decided to discuss her family problems with her supervisor, Sgt. Oscar Frankfurter, since she felt that her worries were affecting her own abilities as a patrol officer. Sgt. Frankfurter listened to Lorna's explanations of David's behavior and immediately recognized the symptoms of jail officer stress. He felt that the department needed to provide counseling to both David and Lorna or they might lose two good officers and contribute to a divorce.


After a few weeks of counseling sessions with the department's psychologist, David learned that he had to share his jail experiences with Lorna and get these frustrating experiences out of his system by talking about them. He began to realize that he was heading for disaster if he continued to bottle up his feelings about the jail. David learned that working in the jail is often stress-producing for officers and that alcohol is not the proper safety valve.

Lorna learned from her own counseling sessions with the psychologist that she had to stop "hinting" to David that he had been "demoted" by being assigned to the jail. The psychologist pointed out to her that she was making David feel inferior and thus alienating him. That was why he found drinking with his fellow jail officers more enjoyable than paying attention to her.

As a result of the counseling, both officers have been making sincere efforts to return to their previous behavioral patterns. David admits that he is actually beginning to enjoy his jail assignment, even though there are many stressful situations present on cell block patrols. He said he sees that the jail work is as important as road patrol, and he feels he can make a significant contribution by helping inmates who want to improve themselves. Lorna now feels that she has her husband "back" with his family after his "mental" vacation.

Last night David asked her if she wants to sign up with him for a jail officer's course being offered at the State University next semester. Sgt. Frankfurter told her David's idea was a good one and that she really ought to take the course with him.

"It will give you some good insights about the stress-producing problems jail officers face," the sergeant said.



Many jail officers are encouraged to participate in college classes.

WHAT AN OFFICER CAN DO ABOUT STRESS

With all these problems, why would anyone want to become a jail officer? Perhaps a sheriff's deputy doesn't have a choice in the matter. Perhaps the officer has too many years invested in the job, and he doesn't want to leave because of his age and pension benefits. Perhaps the officer likes the work, but has trouble living with and dealing with the stress of being a jailer.

There are ways to cope with stress which are more effective than smoking, drinking alcohol, using marijuana or other drugs, or letting off steam by becoming tough with inmates. Jail officers have tried all these methods of coping with stress but have found that these "escape devices" fail to actually help most officers who suffer from stress.

The first effective method of coping with job-related stress is to learn to recognize the value of the job. Anyone can handle road patrol and the more exciting types of police or criminal justice assignments. However, there are sources of stress for patrol officers, too. They also have overwhelming amounts of paper work; they keep rearresting the same offenders. But road deputies have little opportunity to do actual crime prevention. The jail officer does, however.

When an inmate is arrested and admitted to jail, he soon learns what real trouble is. This is especially true for the first offender. He doesn't know the ropes, doesn't know what to expect, how to work with an attorney, what to say, how to handle his family (which will be upset with his crime), and how to deal with other problems, such as losing his job and thinking about his future. If the jail doesn't have a social worker, it has the jail officers. Even if there is a social worker, he isn't there late at night when an inmate wants to talk with someone because he can't sleep. This is where the jail officer can step in and play a constructive, helpful role. The officer has seen people come and go, and he knows what it takes to survive in jail and how to stay straight when release occurs. The officer is the expert. Inmates will listen to him when he is really sincere and interested in them. However, the repeaters will not listen to him or seek him out. They have been around, and they tend to hang out with other repeaters to whom they turn for advice. But they get the wrong advice; that's one of the reasons they keep coming back. It is the first offender who will be more likely to listen to the officer. He hasn't yet decided to step into inmate society. If the officer can reach the first offender, he will feel better and so will the officer. It will be the officer's way of helping others, a way that fits the reason he wanted to work in the jail or police force. Not everyone who works patrol on the streets has the time or temperament to handle such a task. They're so busy answering calls, they often do not have time for crime prevention work with individual potential offenders. However, the jail officer has the skills and time to help inmates who want his assistance.

In some jails throughout the United States, officers have initiated programs with police-juvenile officers to invite young people who seem to be headed for trouble to tour selected parts of the jail. This type of approach has been an outgrowth of "Scared Straight" programs started by some prisons. A jail officer has the best opportunity to contact inmates who might want to participate in this type of program and do something helpful for youthful potential offenders. So long as this does not pose a security problem, this project may be an opportunity to bring a constructive program into the jail. It can offer the officer another opportunity to play the role of the helper he wanted to be when he applied for his job.



Youth Awareness type programs enhance the image of the jail officer and also educate the participants.

This picture shows a jail officer conducting a tour of the local jail facility.

What about the mentally or emotionally disturbed inmate? How can the officer deal with him, especially if a mental health worker is not available at his jail? There are several alternatives available. The officer can take psychology and social work courses at a local community college or university. His local book store or library can provide him with materials on crisis intervention, or if such materials are not available, the officer can contact the National Sheriffs' Association for a list of these resources. Another good source of reference materials is the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's National Criminal Justice Reference Service in Washington, which prepares printed bibliographies on selected topics; many of these reference materials are available at no charge to criminal justice personnel from the United States Justice Department. Taking the time to learn about crisis intervention skills provides many advantages to the officer: he becomes a person who acts, not one who waits around for someone else to do some-

thing. He becomes a professional, positive thinker who is able to solve problems. When the officer can take positive action on his own initiative, he can try new ideas and approaches with inmates, broadening the methods which he can use to communicate with people who need and really want his help.

Learning crisis intervention techniques might also help the jail officer form a special team of other officers who share the same interests. Such a team can be used to help a group of inmates who seem to be disturbed about events at the jail or in their lives. By using this approach as an individual or as a team, officers might be able to help reduce the kinds of tension which bring about wrist-cutting, window smashing, breaking toilets, and throwing urine and feces out through the bars at passers-by.

As an officer works toward expanding the quality of the service he renders, his basic attitude will show others around him, even at home or in his social circle, that he feels his job is important and rewarding. Not everyone could handle persons usually considered to be the toughest and worst members of our society. By learning more about techniques of human management, techniques with a special human touch, the officer will be able to realize an inner strength which he never felt was possible before. If he can reach a few inmates on his cell block and help them look at themselves with greater depth and greater determination to change their life styles, the officer will be able to see that his job is more important than simply detaining inmates while the courts decide what to do with them. Perhaps the officer can help the first offender inmate learn respect for members of the criminal justice system.

When the jail officer is confronted with inept or poor supervision, he can alleviate personal stress by improving the quality of his own work. The officer can become aggressive and seek out promotional opportunities so that he can lead other officers. Most jail supervisors today do not want to stand out as being uninformed or not in step with the times regarding new techniques for managing and approaching inmates. If they see that an officer can handle more responsibility, he will most likely be encouraged and recognized for what he is doing. There are many opportunities on the cell block to gain recognition for work, since officers can usually move about freely once the chores and administrative matters are out of the way. This time is available to work with inmates. If the inmates see that an officer is interested in doing a good job, they may work to help him with what he has to do, including keeping control of the more unruly inmates. They won't want to lose this officer as a valuable resource in the jail.

If an officer finds that he cannot trust certain inmates, the best method of relieving personal stress is to confront them, point out the reality of their failure to assume the proper responsibility, and issue the right rewards and punishments to help keep order in the cell block.

Not much can be done by the individual officer to improve stress-producing physical conditions in the jail, such as the temperature or the built-in, shut-in quality of the work area. However, there are outlets for this tension once the officer completes his shift. He can go to the gym, or jog to get some of the muscle tension and heat out of his system, followed by a swim and shower. After working out his tensions through exercise, the officer will feel like a new person.

The officer can also alleviate stress by developing and maintaining social contact with others who are not connected with jail employment. He should seek out friends who are optimistic about living and should not be afraid to share his work experiences with them. The more the officer works to make his job meaningful, the more there will be to talk about with friends. The officer's efforts to help others will be respected. By broadening the base of his social connections, the officer will offset the feeling that everyone in the world cannot be trusted or is a criminal. There are many nice people out in the world who relate well to others, want to behave in a socially acceptable manner, and do care about others.

If there are psychiatrists, social workers, or psychologists working in the jail, the officer should work with them. In a professional way, he should try to help them understand what he has observed about inmates in general and some inmates in particular. These counselors will be afraid of inmates, will often be naive about them despite all their college training, and will need the officer's experience and wisdom to ensure that they don't break security standards or place their lives or that of another person in danger. The officer does not have to feel less capable because he doesn't have the same level of formal education as the mental health worker. The mental health worker might not have the officer's practical experience, a very important quality when working in a jail.

When the officer's personal problems wear him down, it is important for him to recognize that he needs help. If he has a drinking problem, he should try Alcoholics Anonymous, where he will be able to talk with others who have faced alcohol dependency and conquered it. The officer should also share his feelings with a spouse if he is married. Jail officers who share their problems with their wives or husbands are generally happier because such sharing makes a spouse feel important. In addition, the spouse possesses skills to help solve problems that are important to the officer. On the other hand, if there is no spouse, or there has been marital trouble and the problem is too deep-seated or complicated for the spouse, the officer should reach out for a professional in the community.

Perhaps through the sheriff, supervisors, or the unions, the jail officer can point out a need for jail-based counseling for officers. Such a program has advantages if there is a strict policy of confidentiality so that the officer or his family members can share personal problems without having to fear that a record will be kept and become public knowledge. If that safeguard cannot be guaranteed, the officers should seek to make such services available from a private clinic or therapist.

No matter what sources are used for counseling, officers should not keep their problems bottled up inside. Because an officer seeks professional help does not mean he is weak, and this should not interfere with his future or chances for promotions in the jail. However, as a note of caution, the officer should remember that if he sees a counselor or therapist, this should not prevent or interfere with his keeping open the channels of communication with his spouse or other family members.

When the officer sees a need for inmates' relatives to be counseled, or inmates to be helped in some supportive manner (either for a physical or psychological problem), he should let the administration know what the problem is and what he thinks might be done about it. If specialists are needed, the officer should show some initiative and talk to people at local health or welfare agencies, especially if his jail is located where there are few resources. People outside the jail might be interested in helping the officer work out a program, or volunteer their own time to help inmates or their families. The officer should not be afraid to ask. All that can go wrong is that he is turned down, but he should still keep working until the problem is solved.

What about a partner whose conduct is unprofessional or irritating? The most important thing an officer can do for himself and the abrasive partner is to hold back on talking or acting as the partner does. If the partner sees the officer acting like him, he will think his attitudes and behavior are correct. If he sees that his fellow officer listens but does not follow, he won't be so prone to act in the manner he displayed when the two officers first began working together. The officer under stress from his partner's conduct should try to find something positive about the partner. If the officer gives his abrasive partner recognition for what is right, the partner will see that the officer is a friendly person, not one who is looking down his nose at him. This might make the partner less defensive toward his fellow officers and inmates. Nobody likes to stick out like a sore thumb. If the partner cannot irritate his fellow officer into adopting his views or management techniques, he will loosen up his hold on those offensive ideas, attitudes, or ways of handling inmates. Most new jail officers find it easier to go along with the "old timers" because they reason that the older men have more experience, and the newer ones want to be accepted by the "old guard." This attitude won't help the new officer cope with the offensive partner, because he will start hating himself and his job. The new officer should remember that the "old guard" will not always be there; the new officer will be there longer and one day will become the "old guard" himself. If the new officer's ideas are progressive and flexible, the jail administrators will need that input. What may have to wait for a while is the new officer's timing for advancing those insights, judgments, and management techniques.

However, there will be opportunities. The officer should not assume that if something isn't accepted right away, it's a "no go." Usually when something is worthwhile, it means that the officer has stuck with it and seen it through. In addition, even if the officer's abrasive partner won't respond to what he tries to do as he works for a better relationship, the partner won't be there forever, either. To relieve stress, the officer can listen politely to the partner without agreeing. If the partner steps out of line with an inmate and the officer expresses his disagreement, the partner clearly will know that it is not safe for him to abuse his jailer power, and he should than maintain better control over himself.

It seems hardly necessary to caution about the use of drugs or alcohol, including tranquilizers, as a means of controlling stress. Such ways of coping with stress tend to get out of hand and, so far as tranquilizers are concerned, they soon lose their effectiveness as the body adjusts to the dosage. On a short-term basis, they can be helpful, but not for stress symptoms that require a major revision in an officer's work or life situation. If an officer is feeling *that* much discomfort, he should seek out counseling, get a physical examination from his physician, or try some "letting off steam" activities, such as physical fitness, self-hypnotic relaxation exercises, or transcendental meditation. These activities can help the officer relax and reduce elevated blood pressure, help him sleep better, and quiet down his upset stomach or over-active gastro-intestinal tract.

PLANNING FOR STRESS

Stress can occur on any job. Everyone has to learn to live with it. As has been pointed out here, there are many ways to deal with it. However, there is a source of stress for *all* jobs which calls upon all professionals and non-professionals to plan from the start to deal with the kind of general stress which might occur. This kind of stress arises out of the fact that many professionals begin to develop a work style which leaves them functioning as a machine. They become creatures of routine and time-card punchers. At the beginning of their shifts, they plug themselves in and pull the plug when they leave. Then, after arriving home, they plug themselves into a television set and a bottle of beer, grunt some greetings to the family, and pull the plug before going to bed. After a good night's rest they prepare to play the "plug game" the next day. This goes on for 25 or more years and, when retirement occurs, the former worker has run out of plugs, sits around, and becomes depressed when he cannot find his familiar plug.

Although this example may sound slightly exaggerated, the point is that professionals and *all* workers must start early in their careers or working life to avoid this style of employment and living. Very early in a person's work experience, he should make sure that he has hobbies, interests, social, and recreational activities which offer an opportunity to relax and get away from work and its problems.

The same need exists even if the work is exciting and brings good money and great recognition. Thus, the jail officer should not just think of his work assignment at the jail as just being a jailer. If he were in some other work, the need for growth in all areas to make him feel complete as a person is clearly present. The jail officer's mind needs other outlets, as does his body. Life should offer him rewards in other areas, as well as opportunities for some type of adventure.

SUMMARY

1. A jail officer's job is very tension-producing; the officer must learn to recognize the symptoms of stress and realize that he needs to deal with stress factors in a positive manner.

Some of the symptoms which warn an officer that he may be suffering from stress include: hypertension, severe headaches, stomach or intestinal trouble, and neurological problems, such as trembling hands. In addition, the officer under stress might feel fidgety, lose his appetite or overeat, or suffer from insomnia. When an officer realizes he is under stress, he should attempt to deal with the underlying problems instead of avoiding them by resorting to negative stress relievers, such as alcohol or drugs. Covering up the basic problems only makes the situation much worse in the long run.

2. Officers should recognize the fact that stress and tension can occur on any job.



Although a jail officer's job may be more stress-producing than many others, officers can take steps to relieve on-the-job stress if they know that stressful situations are going to occur regularly on the cell blocks. The best methods for relieving stress are physical exercise, developing interests in people and activities not associated with the job, and talking about stress-producing situations with family members and friends. If the officer talks about jail stress factors, these problems often do not seem as bad as they did at first or as impossible to overcome. In addition, the officer can take positive steps to remedy many stress-producing situations, such as requiring inmates to clean up dirty living quarters. Once the problems are corrected, there will probably be less tension for both the officers and the inmates.

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Section II

Security



Section II

CHAPTER SEVEN

BASIC JAIL SECURITY PRINCIPLES

The new jail officer is faced with the task of learning a wide variety of procedures, usually on the job. This method is inefficient and results in a fragmentation of what are complex and interrelated tasks. As a result of this fragmentation, the individual jail officer often finds it difficult to relate his work to the work of other officers. More important, there is no assurance that he knows or will know all the tasks he may be called upon to perform. To be fully trained, the jail officer must be capable of functioning effectively in *any* position in the jail. He must also understand the reasons for specific security procedures used to maintain order and prevent escapes. The security function primarily is concerned with one of the major goals of jails-- protection of the public. Components of the security function in a jail setting include:

- Admitting the inmate
- Escorting inmates to court, other institutions, hospitals, funeral homes, etc.
- Release procedures
- Control of contraband
- Counts
- Tool, key, and weapons control
- Control of drugs and medications
- Use and maintenance of security equipment
- Development of security policies, plans, and procedures.

OBJECTIVES OF JAIL SECURITY

A jail security program has three primary objectives:

1. Ensure the safety of both inmates and staff;
2. Maintain order within the jail facility; and
3. Prevent escapes.

Ensuring the safety of both inmates and staff is one of the major objectives of a jail security program. If this objective is not achieved successfully, all other programming activities by the jail staff, including rehabilitation efforts, will have little meaning or impact. When an inmate is justifiably in constant fear of assault, then survival, not self-improvement, will be his main concern. Such attitudes also generate high tension levels in the jail which, in turn, often lead to increased incidents of violence and disruptive behavior. In such a tense atmosphere, the fear of violence, if sufficiently extensive among the inmate population, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

High tension levels in the jail also have a negative impact upon jail officers. Officers who must constantly deal with frustrated and troublesome inmates begin to suffer from stress--when stress levels are high, officers often become *careless*, and security of the jail is affected. An officer working in a jail where the inmates are tense becomes tense himself; at such times, "minor" encounters between the officer and the inmates may escalate into explosive situations.

A jail security program which reduces or eliminates tension thus benefits both the jail staff and the inmates by providing a safe environment. No jail, due to the very nature of the institution, can be guaranteed to be trouble-free. However, a high-quality security system will reduce the frequency of serious incidents.

Case Study 1:

Due to overcrowding in the state penitentiary, inmates who have been sentenced to the state institution are being held in the Big Sky County Jail. Two of the convicted inmates, Wayne Rose and Angelo Bruno, both sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, are housed in a newly constructed wing of the county jail. The doors on the cells on the new wing are mechanically controlled from a central location outside the day area which adjoins the cells. The jail officers need only to push a button and the doors slide closed. It was a great improvement over the rest of the old jail, which had cells that had to be locked manually. No more turning keys and shaking cell doors to make sure they were locked; a push of the button did it all. Rose and Bruno noticed that when the inmates were locked in at night the jail officers did not pull on the cell doors to make sure they were secure after closing the doors mechanically. Once they were locked in, no one on the midnight shift was checking on them. Seizing at the breakdown in security, they devised a way

of stuffing the locking mechanisms of the cell doors with aluminum foil from cigarette packs. This gave them free access to the day area. They could come and go as they wished all night long.

They made a "torch" from a piece of metal they removed from a trash can. The metal was kept hot by heating it in a tinfoil dish fashioned out of a bar of soap. They held the heated metal against the Plexiglass window in the day room until they had burned a hole through it. The new wing of the jail did not have a fence around it, so the two inmates arranged with Rose's girlfriend to appear beneath the window with several hacksaw blades, which she attached to a rope the inmates made from a bed sheet. Over a period of two weeks Rose, Bruno, and three other inmates gradually cut out the sheet of Plexiglass, using a mixture of soap and filings from the glass to make a putty to seal it back up for daytime inspections. Finally, they escaped through the window to a car brought to the jail by Rose's girlfriend. Their escape was not discovered until six hours later when the day shift reported for duty and a count was taken. Rose and Bruno were never caught, although the inmates who escaped with them were.

The sergeant who supervised the midnight shift was charged with "dereliction of duty" and fired; all officers on the midnight shift were suspended for three weeks.

How can a jail supervisor prevent a situation like this from occurring? While Rose and Bruno were inmates, who was REALLY in command of the Big Sky County Jail--the jail administrator or these two inmates? The convenience of electric locking devices does not mean that jail officers can become lax in their security inspections. A simple shake of each of the cell doors in this case would have detected this escape plan. Escapes are made from people, not the facility itself.

A second objective of a jail security program is to *maintain order* within the facility. As a public institution and as part of the criminal justice system, a jail can neither permit nor condone any kind of criminal activity. While there are obvious reasons for restricting criminal activities, less obvious is the need to regulate other types of activities. To have order in a forced group living situation, it is necessary to regulate certain activities that would *not* be criminal acts in an outside community, such as the consumption of alcoholic beverages, movement during counts, and so forth. Permitting these activities to occur in a jail could lead to confusion, chaos, and undesirable consequences.

The third major goal of a jail security program is to prevent escapes. An inmate's jail commitment order compels the sheriff or jail administrator to keep the inmate in custody. Thus, escape prevention is a legal obliga-

tion for jail employees. In addition, people are locked up because criminal justice system administrators consider them to be an actual or suspected threat to the safety of the community. By keeping these people in custody, the jail is performing a valuable crime prevention and public safety function.



1. Jail officers should check automatic locking devices.
2. Mechanical locking system.

JAIL SECURITY PLANNING ELEMENTS

Although the jail officer generally is not responsible for planning and supervising a jail security program, he should, nevertheless, be familiar with the security planning process in his jail. This knowledge and understanding of security planning is important for several reasons:

1. The jail officer is often the first person to notice when something is going wrong, such as security equipment malfunctioning, door hinges cracking, and so forth. *If he knows what to look for*, he can report breakdowns and problems to his supervisor. The problems can then be corrected.
2. The *effectiveness* of a security program depends upon the skills and abilities of the people who implement it. The jail officer must know and understand *why* specific procedures and policies have been implemented and what could go wrong if he fails to follow these procedures. In all jails the line officer is the person who keeps the system functioning. When it comes to measuring the importance of his role, he can be compared to the ground mechanic who services an airliner, the emergency medical technician who goes out on ambulance calls, and the classroom teacher who carries out the overall educational plan of a school district. Jail administrators and command personnel are responsible for ensuring that *all* officers are familiar with and understand the goals, objectives, and procedures of the jail security plan, for it is these officers who actually implement the plan.
3. Jail officers who implement security plans can see where the plan needs improvements. They learn to recognize the plan's weaknesses and strengths. Thus, they can provide supervisors with the valuable operational information needed to constantly monitor and upgrade the security plan. Any defects or problems which officers detect in the security system should be described in a *written report* to the officer's supervisor. When problems are communicated verbally, they are often forgotten if the supervisor is confronted with other problems before he can issue orders to correct the security defect. In addition, a written report will protect the officer from liability if an escape or violence occurs because a security problem was not corrected after the officer reported it. The officer is responsible for the security of the area in which he is assigned to work and, if problems occur in this area due to negligence or defects in the security system or procedures, the officer will be held

responsible unless he can prove (through a written report) that he tried to get the problem corrected through proper channels. It may not do any good for the officer to say, after trouble has occurred: "But Captain, I told my sergeant about that busted door hinge three weeks ago! It was his responsibility to get it fixed!" The officer should *always* submit written reports about *all* security problems he observes, both to ensure that the problem is corrected quickly (written reports seem to *demand* action) and to protect himself. *No security problem or defect is too minor to be neglected: nor are any problems too insignificant to be put in writing.* Everything, including loosened screws in a security door, should be documented in writing and the report submitted to the proper supervisor.

Case Study 2:

Rookie Officer Andy Griffith was assigned to supervise visiting at the Big Sky County Jail when he noticed that the new Plexiglass windows in the Visiting Room did not have strips of molding around the edges to cover the screws holding in the Plexiglass. Officer Griffith examined the windows and determined that it would be possible for an inmate to loosen a couple of screws so that the windows could be moved a few inches away from the wall, thus allowing a visitor to pass contraband or weapons into the inmate.

Officer Griffith told his sergeant about this problem at lunch and the sergeant said he would get it fixed. The sergeant called the County Maintenance Department that afternoon, but got a busy signal. He forgot to call back and at the end of his shift, left for a two-week vacation.

Five days later Officer Griffith was supervising inmate Roger Rogue, a convicted murderer, while Rogue visited with his wife, who was on the other side of the window. Because Rogue was a maximum security inmate, Griffith was alone in the room with him. Suddenly there was a loud commotion in the hallway outside the Visiting Room and Officer Griffith ran to see what was happening. Two inmates assigned to janitorial duty were beating another inmate with mop handles. Officer Griffith broke up the fight and gave first aid to the injured inmate, which took 20 minutes. When he got back to the Visiting Room, inmate Rogue was gone. A quick inspection showed that the screws in the Plexiglass window had gradually been loosened by inmates and that Rogue used a dime to remove the screws and the window while Griffith was diverted by the "set-up" fight in the hallway. Griffith realized then that the sergeant had never arranged to have molding installed over the screws.


Rogue's wife had a jacket with her, which she gave to Rogue to put on over his jail uniform. She also gave him a handgun, but he didn't have to use it. By the time Rogue and his wife were captured a week later, he had killed a gas station employee during a hold-up.

As a result of this escape, Officer Griffith learned a painful lesson: When something goes wrong, nobody wants to take the blame. Griffith's sergeant DENIED that Griffith had told him about the missing molding around the Plexiglass window. The sheriff fired Officer Griffith for "dereliction of duty." The wife of the murdered gas station employee sued Officer Griffith, the sheriff, and Big Sky County for negligence for letting inmate Rogue escape.

Was the sheriff acting fairly in holding Officer Griffith responsible for the escape and firing him? What important lesson does this case study impart?

ALL JAIL CONDITIONS
OUT OF THE ORDINARY
MUST BE COMMUNICATED IN WRITING!

The Sheriff



"You're right in telling me about the broken window, but you must make a notation in this jail log."

Jail administrators who neglect to develop adequate security plans and provide officers with an understanding of these plans find that they have to cope with disorders, escape attempts, and confusion on a frequent basis in their jail. Neglect of adequate security planning is costly and can bring disastrous results.

The jail security system needs to be designed to eliminate threats and risks and to respond to both *usual* and *unusual* conditions. Therefore, systematic jail security planning should involve deciding in advance:

1. *What* to do;
2. *When* to do it;
3. *Who* should do it; and
4. *How* to do it.


Subsequent chapters in this section of the *Jail Officer's Training Manual* provide guidelines which answer these security planning questions for specific problem areas in the jail, such as the booking area, key control, and counts. However, officers will need to adapt the general guidelines presented in this textbook to their individual jails.

The Security Plan

A good jail security plan should have a built-in "early warning system," which reemphasizes the need for the jail administrator to make certain that *all* jail officers are thoroughly familiar with security policies and plans. The "early warning system" prevents security problems from reaching a crisis stage. All members of the jail staff should be encouraged to assist in the discovery of security needs and problem areas so that corrective steps can be taken before it is too late.

According to Henry S. Ursic and Leroy E. Pagano, who are security management consultants, a good security plan should contain six basic qualities:

1. *Statement of purpose.* Identifying the purpose of the security plan provides the reason for the action which is required. It sets forth the objectives; however, the purpose of the security plan may be stated in broad and general terms. But as the plans become more detailed, so also must the reasons for proposed action become more specific, more refined, and more detailed.



2. Identify proposed *action*. Obviously, the purpose of formulating a security plan is to take action, and the plan must describe what kind of action needs to be taken. Again, the more detailed the purpose, the more specific or concrete must be the action--from broad general terms in the security plan to minute details in the functional descriptions. Security action can be stipulated as policies, programs, procedures, and practices by which objectives and goals are to be pursued.
3. Identification of *goals*. Define the level of accomplishment expected from the security action taken. Stated another way, goals answer the question of what is to result from the security activity.
4. Specify *resources* to be used. The basic task of security management in the jail is to use resources wisely. The jail's resources include not only funds but also officers and other staff members, the physical plant, equipment, and technical expertise. Security plans must indicate which resources are needed--and whether they are on hand or must be acquired--to avoid a conflicting assignment of the resources or less than optimal use.
5. Establish *time* schedules. Definite time requirements and adherence to schedules are critical to any security plan. Progress toward the established security objectives must be measured not only in degree of achievement but also in time utilization. However, as a subsequent chapter explains, schedules must also be flexible for some situations in the jail, such as cell searches and inmate counts, in order to prevent inmates from taking advantage of a rigid and known schedule.
6. Establish *flexibility*. The security plan must include procedures for anticipating, detecting, and reporting errors in, or the failure of, the security plan and for preventing and/or correcting deviations from the plan on a continuing basis.

Once a security plan is developed and implemented, the jail officer should remember that planning is a *continuous* process--it never stops. The jail security plan must be flexible; it needs constant input from officers because conditions in the jail change daily. During every shift new problems develop and newly admitted inmates may present special security needs not covered by the original plan. Thus, the security plan must be flexible enough to adapt to these constantly changing situations.

In addition, any security problems discovered on each shift should be recorded in a Daily Log and read to officers at rollcall before they start their shift. This Daily Log might also be posted so that officers can refer to it if they need further information. Some of the items which should be included in the Daily Log are:

1. Problems with inmates during the previous two shifts:
 - a. Who was involved?
 - b. What happened?
 - c. Why did it happen?
 - d. Seriousness of the problem (injuries, threats, etc.).
 - e. What has been done to correct the problem (administrative segregation, etc.)?
 - f. Where and when did the problem occur (exercise yard, shower period, mealtime, etc.)?
2. Security problems discovered during the previous two shifts:
 - a. What is the problem (broken door hinge, malfunctioning surveillance camera, etc.)?
 - b. Where is the problem (Cell Block B dayroom window, etc.)?
 - c. What is being done to correct the problem?
 - d. What special security measures or cautionary actions are needed until the problem is corrected?
3. New inmates admitted during the previous two shifts:
 - a. Names and cell assignments.
 - b. Reasons for being in jail.
 - c. Previous commitments to jail:
 - (1) Did problems occur then?
 - (2) Nature of problems.
 - d. Special treatment or attention needed--for example, withdrawing heroin addict, alcoholic, known schizophrenic, etc.
 - e. Has the new inmate stated to admitting officers or police officers that he does not want to be assigned to a cell area where specific *current* inmates are housed? This will indicate a potential security problem; it is the new inmate's way of telling officers that he had previously received threats "on the street" from these persons.

- f. Has a *current* inmate made any remarks about a new inmate which would indicate a potential security problem, such as, "I'm going to take care of that pigeon...he's the rotten (----) who put me in here!"
 - g. Is the new inmate a police informant? He may need to be segregated from the general population for his own protection. However, officers *should not*, under any circumstances, disclose to inmates or to other officers within hearing of inmates why the new inmate is being placed in administrative segregation.
 - h. Is the new inmate likely to be harmed by current inmates because of the nature of his crime (for example, a child molester)? These inmates may have to be placed in administrative segregation and watched carefully.
4. Special situations which occurred on the previous two shifts which could lead to problems: Events occur in any jail which do not cause *immediate* problems but which create tension, add to inmate frustrations, and which may eventually lead to disorders, fights, cell "trashings," and so forth. Some examples are:
- a. For the first time in four weeks, the inmates were treated to turkey for dinner and had been told about this in advance; thus, their expectations were high--they were getting a special meal instead of the usual hamburger casserole or "gray meat surprise." But jail cooks overcooked and burned the turkey and then drowned it in glue-like gravy to try to cover up the mistake. A situation like this causes grumbling and swearing among the inmates; these expressions of frustration *may* escalate into more hostile acts.
 - b. A severe storm passed through on the previous shift, knocking down the jail's TV antenna. There is a football play-off game on TV during the current shift that inmates have been waiting a week to watch. Because there is no antenna, the inmates will miss the game. This could be a problem situation unless jail officers do something to counteract it, such as hooking up a radio broadcast of the game to the jail's public address system so that the inmates can at least *listen* to the play-by-play.
 - c. Because of budget problems, the county board of supervisors, which met while the day shift was on, decided to cut back on jail rehabilitation program funding. Without consulting the sheriff or jail rehab personnel, the supervisors decided to eliminate the "upholstery training course" and the "plumber's

apprentice course," the two most popular programs at the jail because they placed inmates in well-paying jobs when the inmates were paroled. The inmates will probably hear this news on TV during the 4-12 shift, which is now beginning. These oncoming officers must discuss this situation and be aware that they may have problems with the inmates.

Officers who are returning from days off or vacation should be required to read through the Daily Log for the period when they were off-duty. A well-prepared Daily Log and its discussion at rollcall is an important component of the jail security program. Officers who are *aware* of potential problems are more alert and are able to defuse potentially dangerous situations.

RISK REDUCTION

The primary impact of officers, locks, and the other tools of a custodial institution is to constrain inmates and, to some extent, prevent serious breaches of security. But to have an atmosphere in which a majority of the inmates cooperate with security measures requires more than just equipment and a show of force. To prevent a continuous inmate-staff battle for "real" control of the jail, it is necessary for the jail administration to establish and reinforce a climate within the facility which is supportive of security. This can be accomplished to a great extent through staff-inmate communication, fairness on the part of jail employees, and sound programming.



Rollcall

Most inmates want a peaceful jail and are afraid of those inmates who are violent. Since inmates spend 24 hours a day living in an environment that does not afford them much privacy, they want the personal protection a good security system offers. Though this desire for security must often remain unexpressed by the inmates, it nonetheless still exists. Thus, proper treatment of the inmate population reduces tension levels in the jail and helps to maintain a cooperative attitude on the part of most inmates.

The jail officer must recognize that arbitrary, unfair treatment of inmates and constant inmate idleness will contribute to the creation or growth of conditions that are harmful to an effective security system. *Thus, the best approach to jail security is an integrated strategy involving various techniques, programs, and procedures.* Custody is but ONE part of the integrated security system, although it is a very important part.

Some of the factors which help to reduce risks in jails and prevent security problems are:

- Good staff feedback and written reports;
- Knowledgeable, alert, conscientious jail officers;
- Supervisors who are able to communicate effectively and provide guidance and assistance to officers;
- Continuous dissemination of procedures through policy manuals and orders dealing with specific posts or positions in the jail (post orders);
- Good staff-inmate communication processes;
- Clean, sanitary living conditions;
- Equal and fair enforcement of rules and regulations;
- Provision of an adequate method by which inmates may present complaints and, if valid, have them resolved;
- Good food;
- Good medical care;
- Provision for frequent opportunities for visiting by family members and friends;

- The opportunity to do constructive work within the jail;
- An opportunity for constructive leisure-time activities, including outdoor recreation and exercise; and
- Opportunities for self-betterment, such as church services, educational programs, and rehabilitation programs (for example, Alcoholics Anonymous).

All of these factors, if successfully addressed and implemented by the jail staff, can help keep frustrations and tensions at a low level. Thus, they reinforce security. Virtually *all* activity within the jail has an effect upon all other parts of the facility's operations.

The officer should remember that *inmates do not escape from the jail itself, but from the people who staff it.* All officers must constantly be alert and vigilant, looking for actual and potential security problems and taking steps to correct these problems. The jail is no place for an officer to catch up on his sleep, do his homework for a college course, or watch a ballgame on TV.

The officer plays a crucial role in the establishment of a positive jail climate which is conducive to security. He is one of the most important persons in the jail's risk reduction program.

SUMMARY

1. A jail security program has three primary objectives: (1) Ensure the safety of both inmates and staff; (2) Maintain order within the jail facility; and (3) Prevent escapes.

Any jail security program becomes less effective if inmates fear for their safety. Inmate tension in turn creates stressful working conditions for officers. In such situations, routine encounters between officers and inmates can degenerate into explosive situations. Thus, the security program should be designed to ensure inmates that their environment is a safe one.

2. The jail officer must understand the reasons for specific security procedures in his jail and the underlying principles that support them.

The *effectiveness* of a jail security program depends upon the skills and abilities of the people who implement it. Because the jail officer works in direct contact with the inmates and the security equipment, he is usually the first person to notice when something is going wrong. If he knows what to look for, he can report breakdowns and problems to his supervisor and the problems can then be corrected. In *all* jails, the line officer is the person who keeps the security system functioning. For his own protection and to make certain that problems are corrected, the jail officer should report all problems he observes to his supervisor in writing.

3. Inmates do not escape from the jail itself, but from the people who staff it; therefore, jail administrators must take every step possible to reduce security risks.

Reducing security risks begins with the development of a comprehensive jail security plan which has a built-in "early warning system" for problem detection. The plan must be flexible and must receive constant input from all jail staff members because conditions in the jail change daily. In addition, administrators must establish a jail climate which is supportive of security. This can be accomplished to a great extent through staff-inmate communication, staff feedback, fairness on the part of jail employees, and sound programming. All officers should be constantly alert and vigilant, looking for actual and potential security problems and taking steps to correct these problems.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

THE BOOKING AND ADMISSIONS PROCESS

The booking and admissions process has legal, security, health, and human relations aspects. Proper and legally recognized forms are needed at the time of commitment. These forms may differ depending upon whether the committing authority was a law enforcement officer or the court. Without the proper arrest or commitment papers, a person cannot legally be confined. Improper confinement raises the possibility of a law suit and/or other types of legal action.

The booking and admissions procedure is, in many instances, the first contact the inmate has with the jail. These first impressions can be lasting. If the inmate is treated courteously and processed efficiently, an impression will be created which can counteract the fictional stereotypes of jail personnel and lessen the fear connected with confinement. If the new inmate is treated with contempt or discourtesy and the booking process is handled sloppily, a bad impression will be created, which can lead to disrespect and hostility on the part of the inmate.

By carefully carrying out the procedures described in this chapter, the jail officer will be protecting both the jail and himself, while ensuring the proper regard for legal requirements and the rights of the individual.

SECURITY DURING THE ADMISSIONS PROCEDURE

No person carrying firearms should *ever* be allowed inside the jail. An armory or other locked storage area should be provided outside the jail custody perimeter where officers can deposit their weapons prior to entering the jail. If gun lockers are provided, they should have the capacity to receive a weapon with a six-inch barrel. Each compartment should be constructed to enable the officer to deposit his weapon, lock the compartment, and retain the key until he leaves the jail. *No inmate should ever have access to the armory area.* Other weapons, such as chemical agents, saps, and personal pocket knives, should also be included in a weapons control procedure.

SLAYINGS OF OFFICERS RAISE ISSUE
OF BOOKING PROCEDURE

Officers Not Required to Remove Guns

The way his fellow police officers figured it yesterday, Rusty Claggett must never have thought there would be any problem with leaving his loaded gun on while he booked 15 year-old Terrence Gaston Johnson.

"This was just a kid, after all, picked up on suspicion of petty larceny," said a County Police detective. "He wasn't a murderer or some other tough criminal. Who could have thought he'd turn out to be as dangerous?"

But when 26-year-old Claggett's gun was ripped out of its holster and he and his fellow officer, James Brian Swart, 25, were shot to death during the early hours of yesterday morning, shock waves went through the County Police Department.

The most frequently asked question was why Claggett chose not to remove his gun before taking Johnson into the processing room for questioning and fingerprinting.

Removing one's gun before booking a suspect is a "general policy" in the Hyattsville station, according to several police officers interviewed there.

Although there is no written regulation ordering police to do so, said police spokesman John Horie, the department strongly recommends that police remove their weapons before coming into contact with a suspect, as during fingerprinting.¹

The jail should have a sally-port adjacent to the entrance to the booking area, providing a secure enclosure in which a transport vehicle can be parked. This area should be custodially safe, with a closure that can be locked prior to removing an inmate from an automobile or transport van.

A thorough search of the inmate *should* have been made at the time of the arrest by the arresting officers. Any weapons taken by the arresting officers should be placed with the inmate's property when he is booked or retained as evidence by the arresting agency in a secure evidence room. All firearms and ammunition that are taken from the inmate by the arresting agency and not held as evidence should be stored in a secure area outside of the inmate custody area. *No inmates, under any circumstances, should ever have access to this area.*

¹The Washington Star (June 27, 1978), page 1.

A holding cell large enough to hold several persons should be available near the booking desk. This cell should be equipped with benches, a toilet, a drinking fountain, and a wash basin.

RECEIVING THE INMATE

The officer assigned to the admissions desk is responsible for the legal admission of all persons brought to the jail. Therefore, he must be thoroughly familiar with confinement orders and court commitment papers to be able to determine their legal validity. Each jurisdiction has its own forms and commitment procedures. However, there are several fundamental principles that apply anywhere in the United States. These general principles are:

- (1) The confinement order should contain a legal charge. Such statements as "Hold for Marshal," "Hold for Joe," or "Hold for Investigation" are *not* legal charges and should never be accepted. If the evidence is sufficient, a person can be arrested and committed to jail; but the booking *must be* for an offense, not for suspicion of having committed an offense. The jail officer should know what is a valid charge and have a list of codes and statutes which are in effect in his jurisdiction. The officer should make an effort to *learn and remember* the charges that appear most regularly in his jail. If he is not familiar with a particular charge, he should look it up in the statute book. If the officer does not know how to look up statutes, he should seek the help of another, more experienced officer who does know how. Checking formal charges in a statute book is a good practice for jail admissions officers because it often avoids legal difficulties and clears up any doubts which may exist about the legality of a charge. However, even without statute books, it is possible for an experienced officer to recognize *illegal* charges which have been made against people brought to the jail for admission. For example, some *illegal* charges are:

- Investigation
- Under suspicion
- Under observation for mental illness

It is not difficult to recognize that these "charges" are vague and uncertain; they do *not* state what felony or misdemeanor the person is being charged with. It is a requirement that a formal charge *must* explain the actual felony or misdemeanor lodged against the person being committed. The

jail officer is responsible for admitting a person to jail, and he can be held accountable for confining the wrong person.

- (2) The arresting officer should bring the accused person to the jail for admission. When the arresting officer cannot be present, the officer bringing the person to jail must have a citation *that originated with and is signed by the arresting officer*. This will eliminate "Hold for Joe" charges that sometimes appear on confinement orders.
- (3) Persons admitted to the jail for probation or parole violations must also be accompanied by an order authorizing commitment from the court; the commitment paper should also be signed by the parole board or parole officer.
- (4) Persons sentenced to jail are legally confined by a commitment order issued by the court. Some jurisdictions require that all commitment orders be signed by a judge, not a clerk of the court. Generally, however, the signature or initial of the clerk is sufficient. Should an inmate be committed in error, *the only protection the admissions officer has is the commitment order signed by the proper authority*. Obviously, the name of the person and the charge should be given correctly in the commitment orders.
- (5) The identity of the person bringing the inmate to jail should be known, and he should furnish the admissions officer with the proper identification; otherwise, the result may be an illegal commitment or a serious breach of the jail's security. Most inmates will be brought to jail by a uniformed law enforcement officer. Positive identification should be required of all officers trying to commit someone to jail, and the legal commitment document verified. A badge or a uniform is NOT the sole form of identification needed to gain admittance to the booking area of a detention facility. Badges of almost any description can be obtained from a novelty store and uniforms can be stolen by persons who want to break into the jail to help an inmate escape. In addition to a badge, the jail booking officer should ask for credentials or a commission card (preferably with photograph), as well as authority for legal commitment. (An example of proper credentials appears on the next page. See Figure 1.)
- (6) The admissions officer must be familiar with the laws of the state governing the confinement of special categories of persons, especially juveniles. In some states juveniles can never legally be admitted to jail under any circumstances; other states permit juveniles in jails only upon a written court order or under a specific special circumstance.

Admitting a person to jail is the responsibility of the admissions officer, who must be well trained. This is a critical post and one that requires an experienced officer who is familiar with the proper documents for commitment and the appropriate state laws. If there is any question, it should be referred immediately to the highest ranking administrative officer at the jail. If he is unavailable, the problem should be reported immediately to the magistrate or other appropriate court officials for an answer.

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON COUNTY, MARYLAND	
8/30/81 <small>my commission expires</small>	John E. Saunders <small>Sheriff</small> Charles A. Walton <small>clerk of court</small>

WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT			
THIS TO CERTIFY THAT			
Margaret R. Jenkins		<i>Margaret Jenkins</i>	
<small>WHOSE SIGNATURE AND DESCRIPTION APPEARS HEREON, IS A</small>			
Deputy Sheriff		<small>OFFICER'S SIGNATURE</small>	
<small>OF THE WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND IS VESTED WITH FULL AUTHORITY UNDER THE LAW</small>			
John E. Saunders	8/16/79	HGT	WGT
<small>SHERIFF</small>	<small>ISSUED</small>	EYES	HAIR
		5'5"	130
		b1	red
		BORN	BLOOD TYPE
		2/8/52	O

Figure 1

Sick Or Injured Inmates

Occasionally a sick or injured person will be brought to the jail for admission. If the jail has round-the-clock professional medical staff on duty, this is not a problem. But very few jails have such medical care.

Some jails, even though they cannot handle the problem in-house, must accept sick or injured persons under the applicable laws of the jurisdiction. In other places the statutes are not clear on this point. The ideal practice in such circumstances (and some jails have and enforce such a policy) is for the jail admissions officer *not* to accept a sick or injured person until after the law enforcement arresting officer has taken the individual to receive the proper treatment and presents a signed statement to that effect from the treating physician.

Though the jail admissions officer may find it difficult to refuse to accept from the arresting officer a person who appears to be suffering from an injury or illness, he should remember that once he accepts an inmate into the jail, the jail then becomes responsible for providing adequate medical and health care to the inmate. *Legally* the jail and its employees are liable for the inmate's physical well-being.

One way of preventing medical emergencies from occurring in a jail is through careful screening during the admittance process. (Figure 2 and Figure 3 are sample screening forms recommended by the A.M.A.) The admissions officer is acting in the best interest of both himself and the inmate when he insists that inmates with apparent medical problems first receive medical clearance before being admitted to the jail.

If there is any doubt whether a new inmate is actually suffering from injury or illness, the admissions officer should resolve that doubt in his favor by requiring the arresting officer to take the inmate to a medical doctor for an examination and a medical clearance. This clearance *must* be in writing and signed by the examining physician. See Figure 4, sample A.M.A. form.

The American Medical Association recommends that the following cases *not* be accepted:

● New Inmates Who Are Unconscious:

1. The admissions officer has no way of knowing why the inmate is unconscious or what the unconsciousness signifies.
2. The inmate may be seriously ill or injured.
3. Every unconscious person *must* receive an immediate medical evaluation.

Receiving Screening Form

Name _____ Sex _____ D.O.B. _____ Date _____
 Time _____
 Inmate No. _____ Officer or physician _____

Booking Officer's Visual Opinion

- | | | |
|---|-----|----|
| 1. Is the inmate conscious? | YES | NO |
| 2. Does the new inmate have obvious pain or bleeding or other symptoms suggesting need for emergency service? | YES | NO |
| 3. Are there visible signs of trauma or illness requiring immediate emergency or doctor's care? | YES | NO |
| 4. Is there obvious fever, swollen lymph nodes, jaundice or other evidence of infection which might spread through the jail? | YES | NO |
| 5. Is the skin in good condition and free of vermin? | YES | NO |
| 6. Does the inmate appear to be under the influence of alcohol? | YES | NO |
| 7. Does the inmate appear to be under the influence of barbiturates, heroin or any other drugs? | YES | NO |
| 8. Are there any visible signs of alcohol/drug withdrawal symptoms? | YES | NO |
| 9. Does the inmate's behavior suggest the risk of suicide? | YES | NO |
| 10. Does the inmate's behavior suggest the risk of assault to staff or other inmates? | YES | NO |
| 11. Is the inmate carrying medication or does the inmate report being on medication which should be continuously administered or available? | YES | NO |

Officer-Inmate Questionnaire

- | | | |
|---|-----|----|
| 12. Are you presently taking medication for diabetes, heart disease, seizures, arthritis, asthma, ulcers, high blood pressure, or psychiatric disorder? Circle condition. | YES | NO |
| 13. Do you have a special diet prescribed by a physician? Type _____ | YES | NO |
| 14. Do you have history of venereal disease or abnormal discharge? | YES | NO |

Figure 2

Receiving Screening Form (Cont'd.)

- | | | |
|--|-----|----|
| 15. Have you <u>recently</u> been hospitalized or recently seen a medical or psychiatric doctor for any illness? | YES | NO |
| 16. Are you allergic to any medication? | YES | NO |
| 17. Have you fainted recently or had a recent head injury? | YES | NO |
| 18. Do you have epilepsy? | YES | NO |
| 19. Do you have a history of tuberculosis? | YES | NO |
| 20. Do you have diabetes? | YES | NO |
| 21. Do you have hepatitis? | YES | NO |
| 22. If female, are you pregnant? Are you currently on birth control pills? | YES | NO |
| 23. Do you have a painful dental condition? | YES | NO |
| 24. Do you have any other medical problem we should know about? | YES | NO |

REMARKS:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____

(A copy of this form is included in the inmate's medical record)

Receiving Screening: Guidelines for Disposition

Question

1. If no, arrange for immediate transfer to hospital.
2. If yes, call doctor now.
3. If yes, call doctor now and describe symptoms.
4. If yes, isolate from other inmates, monitor condition frequently and call doctor immediately if condition of inmate appears to get worse. Use paper plates-plastic utensils, dispose of immediately. Keep all bedding separate from others-sterilize. In case of fever, administer aspirin as ordered by doctor. Call doctor during next regular office hours and describe symptoms.
5. If yes, isolate if there is a rash or other unusual skin eruption. Follow instructions in question number 4. If vermin are present, isolate and instruct inmate in use of Kwell or other scabicide.
6. If yes, transfer to detoxification unit at hospital.
7. If yes, find out if possible what and how much the inmate has been taking and call doctor now.
8. If yes, monitor closely and call doctor now.
9. If yes, isolate, monitor closely, call doctor or mental health center now.
10. Monitor closely.
11. If yes, place medications in inmate's locker, check that medications in bottle are actually what was prescribed, and try to check with prescribing doctor whether medication is to be continued. If cannot accomplish the preceding, check with jail doctor for instructions before administering any medication.
12. If yes, check with doctor to get prescriptions, diet orders, etc.
13. If yes, notify kitchen staff and inform doctor.
14. If yes, isolate and have testing done as soon as possible, followed by administration of appropriate prescribed medications.
15. If yes, report to doctor during next regular office hours unless there are symptoms indicating need for immediate attention.

Figure 3

(figure 3 cont'd)

- 16. If yes, note names of drugs and inform doctor.
- 17. If yes, report to doctor if there are any symptoms indicating need for immediate attention.
- 18. If yes, check for any medications being taken and follow steps in question number 11.
- 19. If yes, isolate and report to doctor during regular office hours.
- 20. If yes, report to doctor for orders for appropriate medication and/or diet plan.
- 21. If yes, isolate and report to doctor during next regular office hours.
- 22. If pregnant, report to doctor during next regular office hours. If on birth control pills follow sequence in question number 11.
- 23. If yes, write down the problem and call the dentist if it appears necessary.
- 24. If yes, write down the problem and call the doctor if it appears necessary.

PRISONER MEDICAL CLEARANCE REPORT

Name of prisoner _____

Brought into jail by _____

Date _____ Time _____

We have declined to accept the above-named prisoner into the jail, pending medical clearance, for the following reason(s):

Signature of Jailer Date - Time

Name of examining physician _____

- Disposition: _____ I have examined the prisoner and find him/her acceptable for admission to the jail. I have no specific suggestions regarding care of this prisoner for the condition for which I have examined him/her.
- (Check appropriate space) _____ I have examined the prisoner and find him/her acceptable for admission into the jail. I suggest treatment for the prisoner's condition as described below.
- _____ I have examined the prisoner and find him/her acceptable for admission to the jail providing the following conditions are met.
- _____ I have examined the prisoner and find him/her medically unacceptable for admission to the jail.

Physician's Remarks:

Signature of Physician Date Time Telephone Number

Figure 4

- New Inmates Who Are Having or Recently Had Convulsions:

1. There are a number of very serious conditions that could cause convulsions, including:
 - a. Epilepsy
 - b. Severe head injury
 - c. Infection
 - d. Drug or alcohol overdose
2. *In some instances a person who is convulsing could lapse into a coma and die if he does not receive proper medical attention.*

- New Inmates With Any Significant External Bleeding: The admissions officer will have to make a decision regarding the seriousness of the wound:

1. If it is a small cut or wound, it is probably safe to accept the person, but the wound should be cleaned with soap and water and a bandage should be applied.
2. If the new inmate is bleeding profusely or has more than a simple wound, he should not be admitted. A wound which is bleeding a lot may need a suture.
3. If the inmate is bleeding from the head or ears, he should not be admitted. There could be a serious head or brain injury.

- Inmates With Any Obvious Fractures (Bones Broken):

1. ALL fractures must be x-rayed and treated.
2. In an open fracture, a part of the bone has broken the skin.
3. In a closed fracture, the bone has not broken the skin, but there are other signs of a fracture:
 - a. Pain
 - b. Deformity in the injured area
 - c. Inability to use the limb
 - d. Swelling
 - e. Bruising
4. If an inmate's arm or leg simply looks like it is not working right, the admissions officer should suspect a fracture and insist on medical clearance.

- New Inmates With Signs of Head Injury: A head injury may be suspected if the following symptoms are present:

1. There is a serious cut or bruise on the head.
2. There is clear or bloody fluid coming from the nose or ears.
3. One of the pupils of the inmate's eyes is much larger than the other.
4. The inmate is very dizzy or having trouble walking.
5. He has vomited more than twice or is vomiting very forcefully.
6. He is very confused or forgetful.
7. He is semi-conscious, stuporous, or unconscious.

The admissions officer should be very cautious about head injuries.

- New Inmates With Neck or Spinal Injuries: The admissions officer should not accept these persons if:

1. The inmate has trouble walking or is unable to walk.
2. He has pain in the spinal area.
3. There is an obvious deformity in the spinal area.
4. There is obvious loss of muscle function or areas of numbness in his arms or legs.

- New Inmates With Any Type of Serious Injury:

There are obvious signs, such as severe bruises on the body or face. If the inmate has trouble walking or seems to be in severe pain, he should not be accepted.

- New Inmates Who Cannot Walk Under Their Own Power:

If the inmate is having trouble walking because of obvious intoxication, that could be an exception. However, if the inmate does not show signs of drug or alcohol intoxication, he should be referred for a medical examination before he is accepted into the jail.

- Anyone Displaying Symptoms of Possible Internal Bleeding:

Symptoms of internal bleeding from severe blows include:

1. Paleness
2. Cold, clammy skin (blue or gray in color at times)
3. Sweating
4. Rapid pulse
5. Dizziness or fainting
6. Nausea and possible vomiting
7. Weakness
8. Feelings of confusion, agitation, restlessness, and/or fright.
9. Blood around the eyes or ears (this may be a sign of the later stages of internal bleeding).

- New Inmates With Abdominal Bleeding: The inmate should be referred to a physician before being admitted. Abdominal bleeding can be a result of the following serious problems:

1. Food poisoning
2. Alcohol poisoning (such as from drinking turpentine)
3. Bleeding ulcer
4. Allergic reaction
5. Acute appendicitis
6. Drug overdose or withdrawal



"Book him, he's only drunk!"

- New Inmates Displaying Signs of Drug or Alcohol Abuse

Withdrawal from drugs or alcohol can be a very serious matter. A person can go into convulsions, which can lead to coma and possible death. The central nervous system can become depressed, leading to breathing difficulties and other related problems. Some signs of possible drug or alcohol abuse include:

1. Confusion and disorientation
2. Hallucinations and delirium
3. Inability to stand or walk
4. Slurred speech
5. Very rapid or shallow breathing
6. Lethargy (a condition of abnormal drowsiness or torpor)
7. Severe agitation or depression
8. Cramps, nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea
9. Sudden collapse
10. Dilated or pinpoint pupils
11. Restlessness
12. Track or needle marks on arms, legs, or buttocks
13. Feeling of being very hot or cold

The admissions officer should not accept anyone who claims he has taken an overdose.

- Pregnant Women in Labor:

It is very unlikely that a police officer would bring a woman who is in labor to the jail for admission. It is possible, however,

that soon after a pregnant woman is admitted, she could go into premature labor brought about by stress. A pregnant woman should not be accepted if:

1. She is having strong uterine contractions.
2. Her contractions are less than two minutes apart.

If any of these symptoms develop after a pregnant woman is admitted, the jail officer should call an ambulance to have her taken to the hospital immediately.

● Pregnant Women With Other Serious Problems:

1. A pregnant woman who is bleeding from the vagina should not be accepted. If she is spotting (small amounts) and claims she has been doing that for some time, it is probably acceptable to admit her.
2. If she is having cramps or abdominal pains, she should not be accepted.
3. If she is having severe cramps and headache or blurred vision, she should not be accepted.

● Inmates Who Claim They Are Taking Medication, But Do Not Have Their Medicine With Them: Such inmates can go into shock or coma if they do not receive their medicine on a fixed time table. Inmates who require their medicine at fixed intervals include:

1. Diabetics: If an inmate claims he is on insulin, call the inmate's doctor or pharmacy and verify this. If verification is not possible, the inmate should not be accepted and should be taken to the hospital emergency room so he can be examined and obtain his medication before he is admitted to the jail.
2. Epileptics: The admissions officer should follow the same procedure as for a diabetic.
3. Heart Patients: The admissions officer should follow the same procedure as for a diabetic.

Sometimes even though the medical symptoms described in the preceding paragraphs might be present, the admissions officer will accept the inmate because he does not wish to alienate the arresting officer. But when he accepts the sick or injured inmate, he assumes the following responsibilities on behalf of the jail:

- The cost of any medical care becomes the responsibility of the jail once the inmate is accepted.
- Confinement of the inmate to a hospital will necessitate security which could result in a drain on what might very well be an already meager work force.
- There is the threat of costly litigation by the inmate or his family as a result of *alleged* inadequate medical and health care in the jail.
- The inmate may die in the jail as a result of the injury or illness.
- Special attention must be directed toward a sick or injured inmate once he is confined to a jail.
- The sick or injured inmate may commit suicide once he is incarcerated.

Considering the constraints a sick or injured inmate places on the jail administrator and his staff should make it much easier for the admitting officer to tell the arresting officer: "Sorry, but the policy of this jail prohibits me from accepting this person until he receives a clearance from a medical doctor." The admissions officer should not voluntarily inherit someone else's problem for the jail.

To summarize, here are some essential points to remember:

- (1) If an arresting or transporting officer brings in an ill or injured inmate, the admissions officer should not be overly brisk with his refusal to accept the inmate. Instead, he should explain calmly that he can't accept the inmate until the inmate has received medical clearance, according to jail regulations.
- (2) If the arresting officer argues with the admissions officer, the admissions officer should make clear that he understands the arresting officer's feelings, but that the jail administrator requires him to be cautious and that in his judgment the new inmate must be medically cleared before he can be admitted. The admissions officer should again explain his reasons for medical treatment, clearly and calmly. He should be considerate of the arresting officer's feelings and realize that the arresting officer may feel frustrated by a refusal to accept the inmate because it means more work for him.

- (3) The admissions officer should not argue with the arresting officer on the substance of the matter - that is, whether or not the new inmate is really seriously ill or injured. Instead, the admissions officer should stress that his judgment is on the line and that his judgment will have to take precedence in this situation.
- (4) If the arresting officer continues to argue and becomes personally insulting, the admissions officer should not take this as an insult. Instead, he should neutralize the arresting officer by glossing over his personal comments and try to steer the discussion to the issue at hand. The admissions officer can do this and at the same time remain considerate of the arresting officer's feelings and needs. The primary objective of the admissions officer is to assert his own needs, but he can do so in such a way that he does not have to trample on the arresting officer's needs and feelings.

Whenever the jail by policy or by law must accept injured or ill inmates without treatment, then medical care should be obtained as soon as possible, even if this means transporting the inmate to a hospital emergency room. Failure by the jails to obtain medical treatment has resulted in adverse legal actions. The admissions officer should check with his supervisor, the jail administrator, or the sheriff to find out exactly what the policy and/or local law is governing such situations and follow the law or policy closely. If he does have to accept the injured or ill inmate and obtain medical treatment for him or her, then the admissions officer should document what he did to help the inmate by writing a report to the jail administrator. In this way he can prove that he acted in good faith to provide services the inmate was entitled to.

Obtaining Personal Information

It is necessary to obtain personal information from the new inmate for identification and housing assignment (classification) purposes and so that relatives can be notified in case of an emergency. The basic information can usually be obtained from the committing document and by asking a few simple questions. A record should be made of any unusual occurrence that takes place at the time of admission, and this record should include the names of any witnesses to the unusual occurrence. The name of the person's attorney, if he or she has one, should also be noted.

The booking officer should not ask any questions related to the alleged crime which the person is accused of committing. Such questions could later be used by a defense attorney to dismiss charges or hamper the prosecution.

The National Sheriffs' Association monograph on Jail Security, Classification, and Discipline outlines the information essential for admissions records:

1. Date
2. Time (use 24-hour clock and military time)
3. Name (first, middle, and last, circling last name)
4. Home address
5. Name of arresting officer and agency
6. Signature of arresting officer and office phone number
7. Specific charge(s), with code section, warrant number, and commitment number or court number
8. Location of arrest
9. Court district where offense was committed (if applicable)
10. Sex
11. Age
12. Date of birth
13. Place of birth
14. Race
15. Name and relationship of next of kin
16. Address of next of kin and phone number, if known
17. Property taken by the admissions officer with a description of each article
18. Drivers' license number
19. Social Security number
20. Highest grade completed in school
21. Name of employer and employer's address, if known
22. Occupation

RIGHT THUMB AT RELEASE		PHOTO	
I HEREBY AUTHORIZE THE SHERIFF, HIS JAILER, OR DEPUTIES TO OPEN AND INSPECT ALL MAIL MATTER OR PACKAGES WHICH MAY BE ADDRESSED TO ME AS LONG AS I AM A PRISONER IN HIS CUSTODY.			
DATE _____	PRISONER'S SIGNATURE _____		
DATE _____	ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT _____	RIGHT THUMB AT BOOKING	
IN CASE OF EMERGENCY NOTIFY (MR.) (MRS.) (MISS) _____			
WHO RESIDES AT _____		PHONE _____	
DATE PLACED	CHG NO.	CHARGES AND DETAINERS PLACED	DISPOSITIONS

Use of the term "basic" in describing the first type of search should in no way be construed as meaning that the searching officer should be remiss or negligent in the act of searching the arrestee. The "basic frisk or search" is one employed during initial booking procedures and may be accomplished as follows:

- (1) Be sure that no other inmates are in the room when the search takes place. This assures that no contraband can be passed by the new inmate to one already searched.
- (2) Have the inmate empty all pockets in his trousers, shirt, coat, and jacket and, if possible, turn all pockets inside out. After the contents have been checked and itemized, the admissions officer should put these articles in a place visible to the inmate but out of his reach.
- (3) The admissions officer should then have the inmate stand facing a wall with his back to the officer, legs spread, and arms extended straight out. If the admissions officer is alone with the inmate, it might prove advantageous to have the inmate stand approximately two feet from a wall, spread his legs, and lean against the wall with his arms spread. The officer should also direct the inmate not to remove his hands from the wall or move in any manner until so instructed. This position should not be construed as cruelty, but as an advantageous position for the officer should the inmate suddenly display violent tendencies.

Once the inmate has assumed the basic position for the search, it may be accomplished as follows:

- (1) From behind, using both hands, start at the forehead (hairline) and run fingers or a large-toothed comb through the inmate's hair. Often long hair has been used to conceal contraband. Working toward the back of the head and down to the neck, check the shirt collar (turned up). Particular attention should be given to all seams in clothing as they offer excellent hiding places for such items as knife blades, hacksaw blades, jewelers' files, and needles. Following from the neck area, run both hands across the top of the shoulders, then up and down each sleeve - first one, then the other.
- (2) Returning both hands to the base of the neck, proceed with the search by covering the chest, stomach, back, and beltline areas. Particular attention should be paid to items that may be hidden between the belt and waistband of the trousers. Do not allow the inmate to unbuckle his own belt since the buckle may in actuality be a weapon. Special attention should be paid to a wallet, as there are gun wallets available on the market.

- (3) From the waistline proceed down the legs, using both hands on one leg, then the other. Again pay close attention to the seams down the side of the trousers. Check shoe tops, cuffs, and socks. Follow up by running hands up the leg into the groin area.




Figure 6

These areas should be searched thoroughly.

Strip Search Procedures

The strip search of the inmate should be thorough and systematic. During this search, it is imperative that the booking officer remain in visual contact with the inmate at all times. This is to prevent the inmate from disposing of contraband.

The strip search should be conducted out of the presence of other inmates. It may be conducted in the shower room if one is available, or in a room used for interviews or some other isolated area.

The booking officer conducting the strip search should instruct the inmate to face him, take off his shoes, and hand them to him one at a time. The officer should then turn the shoes upside down, shake them out, and bang the heels against the floor to determine if they are hollow. Next he should instruct the inmate to remove his socks and turn them inside out. Often socks are used to conceal money or other items. The inmate should then be instructed to remove his trousers and underwear and turn them

inside out. Next the booking officer should tell the inmate to remove his shirt and undershirt and pass them to him for examination.

Once the inmate has completely undressed, the officer should examine the inmate's body for tape or bandages that may conceal injuries or contraband. If bandages are removed, they should be replaced with clean ones before the search continues. The pubic area should be examined for lice by using the flashlight. The inmate should then be ordered to turn around, bend over, and spread his buttocks so that the rectum can be examined. Again, the flashlight can be used for this purpose so that it is not necessary for the officer to touch the inmate. Bruises, other injuries, and identifying marks such as tattoos, scars, and birthmarks can be found and recorded during the search.

The inmate should be instructed to raise one foot at a time, so that the bottom of each foot can be checked (it is easy to conceal drugs or razors between toes). The male inmate should then be told to turn around and face the booking officer and lift his testicles in his hands. After this examination the inmate should be asked to lift his arms so that his armpits can be examined for contraband or lice.

The next step is for the officer to tell the inmate to comb his hair with a large-toothed comb, with the officer holding a flashlight to detect lice or contraband. The inmate should then bend down and shake out his hair.

The booking officer should move to a distance of about three feet from the inmate and instruct him to turn his left side to him, pull his left ear down, and then let it up so the officer can look into and behind it. The same procedure should be followed with the right ear. Next the inmate should be instructed to face the officer and lift his head up so his nostrils can be checked. Then the inmate should bend his head down, open his mouth, and wiggle his tongue back and forth. Finally, he should be asked if he wears dentures or contact lenses. If he wears contacts, the booking officer should remind him that it is his responsibility to care for them in the living area. If he wears dentures, the booking officer should ask him to take them out so that he can examine them, then remind the inmate that it is his responsibility to care for them in the living area. Many jail officers have found that dentures are a good hiding place for drugs and money.

The search described here is a basic skin or strip search that can be used for both men and women. Any further searching, such as internal rectal and vaginal checks, is a matter of policy to be set by each jurisdiction. *The jail officer must be aware of this policy, and any female must be searched in private by a female officer.*

Following the skin search, all clothing should be placed in storage. The inmate should then be issued jail clothing.

Television cameras may offer some assistance to the searching officer. The monitor should be placed in an area such as a control center, where another officer can be alerted to aggressive behavior.

All types of contraband drugs and weapons have been found on inmates, hidden in areas such as those described above. Capsules of heroin, amphetamines, and barbiturates are regularly discovered on new inmates under bandages on arms and fingers, between toes, and in body cavities. For example, in a large midwestern county jail it was recently discovered that an inmate appeared to be under the influence of drugs three days after commitment. Close examination of the inmate by a physician revealed the following items of contraband in the inmate's rectum: five capsules of heroin, a dropper from a medicine bottle, a bottle cap, one half of a double-edged razor blade, and five large rubber bands. These items had been deposited in the body opening in balloons made from the fingers of a rubber glove.

KEEPING INMATES CALM

New inmates are often hostile about having been arrested or about real or imagined treatment by the arresting officer. They see a uniform on a jail officer and automatically assume that he, too, is one of "them." It can be helpful for the admissions officer to quickly explain to the inmate that he is a jail officer, and that he is required to obtain some simple information before the booking can be finished and the inmate can call a bondsman, attorney, relative, or friend. The admissions officer should ask his questions clearly and in a calm, relaxed tone of voice. This approach sometimes calms the new inmate and makes the whole booking process a lot easier. Tough talk and a gruff manner of speaking often serve to galvanize the new inmate into physical action, which may result in injuries to both the officer and the inmate. A calm, efficient manner on the part of the admissions officer can help the new inmate overcome fear and anxiety brought about by being taken to jail; nastiness only makes a bad situation worse. A courteous approach can make the difference between an ordinary booking and a hostile situation.

INVENTORY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

At the time of commitment, preferably at the booking desk, all personal property should be taken from the new inmate and listed item by item. No individual piece of property should be omitted from the list, no matter how insignificant the item might seem to the officer (for example, one Dr. Pepper bottle cap, one brass button with three inches of blue thread, one Canadian dime, two paperclips, etc.). Care should be taken when listing personal property to describe in accurate detail such items as watches,

rings, and other types of jewelry. For example, a ring should be described by color only; the officer should not make an assumption about the precious metal involved. Thus, a gold ring would be listed as a "gold-colored ring or "yellow metal ring." The color of any stone should be listed, but the officer should not attempt to guess what the stone is. Thus, a gold ring with what the officer *thinks* is a ruby would be listed as follows: "gold-colored ring, with red stone." The inside band of the ring should be examined for initials and any other identifying marks and these, too, should be listed. A watch can be described by color of metal, the color of the band, and the color of the face. The make of the watch should always be listed; otherwise, the inmate may claim when he is being released that the "pawn shop special" was an expensive, handmade Swiss watch. All clothing should be described by color, and by labels if there are any. The fact that clothing has no labels should also be noted; otherwise, a second-hand suit becomes a \$400 custom-tailored suit. The condition of clothing also should be recorded, as for example: "one two-piece blue suit, label (name of manufacturer), tear inside pocket and at the elbow, two buttons missing from jacket front." When describing footwear, it is necessary to describe the type (boots, sandals, shoes) as well as the color. The wallet should be described and its contents inventoried item by item. Money should be counted in the presence of the inmate, and a receipt should be issued for any personal funds taken from him. Information on the booking slip should contain property NOT taken as well as property taken, such as "wedding ring on finger (unable to remove)."

The personal property slip should be signed by both the inmate and the booking officer. One copy should be given to the inmate and the other is retained by the jail. All personal items taken from the inmate should then be placed in a sealed envelope, signed by the officer and the inmate, and stored in a secure place. No inmates should have access to this storage room at any time.

A careful, thorough inventory by the admissions officer, along with receipts signed by inmates, are the best possible protection for the jail against false claims about missing, stolen, or switched property. Many successful false claims have been made by inmates released from jail because they realize that the description of their personal property, made by an admissions officer, was incomplete and vague. When inmates are asked to sign a detailed, thorough property list, there is little chance that they will attempt to claim that their property was stolen or replaced with cheaper merchandise. An example of a booking envelope is provided on the following page. See Figure 7.

Examination For Lice

All new inmates should be examined for lice and bloodsucking insects that commonly infest the body, especially the scalp and pubic region. If louse infestation is discovered, the inmate should be isolated and given proper treatment, since lice can transmit serious disease. Lice move readily from person to person, and are transmitted through skin-to-skin contact, wearing infested clothing, sleeping in infested beds, and using infested combs.

Examination for lice can take place during the strip search since the same areas can conceal both contraband and lice. Usually if a flashlight or lamp is used in the examination for lice, they can be seen as they move about on the inmate's body.

Screening For Diseases And Illnesses

A basic health screening is an essential part of the jail admissions process. (See Figure 3) First, it is necessary to guard the health of other inmates and staff. What if the new inmate has an infectious or contagious disease? In the extremely close environment of the jail, such illnesses could easily be spread to other people. Thus, it is necessary to check for signs of such sickness as soon as possible to isolate the ill person from others and to secure the appropriate medical treatment. Second, health screening is vital to protect the health of the inmate. If the new inmate is a diabetic or epileptic, for example, special steps or medication may be required. Third, actual or potential medical emergencies need to be identified and dealt with accordingly. Fourth, screening and medical action protects the jail against possible future accusations of mistreatment or neglect. (Any screening which involves intimate contact or viewing of a woman inmate should be done by a female officer.)

In many jails, trained medical personnel are not always available. Consequently, the responsibility for health screening may be part of the admissions officer's responsibilities. If this is the case, the admissions officer should be given training by the jail physician to learn what to look for when screening a new inmate. Several common medical problems and their symptoms are discussed later in this book.

No one expects the admissions officer to be able to conduct a complete physical examination or to make an extensive diagnosis of problems such as diabetes or epilepsy. The officer cannot substitute for a doctor or nurse. If the admissions officer doubts whether or not someone requires immediate medical care, he should call a doctor or have the inmate taken to the nearest medical facility, whichever is the policy of his jail. This procedure saves many lives every year in the United States and also protects both the jail and the officer from a possible lawsuit.

Information about an inmate's physical condition at the time of admission should be described in writing and placed in his or her file. For example, if an inmate has a cut, bruise, or scratch, it should be noted in the record and the injury should be described in detail. Otherwise, the inmate may claim that he has been assaulted by jail staff or otherwise injured while confined. Such claims can result in court suits. If the jail does not have some kind of proof that the inmate had been injured prior to admission, the claims might be believed. Ideally, taking a color Polaroid photo of any signs of injury on the body of a new inmate will significantly minimize claims of mistreatment. Where this is not possible, the admissions officer should give a full and accurate description in a written report, specifying the location and kind of injury. Such a description might be: "four-inch, dark purple bruise, right front ribs; scratches on bridge of nose and left cheek."

Some jails have developed a simple form listing common illnesses and injuries with space for descriptions, which the officer can check off by a combination of a quick examination and a few basic questions about the inmate's recent medical history. Such procedures are merely a screening device and are not a substitute for a more thorough examination by a physician at the first available opportunity.

The admissions officer should complete a medical screening form during the interview with the new inmate. This form will be used by the jail physician when he examines the inmate. The examination should be completed as soon after admission as possible. An agreement should be made for the jail physician to conduct sick call frequently.

FINGERPRINTING AND PHOTOGRAPHS

All new inmates should be fingerprinted and photographed. The admissions officer must be careful not to smudge the prints or to cause extraneous ink marks to blot the cards. He must roll complete, not partial, prints. He also must make sure that there is enough ink on the inmate's hands, but not an excessive amount. Properly positioning the inmate will insure good fingerprints. Figure 8 illustrates a properly prepared fingerprint card.

If the inmate has an injured or missing finger, the booking officer must mark the appropriate space on the cards as "missing (injured) digit." If the inmate has a missing hand, the cards also must be appropriately marked. If the inmate has a missing or injured right index finger, the admissions officer must amend the index card of the disposition sheet to read "left index" and then fingerprint the inmate's left index finger.

LEAVE BLANK		TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK										FBI LEAVE BLANK	
		LAST NAME <u>NAM</u>		FIRST NAME		MIDDLE NAME							
STATE USAGE		ALIASES		CONTRIBUTOR ORI <u>DCUSM0100</u>						DATE OF BIRTH <u>DOB</u> Month Day Year			
SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED				<u>USM</u>		<u>WASH D C</u>							
THIS DATA MAY BE COMPUTERIZED IN LOCAL, STATE AND NATIONAL FILES		DATE ARRESTED OR RECEIVED <u>DOA</u>		SEX <u>MALE</u>		RACE <u>W</u>		HGT. <u>502</u>		WGT. <u>135</u>		EYES <u>BRN</u>	
DATE		SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS		YOUR NO. <u>OCA</u>		LEAVE BLANK		HAIR <u>BRN</u>		PLACE OF BIRTH <u>POB</u>			
CHARGE		FBI NO. <u>FBI</u>		SID NO. <u>SID</u>		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. <u>SDC</u>		CLASS		REF			
FINAL DISPOSITION		CAUTION <input type="checkbox"/>		NCIC CLASS - FPC									
1. R. THUMB		2. R. INDEX		3. R. MIDDLE		4. R. RING		5. R. LITTLE					
6. L. THUMB		7. L. INDEX		8. L. MIDDLE		9. L. RING		10. L. LITTLE					
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY		L. THUMB		R. THUMB		RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY							

Figure 8
FBI Fingerprint Card

Force should not be used if an inmate refuses to be fingerprinted. Instead, a hold should be placed on the inmate and he should not be released until fingerprinted. A red tag, indicating a hold, may be placed on the inmate's docket or admission card.

Copies of the fingerprints should be sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation where they will be checked against FBI records. If the inmate has a prior record, the FBI will forward this information (a "rap sheet") to the jail. The FBI record will show whether the inmate is wanted in some other jurisdiction. This information can be helpful in deciding an inmate's custody status in the jail. Some states also require that fingerprints of all persons booked within that jurisdiction be sent to the state Bureau of Investigation for identification. The admissions officer should be aware of what his state requires in this matter.

Every inmate should be photographed during the admission process and one full-face photograph taken. If the inmate wears glasses, at least two full-face photographs should be made - one with glasses and one without.



Typical inmate photo.

CLOTHING AND BEDDING ISSUE

Inexpensive clothing such as T-shirts and washable trousers should be provided for all male inmates. For women inmates, a simple blouse and skirt, or blouse and trousers combination should suffice.

The use of jail-issued clothing helps to prevent the introduction of contraband; aids in the control of lice; and eliminates the possibility of bartering, stealing, or gambling with clothing. Such garments also are easy to launder. Furthermore, the possibility of escape decreases when inmates are dressed uniformly; an inmate in standard jail clothing cannot easily pose as a visitor or workman and leave the jail unrecognized.

All new inmates should be provided with a clean pillowcase, two clean sheets, a blanket (depending on the season) and a fresh towel and wash-cloth.

ORIENTATION TO JAIL RULES

At some point during the admissions process, an officer must make the inmate aware of the basic jail rules and regulations which will govern his conduct while he is incarcerated. Some jails also use this opportunity to explain such matters as the facility's mail and visiting procedures. Jail administrators cannot expect an inmate to live up to rules which he does not know exist and it is far better for the inmate to get an initial orientation from the staff rather than from other inmates. Presenting the inmate with a piece of paper is not enough. These guidelines should be incorporated into a booklet (in more than one language, depending on the number of inmates whose primary language is not English) and given to the inmate upon admission. However, a number of inmates cannot read, and in that event, the rules will have to be explained verbally. The instructions can also be tape recorded and played back to the inmate in the proper language. Jail staff members must make sure that inmates understand these rules. Bilingual officers can explain the rules to inmates who are unfamiliar with the English language. In some cases, it may be necessary to use another inmate as an interpreter when no staff member speaks the new inmate's language (such as Russian or Chinese). A nearby consulate or university is a source for an interpreter if all else fails. It is sound policy to require that the new inmate sign a brief printed statement to the effect that he has received a copy of the rules and regulations and that they have been explained to him, and that he understands them. This form should then be placed in the inmate's personal file.

This orientation is necessary for fairness to the inmates and to protect the integrity of the jail's disciplinary process.

SUMMARY

1. By carefully carrying out proper booking and admissions procedures, the jail officer will be protecting both the jail and himself, while ensuring proper regard for legal requirements and the rights of the individual.

Jail officers and the jail itself are legally liable if they book inmates who are not being held on a legal charge or if they accept for admission inmates who are sick or injured. Jails must establish thorough, clear-cut admissions procedures and booking officers must be carefully trained to screen out those new inmates who need to be referred to a physician for treatment before they are admitted to the jail.

2. For the protection of jail employees and inmates, all booking officers must be trained to thoroughly search all new inmates.

The safety of the jail and its staff and inmates is dependent upon the ability of booking officers to conduct a thorough, comprehensive search of all new inmates for weapons, contraband, body lice, and contagious diseases. Searches should be conducted in a manner which allows the inmate to retain as much personal dignity as is possible under the circumstances.

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CHAPTER NINE

CLASSIFICATION OF INMATES

Classification systems in jails developed in England in the middle sixteenth century in response to demands for reform of correctional procedures. Blasphemy, gambling, drunkenness, lewdness, and the cooperation of officers in supporting inmate vices were reported as commonplace in the jails and prisons. To overcome these practices, reform committees recommended that first offenders be separated from hardened criminals and that inmates be segregated by sex, age, and type of offense. Crude as it was, this was the beginning of the jail classification process.

The inmate classification process is a system that provides guidelines for jail personnel to evaluate inmates for assignment to living quarters. The goal of a good classification system is the *proper assignment of inmates* for rehabilitation and supervision purposes. However, in most jails the classification system is used only for inmate supervisory purposes because the jail lacks the staff to offer rehabilitation, counseling, and educational programs.

Unfortunately, most jails in the United States do not have enough personnel to develop a good system of classification, but every jail *needs* such a system to avoid unwanted litigation. In recent years the lack of a viable classification system has become a constant source of complaints by inmates, who allege that their legal rights have been violated. Inmates express concern about classification procedures for two reasons:

- (1) In the past, classification decisions often have been used to mete out punishment rather than to insure the best use of the facility's programs; and



The degree of care and supervision the new inmate requires must be determined.

- (2) Many vital aspects of the inmate's future--the amount of "good time" earned, the date of parole, personal safety while incarcerated, and the kind of job available on release from jail--are significantly dependent upon how that inmate is "classified."

Because so much is at stake in making classification decisions, courts increasingly are inclined to require that jails deal with classification problems through procedures that are fair, are based on adequate facts, and which give inmates an opportunity to request reclassification at a properly conducted hearing. For many inmates, the jail officer may be the *only* immediate source of help when the inmate feels he has been subjected to an unfair or inappropriate classification decision; similarly, the inmate whose behavior merits reconsideration of a previously valid classification decision may turn to the jail officer for assistance with his request.

INTAKE CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

The admissions officer is usually the person who has initial contact with the inmate. In the absence of an intake counselor, permanent medical staff, or another staff member assigned to this duty, the admissions officer must obtain the information necessary to enable him to determine the degree of care and supervision each new inmate requires.

The initial evaluation is made by considering the following factors:

- Charge: is it a felony or misdemeanor?
- Sex: male or female?
- Age: juvenile or adult?
- Physical appearance
- Health: those new inmates with contagious diseases should be segregated
- Criminal history
- Bond
- Detainers
- Population mix within each cell
- Number of prior arrests
- Suicide attempts
- Case status: is the inmate sentenced or unsentenced?

- Special considerations: request of arresting officer or investigating officer; court order to keep the new inmate separate from other inmates; homosexual
- Hostile attitude toward arresting officers and jail admissions personnel.

An "Initial Classification Placement Form" can be used by the officer making the initial classification so that the jail has a proper record of the decision and the reasoning used by the officer for the classification. This form becomes a permanent part of the inmate's personal history. However, because attitudes and behavioral patterns change, the classification process should be an on-going procedure that continues throughout the inmate's period of confinement. But each time a change is made in the inmate's classification status, a form should be completed and placed in his file.

Jail personnel responsible for admitting new inmates often work alone and, with telephones ringing, attorneys waiting to interview clients, and bondsmen asking for the release of inmates, the situation at the booking desk can be confusing and frustrating. Nevertheless, *taking the time to carefully classify* an inmate can result in fewer future headaches for the jail staff. Any jail officer who has had to answer a lengthy interrogatory as a result of litigation can appreciate the effort spent on *properly* classifying an inmate.



Jail personnel quite often have to carry out their duties under extremely trying circumstances.

CONTINUED

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Inmates who are in custody over 24 hours should be re-interviewed when necessary and reclassified into permanent housing. However, in some jails it may be impractical to re-interview each inmate on a regular basis, but even in these jails reclassification interviews should be conducted as soon as problems arise.

Case Study 1:

The booking officers in the Big Sky County Jail were so busy on a Saturday night in June that they couldn't even take time out for a dinner break. Not only were there a lot of "ordinary drunks" being brought to the jail, but police were also bringing in groups of young people who had been arrested for vandalism and disorderly conduct while attending large graduation parties.

When 18-year-old Matt Swedenborg, who had curly blond hair and a trim figure, was brought to the booking desk by Thundercloud City police, one of the police officers told Jail Booking Officer Jorge Vasquez:

"You better take good care of this kid. As pretty as he is, he's going to be a surprise picnic lunch for the big, bad wolves on the cell block.

"I'm not kidding," the officer added. "This is a timid kid I got here. I kind of feel sorry for him. He's the straight-A type who just wanted to let off steam and he had the bad luck to get mixed up with some classmates who were vandalizing a neighborhood near the high school. He's the only one we caught so I had to bring him in. He'll probably be out when we can get hold of his parents, but--too bad for him--they went fishing up in Canada and we can't locate them."

"Yeah, yeah, sure," Officer Vasquez said, waving the officer away. "We ain't got time to pamper these bums tonight. Damn, we got new admissions stacked up to the roof and I can't even get a dinner break. I ain't got time for no babysitting, that's for sure. Hey, Baxter, process this kid, will ya?"

Because so many new inmates were being admitted, they were being assigned overnight to whichever cells had empty bunks. Swedenborg was taken to the maximum security section cell block, where he was placed in a cell with inmate Jules Brutus, a brawny armed robber who was a known homosexual.

"This is just for tonight, kid," Officer Ted Baxter told the frightened Swedenborg. "We'll get you moved into nicer quarters tomorrow when we have time to classify all the new people."

Inmate Brutus couldn't wait for Officer Baxter to leave the cell block. During the night Brutus raped his attractive young cellmate

several times. Officers escorting the breakfast cart through the maximum security section found Swedenborg unconscious and bleeding; Brutus was sprawled across his own bunk snoring contentedly. Swedenborg was taken to the Big Sky County Hospital, where he was admitted in serious condition due to internal bleeding. He required extensive surgery to repair the damage to his rectal area; in addition, three of his ribs had been fractured.


After Swedenborg recovered, his parents' attorney filed a suit on his behalf against Big Sky County, Sheriff Maxwell Smart, and Officers Vasquez and Baxter. The Thundercloud City Police Department officer who had arrested Swedenborg testified that he had warned Officer Vasquez to place the young inmate in a cell where he would be safe from homosexual attacks; in fact, the police officer had described his verbal request to Jail Officer Vasquez in the arrest report. This written documentation of the officer's request that the jail protect Swedenborg was very damaging to the County attorney's defense of the jail staff.

The jury in the civil trial returned a verdict in Swedenborg's favor and awarded him \$300,000 in damages, to be paid by the County, Sheriff Smart, and the two officers.

This case study illustrates the need for officers to follow proper classification procedures from the moment the inmate is admitted to the jail. Under no circumstances should a young, attractive inmate like Swedenborg be placed in a maximum security cell with an older inmate, especially one who is known to be a homosexual, even if it is for a few hours only. Nor should young inmates be placed in any type of cell with older, aggressive inmates. Officers Vasquez and Baxter should have moved other inmates until they found a cellmate who was not likely to harm Swedenborg, or they should have kept Swedenborg confined in a holding cell near the booking desk, even if they had to keep him there overnight. The officers are responsible for the safety of inmates, and it doesn't hold any weight in court if the officers complain that they were so busy and so overwhelmed with new admissions "that they had no choice except to put the new inmate wherever there was room." In this case, Officers Vasquez and Baxter were clearly negligent.

CONTROL BOARD

A control board which lists the inmates and their housing assignments should be posted in the booking area in smaller jails. The size of the board depends upon the size of the inmate population. The board can be constructed from a piece of one-quarter inch Plexiglass secured over colored pieces of cardboard corresponding to the designated color codes assigned to particular housing blocks. A diagram of each living quarter or cell block configuration can be painted on the face of the Plexiglass and a wax crayon or china marker can be used to print in the name of the inmate assigned to



Control Board

the appropriate housing unit. A daily roster of the inmate population can be compiled from this board and it can also be used as a check against the daily inmate counts.

It is imperative that a single person on each tour of duty, preferably the intake officer, be assigned the responsibility for updating this record. When the intake officer completes his tour of duty, the officer who relieves him should acknowledge the accuracy of the board by initialing the lower-right hand corner. The status of inmates who are outside the jail must be indicated on the board, whether they are on work release, confined to a local hospital, or appearing in court.

The establishment of a control board system is a relatively inexpensive method of improving inmate control procedures. However, in large jails where a great deal of daily movement occurs, the control board probably will be impractical to maintain. In these jails a central file of inmate locations and daily status takes the place of the control board.

CUSTODY CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

Following intake classification, the new inmate should be assigned to permanent quarters in an area with a predetermined custody classification. There are generally three types of custody classifications in use in the United States:

- (1) *Maximum Custody*: This classification requires constant supervision of the inmate in the most secure area of the jail, with minimum movement, no outside recreation, no jail work assignments, and movement outside the cell area *only* when escorted by two staff members to and from a designated area. Inmates in a maximum custody living area are considered dangerous, violent, and/or have attempted to escape or are considered to be escape risks. Inmates in this classification should have their status reviewed periodically.
- (2) *Medium Custody*: This classification requires continuous supervision of the inmate, but allows for outside recreation, assignment to special work details, and housing in regular security living quarters. Medium custody classification is designed for nonviolent inmates who are not designated as escape risks; most inmates fall into this classification. Inmates with mental, emotional, and medical problems which are not severe would be classified in this category, along with drug addicts and alcoholics.
- (3) *Minimum Custody*: This classification requires periodic supervision and permits inmates to be assigned to work inside and outside the institution, allows them to handle tools and equipment, and often permits them to leave the jail premises to accomplish a task when escorted by a staff member. Minimum security inmates are housed in the least secure area of the jail. This classification is designed primarily for sentenced inmates who are no threat to the community and who are well known to the staff as dependable and safe, requiring minimal supervision. There should be a limited number of inmates in this classification at any one time.

Custody is the *single most important factor* in the classification process. Many other considerations will be linked to the ability of the individual inmate to move about the institution. The more severe the custody, the more restrictions are placed on the inmate's movement. However, a person classified as "maximum custody" in one jail may have more freedom of movement than a person similarly classified in another jail. The jail administrator must decide upon the restrictions for maximum custody in his jail. In making this decision he should carefully inspect the facilities he has and determine the boundaries within which the various inmates can move by virtue of their custody classification. As the inmate requires less supervision he will be allowed greater movement.

