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

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9th Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security

SYMMETRY AND ASYMMETRY OF GLOBAL ADVERSARY BEHAVIOR

Tuesday, 3 April 1984

0830-0915 Registration

0915 Opening Remarks — Major General Grayson D. Tate, Jr., USA
Deputy Director (Operations & Administration)
Defense Nuclear Agency

Administrative Announcements

"The Future of Conflict to the Year 2000"
Dr. William J. Taylor, Jr.
Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer
The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies

"Domestic Terrorism: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures"
Deputy Inspector Donald E. Moss
Commanding Officer of the Public Security Section
Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department

1200-1300 Lunch

1300 "The Face of Terrorism—Policymaking and the Eye of the Beholder"
J. Robert McBrien
Deputy for Security Affairs and Crisis Management
Office of the Secretary, Department of the Treasury

"Preparing Personnel to Live with a Protean Terrorist Threat"
Billy Hix
Chief, Physical Security
Central Intelligence Agency

"Terrorism: The Challenge to the Private Sector"
George Murphy
Manager of Security
Mobil Corporation

Steven Van Cleave
President
Inter-American Consultants

1700-1800 Social Hour

1800-1900 Dinner

1900-2000 "Asymmetries in Dealing with Terrorism"
Brian Michael Jenkins
Program Director
Security and Subnational Conflict
The Rand Corporation

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Wednesday, 4 April 1984

0900 "A Discussion of the Factors Affecting Congressional Legislation on Terrorism: 535 and Counting"
Victoria Toensing
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice

"Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Law"
Joseph E. diGenova
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
U.S. Department of justice

1130-1300 Lunch

1300 "Manifestation of Terrorism—Message and Meaning"
James L. Stinson
Manager, Behavioral Sciences Department
CACI, Inc.—Federal

"Motives and Tactics of Terrorist Groups"
Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director.
Federal Bureau of Investigation

1450-1500 Closing Remarks Colonel Charles R. Linton, USAF
Director for Operations
Defense Nuclear Agency

The Future of Conflict to the Year 2000

Dr. William J. Taylor, Jr.
Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer
The Georgetown University Center
for Strategic and International Studies

The future political-military environment will be characterized by "low-intensity conflict," defined as a range of operations involving Soviet special intelligence, Soviet psychological warfare, Soviet support for terrorism and insurgency, and increasing use of Soviet proxies. The primary focus of these activities will be in the Third World, focused along the sea lanes of communication vital to the security of the Western industrial democracies. Still in a period of isolation entered into about 1970, the United States will not be prepared to make requisite decisions on defense capabilities until the late 1980s, unless the Soviets do something provocative which galvanizes U.S. public opinion. The Soviets will not give us the functional equivalent of Pearl Harbor. Thus, decisions which should be made to counter the low-intensity threat in the mid to late 1990s will be foregone. Major foreign policy decisions by the United States could change these forecasted trends.

This brief forecast is based on three separate year-long studies completed at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The first two, entitled respectively "The Future of Conflict in the 1980s" and "Strategic Responses to Conflict in the 1980s," were done under contract for the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The third, done under contract for the Army, was entitled, "Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000." All three studies have recently been published by Lexington Books. Although different teams of CSIS analysts worked on the studies, the steering committees included the same senior staff—James R. Schlesinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Amos A. Jordan. William J. Taylor was project director or co-director of all three studies.

Each of the studies had different specified sets of tasks but, in general, those tasks required a forecast of the long-term worldwide environment, providing a bounded range of conflict scenarios in five regions of the world. We were to identify the broad regional trends and political-military phenomena, derive implications for U.S. national security, develop broad strategic requirements for U.S national security to the year 2000, and provide alternative solutions to strategic problems. This precis covers only the forecast.

Clearly we are dealing with the realm of uncertainty. Anyone who tells us that he or she can "predict" the future has to be jesting. It is possible, however, through the technique known as "forecasting," to develop useful roadmaps for approaching the future.

Why forecasting? Why would anyone want to pursue it? No one knows better than those who have worked in bureaucracies, such as the Departments of State or Defense, or in a large corporation, that busy decision-makers are fortunate if they have time to deal with the problems of the day or week, much less consider what the world will look like for the remainder of the 1980's or on to the year 2000.

But someone needs to attempt forecasting. Why? Consider these examples. Decisions made in the FY 1985 defense budget on an aircraft carrier will lead to an operational vessel in about 20 years. A decision made this fiscal year yields a deployed fighter aircraft in about 15 years. It would be useful to know what the world might look like, what kind of military conflict one might have to face, when those systems are deployed. Multi-billion dollar investments of the American taxpayers' money are at stake and taxpayers have a right to expect us to consider these matters.

Forecasting provides:

- A framework for assumptions
- A means of identifying dangers and opportunities
- A variety of approaches
- An increase in the range of choice
- Alternative policies and actions

Therefore, it assists decisionmakers in shaping their current decisions about future conflict.

Each of our three studies began with a statement of long-range strategic interests and objectives:

- Access to natural resources
- Open air and sea lanes
- Forward bases
- Strong mobilization base
- Alliances and national security need
- Nuclear weapons nonproliferation
- Containment of Soviet influence
- Protection of Americans overseas
- Arms control

Each of these statements is based on a substudy. A great deal of serious controversy and debate was involved in developing each statement.

CSIS does not take positions on policy issues; groups and individuals at CSIS do. This precis represents the personal views of W.J. Taylor only, distilled from the studies referred to in this paper.

Every decent study must be prepared in light of a set of assumptions. Again, each assumption was supported by a substudy:

- General nuclear war will not occur.
- A breakdown of the international economic order will not occur.
- The Soviet Union will continue to pursue a goal of world domination and remain our major adversary.
- The United States will pursue a modest strategic nuclear modernization program.
- No technological breakthrough will occur that would give any single nation total military dominance.

These assumptions may appear to be "boilerplate" over which there could be little controversy; not so.

For example, consider the last assumption, that no major breakthrough in technology will occur that would give either the Soviet Union or the United States military dominance. Some would argue that we are approaching a technological capability via satellite to remove the color from the oceans—to turn the oceans into a transparent looking glass—with great significance for the most secure leg of our triad, the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) force. Our studies demonstrate that such technology may eventually be deployed, but it will not occur by the year 2000.

THE FORECAST

It is important to keep in mind that the rather dismal forecast which follows can be changed if the United States adopts the alternative strategies that our studies recommend. Those alternative strategies are not part of this presentation but are to be found in detail in the studies and books referred to earlier.

Let us start, at the highest level of generalization, with worldwide trends. First, the Soviets will gain a reputation for at least marginal strategic nuclear superiority, but they will be deterred from strategic or tactical nuclear attacks. One of our assumptions was that the United States would pursue a "modest" strategic nuclear modernization program. That is exactly how the FY 1983, 1984, and 1985 defense budgets have proceeded. We estimated that there would be somewhere between 20 and 30 MX's; that is "modest" modernization. We assumed that the Trident program would continue, that the D-5 missile program would continue, that deployment of Mark 12-A reentry vehicles would continue. These kinds of "modest" improvements will be sufficient to provide deterrence. The point is that the Soviet Politburo will consider the costs and risks of *any* strategic nuclear first-use to outweigh any rational conceivable gains. Strategic nuclear deterrence will work.

But second, there will not be any tactical nuclear first-use by the Soviets. Why? Because, despite the views of the "Gang of Four" at the Council on Foreign Relations (McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith), the United States will retain the doctrine of flexible response that is the bedrock of NATO 14/3. That is, the United States will reserve the right to tactical nuclear first-use under certain scenarios. Simply put, if the Soviets attack and NATO forces are confronted with heavy losses from a massive Soviet conventional attack on Europe's central front, we will use battlefield nuclear weapons, with a high probability of further escalation.

The Soviets will, therefore, be deterred from either strategic or tactical nuclear first-use. The probability one might assign to a *calculated* Soviet nuclear first-use is zero. We are not talking about accidents or miscalculations; we are talking about calculated use.

The probabilities of a Soviet major conventional attack in Europe are extremely low. There are several reasons for this. The first is that the flexible-response doctrine will deter. Second, the Soviets will not launch a major conventional attack in Europe because they will get what they want and can reasonably expect in Europe without resorting to war. No one is talking about Western Europe "going behind the Iron Curtain"; that is not our scenario. We are talking about continuation of the slow but definite improvement in Soviet relations with individual Western European countries that we have been witnessing for the past 3 years. Detente will proceed apace. Why? There are several reasons—psychopolitical, economic, and social. Let us examine some of them.

The massive buildup in Soviet power that has taken place over the last 12 to 15 years is perceived differently in different societies. Many in the United States have been persuaded that this massive buildup is enough to justify a modest increase in defense spending, at some sacrifice to social programs. But what do the Europeans think about the massive buildup of Soviet military conventional and nuclear power? The Europeans who come through CSIS every week—whether they be members of the Eurogroup, groups of European parlimentarians, or individuals—say the same thing: "The Reagan rhetoric scares the hell out of us. The United States is separated from Soviet conventional military power by two oceans; Europe is not. That buildup of Soviet power is right in

our backyard." The Soviet military buildup has had a psychopolitical effect, creating what CSIS's Walter Laqueur calls a European mentality or "living with the bear in the woods."

That is, when European decisionmakers approach major decisions in defense and foreign policy, increasingly they look over their shoulders, asking themselves how the Soviets will think or react to the decision: "Is this too provocative, is this too risky?" For example, anyone who thinks the issue of deploying Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe is over had better think again. All the returns are not in on that one. The Dutch cabinet already has decided to postpone Cruise missile deployment until November 1985. How many of the unusually large number of conservative governments in Western Europe will survive their next elections? Our point here is only that Soviet military power has a strong psychopolitical effect on the Western Europeans.

The detente between the Soviet Union and individual Western European countries will proceed apace for economic reasons as well. The Soviets have a definite need for certain kinds of trade with Western Europe. They have a need for greater hard-currency earnings, and of course they have a need for regular infusions of high technology.

Conversely, many European states have decided that they need lower cost energy sources—that is, at costs lower over the long run than they can expect from Persian Gulf sources. And they think they need more secure energy sources than the Persian Gulf will provide. This, especially, should tell us something. In our view, the Soviet "pipeline deal" is only the tip of the iceberg.

So there are psychopolitical reasons and economic reasons why detente between the Soviet Union and *individual* Western European countries will continue and accelerate. None of this is happening by accident. The Soviets are engaged in a massive, long-range psychological warfare campaign aimed at dividing the United States from its allies worldwide and at dividing the American body politic.

There has been a generic change in U.S.-Western European relations, and the change will become more, not less, pronounced. "Generic change" is James Schlesinger's term. David Abshire, before leaving CSIS to work on the problems in U.S.-European relations as U.S. Ambassador to NATO, used to talk about a "sea change." The trend is toward a fundamental erosion of the cohesion in the NATO alliance. We are somewhat divided on this analytical point at CSIS. Some of us suggest that the current problems in U.S.-Western European relations are nothing new and that they will be overcome routinely. Those people compare U.S.-West European relations to a rubber band that stretches and always snaps back. Some of us disagree, suggesting that, if stretched far enough, rubber bands break. U.S.-European relations have been stretched taut over the past 3 years, with no contraction in sight for the future.

The European members of NATO may not abrogate the NATO treaty, but they will not devote their resources to defense to the extent that Americans will "demand." They will not commit national military forces to "out of area" missions deemed "vital" by the United States for the use of force in such areas as Central America. Increasingly, Americans will resent these attitudes and question the costs to the United States of stationing large numbers of U.S. military units in Europe. Senator Sam Nunn, co-chairman of a CSIS Congressional Study Group on Grand Strategy, has been saying this for 2 years.

Finally, there is and will continue to be a movement toward armed neutrality in Europe. Many people speak of "Finlandization." We do not use that term. Our term is the "Swedenization" of Europe, a term with special strategic significance to us. Swedish foreign and defense policy is based on nonalignment in peace, aimed at neutrality in war. This calls for a very different kind of defense strategy, not based on perimeter defense or long-range defense beyond a nation's borders, but on close-in, "territorial defense." Even the Swedes do not want to admit they are shifting to territorial defense, but changes in their force structure and doctrine suggest that they are.

For the Swedes, traditional perimeter defense required a certain kind of force structure which led to the decisions made back in the 1950's to produce the Viggen AJ-37, a long-range, high-technology, very expensive aircraft, and the decisions to support relatively large active-duty military forces.

The Swedes are shifting to territorial, close-in defense, based on initial defense at their borders, then absorbing an attack by "marginal" Soviet forces as they penetrate Swedish territory. That means defense in depth requiring close air support aircraft. That means, also, smaller and less expensive active-duty forces with increased emphasis on rapid mobilization.

"Swedenization," applied to our forecast for individual Western European countries, means a different strategy, smaller active duty forces, larger reserves, different weapons technology—all leading to lower defense budgets.

What are the other forecasts worldwide? The Third World will be increasingly vulnerable for reasons we all can identify—increasing indebtedness, food shortages, skyrocketing population growth, and large transborder refugee flows—with inherent problems of terrorism. Low- to medium-intensity conflict will continue in Central America with a net result described by the old term, "the domino effect." This was a loaded term back in the 1960's when applied to Southeast Asia. But it has real significance when one examines what has happened in Cambodia and Laos and considers the dangers to Thailand's security. Zbigniew Brzezinski summed up our forecast in Central America when he stated to the members of an Army Study Advisory Group 2 years ago: "You people in the Army had better remember a very traditional, but now forgotten, mission for the Army; it's called policing the Mexican border." In our view, the problems of Mexico are not improving. They are deteriorating. The seeds of revolution are there and growing; the economic problems are staggering. Mexico's problems soon will become our problems.

Africa will continue to be an arena for Soviet proxy operations, but the Soviet effort there is likely to decline. Why? The Soviets must establish priorities among their international political-military commitments.

The Soviets have grave problems. What are some of them? First, the rapidly growing Muslim population that will outstrip the ethnic Russian population has many implications for the Soviets. For example, the "yellowization" of the Soviet armed forces will create problems in training, in communication, in teaching the basics to military personnel, and perhaps problems for internal security. The growing Muslim population has other potential concerns for the Soviets. For example, the Politburo must consider Islamic fundamentalism creeping up through "the soft underbelly" of the southern U.S.S.R.

Second, the Soviets have severe medical problems. For example, the Soviet Union is one of only two countries in the world where life expectancy has declined; the other country is Malaysia. This is almost incredible in this day of modern medicine.

By the year 2000, the economic growth rate for the Soviet Union will be zero, according to a year-long CSIS study that included 35 of the best Soviet experts from all over the world. A small minority of that study group concluded that the growth rate will be *negative* by the year 2000. The Soviets will therefore be increasingly constrained and must set priorities. Proxy operations in Africa will continue, but decline.

With exceptions to be discussed later, in East Asia and the Pacific there will be a period of relative political calm and economic progress. What are the reasons for this? One is the normalization of U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China, relations that will continue to improve. Of course, there are going to be recurrent problems over Taiwan, but those problems will be managed as relations improve and decrease the likelihood of political-military conflict in the region.

If you believe that economic stability leads to political stability, there is one more variable leading to a period of relative calm in East Asia and the Pacific. That is the case of the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). During the past few years of worldwide recession, the economic growth rate of ASEAN has been an astonishing 6 to 7 percent.

The Middle East and Southwest Asia will continue to be the most volatile region of the world. We are farther away from peaceful solutions in the region now than we were in 1947, for reasons too obvious to discuss in this precis.

These forecasts depend in large measure on probable U.S. policies worldwide over the next 16 years. How will the United States approach its international security relations to the year 2000? We arrive at our forecast in this respect through "mood theory" analysis. Among political scientists, some of the best analysts—Frank Klingberg, Gabriel Almond, and others—have examined swings or cycles in American mood going back to 1790. They have concluded that these cycles last about 20 to 25 years—cycles that oscillate between moods of interventionism and moods of isolationism.

We focused part of our own study effort on this analysis. There are variations in the ways analysts see the curves—variations in duration and intensity. But, if you look at their forecasts to the year 2000, the curves are almost direct overlays, and they tell us something important. The United States went into a period of isolationism approximately in 1970, and we are going to be in it for quite some time to come—probably into the late 1980's.

When we published this analysis 2 years ago, many people were derisive, saying that some of us at CSIS must not be paying attention to the news media because we didn't have a finger on the pulse of the American public. They referred to the "landslide" vote for Reagan. They wondered why we did not understand that there was a new "defense consensus" in the United States. They suggested that Americans were ready to take on the Soviets worldwide and to massively increase defense spending. We replied that they should watch the FY 1984 and

subsequent defense budgets and then come back and tell us that there is a defense consensus in America. Of course, you know that the Reagan administration asked for 10 percent real growth in the defense budget last year. What did they get? Real growth of 4.2 percent. They began asking for 13 percent real growth in the defense budget this year. What do you think they will get? I suggest that we will be lucky to get 4.5 percent real growth. There is not a defense consensus in this country. What does this mean?

Decisions that should have been taken over the past 3 years and in the next 2 to 3 years to prepare for the most likely forms of conflict out to the year 2000 have not been taken, and are not likely to be taken in the foreseeable future. The result will be that in the 1990's the kinds of systems we will need to meet the most likely—and most important—threats simply are not going to be there.

Policy changes on the part of the United States can change all this. The American mood could be dramatically reversed, for example, if the Soviets were to do something provocative—but it would have to be exceedingly provocative. The Korean Air Lines 007 shoot-down was not perceived as such; 6 months after the event the average American had almost forgotten it. Nor do Americans pay much attention to such matters as Soviet operations in Afghanistan or their use of "yellow rain."

In our view, the Soviets are not apt to do anything rash. They know better than to give the United States the equivalent of another Pearl Harbor, which galvanized the American public and brought this country into World War II. Below, I will forecast what the Soviets' worldwide strategy is likely to be, but, for the moment, let us examine some of the scenarios our studies developed.

One scenario is a Soviet attack on Iran. This would not be a Soviet mass attack with 24 divisions south to Bander Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The Soviets can do that, but there would be great deal of risk involved. We suggest a much more likely scenario that would involve a Soviet seizure of Azerbaijan province in northern Iran. Why? I return to the earlier point about the rising Muslim problem for the Soviet Union, and the potential for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism up into the U.S.S.R. The Soviets might move to seal off that threat by seizing Azerbaijan—to which they have historical claims anyway—to provide a *cordon sanitaire*. Perhaps the Soviets would need six to eight divisions to get the job done.

A second scenario occurs on the Korean Peninsula with a North Korean attack on the South. By examining the trends in relative military capabilities, many respected analysts forecast that there will be a "crossover point" in the early 1990's between the capabilities of the South and the capabilities of the North. The implication is that Kim Il Sung or his successors will be confronted with a "go/no-go" decision in the early 1990's because, if they do not attack South Korea by then, they will no longer be able to do so. This creates a dangerous situation for the early 1990's.

Other likely conflict scenarios include insurrection in Colombia or a Vietnamese thrust into Thailand. Two years ago, the latter forecast was ridiculed in Washington. Some thought such a forecast most unrealistic; of course, many have since changed their minds. The Vietnamese still have significant military forces along the Thai border and this is a worrisome situation to which the Thais may be responding incorrectly. For example, they are buying expensive, high-technology fighters when they ought to buy something at lower cost, better adapted to the threats they confront.

Let us turn to Soviet long-range strategy. If we are not concerned about strategic nuclear exchange, tactical nuclear exchange, or a Soviet conventional attack in Western Europe, what will the Soviets do? In our view, the most probable and most important Soviet threat is "low-intensity conflict," which we define to include Soviet special intelligence operations, psychological warfare, support for terrorism and insurgencies, and increasing use of proxies. No one believes the Soviets can *start* insurgencies in the Third World; we do think they are adept at identifying trends and supporting movements that threaten U.S. and allied vital interests worldwide.

There are many examples of the kinds of low-intensity threats we forecast. Terrorism, especially the state-supported variety which can provide technological capabilities to small groups, is especially worrisome. For example, a terrorist attack against a U.S. special weapons storage site in Europe could result in the seizure of a Pershing I or II, 8-inch, or 155 warhead. Or consider a terrorist attempt to knock out one of our major computer centers in Indianapolis at a time of mobilization. If one of those computer centers goes down, our computerized rail movement plans for military units to ship out of Texas City or Galveston, Texas, and head to Europe are not going to work. Our computerized system for calling up reserves would be unworkable. The point is that we live in an increasingly brittle society and we are

vulnerable. Changes in the laws needed to combat terrorism could be severely divisive in American society.

Soviet blue-water naval power projection capability, with such ships as the Kiev-class aircraft carrier and the Kirov-class battle cruiser, is growing rapidly. Combine this growth with a vastly increased number of Soviet ship-days in the Third World. If we then examine the areas in which the Soviets have acquired major naval bases and reflect on the loci of Soviet proxy operations and support for insurgencies, a pattern emerges.