The jail administrator may want to consider using a special classification category for those inmates who are permitted to go on work release. However, the majority of the inmates will be in the medium custody category. As a general rule, it is better at the beginning to be conservative in determining an inmate's classification status. The classification can always be changed later if the inmate demonstrates by his behavior that he does not need strict supervision.

Special Problems

The National Sheriffs' Association handbook on *Jail Security Classification and Discipline* outlines a typical classification system based on common types of special inmate supervisory problems:

Narcotic Addicts: The many types of drug abusers generally may be classified according to the category of drugs involved (opiates, barbiturates, amphetamines, or hallucinogens). Not all drugs are narcotics, and not all are physically addictive, although they may be psychologically habit forming. Addiction as such is a complex phenomenon and is generally characterized by:

- Physiological dependence which manifests itself when the drug is withheld for an extended period;
- Tolerance, which constitutes physiological adjustment to the drug, thereby calling for increased dosages to produce the same effect; and
- Habituation, which is defined as psychological and emotional dependence upon the drug.



Close supervision should be given to special problem inmates while they are confined to the jail.

Alcoholics: It is widely recognized that *the jail is not the proper place for the treatment of alcoholics*. The establishment and utilization of detoxification centers and subsequent medical treatment are encouraged for alcoholics, in combination with the use of summonses and citations for minor offenses. *When admission of an alcoholic offender to the jail cannot be avoided, an immediate medical examination to determine his physical condition should be given so that all necessary measures can be taken to restore his often debilitated condition.* Alcoholics should be held in quarters separate from other inmates and supervised closely to guard against suicide attempts and to watch for symptoms of delirium tremens or other deterioration in physical condition. An alcoholic with delirium tremens should be placed in a hospital where he can receive proper attention. A well-balanced diet should be provided as soon as he is able to eat. During his stay in the jail,

close supervision should be maintained to guard against the smuggling of liquor into the jail and to prevent access to medicines and other products containing alcohol.

As soon as possible, the inmate should be permitted access to alcoholic counseling. For example, Alcoholics Anonymous provides a program which is being used quite successfully in many jails. The sheriff or jail administrator should seek the help of his local AA chapter and other related agencies in working with the alcoholic inmate while he is confined and after his release.

The Mentally Ill: *The jail is NOT the proper place of detention for the mentally ill inmate.* Every effort should be made by the jail admissions officer to contact a local hospital or clinic for the detention of the mentally ill person. But if the community hospitals have no facilities for the care of mentally ill patients, then jail-detention, pending commitment to a state mental hospital, may be unavoidable for those mentally ill inmates who are violent and who may be dangerous to themselves or others.

Mentally ill persons who must be detained in jail must be closely supervised to guard against suicide attempts or attacks upon others. They should be under the care of a physician who can prescribe sedation, if needed, to control their behavior. Medication should be carefully dispensed. Preferably, the mentally ill should be housed in individual cells. For violent inmates, special restraint rooms should be available.

Sex Offenders: Sexual deviation is often a symptom of mental illness and almost always requires extensive treatment. Although this type of inmate should be separated immediately to protect the health and safety of other inmates, it should be recognized that the degree of danger the inmate poses to the jail community varies considerably with the type of sexual deviation he has. For example, "peeping Toms" (voyeurs) and prostitutes usually are not a problem in jail; however, homosexuals and child molesters may need to be segregated, for their own safety, in individual, secure cells.

Escape Risks: When an inmate's record or behavior indicates that he is an escape risk, or if the charge on which he is held is particularly serious, extra precautions should be taken to insure safe custody. He should be assigned to the most secure quarters the jail has, preferably a single cell. His quarters should be searched often and he should be subjected to frequent strip searches; care should be taken, however, to afford privacy during such searches. The inmate's contact with visitors should be closely supervised and his conduct during and after visits carefully observed. Extra attention should be given to inspection of his mail for contraband. Telephone calls made by him within the maximum security area should be monitored on an extension; however, an exception to this rule is his conversation with his attorney of record, whose status should be verified.

The filing of a detainer often calls for re-evaluation of an inmate's custody classification. An inmate held on a minor charge can easily become an escape risk if he learns that he is facing a serious charge in another jurisdiction.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Annette Avalon was being held in the Rattlesnake County Jail awaiting trial for possession of a large quantity of cocaine. Because of citizen protests against teenage drug use, the district judge had set Avalon's bond at \$1,000,000, which she could not meet. Since the jail has only three cells available to house women inmates, Avalon and the two other women inmates currently in residence were all classified as "minimum security," which was the traditional classification assigned to the women's section.

However, after Avalon had been in the jail for a week, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration field office in Fangville notified jail officials that an FBI fingerprint check determined that Avalon was actually Mary Louise Panther, who was wanted in New York City for setting off a bomb in 1973 which killed five people. She was also being sought by California police for participating in the assassination of two police officers.

"Damn, can you believe this?" Captain Lew Erskine asked his officers at rollcall. "We got us one of those hippie revolutionaries from the early '70s--one who is still on the Bureau's Ten Most Wanted List, believe it or not!"

Inmate Panther, aka Avalon, became a celebrity in the jail. Curiosity got the best of most officers and they found some excuse to go to the women's cell block to see what Panther looked like. But no one bothered to reclassify her to maximum security status, nor did anyone bother to upgrade security for the entire women's cell block. The cell block, which was separated from the men's housing area by jail administration offices and the kitchen, continued to be supervised by only one officer per shift.

Unknown to the jail staff, inmate Panther's "attorney-of-record" was not an attorney at all--he was her boyfriend and one of the leaders in a narcotics trafficking ring which brought large amounts of cocaine, marijuana, and illicit pills into the state for sale on the college campuses. The "attorney" had built a false bottom in his attache case, and, on the day before Panther's scheduled trial on the cocaine charges, he visited her in the jail for a lengthy "legal" conference.

There were two handguns concealed in the attache case's false bottom; the officer on duty only looked at the legal files in the case and waved the "attorney" through to Panther's cell, where he was permitted to interview her because there were no separate conference rooms in the women's cell block.

When the officer entered the cell area with the evening dinner trays, the "attorney" hit her on the head, knocked her out, and took her keys. Panther changed into the officer's uniform and locked her in the cell. Panther then left the jail with her "attorney"--they walked right past the jail administrator's office on their way to the front door.

The escape was not discovered until an hour later when a "trustee" attempted to enter the locked cell block to pick up the dinner trays. By then Panther and her "attorney" were airborne in a private plane, headed for Mexico and more plastic surgery so that she could re-enter the United States with another false identity.

This case study illustrates why it is extremely important to reclassify inmates when a detainer is received from another jurisdiction. An inmate who appears to be "harmless" may suddenly become a serious security risk, especially if the detainer is for a charge more serious than the one for which the inmate is currently being held. In addition, this case study reminds jail officers that they must verify the correct identity of all attorneys who are not personally known to them--it is common for an inmate's friends attempt to enter jails by posing as attorneys, clergymen, social workers, psychologists, or journalists. Officers must be alert to detect these fraudulent visitors, or they may have an escape on their hands.

Other Special Problems: Other problem inmates with whom the jail officer may have to deal include:

- The handicapped, who should be housed separately and closely supervised to protect them from mistreatment by other inmates.
- The suicide risk, who should be given close and constant supervision as well as access to professional counseling.
- The epileptic, diabetic, or heart patient, whose care should be in accordance with the advice of the jail physician.

The Non-Conformist Inmate: In general the same precautions as for the escape risk should be followed, except that this inmate may need to be placed in administrative segregation occasionally for repeated rule infractions or for violent behavior.

Classification Of Juveniles

A universal rule to follow when housing juveniles in the jail is that they must *always* be kept apart from adult inmates: under no circumstances should a juvenile be put in cells or living areas with adults. Juveniles are favored victims of experienced, older inmates. In some jails, juveniles are thoughtlessly placed in cells with adult inmates, who then take physical

advantage of them. Another problem occurs in some jails when officers assign an adult inmate to each juvenile in the mistaken belief that the adult will protect the youth from other inmates. In one known case, the "protecting" adult assigned to a juvenile was nicknamed "Joe Sex" by inmates who knew of his homosexual tendencies. This would never happen if the universal rule of keeping juveniles apart from adults were followed. It is up to each jail officer to know at what age a juvenile becomes an adult in his state so that proper classification can be made.

Keeping juveniles in separate quarters is not the only supervisory duty required of jail officers in charge of them. When confined, young people are likely to become bored, restless, and destructive. The jail officer should, therefore, use extra patience and understanding when dealing with juveniles. But he should always be on the alert for trouble or disturbances. A jail officer should know the value of constant surveillance when dealing with juveniles. For example, one juvenile, left alone for hours at a time while confined in the jail, became depressed and successfully committed suicide. The jail officer learned too late the importance of constant checking and surveillance. In addition, he learned too late the need that juveniles have for security and friendship. In this example, an occasional kind word from the officer or conversation with the young inmate may have prevented even the attempt at suicide.

Often youthful pranks can turn into emergencies when jail officers do not patiently supervise and patrol juvenile living areas. In one jail, for example, juveniles set small fires in their cells to annoy the officer on duty. Having lost his patience with these pranks, the officer decided to teach the boys a lesson. When they called for help for the third time, he didn't respond immediately as he had before. By the time he entered the juvenile living area, a mattress had caught fire and the young inmates were overcome with smoke poisoning.

Jail officers also should be understanding and wary of the highly emotional and volatile nature of many juveniles. For example, in one jail, an officer ignored what seemed to be a minor disagreement between two juveniles and left them to settle it themselves. By the time he returned on patrol, one of the young inmates had lost control of his temper and had badly beaten the other youth.

BOY, 17, FOUND AT HOME AFTER ESCAPE

Authorities arrested a 17-year old Hagerstown boy at his parent's home Monday night, less than two hours after he escaped from the Washington County Detention Center.

The youth was immediately returned to the jail and placed on the maximum security tier, sheriff's deputies said.

Two other inmates accused of helping him escape will also be formally charged with aiding and abetting the escape, according to Deputy Bob Myers, the investigating officer.

They are: Roger Mudd, Jr., 23 of Winchester, Va., who is serving a year for a false pretense conviction; and Charles B. Franklin, 23 of Martinsburg, W. Va. who is being held on federal detainers.

Franklin is also awaiting trial on first degree murder charges stemming from the August beating death of a Hagerstown man.

At the time of the escape Monday night Bryan K. Morris was housed with Mudd and Franklin on the ground floor in a minimum security tier. Deputies said the teenager was being held as an adult on armed robbery charges.

Although Morris has been charged with committing a delinquent act, deputies said they will seek court approval to have him also charged with escape as an adult.

Deputies said Morris got out of the area at about 8:15 p.m. with the assistance of the other two inmates.

Deputies said that the three inmates managed to bend a metal grate from a door frame that connects to the outside of the jail. They bent the hole large enough for Morris to crawl through, deputies said. Morris is 5 feet 2 inches tall and 125 pounds. The two other inmates were too large to crawl through the door....

*Hagerstown Herald
October 24, 1979*

A tendency of young people is to act impulsively. Jail officers should realize this and not allow security precautions to become lax or careless in the juvenile section. Often, in cases where adult inmates would never attack or threaten a jail officer, a youthful inmate will, without considering the consequences.

In essence, then, the most important elements of successful supervision of juveniles are: patience and understanding; willingness to give juveniles special attention and time; a firm policy of constant,

careful surveillance; maintenance of good security procedures; and, when detention cannot possibly be avoided, every effort must be made to expedite the disposition of the juvenile's case.

TEAM CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

In small jails, whoever makes housing assignments is usually responsible for the classification function. Larger, more sophisticated jails, however, generally will have a system of "team classification." The team may be composed of inmate services and custody staff members (counselors, teachers, psychologists, medical personnel, community coordinators, and jail officers). This team reviews the inmate's ability to adjust within the jail environment after he has been detained for an initial period of time (usually two to three weeks). Any problems the inmate might encounter are discussed.

The inmate services staff is introduced at this time, and their programs and services are explained. Inmates are given an opportunity to reconsider their situation and housing. Classification records, bond, charges, detainers, medical problems, etc., are reviewed by the team and the inmate. Facts are revealed and problems are faced. Generally, an honest assessment of where the inmate stands in the jail system is the result. Reclassification, assignment to training programs, therapy groups, and so forth, may result from this classification procedure.

SUMMARY

1. Every jail needs a good classification system to avoid unwanted litigation by inmates.

The inmate classification process is a system that provides guidelines for jail personnel to evaluate inmates for assignment to living quarters. The goal of a good classification system is the proper assignment of inmates for rehabilitation and supervision purposes. Because so much is at stake in making classification decisions, courts increasingly are inclined to require that jails deal with classification problems through procedures that are fair, are based on adequate facts, and which give inmates an opportunity to request reclassification at a properly conducted hearing. Taking the time to properly classify an inmate can result in fewer future headaches for the jail staff.

2. Custody is the single most important factor in the classification process.

There are generally three types of custody classifications used in American jails: maximum, medium, and minimum. While most inmates are assigned to medium security classifications, certain types of

inmates will present special classification problems: therefore, each jail must develop policies to assign these inmates to a classification which permits adequate security and care; special classification procedures are needed for narcotics addicts, alcoholics, the mentally ill, sex offenders, escape risks, and juveniles. As a general rule, it is better at the beginning to be conservative in determining an inmate's classification status, since the classification can always be changed.

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CHAPTER TEN

DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES

Despite the most sincere, intelligent, and painstaking efforts by capable officers to maintain good discipline, disciplinary problems will arise in any jail. If there are group problems such as racial conflicts, strikes, disturbances, or riots, they must be dealt with firmly and without hesitation.

The capable and experienced jail officer can stop most outbreaks before they get started by *constantly analyzing and correcting conditions* that cause bitterness and unrest, and by spotting and segregating inmate ringleaders and agitators who are fermenting trouble.

The word *discipline* is not intended here to suggest negative or punitive action. Rather, it means close supervision of inmates with an understanding of their problems and frustrations, backed up by a thorough knowledge of the inmates' personalities, potentialities, and characters.

THE NATURE OF DISCIPLINE

The jail officer should be aware that there are different kinds of discipline and different approaches that he can use. There is *positive discipline*, a force that *prompts* individuals, and there is *negative discipline*, a force that *restrains* individuals.

The positive approach is centered in building up a high morale level. This method or technique is often referred to as the "training approach" and it involves explaining the need for rules and regulations in such a way that even those who fail to agree with them will understand them and the need for their existence.

The negative approach to discipline involves controlling behavior through punishment, chastisement, or threats. As a supervisor of inmate activities, the jail officer often has to use negative discipline.

To help determine when disciplinary procedures are called for, the jail officer can rely on the following guidelines, which provide a consistent interpretation of rule infractions:

- (1) Does the infraction violate rules that are intended to preserve order and security?
- (2) Does it threaten the safety of the jail staff or inmates?
- (3) Is the infraction due to lack of supervision?
- (4) Does the misbehavior stem from emotional problems or willful resistance to authority? Or does it stem from the normal give and take in day-to-day contact between inmates and jail personnel?
- (5) Does the behavior present an opportunity for the jail officer to involve the inmate in the learning situation (positive discipline)?

The jail officer must have a complete knowledge and understanding of the department's "Standard Operating Procedures" (S.O.P.) before any disciplinary action can be taken against the inmate. Otherwise, he may leave himself open to charges of unfairly singling out a particular inmate for discipline, or he may administer discipline in a situation which does not warrant it with the possible result of inmate-initiated litigation against both the officer and the jail.

A particularly delicate part of the jail officer's job is making judgments about the inmate's *motive* and *intent*. By asking the following questions, the officer can have guidelines for these delicate areas of judgment:

- (1) Was the violation a result of deliberate defiance of jail rules?
- (2) Was the violation a result of ignorance or carelessness on the part of the inmate?

If the violation is a result of ignorance or carelessness on the part of the inmate, the jail officer should:

- (1) Re-examine the department's jail rules and regulations to determine where they are unclear;
- (2) Make sure the inmate understands the rules and regulations;
- (3) Train and assist the inmate so that he can follow the rules.

If the violation was a willfully defiant act, the jail officer might consider taking stronger measures of punishment (negative discipline).

The jail officer has to know and understand the limits placed on disciplinary actions - how much authority does the jail officer actually have and how far can he go in disciplining an inmate before the case should be turned over to higher authorities? Some principles of discipline are:

- (1) Discipline is based on a system of rewards and punishments. When an inmate's standards of work and conduct are not acceptable, steps must be taken to correct him. He should be advised, counseled, and instructed. If these remedial steps are ineffective, then punitive measures must be taken in order to make the inmate aware of the error of his ways and to uphold the standards of the jail, since the other inmates will be observing the situation and will react accordingly. On the other hand, a good attitude, good work record, efforts toward self-improvement, and commendable achievements on the part of the inmate should be recognized and encouraged.
- (2) Punishment must conform with the law and with the policies of the institution. *Cruel and unusual punishment must be avoided.* It has been forbidden by the courts, and to use it is asking for trouble. Such punishment is strongly resented by the entire jail population; all inmates identify with the punished inmate and may act out their resentment in a mass disturbance. In addition, questionable punitive action may provoke investigation by outside agencies such as courts or civic groups. The inquiry and accompanying publicity may cause the prosecution of members of the staff and serious embarrassment to the jail and county or city administration.
- (3) Use of force should be avoided as a disciplinary process. With adequate disciplinary procedures, there should be no need for officers to inflict corporal punishment. In the long run, the officer harms himself more than he hurts the inmate by the injudicious use of force. When an investigation reveals that corporal punishment has been used for discipline, the jail officer may lose his job or be fined heavily. *However, the jail officer has the right to use reasonable force to stop a disturbance if, in his best judgment, property or lives (including his own life) are in danger.* But he will be violating an inmate's constitutional rights if he uses corporal punishment as a way of dealing with a specific act, as distinguished from the use of reasonable force to maintain order and security. Force used in any kind of vindictive retaliation for a specific act by an inmate would be a violation of that inmate's right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or, depending on the nature of the act, its provocation, and the attending circumstances, corporal punishment could

be a violation of the inmate's right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.

- (4) No inmate may impose discipline on other inmates. No "cell block bosses" must be allowed in the jail. "Kangaroo courts" and "sanitation courts" have resulted in physical and moral harm to weak and less aggressive inmates. The jail administrator and the county are responsible for unlawful acts of these unofficial "courts," particularly when they function with the administrator's approval. They must be avoided at all costs. Discipline is the officer's responsibility, and he cannot avoid it.

INDIVIDUAL DISCIPLINE

The factors which contribute to the making of lawbreakers are varied and complex. Hence, the techniques and services required in jail treatment must be appropriately varied and, in terms of understanding the inmate as a person, discipline, too, must be considered on an *individualized* basis. In taking the individualized approach in the handling of disciplinary problems, the jail officer needs to understand the personalities of the inmates and accept them as individuals. To do this, the officer should examine social, psychological, and psychiatric data about each inmate, his prior criminal history, and his jail program and disciplinary history. However, this does not mean that when an inmate is charged with a disciplinary infraction, the officer should read the inmate's social history and let him off with a warning because he had a drunken father and a miserable childhood. The officer should carefully examine *all* data to determine what sort of



A jail officer should obtain as much information as possible about every inmate.

inmate he is dealing with, what he can reasonably expect from him, and what treatment methods will be most effective. To be effective in his work, the jail officer should attempt to obtain as much information as possible about every inmate who is under his supervision. Individual, as distinct from group conduct, calls for individualized treatment on the basis of all pertinent data about the involved inmate. No two inmates are alike, and the type of positive disciplinary approaches which will turn one inmate's thoughts toward changing his way of life may inevitably antagonize another.

Each inmate needs to be disciplined differently. For a reprimand to be effective, the jail officer must know and understand the inmate concerned, and be able to evaluate his character, his work habits, his outlook, his past record, and his present attitudes. The exact nature of the disciplinary action should be dictated by the officer's knowledge of the inmate and the situation that necessitates it. There are a number of "nuts and bolts" things to remember in applying discipline to inmates, which are described in the material that follows.

Inmates Should Be Disciplined In Private

Discipline should *always* be administered in private. The surest way to lose respect is to discipline an inmate with his fellow inmates looking on. Not only does this cause resentment toward the jail officer, but the value of the discipline is significantly reduced. If discipline is publicly administered, the jail officer should not be surprised if the same or similar offense occurs in the near future.

Have All The Facts And Get At Causes

The jail officer should have all the facts concerning the infraction - including all mitigating circumstances. He also should look for reasons why the offense occurred. Underlying many infractions are hidden causes such as



"You bum, McGraw---messed up again! I'm sick and tired of you..."

not understanding a jail rule, misinterpretation of the rule or order, or other worries or pressures. In addition, many inmates in United States jails do not fully understand the English language when it is spoken to them, and thus they may not understand a particular rule. The likely causes of the situation - whether worry, indifference, resentment or whatever - should be carefully considered by the jail officer.

The officer should use an understanding approach. If his approach is hard, and he proceeds to "bawl out" the inmate, he immediately arouses resentment and opposition. Using a sympathetic approach, the jailer can gain the inmate's confidence, learn his side of the story, and make him receptive to advice and suggestions. The officer should discipline the inmate using the same procedures he expects a good supervisor to use when disciplining him. If the officer remembers his own feelings when disciplined by a discourteous, hostile supervisor during his working life, he should be able to understand how an inmate will react to a hostile disciplinary procedure. The key here is for the officer to treat the inmate as he himself would expect to be treated during a disciplinary session with his sergeant.

There is nothing more demoralizing to an inmate than a false accusation. If an inmate is unjustly reprimanded, it is difficult - if not impossible - for the jail officer to counterbalance the effects of that reprimand and to restore the inmate's confidence and respect. Consequently, officers should not overestimate the importance of being sure of themselves before reprimanding an inmate. The officer should have all the facts and make certain that these facts are accurate.

Let The Inmate Explain His Side Of The Story

The jail officer should begin his interview with a question, such as: "What do you think caused you to do so and so?" or "How do you feel about this situation?"

The officer should then give the inmate an ample opportunity to talk and explain. Sound interviewing techniques should be used.

Case Study 1:

Officer Tom Jones, patrolling the cell block, found a toilet overflowing in inmate David Durk's cell. When Durk returned to the jail from his work release job, Officer Jones took him to a medical examining room and began yelling: "Damn it, who gave you the right to tear up a magazine and stuff it in your toilet? I had a rotten mess on my hands! For what you did and the problems you caused me, I'm taking you off work release for a week and you can stay in your damn cell. Now get out of here!"

If Officer Jones would have carefully questioned inmate Durk, he would have learned that Durk was not even aware of the problem in his cell; his toilet was not stopped up when he left the jail at 7 a.m. for his job. Another inmate who was angry at Durk because Durk refused a homosexual advance stuffed the magazine in the toilet, and several inmates witnessed this destructive act. But Officer Jones did not give Durk an opportunity to explain nor did Jones attempt to get the facts before he disciplined Durk.

That night, frustrated and angry at the punishment inflicted by Officer Jones, inmate Durk attacked and seriously injured the inmate who had damaged the cell.

Thus, because of Officer Jones' failure to let inmate Durk explain his side of the story, an inmate who was on his way to rehabilitation has now become a disciplinary problem in the jail.

Know Departmental Policy Involving What Has Been Done In Similar Cases

When inmates know that they are being monitored according to a single, fair standard, they have a target to shoot for. They can modify their performance accordingly, and try to meet that standard. The very least that fair standards will do is minimize misdirected efforts. However, standards usually tell inmates just what is expected of them.

Of course, there is nothing wrong with being flexible with standards. To be consistent to the point of inflexibility is poor management. However, if the jail officer is going to modify his standards, he should communicate this in advance so that inmates can expect a measure of flexibility and remain flexible themselves.

Jail Officers Should Know Their Own Biases And Prejudices

No one is completely devoid of biases and prejudices. The question each jail officer should ask is: Am I aware of my prejudices?

How does an officer become aware of his prejudices? If he predicts an inmate's future and



A jail officer must not let his personal prejudices affect the way he treats an inmate.

the inmate doesn't measure up to what the officer predicted, the officer should first ask himself if he isn't responding to some irrelevant characteristic of the inmate, such as dirty fingernails or hair grooming. Emotional reactions often color what should be an objective judgment on the part of the officer. The officer should constantly be aware of his own emotional prejudices and take care not to let these prejudices surface when he is disciplining inmates.

Case Study 2:

Five years ago Officer Bob Thompson joined a weight reduction group because the sheriff told him he would lose his job if he didn't get rid of 75 pounds of excess flab. The weight reduction group used psychological conditioning, along with a strict diet and, when Officer Thompson completed the program, he was not only 75 pounds lighter but also conditioned to think body fat was ugly and dirty. Officer Thompson is now fanatical about his weight and panics if he gains one extra pound.

One night on the 4-12 shift, four inmates became involved in a fight over a paperback book. Officer Thompson and his partner, Officer Reed, individually interviewed the inmates to find out who was responsible for the fight. All that could be determined was that each inmate equally blamed the others. After the interviews were completed, Officer Reed then called all four inmates into the interview room and told them they would each lose outdoor recreation privileges for three days because of the fight. But Officer Thompson intervened and said he was suspending inmate Rob Wilson's recreation privileges for six days because, "It's obvious to me that Wilson started the fight - he's the biggest one here." Inmate Wilson is 100 pounds overweight.

How would the other inmates react to this disciplinary decision? What mistake did Officer Thompson make?

The Aim Is To Improve The Inmate

The jail officer should discipline inmates firmly, fairly, and promptly. He should be sure he has the facts and that the fault is with the inmate, not from defects of the jail, or from failure on the officer's part to be sure that everyone knows the rules and regulations. Other guidelines for fair disciplinary procedures include:

- (1) Be sure all applicable rules and regulations are known and understood by all inmates, and especially make sure that new inmates are made aware of them.
- (2) Be fair in enforcing rules...don't play favorites. When the officer starts to make exceptions because of personal preference, especially when the inmate he favors is playing up

to him, the rest of the inmate population adopts a "what-the-heck" attitude.

- (3) Don't single out an individual inmate "to make an example out of him" if there has been a general slackening of discipline. A far better technique is to post a general, impersonal order calling attention to a situation that needs tightening up on the part of *all* inmates.
- (4) Create a climate that makes discipline self-enforcing.

USE OF SANCTIONS

Disciplinary action by jail officers must be based on recognition of certain facts if it is to be effective. The staff must recognize that disciplinary measures must be perceived by the inmate as proper and deserved. If it does not seem to the inmate that the punishment fits the crime, that it is excessive, unwarranted, and unjustified, he is resentful and this resentment builds up to hostility and future disciplinary problems.

The largest group in any jail population consists of young men. Not only are they burdened with anxiety about their situation, but they also are frustrated by the lack of normal outlets for energies and desires. The jail should provide activities as a vent for such tensions. But, above all, the staff should not add to these tensions by actions which inevitably evoke a negative response.

Both jail staff and inmates should understand the various sanctions which can be imposed for breaches of discipline. Among these sanctions are:

- (1) *Reprimand*: A reprimand is warranted when the disciplinary officer or committee feels that the infraction will not be repeated, did not present a threat to the institution, or occurred under extenuating circumstances.
- (2) *Loss of Privileges*: The loss of one or more privileges for a specific period of time is a punishment which is felt deeply by many inmates. Because of the monotony of their confinement, they place great value on having a visitor, participating in recreational activities, attending a movie, or participating in other program activities.
- (3) *Lock-up*: Inmates being punished are restricted to a cell for a specified number of days, or in the evenings, or on Saturdays or Sundays.

- (4) *Loss of "Good Time" for Sentenced Inmates:* This punishment involves deprivation of part or all of the discretionary reduction of sentence known as "good time," which is awarded in advance in anticipation of good behavior and satisfactory work habits. Loss of "good time" is an appropriate punishment when such behavior is not forthcoming from the inmate.
- (5) *Change of Work Assignment:* A change in work assignment is an effective method of discipline, particularly when the work situation contributed to the trouble.
- (6) *Solitary Confinement:* In extreme cases, this sanction may be used for *short periods* of time. The inmate must have a full diet. The isolation should be in a cell which is apart from the general jail population. The inmate in isolation must be checked periodically by a supervisor and a physician. *Administrative* segregation is not a punishment. Those inmates who are considered to be chronic troublemakers and who frequently violate the rules, attempt to escape, and who provoke disturbances, should be housed in a separate section of the jail under administrative segregation conditions. While the inmate is not in a punishment status, he nevertheless may forfeit some privileges. Administrative segregation may be indefinite in duration. The inmate is permitted to rejoin the general population when he is considered capable of doing so without getting himself into further trouble and without disrupting the activities of the other inmates.

Here is a checklist of basic factors to review in assessing penalties:

- (1) Nature of the violation.
- (2) Record of prior conduct. This includes any formal and disciplinary actions that appear on the inmates' record. Penalties should become more severe for each additional instance of misconduct.
- (3) Intervening time since last penalty. A long period of good conduct following previous disciplinary action should be considered since it represents the aim of corrective discipline.

Minor infractions present no major problems. Usually, the rules and regulations in general force are followed with reasonable adherence to them by inmates. However, it is the unusual "cited incidents" where the regular rules for discipline seem not to apply. These incidents include serious, dangerous infractions such as physical assaults and, while these episodes fortunately are infrequent, how they are handled by the jail staff will have far-reaching effects upon inmate morale.

If a serious infraction takes place, jail officers should use the following guidelines for analysis and action:

- (1) Don't act in haste regarding disciplinary measures.
- (2) Find out who the informal leaders are in the group or groups involved. Determine how they can aid in handling the situation.
- (3) What can be learned from this particular incident?

In addition, when conducting a formal disciplinary hearing against an inmate for a *serious* violation of jail rules, officers *must* follow due process procedures. The U.S. Supreme Court held in *Wolff v. McDonnell* that certain procedures are *mandatory* on the part of institutional officials during a formal disciplinary hearing involving serious rule violations by an inmate. The more important parts of this major decision are:

- The inmate has the right to a written statement of charges no less than 24 hours before any disciplinary committee hearing.
- The inmate also has the right to a formal notification of hearing and to be given time to prepare a defense.
- The inmate can call witnesses and present evidence, as long as by so doing security or "correctional goals" are not jeopardized.
- There is, however, no right to confront one's accusers. Permitting an inmate to do so is wholly discretionary on the part of institutional officials.
- The inmate does not have a right to counsel at the hearing.
- The inmate is entitled to a written statement of the disciplinary committee's decision and of the rationale for that decision.

The *Wolff* decision was further reinforced and expanded upon in 1976 when the Supreme Court, in *Baxter v. Palmigiana*, added the following guidelines for disciplinary hearings:

- While the inmate has the right to remain silent, the disciplinary committee may use such silence against him in arriving at a decision.
- The accused inmate has no right to cross-examine witnesses.
- If the alleged violation is one for which the inmate could also be prosecuted, then he has the right to counsel at the disciplinary hearing. Otherwise, a right to counsel does not exist.

The jail's policies and rules *must be* written down and posted so that *all* inmates are aware of their existence. If the jail frequently holds inmates who speak Spanish or another foreign language, the rules should also be posted in the foreign language. The courts have also held that the jail staff must enforce the written rules on a fair and impartial basis.

For his own protection, the officer conducting a disciplinary investigation or hearing should *document everything*. Thus, in the event that he becomes a target of litigation initiated by the inmate, the officer will have written proof to show that he acted in "good faith," was fair, and did not violate the inmate's due process rights.

To summarize, the jail officer who conducts or participates in a disciplinary proceeding against an inmate should be like a judge who always questions, listens, and thinks...gets all pertinent facts and opinions...and analyzes, weighs, and thinks all the way around the problem. Then, *and not until then*, he renders a decision promptly and courageously, and follows his decision with pronouncement of a penalty which fits the situation.

SUMMARY

1. There are limits placed on disciplinary actions in the jail.

Discipline is based on a system of rewards and punishments and punishments must conform with the law and the policies of the sheriff. Cruel and unusual punishment must be avoided. The use of force must be avoided although reasonable force is permissible if lives or property are in danger. Jail officers should not permit inmates to impose discipline. If a formal hearing is being conducted to discipline an inmate for a serious offense, the safeguards of due process must be followed, as outlined by the Supreme Court in *Wolff v. McDonnell* and *Baxter v. Palmigiana*.

2. Discipline must be considered on an individualized basis.

The jail officer should obtain all the facts, understand the inmate's background, be aware of departmental actions and policies in similar cases, know his own biases and prejudices, let the inmate explain his side of the story, and discipline the inmate in private. The punishment must fit the crime.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

CONTRABAND CONTROL

Contraband control is one of the more important duties of a jail officer. Controlling contraband aids the officer in maintaining the security of the jail and the safety of the jail staff and inmates. What is contraband? It is any item or article inside a jail that was not issued by the jail, purchased in the commissary, purchased or allowed through approved channels, or approved for issue by an appropriate staff person, or more concisely, *any unauthorized article*.

Typical among articles considered contraband are firearms, knives, files, saw blades, keys, lock picks, hypodermic needles, certain medicines, poisons (lye, insecticides, denatured alcohol, etc.), and any number of small articles which can be hidden on or in the body.

In addition, authorized articles may be considered contraband when they are found in excess. This is typical in most jails where the number of packs of cigarettes an inmate may possess is limited, since cigarettes are used for money. Also, most jails allow toothbrushes and razor blades. However, when the razor blade is attached to the toothbrush, the result is a weapon, which is contraband.

The reasons for controlling contraband are many. In a jail the acquisition of contraband by inmates is considered power. Second, inmates could use weapons or poisons on themselves, other inmates, or jail officers. Finally, an item of contraband could be used in an attempt to escape. Hence, limiting contraband provides for good control and safety within the jail.

In many jails there will be occasions when inmates have access to contraband. For example, this happens when an inmate is taking medications, when he is performing institutional duties such as cooking or cleaning, or in some cases when he is participating in vocational training or work programs. In these cases, inmates must be closely supervised to ensure that dangerous items are used appropriately and that these items do not leave the work areas.

SEARCHES AND SHAKEDOWNS

The principal method of controlling contraband is through searches. The jail officer must continually search all living quarters, buildings, work areas, program areas, and visiting areas to which inmates have access. In addition, if the jail has a "work release" or "live in, work out" program where inmates are in the community, the jail officer must insure that their access to other inmates is either nonexistent, or that they are thoroughly searched prior to entering areas where they can contact other inmates.

The purpose behind any search is to find the object an inmate is concealing or to prove beyond doubt that he does not have a suspected object. While no system for the *complete* control or elimination of contraband has ever been devised, the jail officer can operate safer jails by concentrating on the task and not becoming careless or indifferent in carrying out this important part of the daily routine. The jail officer should be business-like and try to make each search a little better than the last one. A search must be thorough and complete; otherwise, it is useless.

Inmates are among the shrewdest judges of character and they make few mistakes in sizing up those in authority. If a jail officer is very skilled at his work and attentive to details, inmates are the first to know it and, strangely enough, they have a great deal of respect for efficiency. Word quickly gets around and few attempts are made to conceal contraband from the alert officer. On the other hand, if the inmates realize an officer is lax, indifferent, or haphazard in his methods, they will succeed in concealing contraband.

Before examining the "how to" of searches, it is necessary to point out that *searches should be unannounced and they should be conducted at irregular intervals*. Failure to follow this general rule will set up a search pattern to which the inmates will quickly become wise.

Another general rule is that *searches should never be used for harrassment*. If used for harrassment, the search could create an unhealthy climate in the jail. The jail officer should remember that by controlling contraband he wants to ensure good control and safety in the jail. Harrassment would work against that goal.

In making quarters shakedown, the jail officer should remember that inmates do have *some* rights. The officer can do a thorough job and still respect the inmate's rights by being careful not to damage or destroy his *legitimate* personal property. The cell is his home and careless handling of his property results in deep resentment and bitterness toward the person responsible. In short, searching should be done in such a manner that all legitimate articles and bedding can be left as neat and orderly as the officer found them. Confinement gives most inmates an exaggerated sense of values and the needless destruction of

even a small item can lower morale and create disciplinary problems for a thoughtless officer.



"OK, Turkey, now let me see you clean this mess up."

Trusties must be searched regularly for two reasons. First, they are regularly exposed to contraband. The second reason is to keep the "heat" off the trusty who may be forced by other inmates to transport contraband.

Search plans or shakedowns have several purposes. Among them are:

- (1) To prevent introduction of contraband into the institution;
- (2) To discover and suppress trafficking between employees and inmates;
- (3) To detect the manufacture of weapons and escape devices within the jail;
- (4) To enforce rules designed to eliminate usual causes of dissension and strife between inmates (theft, gambling, drugs, etc.);
- (5) To discover theft and traffic in institutional supplies;
- (6) To check any malicious waste or destruction of government property; and,
- (7) To discover hazards to health and safety.

Each jail should have a plan calling for periodic searches. Some agencies require a total search of their facility weekly. It is important that inmates know that such a plan exists. Certainly they should not know when a search will take place but if they realize a plan exists, that knowledge will, to some degree, limit the flow of contraband in the jail.

If one inmate is suspected of having dangerous contraband, it is a good practice for two officers to work together on the shakedown - one officer searches the inmate while the other shakes down his quarters, place of work and, if practical, his associates. Frequently, the contraband item is stashed away in the cell of an associate. Sometimes the inmates hide the contraband just outside the cell where they can have access to it. In such a case, if the item is found, they can disclaim that it is theirs or argue that it was planted.

It is also a sensible practice to double back and re-search supposedly clean cells, as inmates are very clever when it comes to transferring contraband from one place to another. *A jail officer should never underestimate the cunning and ingenuity of an inmate.* The inmate thinks along different lines and it is practically impossible to predict or anticipate his moves. Decoys frequently act in a suspicious manner to divert the officer's attention while the real dirty work goes on in another section of the jail. Lookouts always play a very important part in jailhouse games.

To be successful in searching cells or other sections of the jail for hidden contraband, the officer will have to make full use of all his normal senses, plus use some imagination and ingenuity. *He should be suspicious of everything until convinced of its innocence.* The officer will be in for a few surprises but so will an inmate when he finds that the officer also has a few tricks of his own. An officer who wants to be effective should follow a definite plan for searches and take his time.

CONDUCTING CELL SEARCHES

A complete search should always be made of an unoccupied cell prior to assigning a new inmate to it. It is impossible to know what was left in the cell by its previous tenant. A good example of why this should be done was illustrated recently during a training class. Trainees were required to shake down cells which were "salted" with contraband. One trainee did a very good job by finding all the "salted" contraband and, in addition, he found a shank left by its previous tenant which the training officer had overlooked.

Inmates should be moved out of the cell while the search is taking place. This reduces the possibility of conflict with an inmate who

objects to his cell being searched. It also eliminates the possibility of the inmate moving contraband from the unsearched part of the cell to a part that was searched. However, when the inmate is removed from his cell, he should be searched to make sure that he did not take any contraband out of the cell.


Before beginning the search, the officer should pause for a moment and look at the whole cell. This will provide a search plan. It also serves two other useful purposes; to check sanitation, and possibly to sense the emotional state of the inmate. If an inmate is normally an orderly person and his cell is in disarray, it could tell the officer that the inmate's mental condition may be deteriorating.

The officer should be very thorough in his cell search. Guidelines for an effective search include:

- (1) Probe holes or cracks in walls, floors, and ceilings.
- (2) Unscrew light bulbs and check to see if face plates have been tampered with.
- (3) Inspect the washbowl, plumbing stacks, and the toilet. The officer should not be squeamish about putting his hand in a toilet. Also, with a flat metal scraper, check where fixtures go into the wall to see that caulking was not removed.
- (4) Examine shelves, drawers, and medicine cabinets and all articles on or in them.
- (5) Check bed clothing and extra blankets.
- (6) The officer should run his hands over the mattress and pillow with enough pressure to feel if anything is hidden. Also, the pillow and the mattress should be rolled and the corners crushed. Check seams to see if they have been opened and resewn. Look for other holes in the material. Hundreds of articles have been stored in pillows and mattresses and have escaped notice because of poor inspection procedures.
- (7) Leaf through books, magazines, and newspapers. Check the bindings and covers on hardcover books.
- (8) See if false bottoms exist on tobacco cans, ashtrays, drawers, and medicine cabinets. Cigarettes can be repacked. What about false bottoms on the cigarette pack?
- (9) Probe hollow legs and piping on furniture.
- (10) Examine window bars, window frames, overhead ventilators, grates. Tap the bars to see that they have not been

tampered with. Look for signs of hacksawed bars. Floor grates are a favorite area for hiding contraband by tying it to a thread and suspending it into the hole. The officer may have to check floors by getting on his hands and knees.

- (11) Check sliding doors and check grooves when the doors are open and shut. Do this both inside and outside. A handy device is to have a mirror on a long handle. This will allow the officer to search these and other areas without bending.



A handy device to have is a mirror on a long handle.

- (12) Check locking devices.
- (13) When searching clothes, search anywhere there is a double layer of material.
- (14) Do not overlook a roll of toilet paper, and the backs and frames of pictures. When searching shoes, the officer should put his hand all the way in. Check for slits in the soles and heels.
- (15) In checking furniture, the officer should look before he touches. Inmates have been known to hide razor blades in places where the officer will reach in with his hand with the expectation that the officer will cut himself.


SEARCHING COMMON AREAS

In searching shops, classrooms, dining areas, or any other common areas, officers should remember the tips listed earlier. In addition, furnishings, clothes lockers, work clothes, tool chests, benches, machinery, supplies and materials, pipes and conduits, and holes in tiles and plaster walls should be checked. In short, the officer should check any place which could offer concealment. Inmates should not be allowed to be present during these searches.

In performing these searches it is also necessary to check the area immediately outside of the building. This would include shrubbery, manholes, drain pipes, and so forth.

VEHICULAR SEARCHES

In all but the smallest jails vehicles may have access through the perimeter of the jail. When entering or leaving, all vehicles must be thoroughly searched inside and out.



Officers must thoroughly check all vehicles leaving the jail.

In conducting the search of vehicles, an officer should be systematic and thorough. The officer should look in the passenger and freight compartments, trunk, motor area, and the undersides.


When contraband is suspected, from a tip-off for example, the search should be even more thorough. Such a search requires that hub caps be removed, spare tires inspected, dashboards and seats closely examined, and floor carpeting and head and door linings checked by hand pressure.

In the case of commercial deliveries, the officer should check the invoice or bill of lading to see what is delivered. If the deliveries include narcotics or other pharmaceutical supplies, firearms or ammunition, chemical agents or riot equipment, or anything equally as dangerous, the officer should not let the delivery van inside the jail building or in an area where inmates have access. These supplies must be received outside of the jail through a door that is carefully guarded.

When a delivery vehicle leaves the jail the officer should search it and look for areas where inmates could hide, including the engine compartment. If the truck is loaded, the load should be checked. Inmates can escape in barrels, large boxes, and tanks of liquids. Loose loads such as refuse should be prodded with a probing device. A large sheet of stainless steel which serves as a mirror, and over which vehicles must be required to pass, can be quite useful in checking the underside of vehicles.

PERIMETER SEARCHES

The preventive measures employed to keep contraband out of an institution begin at the perimeter - the walls or fences. These must be adequately guarded and patrolled to insure that nothing goes over, under, or through them, unless it has first been properly authorized. In practice this usually means that the barriers are penetrated by two guarded openings - a front entrance through which most pedestrian traffic and deliveries pass,



Recreation areas must be searched for contraband before each exercise period.

and a side or rear gate for freight shipments and institutional operating and maintenance equipment. With the possible exception of employees and official visitors, everyone and everything which passes through these gates must be thoroughly and carefully searched. Here, the walk-through metal detector is invaluable as it does the job in an impersonal way.

SECURITY INSPECTIONS

A jail administrator should not assume that his security system is in perfect working order. Mechanical devices break down from repeated use and inmates, in an attempt to escape or disrupt the system, have often ruined equipment. Thus it is necessary to maintain a formalized and regular policy of security inspections, reinforced by constant observation of physical plant security, safety, sanitation, and appearance.

Frequent security inspections often reveal escape attempts and discourage inmates who may feel that the value of such an attempt is not worth the effort.

In conducting a security inspection, the jail officer should examine bars to see if they have been cut. A good tool to use is a leather mallet. The mallet, when hit against bars, will give a different ring if the bars have been tampered with. Locking lugs should also be examined to see if they have been jammed with paper, gum, or wood.

It is important to examine glass panels, protective screens, grills, grates, and access plates weekly. They could be loosened by an inmate in preparation for removal. In many cases, screws to these panels, grates, and so on have been removed and cleverly replaced with gum, soap, wood, paper, or bread.

The officer should be very concerned that equipment in his jail is in good working order. During the security inspection he should make sure that he notes and reports to his supervisor any equipment which is not in top working order. This would include security equipment, plumbing equipment, and the like. Faulty equipment which remains unrepaired can contribute to serious problems. For example, during the early stages of the Attica Prison riot in September, 1971, the inmates could have been contained in one small area of the prison. However, they began shaking a grill gate, but the officers on the other side felt little danger. Soon though, the hinge on the gate broke, and the inmates were able to gain control of a large part of the institution. The result was a tremendous loss of life and property. It was later found that the hinge had been cracked for some time and painted over. It certainly gives thought for speculation as to what may have happened had that hinge been discovered prior to the riot. Officers would be

wise to heed the following advice from Benjamin Franklin in his *Poor Richard's Almanac*:

*For want of a nail, the shoe was lost.
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost.
For want of a horse, the rider was lost.
For want of a rider, the message was lost.
For want of a message, the battle was lost.
For want of a battle, the war was lost.
All for the want of a nail.*

Aside from security risks in a jail in poor condition, the cost of repairing a system when it is broken down is a great burden on the county or city. It is part of the jail officer's duties to protect government property by identifying problems and reporting them to his supervisor.

Repeatedly, escapes have been made possible because jail officers have not conducted a careful, thorough, and systematic security inspection. Although things may seem or look secure, the jail officer should not be led into a sense of false security. He must be constantly alert and vigilant to ensure that security inspections are conducted frequently.

COUNTS

The mission of the jail in most cases is twofold: to ensure that those committed to its custody appear for trial; and to ensure the public safety by incarcerating those inmates who have been sentenced to short terms. The jail administrator accomplishes this mission by maintaining a security system that allows for no escape.

There are many aspects to maintaining a secure jail. The primary method of making sure that inmates have not escaped is through the system of counts. This system is simply an accounting of all the inmates in a jail.

The way in which jailers conduct counts can be crucial to the security of the jail and its employees. Too many jails have experienced assaults upon officers and escapes because officers are not aware of the importance of conducting counts according to established rules.

The following is an article from the Hagerstown, Maryland *Morning Herald*, July 26, 1979.

WEST VIRGINIA PEN PROBING ESCAPE

A probe into the escape of two inmates from the most secure cellblock at the West Virginia Penitentiary could lead to the punishment of up to 10 guards, the prison's superintendent said Wednesday.

Superintendent Richard Mohn said he hoped to have the investigation completed today. The two inmates worked an estimated 84 days to dig a tunnel under a solid masonry wall at the maximum-security prison at Moundsville.

Their 19 hours of freedom Tuesday ended without incident when they were arrested while aboard a Greyhound bus in Putnam County. They earlier released a Moundsville man whom they apparently abducted. The two were not found missing until the Moundsville man called authorities. Two head counts had been conducted in the meantime.

The inmates, Johnnie C. Verton, 23, and Donald L. Williamson, 31, escaped from North Hall - called the "Alamo" by inmates and previously believed to be escape-proof.

The two had been lodged in "administrative segregation" because of an escape attempt several months ago.

Corrections Commissioner W. Joseph McCoy, who arrived at the prison late Tuesday, described the escape as a "very sophisticated complex operation."

The guards in North Hall are supposed to conduct a head count every half-hour, Mohn said, adding that they apparently were "not as attentive as they could have been" because "they just assumed you couldn't escape from North Hall. If it was going on for 84 days... surely someone wasn't checking the cells."

Mohn said the two inmates apparently used such crude devices as a plastic bleach bottle fashioned into a scoop, a circular piece of metal from their cells and a small soup bowl to dig the tunnel, which was three to four feet wide and 37 feet long. He estimated a "truck load" of dirt was removed by the inmates and stashed in a hollow area where pipes run.

The jail officer may argue that his jail is so small that counts are not necessary. Consider this example of what happened in a small jail: A U.S. deputy marshal called at the jail to pick up a prisoner who had been left there several days before. The prisoner could not be found. Eventually, officers discovered that the prisoner had escaped the day he had been admitted. No one had bothered to make an inmate count and the man's escape had gone unnoticed!

The number of counts daily depends on local policy, but at a minimum there should be one count per shift. Counts should be spaced to facilitate work, school, or other programs if they are offered at the jail. A good idea is to schedule counts during shift changes when more officers are on duty. It also serves to pinpoint responsibility if escapes are detected during the shift change count. In all cases a master count sheet should be kept in the control center of the jail.

There are various kinds of counts; they include formal counts, census checks, and emergency counts.

Formal counts are taken at times and locations specified by the jail administration. Like all counts, all inmate movement ceases until the count is correct.

Census counts are frequent, irregular checks made by an officer to verify that the inmates under his supervision are there. They are made both between formal counts and at night after lights are out. They can be made on a cell block or in a work assignment. At a work assignment, crews are counted before and after the work period. Census checks are not normally reported unless, of course, an inmate is missing.


Emergency counts are formal counts taken at times other than one of the times specified as a formal count. This means that they are taken when there is reasonable belief that an inmate is missing; immediately following a disorder, escape, or escape attempt or after a fire or other serious incident. Also, they may be required if the jail has towers where visibility of the officers manning the towers may be limited because of weather conditions or power failures.

There are many rules for conducting counts. Generally, the following guidelines apply:

There should be no movement during a count. If the count is being made in a cell block, one officer can efficiently conduct the count as long as inmates are locked in their cells. If inmates are being counted in a dormitory or work area, two officers are needed. The reason for having two officers is illustrated in this example: In a small county jail, only one officer was performing an inmate count in a dormitory. While he was busy conducting the count, the inmates were able to move around and cover for an inmate who had managed to escape an hour earlier. Because of the movement and confusion during the count, the jail officer did not notice that a man was missing.

The proper method for conducting a dormitory count is to have all inmates move to one side of the area. One officer should observe that the inmates remain in that area until called by the counting officer. When called, the inmate should step forward and be identified by the counting officer. After he is identified, the inmate should move to the other side of the room. Another example showing the importance of two officers in a dormitory or work area count is: In a jail with a large dormitory, an officer was making a late night inmate count alone. Since all the inmates appeared to be in their bunks, the officer proceeded to the dayroom to turn off the television. At this time he was assaulted by two inmates who had hidden under tables during the count. The other inmates then joined in the assault and managed to severely injure the officer and two other officers who came to help.

An officer should always make sure that the inmate he counts is breathing and human flesh is visible. This, of course, means that the officer counts a person - not a dummy. Many escapes have succeeded because of dummies. Great success with dummies has been attained by "building up" the officer. In one successful escape, for example, an inmate who was supposed to be standing near his cell door for the count, by degrees and over a period of time, began to recline on his bed. The officer did not enforce count regulations and, after about three weeks of "build-up," the inmate was able to escape by using a dummy in his bed.



An officer should always make sure that the inmate is breathing and human flesh is visible.

An empty bed or cell would indicate a certain inmate is unaccounted for, but it does not tell the officer which inmate is missing. In this case, the missing inmate could have another inmate cover for him. By doing this a description of the wrong inmate would be given to the police, thereby greatly increasing the escapee's chances for a clean getaway. The positive identification of the count would remedy this situation.

When conducting a night count the officer should use a flashlight, but do so judiciously. He should have enough light thrown to leave no doubt that he is counting a live, breathing person.

One final rule on counts is: never allow an inmate "trustee" to conduct a count. Although the word "trustee" implies that the inmate can be trusted, some of the worst incidents that occur in jails are the direct result of jail officers placing their trust in these inmates. Under no circumstances should procedures involving the security of the jail and the safety of the people in the jail be placed under the control of inmates, even if they are called "trustees."

SUMMARY

1. In order for the jail to remain secure, constant vigilance and inspections are necessary.

Jail officers should never underestimate the cunning and ingenuity of inmates. To maintain a secure jail, it is necessary to conduct frequent inspections for contraband. These inspections and searches should be irregular and unannounced and officers conducting searches must be extremely thorough.

2. The jail administrator should maintain a security system that allows for no escapes.

He should never assume that his security system is in perfect working order. Frequent inspections are necessary. It is also necessary to count inmates several times a day to prevent or detect escapes. Although things may seem or look secure, jail officers should not be led into a sense of false security.


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CHAPTER TWELVE

KEY AND TOOL CONTROL

Factory managers like to hang posters with slogans to motivate workers. If a sheriff wants to hang a poster with a slogan that could save a jail officer's life, it would have imprinted upon it:



Most inmates who escape from custody do so because an officer has become careless about jail keys and tools. Either the officer has made it easy for an inmate to obtain a key to open doors or has not supervised the inmate's use of tools.

Key and tool control are two of the most important duties of every jail officer--*the life the officer saves by taking proper security steps could be his own.*

KEY CONTROL

One of the most important *security* responsibilities of jail officers is making certain that no inmates or unauthorized persons *ever* obtain access to jail keys. A security conscious officer must be aware of key control needs constantly--*he cannot ever allow himself to take keys for granted.* The keys which open various doors, storage rooms, and cabinets in the jail are not in the same category as the officer's personal keys. For example, if someone steals the keys to the officer's tool shed at home, this does not present a significant danger to the officer; the person who took the keys probably will use them to burglarize the tool shed to obtain items to sell, such as a lawnmower. However, if an inmate steals a key to a knife cabinet in the jail kitchen, then the officer's life may be endangered.

To help officers become "key conscious," each sheriff or jail administrator should develop a policy statement regarding the control of keys. For example, the statement could read as follows:

This department will maintain a system of control that will provide *immediate* knowledge of the location of *every* key and lock at any hour of the day or night, and provide for the security of *all* keys and locking devices at all times. It will be the responsibility of the chief jail deputy to carry out this policy.

This statement of policy clearly points out that the control of keys is vital and that the chief deputy is responsible for making certain that the policy is carried out.

Inventory Of Locks And Keys

The first step in the development of a key control procedure is to record the location of *every* lock in the jail and stamp it with a number. All keys to match the lock should be stamped with the same number. Step two involves taking a complete inventory of *all* keys and key blanks.



Key Board

All keys should be issued from the jail's central control room by one officer specifically assigned to key control duty during each shift. Every employee, regardless of his rank, should be required to surrender his work keys at the end of each shift. It is a very simple procedure to turn in a set of keys. An officer who thinks he could save a few minutes of his personal time by taking the keys home with him could end up costing the jail thousands of dollars or could indirectly be responsible for an escape. For example, what if the officer loses the keys on his way to or from work? What if the keys are stolen from the officer by accomplices of an inmate who

is planning an escape (if officers are allowed to take jail keys home, this knowledge eventually gets passed around the inmate grapevine; it is difficult to keep secrets in a jail community--one of the first things inmates who are planning to escape check is the jail's key control system: does it have flaws?). If each jail employee is permitted to keep keys, then there will be several sets of jail keys floating around the community at any given time. The threats posed by a situation like this are too numerous to describe.

The control room or console should have a large board with sufficient hooks to accommodate all keys and key rings that are needed. By numbering the vertical row and lettering the horizontal row, the stamping of the keys with identifying numbers is simplified. A metal tag which contains the principle names of the keys and their color code should be affixed above each hook. Every jail develops its own color coding system for key control, such as:

- Red: Security keys, issued only on the orders of the chief jail deputy or the sheriff
- Blue: Emergency keys, issued only on the orders of the chief jail deputy or the sheriff. To be lock-tested by the chief jail deputy at least twice a month and a written memo submitted to the sheriff stating that the inspection was conducted
- Yellow: Restricted keys, to be issued only to those employees who have a need for the keys in order to perform their assigned duties.

Following each change of shift, the control room duty officer should conduct a count of the keys. Once the officer determines that the count is accurate, he should make an entry in the daily log. The total count of keys should be recorded as well as the location of all keys that were in use at the time the count was made.

Issuing Of Keys

All employees should have either plastic or metal tags with their name stamped on the tag. When an employee reports to work, he should surrender his car keys or house keys with his name tag affixed to them. The control room duty officer should place the officer's personal keys on the key board on the same hook number as the jail key ring which the officer will be using during his tour of duty. This reduces the possibility that an officer will drive home only to find that he forgot to turn in a set of jail keys.

All officers should *immediately report* any lost, misplaced, or stolen keys to their duty supervisor so that adequate safeguards can be taken.

Under no circumstances should an inmate be permitted to handle a set of jail keys, even if the inmate is working as a "trusty."

Proper Handling Of Keys

Officers should take the following precautions when handling keys:

1. Keys should be carried and used as inconspicuously as possible.
2. Keys should be carried securely fastened to the officer's belt and covered by a flexible leather flap.
3. The number of keys on a ring should be listed by a number stamped on a tag affixed to that ring. When the officer checks out the keys, he should count the keys to determine if it matches the number listed on the tag. The control room duty officer should do the same when performing the key count following a change of shift.
4. Officers should not refer to keys by either their number or key ring number when in the presence of inmates.
5. Keys should never be thrown or skidded on the floor from one officer to another.
6. Force should never be used to open locks. If a lock does not function easily, it should be repaired or replaced.
7. Only an authorized locksmith or employee trained as a locksmith should be permitted to repair locks or fabricate keys.
8. Key rings should be welded closed so that keys cannot be removed or accidentally fall off the ring.
9. Keys should not be left unattended or stored in desk drawers.
10. Keys that permit egress from the jail proper should never be taken inside the jail.
11. A key should never be drawn across the cell bars as a means of determining if the bars have been tampered with.

The control room duty officer should maintain a cross index file of locks and keys. An alphabetical listing by location is recommended. This listing should indicate what lock each key fits, the make of the lock, the make and the key code number on which the key ring keys are placed, and the control board and hook number where keys are placed.

Case Study 1:

Rural Longhorn County has an old jail that holds a maximum of 25 inmates. The Sheriff's Department has five officers assigned to jail duty on rotating shifts. Because the jail is small, the sheriff never instituted a key control system and each officer takes

his jail keys home with him or leaves them in a desk drawer.

Rookie Officer Travis Abilene, a native of Longhorn County, was very proud that he was hired by the Sheriff's Department. He was anxious to prove himself as a good jail officer and hoped to make a career with the Department. But he also found that his status rose among his friends because of his uniform and badge--Officer Abilene found himself to be the "center of attention" at the poolhall when the men from his high school graduating class got together on weekends to socialize.

To emphasize his important role in the community, Officer Abilene liked to display his uniform equipment whenever he had a chance. He always wore his jail key ring on his belt, since people commented about "the big ring and all the keys." Officer Abilene found that women were especially impressed with his key ring, handcuffs, and sidearm.

On a cold December night while Officer Abilene was on duty at the jail, officers from the State Department of Public Safety, along with road deputies from his own department, brought in three men who had been apprehended while unloading several tons of marijuana from a cargo plane that had put down at a clandestine landing strip on a nearby ranch. Officer Abilene was overjoyed--this was the most "famous" group of inmates he had been assigned to supervise since joining the Sheriff's Department. He would have quite a story to tell at the poolhall the next night.

However, unknown to Officer Abilene, one of his former high school buddies, who worked on a drilling rig at a nearby oilfield, was part of the smuggling operation. The oil worker told the smuggling ring's boss about how Officer Abilene always carried a set of jail keys around with him and that there was only one officer on duty at the jail at night.

"Take out that jerk, Abilene, and get those damn keys!" the boss told the oil worker. "Take three of the men with you and get our boys out of jail tonight. I'll arrange for a plane to get them back to Mexico."

Shortly after midnight Officer Abilene left the poolhall, feeling proud of himself. Several of his friends had bought him beers as he kept retelling the story about the marijuana smugglers in the jail. As he walked across the parking lot toward his pickup truck, Officer Abilene was suddenly hit on the back of the head and he fell to the ground, unconscious. The oil worker and his accomplices tossed Abilene into their van, grabbed the jail key ring from his belt, and sped off toward the jail.

Wearing ski masks, they unlocked the front door to the jail and surprised Duty Officer Digger Barnes, who was asleep in the front room. Barnes was handcuffed and thrown into a cell and the unconscious Abilene, also handcuffed, was tossed in with him. The door to the cell holding the three smugglers was unlocked and the men fled in the van. Just for laughs, the smuggling gang released the jail's other 17 inmates, too.

By the time the day shift officers arrived at the jail at 7 a.m., the smugglers were already in Mexico. The sheriff decided that Officer Abilene was responsible for the jailbreak since he carried his jail keys around with him. Officer Abilene was dismissed from the department.

This case study illustrates the importance of safeguarding jail keys. It was bad enough that the sheriff allowed officers to take their keys home with them or leave them in a desk drawer. However, Officer Abilene, in his enthusiasm to "impress" people, made a bad situation worse by letting everyone in Longhorn County know that all they had to do to get somebody out of jail was to take away his keys. Ex-Officer Abilene should consider himself lucky to be alive.

AUDIT OF KEY CONTROL		In Compliance	Not In Compliance	Exceptions Noted	Staff Information	Confirmed
G	Key rings: Does each key ring tag have the key board number stamped in it, along with the number of keys assigned to the ring?					
H	Key ring directory: Is there a written key ring directory available to staff, at the control point, that lists the key ring numbers for the different jail operations?					
I	Key storage: Does the plan prohibit anyone other than the person assigned by the facility administrator access to inactive key storage, the key-making machine, and pattern keys?					
J	Internal audit: Does the plan require an internal audit at established intervals by the facility administrator, shift supervisors, and control room officers?					
K	Review: Does the plan require an annual review?					
	Are all personnel required to read the plan and document by their initials that they understand the plan?					
L	Key control practices: Are the present key control practices acceptable?					

Sample Key Audit form from the National Sheriffs' Association's Jail Audit System.

TOOL CONTROL

Tools which are used in the jail for maintenance, repair work, and job training programs can become dangerous weapons in the hands of inmates. For example, a shovel blade forcefully rammed up under a man's chin will kill him instantly. Many jail officers have suffered severe head injuries after being attacked by inmates wielding hammers.

AUDIT OF TOOL CONTROL		In Compliance	Not In Compliance	Exceptions Noted	Staff Information	Confirmed
A	Definition: Does "tool" as used in the plan include all instruments of manual operations, minor equipment, and implements such as knives used in the kitchen?					
B	Need for control: Does the plan make clear that good tool control will improve security, place responsibility for losses, improve tool maintenance, and reduce cost?					
C	Responsibilities for control: Has the facility administrator designated one individual to be responsible for the control of tools?					
D	Storage: Are adequate provisions made for the secure and convenient storage of tools in order to expedite withdrawal and return for persons using them?					
E	Control: Does the tool control plan include the following general principles and procedures:					
	Care and maintenance of tools?					
	Inventory?					
	Color code or other designation?					
	Control and issue?					
	Classification (hazardous or non-hazardous)? Replacements and additions?					

Sample Tool Audit form from the National Sheriffs' Association's Jail Audit System.

Because tools can be so lethal, and can also be used in escape attempts, each jail must develop and strictly enforce procedures governing the use and storage of tools. The sheriff or chief jail deputy should issue a tool control policy and procedural plan and establish a system of inspection to insure compliance. In addition to preventing the use of tools as weapons or for escape attempts, the procedural plan is also needed to maintain the

appearance of shop or maintenance areas and to make certain that tools are kept in good working condition. The system should also include provisions to train inmates in the proper care and maintenance of tools.

Each jail should have clearly defined post orders governing the proper procedures for the issuance, storage, and inventory of all tools used in the facility. What tools should receive special attention from officers? Some examples are:

- Hacksaws and blades
- Other saws
- Hatchets, axes, and other tools with a chopping blade
- Screwdrivers
- Files
- Hammers and mallets
- Shovels
- Rakes and hoes
- Letter openers, scissors, and other office equipment which could be dangerous, such as metal rulers
- Pliers and wrenches
- Drills and drill bits
- Any tool made of metal (pieces of metal are filed down to make "shanks"--the homemade knives used in most murders in jails and prisons)
- Ropes
- Wire
- Nails and screws (used to jam locks and sliding doors; also used as weapons or in suicide attempts)
- Knives or any tool with a knife-like blade, such as a wood plane
- Chisels
- Chains

Every jail officer could probably add many more items to this list. To decide what tools are dangerous, the officer should ask himself: Could

I use this in an escape attempt to jam the locks or cut through the bars? By using his imagination, the officer will be able to determine which tools or supplies represent a threat. The key point to remember is: *inmates have a vivid imagination and create weapons or escape devices from whatever is available to them; the officer, too, must develop his ability to "invent" weapons and escape devices so that he can stay one jump ahead of the inmates.* His safety may depend upon his ability to recognize and assess potentially threatening devices.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Kevin O'Toole is an electronics engineer who found himself in the Turkey County Jail awaiting a criminal trial because he wanted to get rich quick. Employed by an electronics equipment manufacturing firm, O'Toole and a co-worker in the shipping department set up a "dummy" corporation and diverted thousands of dollars worth of costly computer components to its warehouse. They then sold the components they stole and were caught when a secret audit was conducted of the shipping department records.

O'Toole behaved himself in jail and was assigned work as a "trusty" in the jail's maintenance section; he had been given a minimum security classification since he was a white collar criminal who was believed to be "not dangerous."

O'Toole began bringing small tools and wires back to his cell each night and started building a little black box. When the jail officers became curious after finding the materials in his cell, O'Toole told them he was building a pocket calculator.

"I always wanted to see if I could design and build one of these things," he told the officers, "but I never had the time before. Now I've got all the time in the world, and a challenging task like this is a heck of a lot better than just sitting here killing time."

Supervising Sergeant Dave Hardnose agreed that O'Toole could continue to work on his "pocket calculator" since the project was apparently good for his morale. The officers even brought O'Toole some of the additional materials and supplies he requested. They, too, became interested in the project.

A week later O'Toole tested his "pocket calculator" during the midnight shift. It worked perfectly. What he had actually constructed was a device similar to an electronic garage door opener--only his little black box opened all the electronically-controlled doors in the jail, including the sallyport door.

O'Toole and his accomplice walked out the next night, along with 18 other inmates. Federal law enforcement officials told Sheriff Gabe Gobble that O'Toole has been spotted enjoying himself in a South American country that does not have an extradition treaty with the United States.

O'Toole left the little black box on a wall near the sallyport with a note to the officers attached: "Thanks for all your help, guys. I couldn't have done it without you. Adios!"

The day after the escape several officers were talking at rollcall when Officer Roosevelt Jefferson suddenly slammed his fist into his hand and said: "Damn, I knew that guy was up to something! Last week when I told my kid brother about that box O'Toole was building--you all know my brother, the science genius--well, he said it didn't sound like no calculator to him. He said it sounded like one of them automatic garage door openers."


"Well, why didn't you tell me, turkey? Where's your brains?" Sgt. Hardnose asked.

"Well, uh, Sarge, I, uh, thought maybe you guys would laugh," Officer Jefferson answered. "I mean, it was just a hunch, and I didn't want you to think I was too carried away with my imagination or anything. You're always on our backs about sticking to the facts."

This was one case where an officer *should* have used his imagination. In fact, as this case study illustrates, officers should be encouraged to be inquisitive and imaginative--the inmates certainly are.

Tool Classification System

All tools can be classified into two categories--hazardous and less hazardous. Shadow boards are considered to be the best method for storing all tools that are adaptable to the board. Only one tool should be kept on each shadow and the shadow must be identical to the tool in size and



Shadow boards are considered to be the best method for storing all tools.

shape. Tools that are not adaptable to the board should be kept in a locked cabinet or storage locker. There should be a tag identifying each tool that is kept in the locked storage area.

All hacksaw blades should be stamped with an identification number. They should be stored in locked boxes in the control room. When they are needed they should be signed for by the officer and returned at the end of his shift or when the worker has finished using them, whichever occurs first.

All tools should be clearly marked to indicate where they belong. For example, if the jail has a hobby shop or educational program, these programs may use similar tools. By engraving each tool with a number code, an officer can quickly determine where the tool properly belongs. The jail may want to designate all tools belonging to its maintenance department with the letter "M" which is followed by a number (M-3, M-4, etc.). All tools assigned to the hobby shop could be designated with the letter "H," followed by numbers for each tool. Officers assigned to supervise these various programs and departments will be responsible for daily inventories of tools and for the proper security and storage of the tools. The tools should be marked with an engraving device, which itself should be kept under lock and key in the central control room. Using adhesive tape and a pen to mark tools is not recommended since the tape can be removed by an inmate. Nor are color codes for tools recommended, since inmates with access to paints can change the colors.

Tools that cannot be marked with an engraving device, such as medical instruments, surgical tools, and drill bits, should be kept in a locked storage cabinet. They must be inventoried frequently by a staff member, preferably once a day.

All new tools received from any source should be marked with an identification number and recorded in the jail inventory before they are issued. The chief jail deputy should be responsible for the inventory.

All tools that are considered to be hazardous should be issued only to employees. If an inmate is permitted to use a hazardous tool, he must be directly supervised by an officer or employee. When a knife or dangerous tool is misplaced or lost, the supervising employee or officer should *immediately* notify the chief jail deputy or duty officer. The inmates working in the area where the tool was lost should be held at or near their work stations until a *thorough* search is made of the entire area. The supervising employee or officer should prepare a written report regarding the loss of the tool.

The jail's tool control plan should identify the person who is responsible for the orderly disposal of tools that are no longer needed. If a tool is discarded, this information should be recorded in the jail's tool inventory log. Under no circumstances should *any* tool, useable or not, be thrown into any trash receptacle at the jail. The tools which are being discarded should be taken to the central control room and removed from the jail by an officer.

Case Study 3:

Gabe Gobble was elected sheriff of Turkey County in November in an unpredicted upset over the incumbent sheriff, Jack Daniels, who had been in office for 20 years. Gobble had campaigned on a reform platform and had argued that the jail needed many policy changes to "bring it into the 20th century." One of Gobble's greatest concerns was the laxness in security at the jail and he knew this was where he would have to concentrate his efforts as soon as he was sworn in on January 15.

But Gobble was frustrated in his efforts to develop security plans prior to being sworn in. Sheriff Daniels, who could not believe he actually lost the election, would not let Gobble enter the jail, nor would he let him talk to officers.

"It's my jail and I'm running it until January 15," Sheriff Daniels told both Gobble and the county administrator. "If Gobble sets foot in this jail before January 15, I'll have him arrested for trespassing!"

After being sworn in on January 15, Sheriff Gobble immediately began inspecting the jail to look for security problems. The first thing he did was establish a key control system. He also called in a locksmith and had the tumblers changed in all the locks in the old jail. He planned to request new electronic locking equipment in his budget for the forthcoming year. But there were too many security problems to remedy quickly, as Sheriff Gobble learned on his second day in office.

Ex-Sheriff Daniels had hired his sister, Lulu, to work as the jail cook. She had a contract which required her to prepare breakfast and lunch only; the evening meal, which consisted of soup and sandwiches, was prepared by jail "trusties" who worked in the kitchen unsupervised. The jail did not have a locking knife cabinet in the kitchen nor were officers assigned to supervise the inmate "trusties" who worked with Lulu and prepared the evening meal alone.

As Sheriff Gobble was winding up his second day at work, the duty sergeant ran into his office and said: "Sheriff, we've got a problem--one of the inmates just stabbed another one over on D block!"

The Sheriff rushed over to D block and saw inmate Willie Lee lying in a pool of blood in the dayroom, with a large butcher knife sticking out of the center of his chest. The inmate had died almost instantly. Two officers were still attempting to subdue inmate Mohammed Khali, a kitchen "trusty" who had committed the murder.

"What's this all about?" Sheriff Gobble asked the sergeant.

"Well, sir, from what I could piece together, Khali smuggled the butcher knife out of the kitchen and had it taped to his leg when he delivered dinner. Inmate Lee said he didn't want to eat the food because it was slop and he threw it in Khali's face. Then he called Khali a 'filthy camel jockey.' The other inmates said Khali whipped out the butcher knife and stabbed Lee in the chest before anybody could stop him."

Sheriff Gobble was only in office two days and already he had a murder in the jail. Despite his efforts to quickly improve the most significant security problems, he had not even thought about the knives in the kitchen and the fact that inmate "trusties" were not supervised while they handled the knives. The new sheriff realized that he had made a mistake--a bad one. Securing the kitchen knives and other dangerous tools should have been a priority task on his first day in office.

Supervising Contract Workers

Civilians who perform contract maintenance work at the jail can often be careless in their use of tools. To ensure that these repair workers have the proper attitude toward tool control, it is recommended that an officer require each worker who enters the jail to report to the central control room and prepare a written list of the tools in his tool box. This list should be verified by the duty officer. When the worker is leaving for the day, the tools should be counted by the duty officer in the presence of the worker and cross-checked with the inventory list prepared earlier. If any hacksaw blades are broken during the work day, the duty officer should ask to see *both pieces* before he allows the worker to leave the jail.

Whenever the jail awards a contract to an outside agency, all tools which the contractor uses to carry out the work must be inventoried at the completion of each work day by a jail officer to assure that none of the tools have fallen into the hands of inmates.

CONTROLLING JANITORIAL AND FOOD SUPPLIES

Since jails are in operation 24 hours a day, they function like hotels--most jails have their own in-house food and cleaning services. In addition, many jails have in-house laundries and some have infirmaries. To carry out these functions, necessary supplies must be stored at the jail, which could lead to security problems if precautions are not taken. For example, many foodstuffs could cause problems if they are improperly consumed by inmates. Cleaning and laundry operations require the use of hazardous chemicals, which also must be stored properly.

Every sheriff or jail administrator should develop a policy governing the control and issuance of supplies and assign an officer or civilian employee to the task of carrying out this policy.

Janitorial Supplies

Janitorial and laundry supplies should be stored in a locked supply room. An adequate inventory of these supplies should be stored in the jail so that the supplies are available when needed. The officer or employee who is responsible for supply control should keep the inventory list up-to-date and re-order materials as they are needed.

Supplies should be issued only to an officer who is supervising a work detail, never to inmate "trusties." When issued to inmates, supplies which have value as contraband can easily disappear. For example, alcoholic inmates have been known to drink cleaning fluids which contain alcohol. In one jail, inmates used an abrasive cleanser in an escape attempt--they coated wire with a paste made from the cleanser and created homemade hacksaws, which they used to cut through window bars. Other inmates have swallowed poisonous cleaning fluids in suicide attempts.

Food Supplies

Food must be secured properly because food items rate high as a medium of exchange among inmates, who use food in place of money for favors, to pay gambling debts, and to bribe other inmates to perform services, such as homosexual acts.

The officer or employee assigned as supply officer should also control food supplies. They must be stored in a locked supply room near the kitchen. Dry and canned foods should be stored on open shelves. However, certain food items are regarded as contraband and additional precautions for securing these items must be taken. For example, yeast, nutmeg, mace, and malt are potential intoxicants. Kitchen "trusties" should not be permitted to handle these items unless they are directly supervised by jail employees.

Inmate "trusties" should not be permitted to work in the jail kitchen unless an employee is supervising them at all times. The supervising employee's duties in the kitchen also



Now, let me see--what will I use to get me through another day."

include tool control--he should issue knives and other kitchen equipment to inmates and make certain that the inmate knows how to use the equipment properly. All equipment should be cleaned by the inmate when he is finished using it and then returned to its proper storage area. It is helpful to have a shadowboard in the kitchen for such items as spatulas, tongs, and meat forks, as well as any other kitchen tools which could be used as potential weapons. Knives should always be kept in a locked cabinet and used by an inmate "trusty" only under the direct supervision of an officer.

The officer supervising a kitchen detail must also count dining utensils after they have been washed by an inmate "trusty." "Trusties" should be pat-searched before they leave the kitchen area after each meal period.

Case Study 4:

The Rattlesnake County Jail, faced with a shortage of funds, laid off its professional cook and instead turned over food service management to inmate Carroll Klinger, a "trusty" who had been working in the kitchen. Klinger, a heavy drinker who was serving two years for assaulting a police officer, was given complete control of all food service activities. However, an officer was assigned during each shift to carefully monitor the storage of dangerous kitchen equipment, such as knives, spatulas, rolling pins, and meat forks.

Since the supervising officers were told only to keep an accurate count of the dangerous equipment and make certain that the knife cabinet was kept locked, this is all they did. They never questioned anything inmate Klinger did regarding the management of the kitchen or the preparation of food. Klinger had served 20 years in the Army as a mess sergeant and knew his job. The food he prepared was very tasty and he fixed special meals for the supervising officers, as well as for other officers who requested special treats.

The officers never questioned Klinger about the huge pot of potato peels he kept bubbling on a back burner. Once, when a "snooping" sergeant became curious because the pot was always on the stove, Klinger told him it was a vegetable soup base. Nor did officers ever notice that more yeast was used than was necessary to bake bread, or that large quantities of apricots, peaches, and sugar were being purchased for the jail.

With his homemade "still" always producing an alcoholic concoction in the kitchen, inmate Klinger became very popular with his fellow "trusties." Kitchen duty was sought after and highly prized.

The sheriff could not understand why so many inmate "trusties" continuously begged to work in the kitchen, since washing pots and pans and some of the other kitchen jobs were not that glamorous. He asked inmate Klinger what he was doing to make kitchen work so popular. Klinger replied that he was providing on-the-job training so that the inmates could get good, steady jobs in restaurants when they were paroled.

The sheriff was pleased that inmate Klinger was taking such an interest in the rehabilitation of his fellow inmates and bragged about this strange event at civic meetings.

"It just goes to prove," the sheriff told citizens over and over again, "that we can have faith in our fellow man. Inmate Klinger has dedicated his life in jail to helping his fellow inmates become hard-working, honest citizens--a remarkable and self-sacrificing deed on his part."

These remarks were printed in an article in the Rattlesnake County Gazette, which Klinger read.

"I certainly am a remarkable achievement," Klinger told his fellow "trusties" when the supervising officer was off in another part of the kitchen. "This calls for a little celebration. Would you all care for a vodka martini? Or perhaps we should toast our rehabilitation with an apricot brandy? Ah, decisions, decisions! What a tough life we have!"

SUMMARY

1. Key and tool control are two of the most important duties of jail officers: an officer should never allow himself to take keys and tools for granted, because there is always an inmate waiting for him to become careless.

Most inmates who escape from custody do so because an officer has become careless about jail keys and tools. Either the officer has made it easy for an inmate to obtain a key to open doors or has not supervised the inmate's use of tools. A security conscious officer must be aware of key and tool control needs constantly.

2. Janitorial and food supplies are highly prized as contraband in the jail; officers must carefully control these supplies to prevent them from being misused by inmates.

Janitorial, laundry, and food supplies should be stored in locked supply rooms and issued only to an officer who is supervising a work detail. Janitorial and food supplies which can be intoxicating rate high as a medium of exchange among inmates, who use these supplies in place of money. "Trusties" should not be permitted access to supply storage areas.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN

PATROL PROCEDURES IN THE JAIL

The responsibility the jail officer has for patrolling the inside of a jail is no different from the patrol responsibilities of the road deputy or police officer assigned to roving patrol car duty. Both officers are responsible for preventing criminal activity in their assigned area; maintaining the peace; and protecting people, their property, and their welfare. The absence or presence of disorders, breaches of the peace, and crime indicates how effectively both officers carry out their assigned responsibilities.

The major difference between the jail officer and the road deputy involves the type of "community" patrolled: the jail officer operates in a *closed* community consisting of people who are either accused or convicted of committing law violations while the road deputy patrols an *open* community and deals for the most part with law-abiding citizens.

There is also a major difference in the manner in which the public reacts to the performance of both officers. If the road deputy on patrol observes an assault taking place and intervenes to arrest the offender, then he may receive thanks and praise from the people in the community. He may even be recognized by the news media with an article or broadcast about his actions. It is common practice for the jail officer who is patrolling a cell block to settle disturbances, usually under extremely hostile circumstances. But no one outside of the institution may ever hear about his accomplishments. The jail officer who settles a fight between two inmates who are assaulting each other probably will not even be thanked by the inmate whose life he may have saved; instead, the inmate more than likely will curse the officer for intervening in his dispute.

For the jail officer, his duties patrolling the cell areas can be extremely frustrating--he knows what he is expected to do and attempts to do his best work at all times, but there is little, if any, positive reinforcement for him in the form of a "thank you" from the inmates or a compliment from a supervisor about a task performed well. The jail officer must learn to be his own "positive reinforcer," telling himself at the end of each shift, "you did your best today."

Because the jail community is composed of law violators, the patrol function performed by the jail officer often is much more difficult and can require more expertise than road patrol duties. Just as the police officer must be familiar with the geographical profile of the community and the existence and nature of places and conditions that are hazards or give rise to criminal activities, so must the jail officer familiarize himself with these existing conditions inside the jail. *Jail officers can become effective patrol officers by keeping themselves fully informed at all times.*

What does the officer need to know to be an effective patrol officer?

First, he needs to keep himself fully informed about *all* activities in the jail. This includes knowing who the inmates are, their cell and work assignments, their special needs and problems, and their previous behavior as inmates. It also involves knowing what has occurred in the jail on other shifts, such as whether two inmates had a fight or whether an inmate had a visitor who left him emotionally upset.

Second, it involves knowing the jail itself so well that the officer is able to walk through the jail in total darkness. The officer should know how all the equipment in the jail operates and be able to recognize when anything is out of place or when bars, windows, and locks have been tampered with.

Third, the officer needs to know jail officer safety procedures and develop an ability to follow these procedures--the officer needs to become so conscious of his own safety and the safety of other officers that he never becomes careless, lax, or mentally unaware of where he is and what his responsibilities are.

Fourth, the officer needs to know his jail's operational policies concerning fires, riots, natural disasters, and escape attempts and know exactly what his role will be if such an incident occurs.

KEEPING INFORMED

In order to keep informed about everything which is occurring in the jail, the officer should report for duty *at least 30 minutes* before his scheduled tour of duty is to begin. By reporting early, the officer will be able to obtain information on events which occurred since he was last on duty, new inmates, inmates who have been released or moved elsewhere (such as to a hospital), and any problems which officers assigned to his patrol post *anticipate* may occur (such as a notation in the logbook to carefully observe a potentially suicidal inmate).


The officer can accomplish this information gathering task by talking to officers assigned to his patrol area, reading reports and logbook notations prepared on the previous two shifts, and reading any notices posted on the bulletin board. The officer should also review post orders in the event that assignments and duty requirements have been changed.

The Officer's Notebook

In addition to keys to the cell block, the jail officer's most important possession is his personal notebook. The notebook should be small enough to fit into his uniform pocket and can be either spiral-bound or looseleaf. This notebook is used to keep a daily record of occurrences on the cell block. Because notebooks could be required years later if the officer is called upon to testify in a legal proceeding, each officer should store his completed notebooks in a secure place, filing them chronologically.

Officers should record only factual information in their notebooks, not personal opinions--observations which the officer records in the notebook should not involve "guessing" on the officer's part. For example, if Officer Starr sees inmate Crawford sitting on his bunk staring at the wall for several hours, the officer should record this information in his notebook: "At 1300, 1330, 1400, 1430, and 1500 hours, while on patrol, I observed inmate Crawford, cell 19A, sitting on his bunk staring at the wall. His position did not change from one observation to another. I observed in the jail logbook that inmate Crawford had been to court during the morning and had been found guilty of embezzlement." Officer Starr would then pass this information on to the officer on the next shift who relieves him, since inmate Crawford is behaving abnormally and should be observed carefully; he could be sick, temporarily depressed because he knows he will be spending a few years in jail, or he could be contemplating suicide or an escape attempt--Officer Starr knows from experience that any of these incidents may occur because of the inmate's behavior and that he must be watched. However, the officer would not record in his notebook what he *thinks* may happen since such a statement would be "guessing" and not factual.

What should the patrol officer record in his notebook? The following items should generally be recorded so that the officer does not forget them:



- Date, tour of duty, who the officer relieves, name of supervisor, and unusual conditions in the jail when he assumes responsibility for the inmates.
- Notations about broken or missing equipment and the action taken to remedy the situation. For example, "at 1630 hours while on patrol in the corridor of Cell Block B, I observed that the emergency exit light had burned out; the maintenance unit supervisor told me that he could not replace the bulb until the day shift."
- Information about inmate attempts to tamper with bars, locks, grills, doors, and so forth. For example, "while completing a security check on the cells at 1730 hours, I found the door track in cell 19 stuffed with pieces of cardboard; inmate Crawford, the cell's occupant, maintained that he had no knowledge about how the cardboard came to be stuffed into the door track; on-coming officers should be notified to watch Crawford carefully. Should suggest to sergeant that incident be further investigated."
- Directions or instructions from other officers or jail personnel regarding specific inmates, changes in inmate work assignments, cell assignments, and so forth. For example, "notified by Sgt. Adamson that inmate Milsap, cell 14B, has been temporarily transferred to the jail infirmary since he has the flu."
- Information provided by confidential sources. For example, "at 1345 hours inmate Carter reported to me that inmate Crawford received a hacksaw blade during a visit from his wife earlier today; inmate Carter says he observed the blade--must notify sergeant to send additional officers to help conduct search." In a case like this, an officer might ask, "why record this information in a notebook--why not just conduct a search?" The information should be recorded because other duties or incidents might occur which require the officer's *immediate* attention. Thus, by recording the information as soon as he receives it, the officer can retrieve it from his notebook; he does not have to rely upon his memory. Officers should be aware that their memory is never totally reliable in a patrol situation, since intervening events may cause them to forget important things, only to remember them when it may be too late to prevent trouble.
- The facts involved in any incident, fight, or unusual occurrence. Methods for properly recording these facts are discussed in Chapter Four.
- Requests by inmates and the action taken by the officer to respond to the request. For example, "at 1130 hours inmate Rivera stopped me as I was patrolling near his cell and said

he had a headache; he asked for two aspirins. Notified jail duty officer to send over aspirins. Aspirins were delivered by Officer Wilson at 1140 hours." This information should be entered into the logbook and passed on to officers on in-coming shifts--if the inmate continues to complain about a headache during future shifts, he may have a head injury and officers will need to refer him for a medical examination.

- Facts regarding violations of jail rules and regulations by inmates. For example, "when I reported to my post at 0700 hours, Duty Inmate tier runner Wolfgang was not present. Inmate Wolfgang showed up at the post five minutes later and told me he had gone to the kitchen for coffee. I spoke to Wolfgang about leaving his assigned area and he told me he will not do it again."
- Information regarding possible security problems, which should be passed on to officers on in-coming shifts. For example, "observed six incidents on this shift of racial slurs between black and white inmates; black inmates are remaining in their cells while white inmates congregate in the dayroom."
- Observations regarding possible problems involving one or two inmates, which should be passed on to officers on in-coming shifts. For example, "inmate David Dorn, cell 13B, is spending a great deal of time with new inmate Tom Luigi, cell 14A, and is sharing his food with Luigi." This behavior on inmate Dorn's part may indicate a potential homosexual problem, requiring the movement of one of the inmates to another area of the jail.
- Other information which the officer feels may be significant.

Observing Inmates

The officer on patrol in the jail must know who the residents of his "beat" are, their problems and special needs, and their normal behavioral patterns. It is necessary for the officer to be totally familiar with the inmates he supervises so that he can immediately detect any abnormal behavior in order to stop trouble before it occurs.


Some potential problems which he should be able to prevent by knowing his inmates and carefully observing their behavioral patterns include suicide attempts, escape attempts, arson, fights, and homosexual activities.

When he is patrolling the corridors of the cell block, the officer should pay particular attention to inmates who are extremely quiet or who appear to be depressed or angry. He should be alert to mood changes in inmates.

The officer should take the time to *listen* to inmates but should not become overly friendly with them. It is possible to be a sympathetic listener without sharing personal experiences--an officer who divulges information about his personal life to inmates is risking fraternization; the inmates may attempt to take advantage of the officer's friendliness or any personal information he has shared with them.

While on patrol, the officer should be alert for telltale signs which may indicate impending trouble. These signs include:

- Obvious tension in the air--the atmosphere of the cell block may seem as if it is charged with electricity; the officer's intuition or "sixth sense" tells him something is wrong.
- An increase in the number of requests for transfers from work assignments or to different cell areas.
- An increasing number of fights within groups or between groups.
- Racial or ethnic slurs being shouted by inmates at each other or racial or ethnic remarks directed at officers by inmates.
- Increasing infractions of the jail rules.
- Missing tools.
- An unusual accumulation of commissary items in the cells.
- Shakedown reveals weapons and other contraband items.