What is the Soviet objective? The long-range Soviet strategy, in our view, is to mount low-cost, low-risk operations with high geostrategic payoffs. *Why low-cost?* In low-intensity conflict, the cost to the Soviets is primarily political support and provision of weapons. The best unclassified data available show that during the last 5 years the Soviets have increased the prices for the weapons they sell to Third World nations and to insurgents there. In fact, provision of weapons to Third World countries has become a major source of Soviet hard-currency earnings. *Why low-risk?* In low-intensity operations, as we have defined them, the probabilities of U.S. and Soviet military forces coming into direct conflict are relatively low and, therefore, risks are low. *What geostrategic payoffs are there?* We are talking about low-intensity operations along the major sea lanes of communication for energy resources, for mineral resources, and, most obvious of all, for free trade—without which the Western industrial democracies and our Asian allies cannot survive. Soviet acquisition of the capability to interdict these sea lanes: that is the long-range geostrategic payoff.

Let us examine the pattern. First, the Soviets have acquired use of a major base at Cam Ranh Bay; we built the base and the Soviets are improving it. Second, many of us are concerned about Soviet intentions in Afghanistan, just north of Baluchistan on the Indian Ocean. I agree with Edward Luttwak that, if the Soviets want Afghanistan, they can take it in 2 or 3 weeks. Afghanistan is not their Vietnam. The Soviet Politburo does not have to deal with an American Congress, with a "youth revolution," or with an American press. We are worried about the Soviets consolidating Afghanistan and moving south through Baluchistan to establish a Soviet warm-water port on the Indian Ocean, an historical Russian objective. The Soviets have acquired major bases in Aden, in Ethiopia, in Mozambique, in Angola, and in Cuba—and many of us worried about an 11,000-foot runway in Grenada where there is but one tourist hotel. We are no longer worried about the latter.

But there is the pattern and those bases are along the major sea lanes of communication. We are not worried about the Soviets moving to attack U.S. and allied shipping along these vital sea lanes. Many of us do worry, however, about a Cuban missile crisis played in reverse in this age of nuclear parity—with Soviet naval blockade or picket screens across which they dare Western ships to move. The question is who will blink first. Merely the capability and veiled threats to carry out such operations would provide the Soviets psychopolitical advantages worldwide.

As CSIS's Henry Kissinger put it in the *Washington Post*, (July 28, 1984), "The Soviets have pursued essentially psychological warfare; they seek to substitute words for deeds." He noted also in relation to NATO INF deployments that "The Soviets' purpose must be to achieve the neutralization of Europe. . . ."

That's the kind of world we forecast to the year 2000. As stated earlier, our studies provided alternative solutions to the strategic problems we posed for the future, but that is another presentation.

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Domestic Terrorism: Threat Analysis and Countermeasures

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I would like to cover today some threat analysis of the situation with respect to domestic terrorism in this country, and some countermeasures—some of the things that we have found to be useful, and some of the things that we have learned have been mistakes. Unfortunately, in New York, we get a certain amount of practice and we have made mistakes over the years. I hope that we can share our experience with you and help you to avoid making the same mistakes we have.

In the entire United States for calendar year 1983, the FBI statistics show 31 incidents of terrorism, about 10 of them in New York. So, we do get our fair share. However, when you compare that figure to something on the order of 1,600 homicides in New York City last year, it is not a terribly big number. Unfortunately, we kill off a small town every year—1,600 homicides and a like number of narcotics-related deaths. It is not common to have forums like this regarding homicides. That's an interesting phenomenon. Why the difference? Why is it that we devote a disproportionate amount of our resources and time to what is really, in strictly criminal terms, a rather minuscule amount of activity?

Well, there are several reasons. First of all, and from the perspective of all of us here, terrorism is designed to challenge the Government. It is designed either to paint the Government as repressive, forcing it into stringent measures of control, or, in many cases, to show the Government as weak and ineffectual, and incapable of protecting its citizens.

To that extent, we must respond to it. It is really more a question of public perception of what the problem is, than of the reality of the situation. Judge Webster recently was asked to what he attributed the increase in terrorism in this country, and he said, "There hasn't been an increase in terrorism; what there has been is an increase in public awareness of terrorism." Unfortunately, when the public sees the portrayal of the bombing in Beirut, they are led to believe that it can happen here. I don't believe it can.

There are a variety of reasons why it is probably not possible to carry out that kind of a major suicidal mission in this country. However, the average citizen in this country doesn't understand that difference, and I think it's that perception we have to deal with. The previous speaker mentioned the threat of the theft of even one nuclear warhead; think how the press could play that, and what it would mean to the careers of several people in this room. I think that's a real concern, and I'm serious when I say that.

The question of what the real damage would be, in contrast to what the public's view of that event would be, is what we have to deal with. Very largely, we have to respond in terms of perception. The fact that we meet and conduct conferences such as this one is important because it shows that we are taking a serious view of the subject. Events such as this also get reported in the media. That is helpful because then the public gets a sense that yes, our leaders, our people that are responsible, are working on the problem and they are dealing with it. Whether we accomplish anything concrete here or not, just the fact that we are discussing terrorism is important.

The terrorist activities in this country tend to be of a very low level technically. The crime of choice, as I'm sure you know, is bombing—probably by 90 percent or better. The terrorists are not terribly sophisticated bombers. They have, in many cases, done as much damage to themselves as they have done to any of their targets. I'm sure you read about William Morales, who blew his hands off putting a bomb together for the FALN several years ago. That's not uncommon. The Croatians, probably as often as not, killed themselves in putting a device together, rather than hurting someone else. They tell a story about one Croatian terrorist, whose leaders sent him out to blow up a car; he burned his lips on the tailpipe. That gives you an idea of the kind of technology you have to be concerned about in this country, and the level of the threat. I wish all terrorists were that clever, but unfortunately some are better than others.

The Cuban anti-Castro terrorists are probably the most technologically proficient terrorists in the world; after all, they were trained by our own CIA before the Bay of Pigs invasion—and the CIA trained them rather well. They've been responsible for a number of remote control bombings and assassinations, and they've put together some very high-tech bombs.

In one case they had placed a bomb on the automobile of the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. It fell off in front of his residence and one of the Cuban security officers found it and put it in the garbage. By the time our Bomb Squad responded, the garbage truck had come and carted it off. I don't know if you're familiar with the term "mungo"—"mungo" is what the garbage men cull from the garbage. In this case they were after the batteries and the magnets and so forth, and they had successfully defused the device. So, it's not all bad, you know; we do get some help from the public.

All right, why does this problem exist? What's behind this phenomenon? What are the goals of these people? What do they hope to accomplish? Most of the terrorist activity that takes place in this country has both tactical and strategic goals.

The best illustration I can give is an operation of the Cuban anti-Castro "Omega Seven" group several years ago. Mackey Airlines, a commuter airline in Miami, was planning to start regular commercial flights between Miami and Havana, Cuba. The anti-Castro Cubans didn't like that idea, so one night they blew up Mackey's office in Fort Lauderdale. The next day Mackey announced that they had reconsidered and were *not* going to sponsor flights to Havana. So, on a purely tactical level, you have to judge that as a successful operation by the Omega Seven group. They stopped Mackey and Mackey got their message—but a lot of other people also got their message, and that's what terrorism is designed to do.

Terrorism basically has, in my definition, three elements:

It is serious criminal conduct. I do not consider bomb threats, or graffiti, or the spray painting of swastikas to be terrorist acts. If we counted such acts, we would have millions of "terrorist" incidents in this country; every day we get something on the order of 100 bomb threats in New York City.

Another element is that it is *politically motivated.* Not long ago the leading bombers in New York City were Local 3 electrical workers. They were the most active bombers, followed closely by organized crime, before you got into any real political terrorist groups. I don't consider such acts to be terrorism. It's terror, maybe, and it's the tactics of terror, but there is no political motivation. It is purely economics. I believe terrorism has a political motivation.

The third element is that *it is aimed at an audience larger than the victim.* Again, the Mackey incident illustrates that rather well. In addition to Mackey as the direct audience, that action was designed to tell Castro that there is still an exile group in this country that is violently opposed to him, and after him, and willing to try to unseat him. It was also aimed at a constituency—and most terrorist action is. The constituency (either real or imagined) of the Cubans was other exile Cubans. They wanted to impress them with the fact that a viable, operational group is trying to unseat Castro and working on their behalf. That is an appeal that a lot of terrorist incidents have, an appeal to a constituency, to an audience the terrorists believe to be friendly to their cause. And finally, the Omega Seven people wanted to let other businesses know that it would not be healthy to do business with Castro. I believe that they reached all of those audiences rather successfully.

As I said before, in most cases in the United States the tactic is bombing and not terribly sophisticated. Something on the order of four to five sticks of dynamite would be the average type of device, generally not well-contained. It could be disguised in any conceivable fashion. We have found bombs in brief cases, umbrellas, rolls of blueprints, flower boxes—in one case, even a loaf of bread. You can't necessarily spot a device. If you were conducting a bomb search, the only thing you could look for and be reasonably hopeful of finding would just be whatever is out of the ordinary, what does not belong.

Some of these groups go to great pains to disguise their bombs. In some cases, most recently with the United Freedom Front, they have actually put an attache case out with the word BOMB painted on it so that people would not tamper with it. What they do depends on their motivation and what they are trying to achieve.

There have been some facility attacks in this country, but not of any great sophistication, and not involving heavy weapons. Probably the most serious was an invasion of an armory in Madison, Wisconsin, by the FALN some years ago; it was not successful because the guard on the weekend didn't have the keys to the gun room, and the terrorists couldn't figure out how to get in. So, again, you are not dealing with a tremendous level of expertise or technical proficiency.

There have been some assassinations, mainly by the Armenians and anti-Castro Cubans. This does not seem to be a popular tactic, or anything that is going to happen often.

Kidnapping by terrorists is virtually unheard of in this country and I think that is a reflection of our culture. Kidnapping in this country has always been perceived as a particularly heinous crime. It is not a popular criminal act, therefore it is not a popular terrorist act. You do see those cultural differences in terrorism from country to country. In Italy, and in some places in South America and Latin America, kidnapping is a common terrorist crime but it is also a common ordinary crime. It does not have the public disapproval level that it has in this country.

One of the things we have found over the years is that terrorists are very good at certain types of activities. They are very adept at disguises, and use a substantial variety. They do very thorough surveillance, repeatedly, before they act. We know this from the patterns of their

activities and from some turnarounds whom we've been able to debrief and some of the undercover operations we have run.

In the aftermath of the Brinks robbery in Nanuet, N.Y., we uncovered a safehouse in East Orange, N.J., where we found fairly extensive documentation of surveillances they had done on a number of our police precincts in New York City. Typically, they would send a woman in to report a lost purse, and she would then detail at some length whom she spoke to, where they were situated, how long she spent there, and how many people were in the building. She would commonly ask to use the restroom and then observe other areas of the premises. Then, apparently after the fact, she would draw a schematic diagram of the premises. This was just basic research; clearly they had no immediate plan for any attacks. Had they planned to attack, we believe they would have done several other surveillances, over greater periods of time.

We know that they do this, and it is the one thing that you can use effectively against them. If you are alert to people watching you, if you can have your guard forces alert to surveillance, it is terribly important information. Surveillance is a common tactic across all the different terrorist groups, and they go into it in very great depth.

Recently there seems to be a trend to the suburbs. Years ago most of the bombings took place in Manhattan. We haven't had a bombing in Manhattan now in over a year. We've had four in other parts of New York City—Queens, the Bronx, Staten Island—but not in Manhattan itself. We've had six incidents in the suburbs. In Harrison, New York, they've had two bombings at IBM facilities. There have also been bombings in East Meadow, Elmont, and Oakdale, Long Island. This follows a trend we started observing around 1979. Not only the left-wing terrorists, but even the Cubans and the right-wing Jewish organizations were displaying a trend toward moving to the suburbs.

We believe there are a variety of reasons for the change. Probably one reason—and one that most of the people in private security agree to—is that, in fact, the degree of security is lower at a corporate premise outside of New York City than in Manhattan itself. We think the terrorists know that.

We would like to think that another reason is that they have a certain fear of the New York City Police Department. We have had some success, especially with the Joint Terrorist Task Force, where our detectives work with special agents from the FBI.

The terrorists also appear to want to complicate the investigation after the fact, by hitting in a variety of jurisdictions, as opposed to one jurisdiction. This clearly was the case in a string of armored car robberies done by a revolutionary organization, where they clearly intended to complicate the investigation, and succeeded. It was many months before we were able to observe the pattern of these armored car robberies and put them together as being the work of one group. So to that extent, they were successful.

On the other hand, the tactic has worked against them, and I hope they don't find that out—I'd like to see them stay in the suburbs although it's costing me a lot of money. I happen to live in Rockland County, which is where the Nanuet Brinks Robbery occurred. My property taxes are going up $50 a month, and the sales taxes just went up 2 percent, strictly to pay for the cost of that trial.

As noted, shifting to the suburbs has worked against them, in at least two instances. One was in Evanston, Illinois, where 11 members of the FALN were arrested. They were setting up to do an armored car robbery at the university, and 11 of them dressed in jogging suits were getting ready for the operation. Some good citizen in Evanston thought it rather curious that 11 Puerto Ricans were running around in jogging suits, especially since some of them were smoking, and she called the police. Two officers from the Evanston Police Department did a magnificent job of capturing all 11 without a shot being fired and with no one getting hurt.

Later, in the Nanuet incident, a good citizen saw a group of black males emptying bank bags from one truck and being assisted by a couple of white females to put them into another truck; he thought that, in Nanuet, New York, this was rather suspicious and called the police. Unfortunately at the cost of the lives of two police officers, several more arrests were made. The point is that the terrorists had previously done exactly that same thing in the Bronx. The black males had killed a guard; they went a few blocks in one truck and transferred to another truck, but in the Bronx nobody thought that terribly suspicious. In the suburbs they did, and we got the phone call, and we made the arrests. So, to that extent, the tactic has worked against them and I hope they don't recognize that.

The targets of the terrorist groups in this country are by and large symbolic. They tend not to try to knock out a facility so much as to cause some damage and get a

lot of publicity. Some of these what they call expropriations, the armored car robberies, they have never claimed publicly. In the aftermath, we found out that as much of the money was going to buy cocaine as to support their safehouses. That might be why they weren't claiming them.

The targets they prefer right now are targets of the military-industrial complex or offices of the Government. As you know, they hit the Capitol fairly recently.

They tend to operate on dates that have some significance to them, though they may mean nothing to you. For example, they will commemorate the anniversary of the date when a person like George Jackson died in prison, which they see as a significant event.

They have become sophisticated enough to realize that we do some countersurveillance. Unfortunately, through the efforts of their lawyers, they know that for a fact. A group called the People's Law Office (PLO) in Chicago sued the Chicago Police Department and in the discovery proceedings the police had to turn over several documents which indicated how they anticipated the activities of the FALN, how they conducted their bomb watches, where they set them up, and so forth. Those documents were given to the lawyers with a court order that they not be shown to anyone or copied. However, about 6 months later, copies of those police documents showed up in the FALN safehouse in Madison, Wisconsin; so the terrorists had learned from our own documents how we operate.

The groups that we have to deal with in this country break down into three general areas: right wing, left wing, and international or transnational, depending on which definition you like.

On the right, we have the Croatian Freedom Fighters, a group that believes a free and independent Kingdom of Croatia should be carved out of what is now Yugoslavia. They are largely defunct, as is the Cuban Omega Seven, anti-Castro group, largely through the efforts of the Joint NYPD/FBI Terrorist Task Force, which has made several arrests of key leaders. While we have not heard from either of those organizations in nearly 2 years, I believe they could come back any day. However, they do not represent any general threat. The Croatians' efforts were almost entirely directed against Yugoslavian properties, and the anti-Castro Cuban activities were directed primarily against Cuban activities and premises, or Russian premises.

The Jewish Defense League I would consider a right-wing organization. Their activities in the terrorist field are primarily anti-Soviet and they have just begun to resurface because of the very low level of emigration that Russia is allowing Soviet Jews. Most recently they put three bombs in the Russian residence complex in the Bronx, one of which severely damaged one of the autos but no major damage was done. That bombing was claimed by a group called Jewish Direct Action, which is an offshoot of the Jewish Defense League.

In the United States, the only real international terrorist groups that we have to deal with are the Armenians. There are two different groups, one called the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and the other called the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. Again, they probably pose no general threat; their main targets are Turks. They, like the Croatians, believe that there should be a free and independent nation of Armenia, carved out of what is largely now Turkey, although part of the area is in the Soviet Union. They have succeeded in assassinating some Turkish officials in this country and we believe that they can operate again at any time. They are truly a transnational group, with tremendous mobility. In one instance, in which a bomb went off prematurely in a hotel in Switzerland, the two people involved were of Armenian extraction—one a resident of Lebanon, the other a resident of Los Angeles. Both were operating in Sweden against Turkish interests. That's about as transnational as you can get; they can operate around the globe and they have, in Africa, Australia, and other countries, primarily against Turkish targets.

The left-wing people make up the group that you have to be concerned about. I'd like to show several charts to illustrate some of the linkages. Up until perhaps 4 or 5 years ago, you could describe separate and distinct groups on the left. Groups like the FALN (Puerto Rican terrorists), the Crusade for Justice (Chicano-Mexicano terrorists), the Black Liberation Army, and the Republic of New Africa could be considered discrete groups. I do not believe that is true any longer.

Figure 1 illustrates the group that was responsible for the Nanuet-Brinks armored car robbery and a string of other armored car robberies in the New York Metropolitan area. It consists of remnants of the old Black Liberation Army (BLA), most of whom had been imprisoned for their activities in the 1970's and had been released after serving their time.

Also, there are elements of the Republic of New Afrika, a group that wants a free and independent Republic of New Afrika carved out of six of the southern

States; in addition, they want several billion dollars in reparations for slavery.

Many members of both of these groups were incarcerated for many years. They had an extensive communication network while they were in prison, supported by the other groups shown at the bottom of Figure 1. The May 19th Communist Organization, Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC), and Weather Underground are, for all intents and purposes, one organization. It started as a communication network for the BLA people who were dispersed, intentionally in many cases, throughout the United States, from Auburn, New York, to San Quentin, California. In order to get materials back and forth, they set up a system whereby let's say Richard Moore up in Auburn wanted to communicate with Curly Estremera in San Quentin. He would send a letter to one of the lawyers in New York City, and print on the outside, "privileged, lawyer-client communication." The lawyer would then readdress the letter to Curly in San Quentin and again print on the outside, "privileged, lawyer-client communication." The prison officials on either end were reluctant to tamper with such letters or check the material out. By using that system, the prisoners were able to pass all kinds of revolutionary rhetoric and actual escape plans (you may have heard of one called "Blue Magic") back and forth among their different prisons. At one point they had the entire country broken down into six areas; each area had a BLA member as the Area Commander and also had a key communication person.

Another thing they were doing was trying to recruit people. What they sought, essentially, was a black male who was doing time for robbery. They would, by getting these revolutionary materials and rhetoric into the prisons, try to convince these people that they were political prisoners and turn them into terrorists.

There are two advantages to that system, one of which is that they know they're not recruiting one of my people. It's tough enough for me to get undercover agents at all, much less to have them do 7-1/2 to 15 years. So they were sure they weren't recruiting an undercover cop. The other advantage was that if they could politicize a guy who has already stood with a gun in his hand and robbed people, they would essentially have a guided missile that they could control and direct.

The most outstanding example of the system (you remember the Patty Hearst case) was Field Marshal General Cinque, who was the head of the Symbionese Liberation Army. This was your average American "dirt bag," who did some time and became radicalized and politicized while in prison. He turned into such a stoned terrorist that he was willing to sacrifice his life in that little hovel in Los Angeles. He had every opportunity to surrender and come out, but became so dedicated to the cause that he was willing to give up his life. That was the model that they were trying to replicate through this recruitment.

As I said before, for all intents and purposes, the bottom part of that chart represents one organization. The Weather Underground, as described, is an underground organization. The old remnants of the Students for a Democratic Society in the late 1960's and early 1970's went underground for a variety of reasons, not in every case because prosecutions were pending. Some of them didn't even have charges pending, but chose to go underground. Their surface group originally called itself the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee and that was nationwide.

Back in 1977 there was an ideological dispute between the San Francisco office and the New York office of Prairie Fire over their role. The dispute arose when the San Francisco people held that they were the leadership and that they should provide the leadership, direction, and training for all other left-wing terrorist groups in this country. The New York people said, "No, that's not true. We should support and assist, but we should let the blacks and the Chicanos and the Puerto Ricans set their own agendas and their own policies and we should only help them." That dispute was resolved in 1978 in favor of the New York position and that is essentially the position of both organizations today, although they still go under different names. In New York they call it May 19th; in San Francisco they call it Prairie Fire. For all intents and purposes they and Weather Underground are the same people.

Representatives of all of these different groups showed up in Nanuet working together. The BLA people during their term of imprisonment became so dependent on the white radicals in the Weather Underground and Prairie Fire that they have now, essentially, joined into one organization.

The current manifestation of this combination is an outfit called the United Freedom Front. Now, again, I'm going to blur the lines. There have been a series of bombings since December 1982, perpetrated in the names of three different organizations. In the Metropolitan Washington area they've called themselves the Armed Resistance Unit. They hit the War College at Fort Leslie McNair; they hit the Navy Yard in downtown Washington, and the United States Capitol Building, using that name.

Figure 1

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED TASK FORCE



In the Metropolitan New York area, we have had a variety of incidents from a group calling themselves the United Freedom Front, and in one incident the FBI office in Staten Island was bombed by an outfit calling themselves the Revolutionary Fighting Group. We believe that those groups, while they may be discrete units, or different cells, are so closely aligned that for all intents and purposes they are one group. Their ties with Weather Underground are very strong. Although we show this as a dotted line (Figure 2) because we can't prove it, we believe that the ties are there.

The Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit is a group that has for many years been defunct. They operated primarily in the Boston area. They were white radical bombers, primarily, although they did one facility attack on a courthouse. There are a number of similarities with the United Freedom Front in technique and in activities, which would indicate to us that the Front is a resurgence of the Melville-Jackson Unit.

To illustrate some of the similarities: The United Freedom Front on a couple of occasions has made warning calls before their bombs exploded, and those calls were *not* made to the target. The calls were made to an unrelated enterprise, in some cases in the same building as the target, in some cases totally different. That is a tactic used before only by Melville-Jackson; they're the only terrorist group that has ever done that. There are also similarities in their devices that I'd rather not go into because they are evidentiary and may become the subject of a prosecution. But there are enough similarities in the bomb construction, and in the tactics, to lead us to believe that the United Freedom Front consists largely of the remnants of the Melville-Jackson Unit, as well as the Weather Underground.

Now, if you go on to the next chart (Figure 3), you will see that they all come together. At the heart of it is the Weather Underground. They're the hub. These are people that have been in this business now approach ing 20 years. Some of them trace their roots back to the student uprisings: the free speech movement at the University of California at Berkeley back in the early 1960's, the days of rage in Chicago back in the late 1960's, the takeover of Columbia University in New York City.

It is very difficult for me to describe to you the level of dedication of some of these people. David Gilbert of the Weather Underground was arrested in Nanuet and took part in the armored robbery and homicide of the two police officers. He had chosen to go underground, lived underground for something like 10 years when he wasn't even wanted, because that's what he believes in.

And when I say living underground, I don't mean in the Best Western Springfield Inn. These people were living in third- and fourth-floor walkups, maybe hot water, maybe not, sleeping on a pallet on the floor, living off welfare, food stamps, and so forth, not high off the hog, changing their identities, moving around—not a very good way to live at all. But they choose to do it because they believe they are in the vanguard of the revolution in this country. They believe that a mass of people is following them. However strange you may think that, that's who they are—and that's the reality you have to deal with. I can only describe their commitment to their cause as verging on religious zealotry; that's how deeply committed these people are.

Willie Morales of the FALN is another example. Willie Morales blew his hands off trying to put together a pipe bomb out in Elmhurst, New York. By the time the police and the fire department responded, they found Willie using the stubs of his damaged hands to stuff papers down the toilet, so that we couldn't find evidence. I don't think that you and I would react that way if we blew our hands off. But that's how Willie Morales acted. And then he spit at one of the officers and threatened to kill him, when the officer was putting him in the ambulance. You're dealing with a very different breed when you talk about these people.

Don't let that make you think that they're any less difficult to deal with. Another story to illustrate my point: A fellow is driving down the road and one of the wheels comes off his car and rolls down the street. He stops and runs out and gets the tire and brings it back. Now, he notices he's in front of an insane asylum and one of the inmates happens to be looking out the bars. The inmate says, "Hey, pal, why don't you take one nut off the other three wheels and put the tire back on. Then you'd be able to get to a gas station, and you could keep going." Our friend says, "That's really pretty clever. What are you doing in a place like that?" And the inmate says, "Pal, I'm in here because I'm crazy, not because I'm stupid." There's a difference.

You may think these people are crazy, but they are a long way from stupid. David Gilbert, Bernadine Dohrn, several of the others have law degrees. Many of them are college-educated, bright, intelligent people—a little deviant, maybe, but no less bright, and very, very dedicated. They're a tough enemy. They have very strong ties, as you can see from the way we have laid out the chart.

The one group you may not have heard of—up in the top right corner of the chart—the Crusade for Justice—is a Denver-based Chicano left-wing organization. They've done some bombings. They haven't operated for

Figure 2

RECENT ANTI-DEFENSE BOMBINGS



Donald E. Moss

Figure 3

WEATHER UNDERGROUND NETWORK



quite a while, but they're still in existence.

They all revolve around the Weather Underground. The Weather Underground people have tried now for several years to take a "hands-off" policy—to supply the logistics and so forth and not get their hands dirty. They tried this in Nanuet, but we believe the blacks were trying to put their feet to the fire. The people in the BLA and the Republic of New Africa wanted to test the depth of their commitment, and we think they've proven that now.

Figure 4 shows Communique #6 of the United Freedom Front. This is their logo; some of you may recognize the weapon. Communique #6 came without a device. It was mailed to several newspapers and several unions. Essentially, it is a statement to the public saying what their goals are, what their tactics will be, and warning the citizenry. They say very clearly that they will continue to bomb. They say very clearly that they do not intend to cause civilian casualties, and as I said, in many cases they have called and provided warning of their devices. They do *not* say that they do not intend to cause military or police casualties. They only say they don't want to cause *civilian* casualties.

As a matter of fact, on the last device they put down, in Harrison, New York, a week ago tonight, they called the warning in, and 10 minutes later they called back and wanted to know why the police hadn't responded. The police eventually did respond and were unable to find the device because it was hidden behind some shrubbery. Fortunately for them, they had left the immediate area where the device was before it went off, and they were only slightly injured.

The best estimate I've heard so far was that about 10 sticks of dynamite went off, causing major structural damage to the point where that building may not be habitable. Because of that second call, I am led to believe that they are now consciously trying to inflict casualties on the police. They were very insistent that the police should have responded. The device was hidden, a different procedure from some of their devices, which they've placed out in sight and actually painted the word "bomb" on. So, we believe now that there has been a shift in their tactics to where they are trying to injure responding police officers.

They may next go to the old IRA tactic of setting a second bomb off 15 or 20 minutes after the first one, and we all know what that's for.

The targets of these groups have primarily been the military-industrial complex. Most recently they've hit Honeywell, Motorola, and IBM. The communiques on those bombings go into great detail with respect to the specific defense contracts that each of those firms hold. In the case of IBM, they talk primarily about South Africa and the contracts that IBM fulfills for South Africa, which help to maintain the apartheid policies.

But in the case of Honeywell and Motorola, they're very specific about the contracts with the Defense Department. In both of them, they accuse Honeywell and Motorola of manufacturing cluster bombs. They go into great detail about how terrible cluster bombs are because they are antipersonnel devices. They detail all kinds of contracts that both of these firms have. Clearly, they have access to a lot of research.

The other curious thing is that Honeywell, Motorola, and IBM all were subject to major civil disobedience demonstrations last year—Honeywell and Motorola by the antiwar movement back in October 1983, and IBM prior to that.

Based on those two facts, the depth of the research and the commonality of the demonstrations, we believe that the U.F.F. are probably getting their research material from the antiwar movement. I'm sure most of you have seen how detailed the antiwar research can be, and the vast resources that they have available to them in groups like the Public Interest Research Group, and others. The terrorists don't have the wherewithal, they don't have the numbers, to do that kind of research independently. They have to have gotten it from someone else, and because of the coincidence of the demonstrations at Honeywell and Motorola and IBM, we believe that the antiwar movement is probably the source of their information.

I would not suggest, and I don't want anybody to leave with the impression, that I am saying that the terrorists are working for the peace movement, or that there is any knowing connection between them and the peace movement. I think there are probably a lot of legitimate, decent people in the peace movement who are dupes, but I would not in any way suggest that they are behind terrorism.

The terrorists are acting on their own agenda. I'm only suggesting that the peace movement is probably the source of their research material.

What can we do about it, what countermeasures are successful? As I said before, one thing that you can be very sure will work is obvious and overt security, and countersurveillance. They will be put off by a hard target. They will always choose the softer target. That is clear

Figure 4 Communique #6

U.S. IMPERIALISM

Communique #6
January 12, 1984

U.S. OUT OF CENTRAL AMERICA

FREE ALL POW'S + POLITICAL PRISONERS

WARNING NOTICE

MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE - TO ALL CIVILIANS AND WORKERS

The United Freedom Front, a revolutionary anti-imperialist organization, has and will continue to engage in armed attacks on military, police and government installations/personnel and on death merchants, both military contractors and corporations engaged in oppression of the People and exploitation of our resources.

These attacks have taken various forms. The method addressed by this notice is the use of bombs/explosive devices. It is NOT the intention of the United Freedom Front to hurt any innocent civilians and workers and it has been our procedure, when applicable, to give sufficient warning for evacuation of buildings and to use other methods to minimize the chance of personal injury. The following precautions/procedures must be observed:

A.) WHEN A NOTICE HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT A BUILDING/INSTALLATION HAS BEEN TARGETED FOR BOMBING - IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE ALL CIVILIANS AND WORKERS - GET OUT OF THE BUILDING! REMOVE YOURSELF FROM THE VICINITY - STAY A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE AWAY FROM THE BUILDING!

B.) NOW IS THE TIME TO MAKE SURE THAT YOUR BOSSES OR BUILDING MANAGERS HAVE A WELL WORKED OUT AND TESTED PROCEDURE BY WHICH YOU AND YOUR CO-WORKERS ARE IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED OF THE BOMB WARNING AND ALLOWED/INSTRUCTED TO EVACUATE THE BUILDING AT ONCE!

C.) DO NOT TOUCH OR HANDLE ANY UNATTENDED PACKAGES, BAGS, BRIEFCASES, SUITCASES, HANDBAGS, BOXES, ETC.! OBSERVE ANY EXPLICIT WARNINGS ON SUCH PARCELS.

This notice is being distributed to various media, unions, workers groups and community organizations. Please try to see to it that this notice is read by as many people as possible.

U.S. imperialism's tentacles reach throughout the world, causing suffering and death. In Central America, Nicaragua and El Salvador are just two countries where the American government is trying to destroy the struggle of People for their Freedom. There are many more: Puerto Rico, South Africa, the Phillipines, Lebanon, etc., etc. The U.S. government and war profiteer corporations not only take the side of the fascists, but they often engineer events so one murderous gang of generals/fascists after another become the dictators of these countries.

We are in a unique position, being in the U.S. -"the heart of the beast"- to strike a blow for the liberation of People everywhere, including in this country where millions are cold and hungry, without jobs, adequate healthcare or housing; where racist attacks against our People of color are a daily brutal reality; where fascists calling themselves police and correctional officers, swat teams and task forces commit acts of torture and murder daily against our People. As long as these conditions and the system that created them exist, there will be popular opposition and we will be part of it!

UNITED FREEDOM FRONT

in their movement to the suburbs, in that pattern of activity, and it is also clear from informants that we have had, turnarounds, and undercover operations that we have run. They can be put off by visible security. I have even told people in private security, "If you are thinking about putting one of those TV cameras outside, you don't even have to put in the camera, just put the housing up. Make it look like you have a camera, and that will be a deterrent." That kind of thing will put them off.

In the IBM case, the most recent one, IBM was a renter in an office complex. The security guard went off duty at 10 p.m. and there was no replacement. The bomb went off at 10:40 p.m. The first call was at 10:10 and the second call was at 10:20. They were clearly watching the device go off. They knew in advance that the guard was going off at 10 o'clock. They do their homework and you can help to defeat them by watching for them.

Intelligence is helpful. I wouldn't recommend that everybody start his own intelligence unit, but an evaluation doesn't have to be terribly sophisticated. All you need to do is pay attention to what's going on; look at yourself and see whether or not you become a target for these people. Remember that for any successful terrorist operation, they need certain things. They need, as I said before, a symbolic target, but they also need a certain amount of logistics and support.

I don't anticipate the Puerto Ricans going out and working on the West Coast and I don't anticipate Chicanos working in New York City. They don't have the logistics, they don't have the safehouses, they don't have the support network. They work where they have a base of support. They can only range so far from their own base of operation. And, in fact, I think it was in the Honeywell communique from United Freedom Front that they said they were going to continue to operate in the Northeast. They are very specific about that. They're going to go after defense contractors, but in the Northeast. So, if your plant is in the Southwest, you don't have to worry about the United Freedom Front.

Those kinds of intelligence are publicly available. All of that has been in the *New York Times*. It's nothing that you have to have a sophisticated intelligence operation to find out; it's just a matter of carefully reading what is already available.

Physical security is always beneficial, particularly where it is visible, and they can be deterred by it because we know they do their surveillances. Personal security, I don't see a real need for in this country if you're talking about terrorism. As I said before, assassination has not been that common. The only assassinations in this country have been directed at political or diplomatic figures and that is not your problem, that's somebody else's problem. I don't see them going after corporate heads because they say very clearly in their communique that they won't go after civilians. Military and police, they may, but that would probably be more likely in connection with one of their usual activities, such as a bombing.

If you want to keep your guards on the alert, you might mention that to them. If terrorists put a device down in a military installation, they're not going to worry about whether there's a uniformed guard there or not. They will be concerned if there is a civilian guard, but not if he's military. That's very clear in Communique #6.

A good question came up last night: "What would you identify as your biggest problem in security?" My sense—and it's the sense of some other people I've spoken to, particularly people in the Secret Service—is that the most difficult problem we face is not that of getting good people or training good people or putting together a good program, but it is keeping the level of interest up in your human element. It's a very, very difficult problem, and it occurs across the board. For example, in New York City, take a cop who works Harlem for years, makes gun collars, narcotics arrests, shootings become routine; his guard becomes relaxed and that's when he becomes vulnerable. The uniformed member of the Secret Service, walking in the Rose Garden at 2 o'clock in the morning, can very easily become lax and complacent. That's what I'm talking about: How do you keep up that level of interest; how do you keep up that level of alertness?

I don't have the answer, I'm raising the question. I have the physical security for both City Hall and Gracie Mansion, the Mayor's residence, so I know the problem. I have people in my office who have been doing dignitary protection work for 20 years. Every day they go out with different dignitaries—the Turkish Consul General today, and maybe the President tomorrow, and maybe the President of France the next day—and to them that has become routine. It's hard for me to motivate them. It's hard for me to make them think that this is the night that something may happen. This may not be very helpful, but I want to make you think. It is a problem and I don't know how to solve it.

We try all kinds of tricks. On the way out the door we have horror pictures of prior assassinations, and we have mottos and slogans and retraining and so forth, but there's always that doubt in my mind that the man's guard might be lax when it is needed most. I don't have the answers, and I'd like you to think about what can be done.

Deputy Inspector Donald E. Moss is the Commanding Officer of the Public Security Section of the New York City Police Department's Intelligence Division. He has been a member of N.Y.P.D. for 23 years, the last 7 in Intelligence, and holds a B.A. in Social Science from Fordham University. Inspector Moss is responsible for protection of foreign dignitaries and elected officials in New York City, including physical security of City Hall and the mayor's residence, as well as coordination of related intelligence-gathering and threat assessment activities. He has spoken on the subject of terrorism before various groups, including the FBI Academy and the American Society for Industrial Security. He has testified as an expert witness regarding terrorism and is frequently interviewed by press and TV reporters.

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The Face of Terrorism—Policymaking and the Eye of the Beholder

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I have been looking over some of the international statistics on terrorism, and have encountered great variations of numbers in the full scope of data kept by different people. Nobody counts the same way, and very few people outside of government define terrorism the same way. People who have to read a great deal about terrorism could find it an advantage to stick to one source.

According to the Department of State, in the last 5 years there have been 1,559 international terrorist incidents involving U.S. citizens and property as targets. These incidents include the Beirut Marine barracks bombing. In that period, 312 U.S. citizens have been killed and 212 wounded.

In the period 1973 through 1982, the total numbers of international victims of terrorism have been 3,500 killed and 7,600 wounded. Bombings have fluctuated in the 50 to 75 percent range as the cause of terrorist acts each year, and more than a third of deaths from terrorist acts have been attributed to bombing.

Let us go back a few months to a Sunday in October. A yellow Mercedes-Benz stake-bed truck carrying one person accelerated through the public parking lot south of the headquarters of the U.S. Marines' multinational force compound at Beirut International Airport. Everybody is too familiar with what happened then. The truck crashed through both barbed wire and concertina fence, went between two Marine guardposts without being fired on, went through another open gate, steered around one sewer pipe barrier and between two others, ran over the sergeant-of-the-guards sandbag booth at the building's entrance, and actually penetrated the lobby of the building, where it detonated with a force equivalent to more than 12,000 pounds of TNT.

Most of the personnel within the building were asleep as the facility was ripped from its foundation and then imploded upon itself. Again, we are too familiar with the figures: 241 military personnel killed, more than 100 others wounded.

Only 6 months earlier, another vehicle bomb, a pickup truck laden with explosives, had driven into the U.S. embassy in Beirut and detonated. That time 17 Americans and 40 foreign nationals died and another 100-plus were wounded.

Following the Beirut bombing, in December there were multiple bombings in Kuwait, again involving vehicle bombs. Again, an American embassy was severely damaged.

On November 15, a U.S. Navy captain was assassinated in Athens. On January 18, the president of the American University of Beirut was assassinated. On February 15, Ambassador Ray Hunt was assassinated in Italy, and today another U.S. military person, a sergeant assigned to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group in Athens, where the Navy captain also was assigned, was shot and wounded while making his courier rounds. In addition, terrorist factions in Lebanon are now holding captive three Americans, including the embassy's political officer, William Buckley. All were kidnapped.

Now, decisionmakers—and not only those who sit at the very top at the National Security Council level, but also those at other levels—have to ask questions: What is terrorism? How do you define it? When does a specific act fit within definitions, and when doesn't it? How does the government protect against that specific kind of act? Furthermore, they must think about the institutions they are dealing with, because they need to know not only how to govern their own troops and run their own agencies, but also how these other people, who should be having an interplay with them, approach the subject.

My view is that we have basically five institutional perspectives: diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, military, and security. I've broken security out separately because it runs across the breadth of other forms of government establishments. To combat terrorism, all these institutions work within a framework of interagency groups and connections, but they also bring their own particular disciplines, professional training, and conceptual perspectives to the problem.

That situation is neither all good nor all bad. A great deal can be learned from institutional perspectives. They are the normal, bureaucratic responses of agencies of government and these different groups within them—the diplomats, for instance, or law enforcement agents.

On a local level, consider police departments. They have well-established missions. They are circumscribed with jurisdictional and legal structures and managed within powerful political environments, whether international or domestic, federal or local. Equally important, they have battle-tested ways of accomplishing their missions. They have histories of the ideas and methods that work and they also have histories of the things that have failed. In addition, they have experience with shifting perceptions of political and legal acceptability and of the legitimacy of the programs, as well as the seemingly

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pragmatic measures they have taken to combat various problems.

Added to all of those characteristics are police departments' well-seasoned suspicions of the often new priorities and program emphases which follow upon the transfers of political power and the transient assignments of political appointees. These factors—these characteristic institutional perspectives—are essential elements of the policymaking process; in responding to the terrorism phenomenon, we would minimize them at our peril.

Ultimately, the wisest of policies must be executed by the institutions of government. Even special organizations which may be established to concentrate on achieving such policies will be only additional elements in the picture. They probably will be composed of members of the "system" and will have to rely upon the mainstream organizations for support, for removing impediments to execution, and for consistent, coordinated movement toward the policy objectives.

Let us consider the specific group perspectives: The diplomats have an obvious reason to exist—to prevent or resolve conflict without the use of force. They look to international agreements, conventions, and understandings. Certainly that has been the focus of our Department of State since the first planning group formed to deal with international terrorism was established, immediately following the Munich massacre.

The intelligence community is seeking knowledge, assessment, prediction, and—I think both for itself and for its consumers—understanding and warning.

The law enforcement community, with which the other elements of government are not always familiar, views terrorism or terroristic-type events through the concept of crimes and in the milieu of our legal system. Investigations, arrests, prosecutions, and—crossing into the international sphere—extraditions and exchanges of information with organizations such as Interpol are the elements with which they deal.

When we get into the more specific relevance of law enforcement to terrorism itself, or terroristic incidents such as hostage/barricade situations, law enforcement traditionally thinks in terms of saving lives. That happens partly because we have learned, through hard experience, that negotiations in hostage situations usually work out, and partly because we have legal standards of the reasonable and prudent use of force under which we have to operate in a domestic legal environment.

Over the last 12 years, the military as a whole has tended to think about terrorism as an overall phenomenon, as a military threat, especially when you get to the level of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I suggest that U.S. capabilities and overall readiness also have been their concern when thinking about what the military has to do. Other focuses in the military mind have been the military's role in the continental United States or territories and in what kinds of situations domestic military use is justified. This must be a consideration of the extremes of possible terrorist acts, such as the theft of a nuclear weapon or a takeover of a nuclear weapons development facility.

Those concerns have nothing to do with the capabilities of the United States military to mount a rescue operation of American hostages wherever they may be. That is a separate aspect of what has been developed in the military environment, starting in 1978. I do not think that as a whole we have had a unified view, within the military establishment, of terrorism as a national security threat.