DANGER

INCREASED CONTRABAND

MISSING TOOLS

RACIAL PROBLEMS

INCREASED FIGHTS

INCREASED TRANSFERS

OBVIOUS TENSION

Barometer measuring jail climate

All of the above signs may occur individually, to some degree, in a normal day in the jail. However, when these signs appear more frequently and in larger combinations, the barometer of the jail climate reads DANGER

AHEAD! *The patrol officer should not hesitate to make his observations and/or intuitive feelings known to his supervisors and fellow officers.*

Case Study 1:

When they were admitted to the Big Sky County Jail for committing a bank robbery together, inmates Roberto Juarez and Eddie Roy Coleman asked to be assigned to the same cell on Cell Block B. They told the classification officer that they were "best friends" and that Juarez was engaged to marry Coleman's sister. Four weeks later, inmate Juarez approached Officer Jimmy Madison and asked for a transfer to Cell Block C. Since Juarez and Coleman had originally asked for the same cell assignment and had acted as if they were brothers, Officer Madison was curious as to why Juarez would suddenly want a transfer to another block.

"I want to be with my own people--I'm uncomfortable here with all these cowboys," Juarez replied.

"OK, if you want to be moved, I'll move you over to C Block as soon as I can arrange it," Officer Madison replied.

"Right this minute ain't soon enough!" Juarez answered. "If I stay here any longer, I'm liable to get a shiv in my gut."

Officer Madison knew from the comments made by Juarez that there was trouble brewing on Cell Block B. He recalled reading a notation in the jail logbook three days earlier about ethnic slurs and shouting matches between the Mexican-American and "Anglo" inmates on the block. The few black inmates on the block were apparently neutral.

Just to make certain his "hunch" was correct, Officer Madison pulled Coleman off a work detail and interviewed him.

"Yeah, I want that wetback out of my cell!" Coleman told Officer Madison. "And if he goes near by sister again, I'll kill him! If you guards don't want a riot, you'll clear all of those greasers off our turf."

His "hunch" confirmed, Officer Madison reported the potential fight situation to his sergeant. In order to "cool down" the situation, the Mexican-American inmates in Cell Block B were temporarily transferred to Cell Block C and the work, dining, and recreation periods were segregated so that there would be no intermingling of Mexican-Americans and "Anglo" inmates until the problem was settled. Once these immediate steps were taken, the officers began

an investigation to discover why the hostilities had erupted between the two groups of inmates. Separate interviews were conducted with all inmates who had been assigned to Cell Block B before the transfers. Inmates were interviewed by officers from the same racial or ethnic group in order to obtain as much information as possible--it was assumed that the inmates would not be as hostile toward the officers if they felt the officer could understand or identify with the problems. The jail administrator felt that a Mexican-American inmate, for example, might hesitate to express his true feelings toward the "Anglo" inmates if he were being interviewed by an "Anglo" officer--and vice-versa.

The black inmates, who had remained neutral, provided the most objective observations about the source of the problem. According to the black inmates, the trouble had started a week earlier in the shower room when a Mexican-American inmate had poked fun at an "Anglo" inmate who had a "feminine physique" and a small penis; the Mexican-American then made sarcastic remarks about the sexual "inabilities" of ALL "Anglo" males. Two black inmates had intervened in the shower room to prevent a fist fight, since they felt a fight would mean punishment for all inmates who were in the shower area at that time, regardless of whether or not they took part in the dispute. But the hostilities simmered and soon there was a verbal war between the Mexican-Americans and the "Anglos."

Once they had learned the source of the problem, the officers were able to develop intervention plans to permanently cool down the tense atmosphere. Within a month, they were able to re-integrate Cell Block B and all other activities.

This case study illustrates the benefits to be gained when officers know their inmates and are thus able to recognize potential problem situations. In this case, Officer Madison's "hunch" proved correct. By checking the jail log and recalling comments in the logbook about ethnic slurs observed by other officers, he knew that trouble was brewing. Alert officers on patrol in the cell areas are able to prevent problems from escalating into dangerous situations by intervening as soon as a problem surfaces.

Utilizing Inmates As Confidential Sources Of Information

One of the best ways for a jail officer to keep informed is to develop and utilize confidential inmate informants. A confidential informant is an inmate who supplies information to an officer with the understanding that his identity will not be revealed nor will information be revealed that will lead to his exposure as an informant. The informer's best understood role is that he is in a position to supply particular information about other people in given situations.

A person who is arrested is quite often solicited to be a confidential employee of the police department. If the offer is refused, it is usually because of the stigma attached to those people who "snitch" to the police about other criminals. Inmates confined to a jail might very well possess a wealth of information concerning criminal activities outside of the institution. Those inmates who have a history of being involved with the law are well aware of the role of the informant in the field of law enforcement. If a law enforcement officer is to discharge the obligations of his office to the fullest extent, he must depend at some time or another on the use of informants to help him solve cases.

Quite often an inmate's attitude toward serving as an informant changes after he has been confined to the jail for a short time and finds out that those accomplices he protected on the outside are not coming forward to secure his release by posting bond or other collateral. He then often looks for help elsewhere--in many cases he turns to the law enforcement officer who made the initial suggestion to him that he serve as an informant, even though the officer tells him he cannot promise him any reward for his help.

Some police departments maintain offices at the local jail and assign plain-clothes officers to interview detained inmates in an effort to close other cases that are pending. The jail officer, too, should capitalize on the information available through those persons willing to serve in the role of a confidential informant. The officer should remember that every inmate is a potential source of information and he should be constantly alert to establish a source of information.

The confidential informant has the ability to:

- Furnish information not readily available from any other source, such as planned criminal activity in the jail.
- Make observations on other inmates who are known to be potential escape risks.
- Keep a watchful eye on inmates who are likely to injure themselves or others.
- Report conduct that is in violation of the rules and regulations of the jail.

Motivation Of Informants: "Motivation" is the reason why a person acts in a certain way or fails to act in a certain way. Most informants furnish information because they have a *reason* for doing so. At times, however, it may appear that an inmate informant seems to act without any apparent motivation, but this usually is because the motivating factors are not clearly visible to the jail officer. Some of the motives often encountered in inmate informants are:

1. Fear:

- A. The inmate realizes he is in serious trouble with the law and is afraid to serve a long sentence in jail: by agreeing to serve as an informant, he hopes that his sentence will be reduced by the court or parole board
- (1) It usually is necessary for the officer to make the initial move to solicit information from these inmates
 - (2) The jail officer should use a discreet approach and create the impression that he is trying to protect the inmate's reputation among his associates
 - (3) While awaiting court action, the inmate will often go to great lengths to help provide information if he is promised that his cooperation will be brought to the attention of the prosecuting attorney
- B. Criminals in trouble with their associates:
- (1) This group generally is seeking some means of protection
 - (2) They must be made to feel that the officer can and will assist in protecting their safety

2. Revenge:

- A. Inmates who feel that they are being treated unfairly by their fellow inmates
- B. Inmates who resent the fact that accomplices are not getting the same treatment that they are and are not coming to their rescue
- C. Jealous inmates who feel they are being jilted because they are in jail and cannot protect their interests
- D. Homosexual inmates who identify another inmate as a homosexual to assure that the other inmate receives the same treatment

3. Perversity:

- A. Inmates who give information about a rival in order to eliminate their competition
- B. Inmates who give worthless information while attempting to find out how much the jail officer knows about their activities

- C. Inmates who deliberately give false or misleading information to divert suspicion away from themselves.

4. Egotism:

- A. Inmates who seek to curry favor and be well thought of by the jail officers
- B. The town drunk or vagrants who seek to magnify their own importance by giving bits of information about unlawful conduct in the jail

5. Promise of reward:

- A. Inmates offer information in return for time cut from their sentence or even outright release. *It is not within the power of the jail officer to promise a reward.* Instead, he should inform the inmate that he will bring the information to the attention of his supervisor and someone will contact the inmate.
- B. When dealing with an inmate who demands a reward for information, the rule should be that the information must be provided before any consideration is given to a reward--officers should remember that the only "reward" they can promise is to agree to bring the inmate's cooperative attitude to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or parole authorities

6. Repentance or desire to reform:

- A. Inmates sometimes become informants because they desire to repay society for the crimes they have committed
- B. Inmates who feel that breaking away from crime can be done only if they get rid of their associates often tell law enforcement authorities about crimes the associates have committed; thus, they cause the associates to be arrested

7. Motives of demented, eccentric, or nuisance-type inmates:

- A. Information given by these inmates is seldom of value; it usually is acquired from common gossip or hallucinations
- B. Their claims should always be evaluated carefully, but their information usually can be recognized readily as being valueless; would-be reformers usually are included in this group

Who Is A Potential Informant? Every person confined to the jail is a potential source of information. The secret to obtaining information from inmates lies in the jail officer's ability to cultivate the potential source.

Local alcoholics are sometimes good sources once they have "dried out" and have regained their mental faculties. Inmates in this category are usually in and out of jail repeatedly and realize that in all probability they will be back. They want to curry favor in advance for their next visit to the jail when they will be going through another withdrawal from alcohol. Thus, they provide information hoping that the officers will remember these favors when they are re-admitted to the jail after another arrest.

Narcotics addicts, too, often serve as informants in the jail. They generally understand the methods employed in gathering information. However, they may use their status as informants to gain favors from officers that will allow them access to some means of getting drugs. Addicts usually are not trustworthy sources of information.

Inmates who want "trusty" status and inmates who want to keep their "trusty" status typically serve as informants, as do "old timers" who have been in and out of jail most of their lives and who are becoming worn out. They may want an "easy" job working in the kitchen or as a tier runner. Kitchen workers who are enjoying their "fringe benefits" and want to continue in that capacity also volunteer to serve as informants.

Another group of informants includes homosexuals who want to offer information for an opportunity to bunk in an area of their choice. Their information, however, usually is very unreliable because their sexual drive is so great that they will make up stories or "set up" another inmate to get the housing assignment they desire.

Proper Procedures When Dealing With Informants. When dealing with inmates who are providing information concerning happenings in the jail, officers must remember that they cannot make any promises or offer any rewards involving the case for which the inmate is incarcerated. If the inmate reveals any information concerning criminal activities, then the jail officer must forward the information to his supervisor so that he can contact the law enforcement officer who is handling the initial case. The jail officer *must never* inject himself in any way into a pending criminal case. His concern should be to develop information that will facilitate the safety and well-being of the people in the jail and the outside community. Information gathering by the jail officer enhances the effective operation of the jail and protects the safety of the people who live in the surrounding community.

Officers should be extremely careful to protect the identities of inmate informants, since informants are disliked by other inmates and

may become targets of physical assaults if their status as an informant becomes known.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Karl Marx, an alcoholic, works in the kitchen at the Rattlesnake County Jail and accompanies the food cart to the cell blocks when meals are being served. Recently, an escape plan of four inmates was uncovered and weapons and hacksaw blades were taken from their cells during a special shakedown. The four inmates have had disciplinary charges placed against them and have been anxious to find out who the "snitch" is so that he can be punished.

Inmate Marx heard from a friend that he was suspected of being the "snitch" and asked Officer Glenn Galveston for help, since he had indeed served as the informant and had given the information about the planned escape to Officer Galveston; because he was able to prevent the escape, Officer Galveston received a commendation from the sheriff.

When inmate Marx told Officer Galveston he should be moved to safer quarters, the officer replied: "Sorry, friend, but I told you I couldn't make you any promises. Besides, those four guys can't hurt you--we took away their weapons, remember?"

A week later, while he was taking a shower, inmate Marx was grabbed from behind by an unidentified intruder and his head was whacked against the cement wall in the shower room. He suffered a skull fracture and required brain surgery because a blood clot developed from the concussion. The assailant has not yet been identified.

As a result of the attack upon Marx, all inmates at the jail who had been serving as informants immediately stopped cooperating with officers. Was Officer Galveston correct in refusing to provide protection for inmate Marx?

In this case it was Officer Galveston's *responsibility* to protect inmate Marx, once the inmate told the officer that his life was in danger. An officer who develops and utilizes an inmate informant must protect that inmate from harm. Obviously, Officer Galveston acted unprofessionally--he was callous and refused to recognize the inmate's needs; the impression is given that the officer was interested only in his own status and advancement at the jail. Once he was commended by the sheriff, Officer Galveston apparently felt as if he had achieved his goal: in other words, he *used* inmate Marx and then "threw him to the wolves." Officer Galveston should have moved inmate Marx to a secure area of the jail, taking him out of contact with the general population; in addition, he should have told all other officers that inmate Marx had been threatened

and was to be protected until he had served the remaining few weeks of his sentence. Although such a move to a secure area would have "confirmed" the status of Marx as an informant in the minds of other inmates, this protection was necessary because the other inmates already *suspected* Marx was an informant. Once an informant makes it known to jail authorities that he has been threatened because of information he has provided (that is, he has been "burned"), then jail personnel have an obligation to ensure the inmate's safety.

PATROLLING THE JAIL

Like the road deputy who patrols in a city, town, or rural area, the jail officer must be so totally familiar with the "geography" and environment of his assigned patrol area that he *immediately* knows when something is wrong: the officer on patrol in the cell blocks must be able to detect immediately equipment that has been tampered with, and he must develop an ability to know when something seems out of place. As the officer becomes totally acquainted with his patrol area, he will develop a "sixth sense" about his territory--he will have "hunches" that something might be amiss or that inmates are gradually tampering with equipment as part of an escape plan.

Knowing the "geography" of his jail enables the officer to patrol his assigned post effectively. The officer should develop an ability to walk his post in total darkness and *still* be able to detect whether something is wrong. If an officer can demonstrate an ability to patrol in the dark, he has proven that he has "learned his territory"--this officer will always be one jump ahead of the inmates, for he will be able to detect potential escapes while they are still in the planning stages. It will be very difficult for inmates to "pull the wool" over this officer's eyes with such tricks as pasting together sawed-through bars with cigarette ashes and soap.

Reporting To An Assigned Post

After the rollcall briefing, the in-coming officer should report immediately to his assigned duty post. Once at the post, he should obtain the necessary keys from the officer who is going off duty--the keys should be handed from one officer to another, not left lying on a desk or deposited in a drawer.

Next, a head count of all inmates assigned to the area should be taken by both officers--*the officer going off duty should not be permitted to leave the area until all inmates have been counted and their identity verified* (procedures for conducting counts were discussed in Chapter Seven).

Once the count has been made, the two officers should inspect the area, making note of any unusual conditions. The inspection should involve checking *each* cell, one at a time, to make certain the cell is secure. Items to be inspected in each cell include: windows, bars or panels, screens, and door locks. The officers should look for *anything out of the ordinary* in each cell. Areas where inmates may have made "changes" include: walls, floors, windows, doors, vents, ceilings, and plumbing fixtures. It is helpful to use a leather mallet against bars and walls to check for hollowed-out areas or to detect bars which have been sawed through and replaced with a paste made from toothpaste and cigarette ashes or some other substance. Both officers should also make certain that tracks on sliding cell doors have not been blocked and that lock mechanisms work; inmates who plan to escape or who want to leave their cells for other reasons often block the track or stuff the locking device with such items as wadded-up chunks of bread and paper, pieces of cardboard, wooden matches, or other small items which the officer may not easily see unless he tests the door and lock.

After both officers are satisfied that *all* individual cells are in order, they should next inspect the cell block "common" areas. These "common" areas include the dayroom, corridors, outside doors and windows, skylights, ceiling and wall vents, storage closets, and floor tiles. Officers should look for:

- Floor tiles which have been pulled up;
- Signs of tampering with bars on doors and windows;
- Cut screens;
- Loosened screws or locks on skylights;
- Broken windows;
- Burned-out light bulbs, flickering fluorescent lights, or broken lighting fixtures;
- Broken surveillance equipment, such as TV cameras and mirrors placed near "blind spots;" and
- Surveillance equipment which has been moved, such as a mirror near a "blind spot" which has been repositioned so that it is ineffective.

Once the in-coming officer is satisfied that the cells and cell block "common" areas are secure, both he and the out-going officer should sign the post logbook, making note of any problem areas which require repairs



Before assuming responsibility for the inmate population, a complete inspection should be conducted by both officers.

or readjustments (such as a burned-out light bulb which needs to be replaced during the shift). When both officers sign the log, the in-coming officer then accepts responsibility for the inmates and the security of the cell block itself.

Case Study 3:

Rookie Officer Bobby Mendoza was assigned to a patrol post on Cell Block C at the Rattlesnake County Jail. This cell block housed work-release inmates and "trusties." When he reported for duty on the 4-12 shift one Friday afternoon, Officer Frank Sanderson, who was being relieved, tossed him the keys and said:

"Look, Bobby, I got to get to the airport to pick up my wife, so I don't have time for the count and security check with you--but everything's shipshape. Don't worry about it. The work-release people all signed in and they're locked up tight. Listen, let me sign the log that we made a count together and I'll owe you one--if I'm late meeting the plane, my wife will kill me. I already got enough problems with her!"

Officer Mendoza, not wishing to offend Officer Sanderson, one of the "old timers" at the jail, agreed to take Sanderson's word that all inmates were accounted for and in their cells. He let Officer Sanderson sign the log and leave.

Before he could make his own count, Officer Mendoza became involved with a medical emergency on the cell block; one of the "trusties" apparently drank some rubbing alcohol while working in the infirmary

during the day and was throwing up violently and shaking uncontrollably. Mendoza called for a medical technician from the infirmary and then turned his attention to restoring order on the cell block, since the other inmates had become noisy and excited. Once he calmed down this problem, Officer Mendoza then escorted the dinner cart through the block. He did not have time to make a count until 6:00 p.m. It was then that he discovered that inmate Reza Gozbhadi was missing. Apparently, the inmate had never returned from his work-release job at a body shop in Fangville.

Officer Mendoza called the duty sergeant and reported the missing inmate. An "all points bulletin" was issued. Inmate Gozbhadi was finally brought back to the jail at 10:30 p.m. by a road deputy, who had found him in a country bar unconscious from too much liquor.

The next day Officer Mendoza was notified that disciplinary charges had been filed against him by the duty sergeant because he had let an inmate escape. At his hearing, Officer Mendoza explained that he had not let Gozbhadi escape--rather, he argued, the inmate had never returned from his work-release job. Inmate Gozbhadi was no help; once he recovered consciousness and got the alcohol out of his system, he couldn't recall a thing about that Friday or wandering off to the country bar.

Officer Mendoza asked Officer Sanderson to explain that Gozbhadi had never returned from work-release, but Sanderson swore the inmate had been in his cell that day when he signed off duty.

"We tend to believe Officer Sanderson, since he's got 22 years on the job," the hearing board lieutenant said. "After all, Officer Mendoza, you and Officer Sanderson both signed the post logbook that day stating that all inmates were counted and in their cells. We're assuming you let the inmate escape while you were busy with the medical emergency. Therefore, we're suspending you for five days without pay--one more screw-up like this and you'll be out of a job."

Officer Mendoza learned a hard fact of life from this experience. He realized that by "going around" the established procedures when another officer asks him to can only lead to trouble--for him, not the other officer. As Officer Mendoza also learned, "when the chips are down, it's every man for himself." In this case, Officer Sanderson knew he did not count the inmates--only he had been on the job for 22 years and couldn't risk his pension by admitting he made the mistake, not Officer Mendoza. "After all, I've got a lot more to lose than that kid," Officer Sanderson rationalized to himself. This case study illustrates in a harsh way that jail procedures have been established for a valid reason and that failure to follow procedures "to the letter" could create severe problems.

Preventive Patrol Procedures

For the jail officer, *preventive* patrol is the most effective method for maintaining order and control on the cell block. Preventive patrol simply means that the officer is *visible* to inmates and stays "one step ahead of them"--the officer who patrols preventively and aggressively constantly walks up and down the corridors of the block rather than sitting behind a desk or staying in an office.

The objective of preventive patrol is to detect escape attempts, inmate disturbances, potential disorders, fires, illegal activities, tampering with jail equipment, sexual assaults, suicide attempts, and inmate problems, such as illness or emotional disturbances. To accomplish this objective, the patrolling officer must be wide awake at all times--he should not permit himself to become complacent or relaxed even if there is "never any trouble on his post." As too many officers have learned too late, *there is always a first time for trouble.*


When patrolling, the officer should constantly be on the alert for suspicious activities. He should always be looking for contraband and anything out of the ordinary. Since most criminals are opportunists, they will commit their illegal acts when and where they believe the risks of detection are the slightest. Jail officers can make these risks seem unattractive by aggressive, selective patrol. *Patrol must never become regular and routinized.* If an inmate can anticipate the activities of the patrol officer, then he can plan his illicit activities accordingly.

The officer must familiarize himself with conditions that contribute to illicit activities, such as towels or blankets draped in front of a cell door, a clothes line strung from one side of the cell to the other with clothing hanging on it, and inmates who avert their eyes when an officer looks at them.

Laundry

Bunk beds in pairs

Inmate partitioning of space



DORMITORY

Some other signs of potential problems which the officer on patrol should pay careful attention to include:

- Strange smells: the officer's nose will tell him if marijuana is being smoked or if an inmate has started a fire.
- Two inmates in a shower stall with lots of steam: this is an indication that homosexual activities may be taking place.
- Noises out of the ordinary: for example, heavy breathing in a darkened cell may indicate that homosexual activities are occurring; the sound of metal scraping against metal probably indicates that an inmate is attempting to cut through bars or break a lock; absolute quiet on an otherwise noisy cell block usually is an indication of pending trouble, such as a fight between two inmates; an excessive noise sometimes is used to cover up an escape attempt or a planned fight.
- Conversation between inmates which stops abruptly when the officer approaches: this sign should warn the officer that something is being planned, such as an escape or an assault upon a weaker inmate; the officer should be especially alerted if the inmates engaging in the conversation are known troublemakers.

How should the officer patrol? To patrol effectively, the officer must practice and learn by experience. He gradually will develop the "sixth sense" possessed by patrol veterans. This "sixth sense" or "intuition" will tell him when something is wrong.

However, audio and visual devices *must not be relied upon* by the jail officers to maintain a constant and continuing surveillance. *There is no substitute for actual foot patrol.* Audio-visual devices do not have the capabilities to sense changes in the inmates' attitudes, nor can they detect outward signs that often indicate potential disturbances, such as the quiet and calm which sometimes acts as a danger signal for impending trouble. (Patrol officers should check all alarms and monitoring devices once they have assumed responsibility for a cell area, since equipment sometimes malfunctions.)

The jail officer must be constantly on patrol, covering his beat every 15 or 20 minutes, but always varying his routine so that inmates cannot establish a pattern for him. Ideally, logs or time clocks should be situated throughout the jail to enable the patrolling officer to record the time that he has covered a particular area. This is comparable to the systems utilized by some police departments which require the patrol officer to call into the station periodically--these calls indicate that the officer is safe and is on his assigned beat; they also enable station personnel to relay messages to the officer. A "call-box" system in a jail with periodic check-ins by patrolling officers would allow officers at the

central control desk to keep a constant check on cell block officers--the control desk would be able to quickly determine that an officer may have encountered trouble in the cell block if the officer does not make his periodic call; this system also serves to keep officers awake and on patrol since they cannot very well fall asleep at a desk if they are expected to call the central console every 15 or 20 minutes. A system such as this can be very effective in medium-size and large jails; however, in the smaller jails where there are fewer than five officers on duty during a shift, this system probably is too elaborate. In the smaller jails, officers usually are able to maintain visual contact with each other for safety purposes. But officers working in the smaller jails should be forewarned that the size of the jail does not mean that constant patrol is unnecessary--if there is only *one* inmate in the jail, he must still be observed carefully. When there are five, 10, or 20 inmates, there is as much *potential* for trouble as there is in a jail which houses 500 inmates.

The officer will find that different methods of patrol are required on different shifts--during the evening and night shifts there is a greater chance that trouble will occur or inmates will attempt to escape. Therefore, officers assigned to patrol duties on these shifts must be even more vigilant than is necessary on daytime patrol posts. Officers on duty at night will need to modify their patrol procedures to include frequent back-tracking--this is often a good way to catch inmates who are involved in illicit activities since inmates often feel that once the officer has passed by their cell, they have another 15 minutes "free and clear" before the officer returns to check them again.

Case Study 4:

Rattlesnake County Jail inmate Bonnie Parker, who was awaiting transfer to the State Penitentiary for Women after being convicted of murder during a bank robbery, was given a maximum security classification although she remained on the first floor women's cell block with the other women inmates, most of whom were classified as minimum security. But, because of several previous escapes of dangerous inmates from his old jail, the sheriff wasn't taking any chances with inmate Parker--he assigned an extra officer to patrol duties in the women's block on each shift.

One Saturday night, Officer Peggy Sampson was on duty in the block and her "intuition" told her that Parker was "up to something." Each time Officer Sampson shined her flashlight into Parker's cell, the inmate pretended to be asleep, but her breathing did not sound like that of a sleeping person. When Officer Sampson stepped around a corner and stopped to listen, she could hear rustling noises in Parker's cell. After going through this routine four times in an hour, Officer Sampson suddenly doubled back to Parker's cell after the 2:15 a.m. check on her. She saw Parker standing on a chair

attempting to saw through a window bar with a hacksaw blade. Officer Sampson blew a whistle, which brought the other officer running. But, before she went to the cell, the "back-up" officer called for additional assistance from the men's cell block. With four officers present, Officer Sampson entered the cell and seized the hacksaw blade. Since two of the bars had been sawed through and pasted back together with soap and cigarette ashes, inmate Parker was moved to another cell. A search of her old cell uncovered two more hacksaw blades stuck to the bottom of her bunk with toothpaste.

An investigation revealed that the blades had been passed to inmate Parker on her dinner tray by a "trusty" who had been bribed by Parker's brother. The "trusty" had received the blades concealed in loaves of bread which had been delivered to the jail kitchen by a commercial bakery in Fangville.

This case study illustrates how a constantly alert patrol officer can detect illicit activities by listening for unusual sounds, using a "sixth sense" or intuition, and back-tracking to surprise an inmate. *The officer on patrol must always be alert--the inmates are.*

Case Study 5:

Current policy at the Turkey County Jail requires officers to patrol their assigned areas constantly and to indicate that the patrol is being carried out by recording their name, date, time, and the conditions of the post area every 30 minutes on registers at different locations throughout the jail. The shift supervisor also is required to patrol the jail at odd and unusual hours and sign the same register, at least once every hour, to indicate that he has carried out this function and that everything is in an acceptable condition.

Last year the residents of Turkey County elected a new sheriff to succeed the incumbent, Jack Daniels, who had been in office for 20 years and who was finding it difficult to keep up with the changing times; ex-Sheriff Daniels had refused to implement new programs that would prove cost-effective to the taxpayers and he was easily defeated. During his administration, the jail officers had been hired on the basis of who they knew, with little or no emphasis placed upon the individual's abilities to effectively carry out the role of the professional jail officer. As a result, most of the officers opposed the new sheriff, Gabe Gobble, who emphasized education, training, and implementation of written policies and procedures. Sheriff Gobble has been attempting to establish a more efficient operation.

As part of his policy changes, Sheriff Gobble implemented the tier patrol check-in procedures. However, the "old timers" resented

this new policy, along with several others, and did everything within their power to "upset the apple cart" by not adhering to the new procedures when they felt they could get away with it. Some of the inmates sensed the dissension within the ranks and decided to capitalize on the internal opposition to the sheriff.

In the past, jail officers assigned to the tiers, especially on the midnight shift, would spend most of their time keeping the duty officer company in his air-conditioned downstairs office. They spent very little time on the tiers. Occasionally, they looked at jail equipment or "eyeballed" cells for contraband, but they did not conduct any thorough searches or inspections. The jail did not have monitoring cameras on the tiers. It was a common practice to give a mop handle to "trusty" Karl Tuckermann, whose cell was located near a light switch, and tell him that he was to reach out and turn on the lights in the tiers if he saw or heard anything that indicated trouble.

Inmates Trigger Phelps, Jack Goin, and Tom "Guttsy" Finn noticed that a constant patrol was maintained by the officer on the 4-12 tour of duty, who was just recently hired by Sheriff Gobble. This officer, unlike the "old timers," checked the cell doors to the dayroom area, searched for contraband, and appeared to be very efficient. He recorded the times he had checked each area and the condition of that area on a clipboard that had been placed at the duty post by the new sheriff. The inmates also noticed that the "old timers" who were working the midnight tour of duty for that particular week never checked the conditions of the cell blocks when they started their tour of duty. It also became apparent to the inmates that the "old timers" would sign the post register for their entire tour of duty when they made their first (and usually their only) visit to the tiers. Once this chore was completed, the "old timers" would "retire" to the downstairs administrative offices to keep the duty officer company and watch old movies on TV. Once these facts were discovered by the inmates, they jammed the cell door locking devices with tin foil from cigarette packages to make it appear that they were locked in. They did the same thing to the door leading from the dayroom area. This enabled them to leave their cells after the jail officers went downstairs; with freedom of movement and no one to watch them, the inmates began to saw on the outside window bars, knowing that no one would bother to check on them. They used hacksaw blades that had been smuggled in by the same "trusty" who was responsible for flipping the light switch with the mop handle if problems occurred on the tiers--however, "trusty" Tuckermann had been bribed by inmates Phelps, Goin, and Finn not to set the alarm.

Once the bars had been sawed through, the three inmates tied sheets together and lowered themselves to the ground. Then they climbed the fence to freedom. However, a resident in the neighborhood who was walking his dog saw the men fleeing and called the Feathertown

Police; the inmates were quickly arrested. The police dispatcher automatically called Sheriff Gobble at his home and the sheriff was able to get to the jail quickly enough to discover that the tier patrol register had been signed for the entire night. By talking with the "trusty," Sheriff Gobble learned what had been going on in the jail. With the evidence he obtained, he was able to dismiss the officers from the Sheriff's Department.

This case study illustrates that alert inmates will take advantage of careless and lax officers who do not carefully patrol the cell areas. When an officer relaxes on duty, the word gets out fast among the inmates. The officer who thinks the jail is a place to watch TV or sleep will one day find himself standing in line at the unemployment office, if he is not killed by inmates who are escaping.


Daily Inspection Duties

The patrolling officer must constantly check conditions in the jail to make certain that all equipment, locks, and emergency alarms are *always* in perfect working order. If an officer observes equipment which is either broken or is showing signs of wear and tear, he should immediately notify the proper jail employees to make certain the defective equipment is repaired. In addition, the officer should record his observations in his personal notebook and in the post logbook.

While he is patrolling, the officer's daily inspection should include:

- An examination of fire extinguishers to assure that they are full.
- Fire hoses should be checked to assure that they are connected to the water supply and that there are no visible holes in the hose.
- Emergency exits should be checked to make certain that they are operating freely; emergency lights should be lit.
- Check any audible alarm to make certain it is functioning properly.
- Physically test all openings with security coverings to be positive that they are securely locked.
- Check for broken windows, cut screens, cracked skylights, defective door hinges, bars which may bear sawing marks, uplifted floor tiles, and holes in walls.
- Test telephones and intercoms for proper performance.
- If the jail utilizes inmates as "trusties" or tier runners, determine daily who is authorized to do what.

- Inspect any desk drawers in the vicinity of the post for contraband. Also check for missing articles. If there are storage closets near the post, check them for contraband or missing supplies and equipment.
- Make a record of any burned out lights and see that they are replaced.
- Assure that any mechanical surveillance device is in working order and that mirrors revealing "blind spots" are properly positioned.
- Check any fire alarms . assure that they are in proper working order.
- Determine that any system of emergency lighting for the cell block is in proper working order.
- If breathing apparatus is available for officers to use during fires, make sure it is in operable condition.



Fire extinguishers must be checked periodically and an inspection tag attached.

Suicides And Homicides: Securing The Scene

If a suicide or homicide occurs in the jail, the incident usually will be discovered by a patrol officer. There are several responsibilities involved with the discovery of a body, since evidence must be preserved until criminal investigators from either the sheriff's department law

enforcement division or the local police department finish their tasks. The primary duties of the jail patrol officer involve *securing the scene itself* and *keeping other inmates under observation* to prevent escape attempts, disorders, and the destruction of evidence.

The jail officer should automatically assume that *every* inmate death in the jail results from foul play. In many cases, inmates who are found hanging in their cells did not actually commit suicide, even though most people would assume that a person who is found hanging killed himself. When one inmate murders another, the death is sometimes disguised to look like a suicide--the inmate murderer hopes that the jail staff and the medical examiner will *assume* a suicide occurred and neglect to conduct a thorough investigation. *Because a homicide may be disguised as a suicide, every death in a jail must be thoroughly investigated.*

The success or failure of a criminal investigation in the jail, like those in the community, depends upon the thoroughness and the immediacy of the preliminary investigation. If a homicide *has* occurred, what the jail patrol officer does or fails to do in protecting and preserving the crime scene will determine whether the perpetrator is identified and apprehended or goes undetected.

The patrol officer who discovers the body of an inmate or jail employee should take *immediate* steps to secure both the general area and the crime scene itself. If inmates are congregating around the scene or are in the general area, the officer should immediately order them to stand back while he summons help (it is a good idea for jail patrol officers to carry whistles in order to summon assistance quickly during emergencies; problems could arise if an officer leaves the scene even for a few minutes to use a telephone or intercom). Inmates near the crime scene who might have had access to the body prior to the arrival of the officer should be ordered to remain standing *exactly where they are* until additional officers arrive. Then these inmates should be thoroughly searched to make certain that they have not removed or concealed evidence; the names of all inmate witnesses, as well as those present who claim they "did not see anything," should be recorded for later interviews. Once these immediate steps are taken with inmate eyewitnesses or by-standers, they should be locked into their cells.

If the victim shows signs of life, an ambulance should be summoned. However, if it is obvious the victim is dead, the patrol officer should not move the body. Nor should he touch or move anything in the vicinity of the body. There will be important physical evidence near, on, or under the body which will be vital to the outcome of the criminal investigation--some of this evidence, such as hair and cloth fibers, is not readily visible to the human eye but will show up during forensic examinations. The officer should be careful where he places his hands since investigators will be dusting the area for fingerprints. *Preserving the crime scene means to keep the site of the crime in the same physical condition as it was left by the perpetrator.*

While guarding the scene, the jail officer should sketch an outline of the scene in his notebook since he will be required to prepare a report. The sketch will also be useful to the officer if he eventually has to testify in court.

Common types of evidence at crime scenes in jails include:

- Fingerprints: the perpetrator may have left fingerprints on a weapon, such as a shank (homemade knife), on any smooth surface around the scene (walls, furniture, and metal cell door panels), and on articles in the area (a magazine cover, piece of paper, can of shaving cream). In addition, if a homicide has occurred which was made to resemble a hanging, the perpetrator could have left fingerprints or palm prints upon the skin of the victim around the neck area, or on the victim's arms, which can be recovered by a recent forensic development known as Iodine Silver Transfer Method. (With this process, the skin is sprayed with a chemical substance and any latent fingerprints or palm prints made under pressure will then show up--this process will indicate whether manual strangulation occurred before the hanging.) If the patrol officer touches anything at the crime scene, he should tell the investigators exactly what he did touch.
- Footprints: if the death occurred in a jail yard or on certain types of floors, there may be footprints which can be photographed or picked up with a plaster cast--these footprints could prove that an inmate who denies being in the area was actually there.
- Tool impressions or "jimmie" marks: if the perpetrator used a tool to jam the door on a cell or dayroom to gain access or "jimmied" the lock on a supply cabinet to obtain poison, drugs, or a weapon (such as a kitchen knife), then there will be markings on any metal or wood. Any tool will leave identifying marks on any substance softer than the tool itself. These markings can be matched with the tool, if it is found at the scene or hidden elsewhere. In a jail, it will usually be difficult for the perpetrator to dispose of the tool so that it cannot be found when officers search carefully.
- Stains: blood stains are the most common stains found at a death scene and often provide the investigator with valuable evidence. Any blood found at the scene will be subjected to chemical analysis to determine if it belongs to the victim or someone else. Many times the perpetrator is injured and leaves some drippings from his own blood at the scene or on the victim's clothing. For example, if an inmate is manually strangling another inmate, the victim might attempt to free himself and scratch the perpetrator--

there will then be tiny pieces of the perpetrator's skin and fragments of blood under the fingernails of the victim. The patrol officer must take care not to step in blood, since he will obliterate the stains and carry the blood from one part of the scene to another.

The jail officer's duties do not end when criminal investigators arrive on the scene. Since he was the *first* officer on the scene, the jail officer will need to prepare a very detailed report and provide vital information to both the criminal investigators and the medical examiner. This information includes:

- The position of the body when found and whether or not the position was subsequently altered.
- The time the body was found and when the victim was last seen alive.
- A description of articles present around the body and where those articles were found.
- How the body was handled and whether any injuries resulted from handling the body. For example, in an officer's haste to begin resuscitating a hanging victim, the limp dead body may strike the floor and sustain lacerations and even skull fracture. Post-mortem bruises can occur and enlarge, depending on the victim's posture.

Criminal investigators might ask jail patrol officers to help search the crime scene and adjacent areas. Before beginning a search, all participating officers should *develop a search plan*. The investigators should tell the officers what types of evidence to look for so that nothing important is missed or ignored. If an officer finds anything that may be evidence, such as a hammer, a torn piece of cloth, or a shank, *he should leave the evidence exactly where he finds it* and immediately summon an investigator. The investigator will record the location of the evidence on a crime scene sketch and will then take the necessary precautions to properly bag and label the item. *The officer should never touch, handle, or move any evidence*. The officers conducting the search should follow a definite pattern, not move about haphazardly.

Case Study 6:

After inmates Trigger Phelps, Jack Goin, and Tom "Guttsy" Finn were re-captured following their escape from the Turkey County Jail, Sheriff Gabe Gobble interviewed "trusty" Karl Tuckermann and obtained all the details of the escape. Criminal charges were filed against the three inmates and they were soon scheduled to be tried, with inmate Tuckermann serving as a witness against them.

However, on the night before the trial was to begin, 4-12 shift patrol Officer Rick Ford found Tuckermann hanging in the dayroom with a bedsheet knotted around his neck and tied to an overhead fluorescent light fixture. To the average person, this was an apparent suicide.

But, because of the forthcoming trial, Officer Ford immediately suspected that inmate Tuckermann had been murdered. He cut down the body to check for signs of life, but realized that the inmate was dead. Officer Ford then secured the dayroom and phoned the shift supervisor, who summoned detectives from the Feathertown Police Department's Homicide Division, which had jurisdiction over crimes committed in the jail since the jail was located within the city limits. The investigators found a torn piece of a blue denim inmate uniform shirt with a button attached to it; scrapings from Tuckermann's fingernails produced skin fragments and human hair, with small drops of dried blood attached to the skin fragments. In addition, there were visible bruises on the sides of Tuckermann's neck which did not correspond with the marks left by the sheet.

This carefully preserved physical evidence led to the identification of inmate Finn as the murderer. He was subsequently tried, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment. After his conviction, he was transferred to the State Penitentiary.

OFFICER SAFETY

The officer on patrol in the cell blocks or inmate work and activity areas must *always* be alert, for he could be attacked by an inmate who wants to escape or who is emotionally or mentally disturbed. The officer should remember that he is, for all practical purposes, in a "war zone" and not a rest home.

In addition, officers must always be aware of problems which could affect the safety of their fellow officers. For example, if an officer hears from an informant that two inmates plan to cause trouble on *another shift*, then he has an obligation to warn the officers who work on that shift. He would appreciate the same warnings if the disturbance were planned for his shift.

Patrolling jail officers should always be alert for an attack. Some inmates will attempt to lure the officer who is patrolling alone into a cell, where the officer will be attacked or seized as a hostage. For this reason, officers should avoid entering cells alone--it is always more advantageous in the long run to summon a back-up officer. Officers approaching corners or "blind spots" on the tiers should also be very cautious. The officer should stop and quietly listen *before* he turns the corner.

The officer on patrol duty should never daydream; he should focus his mind entirely on where he is and what he is doing there, developing an ability to sense danger, much as the combat soldier does.

In the event that the officer encounters trouble, such as a fight between two or more inmates, he should not attempt to handle it alone. The inmates could easily overpower him. The officer should summon assistance and wait for the back-up officers to arrive before he intervenes. However, if an inmate is in danger of being killed, the officer should use his judgment and intervene immediately if he thinks waiting for a back-up officer could result in an inmate's death. Examples of such incidents would be a stabbing or when one inmate is choking another inmate or a jail employee.

When the patrolling officer feels that a surveillance device would enhance the safety features of the jail, he should not hesitate to make a notation in the post logbook and follow up with a written recommendation to his shift supervisor.

The officer who patrols an inmate dormitory or work or activity area where inmates congregate in groups must develop patrol procedures which differ to some extent from those used on a tier--when inmates are free to move about, there is a greater danger that the officer could be attacked. The jail officer on patrol duty in an open dormitory should be alert for inmate prowlers moving from one bunk to another or hiding under furniture. Also, a draped blanket hanging from the top bunk over the bottom bunk requires an immediate investigation. Showers and toilets should be checked frequently since many infractions take place in these areas.

A jail officer should never become so complacent that he considers his patrol function to be "routine." When this happens, the officer develops an unwarranted feeling that nothing serious is going to happen and that he has everything under control. Then one day disaster will strike and the complacent officer will be unprepared to cope with the emergency situation simply because he did not anticipate that an emergency could possibly occur. The consequences can be fatal, both for him and his fellow officers.

A patrol officer who notices that a fellow officer is lazy, inattentive, and generally careless *owes it to himself* to take steps to improve the other officer's performance and awareness. The lazy, indifferent officer could permit potentially dangerous situations to exist in the jail--but he may not be the officer who is harmed as a result of this carelessness. The planned escape or fight could occur on another officer's shift; and it will be the *other* officer who is hurt or killed, not the officer who overlooked or ignored the dangerous conditions because of his own laziness or indifference. *Careless officers do not belong on cell block patrol duties--they present too great a threat to the safety of their fellow officers.*

Case Study 7:

While on patrol in the maximum security section of the women's cell block at the Big Sky County Jail, Officer Louise Grimsley was suddenly grabbed around the neck and pulled against the bars. Inmate Suzie Rice, who had grabbed her, placed a homemade knife against her throat and told her she was a hostage.

Lt. Helen Troy finally negotiated Officer Grimsley's release after talking patiently with inmate Rice for three hours. The inmate was upset because her visiting privileges with her common-law husband had been suspended. The husband had attempted to smuggle heroin into the jail for inmate Rice.

"Well, did you learn anything from this?" Lt. Troy asked Officer Grimsley after she had calmed down.

"You better believe it!" Officer Grimsley replied. "From now on I'll patrol down the middle of the corridor--I won't ever walk that close to the bars again!"

HANDLING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

Every jail, no matter how small its inmate population may be, should have plans for emergency situations and every employee of the jail should know the procedures described in the plans, as well as his own roles and responsibilities during an emergency. Emergency situations which commonly occur in jails or affect jails are fires, riots, natural disasters, escapes, and civil emergencies.

Jail administrators who take the time to develop emergency plans will find that their efforts have been worthwhile if trouble does occur. However, many administrators do not bother to develop plans because they feel that their jail is somehow immune from disaster situations or emergencies. They live by the philosophy: "It has never happened here, and probably never will, so why waste time drawing up elaborate plans?" This type of thinking could result in serious injuries and deaths to both inmates and employees, as well as costly litigation.


The officer who works in a jail which does not have emergency plans, or which has plans but fails to train employees in emergency response duties, has an obligation to bring these problems to the attention of his supervisors--he should think of the possibility that he may lose his own life if he does not know how to respond in a fire, riot, earthquake, or similar emergency.

Advance planning for emergency situations is essential. When an emergency strikes, then it is too late to develop a rational plan which everyone understands. Risk and danger are always present in a jail. A

lack of planning can result in unnecessary fatalities and property damage, escapes, or harm to the community as well as the staff. Lack of planning will cause adverse publicity when the news media reveals errors in judgment during an emergency for which no plans had been made.

There are several elements common to a good emergency plan for any type of situation:

1. All emergency situations mentioned above require a plan that is developed as a cooperative effort on the part of the jail staff. The plan should be comprehensive and should be written so that all staff members understand it. Where appropriate, maps of the jail interior should be included in the plans.
2. Copies of the plan should be available--with the exception of plans for handling escape attempts and riots, plans should be accessible to all staff members. Some plans, such as those for fires, should be posted for everyone to see.
3. Staff members should be trained--knowing how to respond during specific emergencies is essential. Training should include: the person or persons to notify; how and when measures will be taken to combat the emergency; use of all necessary equipment, such as fire extinguishers and tear gas grenade guns; and key posts to be manned during different types of emergencies.
4. Who is in charge--there must be an understanding on each of the daily shifts concerning who will put the plan into effect and when.



Emergency plans must be carried out under simulated conditions.

5. What is needed to implement the plan--the equipment, services, and personnel needed must be listed. With the exception of such devices as fire extinguishers, all equipment must be assembled and stored in a locked but easily reached area of the facility.
6. Return to normal--an order or signal should be given to indicate that the emergency is over. An officer should be designated on each shift to assume this responsibility.
7. Record of what took place--a written record should be maintained of the emergency. The report should be factual in content and conclude with a recommendation to prevent a similar incident, if possible. Where appropriate, the emergency should also be studied to pinpoint responsibility as a guide to prevent something similar in the future.
8. Who to call--the plan should include methods for calling off-duty officers back to work, as well as outside agencies such as the local police, state police, fire department, ambulances, hospital, or Civil Defense. In addition, the plan should designate an employee on each shift who will be responsible for releasing information to the news media.
9. Keep the plan current--times change as do personnel. When plans mention specific names it is essential to keep the lists current. All plans should be updated at least twice a year. In addition, if there are maps of the jail interior in the plans, these maps should be updated as soon as any physical changes are made, such as converting a storeroom into an inmate dormitory.

Fire Prevention And Control

Fires occur in jails as a result of carelessness, heating of food in cells, actions of mentally ill inmates, and arson for malicious or diversionary purposes. A fire may jeopardize the lives of all inmates and personnel in the facility because security barriers can prevent quick exit from the cell block or other affected areas.

The jail administrator should develop a fire prevention plan which includes policies directing officers to implement good house-

keeping standards. Officers on patrol should always be looking for inmate cooking devices, overloaded wiring, and any other practices that could contribute to fires. Regular inspections at unannounced times by the jail administrator and the local fire marshal are an essential part of any fire prevention plan.

The plan should clearly define methods for evacuating the jail, covering all pertinent details; these details include sounding the alarms, staff responsibilities, and security perimeters.

Every individual post should have a fire control plan appropriate for that assignment. Each post should clearly show the responsibilities of post duty officers in the jail's overall fire prevention and control plan; the overall plan should be managed by each shift's chief duty officer. Each of the individual post plans should include floor diagrams for the area covered by the post, noting all emergency exits, windows, and doors. In addition, the post plan should tell duty officers where emergency exit keys for the post are located and their number. The interior diagrams for each post should show the location of volatile chemicals and fluids, electrical switches, fire extinguishers, water hoses, barspreaders to separate bars if locks malfunction, breathing apparatus for officers, resuscitation devices for persons who have suffered smoke inhalation, and first aid kits (which should contain equipment and supplies for the emergency treatment of burn victims who are awaiting the arrival of ambulances.)



Backup keys for all emergency exits and for all security doors, as well as for cell blocks, should be located in a secure area of the jail, such as an armory. A set of keys should also be given to either the local police or fire department and secured under glass (the glass will need to be broken before anyone can gain access to the keys).

If an officer works in a jail which does not have a written fire prevention and control plan, he must do what he can to encourage the development of such a plan. But until the plan is developed, the officer on patrol should try to *visualize* situations of an emergency nature and develop a mental action plan--in this way, if a fire does occur, the officer will already have planned his actions and he should be able to respond effectively.

Even when an emergency plan does exist, however, the availability of the plan, by itself, is not sufficient for its effective implementation. *It is extremely important for each officer to familiarize himself with the contents of the plan, to discuss with his fellow employees possible situations that may arise, and to know the functions of others in the plan.* The security components of fire control plans should remain confidential and should not be shared with the inmate population.

The fire control plan should direct officers on patrol to perform daily inspection duties to make certain that *all* necessary equipment and locking devices are functional. At the beginning of each tour of duty, each patrol officer should check fire extinguishers to make certain that they are in place and that none of the liquid has been used or has leaked out. A visual examination of the fire hoses should be made to make sure they are attached to the water supply and that there are no holes in the hoses. Officers on patrol should also check emergency lighting systems, fire alarms, and smoke detectors on each shift to make certain they are in working order.

When patrolling in the kitchen and work activity areas, the officer should inspect to:

- See that the stoves and other kitchen equipment are free from grease.
- Determine that the ventilation hoods are clean--the accumulation of grease is a frequent cause of fires in the kitchen areas.
- Make certain balls of dust do not accumulate behind or under refrigerators and freezers, since an electrical spark could ignite the dust.
- Be sure that all paints, varnishes, lacquers, oils, and other volatile materials are stored in fireproof rooms, which should be located outside of the housing areas in isolated sections of the jail.

Any findings in these areas that could contribute to a fire should be recorded in the officer's personal notebook, as well as in the jail logbook. These findings should also be brought to the attention of supervisors so that they can correct the defects.

Any fire control plan for the jail should also describe evacuation procedures. In developing an evacuation plan, it is necessary to designate perimeter security officers for each shift and describe where these officers should be posted. Some jails located in cities or towns must evacuate their inmates directly onto a public street. Officers working in these jails will need to consult with the local or state police or the sheriff's department law enforcement division to establish a plan for perimeter security in order to prevent inmate escapes. Any movement of inmates requires control. Once inmates have been evacuated or moved because of a fire, there must be an official count conducted. The patrol officers responsible for each post should count the inmates assigned to their cell block or tier and identify each inmate by sight. If inmates have been evacuated to a public street, frequent counts must be conducted.

Every jail officer must be *totally* familiar with the locking system of the jail and make *daily* inspections to determine if cell and fire escape locks, as well as back-up keys, are in good working order. *All* malfunctions must be reported *immediately* to a supervisor. The officer should record this information in both his personal notebook and the jail logbook. If the jail uses padlocks on either cells or exit doors, the padlocks must be checked daily to make certain that they can be opened. In addition, there should be a set of bolt cutters secured either in an armory or at the control desk.

Each officer should be totally familiar with the procedures to be followed to release inmates from their cells if a fire does break out--it pays in the long run for the sheriff or jail administrator to conduct periodic fire drills in darkness (this can be done by blindfolding officers to simulate actual conditions if the jail is filled with smoke). Officers must know how to act immediately when fire breaks out. A delay of only a few minutes can mean the difference between life and death for both officers and inmates. However, before officers open any security doors, they should remember to first look inside to prepare for the unknown.

Jail officials should also take into consideration the possibility of power failures and the need to manually open some locking devices that are normally power-activated. Thus, the emergency plan should specify that the shift supervisor has the authority to open the locks--he should know where the keys are located.

When officers are rotated from one post to another, they must familiarize themselves with the new post's fire control plan. The officer should sign the post logbook indicating that he has read these instructions during his first tour of duty on the new post.

CONTINUED

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The fire plan, like other emergency plans, needs to be examined after use. All officers should be required to submit a report of their efforts during the emergency. This should include comments about possible causes of the fire.

Case Study 8:

A fire broke out on the night of January 1, 1980, on the top floor of the historic Rattlesnake County Jail, killing 10 inmates and injuring three.

Dr. Charles Moneyman, administrator of the Rattlesnake County Hospital in Fangville, said the 10 inmates were dead on arrival at the hospital. Only three inmates locked up on Cell Block D escaped death. The jail, built in 1863, is a landmark in the community of Fangville.

According to Fangville Fire Marshal Smokey Behr, a "trusty" and two jail officers were unable to open a padlock that would have freed the 10 inmates. Preliminary autopsy results said the victims all died of smoke inhalation. An eleventh inmate was hospitalized in critical condition, and two "trusties" who were not locked up escaped unharmed. The fire was detected by Officer Gary Axelrod.

"When Officer Axelrod entered the cell block, he turned to the right and saw a solid wall of black smoke," said County Sheriff Wayne Higgins.

Sheriff Higgins said Officer Axelrod returned to the control desk on the first floor to get keys and, with the help of "trusty" Glenn Murphy, opened one of two doors to the cell block where eight inmates were housed. Officer Axelrod's efforts to open the second door failed when the padlock would not function.

"It could have been nervousness on the part of Officer Axelrod... it could have been panic," the sheriff said. "Or, because of dense smoke, he couldn't see." Officer Axelrod, who had become a "hero" by rescuing inmates during a small fire in the jail three months earlier, tried to run down the hall to a maximum security area where three other inmates were housed, but was stopped by heat, the sheriff said.

Officer Axelrod said he talked to the inmates behind the door in Cell Block D and handed one of them the key so he could try to open the padlock from the other side. Axelrod said he did not know why the padlock would not open.

"I figured they had done something to it, had tried to get it open before we got there," he said. "We never had no trouble with it before."

Minutes later, firefighters cut the padlock and began dragging the inmates from the cell block. All but one inmate was dead on arrival at the hospital. Rescuers were unable to reach the inmates in maximum security until the fire was put out.

John Wiley, the State Law Enforcement Division chief arson investigator, said the fire apparently began in a storage area containing toilet paper, linens, and clothing. The area was just across from the maximum security cells.

"I found nothing that would cause spontaneous combustion," Wiley said, adding that there were no heating devices or wires nearby. The jail was inspected in March, 1977, and rated unsatisfactory by State Department of Corrections Inspector Shirley Templeton. Among the deficiencies cited was an absence of "adequate storage closets and/or rooms for clean bed linens, mattress covers, clothes, and general supplies."

The jail did not have any fire detectors or sprinkler systems, although the Fangville Fire Department recommended the installation of three fire warning devices in July, 1977.

Inspector Templeton said it would have taken a "major overhaul to correct all the deficiencies."

No one who was at the scene of the fire will soon forget the spectacle of men, imprisoned for offenses ranging from drunken driving to assault, choking and burning to death helplessly.

Controlling Inmate Disturbances And Riots

The sheriff or jail administrator is responsible for the development of a disturbance control procedure or riot plan. This plan should be reviewed at least once a year for updating and changes; however, if there are major changes within the jail, such as renovations or the relocation of an inmate housing section, the plan should be revised immediately to incorporate these changes.

There are two major types of disturbances which commonly occur in jails:

1. Disturbances between two or more inmate factions, which can be defined as "riots" because of the destructiveness of the inmate participants; and
2. Disturbances of a general nature where the inmates want to correct a real or imagined grievance; these disturbances can also be planned by inmates who want to divert the attention of officers away from an escape attempt.

Contributing Factors. Among the contributing factors to jail disturbances are:

- Racial problems;
- Complaints about the food or the size of portions;
- Inmate dissatisfaction with the performance or attitude of the officer or officers assigned to a certain post;
- Complaints regarding medical treatment;
- Complaints regarding recreation, visiting, or mail privileges;
- Jail gang problems;
- Homosexual activities; and
- Misinformation relayed to inmates, either via the inmate "grapevine" or by jail personnel.

Signs Of Tension. There are usually several signs of tension among the inmates which signal that a group disturbance may be about to occur: individual inmates may be sullen, restless, flare up easily, and generally avoid contact with officers. In addition, there may be an unusually large number of requests for cell or work assignment changes and inmates may file grievances against other inmates.

Promptness on the part of officers in detecting and reporting a bad "climate" within the jail may make it possible for the staff to find the cause of the problem and perhaps forestall incidents that could result in a disturbance or riot. *Quick, decisive action by officers quite often will prevent the spread of any disturbance which does occur.* Action taken to accomplish any of the following things will tend to prevent disturbances and riots:

- Good communication with inmates concerning plans, programs, or procedures which affect them;
- Reduction of misunderstandings between two or more inmates;
- An understanding relationship between officers and inmates;
- Constructive work and recreational programs for inmates;
- Fair and impartial treatment of inmates; and
- Prompt reporting methods designed to keep supervisors informed about trouble spots, jail gang information, and group disagreements.

Preparing A Disturbance Plan. Considerations that should be included when preparing a jail disturbance plan have been published by the National Sheriffs' Association in its *Jail Audit System*. These considerations include:

AUDIT OF RIOT PLAN

- Types of disturbances:

Does the plan cover:

Disturbance of a riotous nature between two or more inmate factions?

Disturbance of a general nature, intent on correction of some real or fancied grievance?

Disturbance used as a diversionary tactic to facilitate an escape attempt?

- Contributing factors:

Are the following contributing factors covered in the plan:

Racial problems?

Food Complaints?

Complaints regarding:

Medical attention or treatment?

Recreation?

Visiting?

Mail privileges?

Sex pressure and group problems?

Misinformation relayed to inmates?

- Signs of tension:

Are the following signs of tension addressed in the plan?

Increase in the number of sullen inmates?

Unusual restlessness?

Sudden increase in disciplinary infractions?

- Preventive actions:

Does the plan stress the need for prompt reporting of a bad "climate" in the facility?

Does the plan address positive staff actions that tend to prevent riots, such as good communications concerning:

Plans?

Programs?

Procedures?

Does the plan address prompt reporting methods designed to keep supervisors informed of unrest in the inmate group?

Does the plan stress the need for:

An understanding relationship between staff and inmate?

Constructive activities, recreation, and exercise programs?

Fair and impartial treatment of inmates?

- Order of responsibility:

In deciding on a course of action, are responsibilities considered in the following order:

General public?

Safety and welfare of hostages?

Prevention of loss of life or injury to personnel?

Inmate welfare?

Protection of property?

- Steps to be taken to activate riot plan:

Does the plan cover:

Immediate steps to close all avenues of escape?

Methods of localizing a disturbance by cutting off access from an affected area to an unaffected area?

Notification list of persons and agencies to be notified, in order of priority, along with phone numbers?

Does the notification list include:

Facility administrator?

Sheriff?

City police?

Fire department?

Prosecutor?

Call for reinforcements?

Assembly of reinforcements and equipment?

Planning the immediate objective during the delay while reinforcements and equipment are assembled?

The decision to use force as one to be made only by the facility administrator or by a designated representative?

- Hostages:

Does the plan make clear that any person held hostage has no authority regardless of rank while under duress?

- Nonparticipants:

Does the plan address the need for giving inmates who do not wish to participate in the disturbance an opportunity to withdraw from the disturbed area?

Does the plan provide for a means of safe conduct to a non-affected secure area?

- Communications with inmates:

Does the plan address the need for urging rioters to select a spokesperson to confer with the facility administrator or the designated representative?

- Ringleaders:

Does the plan direct employees to observe actions of inmates closely to determine agitators and ringleaders, to provide evidence that will be helpful later?

- Subjugation of the rioters:

Does the plan make clear that the amount of force to be used will be dictated by the situation, but only the force necessary to control the situation is to be used?

- Equipment:

Does the plan address proper equipment, location, pretesting gas masks, etc.?

- Water:

Because fire often occurs during a riot, does the plan include the location of:

Hydrants?

Extinguishers?

Hose?

Other fire fighting equipment?

Is the use of water to disperse participants covered in the plan?

Is the use of water to create dampness necessary to the most effective concentration of gas covered?

- Gas:

Does the plan make clear that only the facility administrator or a designated representative can make the decision to use gas?

Does the plan stress the need to use sufficient gas on the first attempt to break all resistance?

Does the plan cover the need to allow the gas to develop fully but not dissipate before sending in personnel?

Does the plan cover an after-care medical procedure to treat staff and inmates exposed to heavy concentration of gas?

- Firearms:

Does the plan cover conditions and situations when the use of firearms may be authorized?

- Post-riot:

Does the plan cover:

Confinement of participants and assignment of sufficient staff to maintain control?

Immediate medical attention for all reported injuries?

An accounting of all inmates?

Segregation of agitators?

Curtailement of activities and inmate movement, if warranted?

The investigation?

The requirement that all employees on duty write and submit a report to the facility administrator?

The need to get written statements of witnesses (staff and inmates)?

Photographs of damaged area?

The immediate steps to be taken to repair damage?

The collecting and securing of personal property?

- Review:

Does the plan cover a procedure for all personnel to read the plan and initial it, signifying they have read and understand the plan?

Does the plan require a review at least annually and as changes require?

Is the plan dated and signed by the facility administrator?

Case Study 9:

Officer Walt Beasley was known throughout the Rattlesnake County Jail as "Officer Hardnose." With his shaved head and oversized body, he looked very threatening and used his size, along with his mouth, to intimidate both inmates and fellow staff members. Officer Beasley never said anything in a normal tone of voice or asked questions like most people do: almost every sound that came from his mouth was a "barked command" or a stream of obscenities. While he was feared by his fellow officers, it was evident that the inmates hated him.

Officer Beasley had a habit of picking his fingernails with a small knife he always carried in the right front pocket of his uniform trousers. The captain had pointed out to him once that the knife was a potentially dangerous weapon, but Officer Beasley had told the captain "no one in his right mind would dare to try to take this knife away from me." Whenever he was bored, Officer Beasley would take out the knife and start cleaning his nails; walking up and down the tier corridors in the cell block apparently bored him because he frequently withdrew the knife. The inmates noticed this.

When two bank robbers, Willie Sutton and Clyde Barrow, were admitted to the jail to await trial, they soon had a "run-in" with Officer Beasley. He treated them as if they were military recruits at basic training and, as inmate Sutton later recounted to the sheriff, "he made us feel like a couple of two-year-olds, not men."

After Sutton and Barrow had been in the jail a week, Officer Beasley "got on their backs" in the dayroom while he was supervising the food service cart at lunch.

"You two pigs are a couple of sissy girls!" Officer Beasley yelled as he jabbed his finger into Sutton's chest. "With long hair like that, you ought to be on the women's block, not over here with the men. I ought to get a razor and shave your heads for you!"

Officer Beasley then grabbed inmate Barrow's long golden curls and held them up for the other inmates to see. This was too much for Barrow to take. He used his knee to kick Officer Beasley between the legs, causing the officer to double over in pain. As Beasley moaned, the other 12 inmates in the dayroom jumped him and began taking out their pent-up frustrations upon him. Someone took the pocket knife from Beasley's trousers and slit his throat from ear to ear. He was also stabbed in 15 other places on his body.

The terrified "trustee" who had brought in the lunch cart slipped away and summoned help. But by the time other officers could respond to the dayroom to break up the disturbance, Officer Beasley was dead.

The sheriff then issued an order prohibiting officers from carrying personal pocket knives in the jail. The sheriff also realized, too late, that Officer Beasley was mentally disturbed and should have been removed from the staff and referred for a psychiatric evaluation.

Civil Disturbances

Occasionally, jails and law enforcement agencies become targets during civil disorders; protestors or demonstrators may gather outside the jail and demand that inmates be set free--they may even attempt to "storm" the jail and set the inmates free themselves. However, the usual role of a jail during a civil disorder or demonstration is to house persons who are arrested in mass "sweeps" by the police. Because the jail is charged with the responsibility of housing arrestees, there must be written plans to deal with sudden increases in population.

Each jail's civil disorders plan should be periodically revised and updated and should be made available to all officers to study. In addition, each officer employed by the jail should be familiar with several roles and responsibilities he could fulfill if a civil disorder occurs.

The jail plan must designate where large numbers of people of all ages will be housed if a civil disorder breaks out; it is unlikely that the jail facility itself will have space for the persons brought in by the police during mass arrests. When the plan is being developed, the sheriff or jail administrator should locate a facility which will hold dozens of arrestees--this temporary detention facility will need to have at least minimum capabilities for the provision of water, sanitary facilities, and food service. In addition, it will need to be a facility which can be secured both from within and on the outside perimeters. Officers should be familiar with any building that has been designated as a temporary detention facility. They should study its security problems and know where they will set up security posts.

The plan should describe in detail any problem areas near posts which will need to be staffed; in addition, it should describe call-back procedures for off-duty officers, the distribution and use of weapons and chemical agents, command and control procedures, and perimeter security, both for the jail itself and for any temporary detention facilities which have been established.

The primary point for officers to remember if they are on duty during a civil disorder is to avoid panic.

Insofar as is possible, officers should attempt to document any actions they take and keep careful records. All persons who have been arrested during the demonstration or riot and brought to either the jail or a temporary detention center should be fingerprinted and photographed.

Some factors unique to civil disorders which must be kept in mind by officers assigned to the jail or temporary detention center to process or guard arrestees include:

- Persons arrested during the demonstration or disorder should not be intermingled with the regular jail population.
- Officers must take precautions to search arrestees for contraband and weapons, although it probably will not be possible to follow *all* regular jail booking procedures (such as bathing arrestees and issuing them jail clothing).
- Officers must keep an extremely close watch upon the elapsed time to avoid illegally detaining demonstrators or participants in civil disorders.
- If possible, jail personnel should arrange for temporary courtrooms at the jail or detention center--transporting demonstrators back and forth to a courthouse for arraignment could become hazardous for officers, since sympathizers of the arrested persons might attempt to set them free during the transportation process.

- Officers assigned to guard the regular inmate population must be even more vigilant than normal while a civil disturbance is occurring--inmates may attempt to escape or initiate a disturbance within the jail if they feel that the attention of the officers has been diverted by the disorders occurring in the outside community.

As with plans for fires, the jail's emergency plan for civil disorders should also include liaison procedures with other public agencies, such as local and state police, hospitals, and fire departments. It should also define procedures for returning the jail to routine operations once public order has been restored. The first order of business when returning the jail to normal operations should be to conduct a count of *all* inmates assigned to the jail population prior to the outbreak of the public disorder.


Handling Escape Attempts

Bricks and stones don't make a jail...the employees do. At the heart of every escape attempt is human error. Either a procedure in the jail has broken down or someone has become lax in performing their assignment.

Some inmates take delight in finding ways to escape. It is a practical exercise in cunning that gives them a reason for living. Many of these inmates have been in jails for most of their lives and know more about the security of jails than some officers do. The threat of an added sentence is nothing to them compared to the personal satisfaction they gain from having "beat the system." A good "escape artist" will study the moves of every jail employee to find weak points which he can exploit.

For example, an escape that occurred in a southern jail involved three men, two of whom were serving long sentences. One man was responsible for keys. By merely looking at keys on the patrolling officer's ring, he duplicated five keys. One of the keys was to a skylight grill lock that could not be tested until the night of the escape, but it worked. One of the other men on the escape team was assigned to study the behavior of the officers while they were conducting counts and patrolling the cell block. The inmates knew the personal likes of each patrol officer and the subjects each officer would talk about when he was touring the block. This allowed them extra time to work on locks since cooperative inmates on the opposite side of the cell block would stop the patrolling officers and engage them in idle conversations. The third man was in charge of developing plans for a disturbance on another cell block to keep officers occupied while the actual escape occurred. Everything went according to plan, and the three inmates slipped through the skylight, crossed the roof, and used a rope made from sheets to swing from the rope to a fence. They

got away, since officers neglected to conduct a count in *their* cell block after the disturbance was calmed down on the *other* block.



Jail keys should be carried out of sight of the inmates.

Each sheriff or jail administrator must develop and periodically revise a plan to prevent and deal with escape attempts. However, as earlier sections of this chapter emphasized, escape prevention is the responsibility of *every officer* in the jail. Each officer must constantly be alert for any signs of a potential escape.

There is no *ideal* escape prevention plan which would apply to *all* jails; each jail, because of its architecture and staffing patterns, must develop and implement its own plan. The physical location of the jail facility will determine what other law enforcement agencies need to be informed about the plan and notified if an escape does occur.

All officers must be thoroughly familiar with their jail's escape plan and know what their role will be if an escape attempt occurs. Since time is of great importance in closing off avenues of escape from the facility and its grounds, it is mandatory that all officers be so familiar with the plan that they can put it into operation immediately.

The plan should provide that any unauthorized absence of an inmate from a work detail, living quarters, or other location will be reported *immediately* to the shift supervisor. When it is determined that an escape has occurred, pre-arranged signals should be sounded to notify employees in the vicinity of the facility as well as local police and radio and television stations. A constantly-updated list of all employees with addresses

and phone numbers should be maintained with the plan. This list should be arranged so that a maximum number of employees can be contacted with a minimum number of calls. As soon as an escape occurs, one employee should be assigned to contact the number of off-duty employees required to assist with the search and maintain jail security and have them report for duty immediately.

Officers assigned to work details, or to such on-going activities as dining room or food service cart supervision, should take a count of the inmates they are supervising as soon as the emergency alarm is sounded and report the count to the central control desk immediately. Inmates should be identified by sight by officers who know them since the escaping inmate sometimes bribes another inmate to "cover" for him--this delays the proper identification of the inmate who has escaped and increases his chances for a successful escape.

The escape plan should include specific instructions for the continued operation of work details or other inmate activities during the emergency. Some jails immediately halt all activities and lock inmates in their assigned cells until the escapee has been apprehended or it has been determined that there is no immediate threat of additional escapes.

Employees On Duty. The emergency plan should provide that all employees on duty whose posts can safely be vacated should report to the rollcall room or central control console. Posts which can be vacated during an escape should be listed and a copy placed in the emergency plan. Personnel assigned to these posts should be aware of their duties and responsibilities during an emergency.

After assignment to a new post while the escape emergency is in progress, the officer should stay on the post until he is notified to report in or is relieved. Some specific instructions which should be included in the emergency plan are:

1. Officers who are in charge of work details should order inmates to place their tools in a convenient secure location. They should count and identify the inmates assigned to their work detail as soon as the emergency alarm sounds and, if they are directed by the plan to do so, they should take the inmates back to their cells or dormitories and lock them in.
2. Upon notification, the officer assigned to the armory should immediately prepare to issue arms, ammunition, and other equipment.
3. A designated employee should issue escape bulletins and pictures of the escapee to all law enforcement agencies in the area and to radio and television stations, as well as newspapers.

4. An officer should be assigned to collect all personal property belonging to the escapee and remove it to a secure area for investigation and safe keeping.

Escape Posts. The escape plan should contain a list of pre-determined posts to be covered during a search. These posts should be divided into two or more groups and designated as primary and secondary or mobile and stationary. The posts to be manned will depend upon the information available concerning the time the escape occurred, the means of departure, the direction of travel, or any other pertinent information. An effective plan will include guidelines dealing with the proper method of covering each post--these guidelines will describe such issues as concealment, unnecessary conversation with others, radio volumes, and so forth.

Damage To Security Features. When the escape involves cutting of bars, breaking locks, or other damages, a careful investigation should be conducted to determine whether the escape could have been prevented, whether bars or locks were defective, and who is responsible for the escape. The investigation should be documented with photographs and reports. In addition, physical evidence should be collected and carefully preserved--this will be necessary if the escapee is apprehended and brought to trial. Too many jails neglect to properly collect physical evidence and then discover, too late, that the evidence is necessary to obtain a conviction once the escapee is apprehended and charged with escape. *Any point of escape in a jail facility should be treated as a crime scene and proper crime scene protection and search procedures should be followed.* Finding out how and why an inmate escaped also helps prevent additional escapes, since security defects may be corrected.

If the escapee has damaged tool resistant bars, the jail should hire an expert to make the proper repairs.

Return To Routine Operations. As soon as the escape emergency is over, the jail should be returned to its routine operations. However, all officers on duty, as well as those assigned to the next two in-coming shifts, should be advised to be especially alert and cautious since the inmates will probably be tense. The officers should be alert for inmates congregating in groups and low-volume conversations--these signs may indicate that one of the inmates in the group has useful information about the escape.

Case Study 10:

Big Sky County Jail escapee Butch Cassidy was arrested while robbing a convenience store in neighboring Reindeer County and was taken

to the jail. The escape from Big Sky County was Cassidy's seventh escape from custody in the three years since he had been paroled from a federal penitentiary. This information was on the teletype which Reindeer County Jail officials received from the Big Sky County Sheriff's Department. The teletype also warned other law enforcement agencies that all seven of Cassidy's previous escapes involved going out through the roof of the jail.

"We've got to put this character in maximum security so that he doesn't get away from us, too," Reindeer County Jail Lieutenant Steve Sundance told his booking officers.

"But, Lieutenant, the maximum security section is on the second floor right under the roof!" Booking Officer Kevin Flanigan explained. "Wouldn't it be better to put Cassidy on the first floor in the medium security section with the town drunks? They'll let us know if he's planning anything, since they snitch on everybody."

"If we classify him as maximum security, then he belongs in the maximum security section," Lt. Sundance answered. "We'll just have to keep a close watch on him."

Two weeks later inmate Cassidy escaped during the night from the maximum security section by cutting through a padlock on a door which led to the roof. Once on the roof, he used ropes made from bed sheets to swing down over the unguarded rear wall of the jail, which led to a dark alley. He escaped in a car which an accomplice had waiting for him.

How did he get out? When he was apprehended two months later in Rattlesnake County, Cassidy bragged about how easy it had been to get out of the Reindeer County Jail--"one of the easiest breakouts in my career," he said.

Cassidy said he had carefully watched all moves made by officers on patrol in the maximum security section during his two-week stay in the jail. One of the events which caught his attention was a fire drill, which took place at 2 p.m. when officers assumed all maximum security inmates were in the jail yard for a recreation period. However, Cassidy had told an officer who was escorting the inmates that he had a stomach ache; he stayed inside and was curled up under a blanket on his bunk. But the officers participating in the fire drill didn't bother to check the cells to see if they were occupied. During the fire drill, an officer opened an unlocked linen storage cabinet next to the dayroom, where he reached behind a pile of sheets and grabbed a pair of bolt cutters. He rushed to the exit door to the roof--his assigned post during a fire. After the drill was over, the officer put the bolt cutters back into the linen closet.

On the night of his escape, Cassidy stuffed the locking mechanism on his cell door with balls of aluminum foil which he had collected from the empty cigarette packs in the dayroom trashcan. The officer on patrol never bothered to shake the cell doors, which were locked electronically.

Cassidy had also timed the patrols on the midnight shift. He knew he had at least one hour to stuff his bed with a "dummy," retrieve the bolt cutters, cut the padlock, get up to the roof, and swing over the side of the jail. He didn't realize it at the time, but he had more than an hour to get away--his escape wasn't discovered until the 7 a.m. count. The "dummy" in his bunk was realistic enough to fool the patrolling officer all night long.

After the escape, Lt. Sundance told Officer Flanigan: "Damn, you were right--we should have put Cassidy on the first floor with the town drunks. They would have told us if he was planning something. It's so easy to get out of this broken down old jail!"

What Lt. Sundance failed to realize was that Cassidy didn't escape from the jail itself--he escaped from the people who were staffing it.

Cassidy didn't like the Rattlesnake County Jail either. He only stayed there a week before he escaped. Even though he had bragged to officers at the Rattlesnake Jail about his escape from Reindeer County, and had described his methods to them, they also put him on the second floor of the jail. That's where their maximum security section was located, and if there ever was an inmate who required maximum security, it was Cassidy.

SUMMARY

1. The patrol responsibilities of the jail officer are vital to the continuous security of the facility; jail officers can become effective patrol officers by keeping themselves fully informed at all times.

To keep himself fully informed, the jail officer needs to know who the inmates are, their cell and work assignments, their special needs and problems, and their previous behavior as inmates. The officer keeps himself informed by knowing what has occurred in the jail on other shifts, a task which he can accomplish by talking to officers and other jail employees, reading post orders, and reading the jail logbooks. In addition, he should keep an accurate up-to-date personal notebook, listen to inmates and observe their behavior, and utilize inmates as confidential sources of information.

2. To be an effective patrol officer, the officer must know the jail facility itself and how all the equipment functions--he should be able to quickly recognize anything that is out of place.

Knowing the "geography" of his jail enables the officer to patrol his assigned post effectively. As he becomes totally acquainted with his patrol area, the officer will develop a "sixth sense" about his territory--he will instinctively know when something is amiss and will be able to take corrective action. For the jail officer, preventive patrol is the most effective method for maintaining order and control on the cell block. The officer on patrol must be alert and wide awake at all times--patrol must never become regular and routinized. The officer must create among inmates the impression that he is always present; there is no substitute for actual foot patrol.

3. The officer needs to know jail officer safety procedures and develop an ability to follow these procedures.

He needs to become so conscious of his own safety and the safety of other officers that he never becomes careless, lax, or mentally unaware of where he is and what his responsibilities are. Patrolling jail officers should always be alert for an attack from inmates.

4. The officer needs to know his jail's operational policies concerning fires, disturbances and riots, natural disasters, civil disorders, and escape attempts and know exactly what his role will be if such an incident occurs.

Every jail, no matter how small its inmate population may be, should have plans for emergency situations and every employee of the jail should know the procedures described in the plans, as well as his own roles and responsibilities during the emergency. Whenever an emergency has occurred, it is important to count inmates as quickly as possible and identify them by sight.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

ESCORT OF INMATES

Contrary to what the general public may think, once a man is incarcerated in an institution and the gates of freedom close behind him, he may pass through those gates many times before his sentence is completed. In the day-to-day operation of a jail, many inmates may pass through the gates - inmates on leaves, work release programs, and outside work details. While any inmate going through the gate is important and should not be neglected, this chapter primarily concerns itself with the specialized type of duty that officers may be called upon to perform - the escorting of an *inmate under restraint* outside the confines of the institution.

The main objective of this chapter is to provide the jail officer with the proper knowledge and procedures for escort duty. An officer should always be aware that *escort duty is dangerous*. When escorting an inmate, the officer should remember that he may be providing the inmate with his first exposure to the outside world in a long period of time.

The history of jails is filled with many stories of escapes by inmates who were on escort. Worse, there are many instances where transporting officers were killed. The following summary was reported in a recent All Points Bulletin released by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

APB - Relay to Local Agencies

POLICE KILLED

Law Enforcement Officers Killed Summary

Broward County, Florida, so advised deputy WM aged 47, shot and killed approximately 1:30 pm, 7/11/79. Victim and another deputy transported four prisoners to dentist's office. While unloading prisoners at office, two subjects arrived at scene in vehicle. In apparent attempt to free one prisoner, male subject called victim over to vehicle and shot him at point-blank range with shotgun. Escape plan called for female subject to kill other deputy, but she fled scene after victim was shot. Male subject, aged 28, apprehended at scene and female, aged 18, arrested later at her residence.

In many cases carelessness is the cause for an escape. Improper application of restraint equipment, lack of a proper vehicle search, escorting without arms, and improper supervision during the escort are among the reasons. How, then, can escort duty be conducted while ensuring the public safety and the safety of the officer?

The transporting officer is *legally* responsible for custody of the inmate; therefore, a thorough search of the inmate must be *made by the transporting officer* before the trip. A strip search may be necessary. At a minimum, the inmate should be frisk-searched. The transporting officer should check the inmate's personal effects for possible concealed weapons. *Under no circumstances should the transporting officer assume that the inmate has been searched by anyone else.*

If the inmate is transported to court, a hospital, a home visit, or wherever, he must be frisked before he gets back into the vehicle for his return to the jail. Every inmate being taken from the jail is a potential escape threat and restraining devices must be used. The officer should never assume that because the inmate he is transporting is a "regular visitor" to the jail that he will not attempt to flee. Given the right time, place, and circumstances, the inmate presents this threat. A transporting officer should treat every inmate he is escorting as if he is the most dangerous person alive who will go to any extreme to escape. A good suggestion is to dress an inmate who is being transported in a day-glo orange jumpsuit, labeled with the name of the jail; such a jumpsuit worn directly over underwear is highly visible and is easy to spot if the inmate does flee.

TYPES OF RESTRAINING DEVICES

There are several types of restraining devices which can be used when transporting inmates:

- (1) *Swivel, non-locking handcuffs.* The most popular type of handcuff, their light weight, ease of application, and versatility make for a practical device that can be used in most situations for restraining an inmate.
- (2) *Waist chain.* This chain is used in conjunction with handcuffs. The chain encircles the inmate's waist and is pulled through his belt loops. The snap link on the end of the chain is pulled through a large link to create a snug fit and is secured either with a separate lock or a clip. Handcuffs are then attached to the chain, using the procedure outlined above. This is a most effective restraining device because it lessens the mobility of the inmate's hands.



End of chain must be secure..



Waist chain used in conjunction with handcuffs.

- (3) *Ankle shackles* are cuffs similar in appearance to handcuffs although they are usually much heavier and sturdier. These shackles are designed to restrict leg movements and are used chiefly in transporting inmates for long distances.




Ankle shackles are designed to restrict leg movements.

- (4) The *strait jacket* is used on the violent inmate and is designed to restrict all movements and to completely immobilize the inmate. However, inmates can more easily free themselves from a strait jacket than from handcuffs and ankle shackles.

(5) The *restraining sheet* is a canvas sheet with straps designed to secure an inmate to a bed. In addition to security, it prevents an inmate from injuring himself when circumstances make it necessary for him to remain in bed.

(6) *Restraining straps* are usually made of leather and are designed to secure a person in bed similar to the manner in which a restraining sheet is used.

(7) *Leg brace.* When transporting an inmate by air, a leg brace is an excellent device to use. It is an orthopedic knee cage with a ring lock that impedes the inmate's leg movements. It can be worn under the trouser legs.



Orthopedic knee cage.

METHODS OF HANDCUFFING

Several methods can be used to handcuff inmates for transport. Among them are:

(1) *Securing bracelets to wrists:* This method requires the handcuffs to be secured to each wrist of the inmate as he holds his hands in opposite directions. The *key aperture* should be to the rear facing the inmate's body or facing his head. Each cuff must be double-locked to prevent the inmate from opening it by using a thin piece of metal. The escorting officer should apply any restraining


devices; however, before they are applied, they should be checked for any breaks or malfunctions and the inmate's wrists should be checked to make sure he has not greased them. In all cases, the officer should resolve all doubts in his own favor, and double check the restraints after he has applied them. Handcuffs should be properly applied, tight enough to prevent them from slipping off, but not so tight that they cause discomfort or pain. An officer can be considerate without violating security. Harsh or inhumane treatment should be avoided.



Inmate's hands must be in opposite directions.




The key aperture should be to the rear facing the inmate's body.



Each cuff must be double locked to prevent the inmate from opening it.

(2) *The interlocking method:* This method gives added security by passing one cuff through the other one in a chain-like manner before locking. Facing the hands in opposite directions before using this method will restrict the inmate's use of his hands and arms and cause discomfort with any undue exertion. However, the facing of hands in opposite directions is very uncomfortable and is not recommended for prolonged periods.

(3) *Behind-the-legs method:* In this method both arms are placed under the legs and the wrists cuffed, which in effect has the inmate in a doubled-up position with his leg in the loop formed by his arms. This method is very effective in immobilizing the inmate and is ideal in situations where an officer is alone with an inmate and there is a strong possibility of an escape attempt. However, this position is also uncomfortable for an inmate and should be discontinued as soon as possible.



Both wrists are cuffed under the legs.

Inmates should not be shackled to a stationary object or a vehicle. There is too much possibility of injury. For example, someone could start a truck without seeing an inmate shackled to a tailgate; or an inmate shackled to a stationary object in a building may be forgotten if a fire breaks out.

Restraining equipment should be a standard brand; this will minimize the number of keys necessary during transfers.

The transporting vehicle, whether a car, van, or bus, should be inspected before the transport is made. The transporting officers should make sure that a spare tire, lug wrench, jack, flares, other safety devices, and gasoline credit cards are available. If the vehicle is radio-equipped, the officer should check to see that the radio is working.

TRANSPORT BY AUTOMOBILE


Automobiles used for transport should be searched before the inmate gets in. The transporting officer should check the head linings and seats both above and behind. *The car should be re-searched each time the officer returns to it with the inmate.* For example, after the officer leaves the courtroom to return the inmate to the jail, he should inspect the vehicle again. It is entirely possible that someone could have hidden a weapon in the vehicle.

When the officer gets into his vehicle he should be seated in a position which enables him to observe the inmate at all times. The officer should never sit next to the inmate with a weapon on his side. Also, cuff keys should be kept out of sight of the inmate.

A *safety shield* should be installed between the front and rear seats of a transport vehicle. If a shield is not available, a second officer should sit in the back seat with the inmate; the officer should be seated directly behind the driver of the vehicle.



Transporting two prisoners.



Transporting prisoners in a screened station wagon.



Transporting one prisoner.



Use of safety screen when transporting prisoners.

An officer who sits in the back seat with the inmate should not be carrying a weapon nor should he have direct access to the keys to the restraining devices. Merely handcuffing an inmate does *not* render him harmless. The inmate's arms, although cuffed together, are still effective weapons to slug the officer or turn the steering wheel. There are many cases in which officers have been shot with their own weapons by handcuffed prisoners. A transporting officer should be aware of this and use the restraining belt and ankle shackles with dangerous inmates.

However, an officer must never assume that an inmate is helpless with handcuffs and shackles on. The inmate's head is still a powerful battering instrument that can do considerable damage to the officer. The officer must never take any chances or believe an inmate can be trusted to behave himself.

An escort officer must be especially alert in applying or removing handcuffs or other devices since this is a likely time for a desperate inmate to make an escape attempt. At such a time the officer is extremely vulnerable.

For safety reasons, inmates should never know which officer is carrying the handcuff keys. Knowledge of who has the keys will tempt some inmates to attack an officer if the officer lets his guard down.

Every officer should be provided with sufficient refresher training in securing devices to ensure his continued proficiency in their use so that he acts correctly in an emergency situation.

Constant vigilance is necessary at all times. When driving, a transporting officer should adhere to all motor vehicle laws. It is also helpful to know where hospitals along the route are located. If the officer must stop for meals, sites should be pre-selected. An officer should never stop at a restaurant suggested by the inmate. When available, the transporting officer should use a drive-in restaurant; it is preferable to have the inmate eat in the vehicle rather than take him into a restaurant, especially if he presents a security risk. The officer should also make sure the inmate does not hide salt, pepper, or sugar. These ingredients, if thrown into the officer's eyes, can momentarily blind him and give the inmate an opportunity to escape. To prevent this from happening, the officer should ask the inmate how he wants his food seasoned and do it for him.

It is also wise for the transporting officer to continuously check to make sure that he is not being followed. If he observes a car in distress, the officer should not stop to provide assistance but instead should radio police authorities. Inmates who have planned escapes often advise their friends to set up a "motorist-in-distress" situation to get the unwary officer to stop. Many officers have been killed in situations like this.

If it is necessary to stop for a restroom break, the officer should make sure that the inmate never leaves his sight.

While walking with an inmate, the officer should walk alongside but slightly behind him. Never let the inmate lag behind. In addition, the officer should not allow anyone to pass between him and the inmate. If two officers are escorting, the inmate should walk between them.

The transporting officer should use extreme caution in handling a mentally disturbed or psychotic inmate. In this case, he should always check with a supervisor for special instructions. If the inmate appears physically or mentally unfit to make the trip, the officer should report this to his supervisor.

The escorting task should be carried out as inconspicuously as possible. The officer should not permit the inmate to converse with citizens or reporters.

If there is an escape attempt, the use of weapons will be guided by departmental policy. An officer should know and understand his department's policy regarding the use of firearms in an escape attempt. Does the department allow a warning shot? Is the officer supposed to shoot to disable? Does the officer know what to do in a crowded area? In any event, the transporting officer should *immediately* notify the proper authorities if an inmate has escaped. He should also notify his own agency.

Case Study 1:

Rattlesnake County Jail Officers B.J. Honeycutt and Phil Fairbanks were assigned to escort inmate Donald Krum to court, where he was being tried for the murder of a popular radio disk jockey. Krum's attorney had managed to generate a great deal of public controversy before the trial began by alleging that the dead disk jockey was actually a "cocaine dealer" and that Krum had "shot him in self defense" when the deejay "tried to pull a rip-off during a large narcotics transaction."

When they arrived at the County Courthouse in Fangville, Officers Honeycutt and Fairbanks escorted Krum to the second floor, but were met in the hallway by two men who identified themselves as reporters from the daily newspaper in the state capital. They said they wanted to interview Krum, since there was "a lot of interest in his case in the capital and the legislature was thinking about holding hearings on alleged drug dealing involving radio, TV, and sports personalities."

Officer Honeycutt said an interview was against the jail rules and started to move Krum along toward Courtroom 2, but Krum turned to him and said, "Hey, you guys can't deny me my First Amendment rights! The Supreme Court says I got freedom of the press and freedom of speech, so I'm entitled to give these reporters an interview."

"Well, maybe you're right," Officer Fairbanks said, "but just for a few minutes. Stay with him, B. J., while I check us in."

Officer Fairbanks went into the courtroom, leaving Officer Honeycutt alone with the inmate and the two reporters. The reporters began asking Krum questions about his case. Bored with listening to Krum, Officer Honeycutt lit a cigarette and began watching the courthouse secretaries who were walking in the hallway. Soon he began flirting with a secretary who was especially attractive. He had turned his back on Krum and the reporters.

After 10 minutes had passed, Officer Fairbanks opened the courtroom door and hollered, "Hey, B.J., you better bring him in now--we've got to get him ready for the trial." Officer Honeycutt turned to take Krum's arm but, to his surprise and horror, Krum wasn't there.

Officer Honeycutt raced up the hallway and looked into offices but found no sign of inmate Krum.

"Did you see him leave?" he asked the secretary, who had followed him down the hallway to see what was going on.

"Sure, honey," she answered. "He left with those two guys he was with--about five minutes ago."

"Well, damn, why didn't you say something?" Officer Honeycutt yelled at her.

"Don't you run your mouth at me, mister!" she shouted back. "How was I supposed to know he was a friend of yours?"

Inmate Krum is still at large. One fact has been verified though. The two "reporters" were not employees of the newspaper in the state capital, as they had claimed. No one knows who they were.