Security people look at terrorism in terms of prevention, escape, damage limitation, and containment. Those things all have to be dealt with; all have to be taken into account when we are deciding what should and should not be done about terrorism.

We started off the day with a low-key CSIS view of the problems in the world to come. I can't say that the bureaucratic establishments of the government have necessarily dealt with all of those problems. On the other hand, I have a few good words for all of the agencies. We haven't really done so badly, notwithstanding the disaster at the Marine headquarters, notwithstanding that more than 40 percent of all of the international terrorist incidents involve U.S. interests. I don't think we have done nearly as badly as is sometimes suggested. There is inertia in government and in bureaucracies, and no matter how much dramatic programs are recommended, no matter how much they are pressed, that built-in inertia is hard to overcome. It is difficult to prove that the old standard ways don't work. Unfortunately one of the ways of proving that is to take casualties. We've done that and I think it now has the attention of bureaucracies.

What the various agencies have done has been mainly good. We have taken actions. The intelligence community has been focused on detecting terrorists. Law enforcement agencies have been investigating crimes that appear to be terrorist crimes or involve terrorist

organizations. One can debate whether the priorities have always been timely enough, but they are there now and they have been in place for some time. The FBI made terrorism one of its four principal priorities in October 1982. Very recently, the FBI has established, in operating fashion, the hostage rescue team known as HRT. They have also, in an investigative sense, done severe damage to terrorists within the United States, primarily domestic groups but also groups that have international connections, like the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.

Those steps represent progress. They are deliberate efforts to deal with the problem. We also have systems in which the FBI and others participate to handle nuclear threats and nuclear emergencies. There is a mechanism—perhaps not the best that it could be, but developing and maturing—to respond to chemical and biological threats. We have, as I said, the FBI hostage rescue capability, and we have a military hostage rescue capability.

Through the last 2 years of work on security planning for the 1984 Olympics, we now have the opportunity for new relationships, new cooperative efforts among the Federal agencies, and State and local elements to deal with terrorism on the domestic scene. We hope that the information exchanges, the agreements that have been reached among agencies, and the exercises they have gone through are going to broaden the capability of the United States and its State and local governments to deal with terrorism should it occur in the United States.

On the external side, one of the results of the Beirut bombing was a recommendation that development of a military infusion center to deal with terrorism be considered. At least one of the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense is already working on that concept. Certainly, if that is the right way to address terrorism (and I'm not saying without further examination that that is the way), it has to be integrated with other things that are being done to deal with terrorism, especially with the efforts under the Central Intelligence Agency auspices. Ultimately, the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for all of our foreign intelligence capabilities, but we cannot ignore the necessity of integrating our efforts. The impetus for them is beneficial. The Government is not falling on its face on the subject.

We also have legislation. The action to be taken is not very dramatic, but legislation is being developed to deal with terrorism. Two of the bills do little more than have the United States Government support international conventions (to which it has been a signatory for some time) that deal with terrorists, protection of diplomats, and aircraft hijackings. Two other bills address the problem of American citizens, or others on U.S. soil, who get involved in ventures external to the United States that support terrorism. The fifth bill provides for money to be available, not simply for the payment of informants, but to make cash awards to people who provide information to the United States in international terrorism incidents. That has, through a less than formal system in the past, been beneficial; it permitted at least one U.S. citizen who had been kidnapped to be rescued safe and well because of information received.

On the other hand, things are not perfect. If they were, we might not have had the destruction of the Marine headquarters. Ambassador Hunt might not have been killed. We might not have had another member of the JUSMAG in Athens shot today, we might not have had a political officer from our embassy and two other Americans kidnapped and missing in Lebanon at this time. We might not have had the explosions in Kuwait. And we might have a better sense of how to deal with the deluge of terrorist threats that are constantly coming in.

There is a problem with the Beirut bombing that portends a lot more effort on the U.S. Government's part. There is very possibly a perception of U.S. vulnerability, greater than actually exists, to the successful acts of terrorism and their ability to influence our national policy. The withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut, whether predicated upon a decision that any further losses would be unacceptable because of the bombing of that headquarters or whether predicated on a mix of other national security reasons, is still easily susceptible to an interpretation that it was the result, almost exclusively, of a failure of U.S. foreign policy because our Marines were killed. It has been so interpreted by a great proportion of the press.

That is one of the perceptions that we are going to have to deal with. Other things that we're dealing with, some of which have arisen out of Lebanon and others which have not, are the increased targeting of American diplomats and American military personnel; a targeting of Americans because they are Americans; and a greater targeting of people versus property.

Those tendencies are mixed in with other ominous long-term trends. There are more serious threats to human life from terrorism than there have been previously. There are more assassinations, there have been more mass casualty attacks, there is a global geographic

spread, there is this phenomenon (and quite apparently a growing phenomenon) of state-sponsored terrorism, and there are more terrorist groups of smaller sizes, meaning they are more difficult to penetrate and more difficult to identify.

The U.S. experience in Lebanon has introduced a new factor that we have now dealt with on more than one occasion: suicidal terrorism. We are also dealing with religious fanaticism and with religious fanaticism mixed with political objectives. This is a new force in the phenomenon of terrorism. In contrast to the targeting of U.S. military personnel because they are part of U.S. armed forces, we have now had the targeting of a particular military force—the actual entity there to carry out a mission—and that is new.

We have also had, in that very event, the use of a very unconventional means of violence against a conventional military force. The fact that the conventional military force was in an unconventional job does not change the fact that we have had a shift in the kinds of things that terrorists are doing and are willing to undertake. It is an aspect that cannot be ignored, because it has occurred elsewhere. The very attacks that we have been susceptible to have also been used against the French. Thus the weapon is not exclusively an anti-U.S. measure.

There has also been one other change from Lebanon: U.S. national political will was tested, and it can be perceived that the testing of that will was successful. On the other hand again, we have to be cautious about Lebanon and about drawing lessons from it. All of our plans and strategies should not now begin to be devised with Lebanon as the predicate. I have very mixed feelings about the events there. I've just listed the things that I think are changes and these may be very significant changes. They may shift the whole framework of terrorism. On the other hand, it is a unique environment. It is civil war overlaid with religious divisions. A variety of foreign forces are occupying Lebanon for different purposes. There is major external state support for some of those forces even though the state itself does not have troops in there; that's obviously Iran. And, we've also had our own forces and other troops of the multinational force there in a noncombat posture.

Now, what does all of this have to do with policymaking in the area of terrorism? One thing that is apparent is that changes are being talked about and are beginning to occur in the Federal Government. The changes are going to range across all of the spheres of institutional interests I've mentioned. The policymakers have to understand that the changes are likely to be far-reaching, and they also have to realize that, while on an agency-by-agency basis we've been pretty good up to now, one cannot suggest that that is good enough. There has been cooperation, there has been joint planning, but we need more. The shifts in the terrorist phenomenon that we are seeing imply that we have to have a much closer integration of our plans, our policies, and the methods that the Federal Government plans to use in countering terrorism.

The President and the National Security Council can develop dramatically important policy on how to deal with terrorism, but policy is basically a statement of principles and attitudes. That would not be sufficient. We have to have strategy and it has to be an integrated national strategy to start carrying out that policy. The decisionmakers, the policymakers, and the various elements of government have to start attempting to pull those disparate elements together and coordinate their planning efforts.

I am not suggesting that we need another agency to do things. To me that's one of the worst government actions: The first time it decides that a phenomenon which has existed for some time has become a crucial problem, somebody starts reorganizing. I'm really not in favor of that. If people make some change in what they have, that may be very beneficial. Maybe get rid of something? That may be helpful. To put a couple of things together, that may also be a good idea. This does not mean that we need some new body, as many observers have suggested, to take care of terrorism. First of all, we have the very real legal limitations I've mentioned in dealing in these different environments; they don't all fit together in a nice package where one kind of person and one group of personnel can handle the problem. We do have to integrate the kind of activities that are going to be undertaken. Without that, we will not have strategy.

We also need a much wider perspective, a perspective other than institutional. Such a perspective might possibly emerge through the National Security Council apparatus. I would call it a national security perspective. We have to take into account the different measures. We cannot look only to military solutions, whether state-sponsored terrorism is the specific threat, or whether it's state-sponsored terrorism in other forms, or simply well-organized terrorism. Military responses alone are not going to be sufficient. We are going to have to deal with terrorism as a law enforcement problem domestically, we are going to have to deal with it as a law enforcement problem in other countries we work with, and we are going to have to continue to work through diplomatic

means. Without that concerted approach, we will never reach the kind of agreements we need either to execute military options in a manner that will be acceptable or to have law enforcement cooperation in a manner that really addresses the phenomenon.

In addition, when seeking a better means of addressing terrorism, we have to go back and look at Lebanon and all the other shifts that we have seen in the terrorism phenomenon since 1972. I don't count the years before 1972, because despite the fact that lots of incidents of terrorism occurred around the world, despite the fact that we had our own domestic groups which could be termed to be committing terrorist acts, the U.S. Government didn't start calling these activities terrorism until after the Munich massacre.

Some of the things that the policymakers and the operational personnel, the intelligence analysts, the law enforcement personnel are going to have to be looking for and worrying about are the variables of terrorism. The graph of terrorism has shown a steady escalation, with some peaks and some valleys but a gradual upward creep, in all of its dimensions over its years of existence. We have to look for some of the characteristics that are repeated constantly in terrorism and other acts of shocking violence. We have now had a number of vehicle bombings and we have also had, as a result of that technique, mass casualties. We may not have more vehicle bombings, we may not have copycats, but we may have, now that the threshold of taking large numbers of lives in a single act has been crossed, more attempts to inflict mass casualties, whether on U.S. military personnel, other U.S. interests, or civilians.

We also have to look at some of the other political, military, and cultural factors that are present in the world, and their relationship to terrorism, particularly when we bring in concern over state-sponsored terrorism.

Somewhere in the spectrum of what political scientists might refer to as unconventional or low-level conflict, terrorism falls both as a tactic and as a phenomenon in itself. We have to look at other events with that in mind. The Iran-Iraq war, for example: Not only does it offer a major threat to national security interests in that whole region, but it also has a direct relationship to acts of terrorism we've just suffered. Products of the Iran-Iraq war could change the concepts of what is acceptable for terrorists. We recently had a situation in which there were many reports of Iraq using mustard gas and attempting to assemble the facilities to produce nerve gas. We have also had seizures by the U.S. Customs Service of a number of chemicals destined for Iraq that could have been turned into nerve gas if they had arrived.

There has also been a recent publication from a private group on the question of chemical weaponry and biological weaponry as "the poor man's alternative" to the atomic bomb. One of the points made was that in Lebanon, when the Israelis invaded, they discovered documentation and other proof that there had been Soviet and Eastern bloc training for terrorist and guerrilla forces in the use of chemical weapons.

We also have the phenomenon of terrorism mixed in with the civil war that is ongoing in Central America. In addition to having troops fighting irregular guerrillas in the countrysides, you also have terrorists in the cities committing assassinations of political personalities on both the left and right. That phenomenon is also an aspect of the overall problem that is not a neat fabric. It is not readily understandable, it is not readily discernible as a single trend or a single problem we can deal with in one manner.

We're also going to have to deal with the question of other technologies. Will a terrorist group, especially a state-sponsored terrorist group, be able to go nuclear? Will they steal a nuclear weapon? I'm not going to get into prediction, but a lot of people here are going to have to worry about that prediction.

Overall, through an integration of the various kinds of viewpoints that government agencies bring to dealing with terrorism, and through an integration of the activities they are taking and the policy and strategy developed from the White House, we are going to have to be able to deal with a changing fabric of a phenomenon. When we can do that, when policymakers realize that that is the direction they have to go, we will be on the road to dealing with the problem as an entire concept. Until that time we are going to have agencies doing their own jobs fairly well, but they are going to be doing them in environments that are too independent to bring actions together in the most effective combination.

A comparison of terrorism to flies and cockroaches is illustrative. While we can "swat and squash" terrorists just as we can those pests, both of those insects are virtually ineradicable and also have, over the millenia, demonstrated remarkable adaptive capabilities. A mutant terrorism, like a mutation of the fly and cockroach, may produce the ultimate survivor. We may need a great deal of premutation extermination.

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Preparing Personnel to Live with a Protean Terrorist Threat

Billy Hix
Chief, Physical Security, Central Intelligence Agency

I've been getting questions about what does this word *protean* mean and why I am using it. Well, I don't remember where I learned it, but it has to do with the monster from Greek mythology that had the ability to change forms and it was always grotesque. I don't think there's a better description of terrorism anywhere and it saves me about a paragraph of discussion.

Several people have mentioned that almost everything that we do or are involved in is a matter of perception. What I'm going to tell you will be a matter of perception. It will be, in part, a matter of my perceptions and, in part, of the perceptions of my people who work around the world. I'd better tell you that I'm the chief of physical security, not the director of security of the Agency, and that does include the safety and well-being of our people and our assets all over the world as well as in the United States.

I heard a story which I think will illustrate the issue of perspectives. It involves a rabbi and a priest and a minister who were having a discussion about when life begins. The priest said, "Morally, life begins at conception, there is absolutely no question about it." The minister said, "Well, I think it's an established scientific fact that life begins between the fifth and seventh month after conception." The rabbi hesitated and then said, "Well, you both have a point, but in fact, life begins when the children grow up and leave home and the dogs die."

So, there's room for a lot of different perceptions and what I'm going to bring you are mine. I'm going to tell you one other story. I'm not sure I know what it means. I've thought a lot about it, I've asked a lot of people, but I do know that it has to do with the fact that we do not understand terrorism.

Two years ago on an Easter Sunday, I was sitting with a senior Jordanian military officer and some other people on a picnic, overlooking the Dead Sea. We were talking, and I said, "You know what's wrong in the Middle East? I know all of the institutional things that we read and I studied the Bible when I was a kid in Tennessee and so on, but I really don't understand it, nothing I've heard or any place I go." So, he told me a story. He said that it was an Arab story.

One day a tortoise was down on the edge of the Jordan River (those of you who have seen the Jordan know that it really isn't a very big stream to have had so much to do as it has had over the years). The tortoise was getting ready to cross the Jordan and a scorpion, a deadly scorpion, came up and said to the tortoise, "How about giving me a ride over to the other side?" And the tortoise said, "I'd like to, but I know you and I know your reputation and we'd get out in the middle of the river and you'd sting me and I'd drown." The scorpion thought a minute and he said, "No, I wouldn't do that because I can't swim, you know that, and I'd drown." So the tortoise contemplated that and against his better judgment he said, "Okay, get on, let's go." And so he paddled out and he was about halfway across the river and all of a sudden the scorpion stung him. As the tortoise was getting his last gasp of breath going down for the final time, he said, "Why did you do that? Now, you're going to drown too." And the scorpion said, "That's the way things are in the Middle East."

About 10 days after this occurred, I was taking a tour of Israel with an Israeli tourist guide—she's from Boston, went over there to live on a kibbutz and stayed. We were having lunch, the whole group of about 30 people, and she told the group that same story, so help me.

Two days before the Marine debacle at Beirut, sitting in the lobby of the Riviera Hotel in the Druse section, the manager of the hotel told me and the man traveling with us the same story. That's what you get, or at least that's what I got, when people are trying to explain the Middle East or terrorism in general, and I think that's where we really are where terrorism is concerned. We don't understand it. We've studied it and we know it has new dimensions and new forms. We've established task forces—I've been on two or three of them—and we've written papers until we were all crippled. Careers have been made and broken on them and I still don't think we understand terrorism.

I don't endorse the theory that we can't be proactive; I wish we could. But the nature of our society and the policy limitations we have, the way we operate as multinational corporations, the sense that we seldom have enough information to be proactive and, even if we do, the political apparatus or other circumstances beyond our control—all this keeps us from being proactive. Obviously there are exceptions but, generally speaking, against a terrorist trend we are not proactive.

Everybody has statistics. Somebody else mentioned there were 1,500-plus terrorist acts against Americans over a period of years. In preparation for this talk I asked our people to do a run for me on terrorism worldwide for the calendar year 1983. They gave me separate sheets this thick on 569 terrorist incidents worldwide in the calendar year 1983: kidnappings, barricades, hostage occupation, letter bombings, explosive bombings, things like Beirut, Ireland, crimes against U.S. business both at home and abroad, missile attacks, takeovers, assassinations (some of which you heard about and some of which,

I hope, you have not heard about), sabotage, break-ins, conspiracy, sniping, and on and on and on.

The forecast, as you've already heard here from the people who are able to speak a good deal more profoundly than I am, is for more and worse in the coming decade. I listened to General Williams from the Defense Intelligence Agency speak about 3 months ago on the forecast for the next two decades about pure terrorist acts, and it made me want to defect. It's there, ever-changing, consistently grotesque, always changing in forms, people using others' infrastructure.

My colleague from the New York City Police Department said he doesn't think the Chicanos will ever use the Puerto Rican infrastructure. I wish I believed that. I've seen in Europe places where people who don't speak to each other, who are cultures apart, use the infrastructure. It's there, they're oriented in that direction, they don't even care whom they're against. It's an opportunity to do something against the establishment. This covers everything from the "Golden Youth" of Germany to the completely disenfranchised in the form of the PLO. Terrorism does change and it's hard to get a handle on.

Now, what do we do when we have events like we had in Jerusalem where people were just in the market or riding the bus, or in Athens where you can't go to work without getting killed, or in Beirut, which you've already heard enough about, or in Kuwait where we're lucky as hell they didn't blow up the whole city. Only about 10 percent of the explosives went off—the boosters did not go—and they went to the wrong building in the compound. Otherwise, nothing would be there.

What has been our reaction? We have the head-in-the-sand syndrome. I used to have a cartoon on the wall in my office; when you have your head in the sand, your butt's up in the air and you're easy to kick. We've had the react syndrome. Out in our headquarters we have spent more money on concrete than Yeonas has, building barricades around the place. We've used every bus that we could find across our roadways at night so that the terrorist won't come in with 4,000 pounds of explosives. Who says that it has to be 4,000 pounds of explosives? Why can't they ride in on the bus? Who says they have to go under your building? Who says there isn't a threat?

But that's what we've done. We've reacted to whatever came along and I think that's what we'll continue to do. I don't know that I really think there's a choice, as far as what we can do, except the things that have already been mentioned. But I do have a plan. It isn't my plan. It's a plan that we have come upon, largely by trial and error. We've worked with some of the other people in training and indoctrination; we used the flow of intelligence that we get, usually belatedly, from the different areas in trying to equip our people going into the field and to prepare ourselves for briefings.

Because we have to continue to operate (because that's the business we're in, whether we're the U.S. Government, whether we're an intelligence operation, whether we're an open civil agency, whether we're a multinational corporation operating in South Africa or Central America), we have to find ways of strengthening our people's ability to survive in the field.

Some of our people are out-and-out CIA around the world, and that's a little tough. Many of you who have worked with our people in different places say, "Well, hell, everybody knows who they are no matter what they say they are," and I suspect you're right. But maybe not always, maybe not always. At least our Chief of Station in Athens, whoever he is, doesn't have to wear a uniform, and I hope to God he doesn't go to work the same way every day because if he does, they're going to kill him. And that's the message I'm going to bring you. If you take the easy way out, if you don't take it on your own shoulders, you're going to die if they want you. Even if they can't get your boss, they'll get you, because maybe he's more prudent or has better protection, and any one American is better than no American.

So, how are we going to do this? How are we going to strengthen our people's ability or prepare them to cope with the problems in the field? Well, at the risk of sounding like somebody giving a military presentation at the height of his career, let me say that we are going to select the people, train them, condition them, educate them, support them whenever we can, monitor their existence in the field on a contemporary basis, evaluate how they're doing whenever we can, and sometimes pull them out, for a variety of reasons. I hope you'll see it from my perspective as I go along.

The selection of people for the right job at the right location is an overwhelming task without adding the terrorist element, and I won't dwell on those problems. We test our people to death and then about five or six of us sit down at a career board and say, "I don't care what the tests say, this guy's no good, or this is a great guy."

Suffice it to say that the foundation on which this issue or any other issue relies is the building of your people to go along with you and try to live in a particular environment. If they can't live and function in a particular environment, whether it's in Germany because they drink too much beer and can't make it to their post on time or whether it's someplace like Beirut where they

come unglued, then you have no show. You have got to have people who are producing, or else you're just flying the flag and the terrorists have already won. We've already seen that in some places, officially, around the world where we've become virtually paralyzed by the fact that we've gone into a siege posture. There's no getting around it, that has happened and it's happened sometimes without a shot being fired.

I remember in Turkey in 1980 (there are a couple of people here who were there), I went down to help the military people on a couple of investigations where four Americans were killed. They had been going home the same route every day for 3 or 4 years; one was a GI and the other three were civilians. The terrorists were sitting waiting for them and they had really cased the place, they knew where they stopped every day, they had exit routes and everything else. So, what we did was overreact.

In fact, the terrorists in Turkey were just a few—but deadly—ultra-left-wingers. But, all of a sudden, all of the American contractors pulled out. The school buses had guards on them—I don't think the Turks kill women and children (maybe in blood feuds, but they didn't even do that to the Armenians, at least not out in public). We had a belated assessment—six people got killed, four in one group, two in another very quickly—and so we were paralyzed.