What mistakes did Officers Honeycutt and Fairbanks make? First, officers should not permit inmates to converse with reporters in courthouse hallways or in any other public area while the inmate is being escorted.

If a reporter wants to interview an inmate, he should request permission from the sheriff or jail administrator, who will then ask the inmate if he wants to give an interview. The interview should be conducted in a secure area at the jail, such as a room used for inmate-attorney interviews. Second, the credentials of reporters should *always* be verified before permitting them access to inmates; checking a reporter's press ID card is not a guarantee that the reporter is who he claims to be, however, since these cards can be forged--jail personnel should phone the reporter's employer at the number listed in the telephone directory to verify that the reporter has been assigned to conduct an interview with an inmate.

Third, an inmate's right to "freedom of the press" does not mean he is entitled to give interviews whenever he pleases--"freedom of the press" as applied to inmates by the courts means that they can have access to printed materials or, as some courts have held, can publish a jail newspaper. It does not mean the inmate has a right to give interviews or serve as the source for news stories. However, with his "freedom of speech" rights, inmate Krum was entitled to talk to reporters; but courts have held that direct interviews *can be restricted* by jail personnel if they create a threat to security as was true in this case--security was jeopardized the minute the officers stopped in the hallway to converse with the two "reporters" (see Chapter Two, "Legal Rights and Responsibilities," for a further explanation of the inmate's constitutional rights and the restrictions involving the exercise of these rights). The officers should have escorted inmate Krum directly into the courtroom.

Fourth, Officer Fairbanks erred by leaving Officer Honeycutt alone with inmate Krum in a non-secure hallway. *Both* officers were responsible for providing security during the escort; by leaving, Officer Fairbanks violated procedures. Fifth, Officer Honeycutt was negligent from the moment he stopped watching Krum and began watching and talking to the courthouse secretaries--the officer was assigned to guard an inmate, not flirt with a secretary and try to make a date for Saturday night.

The two officers had a very difficult time trying to defend their actions when the sheriff conducted a disciplinary hearing. Both officers received two weeks suspension.

ESCORTING IN VARIOUS SITUATIONS

There are normally six locations to which inmates are escorted:

- (1) To court;
- (2) To another penal institution, because of a warrant or transfer order;
- (3) To a hospital in the outside community for specialized treatment;

- (4) To a mental institution either due to an order by the court for institutionalization or if an inmate had been declared psychotic;
- (5) To a funeral home to view the body of a deceased relative; and
- (6) To a hospital or home to visit a critically-ill relative.

The type and amount of equipment used in transporting an inmate or inmates depends upon the procedures at the jail and the degree of security risk each inmate presents.

Escort To Court

Whenever possible, two officers should be assigned to the duty of escorting an inmate to court. One officer is designated as the officer-in-charge (normally the senior officer). The other officer is the driver. However, the number of officers used may vary, depending on the number of inmates who are being escorted.

A movement order will be initiated by the jail and generally is self-explanatory. The movement order will contain: general information such as the inmate's name, number, purpose of movement, sentence, and necessary files that are to accompany him (jail or medical records); and any writs, commitments, or indictment papers. In addition, orders also may indicate whether or not personal property, valuables, or monies are to accompany the inmate. The transporting officer should make sure that the movement order is authorized by the proper authority.

Upon arrival at the courthouse, the officers will normally secure the inmate in the courthouse bullpen or lockup. The officers should secure their sidearms before entering the lockup to remove the restraining devices from the inmate. After the inmate is safely secured, the officers can then deliver the necessary documents to the court clerk or to the prosecutor.

When notified that court is to convene to hear the case, the officers should enter the lockup and handcuff the inmate *before* proceeding to the courtroom. Normally, the restraining devices will be removed from the inmate prior to entering the courtroom. The inmate will sit at the defense table with his attorney.

Once the inmate is seated with his attorney, the officers should visually survey the courtroom and decide where they are going to sit during the trial. All possibilities should be considered in making this decision: avenues of escape, prior escape attempts of the inmate, presence of his friends or relatives in the courtroom, and so forth. The officers should position themselves to prevent any escape attempts, remembering that unless they are officially relieved of the responsibility, they are responsible for the inmate.

Upon conclusion of the trial proceedings each day, the officers must prepare the inmate for transport back to the jail. Before leaving the courtroom, the inmate should be handcuffed and then returned to the lockup area where officers can safely apply additional restraining devices. One of the officers should search the vehicle before the inmate enters it, even if the vehicle was locked all day. The reason for this is obvious. Only when this procedure is completed should the officers transport the inmate back to the jail.

Transport To Another Correctional Institution

The movement order will provide the officer with necessary information about material or property to accompany the inmate who is being transferred to another jail or institution. After delivering the inmate to his destination, the transporting officers should obtain a receipt for him from the receiving institution. Generally, officers should follow the guidelines described earlier for transport by automobile.

Escort To The Hospital

In escorting an inmate to a hospital, the movement order should provide necessary information about any material or property accompanying the inmate. Transporting officers should make certain that they have the inmate's medical card and appointment slip. While at the hospital, the officers should be especially vigilant--waiting rooms are crowded, seating space is limited and, in general, conditions are ideal for an attempted escape or for creating a disturbance that could lead to an escape. The officer should stay with the inmate throughout the medical procedure if the inmate is an out-patient. If the inmate is admitted to the hospital, the department should provide officers to guard him; one officer should accompany the inmate whenever he is moved around the hospital for tests. If the inmate is undergoing surgery, the officer should wait outside the operating room, not letting the inmate out of his sight. At no time should an officer guarding an inmate in a hospital leave the inmate untended to run an errand for a nurse or doctor.

There may be rare instances when officers will be required to escort an inmate who is incapacitated to a degree; because of his physical condition, it may be necessary to move him by stretcher. In cases like this, officers should check their transport van and make sure that necessary tie-down equipment is available in the van to prevent the inmate from falling off the stretcher and further injuring himself.

Escort To A Mental Institution

The movement order should provide necessary information concerning what material or property is to accompany an inmate to a mental institution. In the event that the inmate is highly disturbed, transporting officers should be told about his condition and how to handle him. The medical doctor or supervisor should decide whether or not the inmate is to be moved in a strait jacket or restraining sheet.

However, in this day and age a movement of this nature is very rare. The use of sedative drugs practically eliminates the need for a strait jacket and restraining sheet while moving an inmate to a mental institution. Once the inmate is delivered to the institution, the transporting officers should make sure they obtain a signed receipt for him.

Escort To A Funeral Home

Attendance at funerals is considered a privilege granted by the jail administrator or a judge to inmates who are not considered to be serious escape risks. Naturally, since the inmate and the jail officer will be in a public place, special supervisory techniques must be employed.

The first step in escorting an inmate to a funeral home is to tell both the inmate and his family what is expected of them during the visit. The jail officer in charge of the inmate should advise them of the two rules which must be followed:

- The inmate may not leave the room where the event is being held without the escorting officer.
- No special requests by the family will be considered.

The escorting officer should try to remain as inconspicuous as possible while watching his prisoner. He should sit in the back of the room where he can keep the inmate in sight at all times. The best policy to follow is for the officer to tell the inmate where he will be and to warn him not to move out of sight. An inmate should be told that if he becomes careless and wanders out of the officer's sight, his family might be caused some embarrassment when the officer is forced to search for him. The inmate should be aware that if he disappears from the officer's sight, the officer can make only one assumption - that the inmate must be escaping.

The officer should never leave the inmate in anyone else's care. The officer's duty is the safekeeping of the inmate, and he has no other concerns at the funeral.

When an inmate is allowed to mingle with other people in a public place, it is almost impossible for a jail officer to prevent the passing of contraband. In this case the inmate must be searched before he is placed back into the escort vehicle, which also must be searched for contraband.

In all special inmate visiting situations, the escorting officer should present a calm, authoritative appearance. Since many of these occasions become highly emotional, the officer should be prepared to act quickly and decisively. For example, during one funeral the

inmate's mother began to attack him, shouting, "It's because of you that your father died! If you had been good like your brother, he would be alive today!" Before the ceremony began, the officer had noted the location of all the exits in the funeral parlor. When this emotional scene started, he quickly stepped over to the inmate, took him firmly by the arm, and led him to the nearest exit. The officer acted calmly and decisively in this case.

In essence, during a special visit to a funeral, the escorting officer should:

- (1) Search the inmate before returning him to the jail;
- (2) Keep a careful but inconspicuous watch on the inmate during the visit;
- (3) Assume that if an inmate is not present in the room, he has escaped; and
- (4) Explain to the inmate and his family what is expected of him during the visit so that family members will not seek special consideration.

Escort To Visit A Critically-Ill Relative

The procedures to be followed here are much the same as with a funeral visit. The main thing to be concerned with, as in the funeral visit, is the highly emotional atmosphere.

The escorting officer must remember that *no set of rules or procedures can be written to cover all situations*. What has been presented in this chapter are basic procedures. The officer is not dealing with machines but with human beings, so he should stay alert at all times.

In conclusion, it is important to re-emphasize that *escort duty can be very dangerous*. An officer can minimize the danger by following proper escort procedures.

TRANSPORTING FEMALE INMATES

Because of the high potential for allegations of misconduct against a male officer stemming from the transporting of female inmates, there should always be a woman officer participating in the escort. Under no circumstances should a female inmate be transported by one or two male officers. The implications of such an action, while obvious, are often overlooked because of the pressure of staff constraints, the fact that the transport may require only a short

period of time, or that the situation otherwise did not warrant assigning both a male and female officer at the same time.

The male officer who permits a situation to develop in which he finds himself the only escort present during a female inmate transport is asking for trouble. It is conceivable, however, that circumstances might dictate such a situation and, if so, there are some steps that can be taken to minimize the possibility of a misconduct allegation being made by the inmate.

The exact time and precise location of the transport should be recorded. If a vehicle is being used, the exact mileage on the transport vehicle should be recorded at the time the transport begins and ends along with the total lapsed time consumed during the transport. The radio dispatcher should be notified of the time and given the nature of the transport; for example, the escort officer might tell the dispatcher upon beginning the transport, "Unit 42 taking one female prisoner to court, beginning at 27,501 miles on vehicle number 27. The time is 1303 hours." When the officer arrives at his destination, he should again call the radio dispatcher and provide his unit number, the number of miles on the vehicle's odometer, the exact time, and the fact that he is now taking the female inmate into the courthouse. Such data is verifiable and can be used to demonstrate the lack of a void in time and mileage during the transport process. Officers also should be aware that female inmates present *the same security risks* as males, and they should be restrained using the techniques mentioned earlier.

Prudence on the part of a male officer when transporting a female inmate, even when accompanied by a woman officer, is essential. Rough language, curt behavior, and brusque handling of the inmate could be the cause of an unpleasant incident. This is particularly important if the female inmate "makes a scene" or becomes unruly in front of civilians at the courthouse or hospital. The sympathy of the onlookers may be with the inmate at the outset or could be shifted to her if less than prudent constraint is shown by the male officer. His actions will be watched closely by the onlookers and could be misinterpreted as unprofessional; some of these onlookers could later accuse the male officer of official misconduct. Such "witnesses" are formidable in any legal or administrative proceedings that may stem from the "incident."

TRANSPORTING INMATES ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT

Officers who are required to transport an inmate by air should remember to comply with the special rules and procedures established by the Federal Aviation Administration, the airline on which the

officer and the inmate are flying, and the pilot. Federal rules are outlined in Part 121, Section 121-584 and 121-535 of the FAA regulations summarized below. These procedures supplement the rules for proper security in transporting an inmate, such as a thorough strip search of the person and his clothing before leaving the jail and making sure that all restraining devices used are in proper working order and have been placed on the inmate correctly.

The escort officer must notify the airline at least one hour before departure or, in case of an emergency, as soon as possible. The earlier in advance such notification can be made, the better. At this time the officer should ask for the airline's rules and procedures concerning the transporting of prisoners and the carrying of weapons on the aircraft. The officer must also tell airline officials the identity of the inmate and whether or not he is considered to be a maximum security risk.

If the inmate *is* a maximum security risk, he must be guarded on the plane by *two armed* escorting officers. These two officers can guard no more than one maximum security prisoner. If an inmate is not considered to be a maximum security risk, he may be guarded by one armed officer. In either case the officer must assure the airline that he has adequate restraining devices with him and that the inmate has been thoroughly searched.

The officer needs to arrive at the airport early, since each prisoner must be placed on the plane *before* all other passengers board. In most cases, airlines require the officer and the inmate to sit in the rear of the cabin, in the seat in front of the bulkhead.

Wherever the inmate sits, it should not be near a lounge area or next to or directly across from any exit door. The officer having control of the inmate must be seated between the inmate and the aisle. There are some problems involved in transporting an inmate in the commonly-used Boeing 727 aircraft, since there are a galley, restrooms, and an exit door in the rear of the plane; in 727's, the inmate and the officer should be seated on the left-hand side of the plane in front of the galley bulkhead. The importance of following proper seating guidelines can be illustrated by this recent example: In a large Eastern city a transporting officer violated seating procedures. This officer placed an inmate next to an exit door in the rear of a 727 and, before takeoff, he left the prisoner unattended while he engaged in some social conversation with a flight attendant who was storing meals in the galley across from his seat. While the officer's attention was diverted, the inmate forced open the exit door and escaped.

While in flight no food, beverage, or eating utensils should be given to the inmate unless approved by the escorting officer. Neither the inmate nor the officer should receive any kind of alcoholic beverage during the flight. If it is necessary for the inmate to move

through the plane while in flight, he must be escorted at all times by the officer. The officer should accompany the inmate to the restroom and station himself directly outside the door. Otherwise, the inmate may cause a disturbance, as the following example illustrates: An officer permitted an inmate to go to the restroom unescorted. On the way back, the inmate passed by the food service galley, grabbed a table knife, held it to the throat of a female flight attendant, and hijacked the plane.

Although there is no question that the escorting officer should be armed (if the prisoner is maximum security), the Federal Aviation Administration and airlines have many rules concerning the carrying of weapons in flight. There are forms to fill out and procedures to follow. In any close contact situation with an inmate, the officer's weapon should be concealed in a position where the inmate cannot easily grab it. A careless officer and an available weapon could lead to disaster.

Each time an inmate is transported by air, the pilot must be notified. If the officer complies with proper procedures, including proper advance notice to the airline, then airline personnel will make sure the pilot knows. Like the captain of a ship, a pilot is responsible for the safety of *all* persons on board his plane. In an emergency the officer may not have time to hold a conference with the pilot; however, he should try to talk with the pilot *before* taking any action which might endanger other passengers. All officers should be aware that discharging *any* firearm in a crowded, pressurized aircraft can be fatal to all on board.

Upon landing, the other passengers will get off the plane first. The officer should remain seated with his prisoner until he is actually ready to deplane. Presumably, the officer or his supervisor will have made arrangements in advance for him to be met at the plane. However, the officer should request and receive proper identification from anyone claiming to be a representative of any law enforcement agency.

In a crowded place, such as the terminal building, the officers should stay with the inmate at all times and not be distracted by any activity. One moment of carelessness on the officer's part is all that is needed for the inmate to disappear into the crowd and escape. The escorting job is not over until the inmate has been delivered and the officer has obtained a proper receipt from the receiving institution. *The inmate is the escort officer's responsibility every minute while in transit.*

In the event that a transporting officer has to wait at an airport enroute for a connecting flight, he should be aware that many airports in major metropolitan areas now have a small, secure detention facility. The officer may want to arrange for use of this lockup in advance by contacting the airport security office. However, when

picking a prisoner up at such a lockup, the transporting officer should thoroughly search him and check all restraining devices before leaving the area and continuing the trip.

Officers should remember that transporting inmates by air is a great responsibility with the safety of many people at stake. At all times, the officer should follow good inmate transport procedures and the special airline rules involving escorts.

Case Study 2:

Jail Officer Ted Baxter of the Big Sky County Sheriff's Department was assigned to transport inmate Wiley Coyote to Washington, D.C., and turn him over to the Metropolitan Police Department for trial on armed robbery and kidnapping charges. In return, the Metropolitan Police would hand over custody of Frank Nitti, who was wanted in Big Sky County for murder.

When the jet landed at Washington's National Airport, Officer Baxter was met at the arrival gate by two men in plainclothes who said they were Metropolitan Police Department detectives. They "flashed" shields at Officer Baxter and told him they were assigned to take inmate Coyote directly to the D.C. Jail.

"We've arranged a car for you," the men said. "Just go to the Airport Police office on the lower level of the terminal, and they'll give you the keys." The men then placed their own handcuffs on Coyote and started to walk off with him.

"Hey, wait a minute!" Officer Baxter hollered as he caught up with them. "What am I supposed to do about the prisoner I'm supposed to take back with me?"

"We don't know nothing about that," one of the men said. "Ask them at Airport Police--there's an envelope there for you with the keys." They hastily left and disappeared in the crowded terminal.

When Officer Baxter reported to the Airport Police office, the duty officer didn't know anything about car keys or an envelope for him. Neither did his lieutenant. However, Officer Baxter was soon paged and was asked to report to the Mountain Airlines reservation desk. When he arrived at the reservation desk, two uniformed police officers approached him and told him they were sent by the Metropolitan Police Department to pick up both Baxter and the prisoner. They produced their ID cards; their shields were clearly visible on their uniform shirts. The officers also produced a signed letter on D.C. Police stationery addressed to Officer Baxter and signed by the homicide lieutenant. The lieutenant stated that the two officers would escort Baxter directly to

the D.C. Jail to lock up Coyote and then to the Police Department Second District station for a meeting to discuss the transfer of custody process for Frank Nitti.

"But I already turned over the prisoner to two homicide detectives!" Officer Baxter told the uniformed men.

"You what?" one of the officers asked. "The lieutenant only sent us on this assignment--you must have given Coyote to a couple of his friends!"

The officers called the homicide lieutenant, who verified to Officer Baxter that the two uniformed men were the only officers assigned to pick up Coyote. Too late, Officer Baxter learned that he had indeed turned over a dangerous prisoner to men who were impersonating police officers.

Coyote was arrested six months later in California. Meanwhile, he and his accomplices had kidnapped and murdered the young son of a bank president.

This case study demonstrates the importance of being security conscious at *all* stages of a prisoner escort. In addition, it points out that officers *cannot assume* that anyone who meets them at an airport and claims to be a police officer *actually is an officer*. When he simply glanced at two shields that were "flashed" at him, Officer Baxter was negligent. He should have asked to see Metropolitan Police Department ID cards. If the plainclothes "officers" had produced ID cards and Officer Baxter *still* had doubts about their identity, then his best course of action would have been to take the prisoner to the Airport Police lockup and call local police officials to verify the identity of the officers. The Airport Police probably would have been willing to assist him with this task. If the officers assigned to pick up a prisoner at the airport really are officers, and not imposters, then they should not object to waiting while their identity is verified by phone calls. As Officer Baxter learned, it is best to be *overcautious*.

SUMMARY

1. Escort duty is dangerous and officers must be cautious.

The main objective of this chapter is to provide the jail officer with the proper knowledge and procedures for escort duty. Carelessness on the part of escort officers is the major cause for inmate escapes and subsequent injuries to and deaths of officers.

2. To prevent inmate escape attempts, officers must adhere to proper search and restraint procedures.

The escorting officer is legally responsible for the inmate. He, himself, must conduct a thorough strip search of the inmate before transport, check restraining devices, apply them properly, search transport vehicles, and carefully supervise the inmate at all times during the transport.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

HOSTAGE INCIDENTS IN THE JAIL



After a thorough search of the prison, activities began returning to normal Tuesday at the Maryland Correctional Institution.

Prison officials uncovered more than 40 weapons in a massive shakedown on Monday and Tuesday. But top officials are the first to concede that not all weapons were found, and more are being made.

"Every cell has the material and sharpening devices" to make a "shank," a handmade knife, said Les Stoner, MCI assistant superintendent. "You will never eliminate all of them."

The only way to keep inmates from getting weapons is to lock "them naked in cells with bare walls," he added.

The "shakedown" search was started Monday, partially because a guard was briefly held in a locked cell on Sunday by an inmate with a knife. The guard was freed within minutes without being injured.

The Morning Herald
Hagerstown, Md.
Wednesday, Dec. 5, 1979

Knives seized as contraband.

Hostage incidents are occurring more and more frequently in jails throughout the United States. Inmates who initiate these incidents think they need "bargaining power" if they want to escape, settle grievances with jail officials, or demonstrate to other inmates that

they can exert control in the jail. Occasionally, hostages are seized by an inmate who is mentally-ill or suicidal.

Sometimes it is the "element of chance" which determines whether or not a hostage incident will occur in a specific jail. "Chance" also plays a role in determining which officers and employees are seized as hostages. Most often, however, jail officers can prevent hostage incidents from developing. Effective security procedures, coupled with frequent shake-downs for weapons and contraband, can reduce opportunities for inmates to seize hostages. In addition, careful surveillance of inmates and frequent patrols of cell blocks and inmate work areas lessen the chances for a hostage incident to occur. If officers want to prevent these incidents, they must remove all opportunities for inmates to seize hostages and weapons.


In larger jails, hostage situations usually develop along with riots. However, in smaller jails (those holding fewer than 20 inmates), a hostage is more likely to be seized as part of an escape attempt.

Hostage incidents often occur spontaneously in jails because inmates are easily provoked. For example, Dr. Herbert Modlin, director of the law and psychiatry program at the Menninger Foundation in Topeka, Kansas, has characterized inmates as:

"by and large, people with short fuses, people with less control over their impulses. Under stress, they react physically, rather than thinking things over or forming a committee, as healthier people might do."

Anyone employed at a jail must *always* act professionally and avoid provoking inmate hostility, since such actions easily lead to violence. Unprofessional, provocative behavior on the part of officers includes brutality, rudeness, hostility, physical aggression, and insulting inmates (such as demeaning them, embarrassing them, or using ethnic or racial slurs). Before an officer acts unprofessionally, he might want to ask himself: "What kind of treatment could I expect from this inmate if he should ever hold me as a hostage? Do we respect each other? Or have I given him any unnecessary reason to hold a grudge against me?"

Because *any* jail officer could be taken hostage, it is necessary for *all* officers to be familiar with the hostage incident procedures and guidelines developed by the administrators of the jails where they are employed. This chapter provides *general guidelines* for the control and management of hostage situations; however, each sheriff or jail administrator must develop operational policies for his own jail.



The National Sheriffs' Association's Jail Audit System provides guidelines for formulating emergency plans in jail.

TYPICAL INMATE HOSTAGE-TAKERS

What types of inmates may be more likely to create a hostage situation? Is there a profile of a "typical" hostage-taker? While each jail is different and no two inmates are ever exactly alike, there are, however, a few attitudes or characteristics common among inmate hostage-takers.

One type of hostage-taker is the inmate who is fearful. He is usually young and is in jail for the first time. In addition to being afraid because he has been locked up, this inmate may also have that common human "fear of the unknown" or he may be afraid because he does not know what will happen to his family or friends while he is isolated from them. This type of inmate usually seizes a hostage in order to escape--he thinks jail officials will permit him to leave if he promises to free the hostage later.

Many inmate hostage-takers are emotionally unstable--they habitually resort to violence as a means of solving problems. For example, an inmate who had complained about the food he was served for dinner two nights in a row didn't like the menu on the third night either. He suddenly threw

down his tray, grabbed an officer, and held a fork to his throat. The inmate then requested that the jail administrator come to the dining room and tell the cook to prepare a better meal. He said that he would free the officer once he had "decent" food on his tray. This inmate thought that seizing an officer and holding him hostage was the only way he could convince jail officials to listen to his complaints. Inmates who are likely to react impulsively are those who have "quick tempers." Typically, they are in jail because they committed such offenses as aggravated assault, homicide, child or spouse abuse, or other crimes involving violence.

Some inmates who seize hostages are cell block "leaders" who have to maintain or expand their images as persons of power. They want to demonstrate that they fear no one, *especially* jail officials. Thus, they seize hostages to maintain or improve their status on the tier.

Another common type of inmate hostage-taker is the easily confused individual who may impulsively see hostage-taking as the magical means to his end, whatever that may be. The inmate who fits this profile dwells on his past mistakes. He begins stories with sentences like: "If only I had picked a smarter partner, I would have gotten away with that robbery" or "If only I could get out of here, everything would be better." He doesn't know what he wants nor does he know how to accomplish anything. However, once he has made a mistake, then he concentrates on trying to figure out what went wrong. Inmates who fit this profile also have a tendency to blame a mysterious group of people referred to as "they" for making things go wrong. "They" are never identified, but "they" are *always* plotting against the inmate. Seizing hostages may be a method for the inmate to outsmart or get revenge on "them."

Individual inmates who fit these profiles should be carefully observed by officers.

HOSTAGE SITUATIONS: BASIC PRINCIPLES

Because no two hostage situations are alike, there is no simple formula for officers to follow to bring a hostage incident in their jail under control.

Officers must be aware that a response technique which is applicable in one situation may actually be harmful in another, since there is a major difference in the types of hostage situations which occur in jails. Basically, the response depends upon the number of inmates who are participating in the hostage incident.

When one or a very few inmates have taken hostages, then the best approach for officers *usually* is to wait and negotiate. This approach is the one favored by most police agencies. However, when several inmates are involved, it may be more advantageous for jail personnel to *immediately* attempt to free the hostages. This situation generally occurs in large county or city jails in connection with riots. With a tactical response there may be casualties, but there will probably be fewer than could be expected if officers had waited long enough for the inmate hostage-takers to organize themselves efficiently. Jail officials who advocate an immediate tactical response argue that inmates usually are not organized when the takeover begins. By waiting, jail personnel provide inmates with enough time to consolidate their control and select a leader, which makes the inmate group a more structured and powerful force. Furthermore, the peer pressures that exist and grow in such an inmate group can be detrimental to negotiation efforts aimed at peacefully resolving the situation.

The general rule advocated by most jail administrators is: unless there is an imminent threat that inmates will begin killing jail employees who have been seized as hostages, it is best to wait and negotiate. Otherwise, an immediate tactical response could result in the deaths of the hostages. If a hasty tactical response fails to free the hostages, then the inmates may become so angry that they kill a hostage in revenge.

It is relatively safe to assume that hostage situations in *most* county jails would be negotiable. Of the 4,000 or so county jails in the United States, more than 3,000 have a *maximum* average population that does not exceed 20 inmates at a time. In addition, the one to 20 inmates in these smaller jails generally have a lot to lose if they become involved in hostage incidents which involve violence; their sentences in jails are usually short in terms of the amount of time to be served--if they were to injure hostages, they could expect to look forward to lengthy prison sentences once the incident has been resolved. They might also anticipate that they could be killed if jail officers use force to free the hostages.

It is also unlikely that officers in the smaller jails will face a hostage situation arising from a riot. Inmates in these jails often have not had enough time to develop effective relationships with other inmates. For a hostage incident to occur which involves several inmates, the inmates usually have to know and trust each other to some extent.

Officers should always remember that *most* hostages are not taken to be killed. Instead, they are just a means to help the hostage-taker attain his ends; they are "tools" to be used. Consequently, officers should not take any actions that will make the hostage-taker feel *forced* to injure or kill a hostage. Officers must exercise *complete* and *absolute* self-control, especially with regard to firearms, throughout the hostage-taking episode--even if it lasts for days.

A second and perhaps more important point to remember is that the safety of the hostages is the primary concern of everyone. Since human life is the only element in a hostage situation that can never be replaced, great care must be exercised in preserving it.

Officers patrolling the cell areas should always remain alert to contagion factors which may spark a hostage-taking incident in their jail. What this means is that occasionally a well publicized hostage/riot situation in one part of the country will spark an imitation somewhere else, especially if the offenders in the publicized case achieved some success in attaining their goals. Therefore, if recent news reports mention a hostage situation anywhere else, especially in a jail, *all* officers should be increasingly aware of the possibility that a similar event may occur in their own jail. Once the inmates hear about a hostage-taking incident, then there is a possibility that they, too, may decide to seize hostages, particularly if the overall atmosphere in the jail has been tense.

From experience with hostage-taking situations in jails throughout the nation, it is possible to make some *generalizations* about the nature of these incidents:

1. Hostage situations arising from attempted escapes are more likely to have been planned and organized than are those in riot situations.
2. Officers should be aware that emotions in a hostage situation will run high. An officer will have to be in complete control of himself and any weapons he may possess at all times, especially if one or two of the hostages are his close friends.
3. The possibility exists that a hostage may be held *outside* of the institution. This could include an employee's spouse or child.
4. The greater the number of inmate captors and hostages involved, the more alert and prepared everyone should be for any of them to make desperate moves, which may or may not be harmful in themselves.
5. Officers should understand in *most* negotiable situations, as time goes on the hostages will normally become increasingly safer in their situation. This is due to the fact that inmate captors and hostages become more relaxed after initial emotions subside, and they begin to take a more practical and calm view of their situation. Transference, a situation in which the hostages and their captors begin to sympathize with each other, often begins to take effect quite soon, and continues to grow throughout the ordeal. This process makes the captors more comfortable with the hostages. Therefore, they are less likely to harm the hostages.

While officers themselves generally will not be placed in command of a hostage-taking incident, it is important for them to understand the planning and procedural steps necessary to resolve these incidents. The role assumed by officers usually will be to guard perimeters. Officers may also be selected to serve on a hostage incident response team, either as negotiators or as members of a special weapons and tactical unit (SWAT). *All* team members, including negotiators, should receive specialized in-service training to prepare them for their roles.

A sheriff or jail administrator who expects to cope effectively with a hostage-taking incident should develop a plan which includes the following components:

1. Legal Needs and Responsibilities: The local state's attorney should have some involvement in the planning process. His assistance can:
 - a. Help ensure the protection of the rights of the hostages and the captors through all stages of the operation.
 - b. Enhance the possibility of a successful prosecution of the inmate captor when he goes to trial.
 - c. Help protect officers and the jail against making errors which could leave them vulnerable to lawsuits.
 - d. Provide advice about local laws concerning eavesdropping techniques which may be useful during a hostage situation. Even if the information obtained by using listening devices is not admissible in court, he can provide advice about the legality of using such devices to gather intelligence for use by the response team during the negotiation process.
2. Assessing the Jail's Characteristics: Local characteristics are a key factor to be considered in tailoring a plan to meet the needs of a specific jail. For example, the administrator will need to consider:
 - a. The size of the jail and staff.
 - b. Political problems.
 - c. Who can be relied on for emergency assistance? And for what types of assistance?
 - d. How are the inmates classified and assigned?
 - e. What kind of response can be expected from the local media and what type of relationship exists with them?
3. Determining the Jail's Policy: This is the core of the entire planning process. The policy reflects the concerns and legal

considerations of the local administrators. It identifies the course of action to be taken in a typical hostage situation by jail personnel. It may specify, for example, that any employee who is taken hostage, regardless of his rank or status, is automatically relieved of all authority and decision-making responsibilities. It may further state the limits of any relationships with an inmate hostage-taker. For example, he will not be allowed to escape under any circumstances, even if he threatens to kill the hostage.

4. Clarifying the Jail's Goals: This section of the plan should identify the jail's greatest concerns if a hostage situation develops. These should be ranked in order of their importance and could include, but are not limited to:
 - a. The preservation of the lives of the hostages, staff, bystanders, the captors, and others.
 - b. Maintaining the security of the jail.
 - c. Resolving the situation as non-violently and as quickly as possible.
 - d. Maintaining absolute and complete control of the situation by establishing and controlling perimeters to keep out all persons not having a specific duty related to the effective solution of the hostage incident.
5. Outlining the Jail's Priorities: The administrators who develop the hostage incident response plan should list the primary and secondary objective to be sought by jail personnel following the taking of a hostage. As with the rest of the plan, these items should be in writing so that support staff can refer to the written plan and begin their activities quickly. This will limit their need to ask questions of other individuals on the scene, who need to concentrate on their own critical responsibilities. Typical matters covered may include, but are not limited to:
 - a. Telephone security.
 - b. The possible use of electronic sensing devices, such as smoke alarms, long range microphones, and infra-red viewers.
 - c. Deciding how to best alert the fire department if their services are needed.
 - d. Development of a procedure to evacuate the visiting room quickly and safely.
 - e. Development of a system to notify local utility companies that it may be necessary to disrupt regular service during the hostage incident.

- f. Deciding where and how floodlights can be installed, if necessary.
 - g. Deciding how many off-duty staff members would have to be called in and how quickly.
 - h. Medical preparations.
 - i. Identifying any elevators that would need to be secured, and who would have the responsibility to secure them.
 - j. Making a photo/slide file of the entire facility, inmate population, and staff and keeping it up-to-date so that visual aids of the hostage area and the hostages and captors will be available later to help in discussions and on-site plan modifications.
 - k. The use of protective vests should be considered.
6. Developing a Logistical Plan: Certain physical needs must be anticipated in this process. Where will the control center be located? Is that the best location? Why? Why not?
 7. Deciding How Authority Should Be Delegated: The chain-of-command has to be specific. Duties and responsibilities must be clearly defined for everyone. These include the chief administration officer, the control officer, the negotiators, and all officers on duty or called in during the emergency. Alternate staff members should be assigned as back-ups to key members of a response team. A list of the home phone numbers of all personnel should be kept up-to-date and stored in the hostage incident response plan file.
 8. Deciding Which Items Are Non-Negotiable: Most police agencies consider two special items as non-negotiable. These are:
 - a. Weapons--to furnish weapons to an inmate hostage-taker can never serve any constructive purpose. They can further endanger the safety of the hostages as well as every person in the area. Further damage to the facility could result as well.
 - b. Trading hostages--when new hostages enter the captor's control, his tension level increases. All of the transference which had already developed between the captor and the previous hostages is dissolved, forcing the captor to begin a new relationship with the hostage-replacement. His anxiety level increases as he is forced to develop transference with the new hostage.

Since the typical inmate hostage-taker is already under arrest and in many cases convicted, a third non-negotiable item could be added: freedom. In the majority of instances, jail officials may not have the legal authority to grant freedom in any case. Additional items which the inmate hostage-taker may wish to control or negotiate, and on which jail officials may refuse to negotiate, include:

- a. Transportation--since this is probably viewed as a potential means of escape by the captor, it can serve no useful purpose in safely terminating the hostage incident.



The presence of audio/visual equipment could serve as a deterrent in the event that the inmate wants to harm the hostages.

- b. Drugs and alcohol--the potential for abuse and additional demands for more drugs and alcohol is real.
- c. Request for his own negotiator from the outside--in most cases, it is unwise for the jail negotiator to yield his control of the situation to any outsider who may lack the necessary knowledge or desire to cooperate with the response team. To let an untrained, partisan person into the negotiation process could seriously complicate things. Jail officials should be aware that such a request could be a ploy of the inmate to get a hated wife or other individual to the scene so that he has an opportunity to carry out an act of violence against them.
- d. Audio-visual documentation--since the successful prosecution of the hostage-taker could depend upon pictures, films, and tapes that officers make during the incident, jail officials should be reluctant to agree to stop making these records. The presence of audio-visual equipment could serve as a deterrent in the event that the inmate wants to harm the hostages.

9. Deciding How to Release Information to Employees' Next-of-Kin: A system should be developed during the planning stages to inform staff members' families when a hostage incident occurs. It is especially important that these notifications be made before word of the hostage-situation has entered the community grapevine or been released to the media. Families of staff members on duty who were *not* taken hostage should also be notified in order to relieve them of unnecessary worry about the safety of their family member at the jail. Officers should instruct their family members not to phone the jail during an incident, since this would tie up phone lines.
10. Deciding How to Handle the Media: The media has a responsibility to deliver the news. Since they normally consider any hostage situation to be newsworthy, their presence can always be expected. To refuse them access to information on the situation will normally antagonize them. It is wise and helpful for jail officials to establish rapport with local media officials during the hostage incident planning process. Although the plan itself should remain a confidential document, jail officials should let members of the media know what they can expect from jail personnel during such an incident. Until the hostages are all free, it will be necessary to enlist the media's support in maintaining silence about behind-the-scenes activities and intelligence. Reporters usually can be expected to respect such a request, especially when they are aware of the possible consequences for the hostages.

The release of information to the media should be handled by a supervisor. Officers should not, under any circumstances, discuss the incident in progress with the media, unless they are asked to discuss specific aspects of it by a supervisor. When developing a plan for a hostage-taking incident, jail officials should also consider issuing standardized media credentials to media representatives who are normally assigned to cover jail stories, or who could be expected to do so during a crisis. Officers on perimeter duty during an incident should be aware that it is not impossible for a hostage-taker's outside co-conspirator to arrive on the scene posing as a media representative in order to carry out a possible second stage to the escape/hostage operation.

Case Study 1:

On Thanksgiving Day 14 inmates at the Big Sky County Jail, who were watching a football game on TV in the jail dining room, seized four officers as hostages. There were 22 other inmates in the dining room, who were eventually allowed to return to their cells since they did not want to participate in the hostage incident.

Captain Milo Standish, who was commanding the hostage incident response team, allowed his next-door neighbor, reporter John Alden of KRUM-TV and radio in Thundercloud City, to be with him in the control room so that Alden would be able to provide a first hand account of the incident on the evening news.

The negotiations had been in progress for several hours, and the inmates had asked that sandwiches and coffee be provided to them, since the jail kitchen had been secured immediately after the incident, and the inmates did not have access to food. Their only weapons were table knives, homemade "shanks," and forks.

Captain Standish agreed to send an officer into the dining room with food. However, he had "laced" the sandwiches with sleeping pill powder, hoping that this would knock out the hostage-takers and thus permit him to end the incident.

While he was supervising preparations for the food delivery, Captain Standish did not pay any attention to reporter Alden, who was sitting in a corner of the control room talking on the phone to the news director at KRUM-TV, which was broadcasting its evening news report.

The football game had been broadcast on KRUM, and the inmate hostage-takers had left the TV in the dining room turned on. Just as the officer carrying the sandwiches and coffee entered the dining room, the inmates heard on TV:

"And now, we bring you live from the command center at the jail, via a phone hookup, our reporter, John Alden, who has been observing the moves being made to free the hostages. John, tell us what's happening at the jail now."

"Well," Alden responded, "we're about to see a quick end to this tragic incident. Captain Milo Standish, who is commanding the rescue operations, has just sent the inmate hostage-takers sandwiches and coffee laced with sleeping pills. He expects the pills to take effect in the next 15 minutes and then he can go into the dining room to rescue the hostages...we'll be bringing you an on-the-scene report as soon as the hostages are brought out."

When the inmates heard that, they grabbed the officer who had brought in the sandwiches and poured the hot coffee on him, severely burning him. Then they kicked and stomped him until he died. They opened the door and threw the officer's body out into the corridor.

Once this had happened, Captain Standish decided that he had to end the incident immediately by using force. An officer-hostage and three inmates were killed when the jail's SWAT unit stormed the dining room after shooting in tear gas grenades. The officer-hostage, whose uniform had been removed from him by the inmates, was killed by bullets fired by his fellow officers; he was being used as a shield by one of the inmates.

This case study points out the importance of developing an effective plan to control the release of information to the media during a hostage incident. Officers on duty in the control room were too busy to pay attention to a reporter who should not have been allowed in there in the first place. Officers should always be aware that media personnel may not realize that they could jeopardize tactical operations by making careless statements, as reporter Alden did. To prevent such situations from occurring, officers should never discuss tactical movements in the presence of media representatives or other civilians.

VOLUNTEERING FOR RESPONSE TEAMS

Officers may take a direct role in resolving a hostage-taking incident by volunteering beforehand to serve as a member of the jail's trained incident response team, either as a negotiator or as a weapons/tactical specialist. All response team members should be volunteers who have received extensive in-service training in hostage incident response procedures. Other officers on duty when a hostage incident occurs will serve as perimeter guards or will be directed to control inmates who are not participating in the incident.

The Negotiator

As a member of the response team, the negotiator is the most visible and important participant in the negotiation process. An officer who wants to volunteer for this assignment should receive specialized training in hostage negotiation procedures and should meet the following qualifications:

1. He should have a demonstrated ability to think clearly under excessive stress. His voice should be natural and clear.
2. It is imperative that he be a good and mature listener. Individuals with a background as either an investigator or interviewer are generally good listeners, since they have already developed this skill.
3. If the jail frequently houses Spanish-speaking inmates, the officer ought to be fluent in the Spanish language.
4. He must be able to divorce himself from any emotional attachment to the hostages. He should be able to unemotionally accept all types of verbal abuse from inmate hostage-takers and their sympathizers.
5. He should have no desire to exercise command authority on the scene. If he does have any authority to exercise command and the inmate hostage-taker knows it, it can render useless some of the negotiation techniques available to the officer. To lie to the inmate about the negotiator's level of command could seriously hamper any negotiations, since trust is a key ingredient in the negotiations.
6. Women officers should consider volunteering for this assignment since they can work as very effective negotiators. Studies have confirmed that women exceed the ability of men to observe and empathize. Also, women officers are less threatening and seem to get along better with male hostage-takers.
7. The negotiator should be extremely capable of seeing things from another person's point of view, such as the hostage-taker's.
8. He should sincerely believe that negotiating is the best solution to a hostage situation.

Special Weapons And Tactics Team Members

Officers with special skills in handling weapons may want to volunteer to serve on a tactical response team. The special weapons and tactics unit assists in all technical aspects of the rescue operation and, as a last resort, forcefully rescues the hostages.

An officer who is a demolition expert could serve as a valuable member of the team, since his skills could be used in the event that rapid entry is necessary to free the hostages. In addition, he can be of assistance in recognizing and neutralizing booby traps. He can also give advice about other potential dangers to be considered, such as molotov cocktails which may have been prepared by inmate hostage-takers to be hurled at any assault force members or to set diversionary fires in the jail.

Other officer volunteers should be skilled at the use of tear gas, firearms, and communications equipment.

SECURITY WHILE A HOSTAGE INCIDENT IS IN PROGRESS

Once an officer has determined that a hostage has been taken, he should contact the shift supervisor *immediately*. The supervisor will contact administrative officials, hostage incident response team personnel, and any additional personnel who need to be called back to duty.

It will be necessary for the shift supervisor to define the problem as quickly as possible so that the proper response plan can be implemented. He should determine if this incident is due to an escape attempt, a grievance, a mentally-ill inmate acting out, or some other motive. If the inmate hostage-taker is mentally ill, officers on duty should understand that the problem may be considerably more complex to resolve.

The shift supervisor should immediately direct a sufficient number of officers to seal off and secure the hostage area by establishing an adequate inner perimeter around the scene. This will limit the size of the area available to the hostage-takers and enable officers to establish surveillance positions as close to the hostages as possible. The officer who assumes control of the incident should be solely responsible for deciding who is to enter this perimeter. In addition, he should take steps to limit the hostage-taker's view of the situation. Pulling shades, closing doors, and moving vehicles into his line of vision will help to serve this purpose and increase his dependency upon the negotiator.

An outer perimeter should also be established to exclude all persons whose presence is not specifically called for by either the jail's hostage incident plan or the officer in command. This will enable the supervising officer to maintain a clear and sterile area where negotiations can be conducted without interruptions or distractions.

Control of the inner and outer perimeters is vitally necessary and must not be compromised. Officers assigned to perimeter duty should remain alert at all times. If the hostage incident is part of an escape attempt, officers on perimeter duty should be aware that accomplices of the inmates may try to enter the jail premises and are likely to be armed. They may also have escape vehicles waiting near the jail.

Firearms Discipline

Firearms discipline is extremely critical throughout a hostage situation and must be absolutely and strictly controlled. A single gunshot could panic the hostage-taker or the hostages and lead either or both of them to do something harmful to themselves or others.

Furthermore, gunfire will undermine the negotiator's attempts at a peaceful solution, thereby reducing the chances for the safe release of the hostages. The first concern here must be the preservation of human life. No officer should fire a gun unless he is ordered to do so by the supervisor in command of the hostage incident. In a hostage situation there is no place for individual "heroes" who want to act *independently*--all officers must follow orders issued by the commander, or the hostages may be killed.

Incidents have occurred where *hostages* have been shot by their fellow officers while their inmate captors were uninjured. In one instance in a Canadian institution, a hostage was shot by the assault team shortly after he had overpowered his inmate captor. The assault team officers were confused because they had assumed that the captor had maintained control of his own situation.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Hank Hughes, while meeting with his attorney in a second floor interview room at the Rattlesnake County Jail, suddenly pulled a knife from beneath his shirt and took the lawyer hostage. Hughes was able to watch tactical officers move into position outside the wing of the jail where he was holding the hostage. He didn't trust the officer who was negotiating with him and felt that if he tried to leave to get to the car the negotiator promised him, the tactical officers would attempt to shoot him. Hughes made the lawyer undress and put on his jail uniform and then step in front of the window that was under surveillance by the tactical team. He wanted to test the firearms discipline of the officers. Contrary to orders not to fire, an eager marksman fell for the trick and shot the hostage through the head, killing him instantly. Inmate Hughes then surrendered to the officers outside the interview room.

This case study demonstrates how imperative it is for officers to maintain absolute firearms discipline *without exception*. Officers should not fire their weapons unless they are given a specific order to do so by the commander of the response team.

Supervising Non-Participating Inmates

All inmates who are *not* participating in the hostage-taking incident should be evacuated from the immediate area. They should be secured and supervised in a locked area such as a cell block, dormitory, or work area. This should be done as quickly as possible in order to limit opportunities for any of these inmates to join the hostage incident or initiate a second confrontation.

Then, as soon as possible, officers should count and identify all secured inmates. This will tell officers exactly which inmates may be missing or involved in the hostage situation.

Procedures for serving scheduled meals to non-participating inmates should be as orderly as possible. The only difference is that these inmates will receive their meals in the secured area until the hostage situation is over and they can be returned to a normal routine.

HOW TO BE A HOSTAGE

Jail personnel are highly vulnerable to being taken hostage since the inmates confined in jails are, as a group, volatile, angry, impulsive, and emotionally unstable. If taken hostage, there are a number of guidelines an officer can follow which *may* save lives, avoid serious injury, and hasten release from captivity.

The hostage should not make his presence too obvious. In other words, keep a low profile. The hostage should not interfere with discussions being held between his captors. Instead, he should give them the impression that he is not interested. However, he should be aware of what is taking place.

The hostage should make an attempt to appear to avoid witnessing inmate crimes during a riot. He should keep his face down and, if possible, appear to look away. During a jail riot, many inmates wear masks to avoid being recognized. In the event a hostage recognizes inmates who are committing specific crimes, such as assaults on other inmates or hostages, then he becomes a potential danger to his captors. The captors may wish to eliminate a witness to their new criminal offenses--offenses which might bring long prison sentences.

Control of the inner and outer perimeters is vitally necessary and must not be compromised. Officers assigned to perimeter duty should remain alert at all times. If the hostage incident is part of an escape attempt, officers on perimeter duty should be aware that accomplices of the inmates may try to enter the jail premises and are likely to be armed. They may also have escape vehicles waiting near the jail.

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Firearms discipline is extremely critical throughout a hostage situation and must be absolutely and strictly controlled. A single gunshot could panic the hostage-taker or the hostages and lead either or both of them to do something harmful to themselves or others.

Furthermore, gunfire will undermine the negotiator's attempts at a peaceful solution, thereby reducing the chances for the safe release of the hostages. The first concern here must be the preservation of human life. No officer should fire a gun unless he is ordered to do so by the supervisor in command of the hostage incident. In a hostage situation there is no place for individual "heroes" who want to act *independently*--all officers must follow orders issued by the commander, or the hostages may be killed.

Incidents have occurred where *hostages* have been shot by their fellow officers while their inmate captors were uninjured. In one instance in a Canadian institution, a hostage was shot by the assault team shortly after he had overpowered his inmate captor. The assault team officers were confused because they had assumed that the captor had maintained control of his own situation.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Hank Hughes, while meeting with his attorney in a second floor interview room at the Rattlesnake County Jail, suddenly pulled a knife from beneath his shirt and took the lawyer hostage. Hughes was able to watch tactical officers move into position outside the wing of the jail where he was holding the hostage. He didn't trust the officer who was negotiating with him and felt that if he tried to leave to get to the car the negotiator promised him, the tactical officers would attempt to shoot him. Hughes made the lawyer undress and put on his jail uniform and then step in front of the window that was under surveillance by the tactical team. He wanted to test the firearms discipline of the officers. Contrary to orders not to fire, an eager marksman fell for the trick and shot the hostage through the head, killing him instantly. Inmate Hughes then surrendered to the officers outside the interview room.

This case study demonstrates how imperative it is for officers to maintain absolute firearms discipline *without exception*. Officers should not fire their weapons unless they are given a specific order to do so by the commander of the response team.

Supervising Non-Participating Inmates

All inmates who are *not* participating in the hostage-taking incident should be evacuated from the immediate area. They should be secured and supervised in a locked area such as a cell block, dormitory, or work area. This should be done as quickly as possible in order to limit opportunities for any of these inmates to join the hostage incident or initiate a second confrontation.

Then, as soon as possible, officers should count and identify all secured inmates. This will tell officers exactly which inmates may be missing or involved in the hostage situation.

Procedures for serving scheduled meals to non-participating inmates should be as orderly as possible. The only difference is that these inmates will receive their meals in the secured area until the hostage situation is over and they can be returned to a normal routine.

HOW TO BE A HOSTAGE

Jail personnel are highly vulnerable to being taken hostage since the inmates confined in jails are, as a group, volatile, angry, impulsive, and emotionally unstable. If taken hostage, there are a number of guidelines an officer can follow which *may* save lives, avoid serious injury, and hasten release from captivity.

The hostage should not make his presence too obvious. In other words, keep a low profile. The hostage should not interfere with discussions being held between his captors. Instead, he should give them the impression that he is not interested. However, he should be aware of what is taking place.

The hostage should make an attempt to appear to avoid witnessing inmate crimes during a riot. He should keep his face down and, if possible, appear to look away. During a jail riot, many inmates wear masks to avoid being recognized. In the event a hostage recognizes inmates who are committing specific crimes, such as assaults on other inmates or hostages, then he becomes a potential danger to his captors. The captors may wish to eliminate a witness to their new criminal offenses--offenses which might bring long prison sentences.

The hostage should prepare himself to control his own terror during his period of incarceration. Prolonged fear can cause him to function inadequately or unwisely when he must. Consequently, when isolated or left alone, the hostage must try to think of pleasant, gratifying thoughts about other aspects of his life. The hostage should stimulate his own fantasies of other pleasant events in an effort to consciously deny the emotions and experiences in which he is involved. Of course, he must realistically recognize the threats and fears present, but temporary escape from the strain of being a hostage can be helpful.

The hostage should appear to be unfrightened and should not panic. To do so allows the inmates to play upon such emotions and may lead them to taunt their captive and perhaps inflict physical injury upon him.

If asked, hostages should give up their possessions, such as their watch, wallet, lighters and cigarettes. If possible, the hostage should not give up personal items such as shirts, name tags, or pants unless he must. To give up pocket items does not aid the captor and does not affect the emotional state of the hostage. However, the possession of an officer's uniform shirt by a hostage-taker can be used as a threat against both the hostage and jail officials during negotiations. In past incidents, name tags and shirts have been used by inmates to make threats, such as, "the former possessor of this shirt will be the first to die." Also, the giving up of clothing can be dangerous. If the hostage area must be retaken by force, the tactical team officers may have difficulty differentiating between the hostages and the inmates. At such times, proper identity is imperative.

Where possible, allow the hostage takers to talk. When engaged in conversation with the hostage-taker, the hostage should say as little as possible about his situation. The hostage should not interfere or create additional anger or anxiety but, when possible, he should encourage the hostage-holders to be more reasonable. For example, during a riot the inmates requested the governor's presence, claiming he would be the only person with whom they would negotiate. The hostage pointed out to the inmates that the governor was not in the state at the time and that his policy was not to participate in any jail riot hostage negotiations. The inmates became convinced that the hostage was telling the truth and agreed to accept another negotiator. In another situation, a hostage discouraged rioters from tearing a telephone from the wall in the cell block they were holding by pointing out that the telephone was their only means of communication with jail authorities.

If possible, the hostage should exert his influence in an effort to modify hostage conditions. He might bargain for the release of hostages who are ill or potentially ill, calm down excited inmates, and generally exert as positive an attitude as possible.

In some riots, each hostage has an "executioner" assigned to him, usually sitting in the same cell. The hostage might provide an opportunity for his captor to ventilate many of his angry feelings. Of course, the hostage should not challenge what is said by the inmates but, rather, should attempt to prolong talk as long as possible.

The hostage should not refer to his captors by name, unless their faces are uncovered. Even if the inmates are not committing additional crimes, the fact that they are masked suggests that they do not wish their identity revealed or remembered. A hostage who uses an inmate's name can antagonize him and stimulate violence.

Often, the hostage serves as the intermediary between the rioters and jail officials. When cast in such a role, the hostage should readily transmit messages without editing them. Before a message is transmitted, the hostage should make sure the various inmate factions, if they do exist, agree to the contents of such communications. Not to do so will antagonize some of the inmate captors, will cause confusion among the inmates, and may inhibit the negotiations for the release of the hostages. The hostage may then be placing himself between differing groups, creating antagonism toward himself. There is a great potential for violence in this type of situation.

The hostage should encourage his captors to inform the authorities that he is being held and, if possible, tell them where he is being held. This might initiate negotiations. The hostage should not volunteer to communicate with such authorities himself because he may raise the inmate's level of expectation regarding the satisfaction of their demands. If these expectations are not met, then the hostage-holders may become angry and move toward a more violent position.

A great deal has been written and televised regarding hostages identifying with their captors and uniting with their cause against society or authorities. In the experience of jail officer hostages, this phenomenon rarely occurs. If taken hostage, an officer should not be concerned that such a phenomenon will occur. A hostage should act neutral, without verbally or emotionally joining the inmate cause.

While being held hostage, the officer should think about an escape route in the event that this may be the only way he can achieve safety. When corrections personnel retake a cell block held by inmates, the action usually ends in a matter of minutes. The hostage must plan to defend himself for five or 10 minutes until help arrives. Sometimes this can be done by planning to place a cabinet or a bed between himself and the hostage-takers, or by seeking a place where he can run and hide for the brief period of time. If particular sympathetic inmates are well known to the hostage, these inmates might be counted on to protect the hostage. However, extreme caution and judgment should be used before relying upon inmates for assistance during a riot or hostage-taking incident.

Without being conspicuous, hostages should attempt to remember the inmate leaders, agitators, and other inmates who are actively involved in the incident or riot so that they may be identified later. The hostage should try to remember specific acts of violence and other experiences he witnessed. In the event the inmates are brought to trial, the hostage can testify about his experiences and observations with greater certainty and accuracy. As soon as he is rescued, he should prepare detailed written reports.

These guidelines will not guarantee a hostage's safety, but should significantly improve his chances to escape serious injury and survive the experience.

Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance



SUMMARY

1. Hostage incidents can occur in every jail, from the largest to the smallest; effective procedures, coupled with frequent shake-downs for weapons and contraband, can reduce opportunities for inmates to seize hostages.

If officers want to prevent hostage incidents from occurring, they must remove all opportunities for inmates to seize hostages and weapons. There must be careful surveillance of inmates and frequent patrols of inmate cell blocks and work areas. Anyone employed at a jail must always act professionally and avoid provoking inmate hostility, since such actions often lead to violence. Once a hostage-taking incident has occurred, the best procedure, in most cases, is to wait and negotiate. Officers who volunteer for a hostage incident response team must be provided with extensive in-service training so that they know how to resolve the incident without jeopardizing the lives of the hostages, themselves and, if possible, the inmate hostage-takers.

2. Since every officer who works in a jail is highly vulnerable to being taken hostage by inmates, officers should know how to react properly if they find themselves in this situation.

The officer-hostage should keep a low profile and should try to appear to be unaware of inmate crimes if a riot is occurring in conjunction with the hostage incident. He should prepare himself to control his own terror during his period of incarceration and should not panic. If asked, the officer-hostage should give up his personal possessions but should attempt to keep his uniform clothes. When possible, he should allow the hostage-takers to talk. If the hostage-takers ask him to transmit messages, he should do so without editing them. The officer-hostage should encourage his captors to inform the authorities that he is being held and, if possible, tell them where he is being held. He should act neutral, without verbally or emotionally joining the inmate cause. While being held hostage, the officer should think about an escape route. Without being conspicuous, the officer-hostage should attempt to remember the inmate leaders, agitators, and other inmates who are actively involved in the incident so that they may be identified later.

GLOSSARY

- CAPTOR - An individual who holds another person against his own will.
- CONTROL CENTER - The headquarters for the entire hostage negotiation operation, as well as any subsequent assault and investigation.
- CONTROL OFFICER - The specialized commanding officer responsible for directing the operation of the hostage negotiation effort and all supportive activities. He makes all major decisions.
- CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER - The on-scene commander-in-chief who serves in an advisory capacity. He may be the sheriff, jail administrator, or other high-ranking official.
- HOSTAGE - Any person held captive by an individual or a group of individuals as a means of collateral or insurance that another party (e.g., authorities) will perform certain actions.
- HOSTAGE PLAN - That plan which describes in detail how jail authorities will prepare for and respond to a hostage-taking situation.
- NEGOTIATOR - That officially authorized individual who is in direct and personal contact with the captor(s), and whose responsibility is to bring about a realistic settlement to the complaints and/or demands of the captor(s), at no expense to the safety of the hostage(s) or any other persons.
- PERIMETER, INNER - the immediate area of containment. Entry is usually limited to the negotiator.
- PERIMETER, OUTER OR SECONDARY - The invisible line that is completely out of view of, and surrounds, the hostage scene, while serving as a barrier to all individuals not specifically authorized to enter the area by either the hostage plan or the control officer.
- RESPONSE TEAM - That group of individuals specially trained or otherwise prepared to respond to emergency situations such as a hostage takeover. This team is headed by the control officer, and includes the negotiator(s) and all members of the special weapons and tactics unit.

SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS UNIT - That group of individuals possessing special technical skills which are supportive of the negotiation operation, and who are most qualified to effect the rescue of the hostage(s) in the event that negotiations fail.

TRANSFERENCE - The transferring of emotions and attitudes from one person to another. When this occurs between captor and hostage, they become less hostile to each other, more similar in thinking, more friendly to each other, and consequently the captor becomes less likely to injure the hostage.

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
CHAPTER SIXTEEN

RELEASE PROCEDURES

An inmate being processed for release from the jail must undergo the same kind of scrutiny given to a person during the admissions process. The jail officer cannot afford to let his guard down. Processing an inmate for discharge is one of the most critical assignments in the jail, since several mistakes can be made if officers are not cautious. For example, there is a possibility that the officer could release the *wrong* person or that he could release the right person prior to his correct release date. In addition, if proper procedures are not followed, officers could mistakenly release an inmate who is wanted by another agency or turn an inmate over to an unauthorized person operating under false pretenses.

TYPES OF DISCHARGE

Inmates are lawfully released from jail in a variety of ways and under many different circumstances. Release can occur prior to trial, after the inmate has served all or part of his sentence, or for a specific purpose, such as transfer to another institution or participation in a work release program.



Release Of Unsentenced Inmates

Individuals who have been charged with a crime are often held in jail until trial and are referred to as "pre-trial detainees." The three main types of release possibilities for pre-trial detainees are bail, bond, and personal recognizance, which are determined by the court.

Bail. Bail is a specific amount of cash that must be posted before the inmate can be released. The amount usually is set by the court. When the money is posted, the inmate is free to leave pending trial. While the jail may accept the money, it is usually turned over to the clerk of courts, who holds it as security for the individual's appearance at the trial.

Bail can be, and frequently is, modified by court action. For example, the inmate or his attorney may petition for reduction of bail. A common form of modification is for the court to allow the posting of 10 percent of the original amount in the case, with the remaining amount to be covered by sureties.

Another form of bail modification which is having increased use occurs when a court orders a bail of cash or sureties, or a combination of both, along with the provision that the individual will be given work release privileges if the amount is posted. Or the court may make work release a condition of bail. In such a case, the individual is allowed work release privileges until bail has been posted; when the bail has been posted, the inmate is freed.

It is always important to understand exactly what the provisions of release are, according to the wishes of the court. If a jail officer is unsure about the provisions, he should call the court and get a clarification.

Bond. The court may allow posting of a bond or securities. This means that the detainee may be released upon the written pledge of a bonding company through an agent of the company who is called a "bail bondsman." The individual is released essentially into the custody of the bail bondsman. Posting of such a written guaranty is actually a form of bail, but it is useful to distinguish such a *promise* of payment from actual payment of cash, which is the most common form of bail.

It is important to be sure that the company issuing the bond is authorized to do business in the state, and that the bondsman is a genuine agent of the company. Every jail should have a list of authorized bondsmen posted near a telephone for inmates to see.

The jailer should read the bond document thoroughly and examine the signature, company seal, dates, and the amount of money that has been

entered. The document should also tell the individual exactly when and where to appear for trial.

A bondsman may decide to revoke his guaranty that the individual will appear for trial. In that case, he may return the individual to jail custody. The individual should then be re-booked on the original charge, with the original bail. The clerk of court should be notified that the person is back in custody on the original charge so that court records can remain accurate.

Personal Recognizance. Personal recognizance is a relatively new concept. It refers to releasing a pre-trial detainee simply on his promise to appear at trial, or to pay a given amount if he should fail to appear. The release document usually is prepared by the clerk of the court, and the individual signs the document in the courtroom. He is then free until the trial. The clerk or the bailiff generally will call the jail before the individual is released to check on holds, which are indications that the inmate should be detained for a separate offense. This also enables the jail to register the individual as having been released on personal recognizance.

When a pre-trial detainee finally goes to trial and is fined by the court, he can pay the fine to the clerk of the court. He is then immediately free. Forcing the individual to return to jail for "processing" or to pick up his property generally is not allowed. The individual is free, and the jail no longer has any control over him.

Also, if a detainee is found not guilty at his trial, or if the charges against him are dismissed, then he probably will not have to return to jail.



Every jail should post a list of authorized bondsmen near the telephone for inmates to see.

Release Of Sentenced Inmates

Three categories of release are possible for inmates who are serving sentences in jail:

1. Serving the full length of the sentence imposed by the court.
2. Being released early with accumulated "good time."
3. Being released under some modification of the sentence by the court, which reduces the length of the sentence.

Serving Full Length Of Sentence. Courts rarely require an inmate to serve the full length of his sentence without any possibility for reduction of that time. They do have the right to do so, however. The term "mandatory release date" refers to the date after which the inmate cannot legally be held--the date on which he *must* be released. This is the date which marks the full term of the sentence.

One way in which an inmate would have to serve his full term would be in the event of consecutive sentencing. This occurs, for example, when a judge sentences an individual to "two six-month sentences to run consecutively." The first six months must be served before the full term of his first sentence had expired. He could, however, be released early from his second term.

The opposite of consecutive sentencing is concurrent sentencing. This means that a judge sentences an individual to serve sentences for more than one offense, but to serve the sentences at the same time.

Early Release With "Good Time." Accumulation of "good time" is one of the most important ways in which sentences are modified. The amount of "good time" an inmate can earn may vary according to the specific law under which the inmate is sentenced to jail. For example, an inmate sentenced with work release privileges may be entitled to "good time." Some jurisdictions award an inmate "good time" for every day of exemplary conduct he serves while he is confined to the jail.

Modification Of Sentence By Court. Other modifications of a sentence are possible, but any modification must be by the action of a court. In some jurisdictions it is possible for a jail officer to recommend to a court that an inmate receive early release. Such recommendation would be based upon the jailer's assessment of the inmate's adjustment to his sentence, and whether or not he has behaved well while in jail. Most courts will not consider such a recommendation until the inmate has served

at least *half* of his sentence. In general, neither the courts nor the conscientious jail officer really wishes to continue to detain a person who, by his behavior, appears ready to return to the community.

The inmate himself, or his attorney, also may petition the court for early release. In considering such a petition, the court will take into account the same factors--the inmate's behavior, his adjustment to the penalty imposed on him for having broken the law, and so on.

In addition to these types of release for sentenced inmates, it should be remembered that a person may be held in jail for failure to pay a fine, or a fine and court costs. Should such a person, or anybody else offer to pay, the person should be released from custody immediately. Each jail should have clearly-established procedures for the collection of such money and the issuance of a receipt. Some jails, for example, are unwilling to accept personal checks. There have been documented cases in which, after release, payment on a check was stopped and the person stopping payment became an accessory to an escape from custody. At any rate, an individual must be released from custody as soon as the jailer has counted the money for payment of the fine.

Temporary Release

Occasionally, inmates may be allowed to leave the jail for home visits, weddings, funerals, or other special events. They are on a temporary release from custody. As was pointed out in the chapter dealing with the escorting of inmates, such inmates should be searched carefully upon their return to the jail.

In other cases, an inmate may be hospitalized, or at another institution appearing as a witness, or being tried elsewhere for a local charge. He is still considered an inmate of the jail, even though he is not physically present. Inmates on such forms of temporary release are sometimes referred to as "in-but-outs." Accurate follow-up of jail records should ensure that such an inmate is not forgotten--that he has not been released from the hospital, or sent to a state correctional institution. Local courts tend to become unhappy when jails lose jurisdiction over inmates in their care.

Release By Transfer

An inmate may be transferred to another institution after being found guilty and sentenced. It may be a state correctional institution or a state hospital. Proper papers must be drawn up to transfer legal control of the inmate from the jail to the other institution.

In some cases, an inmate may be sentenced with work release privileges

to a particular jail. But he may live and work in another county. He can be transferred to the jail in that county if the sheriff will take him. However, if he fails to conform to that jail's rules, or if he violates the conditions of his sentence, he may be returned to the original jail. Procedure may require that he be rebooked and perhaps he may be returned to the sentencing court. Because of his behavior, the court may decide to revoke work release privileges, and sentence him to "straight time." In any case, the law provides for inmates participating in work or study release programs to be transferred to jails in other counties, providing a mutual agreement can be worked out.

RELEASE PROCEDURE GUIDELINES

Jail officers must know and fully understand the rules of their jail which pertain to release procedures and be constantly alert for illegal or careless releases.

Most jurisdictions require a written document before an inmate can be released. These orders vary depending on the requirements of the courts in that particular jurisdiction. Once it is received, a release order should be time-stamped by the jail officer. The inmate should not be released by the officer until the officer has determined that the order is accurate. If he has any doubt about the validity of the document, the officer should contact the official who authorized the release. The order must fulfill all the legal requirements of the jurisdiction and should be signed by a person authorized to issue release orders.



"Sorry to bother you, judge, but I just wanted to verify Jones' release."

institution records and the information in the original commitment records.

Most jurisdictions require a written document before an inmate can be released, but there are agencies that occasionally permit verbal release orders. Verbal release orders *must not be* accepted over the telephone unless the officer looks up the telephone number of the releasing authority who gave the verbal release order, calls the releasing authority at that number, and asks for and receives the same verbal release order that the authority gave on the first phone call. Most agencies forbid telephone releases under any circumstances; but where they are allowed a written order signed by the releasing authority must follow the actual release.

Case Study 1:

Officer Harold Grey, a rookie at the Rattlesnake County Jail, answered the telephone and listened to the following: "This is Judge Blanton. I want you to release inmate Henry Jones today. I have cleared him of all charges."

The new officer then proceeded to release inmate Jones. Four hours later when another officer inquired about the inmate's whereabouts, Officer Grey told him about the telephoned release order. The older officer replied that the inmate's brother had attempted to do this once before, but naturally had not been successful. But this time he had been lucky because he had managed to call an ill-prepared, inexperienced officer who had released inmate Jones with no questions asked!

This case study points out that officers should NEVER release an inmate until they have obtained the verification that is required by their jail.

It is *most important* that there are no outstanding warrants or "holds" against the inmate who is being released. Charges might surface in another jurisdiction while the inmate is in jail and these charges might very well be more serious than the original one for which he is presently incarcerated. Usually a phone call to an agency with criminal justice computer capabilities will determine if the inmate is wanted by another jurisdiction. When an inmate is first booked into a jail, an arrangement should be made to enter his name into the criminal justice computer system to determine if he is wanted; this should be done again prior to his release.

Some agencies that have the responsibility for executing warrants and other papers issued by the courts, yet which do not have a criminal justice computer available to them, will provide the jail with an up-to-date list of persons they are looking for and request that jail officials "flag" their records with information on these wanted persons. The agency making this request wants to be notified if the person is arrested and

taken to the jail or if he is already in the jail. *This request list must be kept current.*



An agency with criminal justice computer capabilities will determine if the inmate is wanted by another jurisdiction.

If the person is already in jail and is wanted by another jurisdiction, the inmate roster board at the jail where he is being held should bear an asterisk (*) beside his name or his name should be printed or underlined in red. These precautionary measures warn officers not to release the inmate; when he is due to be released from the jail, the law enforcement agency which has placed a detainer on him must be notified.

Case Study 2:

Sgt. Grantland Brice of the Reindeer County Jail gave a sigh of relief when he was notified by Judge Corderman that the charges against inmate Jake Dole had been dismissed because the complainant in the case failed to show up in court to prosecute Dole on the charge of tampering with an automobile.

"Dole has been a real weirdo ever since he got here," Brice told his fellow officers. "He won't talk to anyone. He just sits around and stares at everyone who walks past him. He hasn't had a visitor since he's been here, and he hasn't made any phone calls or sent any mail either. I'm glad he's going before he really flips out, and then we would have to struggle to get the fruitcake committed to the state mental hospital, where he probably belongs anyhow. He sure acts like he's got an awful lot on his mind."

The Whitetail City Police had arrested Dole after observing him trying the doors on cars parked on Main Street. When they stopped him he didn't have any identification on him, and he said that he was only looking for a place to get out of the snow and cold. He was arrested and brought to the jail.

When he was booked, Dole said that he had no fixed address, but was born and raised in Trenton, New Jersey. His tattooed arms bore traces of old "track" marks, and his face was well-tanned. The first thing he told the officer admitting him was that he was entitled to talk to a public defender.

"It's a real waste spending Reindeer County taxpayers' dollars to keep a no-good junkie like Dole here on a 'chicken' charge," Sgt. Brice said. "The only reason the police arrested him was because some people in the neighborhood called, and they were watching when the police arrived. If I had my way, he would have been chased out of here four months ago instead of sitting here getting fat and healthy all this time. The turkey found a nice warm place to spend the winter."

Two days after he had released Dole, Sgt. Brice opened the morning mail to find the latest edition of the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Persons List. Much to his surprise he saw a picture of Jake Dole with the caption "Wanted by the FBI for escape from custody and murder of a jail officer." Dole had been locked up in a southern jail, where he had been sentenced for non-support.

"Will you look at this?" Brice exclaimed to the other officers in the control room. "I knew there was something fishy about Dole by the way he acted. He knew too much about jail not to have spent some time inside one. His summer clothing, no identification, needle marks up and down his arms--a stoned junkie if I ever saw one! I hope they get him before he kills somebody else. Those city cops should have made more of an effort to identify that clown!"

Sgt. Brice should have practiced what he preached. A small effort on his part would have returned Dole to the lock-up because his name was in the FBI's National Crime Information Computer (NCIC) and in the State Police Criminal Identification Network Computer

Precautions must be taken to assure that a jail inmate is released only to a person providing accurate authorization for the release. Officers should ask to see the badge and identification card of anyone not personally known to them and obtain a "body" receipt from the receiving officer. This receipt should be filed in the permanent jail record. The receipt should contain the exact date and time of the release and the signature of the officer accepting the inmate.

When a detainer is filed by another agency requesting that an inmate be held to answer to an offense committed in the requesting jurisdiction, jail officials should not permit the inmate to participate in programs which would enable him to leave the jail premises, such as work release. If the inmate is a "trustee" and a detainer on him arrives from another jurisdiction, then his "trustee" status should be revoked immediately.

Extreme precautions must be taken with inmates who have detainers lodged against them since they might attempt to escape, especially if the charge in the other jurisdiction is a serious one, such as homicide.

Some inmates might have more than one detainer filed against them. Each one must be satisfied before the jail can physically release the inmate. When there is more than one detainer, jail officials will be told which jurisdiction is to receive the inmate.

Positive identification of the inmate being released must be made by the jail officer before he allows the inmate to leave the jail. Once the wrong inmate walks out the door it may be a long time before he is returned. His conduct during that time may prove embarrassing to jail officials and to the officer who mistakingly released him. In addition, there may be new crimes. There have been many serious crimes committed by inmates who were wrongly released because careless jail officers did not take the time to carefully check the correct identities of the inmates.

Case Study 3:

Instead of carefully checking the identification of an inmate who was being released, Rattlesnake County Jail officers merely made a practice of asking the inmate his name, occupation, and address before letting him go. Last year inmate Charlie Bronson was released from jail after smoothly answering these questions. But, several hours later, officers discovered that the man who should have been released, inmate Tony Cooper, was still in his cell.

An investigation revealed that Bronson and Cooper had made a deal to exchange identities so that Bronson could be released on Cooper's bail. The escaping Bronson had known all too well that in

this jail the questions asked by the releasing officer would be simple to answer and that no other attempt at identification would be made. When he offered Cooper \$500 to make the switch, Cooper, an unemployed alcoholic, readily agreed, especially after Bronson explained to him that jail authorities wouldn't be any wiser, and he would still be set free. Cooper was only being held on a charge of drunk in public. But Bronson was being held on a detainer from Big Sky County for murdering a gas station attendant during a robbery. For Bronson, the \$500 his brother gave Cooper's wife was money well spent.

Before being processed for release, the inmate should be instructed to gather all his jail-issued property and personal belongings from his cell. The jail officer should then conduct a complete search of the cell to assure that there is no property damage that can be attributed to the inmate or contraband concealed in the cell for another inmate.

A full strip search of the inmate should then be conducted in the area set aside for this purpose. This will eliminate opportunities for the inmate to remove property which does not belong to him, or to smuggle out contraband, letters, messages, or weapons, which could be used in an attack upon a transporting officer if the inmate is being taken to another institution.

The officer processing the inmate for release should then:

1. Compare the inmate being released to the photograph taken at the time of admission to the jail.
2. Compare new fingerprints with those on record. A thumb print impression of the inmate should have been recorded on his booking card at the time of admission.
3. Compare identifying marks with the physical description recorded at the time of admission.
4. Question the inmate being released concerning his personal history, Social Security number, date and place of birth, next of kin, home address, spelling of his name, the date he was arrested, and the charge for which he was confined. The inmate's answers should match information in his admission record.
5. Compare his signature with the one on the booking record card.

At the time of release the return of an inmate's personal property should be a simple matter if the admissions process was properly conducted. Return of personal property should be done in this manner:

- All items being returned to an inmate should be compared with the property listing made during the admissions procedure;
- If all items match those listed on the property slip, the inmate should sign a receipt indicating that he has received all of his property; and
- The signed receipt should be kept on file at the jail.

If the inmate states that he has not received all of his property, or has received the wrong property, he should be required to make a statement listing:

- What he is missing; and
- A description of the items which he claims he has not received.

This statement should be:

- Signed by him;
- Witnessed by a jail officer; and
- Brought to the attention of the jail administrator.

If a good property description is made during admission, there will be very few problems during release.

Upon discharge or release to the custody of another agency, the inmate's cash and property should be returned to him or to the officer taking custody.



If for some reason the inmate does not have personal clothing which is in good condition, efforts should be made to get him at least one set of clothes and shoes. Usually the Salvation Army, Goodwill Industries, the Council of Churches, or other charitable organizations are willing to help if the inmate does not have a family or friends to offer him assistance.

"What do you mean the clothes don't fit? Get going...you have a job interview in twenty minutes. If you want to make parole, you have to be employed."

THE IMPORTANCE OF RECORDS

It is extremely important that jail officers keep accurate, up-to-date records. Inaccurate information can lead to problems for jail officials, including lawsuits. In regard to discharges, it is *absolutely essential* that records indicate "the authority by which" an inmate is set free. Because there are so many different possible circumstances for discharging an inmate, it becomes imperative to be sure that the authority ordering the release is legitimate. If there is any question about this later, then the record could be checked. The jail register is the primary document which furnishes proof of the legality of discharge actions. If proper entries are made in the jail register, then the jail is better able to defend against charges of false detention.

All releases or transfers from the jail should be entered in the record, which should include:

- The name and number of the inmate;
- The time and date of the release or transfer;
- The reason for the release or transfer;
- The name, rank, and organization of the receiving officer, if the inmate is taken into custody on the authority of a warrant;
- The name of the hospital and official receiving the inmate, and the time and date of the transfer if he is transferred to a hospital at the termination of his sentence; and
- The signature of the officer who released the inmate.

Page 16 is a sample copy of an inmate's personal history record.

Case Study 4:

Tom Dooley was arrested by a Thundercloud City police officer for failure to pay a fine. The open commitment called for five days in the Big Sky County Jail or a fine of \$35. Dooley was taken to jail and placed in a temporary detention cell before being booked. He asked for a phone call, called a friend, and within an hour the friend was there to pay the \$35 so Dooley could be freed. Booking Officer Billy Joe Pierce saw no reason to book Dooley, since he was there for such a short time.

A month later, Dooley was arrested for another minor offense. The booking officer on duty, Clark Kent, noticed that the commitment on which Dooley was originally brought to jail, the failure to pay the

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Inmate's personal history record.

RECEIVED		RECEIVED		RELEASED		RELEASED	
ARRESTING/ COMMITTING OFC		AGENCY/ STATION		BOOKED BY		CASH \$	
INJURIES <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO TYPE		DISABILITIES		SCARS TATTOOS		VERIFIED BY COMM OFC	
IN EMERGENCY NOTIFY NAME		ADDRESS		PHONE		CALL TO BONDSMAN NAME	
REMARKS		INITIAL PERSONAL CALL NAME		PHONE		ATTORNEY PD PRIVATE NAME PHONE	
DETAINERS							
1 FROM	CHG	DATE REC					OFC INT
2 FROM	CHG	DATE REC					OFC INT
3 FROM	CHG	DATE REC					OFC INT
4 FROM	CHG	DATE REC					OFC INT
TEMPORARY RELEASES							
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE	AGENCY	DATE	REASON	RETURNED	DATE	TIME	
DISPOSITION OF CHARGE SENTENCE		TIME SERVED		TRANSFERRED TO			
BOND TO		COLLATERAL POSTED		COMMISSIONER		STATION	
RELEASED AT COURT	ROCKVILLE DIST CT	CIRCUIT CT	SILVER SPRING DIST CT	BETH DIST CT	OTHER		
RELEASED TO	AGENCY	SIGNATURE		RELEASING OFC	WGT OUT		

fine, was still open. Why? The clerk of courts office simply hadn't gotten around to marking it satisfied. Dooley protested that he had paid the \$35 fine, and he even remembered the date. There was no record to substantiate his claim, and he couldn't find his copy of the receipt. So he sat in jail for a full weekend until, on Monday, the clerk of courts office opened and a copy of the receipt was found.

Dooley sued Big Sky County for false detention, and subpoenaed Officer Pierce, who had collected the money. Officer Pierce testified to remembering the incident, and the County lost the case. Yet if Officer Pierce had simply documented the incident in the jail register, there would have been no lawsuit. All Officer Pierce had to do was book Dooley and then properly release him, with the reason for release given as "paid fine and costs." Dooley could have still sued, since the second booking officer had found a commitment open that should have been marked as satisfied, but the jail officer would not have been at fault--the court clerk would have been responsible.

READJUSTMENT

The success of an inmate's resocialization may, to a large degree, be dependent upon the participation by the jail staff in helping him readjust to the community.

Jail authorities can help by:

- Making immediate payment to an inmate of his accumulated funds.
- Providing a gratuity to those without funds, if monies are available for this purpose.
- Referring the inmate to aid organizations for assistance.
- Referring the inmate to medical and mental clinics when such treatment appears necessary.
- Referring him to the proper agency that will help him find a job in his community.
- Supplying the inmate with clothing appropriate for the weather.
- Notifying the police of the release of a dangerous person.

Despite the fact that an inmate is expected to resort to committing crimes soon after his release from the jail, he must be discharged at the termination of his sentence. In the interest of public safety, the police of the community to which he will go should be notified in advance.

THE PASSWORD IS "CAUTION"

Because an inmate is being released, the jail officer releasing him must not become careless or let his guard down. He must proceed in the same cautious and methodical manner as if he were processing an inmate into the jail.

The officer should make sure he is:

- Releasing the right person at the right time;
- Not releasing the wrong person;
- Not releasing a person wanted by another agency;
- Turning the inmate over to a duly authorized person;
- Following all the rules and regulations of his department concerning the release of inmates; and
- Fulfilling all the legal requirements pertaining to release procedures.

An officer can never be too cautious.

Compare Inmate To




PHOTO
FINGERPRINTS
IDENTIFYING MARKS
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
DATE OF BIRTH
NEXT OF KIN
HOME ADDRESS
SPELLING OF NAME
DATE OF ARREST
CHARGE

RELEASE

SUMMARY

1. An inmate who is being processed for release from the jail must undergo the same kind of scrutiny given to a person during the admissions process--the jail officer cannot afford to let his guard down.

Jail officers must know and fully understand the rules of their jail which pertain to release procedures and be constantly alert for illegal or careless releases. A release order must fulfill all the legal requirements of the jurisdiction and should be signed by a person authorized to issue release orders--if he has any doubt about the validity of the document, the officer should contact the official who authorized the release. In addition, officers must verify the identity of each inmate being released to make sure they are releasing the correct inmate: identities can be verified by asking the inmate personal questions, based upon his admissions record, and comparing his fingerprints and photograph with those in the record. An officer can never be too cautious.

2. Before releasing an inmate, jail officers should be certain that there are no outstanding warrants or "holds" against the inmate.


Charges might surface in another jurisdiction while the inmate is in jail and these charges could be much more serious than the one for which the inmate is currently being held. To prevent releasing an inmate who is wanted in another jurisdiction, jail officers should enter the inmate's name into the criminal justice computer system when the inmate is first admitted to the jail; his name should again be entered into the computer system prior to his release. If an inmate is being turned over to officers from another jurisdiction, the identity of these officers should be verified before the inmate is released to their custody. A jail officer should never take *anything* for granted.

Suggested Readings

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Section III

Special Procedures



Sick Call
Recreation and Visiting
Diabetic & Epileptic Inmates
Medical Problems Confronting Women Inmates
Drug Withdrawal in the Jail
Alcohol Abuse Emergencies in the Jail
Psychological Disorders: Psychopathic &
Neurotic Personalities
Homosexual Behavior in the Jail
Suicide Prevention

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

SICK CALL

Administering and supervising daily sick call is one of the critical aspects of the jail operation. Neglect of an inmate's health needs can lead to severe illness or even death. Since the jail is entrusted with the welfare and safekeeping of each inmate, proof of negligence can have serious legal consequences for the jail and the personnel involved.

While a jail officer is not qualified to administer medical treatment, he does have three medically-related responsibilities as a custodial officer assigned to supervise inmates:

1. He must make certain that *all* inmates who have medical complaints or show signs of illness or injury receive prompt attention from a physician, nurse, or medical technicians assigned to the jail.
2. He must assure that medical supplies and medications are properly stored and that medicine administered to inmates is actually taken by the inmates; he must also make certain that proper records are kept of *all* inmate medical complaints and treatments.
3. He must control behavior during the actual sick call procedure.

INMATE MEDICAL COMPLAINTS

Officers should remember that although inmates may have neglected their health prior to incarceration, this is no excuse to deny them proper medical treatment while they are in jail. Many states have established standards of medical care for inmates, and officers should not ignore these standards. Lawsuits alleging that officers denied inmates proper medical treatment are very common--it is the officer's responsibility to make certain that he does not become a defendant in a lawsuit of this nature. In addition to a legal responsibility for the well-being of inmates, the officer also has a *moral* responsibility to make certain that every inmate who asks for medical assistance receives it.

Section III

Some inmates make exaggerated claims about their health. In many cases they can cause themselves physical pain simply because they *think* they are sick. This is a psychiatric problem known as hypochondria. A person suffering from hypochondria actually may feel real pain or exhibit symptoms of illness, such as a rash. This ability to feel pain is induced mentally. The human mind is very powerful and can control other parts of the body. For example, mentally-induced pain often occurs in persons who have had amputations: the person continues to feel "pain" in his missing limb simply because his mind tells him there is pain; to the amputee, this pain is very real.

It is not the responsibility of the jail officer to decide whether an inmate is really sick, is just "goldbricking," or is suffering from hypochondria. The jail officer must forward *all* medical complaints made by inmates to the proper medical authority for consideration.

Case Study 1:

Big Sky County Jail inmate Jason Stone complained regularly about a sharp pain in his back. Officer Ari Sophocles is in charge of sick call in the jail and for several weeks he thought that Stone was trying to get sympathy by complaining about an imaginary pain. Every two or three days inmate Stone would request permission to report to sick call. Each time he had the same complaint--the sharp pain in his lower back. The jail physician could not find anything visibly wrong with inmate Stone, but he eventually became suspicious. Inmate Stone always had the same medical complaint; if he were a hypochondriac, he would have a variety of complaints.

Finally, after three weeks of escorting inmate Stone to sick call, Officer Sophocles complained to the physician: "I'm really getting tired of babysitting that goldbricker, Stone. He keeps crying like a baby and there's not a damn thing wrong with him. Listen, Doc, why don't you tell that mental case to stop wasting our time? I got better things to do."

"I think there is something wrong with him," the physician replied. "But I won't be able to tell for sure until I can get him admitted to the county hospital for tests. I've checked on what was served for dinner the nights before he gets the back pains, and it's always greasy, fried foods. I think he may have a stomach problem or gallstones."

"Come on, Doc, don't give me none of that medical jive," Officer Sophocles answered. "The guy's a fake, I can tell. What kind of doctor are you anyhow? If he's got an upset stomach from the food, well, it's gonna hit him in the front. And he's complaining about his back."

"You tend to your jailing and let me take care of the doctoring," the physician said. "Now, that's all I want to hear from

you about Mr. Stone. I'll let you know when to bring him to the hospital."

Inmate Stone was admitted to the Big Sky County Hospital the next day. When the physician reported to the jail for sick call duties two days later, Officer Sophocles approached him and said: "Hey, Medicine Man, what I tell you about that turkey, Stone, huh? You probably wasted a lot of the taxpayers' money on all those fancy tests to find out the guy was just faking it all along to get out of work details!"

"Sorry to disappoint you, Officer," the physician replied, "but inmate Stone goes into surgery this afternoon. His gallbladder is in such bad shape we've got to take it out. Poor man's got a duodenal ulcer, too."

Officer Sophocles was so embarrassed he had a difficult time supervising sick call. He felt like a fool every time the physician spoke to him. When he arrived home that night, grabbed a beer and sat down to watch a ballgame on TV, he found that he couldn't concentrate on the game. His mind kept wandering back to the sarcastic things he had said about inmate Stone. He decided he wouldn't try to "play doctor" anymore. If an inmate said he was sick, then Officer Sophocles promised himself he would see to it that the inmate was taken to see a physician as soon as possible. Officer Sophocles learned that the physician alone should decide whether an inmate is truly sick or is faking illness. The next day he apologized to the jail physician for his unprofessional conduct.

Officer Sophocles knew from experience that inmates often feign illness while they are in jail in an attempt to receive special attention or comfort. These inmates are a continual problem for a busy staff. However, as the officer also learned, they are a *medical* problem, not a supervisory one. If a jail staff member decides to prevent an inmate from receiving medical attention and he becomes seriously ill as a result, then the legal and moral responsibility for the illness is placed upon the staff member and the jail. The best policy when dealing with inmates who may be feigning illness is to allow them to report repeatedly for sick call; there is always a chance that they have a legitimate complaint.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Larry Goldberg was known throughout the Rattlesnake County Jail as a constant complainer and hypochondriac. In addition, he had an unpleasant personality and a poor attitude. He had often

reported for sick call only to be told by the doctor that there was absolutely nothing wrong with him.

One day Goldberg reported for sick call complaining of stomach pains. Officer Henry Clayton was infuriated and told Goldberg: "Go back to your cell and don't waste any more of the doctor's time!"

Luckily, the doctor overheard this and suggested that he take Goldberg's temperature as a precaution. The inmate's temperature registered at 102 degrees. The doctor sent him to the county hospital for a white blood cell count and Goldberg was found to be in need of an emergency appendectomy.

Goldberg might easily have died in his cell from a burst appendix if his condition had been ignored. Officer Clayton was so upset by the mistake he almost made that he called in sick the next day.

This example is not an isolated one. It represents incidents which happen frequently in jails when officers take a personal view of an inmate's behavior and ignore established procedures. It is the responsibility of every officer to inform the medical staff without delay of any physical complaints inmates may have.

While officers should not, under normal circumstances, treat inmates, administer first aid, or dispense medicine, there are many jails which do not have fulltime physicians, and officers working in these jails must, by necessity, perform some medical duties. The majority of jails in the United States do not have a physician or nurse on duty 24 hours a day; however, the administrators of these jails should make arrangements with a local hospital or physician to respond to medical emergencies on a 24-hour basis.

All officers should be trained in emergency first aid, how to recognize the symptoms of medical emergencies, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation procedures, and the proper method of rescuing a person who is choking on food. The steps that an officer takes in a medical emergency could mean the difference between life and death for a fellow officer or inmate.

When a medical emergency occurs, there will usually be only one officer present. The first thing he should do is report the incident to another officer or his supervisor so that an ambulance can be summoned if necessary. If the emergency occurs in a cellblock, the officer should lock all other inmates in their cells. In an open dormitory, other inmates should be told to remain in their beds. When a second officer arrives, he should take possession of all keys and supervise and control the other inmates while the first officer administers first aid or tends to the victim. Not all of these security procedures can be followed if emergency medical assistance must be rendered to the victim immediately,

such as cardio-pulmonary resuscitation or dislodging a piece of food from the throat of an inmate who is choking--any delay in assistance could result in the victim's death or brain damage from a lack of oxygen.

Each sheriff or jail administrator must develop policies for officers to follow in medical emergencies. However, sometimes the officers will have to use their individual judgment as an emergency occurs and hope that they made the right decision.

Some typical medical emergencies which occur in jails are:

- Heart attacks: officers should immediately summon an ambulance and follow procedures that were taught to them for cardio-pulmonary resuscitation or for the proper handling of a suspected heart victim.
- Choking: officers should attempt to immediately dislodge the obstruction in the throat by using the proper procedures recommended by the American Medical Association or the American Red Cross. The victim should be taken to a hospital emergency room for an examination once the object blocking his breathing passage has been dislodged. He may require oxygen.
- Fainting or blackouts: officers should loosen the victim's clothing, keep him in a prone position until consciousness returns, and then take him to a hospital emergency room for an examination. The inmate may have internal bleeding from a head injury, which could cause sudden death. Officers should never assume that once a fainting victim is revived, he is OK. The fainting could be caused by a serious internal injury or medical problem.
- Suicide attempts: officers should immediately act to remove the cause, such as a bedsheet around the inmate's neck if he tried to hang himself; always assume that a hanging victim is still alive and can be revived. Officers should follow proper emergency first aid procedures and call for an ambulance if the inmate has inflicted serious harm to himself (such as deep cuts or swallowing poison or a quantity of pills).
- Seizures or convulsions: officers should help the inmate prevent bodily harm or injury by removing moveable objects and cushioning the victim with a pillow or blanket. An ambulance should be summoned.
- Miscarriage or attempted abortion: if a pregnant woman inmate undergoes these emergencies, officers should administer proper emergency first aid and immediately summon an ambulance.

CONTINUED

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Some inmates may suffer from allergies. If an inmate says he has an allergy, the officer should not attempt to tell him "it's all in his head" and ignore the inmate's pleas for help. The inmate should be referred to a physician for treatment. The physician might require officers to adopt procedures to make certain that the inmate is kept away from whatever causes the allergic reactions, since an allergy sufferer could become seriously ill if he comes into contact with the offending substance. This may mean that inmates are given special diets if they are allergic to certain foods; extra blankets and clothes if they are allergic to cold air; kept off outdoor work details if they are allergic to pollen or bee stings; and housed in very clean, almost sterile cells if they are allergic to dust. A physician should determine what special treatment the inmate requires.

Case Study 3:

Inmate Marylou Hudson had been abused by her husband, Wilbur, ever since they were married 14 years ago. He would come home from work drunk and attack Marylou and the children if everything wasn't perfect in the house. On New Year's Eve Marylou arrived home from her job as a waitress and found an intoxicated Wilbur attempting to rape their 13-year-old daughter. When Wilbur turned on her with a baseball bat, Marylou grabbed a butcher knife and stabbed him fatally. Now Marylou is in the Rattlesnake County Jail, charged with murder. Marylou is not very popular in the jail because Wilbur was a deputy sheriff, and his fellow officers thought he was a "good old boy." They apparently never knew how he treated his family.

Marylou is frail and sickly looking. During her first week in jail she did not eat much of the food that was served to her. One evening, very hungry, she ate the fried chicken served for dinner. Later that night she became violently ill with stomach cramps and vomiting. Officer Molly Maguire gave Marylou a liquid antacid, but she remained ill all night. Marylou told Officer Maguire that she was allergic to corn-based cooking oil, all corn products, white flour, salt, milk, and eggs, and was supposed to have a special diet of plain broiled meats, fruits, and vegetables. Officer Maguire wrote a report about the incident and sent it to her supervisor, Lt. Vern Venom.

Lt. Venom, who had often gone fishing with Wilbur Hudson, showed Officer Maguire's report to Capt. Al Sandbag, who thought it was funny.

"Damn woman kills one of our best deputies and now she wants special treatment!" Capt. Sandbag laughed. "Can you beat that, Vern? What does she expect us to do? Bring in a chef from the Hotel De-Luxe just to cook for her? I've seen everything now! Well, she can eat the same slop we feed the rest of these turkeys. If she

doesn't like it, that's her problem."

Inmate Hudson did not want to go through another bout with her stomach again; it was too painful and her doctor had warned her that the violent spasms could cause internal bleeding. So she hardly ate anything that was served to her. She didn't have much choice, since most of the jail food was greasy or something she shouldn't have, such as white bread. By her fourth week in jail she was suffering from malnutrition and was finally allowed to report for sick call.

The jail physician immediately hospitalized inmate Hudson. When Officer Maguire, who had been on vacation, found out that Lt. Venom and Capt. Sandbag had not been giving inmate Hudson a proper diet, she requested an interview with the sheriff and showed him a copy of the report she had written three weeks earlier. Because inmate Hudson was seriously ill, the sheriff felt that a disciplinary hearing for Lt. Venom and Capt. Sandbag was necessary.

Both officers were demoted and suspended for not following proper jail procedures and thus jeopardizing the life of an inmate. The sheriff told them jail policy clearly stated that an inmate who claims he or she has an allergy must be sent to a physician for an examination and proper treatment. Capt. Sandbag was so furious about his demotion that he resigned from the Sheriff's Department. When she recovered enough to stand trial, Marylou Hudson was found not guilty of murder by a jury--the jurors agreed that she stabbed Wilbur in self-defense and to protect her daughter from rape. She was released.

This case study points out that allergies must be taken seriously. They could be life threatening. This case study also illustrates the problems that can occur when an officer pre-judges an inmate and lets his personal opinions take precedence over proper jail procedures.

SUPERVISING SICK CALL

Each jail should establish its own procedures for sick call, but no matter which procedure is chosen, sick call should be held daily. It is preferable to schedule sick call as early in the day as possible so that inmates with minor complaints could then report to work details or keep court appointments.

There are two common methods used for sick call. In many smaller jails the visiting physician examines inmates in their housing areas; in other jails a medical examination room is provided for the physician to see inmates.

**PUBLIC SAFETY DEPARTMENT
Jail & Corrections Division**

To: Lieutenant _____ Date _____
 Sergeant _____
 Officer _____
 Nurse _____
 Rehabilitation Officer _____
 Other _____

From: _____ Cell No. _____
(Print your name)

Type of Request (Place X in appropriate box and explain in remarks)

- Phone Call Bondsman Attorney
 Medication (explain nature of illness)
 Clothing for court. Church
 Wish to be made trusty. Speak to you.
 Other: See Remarks.

REMARKS: (Must be printed. Explain Request.)

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

When the physician visits inmates in their cells, he should be accompanied by an officer at all times. A woman officer should accompany a physician who is examining female inmates.

Those jails with a medical examining room should establish a daily sick call line. In small jails all sick inmates could be permitted to line up at the same time; in larger jails, sick inmates should be required to report to the line in groups so that the line does not become too difficult to control. For example, cell blocks A and B could report at 8:00 a.m. and cellblocks C and D could report at 10:00.

Two officers should be assigned to the dispensary area. One officer should remain in the examining room with the physician while the other officer patrols the line to keep it orderly. It is helpful to provide magazines for the inmates to read while they are waiting in line to prevent arguments and fights.

CONTROLLING MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND MEDICATIONS

Medications, including aspirin, should be stored in a locked supply cabinet or safe in or near the treatment or examination room. It is helpful to electrically wire the cabinet to trigger a light or buzzer to go off at the central control console when the cabinet is opened. This procedure can be combined with a system of voice identification by the employee who is opening the cabinet, thereby providing proper security. If the jail does not have a medical examination room, the medical storage cabinet should be kept near the central control console and the same security procedures followed.

No inmates should ever be permitted access to the medical supply cabinet, nor should they be permitted to administer medications to other inmates. *All* medications should be administered by a physician or nurse. In the event that officers have to administer medications after hours, they should be trained by the physician in proper administration procedures.

The sheriff or jail administrator should assign an officer to be accountable for an inventory and the proper storage of medical supplies. The locked medicine cabinet should be inspected at least *twice* on each shift by the duty officer who is assigned this responsibility; the inspections should occur at the beginning and end of each shift. Medicines are highly prized as contraband in jails, and they should be closely guarded.

Jail personnel are responsible for supervising the daily taking of prescribed pills or liquid medicines by inmates, whether the medicine is administered by a physician or nurse or by the officer. Supervising the taking of medicine is an extremely important responsibility. Officers must be continually alert, since inmates often try to accumulate pills to "get high," to exchange with other inmates for cigarettes or candy or, in some cases, to use to commit suicide.



Jail officers must supervise the correct dosage.



Jail officers must supervise actual taking of medicine.



Jail officers should examine inmate's mouth with tongue depressor.

The jail officer supervising the taking of medicine is responsible for seeing that each inmate receives the correct dosage at the correct time and that he actually swallows the medication and does not hide it in his mouth or hand. If a physician or nurse is administering the medicine, the officer still must be certain that the inmate swallowed the pill. He can do this by insisting that the inmate drink a glass of water or by examining the inside of the inmate's mouth, using a tongue depressor and flashlight. He should also require the inmate to spread out his hands since inmates often "palm" pills by holding them between their thumb and forefinger.

Case Study 4:

Recently in the Big Sky County Jail, a busy jail officer, Mark Welby, was asked by the jail physician to administer a dosage of sleeping pills for several days to an extremely nervous inmate, Ralph Redfork, who would soon be going on trial for murdering his wife.

Officer Welby gave Redfork the pills each night as instructed, but he made no effort to watch while the inmate swallowed the pills.

On the morning of the trial, Redfork was found dead in his cell-- he had taken an overdose of sleeping pills. Redfork had managed to save up enough pills without Officer Welby's knowledge so that he could commit suicide.

Did Officer Welby "make an honest mistake?" The members of his trial board thought he did and he only received a verbal reprimand. But Officer Welby felt differently.

"In the jail there is no room for this type of mistake," he told his wife. "A jailer must understand his responsibility fully and be certain that he has acted at all times in accordance with this responsibility. I let myself be too busy to carry out my responsibilities properly and now a man is dead."

There are many other cases in jails across the nation when the failure of an officer to notice that an inmate has not taken his medicine results in serious consequences. For example, many jail officials report that epileptics have hidden their medication instead of taking it and have had serious seizures as a result. Some epileptics hope to trade their pills with other inmates who want to "get high."

No matter whether the inmate is given medication while in a line



Medication log sheet.

Case Study 5:

The Rattlesnake County sheriff never bothered to develop medical record-keeping procedures for the jail. He thought it was a waste of time. Inmate Rufus Parker, who was confined at the jail awaiting trial, complained of a painful, ulcerated toe. The jail physician was called and, after an examination, he prescribed medication. Several days later, Officer Tony Mozzarella, who was in charge of sick call, phoned the physician to tell him the medication had not helped; in fact, the toe was in worse condition. The physician told Officer Mozzarella he would call the local pharmacy and have them deliver a new drug to the jail for inmate Parker.

After four weeks, inmate Parker's toe had to be amputated. Two months later his leg had to be removed below the knee.

Inmate Parker made a formal charge in a court of law that the jail and Officer Mozzarella had been negligent and had failed to provide him with adequate medical attention. Since the jail had no medical records, the sheriff and Officer Mozzarella could not contest the charges. The incident caused quite a scandal which needlessly damaged the reputation of the jail and created a great deal of personal anguish for Officer Mozzarella.

This case study and the one which follows illustrate the importance of keeping adequate records of *all* medical treatment provided to inmates. If an officer works in a jail that does not keep adequate medical records, then he should suggest, for his own protection, that an organized record-keeping system be established.

Case Study 6:

The Big Sky County Jail employs a fulltime nurse. Along with her other tasks, she keeps complete, detailed records of all sick call attendance and medical treatments or examinations which occur in the jail. Mike Stivic, a federal prisoner being held in the jail, filed suit charging that the jail had refused to give him medical care. He claimed that a jail officer had slammed a door on his hand, and he had received no medical treatment for the injury. The nurse was able to prove with the medical records that inmate Stivic had reported for sick call three times for other unrelated complaints after the alleged incident had supposedly occurred. It was shown that on none of these occasions did he complain of a sore hand. When Stivic realized how thorough the records were, he quickly withdrew his suit. He knew he could never prove negligence.

Even if a jail provides excellent professional medical care to inmates, it may still face serious legal problems unless jail personnel are required to keep consistently detailed medical records.

SUMMARY

1. Administering and supervising daily sick call is one of the critical aspects of the jail operation since the jail is entrusted with the welfare and safekeeping of all inmates.

The jail officer himself is not qualified to administer medical treatment, but he must make certain that *all* inmates who have medical complaints or who show signs of illness or injury receive prompt attention from a physician, nurse, or medical technicians assigned to the jail. Many states have established standards of medical care for inmates, and officers should not ignore these standards. If an officer suspects that an inmate is feigning illness, the best policy is to allow him to report repeatedly for sick call--there is always the chance that the inmate has a legitimate complaint. Each jail should conduct sick call daily.

2. Jail officers must assure that medical supplies and medications are properly stored and that medicine administered to inmates is actually taken by them; officers must also make certain that proper records are kept of all inmate medical complaints and treatments.

Medications, including aspirin, should be stored in a locked supply cabinet or safe in or near the treatment or examination room; if the jail does not have a medical examination room, the medical storage cabinet should be kept near the central control console. No inmates should ever be permitted access to the medical supply cabinet, nor should they be permitted to administer medications to other inmates. Jail officers who supervise the daily taking of medicines by inmates must keep complete records and record proper data *each* time medicine is administered. Officers must watch the inmate to make certain he actually swallows pills or capsules.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

RECREATION AND VISITING

In a jail, more so than in other institutions, people are cut off from their normal life patterns. Their lives are regulated to a very great extent, and their control over their lives is greatly diminished. In this situation, recreational activities and visits from family members and friends become very important to the inmate.

Leisure services can be an important support to effective custody as well as to rehabilitation efforts. Frequently, lack of proper use of leisure time helps get an inmate into trouble while in the jail. Subsequent to release, this problem will increase. If an inmate can be exposed to or taught an enjoyable, constructive way to use leisure, it can be of considerable benefit in helping him make a successful adjustment in the community.

Visits, too, are extremely important--they help the inmate maintain his ties with family and friends. They also help keep up morale and alleviate loneliness. Visits help the inmate stay in touch with the people to whom he will return after his release. Visits can help reduce the possibility of marital problems by keeping open channels of communication. In addition, visits may give an inmate the opportunity to solve some very practical problems caused by the incarceration--problems like moving a car or picking up a paycheck. These may not seem like important problems to the officer, but to a person behind bars they have great significance. The inmate has lost the ability to take care of such problems personally, so visits by family and friends are important.

Important also are visits by attorneys. Inmates must be afforded the opportunity to see their attorneys in order to deal adequately with their legal problems. This is certainly true for pre-trial detainees, but it is equally true for sentenced inmates. In addition, visits by religious advisers and other professional people are important to inmates. Jail can be an emotionally troubling experience, and religious counseling is one way to help some inmates get through the experience. Inmates have the right to be visited by attorneys, clergy, and other professional people.

As important as recreational activities and visitation are, however, they are still an area that demands close supervision by jail staff. Security measures must be clearly established and followed to prevent escape attempts and the introduction of contraband. At times, the demands of security may require curtailment of certain visiting privileges or recreational activities.

RECREATION

One of the major architectural failings of most jails today is that they have inadequate space--or none at all--for recreation and leisure services. Yet the sheriff is considered to be both morally and legally responsible for the physical and mental health of inmates. Certainly recreation is an essential element in meeting this responsibility. In many instances, however, owing to lack of space, equipment, and proper jail design, provision for adequate recreation takes considerable creativity and ingenuity on the part of the jail staff.

Ideally, the jail would have a sufficient budget to permit full- or part-time personnel to organize and supervise a regular program of recreation and other leisure time activities. In the overwhelming majority of jails, however, this is not the case. Frequently a staff member is assigned this task and is given a very restricted budget with which to purchase necessary supplies.

But even with a small budget, there are many recreational and leisure activities which can be provided to relieve boredom and boost the physical and mental health of inmates. Among these activities are:

- Active outdoor recreation;
- Indoor physical recreation;
- Table games and hobbies;
- Television and radio;
- Libraries;
- Canteen visits; and
- Other resources.

Active Outdoor Recreation

If the jail has sufficient provision for outdoor recreation, fre-

quent use should be made of it. If there is no effort to provide organized activities, the boredom of the cellblock is just transferred to another setting. Basketball, softball, volleyball, shuffleboard, and weightlifting, among many others, are good activities. Additional use of the recreation yard can relieve the troublesome boredom that inevitably comes with a rigid routine. Weather permitting, some jails hold cookouts (hot dogs, hamburgers, watermelons, etc.) in the yard on holidays like July 4th and combine these with a schedule of field events such as races and basketball games.

In order to ensure the success of outdoor recreation programs, officers must carefully supervise inmates who are participating in them.

Each jail has its own regulations about the care of athletic equipment. However, the supervising officer must see that each piece of equipment is signed out by an inmate and returned by the same inmate; with this system the officer can determine whether or not the inmate has damaged the equipment.

In jails where organized games are played, inmates should be permitted to choose their own umpires and referees. The supervising officer should be concerned only with disagreements which arise among players and umpires, not whether a play was called fairly. If an argument arises over a "bad call," the officer should remind the inmate players that *they* chose the umpire and should abide by his decisions. It is helpful for the officer to keep a rule book available for reference when arguments persist. The only responsibility of the officer supervising recreation is to keep order and to make sure that the activity period is conducted according to schedule.

Case Study 1:

There were 18 inmates at the Reindeer County Jail who were serving lengthy sentences. They decided to make the most of the situation by establishing two softball teams. Inmate "short-timers" were always selected as umpires.

However, when the championship game was being played on July 4 to decide which team would be selected to play in an inmate "World Series" against winning teams from other jails, the inmate ballplayers said they would rather have an officer serve as umpire. Inmate Roberto Mendez, who coached one of the teams, suggested to his players that the usual inmate umpires might be unfair. Inmate Willie Walton, who coached the other team, agreed with Mendez.

Officer Jim-Bob Olssen agreed to serve as umpire. The game was held in the afternoon and several friends and relatives of inmates had been invited to watch. The team which Mendez coached, the Reindeer Raiders, was favored to win over Walton's team, the Jailbirds.

In the bottom of the ninth inning, with bases loaded and two outs, and the score tied at 3 to 3, inmate Tyrone Cobb of the Raiders was at the plate and already had two strikes against him. As the first pitch came in, the umpire, Officer Olssen, said it was "too low." The second pitch was "too high" and the third was "too wide." Everyone watching the game became tense. As the pitcher hurled the ball for the fourth time, Officer Olssen yelled, "Ball Four, you walk!" The inmate on third came home and the game was over. The Reindeer Raiders were the new champs and would soon be travelling around the state for the playoffs.

But as the inmates and their guests ate hot dogs and hamburgers in the recreation yard, a rumor began circulating that the officers had bet heavily on the game and were counting on the Raiders to win. According to the rumors, Officer Olssen had been "paid off" by his fellow officers to "make sure the Raiders won the game."

The rumor worked its way through the inmate population and fights soon began to break out. The visitors were sent home and the inmates were taken back to their cells. But once they were locked up for the night, they began to tear apart their living quarters. The next day inmates refused to participate in work details and announced they were "on strike" because the "officers fixed the game."

It took the sheriff two weeks to restore calm to the jail. In the meantime, he had to reassign all members of the Raiders ball team to segregated quarters away from the general population. Raider fans were also transferred to quarters where they could be together. The sheriff discovered that he had two hostile groups of inmates on his hands, all because he mistakingly agreed to let an officer umpire an inmate softball game.

The officer who supervises outdoor recreation activities should circulate around the area looking and listening, while remaining as inconspicuous as possible. He should monitor conflicts in a positive and confident manner without being aggressive. When resolving a potentially explosive situation, the officer should use his authority, since this gives the inmates an opportunity to "save face" without resorting to violence--it is not considered to be "unmanly" for inmates to back off from a fight if an officer orders them to do so.

Officers who are supervising inmate recreational activities should not join the games as "players"--the officer should remember that he is at the jail to work, not to enjoy himself by taking part in inmate recreational activities. Sometimes inmates try to get officers involved

as participants in games as a diversionary tactic. Too many officers who have proudly demonstrated their skills at "sinking baskets" or hitting home-runs have learned later that something "went down" while they were playing instead of supervising. The "something" could be contraband coming over the fence from the outside. Or an inmate and his friends could use this diversionary ploy to obtain an opportunity to inflict harm on another inmate. An officer cannot intervene in activities that he does not see. He must be alert and observant at all times.

The supervising officer should not cheer for any team or inmate, nor should he allow himself to be distracted by idle conversations with other officers or inmates.

Indoor Physical Recreation



Mini-gym.



"Listen, Snodgrass, you're not paying attention. Now let me tell you a little story about my high school days..."

If the facility does not have any outdoor recreation area, some part of the building should be identified and used to provide for physical recreation. Weights, calisthenics, and other means of "working out" do not require vast areas and space. Mini-gyms are available at reasonable cost, require limited space, and provide opportunity for a variety of forms of working out.

Table Games And Hobbies

Frequently, the recreational needs of inmates not interested in sports are neglected. Provision for a variety of other activities should be made. Chess, checkers, dominoes, playing cards, and other table games are inexpensive and are of interest to many people. In the past, there has been objection that such games might lead to gambling, but this has not proved to be a major problem. Inmates who want to gamble will find a way to do so; an alert staff can ordinarily keep it at a minimum so that gambling debts do not pile up. Crafts such as leather working or painting can provide many hours of wholesome activity at little cost. Some jails have solicited donations of musical instruments as another way of providing for a leisure time outlet.

Television And Radio

Television has today become a staple element in any institutional recreation program. The sets should be placed in areas to which the inmate population has ready access and should be enclosed to prevent tampering or instant repairs by the resident "expert" in the population. Hours during which television may be watched should be clearly posted with occasional exceptions made for special events. It is interesting to note that when serious disturbances occur in jails, the television sets are usually left intact regardless of whatever else might be destroyed.

Radio should be dealt with in the same manner as television. Some of the newer facilities have jacks in the cells or dormitories which enable the occupant to plug in earphones and listen to one of two or three stations. This arrangement allows for the satisfaction of individual taste and a substantial reduction in the noise level in the institution. Some jails now permit inmates who will be confined for a comparatively long time to have their own radios. If this is to be the policy, it is suggested that radios must be purchased through the commissary. This ensures some measure of uniformity, eliminates the "You let his in, why did you keep mine out?" controversy, eliminates a way of introducing contraband, and cuts down on the possibility of theft or damage. Small transistor radios are recommended. Upon purchase, some sort of inmate identification should be soldered or engraved on the radio to reduce the possibility of theft.

Radios and televisions can serve as "dampers" when problems with inmates arise. The mere thought of losing access to this form of media has the effect of keeping the cover on what might well be a boiling pot.

Libraries

Both education and recreation are provided by a library. Hence every jail should have one or make provisions with the local public library system for the delivery of books to inmates. Reading material should take into account the varying interests of the inmates and should include educational material, magazines, fiction and non-fiction, standard reference works, and legal materials. Inmates should have regular access to the library and be able to borrow books from it.

Some jails find that permitting regular visits to the library weakens security coverage or causes other problems. If that is the case, arrangements should be made for an institution "bookmobile" or cart which circulates in the housing units regularly and thus gives inmates regular access to reading materials. This is a service which volunteers can handle. If a "trustee" manages the library cart, he should be accompanied by an officer whenever he makes his rounds.

A major area of controversy arises when discussing library services in jail: censorship--what would and should not be allowed in the library as acceptable reading material. This area has been coming under the close scrutiny of the courts. Often, much staff time is used in deciding what is and is not proper reading material, time that could be better used on some other necessary jail function. Obviously books like *Escape From Jail Made Easy* pose a definite threat to the orderly administration of the jail, and such material should not be on jail library shelves. But, unfortunately, not all such decisions are that simple. A relatively easy rule of thumb is that whatever books could be taken out of or obtained through the local public library should be permitted in the jail library. Thus the jail is out of the censorship business, is using an objective criterion for its decision-making, and is treating its population like members of the community (which they are, especially those held in a pretrial detention status).

Officers must be *security conscious* even with a program as "wholesome" on the surface as a library, as the following news story illustrates:

THE BEST-SELLER

Popular Book at Jail Was Escape Literature

"Beggarmen, Thief" by Irwin Shaw was on the best-seller list at the Baltimore County Jail because of its hidden message--two hacksaw blades used in a recent escape of six prisoners.

Baltimore County Jail Administrator said today the escape of six inmates was engineered with the help of an outsider who hid the cutting blades in a copy of Shaw's book, which was on the county library's shelf.

Someone called an inmate at the jail and said, "Listen, I've just read a good book. 'Beggarmen, Thief' by Irwin Shaw. Check it out," the sheriff said.

Before the call, that someone had apparently climbed the ramp to the fiction section of the local public library, walked down aisle No. 4 and found the novel on the third shelf from the top.

After concealing the pieces of blade in one of the copies by either slicing the inside pages or securing them in the spine, the accomplice hid the other five copies of the book on various shelves so that only the tampered version remained when the inmates sent in their requests for library books.

All but one of the inmates has been recaptured since the October 23 escape, which was made possible by sawing through the window bars.

It was not determined if it was the inmates' idea or if it was something that has been going on for two or three months or five or 10 years.

It was doubtful if the accomplice who doctored the book would ever be identified. But the library staff, who delivers books to prisoners three times a week, was absolved of any responsibility for the incident.

November 3, 1979

Canteen Visits

The purpose of a canteen or commissary is to give inmates the chance to buy certain items or amenities which are not provided by the jail, ranging from candy bars and cigarettes, magazines, newspapers, and shaving supplies to radios, clothing and, in one jail, "near beer." These items help to break the inevitable monotony of the institutional diet and regimen and provide a few of life's simple pleasures to those confined. Items for sale should reflect inmate tastes and preferences within the framework of the security policies of the jail.

Space for the canteen is usually provided by the jail, as are such necessary store equipment as shelving and utilities. In all but the

Largest jails, the commissary is run by an employee detailed to the assignment on a part-time basis, by volunteers, or by inmates. In any event, it is advisable to conduct regular financial and inventory audits of the canteen and to clearly fix responsibility for finances and inventory control.




Inmates are sometimes permitted to work in commissaries but should not be given the responsibility of running the operation.

Inmate-run canteens cause several problems. If there is any theft, recovery of funds could be difficult should the inmate be released prior to discovery. Second, such a position gives the inmate considerable opportunity to play a power game. Whenever possible, the canteen should be run by a responsible staff member.

Since inmates are typically not allowed to have money in their possession, payment for goods is made by a signed order form or receipt for

goods received, the amount of which is then deducted from the inmate's institutional account. It is increasingly common for jails to allow the inmates to have a few dollars in change. This enables the use of vending machines for the most common purchases. Some mark-up over cost of the item is common practice, but in no case should the price of an item in the canteen exceed that which would be paid in a neighborhood store. Profits from the canteen are commonly used to purchase recreational or educational supplies or for some other inmate welfare project.



Vending machines are often used for the most common purchases.

In very small jails with few inmates and limited space, inmates are allowed to fill out and sign an order form once or twice a week, and then a jail employee purchases the item from the vendor or a store in the community. In this way, the basic inmate need is met but the jail receives none of the possible benefits of any profits realized from the activity.

Frequently, jails will place a maximum limit upon the cash amount of purchases which any one inmate can make during a one-or two-week period. The establishment of some sort of fair maximum is done to prevent jealousies arising from comparative affluence among the jail population, strong-arming, and gambling.

In deciding which items to stock in the commissary, care should be taken to ensure that the list represents the needs of the entire population. There are distinct differences in the needs and tastes among various minority groups when it comes to items such as food and grooming aids.

Properly stocked and administered, a canteen or commissary can be a definite asset in maintaining good inmate morale.

Other Leisure Activity Resources

A number of resources are available to help in developing and administering a recreation program. One of the best--and probably the most frequently overlooked--is the jail staff. Many staff members are quite proficient in a wide variety of leisure time activities (bridge, photography, etc.) and would be willing to share their knowledge and skills with the inmates. There is nothing that someone who is a "bug" about a hobby enjoys more than telling and showing other people about it. Use of this resource on either an assigned or volunteer basis usually makes an employee feel that he is more involved with the program and, justifiably, that he is making a significant contribution to the overall jail program.

Other resources in this program area include the local department of recreation, the recreation department at a local college or university, or the local school district. The National Recreation and Parks Association is showing increasing interest in recreation in corrections, and their local chapter may be of considerable assistance. Local service clubs may be helpful in obtaining recreational materials. Musical groups and other entertainers will often agree to come into the jail and perform free of charge.


While access to recreation and leisure services should be made readily available to all inmates, it is also possible to use recreation as an incentive. For example, one very overcrowded jail with little program space borrows movies on a variety of subjects and shows them three times a week to the dormitory which is the cleanest during inspection. Both inmate morale and jail sanitation have improved noticeably since the program began.

With proper use of both in-house and community resources and a healthy bit of creativity, a good recreation program can be developed despite what may be an inadequate physical plant provision for recreation.

VISITING SITUATIONS

Visits are important to most incarcerated people. They help to keep up morale and help inmates maintain contacts with the outside world--

contacts that may be vital to their return to society. Officers have an obligation to supervise visiting in order to discourage mischief. The necessity for close supervision should never be allowed to overshadow the importance of the visitation privilege itself, however.



Visiting rules should be posted in a conspicuous location.

Recommendations For Visitation

Basic recommendations concerning visitation in jails include:

1. Visiting privileges should be controlled in order to accomplish two main objectives:
 - (a) To permit the inmate to maintain authorized and reasonable contacts with his family, friends, and attorneys; and if awaiting trial, persons necessary in the preparation of his defense.
 - (b) To prevent the admission of contraband, and to prevent the planning of escapes or violence.
2. Reasonable visiting hours for general visits should be determined by the sheriff or jail administrator. Family visits are of primary importance, and should be allowed on a reasonable basis.
3. The jail may require advance notification of persons with whom the inmate desires to visit, including name, age, address, and relationship.
4. All visits should be supervised by a jail employee, and persons visiting should be kept under observation to see that they have no opportunity to pass anything to an inmate or leave contraband in the jail to be picked up later by an inmate.
5. Attorneys and religious advisors should be permitted to visit at reasonable times. Such visits should not be subject to any physical

barriers or restrictions unless requested, and should be free of monitoring and electronic or audio surveillance. Submission to a search may be required, however.

Maintaining Security

Like other privileges, visiting must be properly controlled to assure jail security. The jail officer who supervises visiting must be alert and competent. He should be friendly and considerate to visitors but at the same time he must be able to deal with them firmly if necessary.

The location and physical arrangements for visiting are critical factors to security. The visiting area should be located away from normal inmate detention areas. It should be in an area where the visitor has restricted access to the jail and jail personnel, but in which the jail personnel can still maintain control of the inmate during visitation.

The physical arrangements for visiting should allow the inmate adequate access to the visitor but at the same time must be secure enough so contraband cannot be passed and escapes cannot occur. There are a variety of possible arrangements. Some arrangements only permit "closed visiting," meaning that physical barriers between the inmate and the visitor prevent any physical contact. In "open visiting" arrangements they can make contact. Some of the more common arrangements include:



Hand-held metal detectors are used in some jails.



Telephones and Glass

This visiting arrangement prohibits inmate/visitor physical contact.

Telephones And Glass. Not widely used, this type of "closed" arrangement has total separation of inmate and visitor. It is the most secure arrangement. Personal contact is impossible, although the inmate and visitor can see each other through the glass as they talk over the phones. With this type of arrangement, minimal supervision is required. (See previous page for photo.)

Wire Mesh. In this "closed arrangement," a mesh screen between the visitor and the inmate permits no physical contact and also prevents the possibility of contraband being passed--assuming that the screen is strong and the mesh fairly fine. Adequate supervision is necessary with this setup to discourage tampering with the screen.

Tables. Some visiting areas have tables at which the inmate and the visitor sit across from each other. The tables have four- to six-inch boards down the middle to discourage the passing of contraband. However, contraband can be passed more easily in this "open" arrangement than with other arrangements, so extremely close supervision is required. The advantage of this arrangement is that it allows inmates and visitors to meet in a more normal, personal way.

Minimum Security Arrangements

For minimum security inmates, such as those in some work release programs, visiting may be done in lounge settings where inmates and visitors are allowed to sit together. Naturally, since this arrangement is the least secure of all, it demands close supervision.

No matter what the particular physical arrangements for visiting, it is essential that there be adequate supervision procedures. Smuggling of contraband is the basic security problem of visitation. Any physical contact between inmate and visitors presents an opportunity for such smuggling. For example, when an inmate is allowed to kiss his wife or girlfriend it is easy for one of them to pass drugs, money, tools, or weapons to the other. The jail officer should be suspicious of prolonged embraces. If jail policy permits such physical contact, there should always be a reasonable length of time allowed for such contact, but not too long.

In addition, there should be definite security procedures designed to discourage passing of contraband. For example, jail policy might call for a strip search of inmates after every "open" visit. Policy also might call for random searches in cases where the supervising officer feels he has reason to be suspicious. Some jails routinely search every visitor. In any case, *it is important that the jail rules clearly state the policies regarding such searches.* Otherwise, the inmate or visitor may claim unfair or arbitrary treatment.

If contact (or "open") visiting is permitted, special clothing should be issued for visiting periods. The clothing must be removed as soon as the inmate leaves the visiting area (a room for this purpose must be located next to the visiting area). The inmate should also be searched and officers should check the inside of his mouth for contraband (such as narcotics or money).

A jail officer supervising visits must always be aware of what is going on. He should not allow himself to become distracted by noise or unusual behavior. At times, distractions are deliberately planned to cover up the smuggling of contraband or other illicit activities, such as an escape attempt. If a problem develops, the supervising officer should call for assistance immediately. If particular inmates or visitors become loud or unruly, they should first be warned that such behavior is unacceptable. Then, if the behavior continues, the visit should be terminated.

Case Study 2:

Big Sky County Jail inmate Nancy Sabanosh was discovered comatose in her cell on Monday morning. Sunday afternoon she had been visited by her common-law husband. Admitted to the jail for robbing her prostitution clients, Sabanosh was a known heroin addict who had already been withdrawn from the narcotic "cold turkey" in the jail infirmary. Since she was not considered to be an escape risk or in need of maximum security, Sabanosh was allowed "contact" visits.

During the Sunday visit, Sabanosh and her husband had kissed each other passionately and held the embrace for several minutes. Officer Arlene Bertothy, a rookie, became embarrassed at the display of affection and looked away. During the kiss, inmate Sabanosh swallowed a rubber balloon containing heroin, which her husband had concealed inside a large wad of bubblegum he had in his mouth when he entered the jail. Officer Bertothy saw the bubblegum but thought nothing of it.

During the night inmate Sabanosh recovered the balloon of heroin from her excrement. Using a homemade "works" kit, she injected the heroin into her arm and overdosed. By the time officers began to line up the inmates for breakfast, Sabanosh had slipped into a coma. Officers found the "works" kit and the empty balloon and realized what had happened. Rushed to the County Hospital Emergency Room, inmate Sabanosh eventually recovered.

While it is practically impossible to discover the introduction of contraband in a case such as this, the jail officer can lessen the opportunity for such a transfer to take place. This is done by properly

instructing the inmate prior to the visit about the type of contact that will be permitted. An officer should tell inmates and their visitors that long, passionate kissing is prohibited and should immediately intervene if such conduct occurs. Through constant observation, the officer can prevent any breach of the jail's visiting policies. In addition, it is probably unwise to permit a known narcotics addict to have contact visits, since there is a high probability that a visitor will attempt to pass narcotics to the inmate.

Searching The Visiting Area

In addition to providing good supervision during visits, it is necessary to search the visiting area thoroughly *before* visits and *immediately after*. If inmate "trusties" clean the visiting area, then officers must search the area thoroughly *before* inmates are permitted to begin their cleaning tasks. An effective search involves the following procedures:

1. Look on the floor under the tables and chairs where inmates sit. Carefully search the bottoms of the chairs and tables-- it is easy for a visitor to use a wad of gum to attach a balloon of narcotics, razor blades, or hacksaw blades to the underside of a table or chair.
2. Check to see that everything is in order--that is, nothing has been altered, such as screws loosened or detachable parts removed from tables or chairs.
3. If visitors are separated from inmates by a partition, check all pipes, cigarette butt cans, entrance ways to the visiting area, and so forth, after visiting periods.
4. Ensure that inmate workers assigned to clean the area have no contact with visitors.

Case Study 3:

Jorge Bolivia, who was accused of shooting a police officer during a bank robbery, was admitted to the Rattlesnake County Jail in early January. When his FBI criminal history report arrived at the jail, Intake Section Lieutenant Jason Yankee discovered that the jail officers had a real "problem case" on their hands-- the new inmate had previously escaped from six correctional institutions. Lt. Yankee classified Bolivia as an "escape risk" and assigned him to maximum security. He also posted an order stating that Bolivia was not entitled to "contact" visits; he could talk to visitors only through a Plexiglass security window, with an officer observing him at all times. Unlike most inmates, who

were permitted "contact" visits, Bolivia could talk to visitors only by using a telephone while looking at the visitor through the glass screen.

After Bolivia had been in the jail for five weeks, with no attempted escapes, officers began to relax their supervision of him. One Sunday afternoon Bolivia's teenage sister came to visit him. Officer Steve Styles, who was assigned to supervise Bolivia, had had a tiring afternoon and, since his shift was about to end, he was tense and restless. He knew it was impossible for Bolivia to escape because of the solid wall separating him from the visitors. Based on the assumption that Bolivia could not escape, Officer Styles decided that it was safe for him to leave the secured visiting room for a few minutes to stand behind the door in the corridor and smoke a cigarette.

While Officer Styles was in the corridor, inmate Bolivia's sister removed two screws in the Plexiglass screen, using a small sewing machine repair kit screwdriver which she had brought into the jail in her purse. She then pried open the molding around the Plexiglass and slipped two hacksaw blades through to Bolivia. He quickly hid the blades in his socks. The screws in the molding were then replaced.

When Officer Styles returned to the room, he saw that nothing had changed. Bolivia and his sister were still engaged in an animated conversation. The visit soon ended and Officer Styles took Bolivia back to his cell without bothering to search him.

A week later inmate Bolivia finally completed his task of sawing through the window bars in his basement cell. He had used a paste made from cigarette ashes and toothpaste to keep the bars in place during the day. Bolivia escaped from the antiquated jail at 3 a.m. when security was very lax. His sister had a car waiting.

Bolivia was recaptured in Florida after a two-week crime spree through several states. He left behind him two severely injured gas station attendants, a bank guard with a non-fatal bullet wound in his abdomen, and three young rape victims, who were also robbed.

This escape was made possible because Officer Styles let his guard down. The escape was easy to accomplish once inmate Bolivia had hacksaw blades. Although the poor condition of the old jail facilitated the escape, the very fact that the jail was old and dilapidated should have made officers even more cautious--especially since Bolivia's criminal history report had warned them that the inmate was an escape risk. Officers should have been constantly alert for the introduction of contraband to this inmate. In addition to watching Bolivia during every minute of his visiting period, officers should have searched him as well

after each visit. *Jail officers should never assume that a physical barrier will stop an ingenious visitor from figuring out how to pass contraband to the inmate behind the glass or screen.*

Authorization Of Visitors

Many jails require that all visitors be authorized. In some cases, the inmate is required to list specific people whom he would like to receive visits from, and only those people are allowed to visit. One reason for this is to ensure that only a limited number of visitors will come to the jail, since handling visits absorbs staff time. Another reason is to help ensure the identities of visitors. This is accomplished by having the inmate list the age and/or address of visitors he wishes to see, and then verifying that information with the visitor.

Hours Of Visitation

Regular visitation hours should be arranged to best accommodate normal schedules of visitors. In general, weekday evenings and weekend afternoons are the best times. Many jails schedule two regular visitation periods per week, usually one during the week and one during the weekend. Depending upon the size of the facility, of course, visiting hours can be more or less flexible. Visitation scheduling must also take into account the availability of staff to supervise visiting. Without adequate supervision, problems will inevitably develop.

In addition, the length of visits must be regulated. A minimum visitation period of 15 minutes is usually reasonable. Both visitor and inmate should know the time limit beforehand.

Professional Visits

Every inmate has the right to visit with his attorney. These visits must be confidential and supervision should be minimal. Every jail should have a designated area, such as a conference room, for inmates to talk with attorneys. It may be too distracting for the visit to take place in regular visiting areas, as well as not being sufficiently private. If a jail officer happens to overhear any part of a conversation between an inmate and an attorney, he must be careful not to repeat what he has heard. To do so could cause legal problems.

Visits by probation agents or other officials should be handled in the same way as attorney visits. The same confidentiality must be safeguarded.

This is also true for visits from religious advisers. All inmates have the right to religious counseling, in addition to their right to

attend religious services. Conversations between inmates and religious advisers are privileged, and must be permitted to take place in privacy. However, the jail always has the right to require any visitor--whether attorney or minister--to submit to a search before and after visiting.

Attorneys and religious advisers should be allowed to visit "at reasonable times." Thus, such visits need not be allowed at all hours of the day or night. They may be allowed during certain specific hours with the possibility for "reasonable" flexibility.

Curtailement Of Visitation Rights

An inmate usually should not be denied *complete* visitation rights for disciplinary reasons, although it may become necessary to restrict visitation privileges for a short time as a disciplinary measure. Or, it may be necessary to modify visitation procedures when an inmate's behavior has been inappropriate or when there is an obvious threat of violence or escape. For example, if a particular inmate started a fight while visiting with someone in a minimum security visiting arrangement, it would be reasonable to restrict his further visits to a more secure setting where physical contact is not possible. However, complete denial of visitation privileges is called for only under the most extreme circumstances.

Extreme To Normal Procedures

Although there must be standard policies and procedures for visitation, there must also be *some* flexibility to allow for exceptions. For example, the jail policy may allow one visit per week of 15 minutes. But suppose an inmate's mother comes to visit from out-of-state. Should the visit be restricted to only 15 minutes? No. In such a case, an exception to the rules should be allowed. However, to ensure fairness in all cases, the decision on such exceptions should be made by the sheriff, jail administrator, or a designated officer. Thus the jail officers are relieved of the responsibility of having to make decisions that could easily lead to charges of discrimination.

SUMMARY

1. Recreational and leisure activities need to be provided in the jail to relieve boredom and promote good physical and mental health for those who are incarcerated.

Even jails with small budgets can provide recreational activities. If outdoor recreation is provided for inmates, they must be carefully supervised to prevent escape attempts and fights. Officers supervising inmates should remember that they are officers who have a job to perform; they should not join in inmate games as "players"-- officers must be alert and observant at all times. Nor should officers cheer for particular inmates or teams during competitive activities; this tends to create hostility among the inmates who are not "favored" and could lead to serious future problems in the jail. Radios and televisions serve a useful purpose in the cell areas--they can calm down inmates during tense periods. With proper use of both in-house and community resources, it is possible for officers to develop a good recreational/leisure-time program to meet the needs of inmates.

2. For the incarcerated person, visits from family members and friends are extremely important.

Visits help improve morale among the inmate population, particularly when visits are "open" and inmates are allowed to touch their visitors. However, the visiting period also provides an opportunity for contraband to be introduced into the jail. Officers must remain extremely alert while supervising visiting periods and take care to search inmates after contact visits. In addition, officers should never assume that a physical barrier will stop an ingenious visitor from figuring out how to pass contraband to the inmate behind the glass or screen.

Suggested Readings

- Jail Management: Correspondence Course for Jailers.* Vol. 5. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Prisons, 1967.
- Kerper, H.B. and J. Kerper. *Legal Rights of the Convicted.* St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1974.
- Miller, Eugene E. *Jail Management.* Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1978.
- National Sheriffs' Association. *A Handbook on Jail Security, Classification and Discipline.* Washington, D. C.: National Sheriffs' Association, 1974.
- National Sheriffs' Association. *Handbook on Inmates Legal Rights.* Washington, D. C.: National Sheriffs' Association, 1974.

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- National Sheriffs' Association. *Handbook on Inmates Legal Rights.* Washington, D. C.: National Sheriffs' Association, 1974.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

DIABETIC AND EPILEPTIC INMATES

Jail officers in the truest sense of the word are people watchers. What they see and how they react can have a direct effect on the day-to-day operations of a jail.

On any given day the officer deals with persons who differ widely in background, temperament, emotional stability, and physical condition. Faced with supervising many individuals who have a bewildering variety of needs, the officer often becomes confused about the limits of his responsibilities and about the proper responses necessary to handle the problems the inmates bring with them to jail. Too often a jail officer who lacks proper training or information hides his confusion with indifference, callousness, or hostility.


The jail officer is not expected to be a medical expert or diagnostician, but he must have a working knowledge of certain physical and emotional symptoms. Typically, people respond with anxiety when faced with situations where they have misinformation or inadequate knowledge. This is especially true for the jail officer who is required to supervise inmates who are diabetics or epileptics. Therefore, it is necessary that the officer be given basic information about the day-to-day health problems of diabetics and epileptics, since these inmates may become seriously ill while the officer is supervising them, and he must react properly or the inmate could die.

Of equal importance is the need for the officer to learn to describe the symptoms of illness that he sees. The officer must become an initiator of referrals and, to a great extent, an assistant to the medical staff.

THE DIABETIC INMATE

The diabetic inmate presents a special medical problem. However, diabetes can be controlled in a jail environment with proper medication. Jail officers should be aware of the seriousness of this disease which the diabetic must regulate himself under the supervision of the jail physician.

The physician should explain the diabetic inmate's program to jail officers so that they can safeguard both the health of the affected inmates and the security of the institution. The knowledgeable officer will recognize that *some* diabetic inmates may try to use their disease to get special treatment, but at the same time he will realize that support of the diabetic treatment program will avoid the medical emergencies of *diabetic coma* and *insulin reaction*. Jail officers should be prepared for these and other health crises on the job through first-aid courses and staff training by medical personnel.



Insulin and syringe

Diabetes is a disease in which the body cannot make normal use of sugar, starch, and other food. When a person is a diabetic, his body does not produce or use enough *insulin*, a hormone produced in the pancreas to help break down and convert sugar. As the body converts food to sugar in a diabetic, the sugar builds up and is not absorbed, creating a condition that can cause severe complications and even death. Diabetics must have insulin introduced directly into their bodies through medication.

Inmates who have diabetes often compound their problem through alcohol abuse, which raises the body's sugar level very quickly and destroys the metabolic balance achieved from insulin injections.

The fact that the diabetic is on insulin does not mean that he is no longer a medical problem. Once he is taking insulin, the diabetic must constantly balance the right amount of insulin with the right amounts of sugar and food. This task is difficult because the body's needs change from day to day. A regular schedule of insulin, diet, and exercise is the best way to ensure the good health of the diabetic. Nevertheless, even the most responsible diabetics are in danger of falling into two severe medical complications. The more common emergency, *insulin reaction*, occurs when the body takes in too much insulin and not enough sugar. Insulin reaction also can result from consuming too little food or from exercising excessively. The second reaction is a *diabetic coma*, also known as *acidosis*, which occurs when the patient has assimilated too much sugar and fatty acids and not enough insulin.

Jail officers and other personnel dealing with diabetic inmates should be familiar with the following warning signs of insulin reaction and or acidosis/diabetic coma.

DIABETIC EMERGENCY

<u>SIGNS</u>	<u>INSULIN REACTION</u>	<u>ACIDOSIS/DIABETIC COMA</u>
<u>Onset</u>	Sudden	Gradual
<u>Skin</u>	Pale, moist	Flushed, dry
<u>Behavior</u>	Nervous, confused, irritable, excited	Drowsy
<u>Breath</u>	Normal	Fruity, sweet acetone odor
<u>Vomiting</u>	Absent	Present
<u>Tongue</u>	Moist	Dry
<u>Hunger</u>	Present, desire for sugar absent	Probably absent
<u>Thirst</u>	Present	Present
<u>Urine</u>	Little or no sugar in urine	Frequent urination with high level of sugar in urine

Emergency Treatment For Insulin Reaction

Most diabetics will know when they are falling into insulin reaction. Officers should immediately give the affected inmate some form of sugar, such as a candy bar or a glass of orange juice. A diabetic who has lapsed into unconsciousness may require an injection of glucose. A temporary remedy that an officer can apply is to smear a glucose paste, honey, corn syrup, or cake decorating paste in the inmate's mouth and around his gums. A physician should be called for any diabetic who collapses in this manner.


Emergency Treatment For Acidosis/Diabetic Coma

When an inmate becomes comatose, officers should call a doctor or ambulance immediately. The patient will need insulin and possibly a saline intravenous feeding to prevent dehydration.

It should be remembered that there are times when a diabetic on insulin needs sugar. Officers should not be afraid to give a known diabetic sugar if the individual feels the need for it and has symptoms of an insulin reaction. Even if the officer guesses wrong, one candy bar or glass of orange juice will cause little harm to the diabetic on insulin.

Security With Users Of Insulin

Security requires that all medications and medical devices remain with the jail staff. Arrangements should be made, however, to let inmates take their medications and injections at the proper intervals under proper staff supervision. The jail officer should collect all materials after the injection--especially the needle and syringe, since they could be used for drug abuse within the jail.



Medical alert bracelet and medical card

Diabetics should wear nonmetallic, nontransferable bracelets or a Medical-Alert tag as a means of medical identification. If a diabetic inmate is not wearing such a badge when he is admitted to the jail, then one should be issued to him.

Urine Testing

Ideally, all diabetics should test their urine four times daily. Jail personnel responsible for diabetic inmates should consult with the jail physician concerning this matter. There are several simple testing kits which inmates could use in their cells if the physician orders urine testing.

Case Study 1:

Turkey County Jail inmate Phyllis Shoefly is a diabetic who participates in a work-release program. She was sentenced to serve 15 months at the county jail because she assaulted a police officer when he was trying to arrest her for driving while intoxicated. Inmate Shoefly works as a cashier in the student cafeteria at Turkey Technological and Agricultural University, and she has become good friends with Nat Hawthorne, a heavy drinker who works in the cafeteria kitchen.

One Friday afternoon when inmate Shoefly was signing back into the jail for the night, the supervising officer, Lois Lane, noticed that she had a fruity odor on her breath, her breathing was deep and rapid, and she appeared to be intoxicated, since she was having trouble opening her locker and couldn't seem to unbutton her blouse.

"Mrs. Shoefly, have you been drinking?" Officer Lane asked.

"No, I haven't," inmate Shoefly lied. "I'm just tired, that's all." Inmate Shoefly then passed out.

Since she knew that inmate Shoefly was a diabetic, Officer Lane suspected that she was in a diabetic coma. Officer Lane also suspected that Shoefly had been drinking and knew that alcohol causes too much sugar to accumulate, negating the effects of insulin. She immediately called an ambulance, and inmate Shoefly was rushed to the hospital for treatment.

By acting quickly and knowing the signs of diabetic coma, Officer Lane was able to save inmate Shoefly's life. Subsequent interviews with employees at the Turkey Tech cafeteria revealed that Nat Hawthorne had brought a bottle of bourbon to work and had shared it with inmate Shoefly. While she was confined to the hospital, the jail physician spoke at length with inmate Shoefly about the dangers of drinking. She agreed to join the Alcoholics Anonymous group at the jail.

THE EPILEPTIC INMATE

Epilepsy is a medical disorder characterized by seizures of one kind or another. These seizures are caused by temporary imbalances in the normal electrical activity of the brain. These electrical "storms" can result in severe seizures, convulsions, confusion, muscular spasms, and temporary loss of consciousness.

Often no specific cause can be found to explain why a person has epilepsy--anyone may be afflicted. But scientists and doctors do know that some types of epilepsy can develop from head injuries, poor nutrition, severe fever, and certain severe medical problems. Contrary to myths, there is no such thing as an epileptic personality or mentality.

According to the Epilepsy Foundation of America, 2,000,000 Americans have epilepsy. This disease affects about one of every 1,000 people in the United States. Epilepsy is more common in prisons and jails than in the general population. For example, in a study at the Cook County Jail in Chicago, five percent of 50,000 inmates had at least one epileptic attack in their lives. This would be five out of 100 people.

Emergency Care For The Epileptic

It is probable that a correctional officer and not a doctor will be the first person to reach an inmate who is having an epileptic seizure. Thus, it is essential that the officer has been trained to know what to do, since the natural, well-meaning reactions of untrained fellow inmates can actually harm the epileptic patient. There are TWO major types of epileptic seizures which affect adults. Every officer should know how to respond to each situation.

Grand Mal Epilepsy. "Grand mal" seizures are those which are usually associated with epilepsy. In a grand mal attack the patient suffers convulsions or a seizure which may last from one to twenty minutes, but usually less than five minutes. During a typical grand mal seizure, the patient suddenly becomes rigid and falls in the direction he is leaning. This is followed by jerking, convulsive movements.

Many epileptics will experience a warning signal prior to the seizure known as an "aura." The aura may occur as a sensation of unusual smells, colors, numbness, tingling, or other sensory disturbances.

Known epileptics experiencing the aura should be made to lie down in a safe place. Some epileptics will utter a loud cry before their seizure. Although the epileptic will be confused after a seizure, he should be able to return to normal activities after resting. How much rest is needed varies from individual to individual.

Witnessing a grand mal seizure may be frightening to the untrained individual, for little can be done to help a patient once a seizure has started. Most efforts should be directed to keep the patient from harming himself. Once an epileptic seizure begins, jail officers can take the following steps:

1. Keep calm. An officer cannot stop a seizure once it has begun. DO NOT try to restrain the patient or revive him.
2. DO clear the area around the patient of all hard, sharp, or hot objects since he may harm himself as he convulses. If the attack occurs in an unusually dangerous place, such as a ledge from which the inmate might fall, the officer can restrain him by turning him on his side and placing a firm grip on his shoulder until the convulsions have ended.
3. DO NOT force anything between the patient's teeth. Do not put anything into his mouth. If the inmate's mouth is open when an officer arrives, he can place a soft object, such as a balled-up handkerchief, between the patient's side teeth. This creates an airway and keeps the patient from biting his tongue or cheek. If, however, the jaw and teeth are already clenched, the damage has been done and the officer should not try to pry the teeth apart. It is not true that epileptics are likely to "swallow" their tongues. An officer should never let anyone place an object in the patient's mouth.
4. Turn the patient's head to the side to allow saliva to drain from the mouth. Although the patient's mouth may foam or froth, DO NOT be concerned if the patient appears to stop breathing temporarily and appears to be blue in the face. Unless an officer feels that the seizure is associated with a heart condition or suffocation, he should not administer oxygen.
5. When the seizure has ended, let the patient recover on his own. If the seizure is brief, the patient will perhaps be confused but will be able to return to normal activities after a rest. If the seizure is long, the patient will lapse into a deep sleep or coma from which he will awaken in a few hours.

6. BE CONCERNED if the patient seems to pass from one seizure to another without gaining consciousness. This is called status epilepticus, which is a serious medical emergency. A doctor should be summoned at once.
7. Although a normal epileptic attack usually requires little first aid unless the patient was injured in his fall or convulsion, the officer should allow the patient to rest. He should immediately call the jail's physician. During the attack, the officer should observe the inmate closely so that he can give the physician a reliable medical report.
8. Convulsions can be caused by poisoning, high fever, heart disorders, and other severe ailments. An epileptic attack comes without warning, but other types of convulsions are usually associated with medical symptoms such as high fever, stomach pains, chest pain, etc. When in doubt, the officer should summon a doctor immediately.

Psychomotor Epilepsy. Psychomotor epilepsy can easily be mistaken for drunkenness. Psychomotor seizures last about fifteen to twenty minutes. There is a rapid onset of confusion or dizziness, which is followed by disordered mental functioning, including incoherent speech. After a short seizure the patient may not know he had an attack. After a long psychomotor seizure, the patient will be in a state of confusion for some time. The procedures for handling psychomotor seizures are the same as for *grand mal* seizures. An officer should not restrain the patient unless it is for his personal safety. In psychomotor epilepsy the patient is semi-conscious and may react violently to restraint although he is not aware of his actions. However, the patient may listen to kind, non-threatening suggestions during his attack, such as: "why don't you sit down in this chair?" or "why don't you leave your assignment and come over here to rest?" An officer should always let the jail physician know a seizure has occurred. He should try not to confuse these symptoms with other disorders.

Psychomotor epilepsy is difficult even for a doctor to distinguish from drunkenness. Hence, it sometimes happens that police will mistakingly arrest persons for being drunk in public or disorderly conduct when, in fact, they are epileptics suffering a seizure. This means that anybody booked into the jail who is seemingly drunk must be checked on frequently.

Case Study 2:

A "drunk" was booked into a small, rural jail. The officer

put him in a cell to sleep it off and did not check the man for three hours. At the time, he noticed absolutely no movement of any kind, went into the cell to investigate, and found the man dead. The dead man had been suffering a seizure, had not been drunk, and had died from a lack of proper attention.



"The city police arrested him for being drunk and disorderly--hey! You hear me? Boy, this guy is really out of it. We'll just let him sleep it off."

Situations like the one described in the case study occur at least two or three times a year in jails in the United States. They would not happen at all if officers are properly trained to deal with psychomotor epileptic seizures.

Special Considerations For Epileptics In Jail

Epileptics can be confused with drunks or drug addicts when they experience seizures. An officer should not make assumptions. When new inmates are being admitted to the jail, booking officers should check for emergency medical bracelets, necklaces, or wallet cards and take appropriate steps to notify the officers who will be supervising the inmates. The booking officer should also notify the medical staff or the jail's physician.

As with all drugs in a jail, supervising officers should make sure the epileptic inmate actually takes medication each time it is given to him.

Officers on each shift should know who the epileptic inmates are. Each epileptic should wear a Medical-Alert bracelet, which should not be metal (for security purposes) and which cannot be removed or given to another inmate.

Officers should be alert for known epileptics who may fake attacks as part of a coordinated escape with other inmates. In all cases, when an officer's attention must be *totally* centered on one inmate, he should secure help so that other inmates are supervised and controlled. As with any medical problem about which there is doubt, the officer should call a doctor immediately.

SUMMARY

1. Although the inmate who has diabetes presents a special medical problem, this problem can be controlled in the jail environment with proper medication.

Officers must learn about the day-to-day health problems of diabetics since these inmates may become seriously ill; if the officer does not react properly to a diabetic crisis, then the inmate could die. The diabetic inmate must regulate his own medication and diet under the supervision of a jail physician. However, the officer must supervise the inmate's use of insulin and other drugs to ensure proper security and to make certain that the inmate is taking his medication at the proper intervals.

2. Since the officer is often the first person to reach an inmate who is having an epileptic seizure, he must know how to respond properly.

There are two types of epileptic seizures common to adults: "grand mal" and psychomotor epilepsy. Epileptics can be confused with drunks or drug addicts when they experience a seizure; therefore, a booking officer should not make hasty assumptions about the inmate. Officers on each shift should know who the epileptic inmates are and supervise them when they are given medication. Officers should be aware that known epileptics may fake a "seizure" as part of a coordinated escape attempt with other inmates.

MATERIALS PRICE LIST

For further information contact the Epilepsy Foundation of America nearest you.

PAMPHLETS

A Patient's Guide to EEG.....	\$.04
Answers to Questions.....	.10
Anticonvulsant Drug Chart.....	.50
Are You As Well Informed as You Think?.....	.05
Because You Are My Friend (English).....	.12
Because You Are My Friend (Spanish).....	.10
Books on the Epilepsies for Lay and Professional Readers.....	N/C
Can Epilepsy and Its Consequences be Prevented?.....	.10
Epilepsia: Esperanza en la Investigacion.....	N/C
Epilepsy and the School Age Child.....	.06
Epilepsy Films & Audio Visuals for Lay and Professional Audiences..	N/C
Epilepsy School Alert.....	.06
Epilepsy: You and Your Child.....	.25
La Epilepsia (Spanish Q & A).....	.06
Medications for Epilepsy.....	.15
Recognition and First Aid.....	.10
Research into the Epilepsies.....	N/C
Role of the Nurse.....	.10
Teacher's Role.....	N/C
Teacher Tips.....	.06
What Everyone Should Know About Epilepsy.....	.15
Employment Action on Epilepsy.....	N/C
TAPS in Action.....	N/C

REPRINTS

Epilepsy: An Update on Treating Brain Disorders..... (Better Homes and Gardens, May, 1977)	.04
Epilepsy: You Can Have It, Too..... (The Health Letter, October, 1977)	.10

BOOKS

Basic Statistics on the Epilepsies (Hardback with corrective insert) (155 pp. F.A. Davis Co.) Epilepsy Foundation of America	1.50
Epilepsy Rehabilitation (Paperback)..... (275 pp. Little, Brown & Co.) Edited by George W. Wright, Ph.D.	8.80

BOOKS, Cont'd

The Epilepsy Fact Book (Paperback)..... \$ 6.50
(116 pp. F.A. Davis Co.)
Harry Sands, Ph.D. and Frances C. Minters

OTHER PRINTED MATERIALS

History of the Epilepsy Movement..... 1.00
National Spokesman (newspaper)
Annual Subscription..... 5.00
Back Issues as Available..... .55
School Alert Kit..... 2.00

EFA CASSETTES & SLIDES

Understanding and Living with Epilepsy (2-hour audio cassette)..... 10.00
"Because You Are My Friend", Audio/Slide presentation..... 25.00
(includes set of 41 color slides and 5-minute audio
cassette for either automatic or manual slide changing)

EFA FILMS

Doctors Talk About Epilepsy..... 135.00
Epilepsy: Don't Look Away..... 100.00
Epilepsy: For Those Who Teach..... 110.00
Epilepsy: For Those Who Help..... 110.00
Epilepsy: Pass the Word..... 110.00
Nurses Talk About Epilepsy..... 110.00

EFA REGIONAL SERVICE CENTERS

Epilepsy Foundation of America
Eastern Regional Office
4327 Memorial Drive, Suite K
Decatur, GA 30032
(404) 296-0606

Epilepsy Foundation of America
Midwest Regional Office
6 North Michigan Ave., Suite 1202
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 332-6888

Epilepsy Foundation of America
Western Regional Office
6117 Reseda Blvd., Suite G
Reseda, CA 91335
(213) 344-0170

Suggested Readings

Isele, Wm. Paul. *Health Care in Jails: Legal Obligations to the Pre-Trial Detainee*. Chicago, Ill.: American Medical Association, N.D.
Isele, Wm. Paul. *Inmates' Medical Records and Jail Inmates' Rights to Refuse Medical Treatment*. Chicago, Ill.: American Medical Association, N.D.
Isele, Wm. Paul. *The Use of Allied Health Personnel in Jails: Legal Considerations*. Chicago, Ill.: American Medical Association, N.D.
Novick, Lloyd and Mohamed S. Al-Ibrahim. *Health Problems in the Prison Setting: A Clinical and Administrative Approach*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1977.

CHAPTER TWENTY

MEDICAL PROBLEMS CONFRONTING WOMEN INMATES

Women inmates in the jail may experience pain or discomfort resulting from a number of urgent medical situations. In most cases, these are not life-and-death situations. However, proper medical attention should be provided to prevent complications.

Because of the unique nature of female medical emergencies and the psychological traumas that such emergencies can produce in the inmate, it is important that jails employ women officers. However, even if jails do employ women officers, *all* officers should be aware of the common signs and symptoms indicating possible gynecological/obstetrical emergencies and know when it is necessary to summon an ambulance *immediately* or call a physician.

Obstetrical emergencies are usually quite serious and the inmate should receive *immediate* medical attention. In most cases, pregnant inmates are identified during the booking and admissions process--when these inmates are identified, officers can provide proper medical care for them. However, *some* women who are in the early stages of pregnancy when they are admitted to the jail *will not be aware* of their condition. Thus, officers should be prepared to consider the possibility of an obstetrical emergency if women inmates of childbearing age suddenly become ill.

GYNECOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES

Some general signs and symptoms of potentially serious gynecological conditions include:

- Unusually heavy vaginal bleeding;
- Pain or tenderness in lower abdominal area;
- Abnormal vaginal discharge; and
- Pain, tenderness, and/or swelling, usually of external genitalia.

If any of these symptoms are present, officers should call a physician to examine the inmate.

In addition, women inmates may develop medical emergencies resulting from several specific conditions. These include: pelvic inflammatory disease, genital trauma, lower genital tract infections, and birth control complications.

Pelvic Inflammatory Disease (P.I.D.)

This disease usually results from an infection of the pelvic organs. The infection can result from gonorrhea, or can occur following delivery or abortions.

Signs and symptoms of P.I.D. include:

- Pain and tenderness in lower abdominal area;
- Woman may be seen bent at waist with both hands pressing against lower abdomen;
- Usually fever;
- Possible discharge from vagina; and
- Possible nausea, or vomiting.

An officer who encounters an inmate who shows these symptoms should minimize her activities and transport her to an emergency room or doctor's office, keeping her in a semi-reclining position.

Genital Trauma

A wound or injury to the genital area, internal or external, could result from an accident or sexual assault, or could be self-inflicted. Damage may be slight or quite severe. It is best to receive professional medical evaluation of the injury or wound if it seems at all serious.

Possible causes of genital trauma include:

- Kick or other direct blow during a fight;
- Blow from a sharp or blunt instrument;
- Violent or unusual techniques of masturbation; and
- Sexual assault.

The officer assisting this inmate should take the following steps:

1. Make the inmate comfortable;
2. Control bleeding with direct pressure, using a sanitary napkin or other clean, dry material;
3. Apply cold packs if there is swelling of the external genitalia;
4. Arrange for medical evaluation, even if damage seems slight; and
5. If pain and/or bleeding is severe, take the inmate to an emergency room.

Case Study 1:

During a hot spell in July, when outdoor temperatures soared above 100 degrees, the inmate living quarters at the dilapidated Rattlesnake County Jail were like an oven. For the inmates, it was unbearable to be confined to their cells. One day at lunch in the women's section dayroom, inmates Jane Seabright and Emma Lou Bonjour attacked each other during an argument over a male "trustee" they both liked. None of the other inmates were certain who started the fight, but they did tell Officer Carrie Nation that inmate Seabright was a "kicker" who had delivered some severe blows to inmate Bonjour's abdominal area. Officer Nation asked Bonjour if she wanted to see a doctor, but the inmate said no.

"I just want to lie down in my cell for awhile," she told Officer Nation.

Officer Nation checked inmate Bonjour every 15 minutes. Bonjour slept during the rest of the dayshift's tour of duty. But Officer Nation was worried about her. She wrote a complete incident report and told incoming Officer Marcia Harrison to "keep an eye on Bonjour-- she might be hurt."

At 5:00 p.m. when she checked on inmate Bonjour, Officer Harrison noticed a large red stain spreading across the inmate's jail trousers. Checking further, she found that inmate Bonjour was bleeding severely from the vagina. After administering first aid to control the bleeding, Officer Harrison summoned the duty sergeant, and he called for an ambulance.

The emergency room physician told them that inmate Bonjour had been four months pregnant, a fact which was unknown to the officers, and that the severe kicks to her abdomen had caused a miscarriage.

If Officers Nation and Harrison had not kept a constant watch on inmate Bonjour's condition, she probably would have bled to death in her cell, the physician told them.

Lower Genital Tract Infections

Such infections often affect tissues of the vulva and vagina. Vaginitis is the general term used to refer to an inflammation of the vaginal tissue, which may be caused by a number of conditions. Although such infections are rarely emergencies, they can be quite distressing to the woman because of the discomfort and pain involved.

Signs and symptoms of infection include:

- Severe itching and burning; and
- Usually, there is a discharge from the vagina.

The officer who becomes aware that an inmate is suffering from a lower genital tract infection should:

1. Arrange for medical evaluation.
2. In the meantime, provide relief from burning and itching.
 - a. Have her sit in a tub of cool water, or have her apply wet compresses over the vulva.
 - b. Have her use mild soap when washing the vaginal area.
 - c. Discourage her from wearing tight clothing, including panty hose.
 - d. Have her wear white cotton panties.
 - e. Have her douche with either plain water or a solution of one quart of water and two tablespoons of white distilled vinegar. However, obtain permission from a physician *before* initiating this procedure.

Birth Control Complications

If a woman is using birth control pills or an intra-uterine device (I.U.D.), there may be possible complications of which officers should be aware.

When a woman who is taking birth control pills has any of the following symptoms, officers should call a physician:

- Chest pain;
- Calf pain; and
- Blurred vision.

Officers should take a woman with an I.U.D. to an emergency room if she experiences lower abdominal pain.

OBSTETRICAL EMERGENCIES

It is not always easy to know what is normal and abnormal during pregnancy. If an officer knows or suspects that a female inmate is pregnant, the officer should be alert to signs and symptoms indicating a possible obstetrical emergency. The signs and symptoms might be perfectly normal, but they could also indicate something quite serious. An officer who has the slightest doubt should consider it an emergency and act accordingly.

Abortion

A pregnant inmate may deliberately attempt to abort by using mechanical devices or chemical douches. Or, she may experience a miscarriage (spontaneous abortion), which occurs naturally.

Signs and symptoms of an abortion include:

- In cases of spontaneous abortion, the woman may say that she has passed "tissue" or an actual fetus. This may have occurred during a bowel movement in which she has strained.
- Cramping pain.
- Bleeding from vagina, slight or severe.
- Possible vomiting.
- Possible abdominal distension.
- Possible dehydration.
- Possible rapid heartbeat.
- Possible labored breathing.
- Possible fever.

If vaginal bleeding is severe, the officer should call for an ambulance *immediately*; otherwise, the inmate should be taken to an emergency room for treatment.

However, before transporting the inmate, officers should administer basic first aid to her, which includes:

1. Cover vaginal opening with a sanitary napkin or absorbent cloth. Do not throw this away; it will be helpful for medical diagnosis.
2. Treat for shock if necessary.
3. Monitor airway and breathing.
4. Keep her quiet and minimize her movement.
5. Make her comfortable.
6. Collect any tissue that may have been discharged through the vaginal opening. It will be helpful for medical diagnosis.

Tubal Pregnancy

Sometimes the embryo develops in the fallopian tubes, rather than in the uterus. This is known as an ectopic, or tubal pregnancy. The woman will experience the usual early symptoms of pregnancy, including a history of missed periods, nausea, breast swelling and tenderness, and occasional vaginal spotting. But the embryo cannot develop normally in that location, so usually one of two things will happen. Either she will spontaneously abort, or the tubal walls will rupture, resulting in internal bleeding. This will usually happen by the second or third month of pregnancy.

Signs and symptoms of tubal pregnancy emergency include:

- If tubal rupture has not yet occurred, the inmate will usually experience pain in the lower part of the abdomen, sometimes localized on one side. There may also be mild, intermittent vaginal bleeding.
- If tubal rupture has occurred, she will experience sudden abdominal pain. This pain may radiate to the shoulder on the affected side.
- She may appear to be in shock because of heavy internal bleeding.

Signs of shock include:

- Weak and rapid pulse;
- Pale and clammy skin;
- Sweating;
- Dizziness, faintness;
- Nausea or vomiting; and
- Possible unconsciousness as shock progresses.

Whenever an inmate complains of pain in the lower abdomen and is bleeding from the vagina, officers should suspect a tubular pregnancy and take the following steps:

1. Call ambulance if she is bleeding severely or seems to be in shock.
2. Otherwise, take her to an emergency room.
3. Cover the vaginal opening with a sanitary napkin or absorbent cloth.
4. Calm and reassure her.
5. Transport her in a reclining, comfortable position.
6. Treat her for shock if necessary.
7. Monitor her airway and breathing. Provide artificial respiration if necessary.
8. Check her vital signs.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Millie Mae Lee, 18, was arrested and admitted to the Big Sky County Jail for helping her boyfriend escape from a state prison work camp road gang. Inmate Lee was about 50 pounds overweight when she was admitted to the jail, but the examining physician could detect no other physical problems.

One night on the midnight to eight shift, Officer Rhoda Morgan heard a loud moan come from the cells. Checking the cell block, she saw inmate Lee curled up on the floor of her cell vomiting and swaying back and forth. The inmate was sweating heavily. When she entered the cell, Officer Morgan saw that inmate Lee also was bleeding from the vagina.

Officer Morgan immediately summoned assistance from the men's cell blocks, since she was on duty alone in the women's section. She then took steps to control inmate Lee's breathing, since Lee was starting to choke on her own vomit. With the male officers assisting her, Officer Morgan was able to control the heavy bleeding and prevent inmate Lee from going into shock. An ambulance arrived and transported inmate Lee to the County Hospital Emergency Room, where she was admitted.

When Officer Morgan went to the hospital at 8:30 a.m. to obtain information for her incident/medical assistance reports, the Emergency Room physician told her the inmate had a tubal pregnancy, which ruptured.

"Your quick thinking and first aid saved her life," the doctor told Officer Morgan.

This case study illustrates the importance of knowing the symptoms of obstetrical and gynecological emergencies and how to handle them properly. Jails often admit women inmates who are unaware that they are in the early stages of pregnancy; there are many adult women in the United States who have no knowledge of their own bodies and how pregnancy occurs. Jail officers must realize that a woman inmate may not be aware that she is pregnant at the time when she is admitted. Therefore, officers must not rule out obstetrical problems simply because the inmate said she was not pregnant when she was being booked.

Preeclampsia And Eclampsia

Eclampsia is a very dangerous complication of pregnancy which appears after 24 weeks of gestation. It is characterized by convulsions, loss of consciousness, and coma. The cause is unknown. It is always preceded by preeclampsia, in which there are certain warning signals indicating that convulsions may be imminent. It is important to be alert to these warning signals in a pregnant inmate.

Signs and symptoms of preeclampsia include:

- Severe headache;
- Blurring of vision;
- Pain or discomfort in upper middle area of abdomen;
- Further elevation of blood pressure; and
- Accumulation of fluid in body.

Officers should call an ambulance immediately. The inmate should be kept quiet while waiting for the ambulance.

Symptoms of an eclamptic seizure include:

- Convulsions, usually beginning with twitching at the corner of the mouth, followed by contractions of the entire body which last about 20 to 30 seconds.
- Alternate relaxation and contraction of body muscles following the first convulsion.
- Semicomatose state, followed by loss of consciousness.

An officer should call an ambulance immediately and then take the following steps:

1. Protect the woman from additional injury. Have her lie on a padded surface, such as a mattress.
2. Monitor her airway. Maintain an open airway.
3. If necessary, perform artificial respiration using the mouth-to-mouth technique.

Labor

A pregnant woman can go into labor, either at term (when she is due to have the baby) or before. It is important for officers to know what to look for and what to do in such a case.

Signs of labor include:

- Uterine contractions which are regular and strong. The contractions will become stronger at regular intervals.
- Breaking of the "bag of waters" (gushing fluid from vagina).
- Possible "bloody show": up to one ounce of blood and mucus discharged from vagina at the beginning of labor. It is often quite stringy.

Officers should call a physician to obtain specific advice regarding procedures to follow when labor begins. The inmate should be taken to a hospital if her contractions are five minutes or less apart, or if her "bag of waters" breaks. If delivery begins unexpectedly, officers should immediately summon an ambulance.

CALMING THE INMATE

A gynecological or obstetrical emergency can be quite anxiety-provoking and embarrassing to a woman. In addition to getting appropriate medical assistance and providing first aid, officers should be sensitive to her emotions. Her privacy should be protected as much as possible. Officers should remain calm and reassure the inmate. She should be told that she will receive medical care.

Officers should be sympathetic to the fears of a pregnant woman that she will lose her child. But officers should not be unrealistic and tell her that she has nothing to worry about.

Officers who have any doubts about the seriousness of a situation should play it safe and treat it as an emergency. It is always better to be safe than sorry.

All assistance provided to women inmates during medical emergencies should be carefully documented.

SUMMARY

1. Because of the unique nature of female medical emergencies and the psychological traumas that such emergencies can produce in the inmate, it is necessary for all officers to be aware of the common signs and symptoms of gynecological and obstetrical emergencies and know when it is necessary to summon medical help immediately.

Some general signs and symptoms of potentially serious gynecological problems include: unusually heavy vaginal bleeding; pain or tenderness in the lower abdominal area; abnormal vaginal discharge; and pain, tenderness, and/or swelling, usually of external genitalia. If any of these symptoms are present, officers should call a physician to examine the inmate. Officers may also encounter problems involving inmates who are pregnant--if an officer knows or suspects that an inmate is pregnant, the officer should be alert to signs and symptoms which indicate an obstetrical emergency. Although these signs and symptoms might be perfectly normal, they could also indicate something quite serious. An officer who has the slightest doubt should consider it an emergency and act accordingly.

2. Officers who have any doubt about the seriousness of a medical problem involving a woman inmate should play it safe and treat the problem as an emergency.

Severe bleeding can cause death or permanent internal injuries. Officers should obtain medical assistance for the inmate, since it is better to be safe than sorry. Whenever medical assistance is provided to women inmates, officers should document the type of assistance rendered and place this information in the inmate's medical record.

Suggested Readings

- American Bar Association. *Female Offender Workshop Guide*. Washington, D. C.: Female Offender Resource Center, National Offender Services Coordination Program, 1977.
- CONTACT, Inc. *Woman Offender*. Lincoln, Nebraska: CONTACT, Inc., 1978.
- Eyman, Jay S. *Prisons For Women*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1971.
- Foster, E. *Female Offenders in the Federal Correctional System*. Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Prisons.
- King, Mary E. and Judy Lipshutz. "Health Services for Women Prisoners," in *The Woman Offender Report*, Vol. 1, No. e, July/August 1975, pp. 2 & 3.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

DRUG WITHDRAWAL IN THE JAIL

People who use drugs over an extended period of time may become "hooked"--physically and/or mentally dependent on the drug. When a drug user is brought to the jail for admittance, he can often be recognized by visible symptoms of his habit, such as needle tracks on his arms or legs, dilated pupils or, in the case of habitual marijuana smokers, burn scars on the fingertips.



Works used for injecting drugs. Tourniquet, syringe, cooker, heat.

However, other habitual drug abusers are not easily recognizable at the time of admission; their withdrawal symptoms will surface *after* they have been incarcerated for a few hours without another dose of whatever narcotic or substance they have been taking.

When drug addicts can be easily identified at the time of admission, officers should watch them closely for signs of withdrawal. In addition,

officers should carefully observe new inmates who show signs during the booking process that may or may not signal drug withdrawal; such signs are apparent drunkenness, apparent mental illness (hallucinations), extreme anxiety, or extreme drowsiness (inmate falls asleep standing up). Once admitted to the cell block, inmates showing signs of narcotics abuse should be checked frequently. If they become ill or unconscious, *immediate* medical attention should be obtained for them.

Procedures for recognizing signs of drug abuse and for dealing with inmates who are withdrawing from specific drugs are described in the material which follows.

THE OPIATES


The most often abused opiates are heroin, opium, morphine, codeine, and the synthetic opiates--meperidene hydrochloride (demerol) and methadone. Heroin and other opiate derivatives give the user a rush and a euphoric feeling; he feels an easing of his tensions and a temporary relief from his fears and anxieties.

Administration Of Opiates


There are two basic ways to administer opiates. One method is to inhale the drug through the nostrils, where it is absorbed by the mucous membranes. The user who inhales opiates places the narcotic substance on what is commonly called a "quill" (usually a spoon or flat object which can be worn around the neck). Other "quills" consist of the small, long-handled coffee stir spoons used in some fast-food restaurants or a straw cut on an angle to allow the user to insert the narcotics completely to the rear of the nostril.

The second--and most common--method of using heroin or other opiates is to inject the drug directly into the body. The user must first "cook up"--which means that the heroin or opiate substance must be added to water and heated. This is done with a "cooker"--which can be a metal spoon or a soda bottle cap. The user puts water into the cooker and adds the narcotic powder; he then heats the bottom of the cooker to dissolve the powder. The opiate and water solution is then drawn up into a syringe through a needle. Once the syringe is loaded, the user is ready to inject the drug into his body. He might be a "skin popper" who injects the drug under the top layer of his skin. However, the most common method of injection is directly into a vein; this is called *mainlining*. When a user is mainlining, he usually places a tourniquet above the location to be injected; the tourniquet is tightened in order to force a vein to pop up. The tourniquet also controls the flow of the heroin or opiate substance into the blood stream while it is being injected into the vein. The user may take several minutes to inject the drug.

Quills used to inhale drugs.



Works and carrying case.




Marijuana and some paraphernalia.

After the injection, he will feel a "rush" (euphoria). Once the initial elation wears off, however, the user may begin to fall asleep or "nod out"--he could fall asleep while standing. The effect of the drug usually lasts up to six hours, depending upon the strength of the dose.

When the user injects the drug, scar tissue may form over veins which are used frequently. These marks are called "tracks" or "track marks." In many cases the track marks will be in a continuous line; they are usually found on a user's arms, the back of his hands, on his legs and thighs, in the groin area, and on his neck.

Heroin, other opiate derivatives, and semi-synthetic opiate drugs all have the same properties. They cause the individual to develop a tolerance to the drug; therefore, he must continually increase the dosage to obtain a "rush" or euphoric feeling. He gradually becomes *addicted*, both physically and mentally.



With addiction, the user's body becomes accustomed to the drug and cannot function without it. Because of the use of the drug, the user's hunger and thirst needs are reduced and he may suffer from dehydration and malnutrition.

In addition, addiction often results in constipation, a decrease in sexual interest and activity, impotence in males, and a lack of regular menstrual cycles in females. The user often carries laxatives in a pocket or purse to cope with the uncomfortableness of constipation.

Detecting Opiate Use

When an opiate addict stops using drugs, his body will react; this reaction is called *withdrawal*. Withdrawal begins about six hours after the last use of heroin. Symptoms reach their peak from 24 to 36 hours after drug use has been stopped. After 36 hours, the withdrawal symptoms will usually begin to subside and should disappear in 72 hours. But even though symptoms may subside within 72 hours, the withdrawing addict should be kept in a hospital or under medical supervision in a jail infirmary for a period of seven to 10 days, since there may be other

complications related to malnutrition and dehydration.

Common heroin or opiate withdrawal symptoms which the jail officer should develop an ability to recognize are:

1. Mild Withdrawal (when only these signs are present)

- Yawning
- Eyes water
- Nose runs
- Sneezing
- Excessive perspiration

2. Moderate Withdrawal (when these signs are added)

- Loss of appetite
- Dilated pupils
- Tremor
- Goose flesh

3. Marked Withdrawal (when these signs are added)

- Deep breathing
- Fever
- Insomnia
- Restlessness
- Rise in blood pressure

4. Severe Withdrawal (when these signs are added)

- Vomiting
- Diarrhea
- Weight loss
- Convulsions

CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: USES & EFFECTS

	Drug ¹	Schedule	Trade or Other Names	Medical Uses	Physical Dependence	Psychological Dependence	Tolerance	Duration of Effect (in hours)	Usual Methods of Administration	Possible Effects	Effects of Overdose	Withdrawal Syndrome		
NARCOTICS	Opium	II, III, V	Dover's Powder Paregoric, Parepectolin	Analgesic, antidiarrheal	High	High		3 - 6	Oral, smoked	Euphoria, drowsiness, respiratory depression, constricted pupils, nausea	Slow and shallow breathing, clammy skin, convulsions, coma, possible death	Watery eyes, runny nose, yawning, loss of appetite, irritability, tremors, panic, chills and sweating, cramps, nausea		
	Morphine	II, III	Morphine, Pectoral Syrup	Analgesic, antitussive					Oral, injected, smoked					
	Codeine	II, III, V	Codeine, Empirin Compound with Codeine, Robitussin A-C	Analgesic, antitussive	Moderate	Moderate			Oral, injected					
	Heroin	I	Diacetylmorphine, Horse, Smack	Under investigation			Yes	12-24	Injected, sniffed, smoked					
	Hydromorphone		Dilaudid	Analgesic	High	High								
	Meperidine (Pethidine)	II	Demerol, Pethadol	Analgesic				Variable	Oral, injected					
	Methadone		Dolophine, Methadone, Methadose	Analgesic, heroin substitute	High	High								
	Other Narcotics	I, II, III, IV, V	LAAM, Leritine, Levo-Dromoran, Percodan, Tussonex, Fentanyl, Darvon*, Talwin*, Lomotil	Analgesic, anti-diarrheal, antitussive	High-Low	High-Low								
Chloral Hydrate	IV	Noctec, Somnos	Hypnotic	Moderate	Moderate	Possible	5 - 8	Oral	Sturred speech, disorientation, drunken behavior without odor of alcohol	Shallow respiration, cold and clammy skin, dilated pupils, weak and rapid pulse, coma, possible death	Anxiety, insomnia, tremors, delirium, convulsions, possible death			
Barbiturates	II, III, IV	Amobarbital, Phenobarbital, Butisol, Phenobarbital, Secobarbital, Tuinal	Anesthetic, anticonvulsant, sedative, hypnotic	High-Moderate	High-Moderate	Yes	1 - 16	Oral, injected						
	Glutethimide	III	Doriden	Sedative, hypnotic	High							High		
Methaqualone	II	Optimil, Parest, Quaalude, Somnifac, Sopor	Sedative, hypnotic	High	High		4 - 8	Oral, injected						
Benzodiazepines	IV	Ativan, Azene, Clonopin, Dalmane, Diazepam Librium, Serax, Tranxene, Valium, Verstran	Anti-anxiety, anti-convulsant, sedative, hypnotic	Low	Low									
Other Depressants	III, IV	Equanil, Miltown, Noludar, Placidyl, Valmid	Anti-anxiety, sedative, hypnotic	Moderate	Moderate		1 - 2	Sniffed, injected						
Cocaine ²	II	Coke, Flake, Snow	Local anesthetic			Possible	2 - 4	Oral, injected				Increased alertness, excitation, euphoria, increased pulse rate and blood pressure, insomnia, loss of appetite	Agitation, increase in body temperature, hallucinations, convulsions, possible death	Apathy, long periods of sleep, irritability, depression, disorientation
Amphetamines	II, III	Biphentamine, Delcobese, Desoxyn, Dexedrine, Mediatric				Yes	8 - 12	Oral, injected						
Phenmetrazine		Preludin	Hyperkinesis, narcolepsy, weight control	Possible	High				Up to days	Oral				
Methylphenidate	II	Ritalin												
Other Stimulants	III, IV	Adipex, Bacarate, Cylert, Drex, Ionamin, Plegine, Pre-Sate, Sanorex, Tenuate, Tepanil, Voranil					2 - 4	Oral						
HALLUCINOGENS	LSD	I	Acid, Microdot	None	None	Degree unknown	Yes	8 - 12	Oral	Illusions and hallucinations, poor perception of time and distance	Longer, more intense "trip" episodes, psychosis, possible death	Withdrawal syndrome not reported		
	Mescaline and Peyote		Mesc, Buttons, Cactus					Oral, injected						
	Amphetamine Variants		2,5-DMA, PMA, STP, MDA, MDMA, TMA, DOM, DOB											
	Phencyclidine	II	PCP, Angel Dust, Hog	Veterinary anesthetic	Degree unknown	High		Smoked, oral, injected						
Phencyclidine Analogs		PCE, PCPy, TCP					Variable	Oral, injected, smoked, sniffed						
Other Hallucinogens	I	Bufotenine, Ibogaine, DMT, DET, Psilocybin, Psilocyn	None	None	Degree unknown	Possible	2 - 4							
CANNABIS	Marihuana	I	Pot, Acapulco Gold, Grass, Reel, Sinsemilla, Thai Sticks	Under investigation	Degree unknown	Moderate	Yes	2 - 4	Smoked, oral	Euphoria, relaxed inhibitions, increased appetite, disoriented behavior	Fatigue, paranoia, possible psychosis	Insomnia, hyperactivity, and decreased appetite occasionally reported.		
	Tetrahydrocannabinol		THC											
	Hashish		Hash	None										
	Hashish Oil		Hash Oil											

Figure 1

The jail officer might be able to determine if a new inmate is an addict by asking him at the time of admittance. Many addicts will admit that they are users and will tell the officer the type of drug they use. Even a user who denies his addiction during the booking process usually will tell an officer he is an addict as soon as mild withdrawal symptoms begin. Other factors which may help the booking officer determine if a newly admitted inmate is a heroin or opiate user include:

1. The charge--the booking officer should look at the arrest charge. If the new inmate was arrested for possession of a small amount of heroin or another opiate substance, the officer usually can safely assume that the inmate is a user; conversely, persons charged with possession of *large* amounts of heroin for distribution rarely are users themselves--they are in business to make money and often despise the addicts who buy the drugs they are selling. If an officer suspects that a new inmate is an addict, he should tell the inmate that withdrawal symptoms will soon begin and the addict will get sick; the officer should ask the inmate what narcotic he has been taking so that the jail can arrange in advance for proper medical treatment. Most addicts gladly admit their addiction when the officer points out to them that they will soon become sick.
2. Narcotics paraphernalia--if an officer finds certain instruments or materials in an inmate's possession while he is searching him or preparing a property list, it might be safely assumed that the inmate is a heroin or opiate user. These instruments include:
 - Quills for snorting--many times the user will hang a decorative spoon, commonly called a coke spoon, on a chain around his neck. He might also have in his possession a long-handled coffee stir spoon from a fast-food restaurant, a straw cut on an angle, or the inside fold of a matchbook torn so that it can hold powdered narcotics.
 - Hypodermic needles, a syringe, a plunger, or cookers--it is safe to assume that a new inmate with any or all of these items in his possession is a narcotics user; many times the addict will carry around the tools he needs to inject the drug or he may carry with him only one item, such as a needle, a syringe, or a bottle cap with burn marks on the bottom.
 - Tourniquet--a tourniquet can be anything that will stop the flow of blood; most addicts will use a belt, shoe string, or a woman's stocking. If, during the search of a new inmate, a shoe string or a woman's stocking is found folded up in his pants or shirt pocket, then it is safe to assume that the inmate is using the item as a tourniquet.