After that the State Department and their enhancement program, with our people helping them, and a lot of other government agencies, started in Turkey. About 2 years later we finally got some systems in effect and some enhanced briefings that we thought would help people. By then the junta had taken over, and there's probably not a safer place in the world to live than in Turkey.

You've got to find some way to help your people now instead of 2 years down the line. You can't overreact or yo have no program at all. What we think is that you have to select the right people, you have to try to equip them to live in a lot of different places. Think about it. We're talking about places like Capitol Hill. There was a bomb on Capitol Hill.

We get rumors that there are bombs down in Rosslyn; we have a couple of buildings down there that are open CIA. You'd think they were in Saigon. Every morning they're calling my headquarters security branch saying, "What are we going to do, they're gonna blow us up, they can get under our vehicle." How many 4,000-pound vehicles of explosives have ever blown up in Washington, D.C., or Arlington, Virginia? It doesn't do any good to tell people that it might happen with a trailer truck loaded with gasoline, that terrorists don't need 4,000 pounds of explosives. Or they can stand outside and wait for you to come out, they don't have to come in after you. Everybody's scared. It happens, and it's going to happen again and again, so we're trying to select our people a little better and we're also trying to condition them.

You go to Beirut and there are still Americans living in Beirut, there are still bakers in Beirut, there are still official people in Beirut—State Department, military people, other people. Beirut is a combat zone with amenities, pure and simple. There are about two or three hotels in the whole town where the lights don't go off all the time, where you can still drink your wine, but probably your waiter and probably the lady who takes care of your room are reporting on you. They know what time you leave, just like they knew when Colonel Dorman walked out the front door of the Riviera Hotel. There wasn't any place else he could live because all of the rooms are taken in the Durford Building; the senior State Department people are already in there, and they're wise, see, they don't have to walk as far, they're not out on the street.

So, how do you go about getting your people prepared to live? You select good people and then you start to condition them. You've got to get people who have their heads screwed on and it really isn't always easy. You know, macho is good at happy hour but it ain't worth a damn when you're out on the street. It'll get you killed; it'll get you killed quickly. It's good when you're a PFC in a rifle company, but those of you who have lived through combat and are now colonels sitting in this audience, you know that it doesn't work too long. It doesn't work with the terrorist. You're not fighting somebody who is playing by our rules.

We try to condition our people. What does this mean? As a nation, I think we have a very difficult time in individually overcoming our cultural biases. I think we are basically a very decent people who are reared with very sound institutions. We are brought up to believe that the purpose of government is to give us peace and security. We're brought up to believe that basically people are good, and it's hard for us to accept that some people are no damn good (even when we get bad fitness reports, and things like that).

So it's very difficult to get our people, *any* American, to believe that there are other people out there who do not have our values and who look at things totally differently than we do. But if you can't do that, then there

will really be trouble when you send people to live in Afghanistan, in Pakistan and Central America, in Beirut and other places, or if you send them on vacation up in San Sebastian in Spain and they look like they're not Basque, they're liable to get shot on the sidewalk. It actually happened, as many of you know.

About 3 years ago in Madrid, a prosperous Spanish lawyer who lived in a five-unit luxury apartment was shot coming out of his building; he was almost identical in appearance with the leader of the B'nai B'rith in Spain, and the PLO shot him, right in front of his 5-year-old son. He was the victim of coincidence, but he's dead. What do you do about that? I don't know, but you have to think about it.

If you're an American overseas, or here in the States in some areas, you have to believe that there are a lot of people out there who don't have your values. You have to try, even though you may become cynical before your time, to believe as they believe or at least put yourself on their side of the fence and think that way. We try to tell our people that—with limited success, I might add. I don't want to leave you with the impression that we have a panacea.

We try to condition our people by telling them who the terrorists are and why they are terrorists. What are their values? Do they really have values? How can you identify with the values of a kid who has lived in a PLO compound in Syria and been fed pablum about how bad the West and the Israelis are all his life? They're into the second or third generation in some cases and there's no greater accomplishment for them than to get out of the camp and go out and kill a few people. We can't identify with that—at least I can't, and I grew up in a place where we loved everybody except Yankees.

We try to instill caution in our people, but fairly brave caution. Otherwise you're hiding and you slink and you become unglued. We have some training programs where we help brainwash our people into believing, "Yeah, you can live there and it'll be all right, if you'll just watch what you're doing." Again, we try to leave them with the warm fuzzy feeling, give them a little confidence.

We hope what comes out of this conditioning is that our people are sensitized to the environment they're going into, that they at least have some idea about what's happening and enough sense to talk to people and be prudent in what they do. Somebody has said that we hope they end up with a disciplined paranoia, whatever that is. They've got to believe, "They're going to get me, but I'm going to be disciplined and I'm going to be careful and if they get me it's going to be because of an accident, not because I was easy," and we work on that.

But, I have to tell you: It's a short hop from sensitizing people, from making them sensitive to their environment and equipping them to live with it, to fear. It is very difficult to draw that line, and we have to be very careful. We've talked to our psychologists about it; they review our people in the field, and so does the State Department, the military, everybody else, especially in certain areas. Sometimes my people visit and they come back and one will say, "You know, I was having dinner with this guy and he's going to come unglued," and you go back and look in the records and you don't find any signs of it—he seemed to be one who was going to do well. It will take its toll after they've been there for a while.

We ask them to know the enemy, at least know who the enemy is likely to be, so they can stay away from them. Why? We talk to them about things like the Turkey example, where they really don't hate the Turks: "Don't be scared to death of the Turks, they're not all bad, they don't hate Americans—maybe they should, the way we treat them, but they don't. So, realize, don't stand out on the corner every morning at the same time with your uniform on with all the medals on it, that's all, and don't tell your housekeeper that you're really not a GS-5, you're a GS-18 and you're undercover, because then they'll be looking for you, and they'll get you."

There are all kinds of terrorist threats, so you have to equip people to live. I'll give you a few examples, like Turkey I've talked about:

- The capital building in Spain, where you're liable to get killed for being in the wrong place, eating at the best tofa bar in town.
- Chang Mi, Thailand, where a couple of Americans who had nothing to do with the official establishment have been killed. People thought they were Drug Enforcement Administration people, and that's Dodge City in 1870 out there, so it's a different kind of terrorism.
- Paris. All kinds of people have been killed in Paris, and more of them are going to get killed in Paris. We make it easy for the killers. Even the Israeli who was killed in the lobby of his apartment had his guard down. It's not much trouble to kill somebody who walks down the street every morning at the same place in his uniform, waiting to get in the car.

We're all creatures of habit. It's hard, if not impossible, to overcome it, but if you want to live out there

you have to work on it. That's what we try to condition our people to believe.

We train them. We try to educate them in addition to conditioning them. Some people say that is brainwashing, but I don't agree. For example, we teach defensive driving—that's a valid technique. A few years ago in South America the favored technique of two or three groups was blocking streets and killing people or kidnapping them, so we got into the defensive driving business in a big way. It's no help in a place like Beirut, because the streets are too narrow and half of the cars are sitting there bombed out or they are potential bombs. So you don't have much of a chance in such a place because you have no room to maneuver. But it is applicable in many parts of the world, certainly in a place like Paris or Buenos Aires.

We try to teach our people through various exercises to work on around-the-clock awareness. We have a little exercise that we call the good neighbor policy. I hope you won't go away thinking that everybody's as cynical as I am, but the good neighbor policy is where you make your house and your family a harder target then the guy who lives down the street and has the same grade that you have, so that when the terrorists come and they can't watch you with any regularity, they'll go down and get him instead.

We teach our people area familiarization. Some of them are experts already. I think an expert is a fool more than 35 miles away from home. We teach our people hostage survival. We have a special course in that. We don't teach all of them, but we teach the people who are going into certain areas how to survive a hostage environment—and there have been some cases where they managed to do it. The State Department does a pretty good job, belatedly, on the same thing. A number of people out in industry purport to do a good job and I have to assume that they do, since I've never been a hostage and had to be rescued by them.

We teach our people what's available in the way of hardware, like armoring for vehicles and what it costs and whether we think they ought to use it in particular areas. I might add that there's a great deal of disagreement in-house on what is prudent in some places and what is not.

We tell them about Kevlar [an extremely lightweight material used for bullet proof vests] and we tell them about various security hardware for their homes and things of that sort, but we try to leave them with the belief that all of this isn't worth anything unless they, as individuals, are willing to accept the fact that they're the target and that their survival is first and foremost and always their responsibility. It's hard to do, almost impossible to do. But you have to keep trying and maybe we save a few along the way. They have to admit to themselves that they're potential targets. All of us like to feel important. It's unbelievable, the lies you can hear at a bar at an embassy, or if you go someplace and you listen to people who don't know you know them. You don't want to do that, you really don't, because you'll wind up getting hit, sure as a whirl.

I made a note to myself here that we have to work on awareness, we have to work on routines and all of the things that all of you heard and have seen in the handouts. Last week, when the British Government man was shot in Greece, the last sentence in the *Washington Post* story on that incident said he and three of his Greek colleagues were riding home from work by the route that they always took. Now, do you want to be killed, want to be a hero? Go home the same way every day. I can give you 40 cases where this has happened around the world, businessmen in Iran, people in Central America. Roll down the window to listen, if you're in an armored car and you're down in Central America, you're asking for it. You'll get it if you look like an American, especially if you're wearing fatigues or a three-piece suit. It may not even be a terrorist. In Beirut it may be a lady going to work, she'd have a gun in a bread basket or something. So, you'll have to watch it. Be a hard target. I already mentioned that, send them next door.

But the other thing you have to do is train yourself and sometimes even your family, depending on the environment you're in. You'd be surprised what kids see. You have to train them—you and your family and other people—to be observant. You have to come to the place that you can detect surveillance. Everybody involved in surveillance is not like the people in the old Criminal Investigation Division "white shoes" training films, which some of you remember. They're also not trained—people from behind the Iron Curtain or people who are wearing outrageous uniforms or people who are wearing beards or are looking out from behind capes or have daggers in their mouths. Surveillants are all kinds of people. In the Middle East they may be children. More often than not, they will not be people that you have seen before and they won't be the people who come there to kill you. They'll be some other folks sent around to take a look at you. You can talk to your neighbors and find out, if they're locals, why these people are here, have they been here before.

I guarantee you that surveillance will be present if

you are going to become a target specifically because you are an American. If you just have some people in town who decide they're going to kill somebody and walk out, that's a different ballgame, but in the classical sense of terrorism, you will find surveillance. It will be there, sometimes for weeks, sometimes longer. If you are a hard target, unless you're a General Dozier, they'll go somewhere else. They usually will make a "go/no-go" on a single hit, based on their casing and how well they can follow your routes and where you're moving. We try to teach our people this. We remind them over and over and over again. In some cases we have not been successful and the people didn't make it. They might have been had otherwise, but we like to think that they had a chance.

Most hits that we know about do not come in homes. General Dozier is an exception. That was a kidnapping, not an assassination. I think it's a miracle that he got out alive, and I still don't understand how it happened, but I thank God for it. Generally speaking, terrorists are fairly rational even if somebody said that they're crazy; they're bright, they're not stupid. They don't go into 10-story buildings after people, except maybe the Israelis with their hit teams and they're so professional that it doesn't matter, or at least that's what I've read. Terrorists will wait for you to come out on the street. Why should they come inside after you? And, if you do get people coming inside after you, except in a pseudo-military operation, most of the time they may not stay if you have got a noisemaker or a radio or if you shoot off a gun. We've had cases where this happened, even in the Middle East, because they were sent in, it was a first-time deal for them, and maybe they didn't get a double dose of Khomeini or whatever happened.

We teach our people to be careful about traveling, using main roads, following different routes. I have about 15 examples here where people have been zapped because they went the same way every day at the same time or they sat in the same cafe or what have you. Terrorists use different ploys. We tell our people about the ploys. There are pages of them, things like people masquerading as policemen, runners (which seems to be an Armenian tactic), people pushing baby carriages, either in front of a vehicle or actually using them as a dodge. We have a couple of examples where this has happened in so-called civilized society, where people have literally been lured into looking in a baby carriage and zapped. So it happens. Another thing that has happened—children, children have been used to divert people. Emergency calls ascertain where you are or get you to come to a particular place, where they sometimes blow you up.

They've been able to get people at lunches pretty easily because people eat at the same place every day, drink too much wine, or what have you—even in Beirut. Even in Beirut in October, I saw Americans who went to the same little sandwich bar every day. A guy's been kidnapped there since then. They went there every day at the same time in the same car to pick up their sandwiches. You know, "Who's gonna get me? I'm a good old boy from Culpeper, Virginia, who would want to capture me?" Well, they've got him—I don't know, maybe we'll find out who did it one of these days.

We try to tell our people never to relax. We tell them that it will be them, not because they're necessarily a primary target but because the killers can't get to the hard target and any American is better than no American if you are sent out to do a job and you can't get the guy you're going after. Sometimes they don't know who they're going after. Frequently they don't give a damn who they're going after.

Residential security—we teach our people about servants, procedures. We remind them that once a terrorist is inside the house he's no longer on the offensive, so he's not likely to come.

We talk to them about weapons. We've been arguing in our business, debating whether our people ought to have weapons and where they ought to have weapons, since I came to this organization. At this point, I'm still prepared to say, except on a case-by-case basis, "If you don't have trained people whose mission would ordinarily give them a gun, don't give it to them. If you do, somebody's gonna get killed or in jail." That's my own position. Contrary to the James Bond movies, many of our people are analysts and many of our case officers and our communicators and the people who spent a good deal of their lives overseas are not really much with weapons. We have some people who do do that sort of thing, but we have found over the years that giving guns to Americans who are not disciplined, trained in school with weapons, is looking for a disaster. We do arm or advocate arming some of our people in some places for what we think are very good reasons, or we cover them in some activities with countersurveillance that's armed. But there is no policy to arm people unilaterally and routinely, because we think it's counterproductive.

We teach our people to get along with the neighbors. We tell them they have to build a safe haven in their house, not to hold out against the hordes, but if they're in an area where there's a fairly reliable police force and

they have any kind of communications with a base station (which most Americans, including multinational corporations, either should have or do have around the world today), they can hold out against some people in a safe haven in a house for 15 or 20 minutes or more. We also recommend escape routes. We've had at least one case where a man is alive today in Turkey because he had an escape route, because he was paranoid and he had a rope out the bathroom window. Without that rope he would have been a dead man because they came in after him. They were after him because he was an American, but also because he was having an affair with a local lady and they felt that they would never be accused. They didn't want credit for it.

We tell our people that they must brief their families, on strangers, on servicemen, on packages, on calls, on mail. We tell them that all of the family, the children included, must have emergency numbers and check-in times. Finally we tell them, "Be sure that your personal affairs are in order and that somebody knows where all of your papers are and what to do—not because we think everybody's going to get killed, but because of the business you're in." We're trying to take care of people, we're trying to support them, we're trying to make them feel like they belong to an entity, whether it's a multinational corporation or the CIA, where somebody cares. And you really have chaos when the principal of the family disappears, nobody knows where the checkbook is, or the will, or anything else. So, we work on that too.

I have a list of tactics here, different tactics terrorists use in different places, and I'll touch on those briefly. One of the things that we found is that if you're on foot, you'll be apprehended. We've had people apprehended. Almost everybody here that's in a big outfit has had people apprehended when they were walking; some of them have been turned loose. Sometimes it happens in the "have and have not" nations and then it really isn't terrorism, except to the individual who is grabbed.

People have been killed not only by weapons but by vehicles. Three years ago in South America several Americans were zapped, run over by vehicles on the street.

Remote detonated charges, you've heard that. Everybody knows about the case of the Cubans here in Washington. I'm not sure we trained those people, but they sure did a good job. It seems to be a favorite tactic more and more, especially with the Iranians.

People have been killed by mines. When I was in Europe a few years ago I remember being notified that x number of truckloads of antitank mines were missing over a period of years from Army arsenals in Germany. Subsequent to the General Haig incident, people wondered where the explosives came from. What I'm surprised at is that they didn't blow up all of NATO, rather that just one car.

We tell our people that you can't feel safe socially. You can't feel safe shopping. We have a good example of that in Jerusalem and it can happen anywhere else where there are cranks. We talk too about the random acts we are getting more and more, not in an effort to scare them but so they will at least be aware of the problem. The Harrods incident in England is a good example, the Israeli buses, the recent bombing in Amman where one bomb went off in the courtyard across from the American embassy and four more were found and disarmed in the Intercontinental Hotel, just before the Queen arrived. So there you are in the Intercontinental, on a good Baptist tour from the Middle West, and you get blown up.

We try to tell our people to try to control their vehicles. Those of you who have been in Vietnam and other hazardous places know that that is standard but very difficult. You have to know your vehicle, you have to know what it looks like so that you can at least see if somebody's stuck something on it. Some of our people use different little traps on their gas tanks to be sure that nobody's been fooling around with them. Whether it has saved anybody, I don't know, but it makes us feel better. It's one more measure, and it's good to get in a routine of doing things that will protect you as you go along.

We tell our people to know where their dependents are at all times. Dependents have been used many times as lures, and it is a good way to get even the toughest among us into the wrong place at the right time.

Now, after we try to educate and train and condition our people, we recommend trying to monitor them. I know that some multinational corporations do this, at least with their key people. Try to develop a profile approach on your people, depending on their location and their particular task and whether you think they're a threat or not. It is a subjective thing, in spite of everything that we do.

This approach can be used to provide alerting data on critical personnel, but you have to be careful in setting priorities, because, if you're a Government agency, you can burn out all your resources on the wrong target.

You have to stay on top of what's happening with your people after they get out there. We're in contact with our people, both domestically and in the field. We

have good communications, but we don't have someone out there looking around as often as we'd like. We try to support our people. We try to be responsive to their needs while they're in the field.

We try to recognize it if some of them become alarmists, and sometimes we do. Now, that's a real task. I don't suppose people in big multinational corporations have problems with bureaucracy, but we can get somebody who's a basket case, and if they didn't come apart at the ambassador's house or something equally obvious, it can be hell to convince anybody to pull them out. You have to support them and you have to pull them out if they can't work in their environment, because you cannot control a terrorist environment.

Last but not least: If you have substantial reason to believe that one of your people is a target—and this may apply to multinationals as much as, if not more than, it does to Government—and you believe that the group that has targeted him or her has both the intent and the capability to carry out their mission, you better pull that person out because they're going to be dead, and that's the only option that you have.

There have been a number of ambassadors, there have been some of our people, there have been people out of multinational corporations whose lives might have been saved if anybody had stopped and looked or could have conveyed when some indication was made to the principals that they were a target for people who were going to kill them. That's an option you have to be willing to use and you have to be willing to bite a bullet on it, or else you're going to lose some of your key people. And finally, don't compound the problem by relying on dated assumptions which you believed the last time you went to school, regarding people or terrorist track records or the environment. Stay current. It will keep your people alive and working. It's a hard job. It's damn near an impossible job.

I think the guidelines that we use have been productive for us, and I don't believe they are applicable only to our people. They're applicable to anyone who is out in an environment where they're faced with potential terrorism, and I really don't know where you can go that that isn't true. It is just a matter of assessing the threat and identifying the resources you can dedicate to a particular area.

Billy Hix is beginning his 31st year in the security business, 28 as a professional Security Officer in the CIA where he is currently the Chief of Physical Security with worldwide responsibilities. Since the late 1960's, he has been actively involved in countering terrorism, developing personnel protection programs, and designing protective packages for installations, homes, vehicles, and people, both in the United States and abroad. He has extensive on-site international experience, including the Middle East.

Terrorism: The Challenge to the Private Sector

George Murphy
Manager of Security, Mobil Corporation

I must admit that I've only been with the Mobil Corporation for 6 weeks, so my background and understanding of the oil business leave a little to be desired. However, I previously spent 10 years with another multinational corporation in Europe and several domestic locations, so perhaps I can give some perspective from two different companies, albeit one very brief.

Let me start out with some basic premises from a private perspective. I think any business that commits the folly of neglecting its purpose, revenues, and profit for the stockholder will very surely and swiftly find its way to a demise. In Government, the goal may have varying directions, but in business there's only one bottom line and everybody understands that. That's an oversimplification, because each company has a personality, has its beliefs, et cetera, but I'll try to explain a little bit further what I mean.

Foolishness is a much underrated human trait and sometimes we tend, even in business, to overreact to certain types of phenomena. I believe that terrorism may be one of those, from the business perspective, and there are a lot of reasons for that—very valid reasons.

I think in Government you go on the basis, rightfully so, that terrorism is going to happen. For example, consider the security efforts at the Olympics, despite the fact that in a recent *New York Times*, one of the sheriff's high-ranking officials said that to date nobody has made a threat that they can quantify, identify, or point to, at least from that sheriff's department. Now, maybe somebody else knows about a threat and they haven't told the sheriff. But, in any event, the sheriff still has to operate from the premise that it will happen.

The export of technical data provides an example in the defense area. The expectation is that the data that go abroad are going to dilute our national defense, and therefore we have a lot of the programs that have been discussed at this meeting.