- Powder--heroin usually is dispensed in either cut-up pieces of tin foil or in plastic or glassine bags; if the new inmate has a powdery substance in any of these materials, it is safe to assume that he is a heroin user. The substance should be sent to a laboratory for analysis and proper procedures should be followed for its disposition.
 - Empty packages--because of the high cost of heroin, many users will save the plastic or glassine bags which contained their drugs. The addict does this in case he cannot obtain the money needed to buy new drugs; sometimes he can get enough "tracer" powder from the empty packages for a new injection. It is common for jail officers to find small plastic or glassine packages with powder traces in them.
3. Covering up of track marks--many new addicts will attempt to cover up their track marks by using bandages or gauze; in addition, they often wear long-sleeve shirts during hot weather. If a new inmate has bandages on areas where injections are normally made (arms, legs, thighs, groin, neck), then the officer searching the inmate during the booking process should remove the bandages to determine whether the inmate actually has an injury which may require medical treatment (addicts also hide narcotics or narcotics paraphernalia under bandages). An officer who finds track marks should question the inmate to determine what type of narcotics he has been injecting; however, officers should be aware that addicts who take the trouble to cover up track marks usually will swear that the track marks are "old" and that they are no longer using drugs--in the majority of cases, the person is still a user.
 4. Abscesses--These are infections to the skin that are caused when a user misses his vein and ends up injecting a fluid into his skin; this process causes an irritation, which may become infected. (Proper procedures for handling new inmates with infected sores are discussed later in this chapter.)
 5. Small pieces of cotton--many times a user will put a small piece of cotton into his "cooker" and then draw the heroin solution into the needle through the cotton filter; the user feels that this "filter system" keeps the impurities out of his injection. Users often will have both used and unused cotton balls in their possession when they are booked into the jail.

Any of the items described above are not by themselves a *definite* indication that the new inmate is a heroin or opiate user. However, if any of these items are found, jail officers should be "put on notice" that the inmate *probably* is a user and will require extra attention,

either immediately because of withdrawal problems or while in the jail (the inmate may attempt to obtain narcotics through illicit channels). Officers should pay special attention to these inmates during the first 24 to 36 hours of incarceration and be alert to any signs of withdrawal.

The Withdrawal Process

The heroin or opiate user who is admitted to the jail fears the withdrawal process and often will ask to be sent to the hospital. However, it is a common practice for the addict to exaggerate the effects of withdrawal. Heroin withdrawal, unlike alcohol withdrawal, rarely is life-threatening. The addict simply feels miserable for a few days. Dangerous complications usually occur only when the addict is in very poor health or is suffering from another medical disorder, such as heart or kidney disease.

After an officer determines that an inmate is starting to go into withdrawal, either by observing physical signs or by listening to what the inmate has to say about his condition, then the officer should follow the required procedures in his jail to obtain medical treatment for the inmate. Because of the possibility of complications and because other drugs can help relieve withdrawal symptoms, it is preferable to transfer the withdrawing addict to a medical facility or to a jail infirmary if the infirmary is equipped and staffed to handle this type of problem. While an addict rarely will die from the withdrawal process, some addicts may die from complications, especially those who suffer from severe malnutrition and dehydration. *Addicts should never be forced to go through the withdrawal process in a cell*--there is too great a chance that the inmate will become seriously ill or die; if harm comes to the inmate, then the jail and the personnel who supervised the inmate are legally liable.

Case Study 1:

When Greg Kuznetsov was being admitted to the Rattlesnake County Jail at 5 p.m. on a burglary charge, Booking Officer Maggie Jenkins found a small, empty orange-colored cellophane envelope in his wallet. As she reached into a photo slot in the wallet, she pricked her finger on a sharp object which felt like a needle. Concerned about her bloody finger, Officer Jenkins left Kuznetsov standing at the counter unsupervised while she went over to another part of the room to wash off her finger and put a bandage on it. When she returned to her task, the object she thought had been a needle was no longer in the wallet. Officer Jenkins shrugged and felt that perhaps she had jabbed her finger on the broken end of the plastic which covered the photo slot. She asked Kuznetsov if he wanted the orange bag checked in with his property; when he said no, she threw it into a trash can.

When Kuznetsov was weighed, Officer Jenkins noticed that at 120 pounds, he was very underweight for his height, which was six feet, one inch. She recorded his weight on his medical screening form and turned Kuznetsov over to a male officer for a strip search, shower, and processing to a cell block. An hour later Officer Jenkins went off duty for three days. She did not tell anyone about the orange envelope, the needle wound to her finger, or the possibility that Kuznetsov might be ill because of his obvious underweight problem.

Because Kuznetsov was young and attractive, the supervising sergeant assigned him to an individual cell at an isolated end of a corridor in Cell Block B--the sergeant wanted to keep Kuznetsov segregated from other inmates who might sexually assault him. However, the cell corridor housed minimum security inmates who were not closely supervised. In addition, there were two empty cells between Kuznetsov and the nearest inmate, an elderly alcoholic who spent most of his time sleeping. Officers on patrol rarely walked the full length of the cell corridor to check on inmates unless they were called.

At about 2 a.m., the elderly alcoholic began yelling for Duty Officer Jed Hoover. When Officer Hoover walked down the corridor to find out what the commotion was about, the inmate said he couldn't sleep because of the noise in the corridor.

"That new guy at the end of the row keeps moaning and crying," the inmate said. "He's driving me nuts. Why don't you guys do something about him so I can get some sleep?"

Officer Hoover went to inmate Kuznetsov's cell and asked him if anything was wrong.

"Can you get me a fix?" Kuznetsov asked. "I'll pay you anything! Please! I'm gonna die if I don't get a fix!"

"Hey, buddy, you must be nuts or else you ain't never been in jail before," Officer Hoover answered. "This is the can, pal. Not a drugstore for junkies. Now you just quiet down! You're keeping the other men awake."

Officer Hoover then left the cell area and went back to his control desk. He settled back in his chair for a short nap, since he had to go to his "moonlighting" job when the shift ended, and he needed some sleep. He did not check the inmates again during the night.

At 7 a.m. Officer Dick Daley escorted the breakfast cart through the corridor; when he reached inmate Kuznetsov's cell, he suddenly grabbed his nose in disgust. Kuznetsov was lying unconscious in a pool of vomit. Officer Daley called the duty sergeant and showed him inmate Kuznetsov.

"We ought to get this guy to a hospital," the sergeant said. "Did Officer Hoover notice any problems with him during the night?"

"He said to stay away from the guy--that he's a junkie begging for a fix," Officer Daley replied.

"Oh, a junkie coming off the stuff," the sergeant said. "That explains why he's sick. In that case, I guess we would be wasting the taxpayers' money if we took him to a hospital. Leave him here and I'll make a note that the jail doctor should look in on him when he comes by for sick call this afternoon. Meanwhile, have a couple of trusties clean up this cell a little--it stinks in here."

The jail doctor, who had had a busy day with his private patients in Fangville, did not report to the jail until 4 p.m. to examine sick inmates. When he found the note telling him about a "withdrawing junkie" in Cell Block B, he told officers to keep the other inmate patients waiting since Kuznetsov might be seriously ill. When he examined Kuznetsov, he couldn't find a pulse. Apparently, the inmate had been dead for about three hours, but no officers had bothered to check his condition.

The doctor located the duty lieutenant and yelled at him: "Why didn't somebody call me as soon as this young man showed the first withdrawal symptoms? If he had been taken to the hospital, we probably could have saved him!"

An autopsy on Kuznetsov revealed that he had died from kidney failure and severe malnutrition. Kuznetsov's parents in another state were finally notified that their son had died in jail and, after talking to the jail physician, they filed a lawsuit against Rattlesnake County, the sheriff, and the officers involved in supervising the inmate.

Meanwhile, Officer Jenkins began calling in sick. Her finger, which she had been treating herself instead of obtaining medical attention, had become severely infected. She eventually developed hepatitis from the infected needle which had been in Kuznetsov's wallet. Officer Jenkins was hospitalized for a long time but eventually recovered, only to find herself facing a trial board for negligence. As the booking officer, she was told that it was her negligence that contributed to Kuznetsov's death in the jail--the needle "should have aroused her suspicions that the inmate was

an addict," the sheriff told her. Nobody ever found out about the orange cellophane envelope she had thrown into the garbage.

This case study illustrates the importance of obtaining proper medical treatment for *all* new inmates who may be narcotics addicts going through withdrawal. Officers should never make medical judgments as the sergeant and Officers Hoover and Daley did in this case--to say that an inmate is "just a junkie" and ignore him is inviting trouble since officers are not qualified to determine if the inmate is suffering from severe medical problems brought on by the addiction. In addition, this case study demonstrates the importance of the need for skilled booking officers who are able to detect new inmates who may be narcotics addicts. Obviously, Officer Jenkins was not well trained; if she were, she would have immediately known the significance of the orange cellophane envelope and the needle. She should have placed the wallet in an area inaccessible to inmate Kuznetsov and should have asked another officer to watch Kuznetsov while she placed the bandage on her finger. Officer Jenkins then should have notified the supervising sergeant that three facts indicated that Kuznetsov was an addict who needed to be carefully watched and provided with medical attention: the needle, the cellophane envelope, and his obvious underweight. Once she was certain that Kuznetsov would be provided with medical care, Officer Jenkins should have sent the cellophane envelope to a crime laboratory to have the traces of a powdery substance inside the envelope analyzed. The needle and the envelope should have been placed in evidence bags and labeled. These tasks completed, Officer Jenkins should have reported the needle injury to her sergeant and then should have gone to a physician or the hospital emergency room to have her finger treated properly. When an officer comes into contact with an infected needle, there is a strong possibility that the officer will develop hepatitis if the injury is ignored.

Once in the jail infirmary or hospital, the withdrawing addict should be given a complete examination. All questions about his addiction can be answered at this time. The staff members in a jail infirmary should be aware that a withdrawing addict may become anxious and angry as a result of his physical discomfort and may attack them. He may also attempt to escape, since he fears that if he does not obtain another dose of heroin, he will undergo unbearable pain. Officers should be alert to these possibilities and should carefully watch the inmate.

A jail with a well-staffed and well-supplied infirmary is an adequate setting for *most* withdrawing addicts as long as the following conditions are met:

1. A doctor should give the inmate a thorough medical examination upon admittance to the infirmary and should see the inmate every few days during the withdrawal process, and once a day during the peak withdrawal phase.

2. Vital signs should be taken every four hours and charted. The staff should have clear guidelines from the doctor as to what vital signs indicate an emergency situation requiring medical assistance.
3. The withdrawing inmate must be kept well-hydrated and well-nourished.
4. If the infirmary staff is qualified to administer drugs, a mild tranquilizer may be used to calm and relax the addict and to relieve his muscle cramping and aches. Valium, Librium, or Dalmore may be used if approved by the doctor supervising the withdrawal.
5. Aspirin should be the *strongest* pain-killer prescribed; obviously, pain-killers with an opiate base should be avoided.
6. Heroin can act as an anti-psychotic agent. If hallucinations or delusions occur during withdrawal, they may or may not be a sign of mental illness. In any case, the staff should request a psychiatric evaluation if these symptoms occur.
7. In general, withdrawing addicts are not in danger of dying--although in their misery they may say they feel like they are dying. Heroin withdrawal usually starts after six to 18 hours without the drug, peaks at about 24 to 36 hours, and usually declines after 72 hours. Methadone withdrawal starts after 24 to 48 hours without the drug, peaks at about three days, and may last up to two months.

BARBITURATES

Barbiturates are sedatives often called "downers" because they have a depressive effect upon the central nervous system. Abrupt withdrawal from barbiturates can lead to weakness, restlessness, tremor, anxiety, and insomnia. These symptoms are followed by elevated body temperature, convulsions, and possible psychosis. Finally, death can result. Barbiturate abusers are also in danger of taking lethal overdoses either because they have been using the drug long enough that the effective dose soon nears a potentially lethal level or because they mix the drugs with alcohol.

Barbiturates are administered in two ways: by injections or orally. An addict may inject a liquified barbiturate solution in the same manner as heroin is injected; to do this, the addict removes the powder from a barbiturate capsule, mixes it with water in a bottle cap, cooks it, and injects it with a syringe. However, the drug is more commonly taken orally in its capsule form.

The effects of barbiturates range up to eight hours, depending upon the type used and the dosage; once the effect of the last dose wears off, the addict will start to have withdrawal symptoms.

The jail officer should be aware that the barbiturate abuser often has the appearance of drunkenness without the odor of alcohol. For example, he may appear drowsy and confused and his muscle control may be poor; this will result in poor coordination and staggering. His speech may be slurred, his memory may be impaired, and he may exhibit an inability to concentrate. If a person appears this way at the booking desk, he should be asked if he has used barbiturates. If the user is suspected of barbiturate use or admits to it, then he should be sent to a hospital as soon as possible. However, barbiturate users who have been mixing the drug with alcohol will have an odor of alcohol and may be mistakingly assumed to be drunk. These are the most difficult cases for the booking officer to detect; but it is important to attempt to identify these inmates since the danger of death is the greatest for them. In cases such as this, the officer should carefully search the inmate for signs of barbiturate abuse, such as pill vials or narcotics paraphernalia. At any rate, booking officers should question *all* intoxicated new inmates and ask them if they have taken anything with the alcohol, such as pills; younger persons especially should be questioned carefully since this is the age group where the greatest amount of alcohol-pill mixing occurs, usually because the young person is looking for a "new high" and does not know the dangers involved.

The booking officer should look for narcotics paraphernalia in the inmate's personal property. Since barbiturates can be cooked and injected like heroin, the officer should look for the same type of paraphernalia (needles, syringes, plungers, cookers, and tourniquets). The barbiturate user also may have the barbiturate capsules in his possession when he is arrested and brought to the jail; if the pills are loose in his pocket (not in a properly labeled container from a pharmacy), then the arresting officer probably will confiscate them during the preliminary search following the arrest. However, the capsules may be in a properly labeled pharmacy container; in these cases the police officer usually will leave the container with the inmate's personal property when he is brought to the jail. A container of barbiturates combined with a new inmate who appears to be intoxicated is a good indication to the jail booking officer that the inmate is a barbiturate user or addict. Many times the user will carry empty pharmaceutical vials with labels on them so that when he obtains pills illegally, he can place them into the container--thus, he will appear to have a legal prescription if he is questioned by a police officer. When a jail booking officer finds empty vials or labels in the inmate's personal property, he should suspect that the inmate is a barbiturate addict and question him. The inmate should be watched for signs of withdrawal and, once these symptoms begin, he should be sent to a hospital.

An officer who suspects barbiturate abuse should ask the inmate if he has been taking this drug and refer him for a thorough examination. Withdrawal should always take place in a hospital, especially if the inmate has mixed alcohol and barbiturates--by the time convulsions set in from this deadly mix, it may be too late to save the inmate's life.

AMPHETAMINES AND COCAINE (STIMULANTS)

Amphetamines are drugs which stimulate the central nervous system, producing excitation, insomnia, alertness and, in some cases, a temporary rise in blood pressure and respiration. Drugs containing amphetamines are popular drugs of abuse; they are known on the street as "speed," "pep pills," "bennies," and "co-pilots." Most amphetamines are taken in pill or capsule form, which are diverted into the street trade from legitimate sources. However, some addicts inject amphetamines in a liquid form, using the same methods as are used for injecting heroin.

Amphetamines are mood-elevators and "speed" addicts brought to the jail will be excitable, talkative, restless, have hand tremors and enlarged pupils, sweat profusely, and not be able to sleep.

Tolerance develops with amphetamines and many people can take high doses without permanent physical damage--if the dosage is increased gradually. Most medical authorities agree that physical dependence does not develop with amphetamines, even when abused, and that there are no characteristic withdrawal symptoms; however, the possibility of drug psychosis resembling paranoid schizophrenia can develop with excessive doses. The jail officer should keep this in mind when dealing with a new inmate who is hyperactive. Paranoid schizophrenia is characterized by delusions and hallucinations, both visual and auditory. For example, the new inmate may think other people in the jail are making fun of him and are his "enemies" and strike out at them to "protect" himself. *When dealing with a hyperactive new inmate, amphetamine abuse should be suspected and officers should be extremely careful, since the inmate can be very dangerous and attack them without warning.*

Another type of stimulant is cocaine--the drug of the so-called "in-crowd." It is not physically addictive and can be administered in two ways: injection and inhalation. Cocaine can be injected using the same type of paraphernalia as is used by the heroin addict. However, the most common way to use cocaine is to "snort" it--inhaling the drug through the nostrils where it is absorbed by the mucous membranes. The cocaine is then absorbed almost immediately into the bloodstream through the tiny capillaries of the nasal membranes.

After prolonged or heavy use the cocaine user becomes paranoid and may have delusions and hallucinations; he may visualize the jail officer

as the "bad guy" and attempt to fight. This problem will probably occur at the booking desk since cocaine is a relatively short-acting drug. Its effects last only about 20 to 30 minutes.

The booking officer should suspect that a new inmate is a cocaine user if a quill or snorting spoon is found. Many users have expensive or elaborate coke spoons, which they wear around their necks. Cheaper quills consist of straws cut on an angle, small pieces of cardboard, the inside flap of a matchbook, or a fast-food restaurant coffee stir spoon. A quill can be anything that can hold the powder and allow the user to insert the cocaine directly into his nostrils.

PHENCYCLIDINE (PCP)

Of the hallucinogens, the jail officer should be especially aware of the effects of phencyclidine (PCP), commonly known as "angel dust," "peace pills," or "wacky weed." Because the brain stores the drug, the PCP "trip" can last up to two weeks. This drug, developed as an animal tranquilizer, can cause extreme slowness of thought, words, and actions--almost as if the inmate is a record playing at too slow a speed. PCP also causes staggering and balance problems: speech is slow and strange but not quite like the slurred speech caused by drunkenness. There are some reports of users feeling such numbness that they can (and do) mutilate themselves without feeling pain.

The most common ways to administer PCP are either orally (capsules) or by smoking it after it has been sprinkled on parsley or marijuana.



Hand-rolled cigarettes containing parsley laced with PCP.

When PCP is produced in the laboratory, it is usually mixed with ether before it is spread on parsley. PCP is also sold illegally in liquid form, powdered form, or crystal form.

Since PCP is usually sprayed or sprinkled on parsley or marijuana before it is sold "on the street" in small amounts, users who are arrested and brought to the jail may have a hand-rolled cigarette with the ends twisted in order to keep the parsley inside. Although PCP is sometimes sprayed on marijuana to introduce marijuana smokers to a bigger high, the marijuana usually is not used since PCP is the dominant drug.

Thus, if a jail officer twists open the end of a hand-rolled cigarette and parsley falls out, it is safe to assume that the cigarette is laced with PCP and that the person who owns the cigarette is a user.

The effects of PCP vary widely. While research is still being conducted on the long-term effects which this drug has upon humans, it is known that PCP seriously affects the brain and the central nervous system. Most persons using PCP experience a confused state characterized by feelings of weightlessness, unreality, and hallucinations. Reports of difficulty in thinking, poor concentration, and preoccupation with death are frequent. Other effects include nausea, vomiting, profuse sweating, involuntary eye movement, double vision, and extreme restlessness.

If a person is incarcerated and it is suspected that he has used PCP, then very close attention should be given to him. The jail officer's primary concern, in addition to the danger of self-mutilation by the inmate, is that PCP users can be extremely paranoid, hostile, and violent. Because of their extreme fear caused by the drug, they might attack people who appear threatening to them. *Whenever an inmate is a suspected user of PCP, the jail officer should request a medical and psychological evaluation and use extreme care in any contact with the inmate.* The officer should not make any threatening or hostile gestures toward the inmate, nor should the officer remain alone with the inmate since several officers usually are needed to restrain a violent PCP user (people who take PCP seem to develop extraordinary strength when they become violent, as many police officers have learned while trying to arrest persons who are intoxicated on this drug).

Officers should also be aware that hospital personnel may send an inmate who has used PCP *back to the jail* and attempt to tell jail personnel that "nothing can be found wrong with the inmate." This problem occurs because PCP does not remain in a user's bloodstream--it goes directly to the brain, where it is stored. Thus, ordinary blood tests will not detect PCP in a human body. If the officer believes the inmate may have taken PCP, the officer should consider the inmate to be potentially dangerous, even though hospital personnel tell him they cannot find traces of the drug. There will be *other signs* which warn the officer that PCP may be causing erratic behavior and unprovoked violence in an inmate. These signs include:

- Direct admissions by the inmate that he has taken the drug
- Evidence obtained from the inmate's personal property when he was being admitted (parsley, hand-rolled cigarettes, empty cellophane bags with residues of a green leafy substance, a capsule containing an unknown substance, or a small bottle containing an unknown liquid)


- The inmate's physical condition and behavioral symptoms when he was admitted to the jail
- Statements from other inmates, friends, relatives, or police officers that the inmate may have taken PCP
- The nature of the charge, which sometimes provides a clue that the inmate may have taken PCP (such as an unprovoked assault upon another person at a party; running nude down the middle of a street; or committing some other bizarre or seemingly unprovoked act).

OTHER DRUGS

All forms of drugs are dangerous. However, they pose special problems in the jail setting. Each officer employed in the jail should be familiar with the symptoms of drug abuse (see Fig. 1 on the following pages). The U. S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, publishes an excellent booklet entitled *Drugs of Abuse*, which officers can obtain at no charge by writing to: Public Affairs Office, Drug Enforcement Administration, U. S. Justice Department, 1405 Eye Street N. W., Washington, D. C. 20537.

Drugs influence people to act irrationally and drug abusers may suffer from "delusions." When possible, an officer should not use force to deal with a drug abuser. Instead, he should explain to the addict that he is attempting to help him.

All alcohol and drug abusers should be observed for the first few days during withdrawals. They may become quite depressed and need a great deal of reassurance during this difficult time.



Case Study 2:

New inmate Cindy Barr was extremely jittery during the initial stages of the booking process at the Big Sky County Jail, and she was breathing rapidly, gulping down large swallows of air. She almost seemed as if she were jogging in place as her personal property was inventoried, and she became overly excited when Booking Officer Arlene Bertothy started to open a makeup case. The case contained some large white pills but, to Officer Bertothy, the pills looked like extra-strength aspirins like she had at home. She logged the pills on the property form as "three loose aspirins." During the strip search, inmate Barr started mumbling about "all the rats" in the interview room, which were going to "chew off her toes." She refused to take off her clothes. When Officer Bertothy approached her, Parr suddenly turned and, using both hands, clobbered the officer over the back of her head, knocking her unconscious. Inmate Barr then tried to escape but was subdued by two jail officers and the two Thundercloud City Police officers who had arrested her. But all four officers sustained injuries as they tried to bring the inmate under control. What was Officer Bertothy's mistake and what procedures should she have followed?

Inmate Barr was "high" on amphetamines and during the search process she went into drug psychosis; Officer Bertothy became threatening because Barr feared the non-existent "rats" were going to attack her. After she recovered from the blow to her head, Officer Bertothy went back to the Booking Section with a new awareness--whenever she encountered a new inmate who was behaving strangely, she suspected that the inmate had taken drugs. She also learned not to assume that unidentified pills in an inmate's possession were harmless. As a result of this incident, Big Sky County Jail officials purchased a copy of the Physician's Desk Reference for the Booking Section. Concerned for their own safety, officers who worked in the Booking Section studied the pictures and descriptions of the different drugs during their free time; they soon learned to visually identify the most commonly abused dangerous drugs and the symptoms of drug intoxication in new inmates.

General Safety Procedures

Officers not only must watch out for attacks from inmates who are "high" on drugs, but they also have to worry about their own safety if they touch certain drugs. If loose powder is found in a new inmate's personal property, the officer should never return the powder to the inmate. In addition, the officer should never taste the powder or smell it. The powder could have poison in it or be a hallucinogen, such as PCP or LSD. If the officer does touch the powder, he should wash well with a strong soap and be careful to keep his hands away from his face or eyes until he has washed.

Similarly, if an officer finds parsley in an envelope or a hand-rolled cigarette, he should not touch it. The parsley is probably laced with PCP, which can be absorbed through the pores of the skin. This rule also applies to any other strange substances, since PCP also comes in powder form, liquid, or crystals. The officer who does touch these substances accidentally should wash thoroughly with soap and immediately report the contact with the substance to his supervisor. The substance should be sent to a laboratory for an analysis. The officer should also immediately prepare a written report about his contact with the substance. In the event that the officer later begins to hallucinate and show other symptoms of PCP intoxication, his superiors will have both verbal and written reports advising them of the possibility that the officer may have accidentally absorbed the drug through his skin pores.

When an officer accidentally spills liquid PCP on his uniform or shoes, he should discard the items since the PCP will remain in the clothing through numerous washings and will continue to be absorbed into the officer's body each time he wears the items. Officers should remain alert to the possibility of accidentally touching PCP directly or a substance that has been sprayed or dipped into PCP--accidental contact with this drug may result in the officer's death if he absorbs enough of the substance through his skin (death could occur during hallucinations, especially if the officer begins to hallucinate while driving or swimming).

An officer who is accidentally stuck by a hypodermic needle while searching an inmate should report to a hospital or physician immediately since he will need an injection to prevent infection. The needles carried by narcotics addicts have not been sterilized and sometimes are used by many persons; thus, there is a very good chance that an officer who is accidentally stuck by an addict's needle will develop hepatitis if he does not obtain proper medical treatment immediately.

Finally, officers should never smoke cigarettes or eat cookies or candy taken from inmates or offered by them. The officer never knows whether narcotics or poison have been added to the cigarettes or food items.

Case Study 3:


Shortly before Thanksgiving several packages of oatmeal and chocolate chip cookies began to arrive at the Rattlesnake County Jail for inmate John Haight-Ashbury, a young Englishman who had been arrested for smuggling two tons of marijuana into the United States from Mexico in a truckload of watermelons. Because Haight-Ashbury had already been given three boxes of cookies, jail officers on the four-to-12 shift decided that they could

safely consume 10 other boxes and the inmate would never know the difference. If anybody inquired, the officers could report that the boxes of cookies "never arrived at the jail," Shift Sergeant Ben Stanford told his officers.

The officers greedily grabbed boxes of the cookies and took them to their duty stations, where they munched on them throughout the shift. Sgt. Stanford took two boxes for himself. The hunger landed Sergeant Stanford and three officers in the hospital after they began feeling lightheaded and dizzy. Once at the hospital, doctors diagnosed their collective malady as marijuana intoxication.

"I don't want to ever see a chocolate chip or oatmeal cookie again as long as I live," Sgt. Stanford told the sheriff later. "It hit us all by surprise and gave me the worst headache of my life. But I can tell you, we sure won't be stealing any more food sent in for the inmates!"

An investigation revealed that inmate Haight-Ashbury's girlfriend had baked the cookies and sent them to him; she had been so distrustful of the postal service that she had insured the packages and obtained receipts for them in her own name. This fact alone should have been enough to warn the officers to stay away from the cookies--each box of cookies was insured for \$35--rare cookies indeed!



"Ashbury likes my kind of cookies. He can stay in my jail anytime."

Handling Infected Addicts

Some addicts admitted to the jail may need treatment for infected sores where they have used needles. Addicts with long histories of drug addiction often find it difficult to find veins in their arms or legs for the injection of drugs. When their veins break down, they revert to what they refer to as "skin-popping"--the drug is injected under the surface of the skin. With "skin-popping," drugs are not as easily assimilated into the body as they are with an injection into the vein. For that reason abscesses form, resulting in a sluffing off of the skin and infections. Many long-time addicts will have large, open sores all over the surface of their skin. The majority of these wounds are infected and have the appearance of running sores.

Fortunately, only a few addicts admitted to the jail will display these abscesses. But when they do, the officer should seek immediate medical attention for them.



Many long-term addicts have large, open sores.

If a physician is not available immediately, the addict with sores should be put into a tub of warm water and bathed. All his clothes should be burned. These sores should be considered the same as a massive infection and treated accordingly. Addicts with running sores are the type of individuals some physicians refer to as "denyers"--they refuse to admit they have any problems, they don't see anything wrong with their arms or legs, and they can't understand why anyone would get so upset over a little sore. This is a defense mechanism developed over the years to help them continue their use of drugs. If the physician can't come to the jail to treat these inmates, they should be taken to the hospital after they have been washed and issued jail clothing.

SUMMARY

1. New inmates must be carefully screened for signs of drug abuse.

Withdrawal from certain types of drugs can cause illness and, in some cases, death. Inmates going through the withdrawal process must be under medical supervision, either in a hospital or well-staffed jail infirmary.

2. Officers must be familiar with the effects that certain drugs have upon human behavior.

Some drugs, such as amphetamines and phencyclidine, cause psychotic reactions and schizophrenia; inmates under the influence of these drugs may become extremely violent and destructive. Officers must know the symptoms of amphetamine and phencyclidine abuse and handle inmates showing these symptoms with caution.

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GLOSSARY OF DRUG TERMS

- "A's" Amphetamines.
- Acapulco Gold. A supposedly superior grade of marihuana somewhat gold in color and supposedly grown in the vicinity of Acapulco, Mexico.
- Acid. LSD.
- Action. Selling narcotics.
- Acidhead. A chronic user of LSD.
- Amphetamines. Stimulants which include dexedrine, methedrine, and benzedrine.
- Angle Dust. PCP or heroin cut with marihuana (in Richmond, Virginia a white powder that is a combination of cocaine, THC, and mescaline.)
- Around the turn. To have passed through the severest part of withdrawal distress; also over the hump.
- Artillery. Equipment for injecting drugs.
- Backtrack. To withdraw the plunger of the syringe before injecting drugs to make sure the needle is in the proper position.
- Bad Trip. An unpleasant trip with LSD.
- Bag. A container of drugs.
- Bagman. A drug supplier or peddler.
- Ball. 1. a party; 2. absorption of stimulants and cocaine via genitalia.
- Balloon. A small package of narcotics; container for heroin.
- Bang. To inject drugs.
- Barbs. Barbiturates.
- Barf tea. Peyote.
- Bean. Capsule, benzedrine.
- Beat the gong. To smoke opium.
- Been had. Arrested; "laid"; had intercourse.
- Belly habit. Taking the drug orally.

Bong. Water pipe used to smoke marijuana or hashish.

Bennies. Benzedrine (amphetamine).

Benny. Intoxication after using benzedrine.

Benny Jag. Intoxication after using benzedrine.

Bent out of shape. Under the influence of LSD.

Berkeley. Acid with large amount of speed; pink and pale pink tablets.

Bernice. Cocaine.

Bernies. Cocaine.

Bhang. Marijuana.

Big John. The police.

Bird's eye. Extremely small quantity of narcotics.

Biz. Equipment for injecting drugs.

Blanks. Poor quality narcotics or low grade narcotics, also Dummy or Turkey.

Blast. Party.

Blast a joint. Smoke marijuana.

Blow (a stick, hay, jive, number, tea, pot). Smoke marijuana.

Blow the vein. The use of too much pressure on a weak or sclerosed vein which causes it to rupture.

Blue birds. Amobarbital (amytal).

Blue Caps. LSD.

Blue angles. Amobarbital (amytal).

Blue devils. Same as above.

Blue heavens. same as above.

Blues. Same as above.

Blue (blue morphine). Numorphan (oxymorphone), a narcotic used in a

maintenance program (i.e., methadone type); the name blue comes from the fact that it turns blue during cooking.

Blue velvet. Paregoric (tincture of camphorated opium) and an amphetamine.

Boo Gee. Paper used to make the medicine dropper fit snugly into the needle.

Boost. To shoplift.

Boot. Effect of a drug by injection; IV shot in which blood is drawn into the syringe.

Boy. Heroin.

Bombido. Injected amphetamine.

Bread. Money.

Brew. Beer.

Brody. Feigned illness to obtain drugs from a doctor.

Browns. Amphetamines.

Bufotenine. (5-hydroxy-N-N-dimethyl tryptamine), hallucinogenic drug with effects similar to DMT; usually sniffed or taken intravenously.

Bull. A federal narcotic agent; a police officer.

Bummer. An unpleasant trip on LSD.

Bum trip. Same as above.

Burn. To accept money and give no drug in return or to give a substance instead of the drug; to burn the skin when injecting.

Burned. To receive phony drugs or badly diluted drugs.

Business. Paraphenalia for injecting drugs.

Businessman's trip. An experience with DMT (di-methyl tryptamine).

Busted. Arrested.

Button. The sections of the peyote cactus.

Buzz. To try to buy drugs.

"C". Cocaine.

Cactus. Mescaline.

Candy. Barbiturates.

Candyman. Dealer of cocaine.

Cap. A container of drugs (usually a capsule); to put down.

Carga. Spanish for heroin.

Carrie. Cocaine.

Cartwheels. Amphetamine sulfate (benzedrine); round, white, double-scored tablets.

Cecil. Cocaine.

Champs. Drug abusers who won't reveal their suppliers, even under pressure.

Charas. Marihuana.

Charge. Same as above.

Charged up. Under the influence of drugs.

Charley. Cocaine.

Chipping. Taking small amounts of drugs on an irregular basis.

Chippy. An abuser taking small amounts irregularly; a prostitute.

Chloral Hydrate. When mixed with alcohol, called a Mickey Finn.

Chocolate. Organic mescaline cut with a large amount of strychnine.

Cholly. Cocaine.

Christmas trees. Tuinal (amobarbital + secobarbital); green and white capsule.

Clear up. To withdraw from drugs.

Coasting. Under the influence of drugs.

Cocaine. Also called Bernies, Bernice, Burese, Carrie, Cecil, Charley, Cholly, Corine, "C", Coke, Dust, Flake, Flakey, Gold dust, Happy dust, Ice, Snow, White heroin, etc.-- a stimulant.

Coke. Cocaine.

Cocktail. Roach used in regular cigarette.

Coked up. Under the influence of cocaine.

Cold Turkey. Sudden dry withdrawal (see description under heroin), also see Iron Cure.

Columbus Black Tea. Marihuana.

Coming down. Emerging from any "trip".

Connection. A drug supplier.

Contact high. Getting visual high from surroundings or from watching someone else who is high.

Cooker. Any spoon or bottle cap used in preparation of heroin.

Cook up a pill. To prepare a drug for smoking.

Co-pilots. Dexedrine (an amphetamine)

Cop. To process purchase drugs; copping- "they went copping four hours before making a strike"; also called re-up.

Cop-out. To confess; to alibi; quit; inform; defect.

Coral. Chloral hydrate (Noctec).

Corine. Cocaine.

Cotton. A small piece of cotton through which the drug is strained as it is drawn from the cooker into the syringe.

Cottonhead. User who re-cooks the cotton fibers found in cookers when their supply is used up and they are in need of an injection.

Cotton top. Same as above.

Count. Amount or purity of a drug.

Crank. Methamphetamine (methedrine); also Chris, Christine, Crink.

Crap. Heroin.

Crash pad. Place where users withdraw from amphetamines.

Crib. Home.

Crystal. Methedrine (an amphetamine).

Cut. To dilute drugs, usually by adding milk, sugar, and other inert substances.

Cubes. LSD; referring to putting LSD on sugar cubes; also a cube of morphine containing a grain or two.

Dabble. To take small amounts of drugs on an irregular basis.

D.D. A fatal dose of a narcotic or other drug.

Dealer. A drug supplier.

Deck. A small package of narcotics.

Dex. Dexedrine (dextroamphetamine).

Dexies. Same as above.

Det. Diethyltryptamine, see DMT; an hallucinogen.

Dice. Methedrine.

Dillie. Dilaudid (Hydromorphone).

Dime Bag. A \$10 purchase of drugs, especially grass.

Dirty. In possession of narcotics.

Ditch. Inside of the elbow which has two large veins,

Dolls. Barbiturates.

Dollies. Dolophine (methadone) a synthetic narcotic used therapeutically in maintenance programs for heroin addiction.

DMT. Dimethyl tryptamine; short acting (1-3 hours) hallucinogen; sometimes used with marihuana, usually inhaled.

Domino. To purchase drugs.

Doojee. Heroin.

Dom. 4 methyl-2, 5 dimethoxy amphetamine; same as STP.

DOPE. Any drug, especially narcotics.

Dope fiend. Term used by drug users to parody society's view of them.

Doper. Drug user.

Double trouble. Tuinal, combination amobarbital and secobarbital.

Do up. Smoke marihuana.

Downers. Sedatives, alcohol, tranquilizers, and narcotics.

DPT. An hallucinogen.

Dreck. Heroin, German word meaning mud, filth, or excrement.

Dripper. Equipment for injecting drugs, usually eyedropper, also dingers, dingtuzen, take, take-a-too.

Drivers. Amphetamines.

Drop. To swallow a drug (i.e., dropping acid).

Drop a dime. To call the police to cause a raid or arrest.

Dropped. Arrested.

Dugie. Heroin.

Dummy. A purchase which didn't contain narcotics.

Dust. Cocaine.

Dynamite. Narcotics of high potency (e.g., high grade heroin); may be any drug.

Eighth. 8th of an ounce.

Electric Cool Aid. Cool Aid with LSD in it.

Emsel. Morphine.

Ends. Money.

Experience. An LSD trip.

Eye openers. Amphetamines.

Factory. Equipment for injecting drugs.

Figure eight. A feigned illness to get a doctor to give them dope.

CONTINUED

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Five cent bag. A five dollar bag of heroin, grass, or other drugs.

Fix. An injection of narcotics, usually intravenous.

Flake. Cocaine.

Flash. The intense orgasm-like euphoria experienced immediately after an intravenous injection.

Flea powder. Poor quality narcotics.

Flip. Become psychotic; also to be knocked unconscious.

Flip chick. Crazy girl.

Floating. Under the influence of drugs.

Flower power. Morning glory seeds.

Fly. Take narcotics.

Foil. Small package of narcotics.

Fool pills. Barbiturates.

Football. Oval shaped tablets containing amphetamine + dexedrine.

Fours. Empirin compound with codeine gr.1.

Freak. To be afraid; wild sex; crazy person.

Freak-out. Unpleasant reaction while on a trip; also a chemical high.

Fresh and sweet. Out of jail.

Funky. Unpretentious, earthy.

Fuzz. Police.

Gage. Marihuana.

Gasket. Anything that can be placed on the small end of an eyedropper to prevent air from leaking between the dropper and the needle; also see Boo Gee.

Gee. Intravenous injection.

Gee-head. Paregoric abusers.

Geetis. Money.

Geeze. Heroin or narcotics.

Geezer. A narcotic injection, usually a small shot.

Get down. An intravenous injection of drugs.

Get on. An intravenous injection of drugs.

Gigglesmoke. Marihuana.

Gimmicks. Equipment for injecting drugs.

Girl. Cocaine.

Glad rag. Cloth material or handkerchief saturated with a chemical.

Gluey. A glue sniffer.

Gold. Marihuana.

Gold dust. Cocaine.

Goods. Narcotics.

Good trip. A pleasant experience with psychedelics.

Goofballs. Barbiturates.

Goofers. Sedatives.

Goofing. Under the influence of sedatives.

Gowhead. An opium addict.

Grapes. Wine.

Grass. Marihuana.

Grasshopper. Marihuana smoker.

Greenies. Green, heart-shaped dexedrine and amobarbital combines.

Gun. A hypodermic needle.

"H". Heroin.

Hand to hand. Person to person delivery.

Hang-up. Personal problem.

Happy dust. Cocaine.

Hard stuff. Morphine, cocaine, heroin, or the opiates.

Harness bulls. Uniformed police officers.

Hairy. Heroin.

Hask. Hashish; the resin of Cannabis (marihuana), usually four times as potent as marihuana.

Haven dust. Cocaine.

Hay. Marihuana.

Head. User of drugs; a high.

Hearts. Dexedrine and benzedrine.

Heavenly blue. A hallucinogenic variety of morning glory seed, usually triangular in shape.

Heeled. Having narcotics; having money.

Heroin. Boy, caballo, crap, doo jee, "H", Harry, hairy, horse, junk, schmeck, smack, shit, tecata, white stuff, scag, etc. An addictive derivative of opium.

Hit. To purchase drugs; an arrest; a single successful injection of narcotics; a drag of smoke.

Hitch up the reindeer. Preparing to shoot cocaine.

High. Euphoria under the influence of a drug.

Hocus. A narcotic solution ready for injection.

Holding. Possession of narcotics.

Hooked. Addicted.

Honkie. White person.

Hophead. Narcotic user; originally used for opium smokers.

Hopped up. Under the influence of drugs.

Horse hearts. Dexedrine.

Horn. To sniff powdered narcotics.

Horse. Heroin.

Hot. Wanted by the police.

Hot shot. Fatal dose; an injection of poison instead of dope (i.e., strychnine).

Hot turkey. Lighting the roach between two matches and inhaling smoke through nose.

Hustle. Activities involved in obtaining money for drugs, especially heroin.

Hype. Narcotic addict; someone who injects drugs.

Hyke. Hycodan, dioxcodinine.

Ice. Cocaine.

Ice cream habit. Small irregular habit.

Ibogaine. Extracted from African shrub (Tabernanthe Iboga)- in high doses it causes excitement, mental confusion, and a drunken state.

Indian hay. Marihuana.

Iron cure. See also Cold turkey.

Jab. To inject drugs.

Jacking off the spike. Releasing pressure on the pacifier before all the liquid has gone into the vein allowing blood to re-enter the outfit. Sometimes repeated several times supposedly to wash all of the drug into the blood.

Jag. Intoxication after using an amphetamine.

Jam. An overdose or O.D.

Joint. Marihuana cigarette; prison; penis; an addict's works; an opium den.

Jolly beans. Pep pills, amphetamines.

Jones. A habit.

Joy. Marihuana and heroin.

Joy pop. To inject small amounts of drugs irregularly.

Joy powder. Heroin.

Jug. Ampule or multi-dose vial of liquid drugs (for injection).

Juice. "Hard" liquid or alcohol.

Junk. Narcotics.

Junkie. A narcotic addict; one who uses heroin; sometimes one drug user will call another whom he feels is worse off than himself a junkie; also dope fiend, hophead, smecker, user, cowhead, cookie, dope-hop, yenshee quay.

Juvies. Juvenile officers.

Key. Kilogram or 2.2 pounds of marihuana.

Jeyser plant. A finger stall with drugs in it which is concealed in the rectum.

Kick. To abandon a drug habit.

Kick parties. Parties or sessions where LSD is used.

Kilo. Large amounts of narcotics.

Kit. Equipment for injecting drugs.

Knocked out. Under the influence of drugs.

Lace. Money.

Layout. Equipment for injecting drugs.

LBJ (LBL). JB-336-N-Methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate HCL; a new hallucinogen.

L.A. turnabouts. Amphetamines.

Lemonade. Poor quality narcotics.

Lid. About one ounce of marihuana.

Lid proppers. Amphetamines.

Lipton tea. Poor quality narcotics.

Lit up. Under the influence of drugs.

Locoweed. Marihuana.

Long green. Money.

Love weed. Marihuana.

LSD (25). Lysergic acid diethylamide; an hallucinogen.

Lunch hour trip. Trip on DMT.

Lucy in the sky with diamonds. LSD.

Mount shasta. To be from; to be addicted.

M.S. Morphine sulfate.

Muggles. Marihuana.

Mugglehead. Marihuana user.

Muscle. To inject the drug intramuscularly because you cannot find a good vein; to conceal the needle marks; to lengthen the effects of the drug.

Mutah. Marihuana.

Nabs. Police; fuzz.

Nail. The marihuana cigarette.

Narcos. The law; narcotics agents.

Narks. Same as above.

Needle. Hypodermic syringe.

Needle flash. A short high that might come between the time the needle enters the tissue and the drug enters the blood.

Needle freak. One who enjoys using the needle; in fact, they may get greater enjoyment out of using the needle than from the drug itself.

Nickel bag. A five dollar purchase of drugs.

Nimbly (nimby). Neubutal; (pentobarbital); a barbiturate.

Number. The marihuana cigarette.

Numorphan. Trade name for oxymorphone, commonly called "blue morphine" or just "blue"; a narcotic used in maintenance program.

"O". Opium.

OP. Opium.

O.D. Overdose of drugs; usually fatal.

Off. Withdrawn from drugs.

Oil, to. To get an intravenous injection.

On a rip. Under the influence of drugs.

On a trip. Under the influence of LSD or other hallucinogens.

On the beam. Under the influence of marihuana.

On the nod. Under the influence of drugs, especially the opiates.

On the street. Out of jail.

On the stuff. Regular user of drugs or addict.

Orange barrel. LSD; white tablet with orange dots.

Oranges. Dexedrine (dextroamphetamine), an amphetamine.

Orange sunshine. LSD.

Outfit. Eyedropper or cooker used to prepare fix, see Works the influence of LSD.

Out of this world. Under the influence of drugs.

Outside of myself. Feelings experienced under the influence of LSD.

Pack. Heroin.

Pad. Drug user's home; bed.

Panama red. Marihuana.

Panic. Shortage of drugs (especially narcotics) on the market.

Paper. A prescription or package of narcotics; a small square of paper folded into a rectangle to contain powdered drugs.

PCP. One of the hallucinogens commonly known as "angle dust," "peace pills," or "wacky weed." It is legitimately manufactured as a veterinary anesthetic.

Peaches. Benzedrine (amphetamine sulfate).

Peanuts. Barbiturates.

Pearly gates. Morning glory seeds.

Peddler. Dealer in drugs.

Per. Prescription.

Phennies. Phenobarbital (luminal).

Pickeled. Under the influence of a drug.

Pick up. An injection.

Piece. A container of drugs; one ounce; girl; gun; pistol.

Piece of stuff. Heroin.

Pill freak or pill head. Dangerous drug user; someone who likes to take pills.

Pilly. Same as above.

Pink wedge. LSD.

Pin shot. When an injection is made by using a pin or sharp object to make a wound into which the end of the medicine dropper is directly inserted; also a penitentiary shot.

Pin yen. Opium.

Pink berkeley. Acid + strychnine.

Pinks. Second (secobarbital), a barbiturate.

Pink lady. Same as above.

Pipe. Large vein; joint; penis.

Pinned eyes. Pin-point pupils.

Plant. A cache of narcotics; stash; supply of narcotics.

P.G. Paregoric (codeine).

P.O. By mouth; paregoric.

Point. Equipment for injecting drugs; needle.

Point shot. A shot made with the broken point of a needle or a sewing machine needle. The point is inserted into the vein or skin, then the medicine dropper is slid over it and held in place while the injection is made.

Pony. Heroin.

Pop. To inject drugs subcutaneously.

Poppers. Amyl nitrate.

Pot. Marihuana.

Pothead. Marihuana user.

Powder. Amphetamine in powdered form; also heroin.

Pure. Pure narcotics of very good grade.

Purple haze. LSD cut with Smack or Coke and formaldehyde.

Purple hearts. Combination dexedrine and amobarbital.

Purple owsley's. LSD.

Pusher. Narcotic or other drug seller; dealer.

Peyote. The cactus from which mescaline, an hallucinogen, is derived.

Psilocybin. Hallucinogen from Mexican mushrooms.

Quarter trip. LSD.

Quill. A folded matchbox cover from which narcotics are sniffed or snorted.

Rainbows. Tuinal; combination amobarbital and secobarbital, a barbiturate.

Reader. A prescription.

Red and blues. Tuinal; see Rainbows.

Red birds. Seconal (secobarbital), a barbiturate.

Red bullets. Same as above.

Red devils. Same as above.

Reds. Same as red birds.

Reefer. Marihuana cigarette.

Re-up. To buy drugs, also to cop.

RFD dopehead. An addict who travels around in rural areas and small towns and gets his drugs from local doctors.

Rig. Works.

Rip off. General stealing.

Register. When the blood appears in the outfit indicating the vein has been punctured.

Roarer. Small white tablet which affects the tactile senses.

Roller. A vein that will not stay still to let you put the needle in it.

Rope. Marihuana.

Roach. The butt of a marihuana cigarette.

Roach pin. A device to hold the butt of a marihuana cigarette; also Roach clip.

Root. Marihuana.

Roses. Amphetamines.

Rumble. Poilce in the neighborhood; a shake-down or search; a fight.

Rush. The intense orgasm-like euphoria experienced immediately after an intravenous injection of certain drugs.

Satch. To saturate any absorbent material with a drug solution; method used in smuggling.

Satch cotton. Cotton used to strain narcotics before injection, may be used again if supplies of drugs are low.

Scab. Heroin (diacetylmorphine).

Scat. Heroin (diacetylmorphine).

Schoolboy. Paregoric, codeine.

Score. To purchase drugs; when the blood appears in the eyedropper.

Script. A doctor's prescription.

Script writer. A sympathetic physician; someone who forges prescriptions.

Seeds. Slang reference to morning glory seeds.

Seccy. Seconal (secobarbital).

Shit. Heroin, sometimes marihuana or any abused drug.

Shooting up. To inject drugs, also Mainline, taken it main, in the gutter, in the sewer.

Shooting Gallery. Place where narcotic addicts inject drugs.

Sick dizzy's. Peyote, an hallucinogen.

Silver bike. Syringe with chrome fittings or a chrome hypodermic needle.

Sitter. An experienced LSD user who helps a new user.

Skag. Heroin.

Skin popper. Injecting the drug subcutaneously.

Smack. Heroin.

Smack freak. Heroin addict.

Smash. Acetone extracts of marihuana which are added to hash, rolled in little balls and smoked; recently (1970) exported from Mexico.

Smoke. Marihuana.

Sniff. To sniff drugs (usually heroin, cocaine, or glue) through the nose.

Snort. Same as above.

Sniper. Butt of a marihuana cigarette.

Snow. Cocaine, white heroin.

Snow bird. Cocaine user.

Speckled bird. Downers.

Speed. Any amphetamine, but especially methedrine (methamphetamine).

Speedball. An injection which combines a stimulant and a depressant--often cocaine mixed with morphine or heroin; LSD and speed.

Speed demon. Someone who uses amphetamines frequently.

Speed freak. Same as above.

Speedster. An amphetamine user, Speed freak.

Splash. Benzedrine (amphetamine sulfate), an amphetamine.

Spike. The needle used for injecting drugs; to inject drugs.

Spoon. 1/16th of an ounce of heroin.

Square. A non-addict.

Stack. A quantity of marihuana cigarettes.

Star dust. Cocaine.

Stash. A cache of narcotics.

Steamboating. Smoking marihuana through a toilet paper roller or glass tube especially designed for this use.

Stick. Marihuana cigarette.

Stoned. Under the influence of drugs.

Strawberry fields. LSD; a pale pink tablet - part strychnine.

Strawberry shortcake. Methedrine (methamphetamine).

STP. "Serenity, tranquility, and peace"; same as DOM, an hallucinogen.

Straight. In possession of narcotics; person who is not a drug user.

Strung out. Regular user or addict; uncontrolled habitual user of drugs.

Stuff. Narcotics (heroin, usually).

Sugar. Powdered narcotics, especially heroin.

Sugar cube. Large cubes of bulk morphine; also LSD.

Sunshine. A 4-way tablet of LSD with mild effects when taken by sections.

Supplier. Drug source; dealer; pusher.

Sweet lacy. Marihuana.

Swingman. A drug supplier.

Tennessee blue. Marihuana.

Texas tea. Same as above.

THC. Delta-1, tetra hydrocannabinol; active principle of marihuana.

Tom cat. An improvised hypodermic needle made with a sewing machine needle.

Tooies. Tuinal (combination amobarbital and secobarbital), a barbiturate.

Tracks. Scars along veins after many injections.

Tripping out. Getting high on psychedelics.

Turned on. Under the influence of drugs.

Toxy. Small amount of prepared opium.

Truck drivers. Amphetamines.

Tuinal. Combination amobarbital and secobarbital, a barbiturate.

Tuning in. Feeling the effects of LSD.

Turkey. A capsule purported to a narcotic but filled with a non-narcotic.

Turned off. Withdrawn from drugs.

Turps. Elixir of Terpin Hydrate with Codeine, a cough syrup.

Twist. Marihuana cigarette.

25. LSD (from chemical designation as LSD-25).

Uncle. Federal narcotic agent.

Unkie. Morphine.

Uppers. Stimulant, amphetamines, also UPS.

Valley. Inside of elbow, which has two large veins.

Verification shot. During an intravenous injection allowing blood to enter the syringe to verify that it is in the vein.

Wake-ups. Amphetamines; the first shot of the day.

Washed up. Withdrawn from drugs.

Water. Methedrine (methamphetamine)

Wasted. Under the influence of drugs.

Weak acid. Morning glory seeds.

Weed. Marihuana.

Weed head. Marihuana user.

Weekend habit. A small, irregular drug habit.

Whiskers. Federal narcotic agent.

Whites. Amphetamines.

White doctor. Camouflaged reference to drugs, i.e., "I'm sick and only Dr. White can help me."

White heroin. Cocaine.

White lightning. LSD.

White stuff. Morphine, heroin.

Whitey. Heroin.

Wing ding. A feigned illness performed so a doctor will give an addict dope.

Wired. Under the influence of drugs.

Works. Equipment for injecting drugs, also Layout, Factory, Machinery, Gun, Artillery, The business, Bizz, Joint.

Yata. Mexican slang for someone who is crazy.

Yellow berth. Relatively potent acid - very speedy - usually 4-5 way hit per tablet.

Yellow bullets. Nembutal (pentobarbital), a barbiturate; also Yellows.

Yellow dolls. Same as above.

Yellow jackets. Same as above.

Yen. desire for drugs.

Yen hook (hock). Instrument used in opium smoking to prepare the opium.

Yen shee. Opium ash.

Yen shee suey. Opium wine.

Yen sleep. Drowsy period during opium withdrawal.
Youngblood. Young person starting to use marihuana.
Zonked. Under the influence of drugs.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

ALCOHOL ABUSE EMERGENCIES IN THE JAIL

The special inmate most often seen by the jail officer probably is the alcoholic. Familiar symptoms of intoxication include shakiness; staggering; slurred speech; a blank, glassy-eyed look; and the unpleasant odors of heavy drinking. When a person with these signs is being booked, officers should make certain that they do not confuse these symptoms with those of serious medical disorders. For example, persons suffering from multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, diabetes, head injuries, and other medical disorders have occasionally been considered drunk when they were being admitted to the jail. Sometimes the mistake in diagnosis prevented proper medical care, resulting in the death of the inmate.

Jail booking officers should conduct a basic medical screening of *all* inmates and consult a physician if the inmate shows signs of a medical disorder or serious alcoholism.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT - CITY OF ST. LOUIS											
Intoxicated Person Report											
HOW COMPLAINT RECEIVED: (101)			DATE (102)			DIST. OF DC. (103)		COMPLAINT NUMBER (104)			
<input type="checkbox"/> Home <input type="checkbox"/> Station <input type="checkbox"/> Call Room <input type="checkbox"/> On Time											
TYPE OF PROSECUTE (105)		DATE & TIME OCCURRED (106)		LOCATION OF OCCURRENCE (107)				PATROL AREA (108)			
NAME (109)			HOME ADDRESS (110)			HOME PHONE (111)			BUSINESS ADDRESS OR PHONE (112)		
SEX (113)	AGE (114)	RACE (115)	HEIGHT (116)	WEIGHT (117)	MARITAL STATUS (118)		OCCUPATION (119)				
					M F D W						
HAVE YOU BEEN DRUNK (120)			QUANTITY (121)								
CIRCLE APPROPRIATE DESCRIPTION											
BREATH			<input type="radio"/> Sour of Alcoholic Liqueur <input type="radio"/> Apparently Normal <input type="radio"/> Faint <input type="radio"/> Moderate <input type="radio"/> Strong								
COLOR OF FACE			<input type="radio"/> Apparently Normal <input type="radio"/> Flushed <input type="radio"/> Pale <input type="radio"/> Other								
CLOTHES			<input type="radio"/> Cleanly <input type="radio"/> Messed <input type="radio"/> Soiled <input type="radio"/> Disorderly								
ATTITUDE			<input type="radio"/> Polite <input type="radio"/> Excited <input type="radio"/> Belligerent <input type="radio"/> Tactless <input type="radio"/> Care-free <input type="radio"/> Stupid <input type="radio"/> Other								
UNUSUAL ACTIONS			<input type="radio"/> Profane <input type="radio"/> Nauseating <input type="radio"/> Belching <input type="radio"/> Vomiting <input type="radio"/> Other								
EYES			<input type="radio"/> Apparently Normal <input type="radio"/> Watery <input type="radio"/> Bloodshot								
DESCRIBE ANY INJURIES (122) AND HOW RECEIVED											
REMARKS (123)											
OUT OF SERVICE (124)			ARRIVE MEDICAL (125)			LEAVE MEDICAL (126)			TIME IN SERVICE (127)		
DIAGNOSIS (128)			CONVEYANCE (129)			DOCTOR AND HOSPITAL NAME (130)					
SUPER. INITIAL (131)			SIGNATURE OF REPORTING OFFICER, DSM, DIST./DIV. (132)			NAME OF ARRESTING OFFICER, DSM (133)					

Intoxicated person report used by the St. Louis, Missouri Metropolitan Police Department.

Case Study 1:

Molly Pitcher, 21, was arrested by a state highway patrol officer for speeding and, because she was obviously intoxicated and unfit to drive, the officer brought her to the Rattlesnake County Jail. Inmate Pitcher passed out while she was being admitted, but the booking officer revived her by splashing a bucket of cold water on her face. He finished booking her and took her to the women's cell block, where she was placed on a bunk to "sleep off her drunk." Her husband was not notified that she was in jail.

Jail officers were unaware that inmate Pitcher had been attending a party where there were drugs of all types available. She had been taking methaqualone tablets, a popularly abused depressant, and drinking gin to wash down the pills. Officer Heidi Hessian, who was supervising the women's section, had a lot of paperwork to complete and did not bother to check on the inmates during the shift. When the next shift came on duty, Officer Carrie Nation checked the inmates and found Pitcher unconscious. Officer Nation immediately called for an ambulance. When inmate Pitcher arrived at the County Hospital Emergency Room, she was in a coma and died several hours later. Her husband, who was then notified, successfully sued Rattlesnake County, the sheriff, the booking officer, and Officer Hessian for negligence.

This case study points out that alcohol, when combined with other drugs, especially depressants, is a lethal mix. In a report issued in December, 1979, the National Institute of Drug Abuse in Washington stated that alcohol, when used in combination with other drugs, is now the leading cause of emergency room visits and drug-related deaths. The most popular "killer cocktail" is alcohol and morphine taken together; this combination was found in the blood of ten percent of the patients who died from alcohol-drug interactions in 1979. Also high on the list of emergency room reports was the combination of alcohol and aspirin.

Because officers generally will not know whether inmates have taken other drugs along with alcohol, they must attempt to find out by questioning the inmates during the booking process. Inmates who are unconscious at the booking desk should be taken to a hospital emergency room immediately, not revived temporarily with a bucket of water and placed in a cell to "sleep it off." ALL inmates who are intoxicated when admitted to the jail must be observed constantly and examined every 15 minutes by officers for signs of unconsciousness, coma, or toxic reactions--if the officer observes symptoms of a toxic reaction, he should play it safe and send the inmate to a hospital emergency room for treatment. It is always better to be overcautious, as the officers at the Rattlesnake County Jail learned--too late.

ALCOHOL WITHDRAWAL SYNDROMES

An intoxicated person who is admitted to the jail often requires medical treatment. Heavy, long-time drinkers withdrawing from alcohol may suffer from the DTs (delirium tremens). The mortality rate for persons suffering from the DTs who do not receive proper medical treatment ranges from five to fifteen percent. Alcohol withdrawal can be more serious than withdrawal from many dangerous narcotics.

There are four alcohol withdrawal syndromes: tremulousness and hallucinations, seizures, auditory hallucinosis, and delirium tremens.

Tremulousness And Hallucinations

A tremulousness and hallucinations reaction usually begins from seven to eight hours after the inmate has had his last drink and attains maximum severity within 24 hours. The withdrawing inmate is overly alert, nervous, shaky, weak, has a flushed face, suffers a loss of appetite, and often has a rapid heart beat. Disordered perceptions, hallucinations, and delusions may be present. The inmate should be housed in a well-lighted, individual cell away from noise and activity. Officers should watch him carefully.

Treatment. The inmate may be disoriented; this can sometimes be overcome by talking to him or leaving a personal item in his cell, such as a picture from his wallet. The officer should explain to the inmate that he is a correctional officer carrying out his normal duties and is there to help the inmates. It is best to contact the infirmary staff or a local doctor for advice on how to handle this inmate. The doctor may prescribe food or medication or recommend that the inmate be moved to a detoxification center or hospital.

Seizures

Seizures may occur within a seven to 48 hour period after the inmate has stopped drinking. They are essentially *grand mal*, epileptic-like seizures and should be treated as such. Only from two to six seizures should occur during the seven to 48-hour period and each seizure should not last more than five minutes.

Treatment. Surprisingly, a series of these seizures may not pose a serious medical threat. As each seizure occurs, the officer should treat it as a *grand mal* epilepsy attack. He should not restrain the inmate. However, the officer should observe the inmate carefully and make a complete written report to the jail medical staff or to local medical authorities. The officer should become concerned if the inmate seems to have one seizure after another without regaining consciousness or if each seizure lasts more than five minutes. If either of these conditions occur, the inmate should be transferred to a hospital. Officers should also consider the situation to be a medical emergency if the seizures occur in conjunction with a high fever or with the DTs.

Auditory Hallucinosiis

Between 12 and 48 hours after he stops drinking the inmate may have auditory hallucinations. When this occurs, the inmate usually will complain that he hears accusing voices which are persecuting him, but otherwise he may appear to be rational and alert.

Treatment. Officers should keep the inmate in a well-lighted cell, away from noise and activity. Since the inmate may be paranoid, officers might try to convince him that they mean him no harm, that they are concerned about him, and that the voices he hears are the result of drinking and will eventually go away.

DTs (Delirium Tremens)

This is an extremely dangerous medical condition with a mortality rate of from five to 15 percent. DTs usually occur within 72 to 96 hours after the inmate has had his last drink.

The symptoms of delirium tremens are:

- Profound confusion and disorientation;
- Delusions;
- Vivid hallucinations;
- Tremor;
- Agitation;
- Autonomic overactivity (increased pulse and breathing);
- Pallor;
- Sweating;
- Possible terror or confusion;
- High fever with possible convulsions; and
- Vomiting.

Treatment. Transfer the inmate to a hospital immediately. While the officers are waiting for an ambulance to arrive at the jail, a hospital or jail physician may advise them to give the inmate emergency medical aid for high fever and convulsions if necessary; however, officers should not restrain an inmate who is suffering from convulsions. If the inmate

is admitted to a jail infirmary, the infirmary staff should administer multivitamin pills and fluids to him within two hours from the time he is admitted. They should also keep him well-hydrated. The commercial drink Gatorade is an inexpensive, available fluid which physicians advise jail staff to give to inmates suffering from DTs, but it should only be administered after a Thiamin injection and upon the orders of a doctor.

GENERAL RULES FOR HANDLING ALCOHOL ABUSERS IN THE JAIL

Not all intoxicated inmates who are admitted to the jail pose serious medical problems. Many new inmates have simply had too much to drink and will suffer no more than some vomiting and a hangover. However, whether the situation appears serious or not, officers should keep these general rules in mind:

1. Level of Consciousness: A booking officer should *never* admit an unconscious person to the jail even if he thinks the person has merely passed out from drinking. Anyone who faints or collapses in the jail and who does not recover consciousness almost immediately should be sent to the hospital. The level of consciousness of an admitted inmate should always improve while he is in the jail. If the level of consciousness deteriorates, then the inmate may be in danger of falling into a coma; medical personnel should be notified immediately. Officers should wake an inmate who is sleeping off a "drunk" every 3 or 4 hours. If an officer cannot wake an inmate or if his level of consciousness seems to be getting worse, the officer should request an *immediate* medical evaluation. During the booking process and again every few hours, officers can give inmates this simple test to evaluate their level of consciousness:
 - a. Who are you? Who am I?
 - b. Where are you?
 - c. What is the present year, date, day, and approximate time of day?
 - d. Count backwards from 29 by 3's.
 - e. What does the expression "don't cry over spilt milk" mean?

The answers to these questions should improve as the effects of the alcohol wear off. If the inmate's responses do not improve, the officer should request both a medical and psychological evaluation for the inmate. Complete documentation should be made of *every* circumstance surrounding such an inmate.

2. Observation: Officers should observe *all* alcohol abuse admissions closely to detect medical symptoms and to prevent suicides.

3. Paranoia: When some people are very drunk or in a great deal of discomfort from alcohol withdrawal, they may feel extremely threatened and paranoid. A person who has these feelings will probably distrust the jail officer. The officer should try to act in a non-threatening manner and be reassuring to the inmates.
4. Screening: Each jail should have admissions procedures which include basic psychological and medical screening. During the screening process, officers should seek information on how much the inmate has had to drink, whether he has taken any drugs, and whether he has any suicidal feelings. If the inmate indicates that he has been taking alcohol and barbiturates, officers should obtain medical assistance immediately, since this combination can be fatal. By the time severe reactions set in, it may be too late.
5. Depression and Suicide: Often an intoxicated inmate is "high" or hostile when he is admitted to the jail. But as the blood alcohol level drops, he may become depressed to the point of suicide. All alcohol abuse admissions should be considered potential suicide risks until they are completely withdrawn from alcohol (which may take three or four days).
6. Vomiting and Staggering: The intoxicated inmate should be protected from harming himself and encouraged to rest and lie down to prevent head injuries. A semi-conscious, vomiting inmate should be turned face down with his head to the side to prevent him from choking on his own vomit. If there are any signs of head injuries, such as bruises, bumps, or stitches, and vomiting occurs, officers should seek an *immediate* medical evaluation even if the inmate must be transferred to a hospital.
7. Antabuse Reaction: Antabuse is a drug given to alcoholics to prevent them from drinking alcohol. Those who drink while on antabuse will have these symptoms:
 - a. Very red face;
 - b. Pain;
 - c. Fast heart rate;
 - d. Vomiting; and
 - e. Cold sweats.

If the inmate has been taking both antabuse and alcohol and has these symptoms, officers should transfer him to a medical facility immediately.

8. After Admission: An inmate who has adjusted to the jail environment after alcohol withdrawal still has special needs. Often the doctor will recommend a special diet to repair the alcoholic's poor physical health. The inmate must also be watched carefully: alcoholics sometimes try to drink various poisonous cleaners, paint thinners, and other fluids containing alcohol in an attempt to become intoxicated. Jail staff members should be alert to this possibility.

Case Study 2:

Inmate Brandy Waters was an alcoholic who considered the Reindeer County Jail to be his "home away from home." He worked as a farmhand, but every time he got paid he would head for White-tail City to "tie one on" and "raise a little hell." At least twice a year the judge would sentence Waters to a 30- or 60-day term at the jail.

Right before Christmas, Waters was sentenced to an unusual 90 days in the jail because he had gone too far on his last big drunk. He had spent his entire paycheck and his military pension check buying holiday "good cheer" drinks for all his buddies. The bartender at the Big Horn Tavern told Waters he couldn't have any credit. Badly in need of a drink, Waters knocked over a "Santa Claus" at a Salvation Army kettle and stole all the money in the kettle, which turned out to be \$74. He managed to get completely intoxicated before he was identified as the thief and arrested.

The Reindeer County Jail had a small infirmary and Waters was housed there, since he began suffering from tremulousness and hallucinations seven hours after he was admitted. Because it was Christmas Eve, the sheriff had permitted the jail cook to prepare a large holiday dinner for the jail officers and road deputies who were on duty. The meal was being served in the rollcall room. Officer Rudolph Blitzen was the only officer on duty in the infirmary and didn't think he would be able to go to the dinner when it was his turn for a meal break. Since the three inmates in the infirmary were all sleeping, the duty sergeant told Officer Blitzen the inmates would be OK if Blitzen wanted to go to the dinner and leave the inmates alone for an hour. Before he left, Officer Blitzen made certain that the medicine cabinet was securely locked.

While Officer Blitzen was on his dinner break, Waters woke up and started wandering around the infirmary. A half-gallon jug

of rubbing alcohol caught his attention, and he began drinking it. By the time Officer Blitzen returned two hours later, Waters had polished off the alcohol and was sprawled on the floor snoring, with the empty bottle near him. Officer Blitzen called for an ambulance and sent Waters to the County Hospital for emergency treatment. Fortunately--for Officer Blitzen and the sheriff--inmate Waters recovered.

This case study points out that known alcoholics must be watched *constantly*, since they will often drink substances that contain alcohol or other intoxicants. Officers should not leave inmates in an infirmary unsupervised, since a medical emergency could easily occur during the officer's absence. In this case, the supervising sergeant should have detailed another officer to the infirmary while Officer Blitzen was on his meal break. In addition, Officer Blitzen should have kept the rubbing alcohol locked in the medical supply cabinet--with a known alcoholic in the infirmary, leaving the alcohol on a shelf in clear view was like leaving a loaded gun next to a person with suicidal tendencies.

In recent years there has been an increasing consensus that the jail is not the proper place for people who are intoxicated (unless they have been arrested and charged with committing a serious crime). Many cities and counties have established alcohol rehabilitation centers where intoxicated people can be taken. If such a center is available, jail staff members should make an effort to transfer intoxicated new admissions there for treatment.

The former practice of housing intoxicated people in "drunk tanks" to "dry out" is disappearing from use because too many deaths have resulted from such careless procedures. Until intoxicated people can be handled in appropriate community facilities, jail staff members must continue to take the responsibility for the safety of these persons and make certain that they receive proper medical treatment. Staff members should carefully document *all* treatment provided to intoxicated inmates.

SUMMARY

1. If an inmate showing signs of alcoholism is admitted to the jail, he should be examined by a physician; he will need to be observed at all times.

Familiar symptoms of intoxication include shakiness; staggering; slurred speech; a blank, glassy-eyed look; and the unpleasant odors of heavy drinking. However, when a person with these signs is being booked, officers should make certain that they do not confuse these symptoms with those of serious medical disorders, such as multiple sclerosis, epilepsy, diabetes, and head injuries. Intoxi-

cated inmates must be watched constantly, since they may go into alcohol withdrawal, a serious medical condition which could be fatal if not properly treated.

2. If the jail is responsible for housing intoxicated inmates, these inmates must receive proper medical treatment.

Officers should carefully document *all* treatment provided to intoxicated inmates. Officers are responsible for the safety of these inmates and must watch for signs of paranoia, unconsciousness, drug/alcohol reactions, depression and suicidal tendencies, vomiting, and antabuse reactions. If these symptoms appear, then officers should secure the necessary medical or psychological treatment for the inmates. Officers should never ignore intoxicated or withdrawing inmates, since the inmates may die--alcohol is a lethal drug.



Inmates suffering from delirium tremens experience frightening hallucinations.

Suggested Readings

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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDERS:

PSYCHOPATHIC AND NEUROTIC PERSONALITIES

Jail officers frequently are required to supervise inmates who are suffering from psychological disorders. Many inmates are in jail because they have a psychopathic or sociopathic personality and are always getting into trouble. Other inmates, who appear to be "normal" when they are admitted to the jail, may begin to suffer from mental or emotional problems because the environment of the jail is stress producing. The inmate tries to escape from the stress by withdrawing emotionally, since he realizes that it would be difficult to physically escape.

It is often difficult for officers to distinguish between "normal" and abnormal behavior in inmates. It is not the officer's job to try to diagnose mental illness. However, he should know how to recognize the symptoms of psychopathic and neurotic personalities since these inmates may present a threat to themselves or others. If an officer suspects that an inmate is suffering from mental disorders, he should refer the inmate to a psychiatrist or psychologist for a diagnosis.

Since it is often difficult even for a professional to correctly diagnose certain types of mental illness, the officer can assist by carefully documenting the inmate's activities, behavioral problems, and symptoms.

In trying to spot a potentially serious problem, the officer should remember that signs of mental illness are not always evident upon casual observations: to be able to see what is going on takes experience and good judgment. The officer should trust his judgment to let him know when to call in professional help for the inmate.

One of the major categories of the mental illnesses which affect inmates are the *personality disorders*. Personality disorders are self-defeating patterns of behavior which are learned early in life. These disorders probably are responses to disappointments and problems which the inmate encountered as a child. But as he grew older, he continued these childhood responsive actions and did not develop mature, adult behavioral patterns.

Personality disorders force the individual into unhappy situations. The person with a personality disorder (as the name suggests) has incorporated his abnormal behavior into his personality, and he thinks he doesn't have a problem. He may actually believe that he is mentally healthy and that he really knows how to handle life well.

There are several different types of personality disorders which officers may encounter among inmates. For example, people with a *hysterical personality* can be insecure, vain, sexually seductive, and coy, but they do not have any real ability to feel emotion and love. Other inmates may have *passive-aggressive personalities*; on the surface they may seem passive, but in reality they "get back" at others or call attention to themselves in hidden ways. Inmates with other types of personality disorders cannot control their emotions, especially their anger.

PSYCHOPATHIC OR SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITIES

One type of personality disorder which officers should be especially aware of is called the *psychopathic, sociopathic, or antisocial personality*. People with this personality disorder are selfish, self-centered, and impulsive. On the surface they are charming, and even intelligent, but they use these gifts to con other people and gain power over them. An example of this type of personality is Charles Manson, who was able to dominate an assorted group of people which he called his family.

Despite the need to control others, psychopaths have no real life plans and are emotionally shallow when it comes to individual relationships. The most frustrating thing of all about psychopaths is that they have no moral sense--no sense of right or wrong. For example, Charles Manson felt no guilt or remorse about the people he and his "family" members killed. Psychopaths are also pathological liars. They have extensive criminal records and are incarcerated often, especially since being punished doesn't seem to deter them from committing other crimes.

How can the jail officer recognize a psychopath? It is difficult since the condition shows up in many forms. A book with the title *The Mask of Sanity*, written by Hervey Cleckley, gives the following characteristics of the psychopathic personality:

- On-the-surface charm, and seems rather bright.
- No symptoms one would find in a person who is mentally ill.
- No nervousness of the sort commonly seen in a neurotic patient.

- Unreliable--you can't depend on him. He will make promises, but not keep them.
- Untruthful and insincere.
- Lack of any feeling of shame after he has done something wrong.
- Anti-social behavior which often doesn't make sense.
- Poor judgment and failure to learn from experience.
- Thinks only in terms of how things affect him personally; cannot really love another person.
- Lack of any real feelings for the rights of others.
- Lack of realization that there is something wrong with him. It is always somebody else's fault.
- Callousness and lack of ability to work harmoniously or in a team with others.
- Foolish behavior with drink or even without it.
- Threats of suicide when in trouble--seldom carried out.
- Sex life--superficial, and often promiscuous.
- Failure to follow a life plan.

Because an inmate with a psychopathic personality has somehow let his abnormal behavior become an important element of his entire personality, it is hard to convince him that he needs help. There is not much an officer can say or do to change this inmate's behavior.

An officer should *always* exercise caution when dealing with a psychopathic inmate. The psychopathic inmate may act charming, friendly, and cooperative when, in reality, he is trying to gain power over other inmates and con the jail staff. He can also be extremely dangerous.

Case Study 1:

Inmate Harvey Freud was in the Big Sky County Jail awaiting trial for assaulting a police officer who had caught him stealing clothes from a Goodwill Industries' collection bin in a shopping center parking lot. After two weeks in the jail Freud told rookie

Officer Johnny Begood that he had a "vision" and was saved. He said he was "born again" and would devote the remainder of his life to rescuing "lost souls" from the "temptations of the devil." Officer Begood, who was very religious himself, believed Freud and allowed him to establish a Bible study group, which met every night in the jail dining room. Several inmates joined the group because Freud was a very persuasive speaker.

Freud soon began asking Officer Begood if he could participate in a program the jail conducted for county high school students. Inmates participating in this program visited the schools and spoke at assemblies to convince students that they should stay away from a life of crime. One day at lunch Officer Begood began telling Sgt. Chuck Berry all about inmate Freud's "conversion" and how "great" Freud would be as a speaker in the high school program.

"No way!" Sgt. Berry answered. "That turkey's pulling a real number one con job on you because you're new here, Johnny. Have you seen his yellow sheet? He's been in half the jails and prisons in this part of the country, and his record goes back to age seven, although there's a rumor that he burned down his grandfather's farm when he was only four. If you want to hear all about his religious conversions, go look up Officer Bobby Ramirez over at the Reindeer County Jail. He'll tell you a story that will just break your heart."

On his next day off, Officer Begood drove over to Reindeer County to visit Officer Ramirez.

"So you've got Freud!" Ramirez laughed. "You ought to keep that psycho in leg irons or he's liable to steal your keys when you're not looking. He has a habit of taking long walks out of jail and forgetting to come back."

"What's wrong with him?" Officer Begood asked. "I always like to give an inmate a chance to rehabilitate himself."

"He was up here two years ago and pulled the same con job he's trying on you now--his great conversion to a life of saintliness," Ramirez explained. "Only he talked us into letting him out during the day to attend classes at the Bible College over in Whitetail City. Well, after only a week, he forgot to come back to the jail one day after class. When the FBI finally nabbed him for robbing a bank three states away, the officers over there got a psychiatric work-up done on him. The doctor said Freud is a classic psychopathic personality and officers better not turn their backs on him. According to the doctor, Freud can't be rehabilitated--he just has to be locked up because he's a liar who doesn't see anything wrong about his criminal acts."

"Damn, I almost fell for his con job," Officer Begood answered. "Thanks, Bob, you just saved my job. I really owe you one!"

As this case study illustrates, the psychopathic personality is a lot like a rattlesnake--he can't be trusted not to strike if the opportunity arises. Nor does the psychopath become "rehabilitated" after a few weeks in jail. Officers should be suspicious when inmates undergo sudden religious conversions and they should *always* check the past histories of these inmates. Otherwise, an officer may fall victim to the psychopath's schemes.

NEUROTIC PERSONALITIES

A neurosis is an emotional disorder in which the personality is dominated by feelings of anxiety, obsessional thoughts, compulsive acts, or physical complaints.

The main characteristic of a neurosis is *anxiety*, which can be defined as a feeling of dread, apprehension, or fear not justified by reality. For example, a person facing major surgery might experience feelings of dread, apprehension, and fear, but he would not be labeled a "neurotic" because his feelings are a legitimate response to a potentially dangerous situation. Conversely, the anxiety exhibited by the neurotic is *not* justified by reality, even though the behavior he displays is very similar to the behavior of a person who is under extreme stress.

Though the neurotic's anxieties are not justified by reality, he has not lost touch with reality. In fact, most neurotics are aware of their problems. They know that by structuring their lives around unrealistic fears they are making themselves miserable and putting themselves under a great deal of tension.

Why, then, do people continue to have a neurotic fear of elevators, for example, when they know it is irrational to have such a fear? The neurotic who fears elevators is, like all neurotics, afraid of bigger anxieties in the form of emotional conflicts. Any neurotic symptom, such as being afraid of elevators, is really a way of running away from a more important anxiety. The problem is that since the neurotic never deals with what is really bothering him, he has to keep repeating his neurotic behavior until it becomes a way of life.

If an officer can help identify a neurotic inmate and refer him for professional treatment, the officer will be helping him break free from the daily tension which governs his life. It is important to provide help for neurotics because they could cause problems in the jail. When people are tense or worried, they can become irritable, argumentative, or even violent without much provocation. By identifying neurotic

inmates and referring them for treatment, the officer will help to decrease tension levels overall, since the neurotic inmate often "gets on the nerves" of those around him.

An officer should use sound judgment and common sense when he is trying to determine if an inmate may be neurotic. He should take into account the inmate's entire personality and judge it in the context of the stresses and strains the inmate may be experiencing due to his incarceration.

Anxiety Neurosis

Anxiety neurosis is one of the most common types of neuroses, afflicting 30 to 40 percent of all neurotics. It is characterized by *free-floating anxiety*, a general feeling of tension and dread which cannot be pinpointed to any one cause. Anxiety neurosis is also characterized by a relatively constant state of *chronic anxiety*. The anxiety neurotic always feels tense and nervous. He constantly worries that he will fail or that something terrible will happen.

Anxiety neurotics display a number of physical or psychophysiological symptoms, including muscle tension, insomnia, poor appetite, sweating, heart palpitations, nausea, dizziness, headaches, and difficulty in breathing. They are likely to seem like frightened, very tense, extremely sensitive, timid people.

Anxiety neurotics can suffer from *anxiety attacks*, which may last from 15 minutes to an hour. During these attacks the anxiety they feel reaches overwhelming proportions. As he suffers an attack, the anxiety neurotic will perspire, have a pounding heart, and gasp for breath. He may feel dizzy and weak, have a feeling that he is trapped, or believe that he is going to die. He may become fearful, disoriented, and extremely anxious. These attacks may occur at any time, even in the middle of the night.

Phobic Neurosis

A phobia is an intense and debilitating fear of some specific object or situation which actually presents no real threat to the individual. Examples of phobias are a fear of riding in elevators, a fear of dogs, a fear of airplanes, and a fear of snakes. Most people feel a little nervous in certain situations. Sometimes these fears, although not really justified by reality, are based on past experiences. For example, a person who was once bitten by a dog might be unable to bring himself to go near dogs although he knows that most dogs would not bite him.

In trying to determine if an inmate's phobia represents a mental illness, an officer should ask himself these questions:

1. How severe is the reaction the inmate has when faced with his phobia? Does he get slightly nervous or is he so incapacitated that he trembles, feels faint, or has heart palpitations?
2. Is the phobia general or specific and does it keep the inmate from functioning in a normal way? Obviously an inmate who has a fear of mice is in much better shape than an inmate who is terrified of authority figures in uniforms. Mice can be controlled in the jail, but it would be extremely difficult to keep the inmate from seeing officers wearing uniforms. In a case like this, the inmate who is afraid of uniforms needs to be referred to a psychiatrist for professional assistance, since he could suddenly attack a uniformed officer who approaches him. While the person who is very afraid of something usually tries to *avoid* the object of his fear, he may attack if he is cornered because he thinks the only way he can save himself is to destroy the object. For example, people who are extremely afraid of snakes sometimes find themselves in situations where they are confronted by a snake, usually one that is harmless. To these people, a snake is a snake and they cannot tell the difference between the garden snake which crawls into their basement and a deadly rattler. If they find themselves "trapped" with the snake, they are "forced" to kill it in order to prevent the snake from "attacking" them. These neurotics usually "overkill" the snake, smashing it into unrecognizable pulp.

Hysterical Neurosis

Hysterical neurosis takes two forms: conversion and dissociative. In the *conversion* type of hysteria, the neurotic "runs away" from what is troubling him by developing a *physical* disability such as a supposedly paralyzed leg, blindness, loss of hearing, paralysis in some part of the body, or writer's cramp. This type of neurosis is common in combat zones during wars.

If an officer suspects that an inmate is suffering from conversion neurosis, he should not attempt to diagnose the problem himself. Instead, he should refer the inmate to a physician for a diagnosis. An officer's observations may be important to the physician who examines the inmate, since the officer may have an opportunity to observe the inmate moving his "paralyzed arm" or responding to his name, even though he says he has trouble hearing. While not that dangerous a

disorder, conversion hysteria does, however, provide a clue that the inmate is deeply troubled and needs psychological counseling.

In *dissociative* states of hysterical neurosis, the neurotic deals with his inner conflict by developing mental disabilities or changes in his state of consciousness. Although terms like *amnesia* and *multiple personalities* are commonly used in conversations, these neurotic disorders really are very rare.

Amnesia refers to a total or partial inability to recall past experiences. The neurotic may suffer from amnesia because he is trying to forget some specific thing that caused him anxiety. His problems have become too much for him to handle so he "runs away" from them by forgetting them. The neurotic suffering from amnesia may be unable to remember his own name or family, even though he can still speak, read, do crossword puzzles, or remember the names of baseball players.

Only a physician is qualified to decide whether a person is an amnesic neurotic or an amnesia victim. Officers should be aware that true amnesia can occur in conjunction with a head injury, and the victim will lose his memory--he will be unable to recall identifying information about himself and often has no memory of events which occurred prior to receiving a blow to his head. Thus, it is important for officers to refer inmates who show signs of amnesia to a physician for an immediate examination--if the inmate has a brain injury, rather than an amnesic neurosis, he may die if he does not receive proper medical treatment.

Officers should also be aware that inmates who undergo traumatic events in jail, such as a homosexual rape, may forget everything about the traumatic incident and deny that it ever occurred. The officer may find this confusing, since he has facts and reports from other inmates concerning the event. Inmates suffering from this type of amnesia should be referred to a physician for an examination.

Case Study 2:

While patrolling Cell Block B shortly after "lights out," Big Sky County Jail Officer Frank Bender found inmate Wally Burnside lying unconscious on the floor near his bunk. Burnside was taken to the county hospital emergency room and admitted for observation. The emergency room physician told Officer Bender that inmate Burnside had passed out while he was being sodomized by two or three other inmates.

"There are signs of extensive trauma," the physician said. "I think we should keep him here a few days, since he may need surgery."

When Officer Bender entered inmate Burnside's room the next day and began asking him questions about the rape, Burnside angrily denied that he had been raped.

"I fell off my bunk and hit my head," he told the officer. Officer Bender was puzzled. The inmates in neighboring cells, who had witnessed the attack on Burnside, had described the rapes in detail. In addition, the physician said Burnside had been raped repeatedly.

Inmate Burnside developed amnesia concerning the homosexual rapes, which were repulsive to him. It was too dreadful for him to remember the attacks, so he "erased" them from his mind.

Another problem which officers may encounter is *fugue state*, a disorder even more severe than amnesia. The person in a fugue state may not only have lapses of memory, but lapses in his life as well. He may suddenly leave his home or office and wander about for days, months, and sometimes even years until he comes out of the fugue state. When the victim emerges from the fugue state, he does not seem to have any memory whatsoever of the lost period in his life. These victims may be brought to jail for incarceration if they commit a crime while they are in a fugue state. If an officer suspects that a new inmate may be suffering from this disorder, which should become evident during the booking process, then he should immediately summon a physician to examine the inmate. An inmate who is in a fugue state at the time of admission will not be able to answer questions about his real identity when he is being booked. He may give a name and address that does not match identification cards in his wallet. If an officer suspects that an inmate might be in a fugue state, he should be very cautious--some criminals who do not want to be identified assume another identity during the booking process or pretend they are suffering from amnesia. The best course of action to follow is to call a physician to the booking area and let him make the decision about the inmate's condition.

The most common and *least* serious of the dissociative disorders is *somnambulism*, also known as sleepwalking. Nevertheless, this is a neurotic disorder which should be reported to the jail physician.

Finally, officers may encounter inmates who are suffering from the dissociative disorder known as *multiple personalities*. True multiple personalities are very rare. A person with multiple personalities will actually change personalities, perhaps a few times a day. Each personality will have different names, tastes, likes, dislikes, and even speech mannerisms. While one "personality" may be a good person, another "personality" may be "evil" and dangerous. Inmates with more than one personality need psychiatric treatment; officers should deal with them cautiously.

Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis

An *obsession* is an irrational thought which the neurotic always seems to concentrate on. An obsession might be minor, such as dwelling on a song lyric, or major, such as wishing to kill a family member. A *compulsion* is an irrational action which the neurotic must continually engage in. For example, compulsion might also be minor, such as neatly lining up shoes in a row, or major, such as going through complex rituals whenever bathing or dressing. Obsessions and compulsions usually are seen together in a patient.

Obsessive-compulsive neurotics feel guilty about their obsessive thoughts, which they try to "undo" by developing compulsive rituals. When the obsessive-compulsive neurotic is really threatened and can no longer control his environment, he may *project* onto others his own feelings that he should be punished for his guilty thoughts. Consequently, he may develop symptoms of paranoia. A good example of a character who suffers from obsessive-compulsive and paranoid behavior is Captain Queeg in the story and movie called *The Caine Mutiny*. He was *obsessed* with thoughts about his career, what people were saying about him, and a need to run his ship "by the book." When he felt slightly threatened he would pull out two steel balls and *compulsively* roll them in his hand. If he felt severely threatened, he would indulge in delusions of persecution and lash out at his officers and crew, accusing them of being incompetent and of plotting against him. Queeg also typifies how incapacitating a neurosis can be. Although he tried to bring order to his life by relying completely on military rules and regulations, when he finally had to exercise his true military duties as a captain of a ship during an emergency situation, he was unable to make any rational decisions on his own.

Neurasthenic Neurosis

The *neurasthenic neurotic* is chronically weak, exhausted, fatigued, and probably mildly depressed. He may be bored with his jail work assignment or, if he does not have any work tasks, he may be bored because he has to sit in his cell all day. A clue that the fatigue and depression may be psychological surfaces when the inmate "recovers" enough to participate in recreational activities, attend a jail movie, or go to a vocational class which interests him. It is not surprising to find neurasthenic neurotics in the boring jail environment. Officers can assist these inmates by providing them with interesting work tasks geared to their abilities and skills, if this is possible.

Hypochondriacal Neurosis

The *hypochondriac* is constantly concerned with his body and his health and is always afraid that he is coming down with some serious disease. He also has delusions of being sick. There is a distinct

difference between psychotics and hypochondriacs. Psychotic people might claim their brain is wired, that their food is poisoned, or that their "liver is diseased." The hypochondriac, on the other hand, has a different sort of pattern. He is *always* concerned with his body and knows many medical symptoms for different illnesses. He constantly tries to diagnose himself. If he coughs, he may suddenly fear that he has lung cancer or tuberculosis. If he has a headache, he may decide he has a brain tumor. Although these conclusions cause him increased anxiety, the hypochondriac is rarely comforted by a doctor who tells him he is in good health.

In this day and age it is common for everyone to fear disease from time to time. For example, heavy smokers might worry about lung cancer and an older person with chest pain might worry about heart disease. The hypochondriac, however, seems to be *constantly* preoccupied with the feeling that he has some kind of terrible disease. From month to month he will decide he may be dying of a new terminal illness.

Officers who encounter inmates who may be hypochondriacs should play it safe. The officer should not decide if a person is a hypochondriac--he should let the doctor decide. Like the boy who cried wolf, the known hypochondriac could *always* come down with an actual serious illness.

Depersonalization Or Existential Neurosis

This type of neurosis is marked by a feeling of unreality, estrangement, loss of emotion, apathy, mild depression, and a lack of belief or purpose in anything.

All people wonder what life is all about sometimes. Many famous and successful men have thought from time to time, like Hamlet, that the world is "weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable." *These thoughts may be especially frequent for people who are confined in jail*, separated from their families and jobs, and not knowing whether they will be sentenced to long prison terms. Eventually, though, these inmates should adjust to the reality of their positions. Even a person in jail will eventually respond positively to his environment in most cases. If nothing else, he will concentrate on his case, want decent food, and try to plan for the future even if his plans are unrealistic. On the other hand, if he continues for months to feel that life is without meaning, officers should refer him to the jail doctor since he may become suicidal.

DEALING WITH INMATES WHO ARE MENTALLY OR EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED

Some mental and emotional problems suffered by inmates do not seem very serious. Others, such as the hysterical neuroses, are very serious.

Because neurotic inmates are tense and upset, they may be difficult to handle, and they do cause problems in jail. It is best for all involved if officers refer neurotic inmates for psychological help. Officers should use their common sense and discretion when dealing with all inmates who may be suffering from mental or emotional disorders. They should consider the inmate's total personality and the real stresses he may be experiencing in the jail environment.

In addition, officers should try to observe the inmate's behavior closely in order to make a complete, accurate report to the psychologist who will evaluate the inmate's mental condition.

Some general guidelines to follow when approaching an inmate who is or may be mentally or emotionally disturbed include:

1. Try to calm the inmate and relieve some of his anxiety by communicating confidence, firmness, and reasonableness.
2. If possible, remove the inmate from the scene of a crisis. For example, move him from one jail cell block to another or exclude other disturbing persons or activities.
3. Explain to the inmate how you see the problem, what is being done, and what the outcome will probably be. ("I can see you're upset. We're going to move to the next room where we can get away from this confusion and you can relax a bit.")
4. Be directive and supportive. Explain each step you are going to make. Be honest when questioned and try to give reasonable choices. This helps the troubled inmate feel that he has some power to make some decisions himself.
5. Convey your expectation that the crisis is temporary, that things can be worked out.
6. Encourage the inmate to speak freely, express his feelings, and relate them to you.
7. Avoid argument. Just agree that there are different ways of seeing things. Sometimes silence or a non-verbal reply or nod is the best response. Avoid agreeing or disagreeing with obvious distortions; accept these opinions as real for that person.
8. Do not be sarcastic. Do not lie. Do not make promises that cannot be kept or which you have no intention of keeping.

9. Try to help the inmate structure the experience so that it is not so chaotic, nor appears so insoluble. ("Sometimes things seem worse when we're upset...we'll find out if your wife is OK, and then we'll...")

If the disturbed behavior continues or if the officer thinks that a serious problem is indicated, he should call in a mental health professional to evaluate the inmate. The inmate may need hospitalization or some other form of treatment. An officer should trust his judgment to let him know when to call in professional help. He should also keep very accurate records of all conversations he may have with disturbed inmates, as well as records of all referrals he makes.

SUMMARY

1. If an officer suspects that an inmate is suffering from mental disorders, he should refer the inmate to a psychiatrist or psychologist for a diagnosis.

Common psychological problems among jail inmates include psychopathic and neurotic personality disorders. While it is not the officer's job to try to diagnose mental illness, he should be able to recognize the signs and symptoms of mental disease so that he can call in professional help for inmates who have serious mental problems.

2. Officers should use their common sense and discretion when dealing with all inmates who may be suffering from mental or emotional disorders.

Officers should consider the inmate's total personality and the real stresses he may be experiencing in the jail environment. In addition, officers should try to observe the inmate's behavior closely in order to make a complete, accurate report to the psychologist who will evaluate the inmate's condition. Officers should always keep very accurate records of all conversations with disturbed inmates, as well as records of all referrals.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE JAIL

Homosexual behavior is sexual behavior which is directed toward a member of one's own sex. Contrary to popular opinion, it is not possible to divide people into two clear-cut groups--homosexuals and heterosexuals. These labels signify extremes since many persons are bi-sexual; that is, they have sexual relations with both men and women. Other persons are asexual--they go through life without having sexual relations with either men or women; nor do they desire to participate in sexual activities.

Another common myth is that homosexuals exhibit qualities of the opposite sex to a significant degree. In reality, effeminate male homosexuals form a distinct minority group. Homosexuals come from *all* population groups in terms of age, occupation, social class, education, and interests.

The traditional view that one partner plays an active (masculine) role and the other a passive (feminine) role in the homosexual relationship is also a myth that has been proven false by research evidence. The great majority of both male and female homosexuals exchange passive and active roles.

There are a variety of situations in which individuals engage in homosexual behavior without any deep homosexual commitment. Such situations are very common in jails. Both males and females may engage in homosexual acts while they are in jail, but usually resume heterosexual behavior when they are released. Some inmates act as homosexual prostitutes to obtain benefits, such as cigarettes, candy bars, or protection from stronger inmates. This type of behavior is also common in the outside community. Many persons who are arrested for serving as homosexual prostitutes are not actually homosexuals--they engage in homosexual acts for money in order to earn a living.

Homosexual rape of inmates in transport vans, detention centers, and jails is common throughout the nation. Such assaults typically involve anal intercourse for males and are committed by individuals or gangs who do not consider themselves to be homosexuals, but instead are attempting to assert dominance and masculinity. For example,

studies conducted in the prisons and jails in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, indicated that the inmates who engage in homosexual rapes seemed to be motivated more by hostility and the desire to degrade each other than by purely sexual urges. Except in jails and penal institutions, force rarely occurs in homosexual activities.

Homosexuality is still an offense in most states, even though the act between two consenting adults has been decriminalized in others. It is, therefore, necessary to consider it to be a sexual deviation even though it is no longer so considered by the American Psychiatric Association (the APA classifies homosexuality as a "sexual orientation disturbance, to be treated only if the individual is in conflict and desires a change"). As a general rule, the term homosexuality, as such, does not appear in the statutes of the various states; rather, the statutes are concerned with sodomy and unnatural acts. Until recently, homosexuality as an offense has been confined to males.

It is important for the jail officer to keep in mind the distinction between homosexual *behavior* and homosexuality, especially if the officer is assigned to supervise juveniles or young adult inmates. Homosexual peer group play is generally accepted as a "normal" stage in adolescent development. This may involve adolescents "goosiny" one another or rubbing each other's genital organs while "horsing around" during high school group showers or sports activities. It may also involve mutual masturbation or a relatively brief, but intense, sexual affair. After adolescence, homosexual behavior may occur under conditions of prolonged, enforced separation from members of the opposite sex, such as military service in isolated areas or confinement in jails or prisons. In jails and prisons, participation in the homosexual act may result from intimidation, coercion, or even force. Other isolated acts of homosexuality may occur without indicating that the person is really a homosexual who is totally disinterested in members of the opposite sex.

Jail officers are aware that homosexuality is a problem. However, it is difficult to obtain an accurate picture of homosexuality problems in jails. Inmates are reluctant to talk openly about their homosexual encounters because they fear that jail authorities may remove them to another housing area or deny them parole. They are also reluctant to discuss homosexuality because they want to forget such involvement when they are close to being released back into a heterosexually-oriented society.

PROBLEMS FACING THE JAIL OFFICER

One problem facing the jail officer is the possibility of an inmate experiencing what is known as a "homosexual panic." This sit-

uation involves tremendous anxiety when an inmate realizes he may have homosexual desires. An inmate, for example, may have found a forced homosexual act pleasurable and, in a state of homosexual panic, he blindly attacked the homosexual partner with anything at hand.

Homosexual panics are most often seen in environments where men live closely together, particularly when they are deprived of regular contacts with women. This problem is well known to psychiatrists who have worked with members of the armed services, merchant seamen, prisoners, or any group in a closed institution. It probably occurs with more frequency than is generally acknowledged and plays an important role in many crimes of violence in jails.

The inmate who is experiencing a homosexual panic is very anxious, may have hallucinations and delusions, and is physically agitated. His hallucinations and delusions suggest fears of castration and fears of being homosexually seduced or assaulted. The panicky inmate projects his sexual and aggressive impulses onto the environment and often reacts violently to free himself from dangers which do not exist.

Homosexual panics are most likely to occur in inmates who have trouble adapting to the jail environment. The inmate who is most likely to develop a homosexual panic is typically uncertain about his masculinity, identifies with lower-class values, and is rigid and more or less ineffective in his personal relations. He may be afraid of women, but he "handles" them by showing them who the "boss" is--this type of individual believes women are inferior to men and treats them as inferior persons.

Case Study 1:

George Custer, 18, was recently admitted to the Big Sky County Jail to serve an 18-month sentence for burglary. He had never been away from home before, and he immediately encountered great difficulty in adjusting to jail life. An essentially shy and unsophisticated person, he was embarrassed by the intimacy of jail life. He could not accustom himself to open nudity, shared toilet and shower facilities, or any kind of earthy or vulgar masculine behavior. For two weeks prior to his homosexual panic, Custer had been experiencing strange and disturbing feelings. These began when he was assigned to a bunk next to Joe Geronimo, 42, who made frequent suggestive remarks about Custer's attractiveness. Custer felt vague, erotic stirrings which, in turn, made him feel extremely guilty.

One night, a week before the homosexual panic, Custer dreamed that he was kissing Geronimo and woke to find that he was sexually excited. After this, he became even more withdrawn and kept to himself as much as possible. He began to experience feelings of uneasiness which he could not relate to any concrete problems in his daily life. Each night he had nightmares in which animals were chasing him. Two days before the panic he thought that he

had heard a soft voice from somewhere behind him calling him a "queer." When he turned around, no one was present. The next two days were characterized by extreme anxiety. Although he managed to continue working, he felt that other inmates were making derogatory remarks about him and believed they could detect that his body was developing feminine characteristics.

On the night of the homosexual panic, Custer was feeling distraught and nervous. As he sat on his bunk trying to read a novel, Geronimo entered the cell and sat down next to him. Geronimo had several candy bars and offered them to Custer. He also had a large portable radio and asked Custer if he wanted to listen to a football game. Custer felt both temptation and guilt and, although he was in a dazed state, he allowed Geronimo to stay on his bunk and accepted the candy bars. When they had settled down to listen to the football game, Geronimo began to fondle Custer in an erotic manner. At this point, Custer "went berserk." He grabbed the heavy radio and bludgeoned Geronimo to death. The officers who rushed into the cell found Custer in a very confused state. When they tried to question him, he began to assault them. Several officers were required to subdue him. Custer seemed both terrified and enraged and continually shouted that he wasn't going to "let any queer f--- him." He shouted and insisted that his life was in great danger. He accused the officers of ridiculing him, and he had to be forcibly restrained. Custer was taken to the psychiatric ward of the Big Sky County Hospital, where he remained in a disorganized state for another 24 hours. As he gradually calmed down, he was able to relate some of the details of his offense. Most of the above information was not obtained, however, until many months of hospitalization had passed.

As this case study illustrates, homosexual panic can produce severe psychiatric reactions and could lead to deaths in the jail. Officers must learn to recognize the symptoms of this problem and isolate inmates they suspect may become victims of homosexuals in the jail.

Another problem the jail officer faces is the trauma an inmate may experience after a forced homosexual act. As in any sexual assault, homosexual rapes may cause severe anxiety, quietness, and depression, which may lead to suicide. The inmate may feel that his "manhood was taken away," and he will no doubt question his masculinity. To assist these inmates, officers should be familiar with crisis intervention techniques, as well as basic counseling procedures. Services should also be provided by the jail for more in-depth treatment if a victim of homosexual rape needs it. The following list describes the behavioral symptoms the jail officer can expect following a forced homosexual assault:

1. Anxiety (a feeling of uneasiness and apprehension)

2. Tension
3. Sadness and depression
4. Inmate is extremely suspicious of others; he may even exhibit paranoid behavior
5. Suicidal behavior: in male institutions both offenders and victims have been known to attempt suicide following a homosexual act or sexual attack
6. Questions concerning his masculinity and identity
7. Embarrassment: the inmate victim or attacker thinks loved ones and others will learn about the incident
8. Guilt: the victim may question himself and ask, "did I resist enough?"
9. Withdrawn seclusive behavior
10. Nightmares
11. Sleeplessness
12. Revenge: in some instances the victim may seek revenge on his attackers
13. Psychotic reaction: if the trauma is stressful enough, the victim or attacker may experience a break with reality, which may include symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and irrational behavior.

The officer should be aware that any radical change in an inmate's behavior may suggest that a sexual assault may have occurred.

Case Study 2:

Big Sky County Jail inmate Eric Tyger, who was outgoing, cooperative, and hardworking, drastically changed his behavior. Jail Officer Billy Joe Ripple noticed that Tyger had suddenly become depressed, withdrawn, and increasingly tense and anxious. He stayed to himself and was observed by the officers crying at times. After two days of exhibiting this behavior, he attempted to hang himself, but was saved by the alert Officer Ripple, who checked on Tyger frequently during the night. After some probing, Tyger confided in the concerned, interested officer and admitted he had been sexually assaulted by a group of inmates in the shower. He

was subsequently referred to the County Psychological Services Unit where, after some time, he was able to learn how to deal effectively with this emotionally traumatic incident.

By being alert to the signs of trauma resulting from a possible homosexual attack, Officer Ripple was able to save inmate Tyger's life.

Another problem facing the jail officer is the transvestite. Transvestism involves the achievement of sexual excitation by dressing as a member of the opposite sex. Some male homosexuals wear female clothes and put on cosmetics to express their homosexuality. These homosexuals are often referred to as "drag queens." They may solicit favors in return for sex and cause disruption in a jail setting. Many assaults and murders that occur in jails are related to homosexual love triangles, in which the "drag queen" becomes the "woman" who is fought over by two other men.

Homosexuals who dress as females should be encouraged by officers to refrain from this behavior since it stimulates sexual arousal in other inmates and can cause many problems in the jail. Officers should identify the "drag queens" and isolate them in a specific area of the jail for their own protection. Many jails have separate housing areas for known homosexuals and those individuals who have indicated a need for protective custody. If at all possible, inmates placed in the protective custody cells should receive the same privileges provided to inmates in the general population, such as movies and recreational periods, as long as security needs are taken into account. Separate seating areas in the dining room or for movie showings can ensure better observation and security by the custodial staff. Recreational activities can also be held separately to insure the welfare and safety of these men. Jail officials have to be sure that they are not only *protecting* inmates who are segregated from the general population, but are also safeguarding their constitutional rights.

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS ENCOURAGING HOMOSEXUAL BEHAVIOR

Before making any attempts to eliminate or reduce the problem of homosexuality, jail officials should be aware of the factors which contribute to homosexual behavior in an institutional setting. Among these contributory factors are:

1. A single-sex environment deprives an individual of contact with the opposite sex.
2. Close, overcrowded housing areas: dormitory settings with beds that are close together and the sight and smell of naked bodies charge the atmosphere with excessive sexual stimulation.

3. Lack of meaningful work and recreational activities: idleness leads to conversations about sex and crime, which increase sexual fantasies.
4. Demands of the "jail caste system": the inmate grapevine announces its expectations regarding an inmate's sex role and holds him to it.
5. Absence of opportunities for physical release of the sex drive.
6. The need an inmate has to demonstrate a masculine role and to show himself to be independent and dominant is not fulfilled in jail.
7. Lack of opportunity to form meaningful social relationships.
8. Older inmates housed with younger ones make the young, more fearful inmate more susceptible to forced homosexual activities.
9. Permitting known homosexuals (commercial homosexuals) to roam freely through the jail soliciting sex for favors encourages homosexual activity.
10. A lack of security measures and careful observation by jail officers, especially during shower activities, contributes to homosexuality.

PREVENTION OF HOMOSEXUAL ACTIVITY

By following several guidelines, jail officers can keep homosexuality to a minimum:

1. Keep all jail windows and bars clear. Do not allow towels, sheets, or hanging clothes to block the officer's view of the cell's occupants.
2. Avoid double-celling if at all possible. Inmates confined in a relatively small area for extended periods of time may become involved in homosexual activities.
3. Jail officers should make routine tier checks to insure that inmates are in cells assigned to them.
4. House known weak homosexuals in separate housing without removing any of their privileges. Utilize separate seating sections during movies and in dining areas so that these inmates can be observed and supervised more closely. The only problem with this is that a stigma is attached to the individual and harassment may occur since he is now labeled a homosexual.

5. Discourage feminine traits. Also discourage sexually provocative clothing, such as bikini underwear and tight trousers.
6. Closely observe and supervise shower activities.
7. Recreational activities should be provided as an outlet for frustration. Extended and prolonged confinement may lead to increased frustration and subsequent aggression, which may exhibit itself in homosexual activity.
8. Jail officers should know their inmates. The inmate an officer may least expect to be a homosexual may indeed be a homosexual.

A major obstacle to effective intervention in the problem of homosexuality in the jail is the feeling on the part of many psychologists, jail administrators, and officers that nothing can be done to stop it. However, several measures can be taken to at least reduce homosexual activities, as the above list pointed out.

Identification and isolation of the inmate homosexual rapist is the traditional method of dealing with sexual problems in the jail. This approach is employed in an effort to reduce the probability of homosexual love triangles and lessen the chances for sexual attacks.

Group or individual psychotherapy can also be used to reduce homosexual incidents. Although group or individual psychotherapy can be quite an effective method of treatment for homosexuality, in general it usually proves unsatisfactory in jail. Psychotherapy does not treat the inmate's full environment and is not a preventive measure. In addition, staff shortages usually make intensive psychotherapy impractical in most cases.

Another approach to the problem of homosexuality in the jail involves an organized effort to redirect an inmate's sexual drives by providing constructive activities in which he can become involved. By developing programs that allow the inmate to exert initiative, keep active, and demonstrate *some* control over his environment, jail officers might be taking one of the most positive steps possible toward curbing homosexuality.

Legal measures also may be used to deter homosexual behavior in general and sexual attacks in particular. This approach, however, is not used very often. Even in the case of the aggressive homosexual rapist where legal action is most desirable and effective, there are only a handful of cases which are prosecuted each year in the United States.

SUMMARY

1. Homosexual behavior is very common in jails; officers should be aware of the factors which contribute to homosexual behavior in an institutional setting and attempt to eliminate or reduce them.

Homosexual activities commonly occur in single-sex environments, such as jails and prisons, where inmates do not have opportunities for physical release of the sex drive. Jail officers can keep homosexual activities to a minimum if they: (1) keep all windows and bars clear; (2) avoid double-celling if possible; (3) conduct routine tier checks to make sure inmates are in the cells assigned to them; (4) house known homosexuals separately; (5) discourage negative behavior and feminine traits; (6) closely supervise shower activities; (7) provide recreational activities as an outlet for inmates; and (8) know the inmates.

2. Officers must learn to recognize the symptoms of "homosexual panic" and isolate inmates who may become victims of homosexual attacks.

Homosexual panic can produce severe psychiatric reactions and could lead to deaths in the jail. This situation produces intense anxiety in normally heterosexual inmates who realize they may have homosexual desires. Such an inmate may hallucinate and become physically agitated. Officers must also be aware of the signs of homosexual rape; any radical change in an inmate's behavior may suggest that a sexual assault has occurred. Crisis intervention techniques may be necessary, along with psychological counseling for the inmate.

GLOSSARY

- Bisexual - an individual who enjoys sexual relations with members of either sex.
- Drag Queen - the male homosexual who adopts feminine attire as part of his homosexual activity.
- Faggot - a homosexual.
- Fellatio - insertion of penis into the mouth for purposes of sexual gratification.
- Gay - slang for a homosexual person.
- Heterosexual - sexual interest in members of the opposite sex.
- Homosexual - an individual who has a sexual preference for a member of his own sex.
- Lesbian - female homosexual.
- My woman or my wife - the male who is acting as the female in a homosexual relationship.
- Punk - an individual who is forced to participate in homosexual activities who may or may not be a homosexual.
- Rape - to force sexual relations upon another person.
- Sodomy - sexual intercourse via the anus.
- Stud - male prostitute who may or may not be a homosexual.
- Transvestite - an individual who achieves sexual excitation by dressing as a member of the opposite sex.
- Wolf - aggressive inmate who uses his power to force weaker, more susceptible inmates into homosexual activity.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

SUICIDE PREVENTION

Confinement in jail and the circumstances that led to it can cause feelings of desperation in inmates, prompting some to seriously consider suicide. Suicides, both real and attempted, are a significant problem for the jail officer.

Since jail officers are responsible for preventing suicides, special procedures are needed for inmates who threaten suicide or who are known to be suicidal. Although most experts agree that a person who really wants to kill himself will eventually do so, the jail does, however, have a legal and moral responsibility to prevent suicide if possible. An officer could be liable to an inmate, or his family, as well as subjected to disciplinary action for negligent performance of duty, if a suicidal inmate is injured or dies. Negligent performance of duty might consist of, for example, ignoring obvious signs or intentions of suicide.

The expression that people who talk of suicide don't do it is not always true. Many who do commit suicide don't really want to die. They are usually looking for attention and understanding. Sometimes people will attempt suicide to "get even"--make someone feel guilty about supposedly not having treated them better. They very often fall into self-pity and their suicide becomes a fantasy which they actually go ahead and "act out." Frequently, they feel helpless to improve their situation and a suicide attempt becomes a way to gain attention.

SUICIDAL TYPES

There are three major classifications of suicidal persons in the jail and the factors described below can help the jail officer identify them:

1. Inmate Facing a Crisis Situation

A. This person is reacting to a real, immediate problem, such as:

- (1) News that his wife is living with another man or is filing for divorce;

- (2) Being found guilty or receiving a long sentence; and
- (3) Fear of further sexual assaults if he has been raped in jail.

B. Feeling shame, disgrace, frustration, and/or hopelessness over a crisis situation. Officers should observe these inmates carefully:

- (1) Bereaved inmates who have suffered a recent loss of a loved one due to divorce or death;
- (2) The young, impulsive inmate who is charged with a violent crime often makes a serious suicide attempt of high lethality during the first seven days of incarceration, usually as a reaction to the confinement of a jail setting;
- (3) The inmate who has been told he is chronically or terminally ill;
- (4) Inmates recuperating from major surgery;
- (5) Homosexual inmates;
- (6) Incarcerated ex-law enforcement officers or professionals;
- (7) First offenders; and
- (8) Persons who have committed a crime of passion.

C. A narcotic addict or alcoholic may "come down" shortly after entering jail. At this time severe depression may set in, leading to a suicide attempt. Or the person may see suicide as a way out of going through withdrawal.

2. Person in a Serious Depression:

A person defined by experts as being in a "depressed" state mentally does not merely have a case of the "blues." It is normal to react to some problems in life by being temporarily sad or despondent. But a depressed person who is prone to suicide seems to be completely changed by his depression. Below are some of the warning signs of serious depression. A jail officer who sees these signs should refer the inmate to the jail physician, or, if possible, to a mental health professional.

A. Physical warning signs of serious depression:

- (1) Sleeping difficulties: insomnia, irregular hours, early morning awakening;
- (2) Depressed physical appearance;
- (3) Walks slowly;
- (4) Easily fatigued;
- (5) Weight loss or loss of appetite;
- (6) Slumps when walking or sitting; sits in the corner in the fetal position; and
- (7) General loss of energy.

B. Behavioral warning signs of serious depression:

- (1) Cries frequently and/or for no apparent reason;
- (2) Retarded thinking; speaks slowly;
- (3) Apathy and despondency;
- (4) Sudden social withdrawal; little communication with inmates or officers;
- (5) Feelings of helplessness and hopelessness;
- (6) Perhaps general anxiety, with physical and mental symptoms;
- (7) A lot of talk of self-pity, of life not being worth it; of people being happier if the inmate were to kill himself;
- (8) Talks of suicide; composes or leaves suicide notes;
- (9) Talks of getting out of jail unrealistically;
- (10) Gives away personal possessions;
- (11) Has previously attempted suicide and talks about it; and
- (12) Exhibits sudden changes in behavior, such as making an unprovoked attack upon an officer or another inmate.

C. Losing touch with reality:

Occasionally an inmate will become so depressed that he loses touch with reality completely. He may have hallucinations, fear he is sick (hypochondria), or have overwhelming feelings of being "sinful" or worthless. These symptoms may or may not be part of a serious depression, but they are serious mental symptoms, and the inmate should be promptly referred to the jail physician. The officer should watch for sudden mood changes in which the inmate goes from depressed behavior to an excited "high" with increased mental and physical activity and an excited state of mind. A person who alternates manic and depressed behavior should be considered a suicide risk.

3. Manipulative and Impulsive Inmates

It is frustrating for the jail officer to try to be professional and concerned about suicide prevention when he knows that a certain number of inmates use the threat of suicide to manipulate him. The officer should try to remember that anyone who would slash his wrists is emotionally unbalanced and needs professional help. Many people are immature and impulsive; they act without thinking about the consequences of their actions. For an inmate who uses suicide as a threat, this type of behavior can be fatal--many inmates who wanted to be manipulative have died because their "fake" suicide attempt went further than they anticipated.

Anyone who is confined to the jail should be considered a potential suicide risk.

Case Study 1:

On December 28, Thundercloud City Police Department Lieutenant Tom Wilkens was arrested by Big Sky County Sheriff's Department deputies and charged with the murder of his wife, whose body had been found in a shallow grave in a desolate area of the county. Lt. Wilkens had reported his wife missing three weeks earlier, but the discovery of her blood-soaked car in a mountainous forest had led sheriff's deputies to believe Mrs. Wilkens had been murdered. During the investigation they learned that Lt. Wilkens and his wife had recently separated after fighting continuously over the lieutenant's girlfriend, as well as financial problems.

While he was being questioned, Lt. Wilkens broke down and confessed to murdering his wife during an argument. He told the deputies they were in her car arguing and he shot her several times with his service revolver after she had grabbed it out of the holster and attempted to shoot him. Lt. Wilkens claimed he killed his wife in self defense, became remorseful, and told the deputies where to find the body. The deputies also

arrested Big Sky County Jail Sergeant Pete Sellers, who was the "best friend" of Lt. Wilkens. Sgt. Sellers was charged with "accessory to murder," since Lt. Wilkens said he had helped bury the body.

The two arrested officers could not make bond and remained confined in the jail awaiting trial. Sgt. Sellers was very worried about his wife and children and the embarrassment his arrest and subsequent suspension from the Sheriff's Department had caused for them. He was also totally embarrassed at being confined in the jail where he had been employed for 12 years. He sat on his bunk most of the time and stared at the wall. He also refused to eat and couldn't sleep at night. He kept asking the jail officers he had previously supervised if they "hated" him.

Sheriff Maxwell Smart thought Sgt. Sellers might attempt suicide and instructed officers to check on him every 15 minutes. He encouraged Mrs. Sellers to visit her husband to reassure him that his family still loved him. In addition, he asked the jail psychologist to visit Sellers frequently and try to help him "get over the worst days." Sheriff Smart also spoke to the officers at the daily rollcalls and asked them to "try to help Sgt. Sellers realize that he has a lot to live for." Although some of the officers said they were "disgusted" with what Sgt. Sellers had done, they agreed that they should try to help him "improve his spirit" since he seemed very depressed.

By talking with Sellers frequently, the psychologist was able to learn that Lt. Wilkens and Sgt. Sellers had served together as Army privates in Vietnam in 1967 and that Sgt. Sellers had been severely wounded and left for dead in a foxhole while his platoon withdrew under heavy fire. Lt. Wilkens, who was a medic, risked his own life to crawl through a barrage of enemy gunfire to rescue Sellers. Wilkens himself was shot several times during the rescue attempt. Sellers told the psychologist he was "eternally grateful" to Wilkens for saving his life in Vietnam and therefore felt he could not refuse when Wilkens asked him to help bury the body of Mrs. Wilkens, "even though I knew it was wrong." Sellers felt he had now betrayed his own family and the Sheriff's Department and thought it would be best for everyone if he were dead.

Gradually, the psychologist and Mrs. Sellers were able to convince Sellers that he had a lot to live for. Mrs. Sellers and his teenage children told Sellers they understood why he helped Lt. Wilkens and that they "probably would have done the same thing if the circumstances were similar."

With the encouragement he received from his family, the jail psychologist, and the officers, Sgt. Sellers slowly gave up the idea of suicide. He began cooperating with his attorney and started to tell the officers, "I've got the best family in the world--I sure got a lot to live for and maybe when this is over and I've served my time, we can move away and start over."

On February 15 Sheriff Smart opened an envelope containing some inmate complaints and suggestions and started to laugh when he read one of the complaints. Written by Sgt. Sellers, the letter asked: "How many times have I got to tell you people that you are supposed to serve cornbread with the red beans and rice, not rye bread?"

"We must have Sgt. Sellers back among the living!" Sheriff Smart told his secretary. "Knowing we saved a guy from killing himself makes this job worthwhile."

This case study illustrates that conscientious jail personnel can prevent potential suicide attempts by being alert for the symptoms of depression and hopelessness. In this case, Sheriff Smart acted wisely by assigning officers to watch Sgt. Sellers closely, while at the same time attempting to build up the inmate's desire to continue living. The jail officers, too, acted professionally by encouraging Sgt. Sellers to continue living and by not condemning him for his criminal acts, no matter how disgusted they felt personally. Although it may take a few weeks, as it did in this case, the intervention efforts on the part of the jail staff usually are beneficial to both the inmate and his family.

THE FIRST 24 HOURS: THE CRITICAL PERIOD

Most inmate suicides occur within the first 24 hours of confinement. Many inmates who commit suicide could not be described as "seriously depressed" in their everyday lives. But many jail suicides occur when people who are normally respected members of the community break a law, find themselves in jail, and then discover they cannot handle the reality of confinement. Suddenly they have to face shame, humiliation, and guilt over being arrested. This "jail shock" problem becomes even worse when it is compounded by the effects of drugs or alcohol. Some people will refuse to admit the extent of their substance abuse at the time of arrest. When withdrawal does occur, they are forced to realize what has happened. The enormity of their situation may influence them to consider suicide rather than endure the pain of withdrawal.


Identifying The Suicide Risk

Because so many jail suicides occur within the first 24 hours of incarceration, the booking officer should try to identify during the booking process those new inmates who are likely to become suicidal. Once a potential suicide is identified, the booking officer should let cell block officers know so that the inmate can be watched closely and checked frequently on every shift. The types of individuals the booking officer should observe carefully include:

1. Anyone obviously under the influence of either drugs or alcohol.

2. Anyone returning to the jail who has demonstrated suicidal tendencies during previous periods of incarceration.
3. People who seem to be extremely withdrawn or distant.
4. Persons who seem very depressed.
5. Anyone who makes comments such as: "What is the use of living anymore?" or "Nobody cares about me anyway!"
6. Persons who seem overly-anxious.

New inmates who show these symptoms should be housed in easily observable areas which are frequently patrolled by the staff. Sharp objects (razor blades, etc.) or loose-fitting clothing should not be issued to them until further observations can be made over a period of several days. If the inmate is withdrawing from drug or alcohol intoxication, the procedures discussed in previous chapters should be followed.



People with severe mental health problems or who are actively and aggressively suicidal should be placed in or transferred by court order to a mental health facility. In many cases the inmate will remain in the jail while the mental hearing takes place. Once again, it is important for the jail officer to remember that the old statement "people who talk about suicide never kill themselves" is untrue. In fact, statistical studies prove that talking about suicide is one of the best predictors that a person will actually try to kill himself. *It is a serious mistake for the jail officer to ignore suicide threats or invite an inmate to go ahead and kill himself.*

The jail officer must walk a fine line when faced with a potentially suicidal inmate. He must take every suicide threat seriously but suspect that some inmates may be attempting to manipulate him so that he will take pity on the inmate and initiate special handling procedures; the inmate may be "setting up" the officer to get better quarters or to make an escape attempt.

The real threat with a suicidal inmate is that he may by accident carry through his threat. An inmate who constantly has the "blues," is sad, weeps, and feels unworthy, may actually commit the act even though, underneath it all, he doesn't want to. *Prevention is the key.* The officer should treat all potentially suicidal inmates as if they were sincere, since the officer is not equipped with any type of mystical power that would enable him to detect those inmates who are sincere and those who are merely trying to manipulate him.

Many times the officer and jail administrator will be called upon to make some split-second decisions that could result in life or death.

Some inmates will seem completely determined to end their lives but, somewhere within themselves, the spark of desire to live remains. The key for the jail officer is to find a way to convince the inmate he really wants to live *before* serious damages or death occur. Thus, it is only natural that the jail officer would not put this kind of inmate in a cell on the third or fourth tier of the block. Emile Durkheim, a well known French sociologist and philosopher, commented that in his belief, individuals contemplate suicide when they lack contacts with the social system which contribute to their self worth. The result is a breakdown in social integration. They become "lost" people whose only device for solving the problem is to commit suicide. The trick for the jail officer is to reactivate that contact with the real world and the people in it as quickly as possible.

Profile Of Suicide Victims

Age: As a general rule, the older the person, the more likely that he will be successful in the suicide. There are twice as many people who attempt suicide in the 20-30 age group. This is changing somewhat though; in recent years, there has been a 67 percent increase in suicide in the 15-19 age group.

Sex: Women attempt suicide much more frequently than do men; however, men have a higher rate of actual suicide. The average ratio seems to be that for every three women who attempt suicide and fail, one woman succeeds. With men, the ratio is reversed. For every man who attempts and fails, there are three men who succeed. It has been suggested that in our society suicidal gesturing among men is considered a sign of weakness. Therefore, a suicide threat or attempt is less a cry for help and more apt to be the real thing when the victim is a male. In addition, men primarily employ means in which there is a point of no return rapidly reached. For that reason, men will use firearms or hanging more often, while women will ingest some type of toxic substance which allows for attempts to save them if they are discovered and taken to a hospital quickly enough to have their stomachs pumped.

Marital Status: There doesn't seem to be any apparent difference in the successful suicide rate between those who are married and those who are single. There is, however, a difference between those groups and those who are separated, widowed, or divorced. In general, the rate of suicide is four times higher for those in the second group than those in the first.

Race: Approximately 90 percent of those who commit suicide are white; the remaining are black or other minorities. However, there is some indication that the suicide rate among minorities is on the increase. Some social scientists feel that there are a number of suicides in the poverty level group that are masked as something else. Some lower income persons may take a gun in hand but are afraid to kill themselves; instead, they get into a fight with someone else or the police so that they can go out "in a blaze of glory." Culturally this may be more acceptable than taking the "coward's" way out with suicide.

The most important point for the jail officer to remember is *prevention*. The officer should not try to be a mental health professional when he is not prepared to assume that kind of role. However, he should be attentive and seek the advice of the mental health experts on the jail staff.

Myths About Suicide

Discussion of death, and particularly suicide, has always been more or less taboo in our society. Consequently, most people accept certain misconceptions about suicide as truth.

Belief in these misconceptions by jail officers who have contact with suicidal persons can only be detrimental and must be recognized and dealt with if successful intervention is to be achieved. For example, it is a common misconception that if a suicidal inmate appears to have passed his suicidal crisis that the suicide risk is over and the inmate is out of danger. On the contrary, research indicates that half of the persons who were in a suicidal crisis, and subsequently committed suicide, did so within 90 days of having passed the emotional crisis and after they appeared to be on their way to recovery.

Any inmate exhibiting behavioral change such as an improvement during such a suicidal crisis should be CAREFULLY WATCHED as this is a very CRITICAL PERIOD.

Following are common misconceptions or fables about suicide and the appropriate facts which apply.

FABLE

Suicide happens suddenly and impulsively without premeditation.

The suicidal person rarely reveals or conveys his intentions to anyone else.

Once a person attempts suicide and fails, this minimizes the possibility of a future attempt because the inmate has "gotten it out of his system."

The suicidal act is a logical, well thought out expression of an attempt to cope with serious personal problems.

FACT

Less than five percent of suicides result from impulsive panic-type behavior. More often than not the suicidal thought arises as a fantasy to resolve some personal crisis.

Eighty percent who kill themselves have made at least one previous attempt.

Eighty percent of persons who kill themselves have made at least one previous attempt.

Most suicidal persons are irrational at the time of their suicidal crisis. This person has ambivalent feelings; he wants to live. However, overwhelmed with despair, anxiety, and hopelessness, he cannot see any other solutions to his problems.

Suicides happen much less frequently in a jail-type setting than in the non-prison population (outside the jail).

If someone says they want to kill themselves there is usually no way to prevent it.

Jail suicides occur 3 1/2 times more frequently than suicide in the non-prison population.

Most suicidal persons are ambivalent; they are miserable but they wish to be saved.

Talking To An Inmate Who May Become Suicidal

One of the most important reasons for an officer to be attentive to the emotional needs of an inmate is that the inmate may not be suicidal yet. The inmate could be desperately searching for a reason to live and seeking help. Denial on the part of the officer of the individual's problem and withdrawal or lack of attention could literally cause this individual to decide to kill himself. The officer who ignores a suicidal inmate could confirm the inmate's feelings that his life is not worth living and that death is the only answer to his problems.

An officer will not endanger an inmate's life by discussing his suicidal thoughts; on the contrary, the officer will encourage verbalization, which is desired. All cries for help are genuine and cannot be measured by the apparent seriousness of the threat.

HOW TO ACT IN A SUICIDAL SITUATION

The natural tendency is to rush in and make an immediate rescue. All too frequently, however, unwise, unplanned action leads to injury or death. The officer should keep in mind that if the death is imminent, there is little he can do to prevent it. His first step is to assess any threats to his own safety or to that of others.

The officer should secure the area as quickly as possible. This includes moving the inmates into another housing area or out of the area where the suicide incident is taking place. The officer should try to position himself so that he has line-of-sight vision with the suicidal inmate. He should also make sure entrances are cleared for others who will assist him.

The officer should try to determine from those who may know the suicidal inmate what may have occurred that precipitated this event. He should also obtain the names of any other people--either inmates, friends, relatives, or staff--who may have a good relationship with the individual and bring them to the area, if possible.

The important thing is to start a conversation with the suicidal inmate that is non-threatening. A person intent on suicide needs to feel that he is

in complete control of the situation. Therefore, it is essential that the officer not act in any manner that could be considered threatening. A part of the battle is won as soon as conversation begins. By such reassurances from the officer as "OK, you're calling the shots, we'll listen to you," the suicidal inmate is encouraged to release some of this emotion.

It is essential that the officer be attentive and *listen* to the inmate. He should use facial and body gestures to encourage the inmate to talk until the officer feels comfortable enough to enter the conversation. The following guidelines should be helpful:

1. The officer should be honest in his responses.
2. He should not be judgmental.
3. He should try to understand the suicidal inmate's point of view.
4. He should not belittle or make fun of the inmate.
5. He should try to talk naturally with the inmate.

If the situation allows, after a conversation is being conducted as naturally as possible, the officer should attempt to suggest that there are other, more acceptable ways to solve the problem, especially if the inmate is trying to kill himself to "get back" at someone else for a personal injury or insult. The officer should recognize the inmate's anger and disgust and "legitimize" it while offering a better alternative.

Case Study 2:

Rattlesnake County Jail inmate Harvey Goldbrick, 42, kept threatening to kill himself since nothing seemed to be right with his life. A professional accountant, he was sentenced to the jail for 18 months after being convicted of embezzling some money from his employer to buy his girlfriend a large diamond ring for her birthday. When his wife heard about the girlfriend during the trial, she sued Goldbrick for divorce, asking for all their mutual property, including a large suburban home, as well as custody of the children. Once he was convicted, Goldbrick's girlfriend left him for another man. Nobody came to visit Goldbrick on visiting day.

The other inmates avoided Goldbrick because they thought he was "too moody and stuck-up." The jail officers didn't like him either because he refused to participate in work details, claiming that "a professional man does not scrub floors." He also complained about everything and reported for sick call daily with numerous ailments.

Goldbrick never really believed his wife would go through with the divorce. He thought she was just threatening him to "punish" him for having a girlfriend and "acting stupidly." But on the day when Goldbrick

was notified that the divorce was final, the reality of his situation finally hit him full force. He became excessively moody and depressed, stopped complaining to officers, and refused to eat. He slept constantly and, when he was awake, he paced back and forth in his cell.

"What's the matter with you?" officer Jack Bonaparte asked after Goldbrick had refused the third meal in a row.

"I'm going to kill myself," Goldbrick said. "I'm a complete and total failure, so I might as well be dead."

"Oh, go ahead and kill yourself then," Officer Bonaparte replied. "Nobody will miss you. You know, we're getting awful tired of listening to you gripe and complain all the time. You're a real pain. The officers are so sick of listening to you that they're willing to chip in and buy you a rope."

Officer Bonaparte then left the cell block. When he made rounds an hour later, he found inmate Goldbrick hanging in his cell. Goldbrick had tied his shirt sleeves to the metal bars on the upper bunk after looping the shirt tightly around his neck. He jumped off the upper bunk and died from strangulation.

Two inmates in the next cell reported to the sheriff that Officer Bonaparte had told inmate Goldbrick to kill himself. They also repeated Officer's Bonaparte's comments about "officers chipping in to buy a rope." After a disciplinary hearing at which the inmates testified, Officer Bonaparte was found guilty of unprofessional conduct and fired from the Sheriff's Department.

This case study illustrates the importance of considering an inmate's threats of suicide to be serious. Officers should not be judgmental and condemn the inmate's conduct or personality, as Officer Bonaparte did. Nor should officers belittle or make fun of the inmate. In this case Officer Bonaparte did not act properly--he should have attempted to convince inmate Goldbrick that he was not a "worthless person" and also should have reported the suicide threat so that officers could keep Goldbrick under constant observation. In addition, Officer Bonaparte should have asked the jail psychologist or chaplain to come to the jail to talk with Goldbrick, since the inmate was in a "suicide crisis" situation and needed help immediately.

An early recognition of the warning signs of suicide and prompt referral to a mental health counselor can ward off a lot of problems. A major factor in the prevention of suicide is getting the individual professional help. The importance of quick and appropriate referrals cannot be stressed enough. Persons contemplating suicide can often, with the help of qualified professionals, find alternative solutions which are more appropriate than suicide. It is the officer's responsibility to inform the jail's mental health professionals about any inmate displaying abnormal behavior or obvious signs of depression. By not referring the individual, the officer may in fact be endangering the inmate's life.

Awareness Of Suicidal Behavior Is Crucial

An inmate who is serious about committing suicide will try to estimate a time to carry out his plan when the likelihood of being discovered by someone is small. For this reason the officer should make *unsystematic patrols* of the tier. This will hinder the inmate's efforts at timing him and increase the possibility of successful intervention.

Because the largest percentage of suicides occur between the hours of 12 midnight and 8 A.M., this tour must be *extra observant* and aware of suicidal potential. Persons suffering from insomnia or severe states of depression should be kept under close observation. The importance of *untimed frequent patrols* is even more crucial on this shift.

In addition to unsystematic tours and referrals, the officer should make an entry in the *log book* and make sure the officers coming on at the next tour are aware of any abnormal behavior.

Hanging Attempts

Hanging is overwhelmingly the most common form of suicide in jails. However, this does not mean to imply that other methods such as cutting or burning are not attempted. But, since hanging is the usual method of suicide attempted by inmates, officers should know how to respond properly, since it may be possible to save the inmate's life in some cases.

A hanging attempt may affect any or all of the structures in the neck. These include the structures of the airway, spinal cord, and the major blood vessels which bring the blood supply to the head. All of these must be considered in caring for the hanging victim.

The officer who discovers a hanging attempt should:

- Extricate the victim, protecting his head and neck as much as possible.
- Have someone call for an ambulance *immediately*.
- Give basic first aid. This includes:
 1. Monitor and maintain open airway.
 - a. Look, listen, and feel for breathing if he is unconscious.
 - b. Maintain airway, if necessary, using the modified jaw thrust technique. DO NOT tilt the head back.
 - (1) Place your fingers behind the angles of lower jaw.

- (2) Forcefully bring his jaw forward.
- (3) Use your thumbs to pull his lower lip down to allow breathing through the mouth as well as the nose.
 - c. Give artificial respiration, if necessary, while continuing maintenance of airway through jaw lift.
2. If there is no pulse, give cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
3. Assume that he has spinal cord injury, and treat appropriately:
 - a. Place victim flat on floor with head held stable.
 - b. Do not let victim or anyone else lift or twist his head.
 - c. Give him nothing to eat or drink, and no medications.
4. If there is swelling or discoloration, apply an ice bag to the area.
5. Do not leave the victim alone.

Officers should always remember that any suicide attempt is a serious matter.

SUMMARY

1. Suicides, both real and attempted, are a significant problem for the jail officer; since officers are responsible for preventing suicides, they must be able to recognize the symptoms of suicide and take the proper steps to intervene.

Officers should consider all suicide threats by inmates to be serious and take appropriate steps to prevent the inmate from carrying out his threats. This includes constant observation of the inmate and seeking professional mental health assistance for him. Officers should recognize the symptoms of potential suicide, such as depression or a sudden change in the inmate's behavior, and attempt to find out what is troubling the inmate. It is a serious mistake for the jail officer to ignore suicide threats or invite an inmate to go ahead and kill himself. Prevention is the key.

2. If an officer discovers an inmate attempting to kill himself, the most important step the officer can take in most cases is to start a conversation with the inmate that is non-threatening.

A person who is actually attempting suicide needs to feel that he is in complete control of the situation. Therefore, it is essential that the officer not act in any manner which could be considered threatening. The

officer should encourage the inmate to talk and gradually enter the conversation himself. He should be honest in his responses to the inmate and should not be judgmental. Nor should he belittle the inmate or make fun of him. However, if the officer arrives upon the scene too late to prevent an inmate from carrying out a suicide attempt, such as a hanging, the officer should act immediately to rescue the inmate, summon an ambulance, and administer first aid if it is still possible to save the inmate's life.

Suggested Readings

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
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Section IV

Supervision



Supervising Inmates: Principles & Skills
Personal Supervision Situations in Housing &
General Areas
Special Supervision Problems in the Jail
Supervision of Inmates in Dining Areas
Supervision of Minimum Security Inmates

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

SUPERVISING INMATES:


PRINCIPLES AND SKILLS

One of the most difficult--yet interesting--aspects of the jail officer's job is that of supervising inmates. Because he is responsible for the conduct of inmates, the jail officer must be skilled at his work, possess and know how to use "common sense" and imagination, and be as intelligent as other people in the helping professions, such as police officers, teachers, physicians, and social workers.

While all jail officers should possess these qualities when they are hired, they become more adept at applying them as they gain on-the-job experience. No one can "teach" a jail officer how to use "common sense" when dealing with inmates; "common sense" is a quality the officer possesses and refines as he works in the cell blocks. The same holds true for imagination and intelligence. However, the new officer can be taught some basic *skills or principles* to use when supervising inmates. This chapter examines these principles of supervision. The officer should learn these principles but should also remember to intelligently judge each individual incident and use imagination and "common sense" to solve the problem.

Supervising inmates properly is one of the most important components of the jail officer's job. Inmates who are poorly supervised begin to gain control of the cell blocks. Other inmates become tense and discontented. Poorly supervised inmates have a tendency to cause trouble in the jail by fighting, provoking disturbances, and attempting to escape. On the other hand, inmates who are supervised properly can be motivated to carry out work assignments, follow the jail rules, and participate in rehabilitation programs.

How does a jail officer properly supervise inmates? This is not as difficult to do as it may seem on the surface. The key is to *win the confidence of the inmates* and show them that the officer knows how to *manage* them.



Poorly supervised inmates may cause disturbances and attempt escapes.

Inmates will use every "test" in the book of jailhouse lore to try to prove that an officer is unable to manage them, but a knowledgeable officer will be aware of these "tests" and know how to pass them. For example, consider the following "games" or "tests," which occur in every jail:

Situation One: The "explosion" game: an inmate attempts to exert power in the cell block by making an officer lose his temper. The inmate "wins" the power game when he manages to make the officer angry enough to start yelling or swearing.

Situation Two: The "watch me embarrass you" game: this is commonly used by inmates to provoke an officer of the opposite sex, causing fellow inmates to laugh at the officer's embarrassment *if the officer reacts to the situation in the way the inmates anticipate she or he will.* For example, a male inmate will expose his genital organs to a female officer to get a reaction.

Situation Three: The "playing one officer against another" game: in this game an inmate attempts to gain control over two officers at once by getting them angry at each other. While this game is being played, other inmates are aware of the play-by-play action. It happens like this: the inmate "player" tells Officer A that Officer B said he was wrong when he told inmates to perform a task in a certain way.

Then the inmate later tells Officer B that Officer A said he was a "stupid jerk who doesn't know which end is up." The inmates expect the officers to get involved in a dispute, which draws attention from a supervisor. Officers should be aware that this game is one of the most popular methods inmates use to gain control in the cell block. This game is generally learned by children in kindergarten and is used there to get other children in trouble with the teacher.

Situation Four: The "I'm on my deathbed" game: in this game an inmate convinces an officer that he is suffering from almost every ailment and disease known to mankind and therefore needs special attention, such as plenty of bed rest instead of a work detail. The inmate "puts one over" on the officer and gains some power in the cell block. The American version of this game developed in the Continental Army in 1776 and has since been refined by generations of soldiers, sailors, inmates, and others who find themselves in institutions which they cannot leave for a few years. Officers should have an inmate who complains of illness examined by a physician; with those who are playing this game, a pattern will soon develop. The physician will be able to determine if the inmate is playing this game and give the officer advice on how to "cure" the inmate. But the jail officer should never just assume he is feigning illness--let the doctor make the determination.

There are many other "games" which inmates play to gain control over an officer, thus sabotaging the officer's efforts to properly supervise the entire inmate population under his care. By being aware of these "games" and comparing notes with other officers on power "games" they have encountered, the officer can circumvent these inmate attempts to undermine his authority. At the same time there are several positive steps the officer can take to encourage inmate confidence in his ability to supervise them. Among these steps are:

1. The officer must strongly believe in his own competence to deal successfully with any situation that may develop.
2. He must develop an ability to display his self-confidence in a natural and acceptable manner.
3. He must develop the knowledge and skills required in his job.
4. He must develop a willingness and ability to make decisions promptly but not hastily.
5. He must insist on having all the facts before taking action.
6. He must develop a willingness and ability to accept responsibility and liability for failures without *unjustly* passing the blame on to inmates or other officers.
7. He must develop an ability to maintain poise and self-control

(mentally, physically, and emotionally) when being criticized by his supervisors or by inmates.

8. He must develop the initiative to investigate unsatisfactory conditions and take corrective actions.
9. He must develop an ability to be free from prejudices, especially in reference to race, ethnic origins, sex, politics, and religion.
10. He must have an unquestioned personal integrity.
11. He must develop an ability to work hard.
12. He must develop the physical and emotional strength to withstand the strain of demands on his time, energy, and patience.

To summarize, a good supervisor knows how to communicate and give orders; can take orders and carry out the policies and procedures of the jail; and can make decisions.

COMMUNICATION SKILLS

Communicating with inmates involves knowing how to *listen*. But it also involves knowing how to give directions and orders to the inmates. Communication is a two-part process: the taking in and the giving out of information. In other words, good communication is an *exchange* of information between the officer and the inmate with the jail officer still maintaining control.

Some officers feel it is a waste of time to communicate with inmates while other officers feel that in order to maintain an authoritarian presence, they cannot participate in conversations with inmates--these officers believe the *only* communication they should have with inmates is the one-way giving of orders and asking questions to obtain information from the inmates.

An officer who follows these approaches will not be a very successful supervisor of inmates. There are *psychological* benefits in keeping inmates informed about events in the jail or in the community which affect them. The officer who is reluctant to communicate with inmates should envision how he himself reacts when supervisors fail to communicate with subordinates. Does he feel "left out" of the jail decision-making process? Does he feel resentment toward fellow employees who are "in the know" about what is going on in the jail or the sheriff's department? Does he become less motivated--a feeling that he is "only putting in an eight hour day" and his "real" life begins when he leaves work?

Does he begin to say "I don't give a damn about what happens in this place, as long as I get my paycheck each week?" When employees in private industry and governmental agencies are excluded from the internal communication process, the attitudes described above begin to take root and the organization suffers. Along with a decline in employee morale, absenteeism increases, productivity declines, and employees may resort to job actions to force communication with management.



"You're not going to tell me anything--I run this jail!"

The officer-inmate relationship is the same as a supervisor-subordinate relationship in industry or government. Disturbances and negative changes in inmate morale can be prevented by good officer-inmate communication. This communication process takes several forms:

1. Knowing how to *listen* to what inmates have to say.
2. Knowing how to ask questions to determine what the *real* problems are.
3. Knowing how to give orders and directions so that the inmates can understand them.
4. Knowing how to observe non-verbal communication symbols to detect hidden messages and attitudes.

5. Knowing how to motivate inmates through proper communication procedures.

Proper officer-inmate communication processes can provide many benefits and lead to a smoothly functioning jail. For example, consider what potential problems were averted by the officers in the following situation:

Case Study 1:

The newly built Big Sky County Jail was designed to be an escape-proof fortress with high cement walls and no outside windows. On the day of the final game of the World Series, a hurricane hit Big Sky County and knocked down the jail's TV antenna. The inmates had been eagerly looking forward to watching the game on TV in the jail dining room. However, game time arrived and no officers came to the cell blocks to escort inmates to the dining room. The inmates began to grumble and became restless. Then an officer appeared on each cell block to tell the inmates about the fierce hurricane raging outside and express the sheriff's regret about the TV antenna. However, each officer also said: "We've got a man rigging a hook-up to pull in the audio and we'll put the game on the loudspeaker system...it should take another 10 minutes." The inmates cheered, since they now understood the situation and realized the sheriff was trying to help them instead of punish them, as they had at first believed.

How To Be An Effective Listener


Many jail officers have very poor listening habits even though they have no trouble with important supervisory skills such as making decisions or giving orders. Officers often listen only to what they expect to hear from inmates, missing what is new or unusual. Any improvement an officer can make in his listening skills will increase his effectiveness as a supervisor of inmates.

Listening Guidelines. There must be a receiver as well as a sender for communication to take place. Guidelines for an officer who wants to be an effective "receiver" include:

1. Keep an open mind. The good listener must be willing to hear suggestions or differences of opinion both from inmates and fellow officers.
2. Give inmates a chance to talk freely. As discussed in the chapter on discipline, this is especially important when handling specific grievances. It is a good rule to pause

occasionally when talking to the inmate so that the inmate will have a chance to say what is on his mind.

3. Set up "feedback mechanisms." An officer can't supervise a shift of inmates blindfolded. An effective officer will make full use of informed inmate leaders under his supervision to give him prompt and reliable feedback.
4. An officer should gauge his attention span. Psychologists report that the average attention span while listening is extremely brief--sometimes as little as four or five seconds. After that the listener's mind wanders off on problems of his own.
5. The officer should be aware of his "bias factors." Most people don't listen objectively. They mentally translate much of what they hear as it relates to their various prejudices or preconceived notions.
6. The officer should ask questions when something doesn't come through clearly. He should not be concerned about giving the impression that he didn't "catch on."



How To Improve Listening Skills. For effective communication, both with his own supervisors and inmates, an officer must know how to listen. An officer who is preoccupied with his own thoughts often gives superficial or careless attention to conversation with inmates. He may select only those ideas he expects or wants to hear, thereby missing what he considers unpleasant (but frequently important) information. Here are some steps to take to avoid closing the door on an important source of information:

1. Briefly restate what the inmate has said. Keep the tone of voice neutral so that the inmate will not be led to guess the officer's conclusion and agree with him. The officer should be trying to find out what the inmate's ideas are.
2. Pay attention. The officer should keep his mind on what the inmate is saying. He should think about his own problems when he is alone.
3. Forget preconceived ideas. The jail officer who won't believe something because it is contrary to what he "always knew" is closing his mind to fresh and perhaps vital information.
4. Consider the source. If the officer knows the speaker and whether he is biased or inclined toward overstatement, then the meaning of the speaker's statements become more clear. Caution: Thinking in generalities or lumping people into categories is a common pitfall.
5. The listener should discipline himself. If he reacts emotionally to what others say, the officer loses objectivity about what he is being told. The officer should not let anger or sympathy prevent him from understanding a statement.
6. The officer should want to listen. He should not just pretend he is interested in what's being said. The officer should give the speaker his attention and show his interest by displaying some animation, such as eye movements or nodding his head. He should ask questions which prove he is listening.
7. The officer should not interrupt. The "open mouth" listener who must say something each time the speaker catches his breath is not listening fulltime.

Helping Inmates To Become Good Listeners. Just as the officer might have difficulty understanding some of the pronouncements of management, so might the inmates have problems understanding the officer's instructions and requests. The same guidelines that can

help the officer become a better listener will also benefit the inmates who are being supervised by the officer. An officer who wants to be an effective supervisor should help train the inmates to be good listeners.

How To Ask Questions

An important aspect of communication for the jail officer is gathering information. He needs to know how to ask questions. By asking a question, the jail officer lets the inmate know that he requires a verbal reply. The officer who becomes skilled at communicating will learn to tell when an inmate answers a question with a lie.

There are several signs which accompany lying; they all generally reflect an underlying anxiety. These signs are:



Signs which may accompany lying.

1. A "dry mouth"--the person being interviewed has difficulty completing a long phrase or sentence because he has to swallow or take a breath.

2. Excessive fidgeting or tending to irrelevant activities, such as picking invisible lint from a sleeve.

3. Long pauses when answering questions.

4. An "overfast" response to a question, as though the answer had been rehearsed.

5. An inmate who protests his innocence *before* the officer accuses him of anything may be lying.

However, the officer should be aware that any one or all of these signs *may appear* in a perfectly innocent inmate if the inmate is afraid of the officer and the fact that the officer has called him in for an interview. In such a case, the officer needs to look for non-verbal cues or investigate why the inmate is afraid. For example, cell block

leaders may be looking for a "snitch" who got them into trouble when they were planning an escape; by being called to a private interview with an officer, an inmate may fear that the cell block leaders will decide he is the "snitch." An officer should look for these extenuating circumstances if he is not certain whether an inmate is lying or is just nervous.

When questioning an inmate, the officer can reinforce his responses by indicating interest, approval, or agreement. But he should not phrase questions so that they provide their own answers. To avoid this, questions should require more than a "yes" or "no" answer. The officer also should avoid asking *leading* questions which *suggest* the answer he is looking for.

Giving Directions And Orders

The chief job of the jail officer is to supervise the activities of inmates. The results the officer gets depend a great deal upon his ability to give directions or orders clearly. How he tells or asks inmates to do things can make all the difference in the world in the kind of response he will get.

How To Give Orders. Orders fizzle when they are given to the wrong people, or in the wrong way, or at the wrong time. Jail officers know that a lot of confusion is caused when inmates don't understand instructions. To prevent confusion any order that an officer issues to an inmate should be based upon the following rules:



"Jones, take this cleaning material right now and scrub the wall behind the kitchen stove to get the grease off. We have an inspection soon."

1. Make the order clear and complete.

A. Who is to do it?

- (1) Does the order state clearly who is to do it?
- (2) Does it leave any loop-holes for passing the buck?
- (3) Does it define clearly who is responsible for results?
- (4) Does it delegate sufficient authority to the right person?

B. What is to be done?

- (1) What does the officer want the inmate to do? (Example: "Take these boxes over to the kitchen." What does the inmate do with the boxes when he gets them there?)

(2) What is to be ordered? (Materials, supplies?)

(3) What equipment is to be used? (If an inmate uses a wrong-size machine and the order doesn't specify the correct size, who is to blame?)

(4) What results are expected?

C. When is it to be done?

(1) When is the job to start?

(2) When is the job to be finished? (Lots of jobs just hang around because nobody puts a date on them.)

(3) Does the order reflect the urgent need to do the job?

D. Where?

(1) Where are the supplies located?

(2) Where is the work to be done?

(3) Where is the completed project to be delivered?

E. How?

(1) How is the work to be done?

(2) Does the order allow sufficient leeway?

(3) Can the inmate understand the instructions?

(4) Are special details clearly outlined?

F. Why?

(1) Why is the order necessary?

(2) Why is a certain method being used?

(3) Why have special requirements (if any) been made?

2. Be positive: When giving an order, always use a positive sentence. Many times an inmate does exactly what he is told NOT to do because the order is phrased in the negative, and he remembers only the idea. He forgets the "DO NOT" part of the order.

3. Make the order fit the person.

- A. What is the inmate's experience?
- B. Is he quick or slow to understand?
- C. How cooperative is he?
- D. Is his morale good, poor, or only fair?
- E. Does he have good self-discipline? (Will he require close supervision on this job, or can he work by himself? Can he be depended upon to do the job in the best way he can, and on time?)
- F. Does the inmate have the ability to carry the job through to completion? (Should more than one inmate be in on the order? Should the order be given to someone else?)
- G. Does the way the order is worded and given to the inmate invite cooperation?

Case Study 2:

Officer John Cash thinks all inmates are dumb. They never seem to do anything right on the work details and Officer Cash says they are "making me crazy."

For example, yesterday he told inmates Washington and Post to "go paint the jail library." The two inmates went off to do their assigned work and Officer Cash did not check on them all day. However, at the end of his shift, his sergeant called him in and asked: "Cash, what's the idea telling those two inmates to paint everything in the library? The place looks like a Las Vegas nightclub stage set for a patriotic dance act."


Unable to answer his sergeant because he had not seen the new paint job in the library, Officer Cash rushed over there. He suddenly got a fierce headache when he saw the results of the inmates' work. They had painted the library walls fire-engine red, the ceiling blue with white clouds, the floor white with red stripes, and the new wooden bookshelves a combination of red, white, and blue. In addition, all furniture in the room--desks, chairs, and tables--had been painted red, white, and blue, with stars and stripes decorating them. It was a very patriotic-looking room. The inmates were cleaning the paint brushes when Cash found them.

"You dumb idiots!" he yelled. "Why would you paint every damn thing in that library? Don't you have any common sense? I just

wanted the walls painted, and they were supposed to be green like every other wall in this jail!"

Inmate Washington replied: "But, Officer, we were in the Army and in the Army they have a rule: 'If you can't move it, paint it.' So we painted everything in there except the books, which we moved."

"Yeah," added inmate Post, "and we did it in the paint we found over in the storeroom. Wasn't no green paint in there. Man in the storeroom said they ain't got no green paint, so he gave us this. You didn't exactly tell us how you wanted it, so we used our imagination, like the shrink who counsels us told us to do. We did a nice job, huh?"



"I just wanted the walls painted green!"

Who goofed? Officer Cash wanted to know if the inmates could be disciplined for painting everything in the library red, white, and blue. His sergeant told Cash he could not discipline the inmates because he, himself, was responsible for their errors. Officer Cash did not issue proper instructions: he did not tell the inmates what was to be painted (only the walls), what color paint to use (green), or where to obtain the paint (a new can of green paint was in the jail kitchen, where it had been used to paint a door). Nor did Officer Cash supervise the inmates properly; he should have accompanied them to the library and explained to them that only the walls were to be painted. Officer Cash was negligent for leaving


the inmates unsupervised during an entire eight-hour shift. The next time Officer Cash tells inmates to paint something, exactly how should he word his orders and directions and what other responsibilities does he have as a supervisor to see that the job is done correctly?

Non-Verbal Communication: Detecting Hidden Messages

Non-verbal communication is communication that takes place outside of language. It is popularly called "body language." By using non-verbal communication, one person can exert control over another.

As jail officers become more experienced at working on the cell blocks, they develop an expertise in non-verbal communication skills. When an officer "has a hunch" that an inmate is plotting an escape or disturbance, the officer is probably basing this "hunch" on clues he picked up from the inmate's facial and bodily expressions. Officers also learn how to use "body language" to let inmates know who is in charge, and the officer's supervisor uses the same movements or positions to let the officer know who the boss is.

There are many excellent books on non-verbal communication which officers are encouraged to read. These books will help the officer learn what inmate expressions and behavioral clues to watch for. If he knows how to observe non-verbal communication signs, the officer often can avert trouble by acting quickly. Among the books which an officer should study are: How To Read A Person Like A Book, by Gerald I. Nierenberg and Henry H. Calero; Body Language, by Julius Fast; and Manwatching, by Desmond Morris. These books are very interesting to read and will also help an officer be more successful in his personal life.



"What makes you think I'm going somewhere, Officer?"

Motivating Inmates

An officer who wants to work on a cell block that is quiet and free from disturbances needs to know how to *motivate* inmates to follow the jail rules, complete work tasks, and participate in counseling and rehabilitation programs.

As was pointed out in the chapter on discipline, one of the easiest ways to lower morale on an entire cell block is to administer discipline poorly or unfairly. To avoid these problems in situations that do not involve serious breaches of the jail's security, the officer should take the following steps when an inmate makes a mistake:

1. Look to see if anything can be salvaged from the situation. Can the officer correct the problem so that the inmate does not "lose face" among the other inmates?
2. Who is at fault? The officer should get the facts so that he doesn't falsely blame the wrong inmate for the mistake. Was an officer at fault because his directions to the inmate were unclear?
3. The officer should "cool down" before taking any action. Otherwise, he might lose control of his temper (and thus let an inmate win a "power game") or he may make an inmate "lose face," which could create disciplinary problems on the cell block.
4. Don't beat a dead horse. Once the mistake has been corrected and the inmate has been told the proper procedure to follow, the officer should not keep "nagging" the inmate or mention the mistake again the next time he sees the inmate.
5. Can the inmate who made the mistake learn anything from this experience? The officer should look for a positive benefit. For example: While the inmate was refinishing a table, an officer caught him smoking a cigarette near an uncovered varnish can. The officer can turn this mistake into a positive learning experience by pointing out to the inmate that he could cause a flash fire and, because of the varnish on his clothes and hands, he would probably be severely burned.
6. How can the mistake of one inmate be used to train other inmates? In the above example, the officer who supervises the woodworking shop can explain the dangers of open flames to *all* inmates (without embarrassing the inmate who made the original mistake).

There are numerous guidelines available for *motivating* inmates to follow jail rules, perform tasks, and seek to better themselves. Among the more important guidelines the officer should follow are:

1. Communicate jail standards to inmates and be consistent.
2. Be aware of your own biases and prejudices.
3. Let inmates know where they stand.
4. Give praise when it is appropriate.
5. Keep inmates informed of changes that may affect them.
6. Care about the inmates as people.
7. Perceive people as ends, not means.
8. Go out of your way to help inmates.
9. Take responsibility for your job.
10. Exhibit personal diligence.
11. Be tactful.
12. Be willing to learn from others.
13. Demonstrate confidence.
14. Allow freedom of expression, as long as it does not interfere with jail security.
15. Encourage ingenuity, where appropriate.

Just as there are guidelines to motivate inmates, there are also deadly "de-motivators." An officer who cares about his job and his profession should avoid the following behavior:

1. Never belittle an inmate.
2. Never criticize an inmate in front of others.
3. Never fail to give inmates your undivided attention.
4. Never seem preoccupied with your own interests.
5. Never play favorites.
6. Never fail to help inmates grow.

7. Never be insensitive to small things.
8. Never embarrass weak inmates.
9. Never delay in making a decision.



Never criticize an inmate in front of others.

"Brown, you eat like a pig. Didn't your parents ever teach you any manners?"

Not all inmates are hardened criminals who have no interest whatsoever in improving themselves. The majority of inmates can be motivated to serve "good time" and participate in available rehabilitation and



Never embarrass weak inmates.

"Look at our award winning citizen. They should have recognized you for being the drunk you are, not for helping the poor."

counseling programs. The officer who deals with a hardened inmate who tells him to "shove all the goody-goody garbage" should not become discouraged and cynical, for there are many other inmates who will respond positively to his attempts to motivate them to do better.

Case Study 3:

Jail Officers Brenda Lee, 23, and Dolly Madison, 25, work on separate shifts on the women's cell block. Officer Lee is very enthusiastic about her job and tells her friends she wants to be "the very best jail officer in the county." She is going to college part-time and is majoring in corrections and psychology. Officer Lee is firm yet friendly when dealing with the women inmates in her cell block and always finds time to listen to their problems. She has encouraged four of the women to sign up for college classes at the jail and has seen to it that the children of two other inmates have been placed in good foster homes. There are never any problems on the women's cell block when Officer Lee is on duty and the captain is so pleased with her performance that he is encouraging her to take the sergeant's exam.

Officer Madison is working in the jail because her husband left her and this was the best job she could find. She avoids talking to the inmates and acts very authoritarian. She tells her friends she "can't stand the jail, but the pay is better than being a waitress." Inmates have stopped trying to get Officer Madison to help them with problems. When Officer Madison orders the inmates to do work, the inmates always manage to make mistakes or damage jail equipment.

What is Officer Madison doing wrong? Can her supervisor do anything to improve Officer Madison's performance or should she be encouraged to seek a job elsewhere? Would the situation improve if the sergeant assigned Officer Madison as Officer Lee's partner?

CARRYING OUT JAIL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

While the jail officer is a *supervisor* in his relationship with inmates, he is a subordinate in the chain-of-command in the jail. He must carry out the policies and procedures of the jail and take orders from his commanding officers.

Often, though, the jail officer feels like the railroader in the following poem:

I ain't allowed to run the train

Or see how far 'twill go.

I ain't allowed to let off steam

Or make the whistle blow.


I ain't allowed to pull a switch

Or even ring the bell.

But let the damn thing jump the track

And see who catches hell!

What this poem is saying is that the jail officer is the person who is responsible if anything goes wrong on the tier, such as an escape, a riot, an inmate suicide, or a fight. While it is almost impossible to run a *completely* trouble-free jail because of the nature of the institution itself, it is *possible* for each individual officer to manage a cell block that is relatively trouble-free.



The officer accomplishes this "Mission Impossible" task by knowing and understanding the policies and procedures of the jail and carrying them out in a professional manner. The jail's policies and procedures are described in its Manual of Rules and Regulations (or General Orders), which each jail should have. New policies and procedural changes are communicated daily to officers in the following manner:

1. New general orders, to be placed in the Manual of Rules and Regulations: these new orders replace existing orders.
2. Memorandums from the sheriff or jail administrator to officers: these are used to explain or reinforce policies, to seek staff input on a specific question, or to describe a problem area in the jail and tell officers what should be done about the problem. Memorandums are also used to explain new court rulings which may affect the way officers perform.
3. Roll call briefings: shift supervisors orally brief officers about problems and procedures at the start of each tour of duty and explain methods for carrying out any new procedures.

In addition, the officer will receive orders, either verbal or written, from commanding officers, which he must carry out to the best of his ability and in a professional manner consistent with the jail's policies and procedures. But what happens if an officer receives an order from his sergeant that the officer knows is in violation of one of the jail's policies or procedures? If this happens, it is the *responsibility* of the officer to point out the conflict to his supervisor. The officer can be held *legally liable* if he knowingly carries out an order that violates proper procedures or the law. The supervisor should be told about the conflict in a professional manner--the officer should not become indignant or insubordinate.

If the supervisor refuses to withdraw an order which violates jail policy or the law, the officer should follow his jail's established procedures for administrative remedies. Most jails have procedures to be followed by officers who have a complaint about their supervisor. Officers should not "go around" the chain-of-command or take any complaints they might have to the public media for settlement.

Case Study 4:

Inmate Jerry Wilson thinks the jail food is terrible and poisonous. He has been conducting a voluntary hunger strike for two days to protest the quality of the food. At mealtimes in the inmate dining room, Wilson has only bread and water. During the rollcall briefing on the third day of Wilson's strike, Sgt. Jim Holly told Officer Jeff Anderson: "I've had enough of that crackpot Wilson's games. There's nothing wrong with the food here--

even the staff people eat it and none of us are dead yet. I want you to lock him in his cell each mealtime and don't allow him any food. After a day or so, he ought to be ready to eat like the rest of the inmates. We'll teach that turkey not to play games with us!"

Officer Anderson realized that the order Sgt. Holly gave him violated a jail rule: "Officers shall not, under any circumstances, willfully deprive inmates of food or liquids as a form of punishment."

What should Officer Anderson do? He decided to wait for the rollcall to end and then asked Sgt. Holly if he could speak to him in private. When they were alone, Officer Anderson explained to Sgt. Holly that the order violated jail rules and perhaps it would be better to find another way to deal with inmate Wilson's hunger strike. Sgt. Holly said he was sure it was OK to deny inmates food, but just to make certain, he would look up the policy in the jail's Manual of Rules and Regulations.

"Don't do anything until I get back to you," he told Officer Anderson.

An hour later Sgt. Holly called Officer Anderson into a conference room and told him he had read the jail policy.

"I'm sorry about giving you a bad order, Jeff," he said, "but it's a new policy and a few years ago we used to make the inmates go without meals. I've decided to ask the jail psychologist to talk to Wilson about his problem with the food. That seems to be the best way to handle this."

The jail officer must be *loyal* to his department and its goals and objectives. He should be discreet about discussing jail problems with his fellow officers and should not discuss *any* internal problems in public or in front of inmates. The officer should not, under any circumstances, let inmates know that he personally disagrees with an order from his supervisor or with a jail policy. In addition, the officer should not criticize other jail personnel to inmates--this leads to a breakdown in authority within the jail.

DECISION-MAKING

Both because of the nature of his job in the jail and the fact that he supervises inmates, the officer must make decisions about problems, people, or situations on a daily basis. These decisions can range from relatively minor issues to complex problems which require

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
DECISION-MAKING

Both because of the nature of his job in the jail and the fact that he supervises inmates, the officer must make decisions about problems, people, or situations on a daily basis. These decisions can range from relatively minor issues to complex problems which require

a great deal of fact gathering, thought, and analysis. For example, a *minor* issue would be deciding to rearrange the inmates' Sunday afternoon schedule so that they would not be interrupted for their outdoor recreation period while they are watching a football game on TV. A *major* decision would be determining the best possible method to improve inmate morale in Cell Block B, where there has been a great deal of tension, inmate assaults, and hostility toward officers.

Decision-making is a four-part process:

1. Identify the problem.
2. Consider the alternatives.
3. Solve the problem.
4. Take action.



Identifying The Problem

One of the major reasons for poor decision-making is an inability by the jail officer to manage his time. Frequently, too much time is spent looking for an answer rather than identifying the problem. This usually results in finding the right answer--but to the wrong question. Thus, the most *important* factor in decision-making is *defining the real problem* and *pinpointing its critical elements*. For example, suppose an inmate complains about cockroaches in his cell area. Before

ordering exterminators to spray the cell, the officer should ask some questions. It could turn out that the real reason for the inmate's complaint is the fact that he doesn't get along with the inmates around him and he wants to be placed in another part of the jail.

All sorts of situations in the jail may present problems which the officer needs to solve. For the jail officer, a problem is any situation in which he must act. He is responsible and must do something to remedy the situation. He should not hesitate to ask advice from other jail officers. It may be a long-standing problem or one that suddenly emerges, but it now requires action. It involves uncertainty and discretion for the jail officer--he has questions to answer and choices to make.

The amount of discretion involved in a jail officer's problems covers a wide spectrum, for his job in the cell block is very similar to that of a police officer on patrol. Discretion ranges from almost wide-open choices of what to do, to more narrowly limited discretion as to how best to carry out an assigned task (standard operating procedures). However, a jail officer on duty in the cell block often has a wide choice of what to do, if anything, to maintain order in a given situation when apparent unrest seems likely to lead to violence.

It is particularly important for a jail officer to define problems accurately and realistically in situations where there is a great amount of discretion. There is probably no more common error in jail administration or law enforcement than to misjudge the basic difficulty, and then to proceed with a program or solution which, although it may be well intended, fails because it is a solution for the *wrong* problem. If the diagnosis of the problem is faulty, then the prescribed remedy is almost certain to be ineffective.

The point for the jail officer is to make sure, so far as is possible, that the problem definition with which he proceeds is valid.

The following checklist helps in discovering the *real* problem:

1. List the facts that need to be obtained;
2. Check the accuracy of the facts;
3. Examine the facts in the light of past experience with a particular inmate or jail problem;
4. Check the facts with other officers or jail personnel;
5. Consult a supervisor, if appropriate;
6. Review departmental policy as it relates to the problem;

7. Identify the key obstacles; and
8. Determine the limits of authority.

Most of the time it will be unnecessary to make all of these checks. However, officers should use the list as a reminder when the situation dictates a thorough study.

Considering The Alternatives

After preliminary checking has been completed, the officer may see two or more solutions. The seemingly "one" right or obvious solution is not always the best answer because the first idea to come to mind is frequently biased by notions of what the officer wants to believe. The alternatives must be weighed for their positive and negative points. This process is called *comparative analysis* and is relatively simple. Most officers use the comparative analysis process in their everyday lives when they are making a major decision.

Case Study 5:

Officer Robin Hood has been assigned the task of deciding what type of exercise equipment to purchase for a small indoor recreation room. The Nottingham Forest County Jail does not have an outdoor exercise area and inmates have been complaining. In a recent state court case, the judge ruled that the profits from jail commissaries are to be used to benefit the inmates. After the court decision was made public, the inmates at the Nottingham Forest Jail voted to use their commissary profits to convert a small unused storeroom into an exercise room. There is \$700 in the commissary fund which Officer Hood can use to buy exercise equipment. The sheriff told him to buy the best equipment possible, but "try to get enough different kinds so that several inmates can use the room at the same time." The sheriff, who belongs to a community recreation association which has an indoor exercise room, also told Officer Hood that he should purchase at least one stationary exercise bicycle, a rowing machine, and a stationary jogging pad.

There are many types of exercise bicycles and rowing machines available on the market. Officer Hood decided to choose the best models available within a limited price range by using the comparative analysis method. To solve his problem, he followed these steps:

First, he visited sporting goods stores to look at catalogs and equipment. After he had obtained descriptions of the various types of equipment and a price list, he visited or called several

recreation center managers and college physical education instructors to talk to them about the health benefits provided by the various machines and devices, such as barbells and jump ropes. This is the fact-finding process.

Second, Officer Hood decided what criteria to use to judge the various types of exercise equipment. He decided that the following factors needed to be analyzed: durability of the equipment, cost, amount of floor space the equipment requires, physical benefits inmates can gain from the equipment, maintenance problems, availability of replacement parts, and whether or not the equipment needed to be assembled by the inmates before they could use it.

Third, he had to assign weights to the criteria--that is, decide which of the criteria are most important to the jail and assign them a numerical value in order of descending importance. Officer Hood decided that the most important criteria were: durability (a weight of 10 points), amount of floor space the equipment requires (9 points), physical benefits the inmates can gain from the equipment (8 points), and cost (7 points).

After taking these three steps, Officer Hood could then compare alternative exercise machine models. For example, he obtained factual information on seven different stationary bicycle models, ranging in price from \$40 to \$1,900. The exercise bicycle which received the highest score in the analysis is the best (or recommended) bicycle to purchase for the jail. The same analytical process is followed to select the best rowing machine model and stationary jogger.

Based upon his evaluations of the individual types of equipment, Officer Hood decided to use the \$700 to purchase two stationary bicycles, a rowing machine, a stationary jogger, exercise mats, a punching bag and boxing gloves, barbells, and several jump ropes. This is the scientific way to solve problems. The \$700 was spent wisely and the inmates were able to benefit from a variety of durable exercise equipment.

Many problems in the jail can be solved mentally, with the officer assigning and weighing criteria in his head--this process is used for problems which occur frequently and with which the officer has experience.

Solving The Problem

Alternative solutions to the problem should be based on the data which has been collected and analyzed. Again, the officer should keep

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an open mind and use his imagination--let his mind roam freely over the facts he has. He should jot down every possible solution, even though it may be absurd, while resisting any temptation to evaluate. Then he should examine his facts: these facts should be studied as long as there seems to be any chance of getting from them additional ideas, solutions, patterns, or explanations.

The next step is to evaluate, objectively, the possible solutions to the problem. The officer should be careful not to confine himself to sources which give evidence only on one side of the question. As the officer studies his evidence, he should not let himself form any opinion or premature judgment. The way to avoid this is to ask these questions:

1. Is this solution practical?
2. Will it solve the problem permanently and completely?
3. Is it acceptable to the officer's immediate supervisor?
4. What will be the effect of the solution on an inmate or inmates?
5. Will precedents be set?
6. Will the decision affect other shifts?
7. What are the cost factors?
8. Will the decision meet departmental objectives?
9. Will future problems occur as a result of this decision?
10. Is the decision legal and ethical?
11. Is the decision in line with jail policies and procedures?

Taking Action

If possible, the officer should test his tentative decision before adopting a final course of action. He can experiment with the decision in a few typical situations and try it out on one or two inmates to see if the plan works as well as he thought it would. If the officer does discover any pitfalls, he can then adjust his plan.

Not taking, or procrastinating, a needed action is no better than making a snap decision. Proper timing is important. Though postponing action is in reality making a decision, it is negative in character and accomplishes nothing.

If, after each alternative has been carefully weighed, there are still two or more alternatives that seem equally good, then the officer should select one and stick with it. When a decision has been made, the officer should not let it die. Everyone concerned must be told. The inmates should be told how they are involved and just what is expected of them. If what the officer has decided to do will affect the operations of other sections of the jail, then he should tell the supervisors of those sections just what is being planned. He and his supervisor should make sure there is understanding and agreement. Then the officer should follow up to be certain that the right action is being taken.

SUMMARY

1. Supervising inmates properly is one of the most important components of the jail officer's job.

Inmates who are supervised properly are motivated to carry out work assignments, follow jail rules, and participate in rehabilitation programs. Inmates will attempt to undermine an officer's authority--therefore, it is necessary for the officer to take positive steps to encourage inmate confidence in his ability to supervise them.

2. In order to effectively supervise and motivate inmates, a jail officer must develop an ability to communicate and solve problems.

Communication is a two-way exchange of information. It involves an ability to listen effectively, knowing how to "read" non-verbal messages and cues, and being able to question inmates to obtain information. But it also includes developing an ability to provide information to inmates--knowing how to give orders and directions and talk with inmates so that they are motivated to serve "good time." Proper officer-inmate communication can lead to a smoothly functioning trouble-free jail.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

PERSONAL SUPERVISION SITUATIONS

IN HOUSING AND GENERAL AREAS

The custodial nature of the jail demands that a rigid form of personal supervision be applied. In a free society, no one would ordinarily reprimand a person for talking and arguing loudly or for leaving food on his plate in a public restaurant. But in the jail, such seemingly harmless lapses in behavior must not go unchallenged if they pose a potential threat to the security of the institution. If the jail officer cannot effectively supervise these everyday occurrences, then the jail can easily become a chaotic and dangerous place.

Only jail staff members are qualified to supervise the activities of inmates. When inmates are permitted to supervise the activities of other inmates, this is a sure sign that jail personnel have given away control of the jail. A situation like this is potentially very dangerous both for inmates and jail personnel.

Case Study 1:

Four inmates at the Big Sky County Jail recently were charged with a variety of criminal acts. A Grand Jury investigation was initiated, based upon a complaint by three inmates participating in a work-release program who were caught attempting to smuggle marijuana into the jail. The Grand Jury investigation uncovered a "sanitary court" being operated by inmates Sam Houston, Dave Crockett, Billy Bob Travis, and Jimmy Bowie. These inmates were forcibly taking money from other inmates; inducing work-release inmates to smuggle marijuana, pills, and other narcotics into the jail; torturing weak inmates; making Mexican-American inmates pay "bribe" money for their meals; and forcing young male inmates to take part in homosexual acts.

Inmate Houston was "fingered" by the other three inmates as the ringleader. After agreeing to testify for the state in exchange for leniency, inmates Crockett, Travis, and Bowie said

that Houston and his relatives in the community threatened to harm their families if they did not cooperate with Houston and serve as his jailhouse "lieutenants."

Inmate Houston's defense attorney argued at the General District Court trial that Houston was simply operating a "sanitary court" to keep the cells clean. The attorney said this court was approved by jail officers, who could not maintain control of the inmates by themselves. To prove his arguments, Houston cited the fact that he held "trusty" status and assisted officers in drawing up work and cell assignments for other inmates.

Houston was found guilty and was sentenced to an additional four-year term. He was transferred to the State Penitentiary. However, shortly after the trial ended, six inmates filed suit against Big Sky County and the sheriff for "permitting them to be raped while in jail." The County attorney told the sheriff: "This is going to be a tough one to defend."

This case study is a classic example of how "kangaroo courts" come into existence. These "courts" have various names, such as "banking" and "orientation" courts. Whenever they are permitted to exist, this indicates that the jail staff members have lost control. The staff is totally responsible for the care, safety, and security of all inmates and cannot delegate this responsibility to inmates under any circumstances. The existence of an inmate-run "court" is a denial of the rights of the majority of inmates, and the jail staff can be held legally liable for permitting such a "court to function."



Sanitary court "trial"

Case Study 2:

In the Sherwood Forest County Jail, day shift Booking Officer Littlejohn found himself constantly overloaded with paperwork. He decided to assign inmate "trusty" Bruce Lee the task of photographing and fingerprinting all new inmates. Inmate Lee was not supervised in the booking area and was given complete authority over all inmates he was processing.

Six months later a newly-admitted inmate, Gary Romano, was found unconscious in his cell. The Emergency Room physician at the Sherwood Forest Hospital reported to the jail lieutenant that inmate Romano was the victim of several unnatural sex acts and that the unconsciousness resulted from internal bleeding as a result of a severe beating to his abdominal area.

While Romano was recovering from surgery, two detectives from the Sheriff's Department Criminal Investigations Division visited him to obtain a statement about the assault and rape.

"It was Bruce Lee and his friends who did it," Romano said. "Lee started in on me while I was still being booked. When I get out of here, I'm gonna take care of that creep for good. If you wanna keep him alive, you better put him in another jail!"

The detectives investigated the situation in the jail and found that inmate Lee was a member of a jail "kangaroo court." He regularly ordered newly-admitted young male inmates, especially those who were physically attractive, to report to him for "retakes" of their booking photos. Lee, left alone in the fingerprint and photo room with the inmate, would order the inmate to undress and force him to engage in sexual acts. Later, back on the cell block, the inmate would be visited by some of Lee's friends and again forced into sexual acts. If the inmate resisted, as Romano did, he would be "taught a lesson"--which usually involved a severe beating. The inmate victims, who felt inmate Lee had the backing of the jail staff, were afraid to complain about him. They thought the jail officers would tell Lee and then they would be subjected to more punishment by Lee and his friends.

Once these activities were uncovered, criminal charges were filed against inmate Lee and his friends. Lee's status as a "trusty" was revoked. The jail administrator scheduled a disciplinary hearing for Officer Littlejohn.

In this case, allowing "trusty" Lee to exercise authority over other inmates was a serious lapse in supervision and led to:

- Loss of control of the jail by jail personnel; and
- Violation of the legal rights of the inmates--when jail officers allow some inmates to exercise control over other inmates, then the officers are responsible for any harmful acts which result from this lack of proper supervision.