I had occasion to visit a group of people who are going to study the Alaskan pipeline and other domestic sources of oil from the premise, not of what is the risk that terrorism will happen, but that terrorism will happen and what do we do after it happens. Then they will come back through Congress with the information on what it will take to rehabilitate the supply. The costs of any additional protection will then accrue to business because the Government, the military, and the state police do not have the resources or the funds.

Believe me, to make anything at all happen in the security environment, business has to have a credible business case. Management has to recognize that there is an illicit economic system and that to ignore it enhances it. To call shrinkage, for example, mysterious disappearance instead of theft is a failure to face up to reality. So, in the business environment, security has to make a business case. In Government, you make your case for your budgets and then you go fight for your appropriations and your head count. In business, once you've made your case, you will have the resources, at least if it's a profitable multinational. You will have the resources to get done what they agreed to do or the project will be sized down accordingly. At that point you are on your own. If you don't get it done with the resources that you've asked for and that you've convinced your management to approve, then you've really got a problem.

Part of that business case deals with stating the problem. You really have to have a reasonable set of data to show that there is a problem (not as detailed as in a Government project, by the way). I've jokingly said in the past there are more experts on terrorism than there are terrorists, but now I'm not so sure that I'm wrong, frankly, as I scan all of the professionals in the audience. What is really the problem?

For example, consider the coverage of traveling executives in Europe. Living in Paris for five years and working in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, I was one of the few American private industrial security personnel in Europe. I was overwhelmed with calls from my peer group from other companies in the United States who had executives coming to Europe, asking me who they could hire for personnel protection and what they should do about it. And yet to the best of my recollection, there has not been an American businessman attacked by terrorists while on travel status in Europe, at least not in the last 5 years.

Managing to the risk at hand is a critical element for security credibility. For example, people who are living in Europe and are regular, as pointed out, in their habits, are at risk in certain environments. Nevertheless, I think that you really need to identify the problem properly, establish the need, the cost, et cetera, before initiating a massive program.

Once you've made your business case, you should institutionalize the process within the company, because nobody in the private sector is going to look out for that program but the security community, particularly if things are QUIET.

But there's a fine line of distinction. In the private sector, security is a line management responsibility, particularly where goals and objectives, information protec-

tion, and protection of key assets are concerned.

Obviously the security community performs some line services, such as guarding, contacts with the outside world, et cetera, but fundamentally security should be a line manangement responsibility and the goal should be to harden targets. The process in the business world is very difficult. It's easy to state goals, but it's more difficult to institutionalize the process. We don't need a large amount of data but senior business managers have clear perceptions of problems; scare tactics don't usually last.

It's not clearly understood, I think, by most people in the law enforcement sector (in which I spent a great deal of my life) and in the military or the intelligence sector, that in business you must make a terrific transition. It's a big leap and a lot of people who go into the private sector don't make it. The profit motivation is not show business; you're not carrying the badge or doing certain other things for the public good. Most of us come to fruition after a year or two when we come to grips with the fact that we have a different responsibility than law enforcement or the military. What's not clearly understood is that you fundamentally are a business manager and you must survive in the senior management ranks of the major corporations—and, believe me, you are dealing with egos equivalent to that of any general. Convincing them in an area in which everybody feels they're an expert is quite an undertaking, so you have to have your problem statements very, very crisply and quantitatively defined.

Someone from the Secret Service was telling me how they identified some of their problems. We also had to crunch numbers, come up with proofs, and get management support to even get a program off the ground, much less keep it running—perhaps not as many numbers as in Government, but the argument has to make sense.

Each company in the corporate world has a different personality. The goals are pretty much the same, but once you get below that initial goal, then you go to beliefs. Some companies are very macho. Some companies won't let a security man interview a suspect, some companies will. One thing I want to stress: Most companies will *not* do unethical things in the security field. Companies are very hesitant to go to extremes. Companies are both image conscious and fundamentally ethical. They truly do believe in people and employees, much to the chagrin of those who would unfairly accuse them of not being ethical, above-board, and cognizant of people's rights.

How you weave your program into the management system differs according to the company, and not only that, but according to its profitability, which also has some bearing on how quickly you move your program. I'm in a company now that has a completely different need than my prior employer. Despite recent bombings, my former employer's problem is still fundamentally information protection. It has major problems if its technology is lost.

Mobil, I believe from what I've seen in just 6 weeks, probably needs as strong a safety program as they do a security program, so I'm going to build my program on the existing safety program staff, utilize those very bright resources, and have a very lean, tough, and hungry senior group of security people in my chain. But I am going to build on what is there, because it is costwise and practical for my company. We don't need an empire at this juncture.

In the particular field of terrorism, I think you have to analyze terrorism as it affects your company's revenues, profits, and people, and install sensible yet clear deterrents. For example, in Italy, anybody who really checked into numbers would find that the victim in the private sector is generally the person who deals directly with employees, not the president where all the money is spent in terms of countersurveillance, armored cars, or whatever you do. It's some poor guy down there dealing with the employee group who gets kneecapped. Statistically, that's true in the private sector.

Now, let me divorce myself from the people in the military establishment. When you live abroad, the people in the private sector, the military, the Secret Service, the FBI become very close to each other in a nonmilitary town environment, such as Paris, which does not have a huge, working American presence. In such a setting you feel very close to embassy or military people even if you don't know them personally. You feel it when the United States succeeds militarily and you know the terrorist problem is going to go up—but where is it going to go? The assessment by business is that the first shot is going to be at the military and the embassy.

Of course, we did our security things where I thought the problems were. I had people operating at the most vulnerable times, and then randomly at other times. Such things go in a curve and you watch the curve and the trends for both cost and credibility. You can cry wolf too much in a business environment and then you can't get in the door. If a security manager uses his common sense, analyzes risks, is credible, and is a manager and a leader, he will be successful in a corporate security post. Then that manager will have access to the top when

he needs it. One of the other speakers used the phrase, "ear of the commander." You have to have the commander's ear. Otherwise you are sitting out there with a guard force and you're spending nickels and dimes for your program and you're not influencing anything in the long-term strategy direction of the company.

One of the more dangerous things that I've seen is Europeans visiting the United States, not the reverse; that is, they encounter big-city crime. The reverse—trouble for executives traveling from the United States to Europe--is, I think, almost nonexistent, even after the two jets were shot down, which is when the trends swung to terrorist problems in continental Europe.

Deranged employees are another threat that is more important, at least in my experience, than the terrorist.

Country upheaval is always a problem. Planning, in terms of exit visas, zodiac boats, long-range jets—if you don't do it before the uproar starts, forget it because you've got to go through the wrong part of town to get to the airport. You have to plan for all of that.

I went to an embassy that had suffered an attack, and the State Department Regional Security Officer gave me a walk-through. He was telling me that "times have changed." The guys who came in with guns, the ones we were guarding against, are not the priority anymore. Now it is masses of humanity, crushing the gate. So we are preparing the embassies all across the world, getting ready for masses of humanity. Now, the threat is a truck loaded with dynamite, and I'm not sure that the next one is not going to be the human bomb. I would even put criminal kidnapping as a more important thing for me to worry about, particularly in Latin America, and I would put terrorism fairly low on my priority list. Now, I'm being a little facetious; we have an ongoing program, obviously, and we monitor it very closely.

It is of key importance to keep in touch with people in the Secret Service, the FBI, peers in private security, our own people on the ground in various countries. Those inputs all factor into some reasonable analysis. As Steve Van Cleave told me, "Get a map of the world, Murphy, because as you travel across those countries, you'd better know where they are and who's in charge, when the elections are and what's going on."

A visit by the President is always a happy event, but on the security side it is a bombing problem. During the last Reagan visit even the American School of Paris was bombed. American people were under surveillance; in churches, in English-speaking gatherings, there was constant surveillance.

On bombs I have one major principle: Film glass. Every explosion I've been to, and I suspect it's been 30 now, in the last 5 or 6 years—if you film glass, you save life. In Athens, Greece, we saw it coming. The government didn't go completely to the left, ELS started to come back, they forewarned them, they told everybody. They started to light fires again under embassy cars, they bombed American Express. We shuttered two buildings, we put on extra guards, we filmed the glass for two stories, and despite everything that we did, we were bombed. (We all put up defense in the hope that they'll go on to the next guy who didn't analyze it or put up the bucks.) When the explosion went off in one building, the exterior guard ran over to that building just as they blew a second bomb at the building he had just left. The life of the internal guard was saved by the filming.

Now that the peacekeeping forces are out of Beirut it may reduce attacks, but even then the military and embassy rather than business, caught the brunt of it. Belfast was always a depressing place to visit, even though the risk of terrorist attack was low. Americans aren't targeted because the IRA gets their money from Americans; they're not going to hit an American company. Just by proximity, your windows are blown out about once a week, so you get your windows replaced, you have your blast curtains, and everything else.

European employees tend to make threats against their company in the guise of a terrorist group. I would suspect that we had at least seven or eight terrorist threats that were not terrorist threats, but were made by disgruntled employees. Threats came in all sorts and forms, and when a threat comes, then you have to respond. If you open a plant right in the middle of politically unstable areas, and then lay off 300 people the day before May Day, that's not planning.

The last point I want to make is training. I'm not sure how far you can go and keep credibility in training, particularly with executives and their families, and keep their awareness up. I agree completely on the need for continuous awareness, but it's just like stopping the traffic violator, you let your guard down after the 1,150th stop.

Talking about driving, I want to close by reading you the graduation letter from a driving school to which I sent the driver for one of my company's country managers. I won't mention the name of the school, but it's in Europe. The certificate reads:

On September 12th, 1979, Anti-Kidnapped Driver's Course, we certify that Mr. Gonzales has finished our special Anti-Kidnapped Driver's Course and he has qualified himself with the mark "good." (signed by the chief instructor.)

They sent a little editorial letter along with it to me. It said:

Dear Mr. Murphy,

Mr. Gonzales has absolved our Anti-Kidnap Driver's Course on 25-26 June '79. The first part, in (unnamed location) and on 22nd October '79, two-thirds of the second part that took place on the race track of (unnamed location).

One-third of the instruction is missing because of the accident. It is a minor part, so we can nevertheless qualify Mr. Gonzales. Unfortunately, Mr. Gonzales during the training lost control of the car, things that happened, and crashed it against the guard rail.

Cause of the accident was the little bit impulsive temperament of Mr. Gonzales. As I already mentioned in my first report, an overrate of his own possibilities.

Everybody has his own limits, so do the cars too, and by having too much confidence, something can go wrong.

As long as more or less small crashes happen during the training, it is not so bad. But, we have to learn from them and that is what we hope Mr. Gonzales will do.

Also, we hope that the injury of his arm is healed with satisfaction, we sent him our kind regards.

We thank you so much for your confidence in our school and remain

Yours faithfully,

Signed
Director, the Driving School

George M. Murphy is the Manager of Security for the Mobil Corporation. Prior to joining Mobil, he spent 10 years with another multinational company, 5 years being spent in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. He holds a Bachelor's degree and a Master of Science degree.

Mr. Murphy served with local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies as a patrolman, trooper, detective, and agent for 12 years. He was Administrator of the Police Science program at the University of Georgia and subsequently was the Southeastern Regional Administrator for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Asymmetries in Dealing with Terrorism

Brian Michael Jenkins
Program Director, Security and Subnational Conflict
The Rand Corporation

This briefing will review some of the recent trends in terrorism worldwide, examine the nature of armed conflict in the future, and briefly discuss some of the implications of these likely future developments for the United States in general, and for the U.S. military in particular.

I shall begin by sharing with you an interesting observation from a recent meeting that involved some high-level officials from the Departments of Defense and State, as well as Justice. The meeting addressed the topic of terrorism and what the United States ought to do about it in terms of policies and programs. All discussions of terrorism inevitably become mired in discussions of definition, and this meeting was no exception. We discussed at length just what we were talking about when we used the word "terrorism," what we were defining in, what we were defining out. But there was one remarkable difference—a change that has come about in recent months. One of the major impacts of the Beirut bombing of October 23 is that terrorism, at least state-sponsored terrorism, is now perceived at the highest levels of the U.S. Government as *war*.

It hasn't always been that way. The notion that state-sponsored terrorism was a mode of conflict among nations was at one time a controversial idea that was often resisted. Indeed, in an essay that I wrote for DNA some time ago called "New Modes of Conflict"—a speculative essay filled with assertions and notions and ideas that were at that time half-formed and in the opinion of many people, I'm sure, half-baked—I made that assertion.

DNA did not know quite what to do with that document. For many months they tried to figure out whether it was appropriate for DNA to publish, and I couldn't understand what the dilemma was. Yet now—and I say this not to vindicate my own ideas, but to try to describe to you how dramatic a change has come about in government—in terms of the attention that we are paying to the problem of terrorism and what has become convention, we now see this as a kind of warfare. That has enormous implications for U.S. policy, and it has also some pretty serious implications for how we organize and what we do to combat terrorist warfare, some good ones and some bad ones.

Before I get to that, let me talk about this new era of conflict, as I describe it, and discuss the implications it has for us.

When we review terrorism over the last 10 or 15 years, the first thing we confront is a paradox. The paradox is that despite government's success in combating terrorist elements in various countries, the total volume of terrorist activity in recent years has increased. It hasn't gone down, it's gone up. There has been a decline in some countries, but overall the level of terrorist violence has increased. The first 4 years of the 1980's showed an average annual increase in international terrorist incidents of approximately 17 percent. The number of such incidents that occur each year has increased about fourfold since the Munich attack in 1972, when we first began our research on this topic.

This statistic on the increase in incidents of terrorism is based on Rand's chronology of international terrorism. Everybody's statistics vary, because of differences in collection criteria and collection procedures, but if one puts aside these differences, the overall trajectory of all of these charts does go up.

It is not simply that terrorism has increased in terms of total volume. Indeed, if that had been the only increase, I would be very suspicious that the increase was not genuine, but was simply a reflection of better reporting.

However, in fact, terrorism has become bloodier. More and more terrorist attacks are directed against persons instead of property. Incidents with fatalities have been increasing, and large-scale, indiscriminate attacks have become more common.

One of the ways of testing whether the increase is genuine is to look not only at the skyrocketing number of incidents or the number of fatalities, but also at terrorist incidents with fatalities.

Peaks and valleys occur at different times but the overall trend goes upward. More alarming than that is the trend toward incidents with multiple fatalities, a clear indication of increased terrorist proficiency. Terrorists now know how to build bigger bombs, and they also evidence an increased willingness to engage in wholesale murder.

The bombings in Beirut, Kuwait, and elsewhere in the Middle East illustrate the tendency, but I should point out that the trend is not confined to the Middle East, where government sponsorship and religious fanaticism permit this sort of terrorism on a grander scale. Last year, large-scale terrorist bombings also occurred in Paris,

Views expressed in this paper are the author's own and are not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors.

Port-au-Prince, Pretoria, Rangoon, and London. Between 1980 and 1983, more than one person was killed in 37 percent of the incidents with fatalities. In 1983, this figure jumped to 59 percent of the total.

The trend is even more dramatic when we consider the number of international terrorist incidents with five or more fatalities that have occurred each year. Now we are looking at the more serious end of terrorism, and it becomes even more dramatic when we look at the number of incidents with 10 or more fatalities.

In 1983, there were 14 episodes of international terrorism with 10 or more fatalities. In the previous 3-year period, there were only 11, so we have a clear increase. This in itself confirms that, despite the peaks and valleys, and the effects of altering our criteria for measuring terrorist violence, there is one unmistakable trend: Terrorism is going up.

What can we say about terrorist tactics? Terrorists operate with a very limited tactical repertoire. Bombings alone account for about half of all terrorist incidents. Six basic tactics comprise 95 percent of the total: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, barricade-and-hostage situations, and hijackings. No terrorist group uses them all. Most terrorist groups operate with a repertoire of about three or four tactics, and most appear to be more imitative than innovative. This tactical repertoire has changed very little over time. However, there have been a couple of notable changes, one of which is the decline in embassy seizures, or what police called barricade-and-hostage situations.

This was a very popular tactic in the 1970's. Since then, the number of seizures of embassies, consulates, and other government buildings has declined as physical security measures have turned the likely targets, particularly the embassies, into virtual fortresses and governments have become less likely to meet the demands of terrorists holding hostages and more likely to use force against them. Of course, the latter two trends are closely related. If you are not going to yield to the demands of terrorists holding hostages and you are not willing to stand by idly while hostages are shot, then you are compelled, ultimately, to resort to the use of force to rescue those hostages that you can.

As a result, the terrorists' chances of success in seizing government buildings have declined over the years, and their chances of being captured or killed have increased. These people are no fools. They may be slow learners, but they do get the picture after a while. Thus, the tactic declined in the 1980's. There were 20 building seizures in 1980, 10 in 1981, 6 in 1982, and only 1 in 1983.

This is not to say that terrorist attacks on diplomats have declined. On the contrary, the terrorists simply switched from embassy seizures to assassinations and bombings. And therein lies a lesson for those who are concerned with security against terrorist attacks. The lesson is that security does work in reducing certain tactics, but it is not necessarily a means of reducing terrorism overall. We have to regard terrorists as a nimble adversary. If one set of targets is well protected, or if one tactic becomes more dangerous for them, they merely shift their targets or alter their tactics.

The Beirut bombing of April that destroyed the American Embassy is a splendid example of this. This embassy was provided with all of the upgraded security measures available to protect it against terrorist takeover. Unfortunately, it was located in a building that was built at a time when the view of the Mediterranean across the street was more important than security against large-scale bombings. The entire front of the building was sheathed in glass, and that made it uniquely vulnerable to the new terrorist weapon that emerged in the Middle East, the car bomb. Ultimately, the embassy that was protected against takeover was destroyed by a car bomb. I think we have to be careful, when we consider one set of measures to protect against one set of tactics, that we also try to anticipate the tactics that terrorists may use to get around those measures.

Car bombs are definitely a trend. In fact, last year at this meeting, I suggested 1983 was likely to be the year of the car bomb. That required no prescience on my part; it was already a trend that we had seen in the first years of the 1980's, and there was an easy explanation for it. As bombs got bigger and bigger, and there was pressure on the terrorists to create larger and larger explosions in order to get headlines and to maintain their power, a delivery problem was created.

The bombs got beyond the scale that could be concealed in shopping bags, in briefcases, and under overcoats, and the terrorists simply adopted an obvious solution: They put the bomb on wheels and they invented the car bomb. We have seen two types. The first is the more "traditional" car bomb, a vehicle loaded with explosives and driven to a point where it was detonated either by a timer or by a remote detonating device. That was the kind of car bomb that was used frequently in Northern Ireland, and it was the kind that went off in front of Harrods Department Store in London, just before Christmas last year.

In the Middle East, they devised a different sort of car bomb. There, the car bomb is a truck loaded with

explosives and driven by a suicidal driver, which basically turns the weapon into a kind of human missile with a very sophisticated guidance system—a human brain—to guide it through barriers, around barriers, and into the target. Certainly it was the suicide bombings of the autumn of 1983 that caused the most concern in this country and that indeed lie behind the erection of the concrete barriers in front of the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department.

It is easy to overestimate the threat posed by suicide bombers. Of all of the attacks accredited to Shiite extremists in the Middle East—some 30 in the last couple of years—only five were genuine suicide attacks. In other cases, for example in Kuwait, the terrorists relied on a more traditional car bomb, even though that meant a less effective device. This suggests that perhaps suicide bombers are not so easily recruited, despite the claims and threats of those in Iran who say they are training and have ready to march 1,000 suicide bombers.

Neither does it seem likely that the tactic of suicidal attack will gain favor among other terrorist groups of the world. For the most part, terrorists have not shown themselves to be suicidal. The few examples that we have seen—those of the Japanese Red Army, for example, and the Shiite Moslems—appear to be ethnic or cultural exceptions, rather than part of a terrorist trend.

To say that terrorism has increased a lot is not to say that terrorism has been a success. Nowhere since the colonial era have terrorists achieved any of their stated long-range goals. They have been able to attract publicity to themselves and their causes. They have been able to cause worldwide alarm. They have created crises that governments are compelled to deal with. They have made governments and corporations divert vast resources to security measures. And occasionally they win concessions. But terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains, and in that sense, terrorism has failed.

Yet, despite their failure, they persist in their struggles. We have ample evidence of this. For example, the Red Brigades recently returned to carry out an assassination of an American diplomat in Rome. Recall that the Red Brigades were declared destroyed in 1978; they were declared destroyed in 1980; they were declared destroyed in 1982; they keep on resurfacing to carry out attacks, although they are operating at a much lower level than they were in the late 1970's.

That attack by the Red Brigades was a very curious sort of operation for them to undertake, and indeed it made no sense in terms of the kind of targets they normally chose. The American diplomat in Rome, Lehman Hunt, by the way, was the official in charge of the Sinai Commission, which suggests that the Red Brigades carried out the operation on behalf of someone else. There are Palestinians and other Middle Eastern groups who would have been interested in killing Mr. Hunt, and there is now considerable evidence that the assassination was, in fact, part of a deal between the Red Brigades and some Middle Eastern elements. The Red Brigades either carried out the assassination or claimed credit for it, in return for promised logistical support and financing, which they desperately need to get their struggle going again.