Case Study 3:



"Sorry, sir, but he doesn't have a record with this agency," the inmate "trusty" working in the jail office told the investigator from the FBI who was calling to locate a fugitive: The fugitive was actually in the jail, but was a friend of the "trusty."

There is an overload of paperwork at the Big Sky County Jail, where Officer Andy Rickert works. To cope with this work, Officer Rickert assigned a "trusty," inmate Hal Smith, to work as a clerk-typist in the jail office. Smith was asked to type out the cell assignment lists everyday. He learned the job quickly and Officer Rickert decided that Smith could be left on his own to make cell assignments without supervision. Inmate Smith soon learned that he could make cell assignments to please his friends and any other inmates who had an attractive bribe to offer him. He arranged to put homosexuals together and, in some cases, placed young, weaker inmates in cells with aggressive homosexuals. In one instance, Smith arranged to put two known troublemakers together. Within a few days, they had organized and were running a powerful "banking" committee and were taking advantage of other inmates.

It took Officer Rickert three months to learn what was happening. He might not have learned how Smith was taking advantage of his role as a "trusty" until after a very serious incident had occurred. However, Officer Rickert was lucky--another officer who communicated well with several inmates found out what was going on. He told Officer Rickert, who revoked Smith's status as a "trusty" and filed disciplinary charges against him. Along with several other officers, Rickert was able to readjust cell assignments and restore order to the cell blocks.



It is dangerous to allow inmates to supervise other inmates.

SUPERVISORY PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

While it is dangerous to permit inmates to assume supervisory functions in the jail, it is an *equally unwise practice* for jail personnel to allow mechanical and electronic devices to take over supervisory duties that should be performed by the officers themselves. For example, in a large midwestern jail there is a control center with seven TV monitors which must be watched constantly by a jail officer. Some of the monitors are focused on security entrances. The officer in the control center must identify persons appearing at these entrances and operate electrical controls to let them enter. Other monitors are placed in cell block hallways. There are additional monitors in maximum security cells. This same officer also is responsible for monitoring three 2-way radio bands, answering several telephones, and operating dictating equipment for other officers.

The administrator of this jail is very confident that his TV surveillance system is effective. He has assigned fewer officers to patrol and check for trouble in the areas where the TV cameras are located.


It is understandable that jail personnel learn to appreciate the effectiveness of TV monitoring equipment. However, when they allow themselves to rely strongly upon the equipment for monitoring cell areas, it becomes easy to forget how important personal supervision can be. How can the practice of relying on the TV monitors for supervision lead to a dangerous situation in the midwestern jail described above? In the first place, the jail officer on duty is probably just too busy to keep his total attention on the monitors and he may overlook some movements and incidents.



Jail officers must not depend on automatic locking mechanisms, but should physically double check to assure that doors are locked.



The distinct sound made from drawing a wooden handle across jail bars may cause an escape attempt to fail.



There is no substitute for personal observation of the inmate population.

Second, *there is no substitute for on-the-scene supervision.* Only a jail officer *in person* can check for such hidden dangers as inmate tampering with bars and locks. A jail officer *in person* can talk to inmates and, by watching and listening carefully, can sense the overall mood and atmosphere of a cell area.

A jail officer's most important duties are performed in the cell areas, *not at a desk.* A jail where all officers are sitting at their desks or congregating in the control room or receiving area is a poorly run, potentially dangerous jail.

However, it is also a mistake to assume that personal surveillance of cell areas is foolproof. Illegal activity can and will occur in many jails despite the most thorough methods of personal and mechanical surveillance. Jail officers constantly must work to make their supervisory techniques as effective and efficient as possible.

Making on-the-scene supervision of cell blocks as effective as possible requires flexibility and even imagination on the part of the patrolling officer. Inmates quickly become aware of any set routine practiced by a patrolling officer. For this reason, jail officers should consciously make frequent patrols at irregular times which cannot be predicted by inmates. The officer on patrol should be constantly alert for unusual sounds or activities. Sometimes excessive quiet or unusually loud noises in the cell areas can be immediate danger signals to an alert officer. The imaginative officer "tunes in" to all such unusual signs.



"It's nice that everyone is in the holiday spirit this year."

Case Study 4:

The Reindeer County Jail is old and dilapidated. Recently, a large group of inmates successfully planned and carried out an escape on Christmas Eve. Several of the inmates, using a metal bar that was torn from a bunk, managed to knock a hole through a crumbling exterior brick wall while other inmates in the cell area drowned out the noise by loudly singing Christmas carols and creating a general disturbance.

It could be argued that the poor condition of the jail building contributed to the escape, but shift supervisor Sgt. Nick Saint was equally at fault. Inspired by the inmates' loud singing of Christmas carols, Sgt. Saint gathered his on-duty officers together in the receiving area for an impromptu Christmas party, which his wife hastily arranged. The officers sat around drinking coffee and enjoying a variety of sandwiches and cakes brought in by several wives, who stayed for the party. No one thought about checking up on the inmates.

The cell area was not checked by the officers until they were ready to go off duty, six hours after the escape had occurred. It was not a "happy New Year" for Sgt. Saint. The sheriff fired him.

This case study illustrates that alert and imaginative supervision by jail officers could have prevented a mass escape. An alert officer probably would have been suspicious of the loud singing and noise in the cell block. A surprise investigation of the situation by jail personnel would have uncovered the plan and prevented the mass escape. In addition, this case study also points out that *officers should never relax on duty.* Sgt. Saint clearly violated proper jail procedures by hosting an on-duty Christmas party for his officers--the officers on duty were responsible for maintaining the security of the jail, not celebrating a holiday. Under no circumstances should wives or friends of officers be permitted inside secure areas of the jail.

But this case study also illustrates a security problem faced by officers who work in old, poorly constructed jail buildings. In many old jails, supervisory problems result because of poor architecture. Often it is impossible for a jail officer to check on a cell unit without having the turn of his key in the lock or the sound of his footsteps warn the inmates of his approach. Many suggestions have been made for improving this situation in specific jails. However, even some of the most ingenious ideas can have weak points, as the following examples illustrate:

- In one jail, an elaborate system of one-way observation windows was installed as a means of improving the ability of officers

to surprise inmates with irregular patrols. It was soon found, however, that when the lights in the cell block were turned down or off, the windows worked in the opposite way: the inmates could see the officer approaching, but the officer could not see the inmates.

- In another county, a grand jury ordered that officers be equipped with rubber-soled shoes so that they could detect illegal activities in the cell blocks by "sneaking up" on inmates. However, it was soon found that the rubber-soled shoes were even noisier than regular shoes because they squeaked loudly when the officers walked on the cleaned and waxed jail floors.

Although good personal supervision in a jail is often made extremely difficult by poor architecture or a shortage of on-duty officers, an officer who wants to be effective can make the most of the situation by:

- Using his imagination and being constantly alert for possible signs of disturbances; and
- Making frequent patrols at irregular times.

CLEANLINESS IS IMPORTANT



Jail personnel must set standards for cleanliness.

In order to properly supervise a jail, it is extremely important that jail personnel set standards for cleanliness and make certain, through frequent inspections and inmate guidance, that these standards are met.

Low standards of cleanliness in a jail point to staff indifference and neglect. Sometimes messy conditions can be dangerous as well as unsanitary; they encourage a breakdown in security and contribute to poor morale among inmates who must live under these conditions. Maintenance of high standards of cleanliness in the jail does much to raise inmate morale. In addition, when officers establish cleanliness standards, they provide useful work activities for inmates.

Case Study 5:

Because the Reindeer County Jail is old and dilapidated, officers do not bother to set cleanliness standards for the inmates. The cell areas are dirty and grimy. In addition, officers rarely bother to search inmates after visiting hours on Sundays.

A month ago the inmates used smuggled hacksaw blades to saw through the bars in preparation for an escape. During the day they mixed together a paste of soap, cigarette ashes, and paper to hide the cuts in the bars. The light in the cell area was poor because of filthy windows and too few lighting fixtures. The sawed-through bars went unnoticed by the officers. During their routine, careless inspections, the officers never noticed the hacksaw blades that had been hidden in the cell door channels. Five inmates escaped.

It is unlikely that this escape would have been made if the jail officers had been alert. Inmates frequently try to take advantage of officers' carelessness and lack of attention to details. If jail officers are sloppy and lax about upholding standards and fail to inspect regularly and thoroughly, then it is reasonable to assume that observant inmates will try to benefit from the situation.

Most inmates prefer clean surroundings. But if supervisors and officers are disinterested, then the inmates, too, will lose interest and will let their surroundings deteriorate. Frequent inspections, high standards of cleanliness, and a genuinely interested attitude on the part of jail personnel will do much to encourage high standards among the inmates.

Although cleaning regulations in many jails are often too general and vague, an officer who wants to be effective can maintain consistently high standards of cleanliness in the jail if he:

- Agrees upon standards of cleanliness with other officers and

develops a regular cleaning schedule for the jail;

- Inspects and supervises all cleaning operations to make sure that inmates understand what is expected of them; and
- Makes sure that his orders are clear and precise. If inmates seem confused or unsure of cleaning procedures, then the officer must assume that his explanation probably has not been clear enough. He should explain the procedure again, permitting inmates to ask questions.

SUMMARY

1. If a jail administrator expects to maintain a secure facility, then he must assure that inmates are rigidly and carefully supervised by officers at all times.

While electronic and mechanical surveillance devices contribute to the security of a jail, these devices should not be used in place of personal supervision of inmates by officers. An officer who patrols the cell areas can detect hidden dangers, such as broken locks, bars that have been tampered with, and contraband. In addition, only an officer in person can sense the mood of the inmate population--steps can then be taken to avert possible trouble. A TV monitor is not an adequate substitute for a patrolling officer. Under no circumstances should inmates be permitted to supervise the activities of other inmates. Where this occurs, it indicates that jail officers have abdicated control of the jail to the inmate population. If inmates are harmed as a result of this loss of control, then the officers and the jail administration are legally liable.

2. In order to maintain proper security in a jail, it is necessary for jail administrators to establish high standards of cleanliness.

Low standards of cleanliness in a jail point to staff indifference and neglect and dangerous situations can result. An officer can maintain high standards of cleanliness if he agrees upon standards with other officers and develops a regular cleaning schedule for the jail, inspects and supervises all cleaning operations to make sure that inmates know what is expected of them, and makes certain that his orders to inmates regarding cleaning procedures are clear and concise.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

SPECIAL SUPERVISION PROBLEMS IN THE JAIL

The responsibility for the "front line" management of the violent inmate falls upon the jail officer who works in the cell areas. For the safety of both staff and inmates, it is important that the officer know how to recognize quickly those inmates who are potentially dangerous. In addition, the officer constantly must be alert for signs which indicate that explosive or self-destructive behavior may occur.

Although guidelines are available to aid the officer in the detection and management of violence, there is no truly reliable test for predicting dangerousness. Therefore, it is suggested that any prediction be made from a three-dimensional frame of reference:

1. *Frequency*: How often in the past has the inmate been violent?
2. *Location*: Under what particular combinations of stress does violence occur?
3. *Destructiveness*: How dangerous to himself and others is the inmate?

A previous history of violent behavior is one of the best indicators that the inmate may once again become destructive. The more frequent the behavior has been in the past, the more likely its recurrence.

Very often violent and disruptive behavior occurs in a jail because inmates bring with them the values, goals, and behavioral patterns they learned in the community. Violence is also a product of the jail's social structure. There is no *one* single stimulus for violent episodes--rather, they result from a combination of physical, emotional, and environmental factors.

Inmates who become violent usually do so after undergoing an emotional trauma, such as anxiety, fear, anger, or rage. At times, the officer does not know that the inmate is suffering from one of these emotional problems until *after* he has become violent and has "acted out" his feelings. However, the officer can sometimes recognize certain specific alarm signals which generally precede violence. By being able to recognize these signals, the officer can intervene in the situation *before* it reaches a crisis level.

PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DEALING WITH A VIOLENT INMATE

Certain inmates require continuous supervision in a jail setting because of their potential for impulsive and violent behavior. These inmates include the acting-out psychotic; the inmate with a character disorder; the anti-social personality; the negative inmate; the chronic assaulter; and the malingering inmate.

The Acting-Out Psychotic

The psychotic individual most likely to be in jail is one who suffers from paranoia. An inmate who is paranoid distorts reality and sees his world in grossly inappropriate ways. He may see himself as being another person or, in many instances, may view other people as "enemies" preparing to hurt him.

For the officer who must supervise psychotic inmates, the first step is to properly identify them. Often this identification can be made during the classification process when the inmate is admitted to the jail. However, in many cases, the symptoms of paranoia are not immediately visible when the inmate is being booked and there is no previous history available to the officers. The first signs that the inmate may be a paranoid psychotic can appear *after* the inmate has been assigned to a cell. When an officer *first* notices that the inmate may be suffering from paranoia, he should tell the jail or county hospital physician about the behavioral patterns exhibited by the inmate and ask the physician to properly diagnose the problem. Once the inmate has been identified as a paranoid psychotic by the physician, the next step is to restrain him and isolate him from the general inmate population. This is necessary because paranoid psychotic inmates are disruptive and may assault both staff members and other inmates since they believe other people are "out to get them."

The officer should accept the inmate's distortion of thinking as "reality." Whatever the inmate believes *is* actually "reality" to him, no matter how far-fetched his belief is. For example, an inmate in a southwestern jail believes *all* officers in the jail are going to torture him if he doesn't confess to his crimes. The inmate was once a political prisoner in a South American jail and was made to confess to "imaginary" crimes against the state. The officers in the South American jail wore brown and tan uniforms, the same colors as are worn by the officers in the jail where he is now being held. Because he firmly believes he is back in the South American jail and is going to be tortured, this inmate feels a need to confess his "crimes" each time an officer approaches him. The officers have tried, but to no avail, to convince this inmate that he is in Texas and not in South America. Now the officers "play along" and let the inmate "confess," since this calms him down. This inmate is suffering from paranoia, most likely brought on by the brutal treatment he received in the South American jail.

When an officer argues with a paranoid individual, all this accomplishes is to increase the inmate's anger; it encourages him to "act up" even more. The officer should try to be non-authoritative and behave gently toward the inmate. However, he should also take physical precautions by disarming the inmate and taking away his feeding tray, light bulbs, utensils, belt, and other items that can be used as potential weapons. In all cases, *the officer must exercise extreme caution.*

The inmate should be kept in a place where he does not disturb other inmates. Psychotic inmates are often noisy and the noise they make can excite other inmates.

When dealing with a psychotic inmate, the officer must be constantly on guard for physical dangers, particularly when taking the inmate out of his cell for exercise or movement to another area. The officer should *always* have an additional back-up officer along because the management of psychotic inmates is *always potentially dangerous.* In addition, movement should take place when other inmates are in their cells so that the psychotic inmate will be less likely to act out.



The psychotic inmate may view the jail officer as an "enemy" trying to hurt him.

Case Study 1:

Inmate Billy George Washington, whose family members had served with distinction in the U.S. Army since the Revolutionary War, was declared 4-F in World War II and rejected for military service. Washington's father, an infantry colonel, told him he

had brought dishonor upon the family name, but none of the services would accept him because a high school football injury to his knee caused him to walk with a limp. Shortly after World War II ended, Washington moved to another part of the country and began telling his new friends about his "heroic escapades as a combat soldier in Europe during the war." All these stories were imaginary but Washington soon came to believe he was the "war hero" he described in his stories. He found that people showed him respect when he explained that he limped because he singlehandedly raided a German machine gun nest and was shot in the knee.

As he aged, Washington "promoted" himself through the ranks of the Army as he told his "battle" stories. When he was being admitted to the Big Sky County Jail for burglarizing a National Guard Armory, Washington told the booking officer his name was "General Dwight D. Eisenhower" and he was "preparing for the Normandy Beach invasion." He refused to answer any other questions, and stated that since he was a "general in the United States Army," he was required to give only his "name, rank, and serial number."

Despite signs during the booking process that Washington had mental problems and needed to be referred for a medical examination, he nevertheless was admitted to a cell block. Inmate Washington was convinced that he had been "captured by the Nazis to halt the D-Day invasion." By his third day in jail, he began to believe his cellmate was "Winston Churchill" and that "Churchill had betrayed him to his Nazi captors."

The officers working on the cell block decided Washington was "nutty as a fruitcake" but harmless. They ignored a request from his cellmate for a transfer to another cell. Washington decided that the only way he could lead the "scheduled D-Day invasion was to escape from the Nazi prison where he was being held." He began making his escape plans and described these plans to his cellmate, "Winston Churchill."

"Churchill" reported these plans to Officer Leroy Carter, who told "Churchill" to ignore Washington.

"The guy's a nut," Officer Carter said. "He talks a lot but, believe me, fruitcakes like him never do a damn thing. We'll move him to the muthouse eventually. Meanwhile, you'll just have to



"Name, rank, and serial number are.....!"

put up with him, because this jail house is crowded and we don't have any vacant cells for you."

The next day Officer Carter went alone to Washington's cell to escort him to court for a hearing. When he opened the cell door, Washington leaped out, grabbed Carter around the neck, and started to choke him. By the time inmate "Churchill" was able to pull the screaming Washington off Officer Carter, Carter was already turning blue from a lack of oxygen. When three other officers opened the security door because they heard the inmates yelling for help, Washington knocked two of them over and started running down a hallway. The third officer was able to subdue Washington and he was taken back to his cell.

Officer Carter learned the hard way that a paranoid psychotic inmate can be very dangerous. The officers should have isolated Carter immediately after booking him when he began telling them they were "Nazi soldiers" and he "would have to escape from their prison." Officers should not simply label a psychotic inmate as a "nut" and assume he is harmless for, as inmate Washington demonstrated, a paranoid psychotic inmate can inflict serious harm upon persons who appear "threatening" to him. In addition, these officers never should have assigned Washington to a cell with another inmate, since Washington could have assaulted or killed the inmate he called "Churchill," especially since he thought "Churchill" had betrayed him. If any harm had been inflicted upon inmate "Churchill," then the county, the jail administrator, and the officers involved in supervising Washington could have been held legally liable.

The Inmate With A Character Disorder

The inmate with a character disorder generally is uncooperative, hostile, and has a "chip on his shoulder." Such an individual usually attempts to get as much as he can by insolence, bluffing, and threats. He constantly breaks institutional rules out of defiance and seeks a reaction from the staff. There is *always* conflict between this type of inmate and officers because one of his primary methods of aggression is to defy authority figures.

In dealing with such an inmate, the officer should use common sense. He should not turn his back in the face of the inmate's bravado. There should be no attempt on the part of the officer to out-talk or out-tough the inmate--this might anger the inmate further. The officer who employs this type of approach eventually meets an inmate who will not be bluffed and a fight may ensue. When an officer gains the reputation of being a "tough guy," every would-be "tough" who enters the jail will make the officer prove himself all over again--a throw-back to the days of the Old West when gunslingers with a reputation

were constantly being challenged by newcomers who thought they were "quicker on the draw" and often were. An officer who views himself as Wyatt Earp eventually will meet an inmate who is tougher and the officer may end up with a cracked skull.

The officer should not challenge the angry feelings of inmates with character disorders, but instead should attempt to recognize their feelings. This does not condone disruptive behavior by the inmate--rather, it often tends to disarm the inmate's anger and prevent him from continuing to "act out."

The inmate with a character disorder is especially likely to act out aggressively in the presence of other inmates so that he can perpetuate his "macho" image or establish a reputation on the cell block as a "tough guy." The officer should isolate such an individual from other inmates in order to stop his unacceptable behavior. When there is no audience, these inmates are unlikely to "put on a show."

Case Study 2:

Inmate Joey Youngblood has had a hostile attitude toward society and people ever since he returned from military service in Vietnam. He keeps getting fired from jobs on construction sites because "something happens" to "set him off" and he assaults his foreman or a co-worker. Once again, he is in the Big Sky County Jail for starting a fight at Honky Tonk Heaven, which resulted in trips to the hospital for eight patrons of the dance-hall and two city police officers. One of the officers suffered several fractured ribs when Youngblood picked him up and threw him over the bar.

The officers at the jail call Youngblood "scum" and, among themselves, they talk about how somebody "would do the county a favor if he could take Youngblood out." Some of the officers hope Youngblood will "start something" in the jail "so we can teach that animal a lesson."

Rookie Officer Ramon Rodriguez, who has been developing a reputation among the inmates for his "toughness" and eagerness to "take anybody on" has been assigned to Youngblood's cell block. Youngblood quickly heard about the reputation Rodriguez had as a "tough officer" and decided that he would show the other inmates who was tougher.

Youngblood began to taunt Officer Rodriguez whenever other inmates were present, calling Rodriguez a "yellow wetback too chicken to fight like a man." This went on for several days. Then Youngblood began calling Rodriguez a "fairy" and a "girl" and asked him in front of other inmates if he wore "lace panties underneath his uniform." This was too much for Officer Rodriguez. He felt Young-

blood was threatening the "macho" image he had worked so carefully to build up in the jail.

When Youngblood again began harassing Officer Rodriguez in the recreation yard, Rodriguez was ready. With six other officers standing by, he told Youngblood to step forward and fight. Youngblood jumped at the challenge. Officer Rodriguez soon realized he had made a mistake. Youngblood not only was very strong, but he was also a trained fighter. Rodriguez screamed for the other officers to intervene but it was too late. Youngblood snapped the officer's wrist back and broke it while simultaneously smashing his face into a brick wall.

While Officer Rodriguez was in the hospital recovering from the surgery necessary to put his nose back together, his sergeant visited him. The sergeant told Rodriguez that the jail administrator was initiating disciplinary procedures against both Youngblood and Rodriguez and that Rodriguez would "probably get a few days off" after the hearings were over. Officer Rodriguez realized, too late, that he should have ignored Youngblood, since Youngblood had an obvious character disorder and needed to prove his masculinity in front of an inmate audience.

The Anti-Social Personality

The inmate with an anti-social personality acts out his anger very easily. He has violent outbursts of temper and frequently inflicts superficial cuts upon his arm for attention. When left in the presence of other inmates, he often provokes or leads mass disruptive behavior or riots, since he is skilled at manipulating others. He "learns the ropes" of jail life very quickly.

Inmates with an anti-social personality explode with anger when they are under pressure. It may appear to the officer that the inmate "explodes" for no reason at all and with no provocation. However, there are hidden stresses which cause this behavior and the officer should be aware that these stresses occur primarily at three specific periods. They are:

- The first 36-to-48 hours after the inmate is admitted to the jail;
- The first 24-to-48 hours after he has been convicted and sentenced; and
- The first two-to-five days after he has been transferred to the institution where he will serve his sentence.

An effective method of dealing with the anti-social personality is to assume an attitude of natural expectation--that is, to let the

inmate know that he *is* going to obey institutional rules and the staff takes it for granted that *he will do so*. This unspoken expectation tends to defuse the inmate's potential to exhibit explosive behavior.

However, this method does not always work. When the inmate breaks rules or becomes violent, then an appropriate response is necessary. A response by officers should be consistent and should involve enough personnel so that the use of force is not necessary. Surprisingly, a show of force will immediately calm down *most* anti-social inmates. A large number of officers available to deal with the inmate reassures the officer responsible for him and, at the same time, this "show of force" enables the inmate to save face among his peers--being confronted by three or four officers gives the inmate a good reason to back down, since other inmates know it would be "suicidal" to attack that many officers.

The alert officer may be able to spot the anti-social inmate's potentially explosive behavior. Clues include: increasing anxiety in an inmate who usually displays a complete lack of anxiety; restlessness during the daytime (such as pacing up and down or tearing up papers); and increased stress and irritability. In addition, insomnia, nightly restlessness, sitting in the fetal position and troubled sleep are indicators.

The officer is in *less* danger from an anti-social inmate if the inmate is approached slowly and with no sudden moves by the officer. If the inmate is in an acute state of anxiety, the officer should not attempt to control his physical activity *unless there is a strong possibility* that the behavior will result in serious injury to the inmate or others. The officer's approach should be easy-going, smooth, and soft-spoken. If possible, the officer who deals with such an inmate when he is in an anxiety state should be an officer who has already developed rapport with the inmate.

The anti-social offender can lead weak inmates into violence, then sit back innocently and watch the discomfort of the officers who are sent to end the disturbance. Such an inmate must be observed so that this manipulative behavior can be controlled.

An officer can often learn valuable intelligence information from the anti-social inmate--this inmate can serve as an indicator of what is "going down" in the jail, such as a riot, because he *usually* breaks under stress. He easily becomes upset and irritable and is likely to reveal any riot or escape plans *if he is approached correctly*. He must be allowed to save face and made to feel like a special hero. If the officers learn how to approach the anti-social inmate, he will often reveal essential information to them when he is confronted by stressful situations created by other inmates.

Case Study 3:

Professor Brenda Starr, Big Sky County program director for a liberal civil rights organization, has been sentenced to 90 days at the Big Sky County Jail for her role in leading an attack upon a restaurant which the civil rights group claimed was "racist" in its hiring policies. Professor Starr spends more time leading demonstrations against established institutions than she does teaching her philosophy classes at the State University in Thundercloud City. Local law enforcement officials are reaching the point where they can no longer tolerate the trouble she causes in the community; her fiery speeches inspire crowds of normally docile housewives and children to throw rocks at the police. The police are very pleased that the district court judge finally gave her a 90-day jail sentence instead of the probation she usually receives.

But the officers at the jail are not so pleased. They know Professor Starr has an anti-social personality and will probably cause trouble on the usually quiet women's cell block unless she is kept isolated from the other inmates. Since the women's cell block is not crowded, the sergeants responsible for supervising women inmates decided to assign Professor Starr to her own cell. There were three empty cells between Starr and the nearest inmates. In addition, the sergeants agreed to serve Professor Starr all meals in her cell instead of allowing her to go to the dining room with other inmates. They also agreed to escort Starr privately to the outdoor recreation area and the shower room. The jail administrator agreed that the only way to prevent Professor Starr from causing trouble in the jail would be to keep her in administrative segregation.

Professor Starr filed a grievance with the court in which she stated that she was being denied her "right to equal treatment" by being kept in a separate cell away from the other inmates. The judge disagreed with her, and said she was receiving equal treatment--she received the same meals and was permitted the same number of showers and recreation periods as other inmates.

During the 90 days that Professor Starr was an inmate, she was unable to create any incidents in the jail. In this case the jail sergeants acted wisely by immediately identifying a new inmate with a known anti-social personality and keeping her away from other inmates.

The Negative Inmate

A negative inmate says "no" to every request or order. He constantly threatens to sue the officer or jail administrator and he tends to create anxiety in the officer since no one likes to be sued. The

negative inmate also encourages other inmates to refuse to obey orders. Such an inmate must be brought under control immediately.

When approaching this inmate, the officer must appear casual and suggest to the inmate that he can file a grievance if he feels he is "right" and the officer is "wrong." The courts are fair and will not unjustly award damages to an inmate when he sues a jail officer. The officer's best defense is to keep accurate notes about all encounters with a negative inmate.

An officer should not allow himself to be intimidated by an inmate with a negative personality. When such an inmate acts negatively (for example, refusing to leave his cell to eat), the officer should casually point out that the inmate himself is the loser and that if he does not want to eat, he does not have to. If the inmate is disobeying a direct order because he is negative, then the officer has little choice in what action he can take. After properly warning the inmate, he must follow the usual jail procedures for handling such disciplinary cases. A show of force (as opposed to an unwarranted use of force) also helps.

Case Study 4:

Inmate Larry Hartman has been in several jails throughout the state for petty theft. He earns his living as a shoplifter and by collecting insurance settlements for false claims. Hartman has a known "negative" personality and jail officers in several counties call him "Lawsuit Larry" because he is always threatening to sue officers for various reasons. Sometimes he does file suits and he has won some judgments against officers because officers could not produce evidence that they acted properly.

Hartman has just been admitted to the Rattlesnake County Jail. Thinking that he should not waste his time while in jail, Hartman decided to test a new "scam" which he had not used before. When he was given a physical examination during the admissions process, Hartman weighed 200 pounds. He decided to lose 50 pounds by not eating his meals so that he could accuse the officers of "deliberately starving" him.

The meals in the jail were served in the cells. Hartman began flushing most of his food down the toilet on the first day he was admitted. But, unknown to Hartman, his cellmate was a "snitch" who had been asked by the supervising sergeant to give a daily report on Hartman's activities in the cell. When the "snitch" reported that Hartman was flushing most of his food down the toilet, the officers figured out his "starvation scam" and knew that a lawsuit was going to be filed against them eventually.

The officers on duty kept accurate records of all food delivered to Hartman's cell, and even photographed (from a distance)

the loaded tray being served to Hartman. Each day they interviewed, on tape, the inmate "snitch" who reported exactly which food items Hartman had flushed down the toilet. After one month Hartman had lost 20 pounds. The sergeant told him he "didn't look well" and sent him to the jail physician for an examination. Hartman told the physician he was "exercising strenuously" and that was probably why he had lost weight. Notes were kept of this interview. Hartman continued to flush much of his food down the toilet and soon lost another 20 pounds. But he was beginning to show signs of malnutrition and was admitted to the County Hospital, where he was fed nutritional supplements.

While in the hospital, Hartman called his attorney and told him to file a suit charging jail personnel with "deliberately starving" him. After the suit was filed, the County Attorney asked Hartman's attorney to meet with him. When he reviewed the evidence which the jail officers had assembled to disprove Hartman's "starvation" charges, the inmate's attorney persuaded him to withdraw the lawsuit.

During the remaining nine months of his sentence at the Rattlesnake County Jail, Hartman was a docile, well-behaved inmate. Nevertheless, the officers continued to keep detailed notes of all encounters with him--just in case he tried another "legal scam."

The Chronic Assaulter

This inmate frequently gets into fights. He might fight because he is angry or because he has accepted a paid "contract" to assault another individual. He also may fight because of negative racial or ethnic feelings or because he wants to prove his "toughness" to himself or others. At times, such an individual strikes out at both officers and other inmates for no visible reason.

The appropriate way for an officer to handle such individuals is to avoid taking sides between two inmates who are fighting. When a fight occurs, officers should apply the usual disciplinary procedures. This should include a show of force to subdue two fighting inmates. If many officers are present, then the inmates are more likely to stop fighting.

An officer should not arbitrate fights between inmates, but if such arbitration is necessary to prevent further fighting, the officer should ask his supervisor to serve as the arbitrator. This procedure should be followed because the inmate who "loses" in the arbitration procedure may feel that there was "favoritism" shown toward the "winning" inmate. It is far better for a "losing" inmate to be angry with an officer's supervisor than with the officer himself, since it is the officer who has to work on the cell block in close contact with the

hostile inmate and his friends. *The officer should never take sides with one inmate against another inmate.*

All fighting incidents should be reported to the officer's supervisor immediately. The officer should not break up a fight alone; he could be injured. Rather, as soon as a fight begins, he should call the control center for assistance and wait for several officers to arrive before breaking up the fight, unless an inmate's life is in immediate danger (for example, if one inmate is choking another inmate, the officer should intervene at once since death from strangulation can occur quickly).

After a fight has occurred, the next shift of officers should be told about it, who was involved, and the reasons why the fight took place, if this information is known. The incident should also be described in the jail's logbook, and the officer should record the facts about the fight and the actions he took in his personal notebook. One of the inmates who was involved in the fight should be transferred immediately to another cell or area of the jail to prevent another altercation.

The Malingering Inmate

The malingerer is an individual who acts as if he is mentally ill or who fakes suicide attempts because he feels he will profit by such behavior. He may feel he will be transferred to a hospital where it will be easier to escape. He may be seeking sympathy, be trying to avoid work, or have a desire to avoid being near other inmates.

An officer should exercise caution when an inmate malingerer is offered medication. He must be supervised carefully and the officer should watch him take the medication; otherwise, the inmate might hide pills for a future fake suicide attempt.

The malingerer should be encouraged by the officer to work and assume his role in various programs offered by the jail. He must be considered a difficult inmate and his behavior should be assessed carefully, since he can be self-destructive. Care must be taken to make sure that the malingerer does not take advantage of weaker inmates and lead them into riots or fighting situations.

There is a fine line between malingerers and inmates who are truly ill. For this reason, malingerers should be referred to the jail physician or county hospital for an examination each time they complain of illness. Officers should not take chances with an inmate's health, since even a chronic malingerer can become seriously ill.

MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES

All of the inmates described in the previous pages would be classified, along with known escape risks, as "inmates in need of maximum security." They have demonstrated by their conduct that they are a danger to themselves or others. They all have one common denominator-- they require extra supervision.

However, the fact that an inmate requires extra supervision cannot be used as an excuse to deny him his constitutionally mandated rights. The effects of custody classifications on housing or program assignments should be published in the jail's inmate rulebook so that inmates understand why special classifications are necessary. Jail officers must, for security and safety purposes, restrict the movements of an inmate who is suspected of being an escape risk or behavioral problem.

While the inmate may object to a maximum security classification, this classification would not be a proper subject for litigation purposes by the inmate if the classification process is fair and standardized procedures are established to determine when inmates are to be classified as maximum security risks. These procedures should include provisions for reclassification hearings when warranted. If additional information becomes available regarding the inmate's character, then reclassification from maximum security back into the general population *might* be appropriate.

The jail's written policy guidelines should specify that all inmates who are initially classified as in need of maximum supervision will have their status reviewed at least once each week for the first two months and once a month thereafter. The process for review of a custody classification or appeal of a classification by an inmate should be the same as for a disciplinary hearing.

Isolating Maximum Security Inmates

Most jails have cells that are designated as the "isolation" or "maximum security" section. These cells are used to separate certain inmates from other inmates in order to:

1. Prevent dangerous inmates from injuring themselves or others;
2. Prevent other inmates from injuring the inmate who is being isolated;
3. Prevent other inmates from harming inmates who are being held in protective custody;
4. Prevent homosexual activity in the jail;
5. Prevent the spread of communicable disease or parasites;

6. Secure dangerous or escape-minded inmates;
7. Punish inmates who require severe sanctions; and
8. Segregate inmates who are suspected of having impending medical or psychological problems.

When an inmate is confined to an isolation cell, a detailed report should be made of the circumstances that led to the isolation. In addition, a jail log should be maintained by officers who are in charge of the isolation section; they should record the date and time the inmate was transferred to isolation and the circumstances which necessitated the transfer.

Inmates who are confined to isolation cells should be issued only linens, a jail uniform, and a mattress. No matches, lighters, or smoking should be permitted in this section. However, when smoking is allowed, care should be taken to assure that refuse cans outside the cells are not placed close enough for the inmates to throw lighted matches or cigarettes into them. Mentally-ill inmates in the isolation section should not be permitted to smoke under any circumstances--they are too unpredictable and may set themselves on fire.

Two jail officers should escort an inmate who is being transferred to an isolation cell. This procedure helps to prevent an inmate from falsely claiming that he was "brutalized" or that the officers used excessive force while transferring him. It also helps protect the jail officers.

The inmate should be strip-searched prior to being placed in his isolation cell. A complete search should also be made of the cell. Belts and shoe laces or any item of clothing that the inmate could use to injure himself or others should be taken away from him.

Reading and writing material can be permitted, but this depends upon the demeanor of the individual inmate. If an inmate is violent or suicidal, he should be denied any or all of his linen and, if necessary, he should be handcuffed and manacled. However, care must be taken to prevent any injuries from the use of this restraining equipment.

An aggressive inmate may demonstrate his resentment at being confined in isolation by using a shoe to bang on any metal walls or fixtures the cell may have. When this happens, the inmate should be given canvas or cardboard slippers.

If a violent or highly-intoxicated prisoner is brought to the jail who requires *immediate* isolation, the booking officer should pat-search the prisoner while he is still handcuffed. The new inmate's shoes, belt, and socks should be removed. If it is practical for the officers to remove the inmate's handcuffs without endangering themselves, they should do so and then remove the rest of the inmate's clothes so that

he can be searched thoroughly. The inmate should then be given jail clothing and placed in a holding cell where he can be watched. It may be necessary for the officers to dress the inmate who is intoxicated.

Light fixtures should be of the recessed type and securely attached to the wall or ceiling with a protective cover. Inmates who are confined to isolation cells will sometimes stuff the plumbing fixtures with clothing or linens to get attention. When an inmate does this, the officers can prevent it from happening again by restricting the flow of water to that particular cell. Water can be turned on when necessary to deposit body wastes.

Isolation cells should be searched at odd and unusual times for contraband and inspected frequently for conditions which are not normal. Jail post orders should provide for both regular and irregular shake-downs by officers who are assigned to patrol the isolation unit.

At least *two* jail officers should supervise food service to maximum security inmates, who should always have their meals served in their individual cells, even if the jail has an inmate dining room. The food and utensils should be examined before each inmate is served. Paper plates and cups and plastic utensils should be used. All utensils should be collected and counted after each meal; this prevents the inmate from using paper plates to stuff the plumbing fixtures or from hiding a plastic knife or spoon, which he could use to stab himself or an officer.

Maximum security inmates should be required to keep their living quarters clean and orderly. In addition, they should be allowed to maintain an acceptable standard of personal hygiene. When each maximum security inmate is let out of his cell to shower and shave, two jail officers should accompany him.

How often inmates in isolation cells are monitored will be determined by each individual case and by the supervisor of the maximum security area. But a check should be made *at least* once each half hour and, ideally, at least once every 15 minutes. Each time a check is made, the date, time, and condition of the inmates should be recorded in the jail log. When an inmate is removed from isolation, a report should be filed.

Jail officers should report to their supervisor any unusual activity or change in attitude on the part of an inmate who is confined to an isolation cell so that officers can watch the inmate more closely and prevent any self-destructive behavior which the inmate may be contemplating.

Case Study 5:

Inmate Dick Nixon behaved well during his first six months in the Big Sky County Jail, where he was serving an 18-month sentence for burglarizing an office building. However, when he received word that his burglary partner (who had not been apprehended) had moved into his house and was living with his wife, Nixon became withdrawn, started acting strangely, and began asking officers to protect him against imaginary threats from other inmates.

After this behavior had been occurring for a month, Nixon approached Officer Lucas Skywalker and asked him for a syringe and battery acid so that he could commit suicide. Nixon said he was depressed. Officer Skywalker immediately discussed this incident with Sergeant Buck Rogers, and they decided to move Nixon to an isolation cell in the maximum security section. Officer Skywalker prepared a written report about the incident and the transfer.

Two days after his transfer to an isolation cell, Nixon blocked his cell door with his mattress, wrapped his T-shirt around his head, doused it in lighter fluid from the lighter he was allowed to keep with his pipe-smoking equipment, and set himself on fire. By the time officers could rescue him, Nixon had been severely burned on his head and face and eventually lost the sight in his left eye.

Six months later, after he had recovered from the burns and hospitalization for mental illness, Nixon filed suit against Big Sky County, alleging that officers knew he was mentally ill and failed to follow proper procedures to prevent him from committing suicide. Nixon claimed in his lawsuit that jail regulations prohibited smoking materials, matches, and lighters in isolation cells and that the officers were negligent by allowing him to have a pipe lighter, which he used in his suicide attempt.

In defending the actions of the officers, the county attorney argued that the officers had exercised due care and that Nixon was guilty of contributory negligence in his suicide attempt.

However, the District Court judge found in favor of inmate Nixon. He said that Nixon showed obvious signs of mental illness and that the officers realized this by placing him in an isolation cell. The judge then explained that a mentally-ill person cannot properly distinguish between right and wrong. The officers violated the jail procedural manual by allowing Nixon to have smoking materials, the judge argued, and therefore the officers were responsible for the suicide attempt since they provided the inmate with the tools to attempt suicide.

What did the officers at the Big Sky County Jail learn from this incident and subsequent court case? It became clear to them that when inmates are placed in isolation cells because they are a danger to themselves or others, the officers cannot be "kind" to the inmates by granting them special privileges. The rule banning smoking materials in the maximum security section must have existed for good reason, the officers learned--too late. They also learned that mentally-ill inmates need to be watched constantly. Checking on them only once each hour allows too much time for the inmates to get into trouble.

SPECIAL OFFENDERS

A "special offender" is an inmate who needs protection from other inmates or persons who might attempt to enter the jail to harm him. Fortunately, there are not many inmates who require this special treatment. The special offender presents problems of a unique nature. These individuals are criminals who have agreed to testify for the government and they have been selected for execution by the criminals they will testify against, either to prevent their testimony or to teach other "songbirds" a lesson. These inmates are critical witnesses in the cases being presented by the government; therefore, they must be closely watched 24 hours a day.

Special offenders often are registered under an assumed name. The jail officer should not attempt to learn the inmate's real identity or background. If a jail officer should learn who a special offender is, and lets the information "slip out" to someone else (such as his wife, a fellow officer, or a neighbor), he may read about the offender in the newspaper the next day. The officer then may find himself facing charges for jeopardizing the jail's security program, even if he did not give the information to the newspaper himself. All officers assigned to guard special offenders must be extremely security conscious, which means they must resist all temptations to tell anyone about the person they are protecting--no matter how notorious the special offender may be. Many newspapers and television stations pay citizens for news tips, so the officer involved in a security assignment should trust no one with information about the identity of the special offender.

At no time should such a person be permitted to have contact with the general inmate population. As a rule, all inmates, including "trusties," should be returned to their cells and the doors locked before a special offender is allowed to shower or attend to any personal needs. All meals for special offenders should be served separately from the meals prepared for the general population. The meals should be served by a jail officer, not by a "trusty." The officers assigned to supervise special offenders should be screened carefully and personally approved by the law enforcement agency or prosecutor's office responsible for the offender (usually the U. S. Marshal's Service,

since the majority of special offenders testify against organized crime figures in Federal cases). Utmost care should be taken by the jail officers when allowing the special offender to meet with visitors or receive correspondence. The whereabouts of these inmates should be known *only* to those officers or administrators whose duties require it.

Each time a jail houses an offender of this type, the situation is unique. The circumstances will vary depending upon the nature of the court trials or grand jury hearings which require personal appearances by the protected inmate. If several weeks are required for the legal process, it may be advisable to consider transferring the inmate to a jail in another jurisdiction or using a "safe house" operated by a law enforcement agency, if one is available.

The primary rule when supervising special offenders is: *do not assume anything*. The jail officer should be thorough in planning all movements for the inmate. The jail administrator must make certain that each employee who is assigned to supervise or guard the special offender is properly trained. *Remember*: an inmate is an inmate is an inmate, and should be handled as such, no matter how "famous" the inmate may be.

WOMEN INMATES

The problem of female offenders in jails has reached critical proportions because there are more women being admitted to jails. Facilities often are inadequate. The neglect that has characterized female correctional facilities in this century becomes more alarming and visible as the role of women in society rapidly changes. The criminal justice system can no longer ignore institutional programs for women. Although women are becoming more involved in violent crimes, most women inmates still are confined for such crimes as larceny, embezzlement, forgery, fraud, prostitution, and drug violations.

The majority of women inmates in the United States are housed in male-oriented jails. These jails have rehabilitation programs designed primarily for men. The courts have been attempting to remedy this problem in recent years by making certain that each jail has separate, but equal, facilities for the women inmates. Many jurisdictions are learning that it is a violation of the rights of the individual inmate, both male and female, to be deprived of opportunities for training, education, or any other program merely because of sex.

A consistent complaint of women's groups over the past few years has been that women in institutions usually are assigned to tasks that traditionally are defined as "women's work." They cook, sew, do the cleaning, and perform other general maintenance tasks. These jobs should be shared by both men and women inmates. If adequate supervision is available, women should be permitted to participate in the same

rehabilitation and work programs as the men. Women should have the same access to jail programs as the male inmates and should not be restricted merely because of their sex or small numbers. They should have access to the jail's legal library, church groups, and other activities, such as Alcoholics Anonymous.

The women should be housed in a separate section of the jail but their quarters should be equivalent to those provided to male inmates, if possible. They should not be housed in areas where they would be subjected to unwarranted attention by either male staff members or male inmates.

Of special consideration to some women inmates will be a need to hold and comfort their children on visiting days. Some women will seek access to governmental or social welfare officials who are involved in the care and support of their children. These community ties should be encouraged.

Special Supervisory Problems

Because there are many unique problems which can occur in a cell area housing women inmates, every jail administrator should make an effort to hire women officers; in some states, jails are required by statute to hire female officers to supervise women offenders. In addition, the administrator should establish written policies which provide guidelines for male officers to enter the women's unit. A similar policy is necessary governing the circumstances in which women officers can enter cell areas housing males.

Unless it is absolutely necessary, a male officer should never enter a female inmate's cell unless he is accompanied by a witness--preferably a female officer. Exceptions are fights which must be stopped immediately and medical emergencies.

A male officer who enters a female inmate's cell alone for any reason other than an emergency could be walking into a trap or "set up." Women inmates use a variety of methods to gain control over male officers for obvious and not-so-obvious reasons. An obvious reason is the desire of *some* women inmates for sexual relations while they are incarcerated. Other women inmates will use sexual activities or promises of sex to induce a male officer to do favors for their boyfriends or husbands, who are also inmates. These favors may involve taking notes back and forth between the men's and women's cell blocks or something as extreme as arranging for the two inmates to meet privately during the midnight shift.

Every male officer who is assigned to work on a women's cell block is going to be tested by the inmates. *It doesn't make any difference whether the officer is a rookie or has been employed in the jail for 30 years.* Nor does it make any difference whether the officer is 22 years old or 62.

Some women inmates will attempt to gain psychological control over male officers. No matter what women's liberationists say, it is a fact of life that *some* women have a strong psychological need to exercise control over the men around them. Thus, a male officer who is assigned to a women's cell block becomes a challenge for these domineering inmates. The inmates will try everything possible to make the male officer submissive to the point where he carries out their demands or allows them to get away with infractions of the jail rules.

A male officer should be aware of an attempted "set up" by a female inmate whenever the inmate seeks special attention from him. For example, at 3 a.m. inmate Carla Black called out from her cell: "Officer Brown, it's cold in here...I don't feel good...would you come here a minute?" Officer John Brown, if he goes to inmate Black's cell alone, is asking for trouble. All he has to do is *touch* inmate Black and she could gain control over him, if this is her objective. If Officer Brown enters Black's cell, he may not consciously try to touch her, but "accidents" happen. It is very easy for inmate Black to stumble into Officer Brown--he may then grab her to prevent her from falling, a gentlemanly gesture. To the female inmate and other inmates who may be watching, Officer Brown has now "fondled" inmate Black. An innocent touch such as this could be exaggerated by the inmates out of proportion to what actually occurred. The male officer can be brought up on disciplinary charges and find his entire career ruined.

To protect himself, the male officer should never enter a woman inmate's cell alone, with the exception of true emergencies. He should summon another officer, preferably a female officer or, if there are no female officers on duty, a supervisor. If a woman inmate makes suggestive remarks to a male officer or engages in suggestive behavior in his presence, *the officer should document what happened in his personal logbook*. He should record the names of other officers who may have witnessed the act. In addition, he should forewarn officers on the next shift about the inmate's behavior.

Case Study 6:

One of the two female officers at the Rattlesnake County Jail resigned and the sheriff had to assign male officers to patrol the women's cell area at nights and on weekends. For a three-week period, there were only two women inmates housed in the jail. They were sisters who belonged to a motorcycle club whose members had been arrested for manufacturing and selling the hallucinatory drug, PCP. Both women were in their early twenties and were attractive once their hair had been washed. They wanted some special favors, such as a radio, fried chicken from a carryout restaurant, and a chance to talk to their boyfriends on the jail's internal telephone system. The two women were also accustomed to engaging in group sexual activities with members of the motorcycle gang each night and felt that the lack of sexual opportunities in the jail was very oppressive.

They decided that it would not take much effort on their part to seduce Officers Ron Smith and Carl King. Officer Smith had been married for 19 years and was fighting with his wife constantly. Officer King was also having difficulties at home. He felt unsure of himself and was undecided about his career plans, but his wife was always too busy with the children to talk with him.

Officers Smith and King were assigned to the midnight shift, when the jail was very quiet. Several jail officers caught up on their sleep while they worked the midnight shift. But the two women inmates kept Officers Smith and King awake. They began to confide in the officers about their "difficult life" with the motorcycle gang and soon they began asking Officers Smith and King for advice on "how they could straighten out their lives." These nightly talks made the officers feel important because, in contrast to the treatment they received at home, the officers felt these women inmates needed them. The inmates were asking the officers for advice and counseling, something their wives never did.

By the third night, Officer Smith began to tell the women about his own problems and how he resented his "nagging" wife and undisciplined teenage children. The two young women offered sympathy to the officers and began giving them advice on how to control their wives. On the fifth night, the women had sexual relations with the officers. The officers brought the women a transistor radio and shared several buckets of fried chicken with them. They also allowed the women to send notes to their boyfriends, which the officers delivered to the men's cell block.

The two officers contracted venereal disease from the women inmates and passed it on to their wives. Officer Smith's wife was so angry that she reported her husband to the sheriff and then forced him to move out of the house. She filed for divorce.

When the members of the motorcycle gang were brought to trial, their attorney described in open court how "two jail officers had raped the two women gang members." This news made page one of the Rattlesnake County Gazette and soon several prominent citizens demanded an official investigation of the jail by a grand jury. After a disciplinary hearing, Officers Smith and King were fired.

This case study illustrates how male jail officers can easily become intimidated and manipulated by female inmates when they work alone in a women's cell block. Officers Smith and King failed to realize that the women inmates were using them to obtain special privileges. The women, who had no loyalty to the officers and laughed about how "easy" it had been to gain control of the officers, told their attorneys they had been sexually assaulted with the hope that this news would upset the trial jury and perhaps allow the gang members to escape a guilty verdict.

Male officers should not let their egos get in the way of effective supervision. The officer should never allow himself to believe that a woman inmate is interested in him as a person. Most likely, the woman will use a reciprocation of interest for her own benefit--to obtain special privileges.

Similar problems occur when a jail administrator permits male "trusties" to work in the women's housing unit. Some of the women will attempt to bribe the "trusties" for special favors. Typical bribes include allowing the "trusties" to touch them; promising the "trusties" that sexual relations will occur when they are released from jail; or convincing "trusties" that actual romances do exist (people in confinement fall in love easily and have a tendency to involve themselves deeply in the idea of "being in love," since they have so much time to think).

Male "trusties" should not be permitted to perform cleaning or repair tasks in the women's housing area unless they are accompanied by an officer at all times. Similarly, male "trusties" should not serve food trays to women inmates in the cell areas--the inmates often use the food tray to pass notes to male inmates, with the food service "trusties" serving as couriers. Notes hidden in leftover food or underneath a plate are retrieved by the "trusties" in the kitchen. These "trusties" who serve as couriers receive favors from either the women inmates or their inmate boyfriends or husbands.

The male jail officer who supervises women inmates must be aware of the special supervisory problems which can occur. *The officer must exercise caution and sound judgment at all times.*

SUMMARY

1. Officers who supervise inmates must be constantly alert for signs of potential violent behavior.

The responsibility for the "front line" management of the violent inmate falls upon the jail officer who works in the cell areas. For the safety of both staff and inmates, it is important that the officer know how to recognize quickly those inmates who are potentially dangerous. Some inmates who require constant supervision and, in some cases, isolation because they may suddenly become violent include: the acting-out psychotic, the inmate with a character disorder, the anti-social personality, the negative inmate, the chronic assaulter, and the malingering inmate. There is no truly reliable test for predicting dangerousness. Thus, officers should make their predictions about specific inmates based on a three-dimensional frame of reference, which includes the factors of frequency, location, and destructiveness.

2. Some inmates present special supervision problems; officers need to identify these inmates and determine whether they need to be isolated both for their own protection and for the safety of others.

Jails may be required to house "special offenders" who need protection from other inmates or persons who may try to enter the jail to harm them. In addition, some inmates, because of their past behavior, may need to be housed in maximum security cells. Women inmates can also present supervision problems, particularly if male officers are assigned to supervise them. Officers must exercise caution and sound judgment when working with inmates who present special supervision problems.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

SUPERVISION OF INMATES IN DINING AREAS

For the confined person, food takes on an almost unnatural importance. Inmate reaction to poorly prepared food, boring menus, or unfair distribution of food can result in serious problems and disturbances.

Most jails employ a system of dayroom dining or food service to individual cells. However, some large jails have dining rooms. Where dining rooms exist, certain supervisory techniques must be employed to avoid mass misbehavior and chaos.


CENTRAL DINING ROOMS

Jail disturbances most frequently start in dining rooms. There are many theories as to why this is the case. One is that mealtime brings many inmates together--they see each other only at meals. Together, they feel powerful since so few officers are present. Another theory is that emotions, both positive and negative, tend to be loosened when food is taken in. Finally, it is believed that institutional dining is frustrating since people do not get to eat what they want--they must stand in line, the pace is fast, and the noise level is high.

Because disturbances can easily occur during mealtimes, every jail should have clearly stated rules for conduct in the dining room. Inmates should be fully aware of the behavior that is expected of them. They should not be surprised when an officer takes disciplinary action against them for violating a rule.

Rules for the dining room are usually uncomplicated and generally deal with three main areas:

- Maintenance of order in the serving line and during the meal;
- Fair distribution of food by inmate servers; and
- Control of utensils to avoid their removal from the dining room.



The personal hygiene of kitchen workers is important.

Officers who work in a jail with a central dining room should report to their assigned posts early. The menu should be checked as well as the quality of the food. An officer should determine the quantity of each food item an inmate is to receive. He should also examine the inmate server to ensure that he is clean (hands and face), does not have body odor, and wears a hair covering. The inmate server should be told the quantity of each food item to be served and where he should place it on the plate or tray.

General supervision of the dining room can be accomplished by stationing officers at key locations throughout the area or, if there is a shortage of officers available for mealtime duty, by assigning officers to circulate around the dining room, paying close attention to critical areas.

The Serving Line

One of the most critical areas of the dining room is the serving line. Here an officer must be alert to several types of misbehavior by inmates. Some inmates skip ahead of others in the line in order to be served first or because they want to catch up with friends. Often inmates jokingly push and shove each other while in the line and interfere with the normal progression of the line.

Both of these activities can easily cause fights and arguments to begin among inmates. The rules of the dining room should state specifically that skipping ahead or horseplay in line are infractions and will bring a warning by the jail officer in attendance.

In most jails, the actual serving of food is done by inmates. This practice can give rise to violent disagreements and tension if it is not properly supervised. Inmates serving food can be intimidated by stronger inmates who desire extra servings of meat or dessert. Any special favors are quickly discovered by other inmates, who understandably expect and angrily demand equal treatment.



In most jails inmates assist in the preparation and the serving of food.

Inmates who work in serving lines are especially subject to the temptation of trying to please a friend. All too often, an inmate server will try to give extra helpings or the most desirable cut of meat to



Some inmates serving food can be intimidated by stronger inmates who desire extra servings of meat or dessert.

special friends. Again, this situation can easily give rise to demands for extra food by other inmates and possibly result in fights.

Fights and tense situations arising from favoritism on the part of inmate servers will seldom occur if a jail officer is stationed behind the serving line and pays careful attention to serving activities. If arguments do arise, an effective jail officer can quickly settle them by using reason and firmness. A jail officer who wants to be effective will make sure that he knows what kinds of problems can arise in the serving line as a result of "special favors" and he will be on the lookout for any signs that this practice exists.

When a jail officer observes strong-arming or favoritism in the serving line, it is important to intervene as soon as the incident occurs. However, the officer should not reprimand the inmate server in front of the other inmates in order to avoid creating additional tension.

Case Study 1:

Officer Carl Brown was stationed behind the serving line during the dinner hour at the Big Sky County Jail. An inmate server, Elliot Ness, was dishing out beef stew to the inmates in line. One of the inmates, Al Capone, started complaining that Ness was giving him all gravy and no meat. Immediately, Officer Brown stepped over to the line and examined Capone's meat serving.

"You're right, Mr. Capone," Officer Brown said. "You do have a lot of gravy there. I'm sure Mr. Ness didn't mean to shortchange you."

Officer Brown then asked Ness to dish out a portion with meat to Capone. As the rest of the inmates filed through the serving line, Officer Brown kept a careful watch on Ness to make sure he was serving all inmates equally. When the inmates had left the dining hall, Officer Brown took Ness aside and suggested firmly that he be more careful in the future about serving the meat equally and fairly.

Wasting Food

Since most jails operate on a tight budget, it is important that food not be wasted. To prevent the wasting of food, many jail administrators strictly enforce a regulation which requires inmates to eat all the food they take. Often, though, inmates are unfairly punished for occasionally miscalculating their appetites and leaving food on their trays.

A good supervisor should be able to determine which inmates are chronic--or regular--food wasters. In most cases, an inmate who wastes food regularly does so intentionally to attract attention or create a disturbance.

Case Study 2:

In the Big Sky County Jail all inmates are made aware of the rule that they will face disciplinary action if they purposely waste food. One Monday, inmate Ferris Weel returned his tray, having left untouched his potatoes and a slice of bread and butter. Officer Bart Reynolds mentioned the wasted food to inmate Weel, and for the next three days, checked to see if Weel was still leaving food on his plate. Reynolds made a note in his logbook that Weel was consistently wasting food and, on Friday, he drew Weel aside as he returned his food and told him to report to the sergeant for an interview.

After talking to inmate Weel, Sgt. Edith Bunker learned that he was upset because his wife told him on Sunday that she was filing for a divorce so that she could marry his brother. Weel took as much food as he usually ate but, because he was depressed, he found that he could not eat everything on his tray. Sgt. Bunker made an appointment for Weel to speak with the jail chaplain about his family problems. In this case, Officer Reynolds and Sgt. Bunker were able to determine why the food was being wasted and provide help to an inmate who had personal problems.

This case study illustrates how a jail officer can act wisely in a situation when he does not know why an inmate is behaving poorly. Officer Reynolds waited for several days to make sure that inmate Weel was a chronic food waster and not simply a person whose appetite was poor for one meal. Then, instead of ordering Weel to "clean his plate" like a child, Officer Reynolds told him to report to Sgt. Bunker for a talk and possible disciplinary action. In this situation, Sgt. Bunker found that a disciplinary action was not warranted.

Supervisory Techniques

There are many right ways and wrong ways to supervise a jail dining room. The officer on duty in a dining room must continually be alert without appearing jumpy. He should enforce all the rules fairly and consistently in a low-key way.

The officer will receive many complaints about the quality of the food. He should sincerely consider them but should not automatically believe them. If the officer over-reacts to inmate complaints and files reports each time he receives a complaint, he could negatively affect the morale of those responsible for food preparation. However, if the food is of poor quality, the officer should report this to his supervisor, since poor food can affect security.

If a fight erupts, the officer should respond immediately to stop it. Those inmates who are fighting must be removed from the area quickly. However, the officer should be careful not to be overzealous when he is subduing inmates, since overzealousness could be interpreted by the other inmates as brutality.

Inmates should be given sufficient time to complete their meals, but not an excessive amount of time. Officers should remember that the inmates are eating and some people eat more slowly than others. In addition, the meal periods may be the most relaxing times of the day for inmates. Officers should show them basic respect.

Officers should watch to make sure that food is not passed indiscriminately from one table to the next. This could be a case of "strong-arm" tactics on the part of some inmates who pressure other inmates into giving them food as a payment for protection or gambling debts.

In jails with dining rooms, supervising officers can inspect for wasted food at the same time that they watch inmates return utensils. As a security precaution, the officers should be especially alert at this time so that they will notice any inmates who do not return the correct number of utensils and attempt to smuggle them out of the dining area.



Officer must count all utensils.

performs his duties professionally and is alert to potential trouble, then inmate mealtime will be an orderly and relatively safe operation.

DINING IN CELLS OR A DAYROOM

Most jails in the United States serve meals in cells or in dayrooms, using a food cart and one or two inmate "trusties" as servers. Many problems arise in this situation, including the stealing of utensils, complaints about cold food, unfair apportionment of food to friends of a "trusty," and the bullying of weaker inmates by strong inmates who want more food.

Good supervision can eliminate these problems or at least keep them to a minimum. Whenever a jail uses food cart service, an officer must accompany each food cart. For example, in one jail, there are constant complaints about cold and clammy food from the inmates in the cells farthest from the kitchen. The "trusty" manning the food cart uses the mealtime to visit with his friends and find out the most recent gossip.



An officer must supervise a trusty serving food.

Naturally, by the time he gets to the last cell, the food is usually unpleasantly cold. Another jail always seems to have trouble with incidents arising from the use of utensils stolen from the food cart. Recently, an inmate tried to escape by holding a jail officer hostage with a stolen spoon which he had honed down to a razor-sharp edge. Several fights have broken out in another jail because the "trusty" in charge of food cart service shows favoritism and gives extra food and better slices of meat to his friends. Problems such as these can be eliminated if an officer accompanies the food cart.

Case Study 3:

Rattlesnake County Jail Officer Bobby E. Lee discovered that inmate Stoney Jackson, 63, was losing weight rapidly and becoming extremely weak and feeble. The jail doctor examined Jackson and found him to be near starvation and suffering from malnutrition. Officer Lee conducted an investigation and found that the younger, stronger inmates, with the help of the "trusty" serving the food, were taking inmate Jackson's meat and dessert portions. The old man was too frightened to complain to the jail authorities. Officer Lee reported this situation to his supervisor, who disciplined the "trusty" and the inmates who were stealing Jackson's food. He also decided that an officer should accompany the food cart at each meal to prevent a similar situation from occurring.

All utensils taken onto a tier during mealtimes must be counted and inspected upon return to the food service area to assure that a potential weapon was not left in the cells. If a utensil is missing, then the cells and the inmates should be searched.

Whatever the type of food service in the jail, one of the critical areas of supervision is the choice of inmates who are to serve food. No officer would want to eat in a restaurant where the cook and waiters had dirty fingernails, dirty hair and clothes, or smoked while serving food. There is no reason to expect inmates to be any more tolerant of filthy personal habits on the part of the people who serve food to them. A good supervisor must consider it an important part of his job to inspect frequently to assure that high standards of cleanliness are being maintained by inmates chosen to serve food.

SUMMARY

1. Jails which have central dining rooms must develop rules and guidelines for inmate behavior, since disturbances can easily occur during mealtimes.

For the confined person, food is very important. Poorly prepared food, boring menus, and unfair portion distribution can lead to serious behavioral problems and disturbances. Most disturbances in large jails start in central dining rooms. Therefore, officers assigned to dining room patrol must pay careful attention to potential signs of trouble. In addition, inmates should be provided with rules of dining room conduct and disciplined if they violate these rules. If the officers perform their duties professionally and are alert to potential trouble, then inmate mealtimes should be orderly and relatively safe operations.

2. When inmates are served their meals in cells or a dayroom, a jail officer should always accompany the serving cart and carefully observe inmate "trusties" who are distributing the meals.

Many problems arise when inmate servers are not supervised. These "trusties" may show favoritism in the distribution of food or may use their position to enrich themselves by accepting bribes from other inmates who want larger portions of food. Most problems dealing with the serving of food can be eliminated if an officer accompanies the food service cart and pays careful attention to inmate servers.

3. Whether meals are served in a central dining room or in cell areas, officers should make certain that all utensils are returned and counted.

Inmates are especially likely to steal utensils when their meals are served in their cells. These utensils are highly dangerous contraband items, since they are often sharpened into "shanks" or knives. Officers should make certain that *all* utensils are returned by inmates; if utensils are missing after a meal, then inmates and their cells should be carefully searched.

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CHAPTER THIRTY

SUPERVISION OF MINIMUM SECURITY INMATES

At any given time a jail will contain inmates who require a minimal amount of supervision. These inmates may be persons who are serving brief sentences and who are not what the Federal Government classifies as "dangerous career criminals" (for example, a housewife who has been sentenced to serve 30 days in jail for a shoplifting conviction). Or they may be inmates who have demonstrated by their previous behavior in the jail that they know how to serve "good time" and stay out of trouble.

Inmates who are designated as "minimum security" should be housed apart from the general jail population. This includes those inmates who are granted "trustie" status and who serve on work details as well as those who leave the jail during the day to participate in work release or education and training programs. Separate housing is necessary for security reasons, since inmates who have the "freedom" to move throughout the jail facility or leave it for several hours each day also can more easily violate jail rules and smuggle contraband than can inmates who remain in more secure housing areas.

"TRUSTIES"

"The first blow from that hammer was like a light bulb exploding in my head. He kept pounding me and yelling, 'I'm going to beat you to death if you don't give me those keys!' So I gave him the keys."

Those were the words of Jail Officer Ted Savvy, who was attacked without warning by a hammer-wielding "trusty" who was trying to escape from the Rattlesnake County Jail. In this jail the "trusty" was allowed the special privileges of easy access to the tool room and not being locked into a cell at night.

As Officer Savvy learned, the term "trusty" is a misleading one. Contrary to the title, a "trusty" cannot be trusted to work totally alone and unsupervised. He should not be given authority over other inmates,

and he should not have any special privileges. "Trusties" should be individuals who have been screened and evaluated as people who are easy to supervise, dependable under minimum supervision, and not disciplinary problems.

Many jail staffs automatically use their "regulars" as "trusties." Unfortunately, many of these "regulars" are thoroughly trusted by jail officers simply because they are recognized and well known in the jail. Officers often fail to realize that these inmates can sometimes be bribed to bring in contraband or assist in an escape attempt.

Case Study 1:

Dick O'Connell, who lived in Fangville, was an alcoholic who was a "regular" at the Rattlesnake County Jail. He was constantly being sentenced to 60- or 90-day terms for such offenses as vagrancy, disturbing the peace, drunk in public, and shoplifting. All the officers at the jail knew O'Connell and he was always selected to be a "trusty," since he was a reliable worker once he was incarcerated.

O'Connell was allowed free access to the jail storeroom. This room had a window that was unprotected by bars or a screen. One night, while there was a heavy fog and visibility was poor, friends of some inmates passed a loaded gun, hacksaw, blades, chisels, knives, and other tools through this window. They offered O'Connell a bottle of bourbon if he would deliver the contraband to the inmates upstairs in the cells. Six inmates escaped two nights later.

An investigation was conducted and officers were eventually disciplined for not making frequent cell searches. But the investigating officers were unable to learn how the inmates got the weapons and tools. No one ever suspected inmate O'Connell, since he was a "regular" and also a "trusty."

One of the escapees was arrested by FBI agents a month after the jailbreak. Brought back to Rattlesnake County, he agreed to talk about the escape and the whereabouts of the other escapees in exchange for a lighter sentence. It was then that the jail staff learned how "trustworthy" inmate O'Connell was--all that was needed to induce him to violate his "trusty" status was one bottle of bourbon. The jail officers learned a painful lesson and took steps to make certain a similar situation did not occur again.

When considering a person for "trusty" status, officers should determine if he is a security risk and if he has good work habits. His behavior in confinement should also be considered. Jail officers play an important role in the decision-making process because they can supply much of this information about inmates being considered for "trusty" positions.

Case Study 2:

Big Sky County Jail Officer John Holman was asked by the jail administrator if he thought an inmate, Harold Tompkins, could be given "trusty" status. At first, Officer Holman fully endorsed the idea, stating that Tompkins was a hard worker and a good inmate. However, he then remembered that lately the inmate had been having emotional arguments with his wife on visiting day. Officer Holman remembered that after the last visiting day, Tompkins was moody and bitter. He overheard Tompkins say to his cellmate: "If only I could get out of this place, I'm sure I could clear up my problems at home."

After hearing this new information about Tompkins, the jail administrator decided that he would not give him "trusty" status. The information that Officer Holman gave concerning Tompkins indicated that he was a possible escape risk. The jail administrator knew that inmates often try to escape when they are having problems at home. Officer Holman's information was extremely important in this case.

Case Study 3:

Rattlesnake County Jail inmate Joe Grange was being considered for "trusty" status. He was well behaved, even tempered, and a hard worker. Officer Abe Cain, who usually supervised inmate Grange on work details, told the sheriff that Grange did his work well but needed constant directions and encouragement. For example, while assigned to such a simple task as mopping floors, Grange often stopped and asked the supervising officer if he was doing the job correctly. He frequently asked questions about what to do next.

On the basis of this information, Grange was not granted "trusty" status. Since "trusties" in this jail receive only minimum supervision, the sheriff felt that Grange was not able to perform his tasks well without constant supervision, which he seemed to want and need.

It is a common misbelief that "trusties" require only minimum supervision by jail officers. This perception is true only when "trusty" jobs involve such tasks as cleaning within security classification sections, general clerical work, and washing dishes and pans in the jail kitchen.

Many jail administrators assign "trusties" to perform jobs which affect the well-being of other inmates, probably because there is a shortage of funds to hire qualified civilian employees. When performing tasks which affect other inmates, "trusties" must be supervised carefully. Examples of jobs which require careful supervision of "trusties" are: serving food, typing cell assignments, and serving as medical orderlies.



Trusties are often used for kitchen duty.

It is considered to be good jail policy to house "trusties" in areas where they do not have contact with other inmates. "Trusties" often are subject to bribery, will assist in escapes, or will bring contraband into the jail. However, many jails do not have separate housing or dormitory facilities for "trusties." When this is the case, jail officers should be constantly alert and conscientious, and follow a policy of frequently searching "trusties." This policy is especially important if the "trusties" work outside the jail or live in the cell areas with the general inmate population.

Many jail inspectors have noticed that the cells occupied by "trusties" usually are the dirtiest and messiest in the jail. This happens because jail officers often forget that "trusties" are inmates too, and they often neglect to make "trusties" follow jail regulations for cleanliness. Many unnecessary and unpleasant incidents occur in jails when cells occupied by "trusties" are not inspected for contraband and are not kept clean and uncluttered.

A casual, lazy attitude toward the supervision of "trusties" by jail officers can lead to an endless list of dangerous situations in the jail. Time and time again jail officials report that they have trusted, respected, and given important responsibilities to "trusties," only to be rewarded by an escape, the smuggling in of contraband, or a "trusty"-sponsored drunken jailhouse brawl.

Officers should learn from the experiences of others. *The term "trusty" does not mean that the inmate can be trusted.*

Supervising Work Details

To get the most work done by inmates assigned to a work detail, the supervising officer should give the inmates clear, concise instructions. He should deliver these instructions in a sincere and non-threatening manner. In addition, the officer, when making job assignments, should consider the individual abilities of the inmates. Once the inmate has begun a task, the officer should check his work periodically and insist that the job be done correctly. The officer should also listen to any suggestions the inmates might have about work methods. He should take an interest in the work crew which he supervises, listen to their problems, and respond to their needs when it is appropriate.

When the work has been done correctly, the officer should evaluate the inmate's performance honestly and discuss it with him. An officer should not hesitate to praise the inmates or tell them they did a good job. Such praise often boosts morale. Every worker, whether he is employed in a factory, serves in the Army, or washes pots in the jail kitchen, needs to be told periodically that his work is necessary and valuable--otherwise, the worker loses interest, becomes bored, and begins to make mistakes, which often become costly to the employer.

SUPERVISING WORK RELEASE INMATES

Work release programs extend the limits of confinement into the community, allowing inmates to continue their employment or secure new jobs while they are being supervised by jail personnel. Inmates who participate in a work release program leave the jail during the day and return to the jail at the completion of their work day.

These inmates, who have a minimum security classification, should be segregated from the general jail population for security reasons. Ideally, they should be confined in a facility which is physically removed from the jail, such as a halfway house, but this is not always possible and many jails must provide in-house dormitory facilities for their work release participants. Even though work release inmates themselves are not necessarily escape risks, they may become involved in the escape plans of other inmates by succumbing to pressure tactics from regular inmates who have not been granted any privileges or freedom of movement. Work release inmates are on the street daily. They have access to contraband items, such as hacksaw blades and weapons--necessary tools for inmates who want to escape. They also have access to such forbidden items as marijuana, narcotics, and alcoholic beverages.



Work release inmates should be housed separately from the general population of the jail.

Some work release inmates may attempt to become overly friendly with officers in order to divert the officer's attention while he is searching for contraband.

If a jail officer *even suspects* that the inmate has consumed alcohol or is under the influence of drugs, he should make the inmate take the proper tests--urinalysis or breathalyzer. Work release inmates should also be subject to random alcohol and drug abuse testing, particularly those who are known alcoholics and drug users.

When contraband is brought into the jail by a work release inmate, it is often because the working inmate is responding to pressure and/or threats from others in the jail and not because of any desire on his part to "beat the system." Therefore, no matter how strict the security measures are to prevent the introduction of contraband by work release inmates, *it is always best to keep such inmates segregated from the general population.*

When the work release inmate returns to the jail each evening, a jail officer should thoroughly strip-search him. After the search has been completed, the inmate should change back into his regulation jail clothing. Personal items such as packs of cigarettes also should be searched. A separate room near the entrance to the jail should be made available for this purpose and equipped with lockers (as well as combination locks) in which the inmate can store his work and institutional clothing and whatever personal effects may be appropriate for his job but not for the jail (such as a lunchbox, hard-hat, pocket calculator, etc.). *It is at this point that any possible contraband should be detected.* This is why the location of the "changing room" near the jail's entrance is so important.



Work release inmate who is suspected of consuming alcohol should be given the proper test.

The living quarters of work release inmates should be carefully monitored and subject to periodic searches. Living quarters should be checked daily to assure that the inmates keep the area clean and orderly.

Officers should make sure that work release participants are punctual in reporting to work each day. The inmates should be required to sign in and out as they enter and leave the jail building for their work assignment or to participate in any other community activity.

The jail officer cannot afford to let his guard down when dealing with inmates on work release. Although the inmates have been released to work in the community, *they are still inmates* and, while confined, they are subject to *all* the rules and regulations of the institution.

Case Study 4:

Turkey County Sheriff Gabe Gobble decided he never wanted to face another November 25 as bad as this one had been. Not only did the plumbing system in his old, overcrowded jail break down again,

but a Russian flu epidemic had been hitting one officer after another. The sheriff had to completely revise the work schedules for the coming week and those officers who were still healthy were being assigned to double shifts. Then, when he went out to lunch, a garbage truck backed into his County cruiser while it was parked in the restaurant lot--the front end was smashed beyond recognition. On top of everything else, a blizzard hit Turkey County in mid-afternoon and Sheriff Gobble realized he would have to spend the weekend inside the house with his wife and her mother instead of stalking deer with his friends.

At 4:30 Sheriff Gobble thought the worst part of his rotten day was over, but just as he was about to ask the duty officer to get him a ride home, the phone rang. It was Judge Peter Stuyvesant of the District Court.

"Gabe," the judge said, "I don't know how you're going to handle this, but I was just forced to decide in favor of an inmate civil rights group...you know, the group that filed a suit because none of the jails in this part of the state have work release programs."

"So, what am I supposed to do?" Sheriff Gobble asked. "You know, Pete, that we don't have any money in the budget this year for those fancy do-gooder programs. Heck, we've got enough trouble just meeting the payroll each week and putting gas in the patrol cars. This inflation is eating us alive."

"Yeah, I know, but I don't have any suggestions," the judge responded. "Anyhow, you'll have to get something planned by next Friday or those civil rights people threaten to go to the Federal courts--that wouldn't look so hot in the newspapers for either of us, especially with the election coming up next year. Do your best, Gabe, but bring me some kind of plan by the end of next week. Sorry if I ruined the day for you."

"Oh, damn," Sheriff Gobble muttered as he hung up the phone. "I don't have the foggiest idea how to run one of those work release things."

Sheriff Gobble then summoned his chief deputy, Eartha June Mayflower, and asked her if she knew how to set up a work release program.

"No, sir," she answered, "but I suggest we give it to Lieutenant Rocky Plymouth to handle. He's working on a master's degree in corrections at Turkey Tech and keeps up with all the latest developments in these kinds of programs. He keeps nagging me to talk you into setting up a planning and research unit here at the Sheriff's Department so he can bring in some new programs he hears about at the university. He thinks it would help you get re-elected if we become the best jail in the state."

"Well, by all means, call the young man in here," Sheriff Gobble said. "I've got just the assignment he's been looking for."

When Lt. Plymouth left Sheriff Gobble's office 30 minutes later, he not only found himself appointed the first director of the Sheriff's Department Planning and Research Unit, but he had a project to work on that he had been waiting for months to introduce into the jail. In fact, Lt. Plymouth had written a term paper on work release and had used his days off to visit several jails in a neighboring state which were operating successful work release programs in their communities.

Despite the fact that the snow was two feet deep the next day, Lt. Plymouth nevertheless went to the office of the president of the Feathertown Jaycees to discuss job opportunities for work release inmates. Feathertown, the county seat, had two major industries--Turkey Technological and Agricultural University and a huge poultry processing plant, which had a large contract to provide frozen turkeys, chickens, and ducks to the Defense Department. In addition, there were several other smaller industries, as well as a County Hospital, County Government offices, and a sizeable construction industry. There should be many jobs available for inmates, the Jaycees president said. He told Lt. Plymouth he would talk to employers on behalf of the Sheriff's Department.

Next, Lt. Plymouth called the National Sheriffs' Association in Washington and the National Institute of Corrections Jail Center in Boulder, Colorado, to speak with staff members about initial problems the Sheriff's Department might encounter in establishing a work release program. The NSA and NIC consultants were able to give him some good advice about jail security needs, community acceptance problems, and how to select the inmates who would participate in the program. Lt. Plymouth also sought the advice of those jail officers who were not out sick with the flu. He visited each rollcall on November 26 and asked the officers to think about possible problems and solutions over the weekend and to write their ideas down for him. He also briefed them on what he had learned from the NSA and NIC consultants.

On November 29, a Monday, Lt. Plymouth again spoke to the officers at rollcall. Some officers grumbled and complained that the work release program was a lot of bull and another "plot" by liberals to "coddle criminals" and "waste the taxpayers' hard-earned money." But other officers had seriously considered possible security problems and had prepared short papers for Lt. Plymouth. In addition, Capt. John Smith, Sgt. Ellie Poachontas, and Officers Pat Pilgrim, Chuck Cranberry, and Nick Turkevich volunteered to spend the "dead time" on their shifts helping Lt. Plymouth develop the program, especially since the written plan had to be submitted to Sheriff Gobble in only three days.

Sheriff Gobble was very impressed with the work release program plan when Lt. Plymouth and his volunteers presented it to him on December 2.

"Damn, this is the best piece of work anybody has ever turned in at this jail!" Sheriff Gobble told them. "It ought to impress Judge Stuyvesant and that inmate civil rights group! I didn't believe a program like work release was worth two cents, but from what y'all have brought me, I think we can make this work!"

What was so impressive about Lt. Plymouth's plan?

First, the costs to the Sheriff's Department would be minor. The necessary renovation work at the jail to provide separate living quarters for the work release inmates would be done at no charge to the County. The president of the Jaycees had arranged for the building materials, equipment, and supplies to be donated by local businessmen and women who had agreed to participate in the program. In addition, several other civic groups joined with the Jaycees to help make the program a success and those members who were experienced at construction, masonry, carpentry, plumbing, and wiring had agreed to provide "free" labor services for the renovation work. Capt. Smith's daughter, an architecture student at Turkey Tech, volunteered to design the new quarters for her term project. The Tastybird Poultry Packing Company, which was anxious to hire work release inmates because of a continuous shortage of personnel, agreed to donate lockers, bunks, and plumbing fixtures for the new quarters, as well as a van to transport inmates to the processing plant. The van could also be used to take inmates to jobs at other companies. Feathertown Auto and Body Shop, which needed two experienced mechanics if the jail could provide them, agreed to provide gasoline and servicing for the van. Turkey Tech, using funds provided by the Federal Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA), volunteered to provide the part-time services of one of the employees of the University's Business Office to supervise the scheduling of inmates, the management of inmate paychecks, and other record-keeping needs. Lt. Plymouth assigned himself the job of overall program management as part of his duties as director of the Planning and Research Unit.

Second, the sheriff was very impressed with the security aspects of the work release program. The inmate participants would live in separate quarters in the jail and would not have any contact with the general inmate population. A locker room would be provided near the entrance to the jail so that inmates could change their clothing and be searched each day. Male and female inmates would be processed through the locker room separately. The plan would allow little opportunity for contraband to be brought into the jail, which was one of the sheriff's major worries at the outset--the jail was old and crowded and there were many hiding places for contraband.

The jail held 100 male inmates and 10 females. When the plan was initiated, 15 inmates were confined to maximum security cells. Lt. Plymouth, using guidelines he obtained from other jails with established work release programs, set up criteria to select work release participants. The inmate had to meet the following qualifications to be selected:

- No detainers from other jurisdictions;
- Free from incapacitating illness or mental problems;
- Possess a good behavior record in the jail;
- Had previously demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with directions given by officers supervising work details in the jail;
- Residence was in Turkey County at time of arrest or family lives within a three-county area;
- Was classified at the jail as "minimum security";
- Would be eligible for parole in a few months; and
- Had a desire to work.

From the initial jail population, 10 inmates met these criteria fully--six men and four women.

The work release dormitory was designed to utilize the jail basement, which was also known as "the Dungeon." This basement, which had served as "the hole" when the jail was first built, had been used in recent years to store old records, broken furniture, and some supplies. The records were sent to the Courthouse, the old furniture was sold at auction and the money was used to purchase two TV sets for the dormitory, and the supplies were moved upstairs to a storage room. The volunteer work crews made certain that the foundation of the jail building was secure and installed new bars and glass in the basement windows. Cement walls were built to separate the men's dormitory from the women's section. The locker room and a control office were built near the door to the basement, which led up to the first floor and opened near the central control console. The sheriff felt very confident that the work release program would not present security problems.

A year after the program had been initiated, Judge Stuyvesant asked a Turkey Tech criminal justice professor to evaluate it. The professor found that overall the program was very successful. Only one inmate had been dismissed from the program; he had been caught attempting to smuggle a small quantity of marijuana back into the jail at night. A woman

inmate who was assigned to the feather removal crew at the poultry processing plant became a disciplinary problem at work; she kept getting into fights and arguments with her co-workers. But this problem was remedied when the woman was transferred to a job in the plant's office, where she enjoyed her record-keeping assignment and got along well with her fellow employees. These were the only incidents involving work release inmates during the 12 months that the program had been in operation.

By the second year, 20 inmates were participating in the program each month. Most of the inmates who were eventually paroled remained with their work release employer fulltime. Several ex-inmates have been promoted to supervisory positions by their employers. Only one out of 26 work release "graduates" has been arrested again. There are more jobs available for work release inmates in Feathertown than there are qualified inmates.

Sheriff Gobble learned that nothing is impossible with good planning and that a work release program can benefit both the inmates and the community, if it is carefully developed and potential security problems are eliminated from the outset.

SUMMARY

1. Officers should always remember that all inmates are inmates, and should be treated as inmates--even if they are given "trusty" status.

No "trusty" should ever be trusted--the term "trusty" does not imply trust; rather, it refers to the minimum security classification assigned to the inmate and his role on a work detail. Officers must *always* supervise "trusties" and never permit them to supervise other inmates. If possible, "trusties" should be housed separately from the general inmate population in order to avert potential security problems.

2. An officer cannot afford to let his guard down when dealing with an inmate on work release status.

Work release inmates are still inmates while they are confined to the jail's custody. They need to be searched when they return to the jail from their jobs since other inmates may have pressured them into smuggling contraband into the jail. If possible, work release inmates should be housed separately from the general jail population to prevent security problems from occurring.

Suggested Readings

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APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

Acidosis. A condition in which body's alkali reserve is below normal because of faulty metabolism.

Ambivalent. Simultaneous conflicting feeling toward a person or thing, as love or hate.

Amenities. Pleasant qualities; attractiveness.

Analogy. Similarity in some respects between things otherwise unlike; partial resemblance.

Assimilated. To change (food) into a form that can be taken up by, and made part of, the body tissues; absorb into the body.

Aura. An invisible emanation or vapor, as the aroma of flowers.

Authoritative. Having or showing authority; official.

Bereaved. To deprive or rob; dispossess.

Blasphemy. Profane or contemptuous speech, writing, or action concerning God or anything held as divine.

Chastisement. To punish, especially by beating.

Comatose. Of, like, or in a coma or stupor.

Conjunction. Joining together or being joined together; union association; combination.

Contemptuous. Full of contempt, scornful; disdainful.

Dehydration. To remove water from a (compound, substance, body tissues, etc.) dry (foods are dehydrated to conserve them for future use).

Delirium Tremens. A violent delirium resulting chiefly from excessive drinking of alcoholic liquor, and characterized by sweating, trembling, anxiety, and frightening hallucinations.

Detoxification. To remove a poison or a poisonous effect from.

Eclampsia. An attack of convulsions; specifically, a disorder occurring late in pregnancy characterized by convulsions, edema, and elevated blood pressure.

Ectopic Pregnancy. The abnormal deposit and subsequent development of the fertilized ovum outside the uterus, as in a Fallopian tube.

Enormity. Great wickedness (the enormity of a crime).

Embryo. The human organism up to the third month after conception is called an embryo, thereafter a fetus.

Exemplify. To show by example, serve as an example of.

Extraneous. Coming from outside; foreign.

Fallopian Tube. Either of two slender tubes that carry ova from the ovaries to the uterus.

Fantasy. Imagination or fancy; especially, wild, visionary fancy.

Fermenting. A substance or organism causing fermentation, as yeast, bacteria, enzymes, etc.

Fetus. In man, the offspring in the womb from the end of the third month of pregnancy until birth; distinguished from embryo.

Genitalia. The reproductive organs; especially the external sex organs.

Gestation. The act or period of carrying young in the uterus from conception to birth; pregnancy.

Glucose. A crystalline sugar $C_6H_{12}O_6$, occurring naturally in fruits, honey, etc., in commercial form. Also containing dextrine and maltose, is prepared as a sweet syrup or, upon desiccation, as a light-colored solid.

Gonorrhoea. A venereal disease caused by gonococci, characterized by inflammation of the mucous membrane of the genitourinary tract and a discharge of mucus and pus; it can seriously affect other mucous membranes, especially those of the eye as in a baby during childbirth.

Gynecological. The branch of medicine dealing with the specific functions, diseases, etc., of women.

Hallucinations. Apparent sights, sounds, etc., that are not actually present; it may occur in certain mental disorders.

Indemnification. An indemnifying or being indemnified. Indemnify means to protect against or keep free from loss, damage, etc.; insure.

Ingenuity. The quality of being ingenious; cleverness, originality, skill, etc.

Injudicious. Showing poor judgement; not discreet or wise.

Instinctively. Of or having the nature of instinct. Instinct means (an) inborn tendency to behave in a way characteristic of a species; natural unacquired response to stimuli (suckling is an instinct in mammals).

Insulin. A protein hormone secreted in the pancreas, which helps the body use sugar and other carbohydrates.

Legitimize. To make or declare legitimate; specifically: a) to make lawful; give legal force or status to; b) to give official or formal sanction to; authorize; c) to give the status of a legitimate child to (one born out of wedlock.)

Liability. The state of being liable. Liable means legally bound or obligated as to make good any loss or damage that occurs in a transaction; responsible.

Magna Carta. The great charter that King John of England was forced by the English barons to grant at Runnymede, June 15, 1215; traditionally interpreted as guaranteeing certain civil and political liberties.

Manic. Having, characterized by, or like mania.

Momentous. Of great moment; very important.

Mystical. Spiritually significant or symbolic.

Myths. Traditional stories of unknown authorship, ostensibly with a historical basis, but serving usually to explain some phenomenon of nature, the origin of man, or the customs, institutions, religious rites, etc., of a people; myths usually involve the exploits of gods and heroes.

Paranoia. A mental disorder characterized by systematized delusions, as of grandeur or, especially, persecution. Often except in a schizophrenic state, with an otherwise relatively intact personality.

Pancreas. A large, elongated gland situated behind the stomach and secreting a digestive juice into the small intestine; group of differentiated cells in gland produce the hormone insulin.

Perimeter. The outer boundary of a figure or area.

Pharmaceutical. 1) of pharmacy or pharmacists; 2) of or by drugs; also a pharmaceutical product; drug.

Precipitated. To throw headlong; hurl downward; to cause to happen before expected.

Premeditation. A degree of planning and forethought sufficient to show intent to commit an act.

Recidivist. Habitual or chronic relapse or tendency to relapse, especially into crime or anti-social behavior.

Recognizance. 1. Law; a) a bond or obligation of record entered into before a court or magistrate, binding a person to do or not to do something, be in court at a certain time, etc. b) a sum of money pledged and subject to forfeit if this obligation is not fulfilled.

Rehabilitation. To restore to rank, privileges, or property which one has lost.

Reprimand. A severe or formal rebuke, especially by a person in authority.

Self-Esteem. Belief in oneself; self respect.

Squeamish. Having a digestive system that is easily upset; easily nauseated: queasy.

Standards. Something established for use as a rule or basis of comparison in measuring or judging capacity, quantity, content, extent, value; quality, etc.

Summoned. To call together; order to meet or convene.

Viable. Able to live; specifically, a) having developed sufficiently within the uterus to be able to live and continue normal development outside the uterus (a premature but viable infant); b) able to take root and grow (viable seeds).

Versatility. 1. a) competent in many things; able to turn easily from one subject or occupation to another; many sided; b) adaptable to many uses or functions.

Vigilant. Staying watchful and alert to danger or trouble.

Wantonly. Orig., undisciplined, unmanageable.

Watch and Ward. The act of watching as a sentinel; now chiefly in the titles of societies self-appointed as guardians of a community's morals.

END