Why do these groups persist despite their apparent failure? There are several reasons. First, cut off from the normal contacts of society, having only each other to talk to, terrorists live in a kind of fantasy world. Their organizations are extravagant assertions. They call themselves armies and brigades, when in fact they are handfuls of people. They believe themselves to have legions of supporters or potential supporters, when in fact their constituencies may be largely imaginary. They fall prey to their own propaganda. They overestimate their own strength, their appeal, the weakness of the enemies, the imminence of victory.

Second, some terrorist groups place less importance on whether they achieve progress toward distant goals; it's not winning or losing for these groups, it's playing the game. In the jargon of pop psychology, they are action-oriented, process-oriented, rather than goal-oriented people. For them terrorism is an end in itself. Living a dangerous life underground, oiling weapons, endlessly planning operations, occasionally carrying out operations, and reading about themselves in a newspaper or seeing themselves on television all fulfill some inner psychological need.

A third reason for the persistence of terrorist groups lies in the composition of terrorist groups. They are collections of persons with otherwise unsalable skills. They have membership, hierarchy, management, specialized functions, and cash flow. Like all organizations, they are dedicated to survival. They may restructure themselves to survive, they may revise their goals, they may alter their operations, they may alter their traditional targeting and carry out operations on behalf of other people in order to gain logistical support, but they will struggle to stay in business. This is a kind of organizational imperative.

As in war, when neither side prevails there is a tendency toward escalation, and we have seen ample evi-

dence of escalation in terrorism. There are several explanations for the increasing bloodiness of terrorism. Terrorists have been brutalized by long struggles; to a certain extent, the public has been numbed. If terrorist activity has increased fourfold since the Munich incident of 1972, that means that every type of terrorist incident has become four times more commonplace.

Now that poses a problem for the terrorists, who are trying to maintain a certain degree of coercive power and trying to maintain publicity. Staying in the headlines in a world where terrorism has become increasingly commonplace requires acts of greater violence, so there is a built-in requirement for terrorism to escalate, and we see it happening.

Terrorists have become more proficient in their violence. They have learned over the years how to build bigger bombs, how to use automatic weapons more frequently, how to shoot through the windshields of armorplated limousines. They have learned to do a variety of things they couldn't do before, and they are a much tougher adversary than they were 10 years ago. In retrospect, some of the terrorist activities of the early 1970's seem by today's standards to be almost innocent.

There has also been a change in the composition of the membership of terrorist organizations. At each threshold of violence, there is some debate, some argument within the terrorist ranks as to whether this operation, this level of violence makes sense. Is it politically useful? Is it morally acceptable? Will it alienate perceived constituents? Will it provoke public backlash? We know that they have these arguments, and we also know that over a period of time those who have doubts about the utility or the morality of increasing violence drop out. In a sense, that is good, since it has in many cases provided intelligence resources that have been exploited by the state.

But at the same time, who does that leave in the groups? It leaves the most ruthless people, the ones who have the least doubts about higher and higher levels of violence.

The final ingredient in the escalation of terrorism is the religious sanction that permits the devastating suicide bombings in the Middle East. Historically, religious conflicts have been the bloodiest. If God says it's okay to kill the pagans, the disbelievers, the infidels, the Jews, the Christians, or the Moslems, depending on which side one is on, then the capacity for much higher levels of violence goes up enormously.

While our attention recently has been understandably focused on the bombings carried out by the so-called Islamic Jihad organization in the Middle East, a number of other significant events have taken place recently. I refer to, first, the bombing in Rangoon, Burma, last December, in which terrorists attempted to assassinate, through a large-scale bombing, a group of South Korean Government officials who were visiting Rangoon. The operation was traced directly to the Government of North Korea.

There was also an assassination campaign directed against Jordanian diplomats in New Delhi, in Rome, and in Paris, and of course, there was the renewed violence against them by terrorists traced to Libya that has occurred in the United Kingdom.

All of these, including the attacks carried out by the Islamic Jihad, appear to have been state-sponsored terrorism, and that certainly is another trend that we see. A growing number of governments are using terrorist tactics, deploying terrorist groups, and exploiting terrorist incidents as a mode of surrogate warfare.

These governments see in terrorism a useful capability, a weapons system, a cheap means of waging war, a deniable means of waging war. For them, terrorists simply fill a need. A modern conventional war is increasingly impractical; it is too destructive and too expensive. Moreover, world, and sometimes domestic, opinion imposes constraints.

Terrorists offer a possible alternative to open armed conflict. For some nations that are unwilling or unable to mount a conventional challenge on the battlefield, terrorism is an equalizer. Indeed, we may be on the threshold of a new era of armed conflict in which limited conventional warfare, classic guerrilla warfare, and international terrorism will coexist, with both government and subnational entities employing them individually, interchangeably, sequentially, or even simultaneously, as well as being required to combat them.

In many respects, I think the future face of war is reflected in the course of armed conflict in Lebanon since the early 1970's. When we look at it conceptually, warfare in that country has continued on all three of these levels—conventional war, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism. It involves regular armies, guerrillas, private militias, and terrorist gunmen, some of whom are openly assisted or covertly sponsored by foreign states, by political or religious factions, or even by other terrorist groups. We may be looking forward to an era of warfare that is perhaps less destructive than that in the first half of the 20th century, but it will also be less coherent. Warfare will cease to be finite. The distinctions between war and peace will dissolve, nominal peace will be filled with

continuing confrontations and crises, armed conflict will not be confined by national frontiers. Local belligerents will mobilize foreign patrons. Terrorists will attack foreign targets, both at home and abroad. And the United States will be compelled to maintain capabilities for dealing with all three kinds of armed conflict.

I mentioned state sponsorship of terrorism as a trend and state-sponsored terrorism as an element of armed conflict in the future. State sponsorship of terrorism has enormous consequences. It alters the contest.

First of all, state sponsorship puts more resources in the hands of the terrorists; it provides them with more sophisticated weapons, explosives, intelligence, and technical expertise. This increase in destructive potential became clear in the Beirut bombing of October 23. The bomb that destroyed the Marine headquarters was colossal, an extraordinary device that had the equivalent of 12,000 pounds of TNT. Most of us aren't really sure what that kind of number actually means; I certainly did not know how big a blast that would be until I saw the actual effects of this one.

The Marine headquarters in Beirut was an interesting building. It had previously served as an Israeli field hospital during the Israeli invasion. Before that, it had been used by the PLO as one of their headquarters in Beirut; and it had also been used as a headquarters by the Syrian Army when they had intervened in Beirut. There were four levels of graffiti from soldiers of different armies written on the walls.

The building was held up with 12 or 14 major concrete columns. Each of these columns was 15 feet in circumference (about 5 feet in diameter) and was reinforced with iron bars 1¾ inches thick. The truck bomb exploded in the lobby and sheared off every one of the columns at its base. According to the investigation by the FBI after the episode, the building literally was sheared off at the base, lifted up, and the foundation blown out. The crater this created was about 30 feet by 40 feet by 9 feet deep, and the building collapsed down in on itself. An incredible explosion.

The testimony of some of the survivors, the Marine guards, was fascinating. One fellow described being up on the roof on guard duty when he saw the truck disappear between his legs. The concrete slab that he was standing on was lifted up, and it then fell down. He rode this concrete slab down 40 feet and jumped off at the last minute, somehow—he can't explain it—ending seated upright in a jeep, unhurt.

One of the questions that arose right after the incident was whether the attack was likely to have been state sponsored. My immediate reaction to that question was, "I certainly hope so," because if it was not state sponsored, the consequences would be even more enormous than they already were. If the attack was not state sponsored, that would mean that some terrorist group, unbeknownst to any government, had managed to acquire an enormous quantity of C-4 hexagen, a restricted explosive that is not manufactured in the Middle East. It is manufactured in only a few countries, and its export is supposedly rigorously controlled by ministries of defense. The attackers managed to acquire an enormous quantity of hexagen, build a very sophisticated bomb, acquire the necessary intelligence, and carry out an extraordinary operation.

If they did that without the help or the knowledge of a government, without the complicity of a government, we would have to dramatically revise all of our estimates of the ceiling on terrorist activity.

When we talk about the possibility of weapons of mass destruction, chemical or even conceivably crude nuclear devices, we have drawn some confidence from the assumption that it would be very, very difficult for any terrorist group anywhere in the world to acquire a highly restricted commodity, fabricate an extraordinary device, and carry out an operation without tipping off some government. At that point, we would hope, bells and alarms would go off, somebody would exercise prudence, and the operation would be suppressed or aborted.

So if the attack on the Marine headquarters wasn't state sponsored, the last remaining bit of confidence in that assumption would be wiped out. It appears, on the basis of certain substantial evidence, however, that the bombing was sponsored by governments.

Not only does state-sponsored terrorism put more resources in terrorists' hands, it also reduces the constraints on terrorism. Terrorists operating on their own have to think as politicians. They have to worry about what any proposed operation will do for the leadership, whether it will be understood and supported by the perceived constituents, whether it will provoke the kind of action that could imperil the organization. These considerations that they have to run through impose a certain caution and conservatism on terrorist tactics, and this may be why the terrorist repertoire has changed so little.

When terrorists have state sponsors, they don't have to worry about these things. The state becomes their constituency. They worry less about provoking a backlash, they have state sponsors to fall back on, they worry less

about alienating the perceived constituents, and they have financing from a government.

Under these conditions, instead of thinking as politicians, they begin to think as generals in battle. Their primary concern is how badly the operation will hurt the enemy, and that's a different kind of thinking. Thus, reduced constraints plus increased resources lead to a much higher level of violence.

If we compare the operations of state-sponsored terrorist groups with the operations of groups that have little or no state support, we see some pretty dramatic results. For example, state-sponsored terrorism is, on the basis of our rough analysis, eight times more lethal than the operations of terrorist groups that do not have state sponsorship.

State-sponsored terrorists range globally, in contrast to nonsponsored groups, which tend to stay pretty much at home. State-sponsored groups operate in an average of 10 countries each.

The state-sponsored groups also undertake fewer operations. They do not have to rob banks or kidnap people for ransom to finance themselves; they do not have to rob arsenals to get the weapons; they do not have to carry out operations to establish themselves in the public mind and keep themselves there; and they do not have to carry out operations simply to maintain group cohesiveness or to release tension, which many of the nonstate-sponsored groups have to do. In summary, then, they strike less often, but they range wider, and when they do strike, they are far more deadly.

They hit business targets considerably less frequently than government targets, again because they do not have to finance themselves by attacking corporations. Also, they do not have ideological motives that would cause them to attack corporations as symbols of the capitalist system. When they do attack businesses, they do so for a different reason. They are either engaging in economic warfare, or the corporation is involved in something that they oppose. For example, the Raytheon Corporation, which is providing Kuwait with a missile system, was one of the targets in the Kuwait bombings. The corporation in France that developed the Exocet missile, which France is providing to the Iraqis, was blown up by terrorists in the employ of the Iranian government.

We do not have a clear indication yet of whether state-sponsored or nonsponsored groups are more dangerous to Americans. However, we do know that when state-sponsored terrorist groups attack Americans, they are much more lethal; therefore they are more dangerous in that sense.

State-sponsored terrorism is extraordinarily difficult to counterattack; indeed, in some cases there may not be any group to counterattack. In the press, we talk about intelligence reports on the Islamic Jihad organization. But the guys who call up do not say, "Islamic Jihad organization," they say, "Islamic Jihad." Islamic Jihad is a commitment, it's a vow, it's a spirit. Spirits and vows don't blow up headquarters and embassies. It is we, at our end, who have added the word "organization." That can be misleading, because if you add the word "organization," you begin to look for the attributes of an organization. You begin to look for a hierarchy, for leadership, for structure, for headquarters—and there may not be any of those things in the case of Islamic Jihad. In many cases, there is no group at all to counterattack. There is only a voice on the telephone.

Even when there is a group to counterattack, it is extraordinarily difficult to do so. When we talk about attacking in retaliation or in reprisal for state-sponsored terrorism, we are really talking about operations aimed at modifying the behavior of the government that employed or directly sponsored the groups or that permitted the terrorists to operate from its territory.

It is very difficult for a state to attack a terrorist group, because there isn't any symmetry of vulnerabilities. They don't have territory, they don't have populations to protect, they don't have economies, they don't offer lucrative targets in the conventional sense. On the other hand, states do have those things, and therefore state sponsors are a bit more vulnerable than terrorist groups to the kinds of counterattack that we can contemplate. However, the problem in going after the state is proof. We cannot easily prove the links between the terrorist and the state sponsors, and the state sponsors want it that way.

Although our intelligence is really very good, it is inadequate for this purpose. People who are in the business of prosecuting are well aware of this. National intelligence works with probabilities. That is, a certain probability of an attack justifies taking the necessary measures to defend oneself against that attack.

But when we talk about proving links, then we're asking intelligence to do something else. We're asking intelligence to provide proof, and intelligence is not very good at that. It is quite apparent that we are not going to have the kinds of proof in these cases of state-sponsored terrorism that would meet the standards of an American courtroom. And that constitutes a real problem in terms of links.

The other problem one faces here is that while one can eventually make a case on the basis of certain substantial evidence, it takes time to do that. Public support for operations is very ephemeral and diminishes faster than we can gather the proof to justify any sort of reaction.

The final consequence is that state sponsorship alters the measures of success and failure. The question of how terrorists evaluate the success or failure of their actions is really a very difficult but a very crucial one. Our ability to affect their decisionmaking, their choice of targets, and their willingness to fight on depends on the answer to that question.

On the basis of what we know about terrorists and what we know from terrorists, it is not clear that they agree on the measures of success. Indeed, in a tactical sense, they often seem to win, but strategically they often seem to lose. State sponsorship changes all of this, because success or failure is no longer the issue; the terrorists are simply the tools of someone's policy.

What we can say clearly, though, is that the Beirut bombing is a remarkable demonstration of a success. It is not simply that the terrorist killed 241 U.S. Marines; it is not simply that American military men were rebuked publicly for neglecting their command responsibilities; it is that the attack obliterated U.S. policy in the Middle East.

More than that, it demonstrated our vulnerability, our inability to respond. It suggested that the United States was impotent. It invites further attack, in a sense saying that if you want to hit the United States, this is the way to hit them. And that is the consequence of the Beirut bombing, and it is significant.

Some of the problems of intelligence are obvious: Terrorist groups are small, tightly knit groups, conscious of security; they're hard to penetrate; they're hard to predict. On the other hand, state sponsorship may offer us some possibility of penetration and prediction, because states are big organizations and they are easier to penetrate.

What we know about terrorist groups and terrorist intentions thus far is primarily a matter of human intelligence, and we know that human intelligence is always very difficult to obtain. Another problem in this regard is the fact that there is a high noise level. Indeed, 44 percent of the incidents in the Government's database of international terrorism are threats and hoaxes, none of which can be entirely ignored, but very few of which ultimately materialize in the form of actions.

And finally, state sponsors cover their tracks very successfully. One possible option we might think about here is the public use of intelligence—that is, compiling and making a public case with all of the information we have that may link state sponsors with a particular terrorist group, as a means of bringing pressure on those state sponsors, as a means of warning them that we know what they're up to, as a means of providing a justifiable basis for reaction should they continue their attacks. I'm talking about an *effective* use of public intelligence, such as we saw in the case of the Soviet shooting down of the Korean airliner.

The intelligence community is always opposed to going public. All sources are sacrosanct in the intelligence community, and they never want to reveal anything that may reveal sources. That is certainly a consideration, but we may have to overrule that particular objection.

However, before public use of intelligence can be considered, the Government must come to a position of willingness to do something about it. If we simply advertise that we know who's behind the attacks but don't intend to do anything about it, we are only demonstrating further our own impotence.

Problems of physical protection again present asymmetries. Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, anytime, but governments cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time. The size of the security budget—the resources needed for security—is determined not by the magnitude of the threat, but by the number of targets to be protected. And that can lead to extraordinary expenditures for physical security. Indeed, it could lead to one-half of the armed services being dedicated to protecting the other half. Obviously this would be terribly disruptive to operations.

If we begin to conceptually accept terrorism as warfare, then we may have to alter the way we view risk. That is, a higher level of risk may become acceptable. In wartime, we expect to take casualties. In peacetime, if a single soldier breaks an ankle, it is cause for an investigation. But if we must live in a world that is sort of at war, and sort of at peace, we may have to accept occasional losses because we are unwilling or unable to provide a level of physical security for every conceivable target all the time.

How much physical security is enough? We don't know. The answer is often a subjective measure, in which the prevailing atmosphere is very important. In an atmosphere of fear and alarm, people have a tendency

to become extraordinarily protective and we see evidence of that in Washington.

Finally, these security measures are a little bit like linoleum—they're easier to lay down than they are to lift up. Once you put these measures in place, they have a tendency to become permanent. It works like a ratchet, with levels of security becoming higher and higher and an increasing portion of our resources being diverted to security measures.

What are the implications of all of this for the United States, and in particular, for the U.S. military? Obviously, greater attention must be paid to physical protection. The trends in terrorism affect our willingness to deploy our forces, particularly ground forces, in areas where they may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. We are seeing decisionmakers try to figure out ways of substituting either sea power or air power for presence missions. We are not certain of how jets would perform presence missions. We know how the *New Jersey* does it, but we're not sure that's an effective way of doing it, so this is an area that is currently being debated and explored.

As I mentioned earlier, in some cases we may simply have to alter our views and accept a higher level of risk. To view terrorism as war increases the likelihood of military involvement in retaliatory or possibly preemptive operations. This would mean a greater investment in special operations. And there is a growing consensus in the Government that we simply cannot go on passively reacting to terrorist actions, saying that we will protect ourselves as well as we can, but will not necessarily strike back. This Government appears to me to be about an inch away from adopting a policy that says we will strike back, for the reasons I've already mentioned.

Terrorism has revealed our vulnerability. It has revealed our inability to respond. This leads to the perception that we are impotent, and it invites further attack. The people who might contemplate another operation against the United States may have some measure of the feeling in this country, but we cannot know for sure.

Whatever military response we might take, the options we know are quite limited, and we do not know what effect they will have. Certainly whatever we do will be debated at home, and this tends to push us in the direction of covert operations. But there we have a whole array of problems as well.

We are not going to react to terrorism with terrorism. We are not going to lose our own legitimacy in responding to what we regard as illegitimate attack. We cannot afford to destroy our own value system and operate on the level of savagery at which they operate. In fact, the unattractiveness of many covert operations (referred to with an incredible array of euphemisms) pushes us in the direction of military operations. And that's where the dilemma and the debate are right now in government.

Finally, military measures alone won't do it. The fact that we now view terrorism as a mode of conflict, as a kind of warfare, doesn't mean that the problem can simply be handed off to the military. Simply washing Government's hands of the problem wouldn't solve a thing.

Lest we adjourn in despair to retire behind our concrete barriers, let me quote from a letter in the *London Times*:

> In the debate in the House of Commons, it seemed to be taken for granted on all sides that there is and can be no defense against terrorist attack and that we must rely entirely upon counterattack and reprisals, that there is at present no means of preventing terrorists from deploying their loads of explosives upon their objectives. I believe this to be true.
>
> But, if we are reduced to a policy of reprisals, the temptation to be quickest on the draw will be tremendous. It seems not too much to say that terrorism in the hands of gangster governments might jeopardize the whole future of our Western Civilization.

I've taken some liberties with the quote. I've substituted the word "terrorism" for the word "aerial bombers." The letter was written in 1934, when people thought there could be no defense against aircraft carrying bombs. Our situation today may be very similar. I think that we can, with a great deal of hard thought and with more resources, learn how to combat this new kind of terrorist problem. We have had limited success in protecting embassies. We had a problem with airline hijacking years ago, and ultimately we figured out ways of at least containing the problem to a degree and dealing with it. It certainly would be a worse fate to simply wring our hands, hide behind our concrete barriers, and wait for the inevitable terrorist attack.

Brian Michael Jenkins is one of the world's leading authorities on international terrorism. One of the first analysts to conduct research on the topic, he currently directs The Rand Corporation's research program on subnational conflict and political violence. He also has served as a consultant to a number of U.S. Government agencies and major corporations.

Before coming to Rand, Mr. Jenkins, a former captain in the elite Green Berets, served in the Dominican Republic during the American intervention and later in Vietnam where he was on several occasions decorated for valor in combat. He later returned to Vietnam as a member of General Creighton Abrams' Long Range Planning Task Group. His work with this group earned him the Department of the Army's highest award for civilian service.

A Discussion of the Factors Affecting Legislation on Terrorism: 535 and Counting

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Thank you for asking me to speak with you about terrorism—a subject that I was concerned with in the job I just left, Chief Counsel for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and a subject I sense I will be delving into even more deeply in my new position as Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division.

There is not a lot of change for me in leaving the intelligence community and going to law enforcement at Justice. I say that because during the time I was charged with intelligence oversight, the CIA convinced me they were just like everybody else. As one CIA operative said to me, "I'm no different from a Harvard professor: I speak Russian, take urine samples, and worry about what's happening in Czechoslovakia."

After I was asked to speak here to explain how the Congressional process affects terrorism legislation, I called in the title of my speech: "A Discussion of the Factors Affecting Legislation on Terrorism: 535 and Counting." The answer was, "What does that mean?" That's when I knew I might be needed here. To all of us who have worked "on the Hill," the number 535 automatically summons forth the knowledge that it is the sum total of the number of Representatives and Senators.

So I will get to the business requested of me and discuss the factors affecting terrorism legislation, with the words of Bismarck as a caveat, "The law is like sausage—anyone who likes it should never watch it being made." So if there be a person out there of faint heart or weak stomach, please exit immediately.

First, I will discuss the 535 and how the institution of Congress affects them. Second, I will discuss the external factors affecting the 535. And last, we will look at some legislative successes in this area.

THE 535

One commentator has said that Congressional decisions are rarely made on the basis of conscience or constituents, but that they are based on the institutions themselves. Although the commentator is guilty of some hyperbole, those of us who have worked inside the legislative institution are keenly aware that the very nature of each chamber—and the Senate and the House are two diverse bodies—is an important factor affecting the legislative process.

The Senate, with its 100 members, is a club. Each Senator knows the other—by nickname. The Senate runs best when no rules are applied but when there is agreement by unanimous consent. The Senate rulebook is about a quarter-inch thick.

The House has 435 members who do not necessarily know each other's names by the end of the 2-year term. The Rule Book is inches thick. Moreover, there is a powerful Rules Committee which dictates how most of the House legislation is handled on the floor. By comparison, we must not forget that each Senator has the right to filibuster, a mighty threat which is not available to a House member and which can bring a ringing halt to any legislation.

Senators, because of the smaller numbers, are generalists. They are the "big picture" people. The House has sufficient numbers to study issues in depth. They are specialists. So what happens to legislation passing through these two diverse groups? The Senate carves out the major thrust; the House puts up a magnifying glass to analyze the nitty gritty. It takes a long time, sometimes, to shape the nitty gritty.

Senators run every 6 years. For 4 years, their votes appear to reflect more of their own instincts; then, about 2 years before reelection time, there is much more awareness of the folks and, moreover, the media back home. For example, the 1982 Agents Identities Protection Act, which I floormanaged for Senator John Chafee, made it a crime to disclose the identity of intelligence covert agents. A specific provision in the bill came under attack by the media, claiming it threatened their rights under the First Amendment. As I counted votes by checking with each Senator's office, it was not unusual to have a staffer say, "The Senator would like to vote with you on that provision but he's up for reelection and the press would crucify him back home." Senator Chafee showed particular courage by not only voting for that controversial provision but also by leading the fight just months before his November election.

It is particularly difficult for a person up for reelection to be on a subcommittee considering controversial legislation. And it has not been unknown for certain legislation to be assigned to a Senate subcommittee with fewer members up for reelection so that the members would not have the heat of the fall election inhibiting work on a bill.

After all that has been said about the Senate reelection situation, you can anticipate the problems of dealing with anything controversial in the House, whose

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members run every 2 years or all the time, whichever comes first.

These are some of the key institutional ingredients that affect sausage making. They are present whatever the subject of the legislation. They are a response to the apparatus constructed for the purpose of legislating. But the process does not end within the institution itself. So let us turn to the external factors that affect the process and view these factors through possible legislative remedies for terrorism.

FACTORS AFFECTING THE 535

The Media: The media is listed first because, from what I have observed, it *is* first. As soon as the press calls come into a Congressional office about a specific subject, there is reaction. We can all agree there should be apple pie and motherhood, and that terrorism should be outlawed. But wait—what if antiterrorist legislation includes a provision affecting the press? Again, the Agent Identities Bill is an example. Naming names of covert agents was the dirty business of Covert Action Information Bulletin. It became an unconscionable act when disclosing one of those identities led to the assassination of the Chief of Station in Athens. Everyone agreed that Covert Action Information Bulletin should quit naming names. But hold on—the language used to criminalize this conduct could also apply to the *New York Times*. Now, said the press, that is where only respectable stories are printed. If a covert agent were named in the *New York Times*, clearly, the argument went, it would be for a good reason. The journalists' argument continued that at certain times it would be necessary to reveal the names of covert intelligence agents to uncover corruption and wrongdoing. And so the media waged war against certain provisions of the Agent Identities Bill. Just an aside: I always liked to ask these protesting journalists how the *Washington Post* managed to uncover all the corruption in Watergate without ever telling me the name of Deep Throat.

Another example: Consider a provision in antiterrorism legislation that the press is limited in the publicity it can give to acts by terrorists. It is generally agreed that publicity exacerbates the immediate situation and encourages future terrorists. But do you think the press will react to a legislative provision that prohibits publicity for certain acts of terrorism? I leave the journalistic response to your imagination.

The problem is that there is nowhere to go to protest if you are a supporter of legislation the press opposes. So, if you are a politician relying on those votes—and you do not have any other forum to explain your side of the story—it can affect some of your decisions on legislation.

The Lobbyist: Each member of Congress has specific groups of supporters within his or her constituents. Various lobbying groups support each member's election. When those lobbyists speak, "E.F. Congressperson" better listen. We all know the ACLU will oppose most legislation tightening the criminal laws. What if there were a bill to prohibit trade with any country providing sanctuary to terrorists—a very possible idea and one that should be in any arsenal of tools to combat terrorism. There could be lobbying opposition from places one would never suppose. Some administrations could find their own Commerce Departments protesting this legislation. Certainly lobbyists representing a trade association dealing with any country under suspicion of harboring terrorists could find themselves under the same covers with some strange political bedfellows.

How do you think politically active factions opposing covert action and a strong intelligence community would feel about legislation increasing intelligence and police activity seeking to penetrate terrorist groups?

How do you think groups opposed to a strong Executive would feel about giving broad power to the President to impose economic sanctions against countries supporting terrorism or failing to take action against terrorists?

Do you think the President should send military force against terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens? If so, does that trigger the War Powers Act?

Indeed, I think we can assume that all of these groups earnestly oppose terrorism. But no one wants his or her own sphere of political interest affected to cure this awesome threat.

Staff: It is significant that I was not sure where to discuss the Congressional staff: in the part of my talk discussing the 535 as an institution or in the part discussing the external factors on the 535. Since I have seen good loyal staff totally represent their principals and yet other staff go far astray from what I knew to be their members' views, this dilemma of mine is understandable.

When a Congressional staffer has his or her own agenda, it is a very difficult situation to counter. One has to choose carefully those issues to be taken to the

member personally. I developed certain approaches. For example, "Well, let's go have a discussion with the Senator so we can make absolutely sure this is what he wanted." Another tactic was, "Well, I'll have my Senator call your Senator and make sure we clear this thing up." But there were many occasions when it is impossible to penetrate this staff wall—and so you better hope the limb the staffer is going out on is the limb you want.

Executive Branch Relationships: A fourth factor not much addressed is that some Executive Branch agencies sometimes have such poor relationships with their Congressional oversight committees that needed legislation will not be developed. We are all aware of the tension inherent within the three branches, a tension mandated by the framers of our Constitution to ensure that no single branch becomes more powerful than the other two. It is much like that children's game—Rock, Scissors, Paper—where scissors cut paper, paper covers rock, and rock breaks scissors. Each Branch has a tool that cuts, covers, or breaks the others.

Congress must fulfill certain constitutional oversight duties with the Executive Branch. If Congress is doing its duty professionally, it does not dictate and it does not insult. By the same token, the Executive Branch should respond professionally to Congressional requests. I have seen Congressional liaison offices foment such adversarial relationships in the oversight process that when they need something, like certain legislation, the members and, just as important, the staff, say "tough."

Crisis: Many times the most significant factor affecting legislation is a crisis—a high-publicity situation that focuses everyone's attention on a specific subject matter. A good idea is not necessarily sufficient for that good idea to become law. Changes in the federal insanity defense were first proposed as a result of Governor Brown's Commission. This is not Jerry Brown of recent medfly fame but his father, who chaired the Commission under the Nixon Administration. Fifteen years later, it took John Hinckley's shooting of the President to grab the necessary legislative attention. The Senate passed the Reform Bill but the House, which does not move strong criminal enforcement bills, has not.

The November bombing of the Capitol may have done more to focus the proper attention on terrorism than all the well-meaning lobbying could ever have done. In the past few months in the Senate, there were daily reminders of that bombing as I had to show passes and have my purse searched at almost every turn—and I worked there.

SOME SUCCESSES

Notwithstanding these hurdles, there have been recent legislation and Senate treaty ratifications that could be considered successes in the area of anti-terrorism.

1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This law set up procedures for electronic surveillance to acquire certain national security information, including terrorists' acts. Information for probable cause determination goes to the FISA Court and is kept sealed. The Executive and Legislative Branches have sung the law's praises and the courts have upheld its constitutionality against many attacks.

1982 Agent Identities Protection Act. This law criminalized disclosure of undercover agents. Covert Action Information Bulletin has not published another name since the bill passed the Senate, which was months before it was signed into law. The Senate has also sent to the House a bill which provides capital punishment for terrorism, but, I repeat myself, the House has not been very receptive to restrictive crime legislation. So there the legislation might sit.

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. In 1981, the Senate unanimously ratified this convention. The convention imposes binding legal obligation on the parties either to extradite or submit for prosecution alleged hostage-takers found in their jurisdiction. Each signatory state must comply with this obligation without regard to where the alleged hostage-taking was committed.

Another treaty is the *Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.* This convention requires that those who commit serious offenses involving nuclear material will be punished and that international cooperation in providing security for nuclear material will be increased.

The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation was ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1972 but implementing legislation has not yet been passed. I am told this legislation is in the works.

In closing, I wish to comment that this complex sausage-making apparatus was constructed so that much debate and then consensus would be essential ingredients of legislation. For those of us interested in passing specific legislation, it is necessary to understand this apparatus to make it work for us. It is also necessary to have a strong stomach.

Victoria Toensing

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Terrorism, Intelligence, and the Law

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The theme of this symposium, "Symmetry and Asymmetry of Global Adversary Behavior," gives us a hint of the difficulty in dealing with the core subject at hand—terrorism. I feel a bit like the great jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes. Late in his distinguished career on the Supreme Court, Holmes found himself on a train. Confronted by the conductor, the Justice couldn't find his ticket. The conductor recognized the distinguished jurist and told him not to worry, that he could just send in the ticket when he found it. Holmes looked at the conductor with some irritation and replied: "The problem is not where my ticket is. The problem is, where am I going?"

And so we might ask, where are we going? What is this phenomenon, terrorism, and what has it done to us from the perspective of intelligence and the law? What has it forced us to do and where are we headed in this "uncharted field"?

Professor Yonah Alexander says that what constitutes "terrorism" is highly controversial because the perception of what justifies political violence varies greatly. Thus each country decides who are the terrorists. Hence, he was not surprised when the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism of the U.N. General Assembly failed to reach a consensus on the definition of terrorism. Unencumbered by the need to form such a consensus, Dr. Alexander defines it thus:

> I define terrorism as the threat and use of psychological and physical force—including intimidation, coercion, repression, and, ultimately, destruction of human lives and property—for the purpose of attaining real or imaginary ideological and political goals. In other words, terrorism should be regarded as an expedient tactical and strategic tool utilized by both established regimes and opposition groups functioning under varying degrees of stress.
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> Nonstate movements consist of ethnic, religious, and nationalist groups (e.g., the provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army); Marxist-Leninist groups (e.g., the Basques in Spain); anarchist groups (e.g., Germany's Red Cells); neo-Fascist and extreme right-wing groups (e.g., Turkey's Gray Wolves); ideological mercenaries (e.g., the Japanese Red Army); and pathological groups (e.g., the Symbionese Liberation Army). Unlike ordinary criminals these terrorists are ostensibly dedicated to an altruistic ideological or political cause. Yet, for terrorism's victims, it doesn't matter whether the cause for which they suffered or died was Puerto Rican independence or the furtherance of international communism. In short, we are living in an "Age of Terrorism" in terms of technology, victimization, threat, and response.

What to do about it? Here is his prescription:

> Obviously the first line of defense is the law enforcement agencies, and they're doing a good job. However, the problem of terrorism is so critical that it cannot be left to the law enforcement agencies alone. Other segments of society—Congress, universities, churches, and families—should also have an input. Much technology is available, and new technology usually can be developed to deal with most terrorists threats. The problem lies in making the *decision to use* specific technological countermeasures.
>
> Also, intelligence countermeasures are possible but are not used because of public attitudes and political and bureaucratic restrictions. In other words, our democracy is restrained by moral and legal principles in countering terrorism. To correct this weakness we must mobilize both the public and Congress to help strengthen the prediction, prevention, contingency planning, and crisis management capabilities of the U.S. government. In short, we must seriously assess our vulnerability to modern terrorism and develop adequate strategies to deal with the problem.

And what contributes to the existence of contemporary terrorism?

> Let me answer by listing some reasons for the perpetuation of ideological and political violence: 1. disagreement about who is a terrorist; 2. lack of understanding of the causes of terrorism; 3. confusion over the role of the media; 4. the politicization of religion; 5. double standards of morality; 6. *loss of resolve by governments*; 7. inadequate punishment for terrorists; 8. flouting of world law; 9. the support of terrorism by communist and third world countries; and 10. the existence of an international network of terrorism.

This latter network is exemplified by looking at the list of FBI terrorist cases in the Attorney General's 1982 Annual Report. Armenian, Croatian, Irish, Palestinian, Puerto Rican, and Haitian groups all were operating here. In my office, we dealt with another brand of terrorist—Edwin Wilson, a former CIA agent, and his associates, who worked hand in glove with the Libyan Government to support and export terrorism abroad. Their successful prosecution was a painstaking ordeal—but necessary. In supplying military equipment, plastic explosives, and expertise, this group had elevated the role of consultant to that of international hitman. Indeed, our pursuit led to attempts by Wilson, even while jailed, to have two of my prosecutors assassinated.

Our involvement in Central America has created pretexts for action by terrorists from that troubled spot and their cohorts here. But even before that, state-sponsored terrorism from that part of the world had found its way to our shores when Orlando Letalier was assassinated on the streets of Washington, D.C. As in the Wilson case, a series of prosecutions resulted.

The barricades in Washington, at the White House, the State Department, and the Capitol, are sad testimony to the reality of the threat and the need for and ultimate benefit of intelligence. But even with more and better intelligence, we may not be able to prevent an act that could change the course of government here. The Capitol bombing demonstrated that. But for the accident of a tired and frustrated majority leader, the Senate would have been in session the night the terrorist bomb exploded. The blast would have killed a number of Senators. The bomb was placed outside the Republican cloakroam. Had one more amendment been permitted on the floor or an extra speech been read that night, no one knows what the political consequences could have been or how the distribution of power in that body would have been affected. Though this incident ended without a death or serious bodily injury, it was not without unforeseen and unusual consequences.

Recently, a man arrived at Senator Howard Baker's office in the Hart Building. When Baker's personal office was locked, he strode across the hall to Senator Quayle's office and asked the receptionist if she would keep his briefcase until he returned for his meeting with Senator Baker. He was going to get a cup of coffee. Senator Quayle's receptionist agreed courteously and the man left. He did not return within a reasonable period of time so, when Senator Baker's receptionist opened that office, the locked briefcase was delivered to her with the explanation that the man had said he had an appointment with Senator Baker that morning.

Senator Baker's receptionist looked at the briefcase and saw that it bore the initials "WTD." She checked her appointment book and saw no one scheduled for the Senator with those initials. She checked with the personal secretary and discovered there was no one on that schedule with those initials. She then called the Majority Leader's office and discovered that his calendar there indicated no one with those initials scheduled to see him in the Capitol office. At this point she called the Capitol Police. The police arrived, took the briefcase gingerly from the Hart Building, and began their work.

Later, the police returned with a plastic bag which contained the shredded briefcase and its shredded contents, announcing that there was no bomb of any kind therein. As they were departing, the unknown gentleman finally returned and asked for his briefcase. He was asked what his initials were and he said, "WTD." He said, "I'm Winfield T. Dunn, the former Governor of Tennessee and I just thought I'd stop in and see Howard while I was in town."

But other consequences are not so easily laughed off because they have changed our lives in a real and tangible way. On February 2, 1984, my wife and I were fortunate enough to attend the 32nd Annual National Prayer Breakfast at the Washington Hilton Hotel. The President and Mrs. Reagan were in attendance as were House and Senate leaders and many members of both Houses of Congress and the Cabinet. A beautiful invitation and program were part of the occasion. But discreetly inserted into the invitation was a card which read as follows:

> Due to the need for greater security for all those attending the National Prayer Breakfast, there will be metal detectors at each entrance.
>
> For this reason it is advisable that you eliminate any unnecessary metal from your person before coming to the hotel (camera, recorder, big belt buckle, etc.); and, since this process is a bit more time consuming, you might be wise to arrive a bit earlier than may have been planned.

There is an almost Orwellian eloquence in this little card.

How can you calculate such costs in terms of freedom? This is what the terrorists have taken from us. Our rights have been limited. Real rights—movement, access, tranquility—have been stolen from us. We have been victimized by a form of international burglary. Our way of life has been changed. That realization is central to understanding the needs of those who must protect the public from such threats. It is central to convincing those in Congress who will not listen, that real damage

has already been done to the body politic by the acts of dedicated international criminals. That reality also explains the wisdom of the Attorney General's changes in the Domestic Security and Terrorism Guidelines issued last year. But I will deal with those later.

Terrorism's reach has gone beyond the obvious areas I've just spoken about. It has now even found its way into our civil law. In a little noticed case handed down by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on February 3 entitled *Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, a three-judge panel grappled with the legal consequences of a terrorist armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel in March 1978. The survivors and relatives of the decedents sued the PLO, Libya, and others.

The case is fascinating not for its result—affirmance of the dismissal of the action in the District Court—but for the three opinions issued by the three jurists and their thoughts on terrorism and its place in our jurisprudence. The first judge attempted to decide "whether terrorism is itself a law of nations violation."

> I turn next to consider whether terrorism is itself a law of nations violation. While this nation unequivocally condemns all terrorism attacks, that sentiment is not universal. Indeed, the nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus. Unlike the issue of individual responsibility, which much of the world has never even reached, terrorism has evoked strident reactions and sparked strong alliances among numerous states. Given this division, I do not believe that under current law terrorist attacks amount to law of nations violations.

After reviewing pertinent international documents, he concluded:

> The divergence as to basic norms of course reflects a basic disagreement as to legitimate political goals and the proper method of attainment. Given such disharmony, I cannot conclude that the law of nations—which, we must recall, is defined as the principles and rules that states feel themselves bound to observe, and do commonly observe—outlaws politically motivated terrorism, no matter how repugnant it might be to our own legal system.

Another jurist agreed and delved further into the murky status of terrorism:

> In addition, appellants' principal claim, that appellees violated customary principles of international law against terrorism, concerns an area of international law in which there is little or no consensus and in which the disagreements concern politically sensitive issues that are especially prominent in the foreign relations problems of the Middle East. Some aspects of terrorism have been the subject of several international conventions, such as those concerning hijacking, . . . and attacks on internationally protected persons such as diplomats . . . But no consensus has developed on how properly to define "terrorism" generally. . . . As a consequence, " '[i]nternational law and the rules of warfare as they now exist are inadequate to cope with this new mode of conflict.' " . . . "The dismal truth is that the international community has dealt with terrorism ambivalently and ineffectually." . . .
>
> Customary international law may well forbid states from aiding terrorist attacks on neighboring states. . . . Although that principle might apply in a case like this to a *state* such as Libya (which is not a proper party here . . .), it does not, at least on its face, apply to a *nonstate* like the PLO. More important, there is less than universal consensus about whether PLO-sponsored attacks on Israel are lawful. One important sign of the lack of consensus about terrorism generally, and about PLO activities in particular, is that accusations of terrorism are often met not by denial of the fact of responsibility but by a justification for the challenged actions . . . Indeed, one of the key documents relied on as evidence of an international law proscription on terrorism, the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, . . . was said by at least one state at the time of its promulgation not to be applicable to Palestinian terrorist raids into Israel supported by Arab states . . . Attempts to secure greater consensus on terrorism have foundered on just such issues as the lawfulness of violent action by groups like the PLO fighting what some states view as "wars of national liberation." . . .

He concluded that, out of respect for the separation of powers, no cause of action should lie.

The third judge described the assailants as "thugs clothed with power who are unfortunately present in great numbers in the international order." But he too concluded that "[f]ederal courts are not in a position to determine the international status of terrorist acts." He then gives an almost aesthetic warning:

> Courts ought not to engage in it when that search takes us towards a consideration of terrorism's place in the international order. Indeed, when such a review forces us to dignify by judicial notice the most outrageous of the diplomatic charades that attempt to dignify the violence of terrorist atrocities, we corrupt our own understanding of evil.

That is, of course, an unusual setting for the discussion of terrorism and the law. But is it instructive of our mindset, our attitude, and one would hope, our resolve to find a way to deal in some form with this new evil created by man.

One way we have decided to deal with this horror is to shape the law to allow our law enforcement agencies to prevent terrorist acts through intelligence-type investigation and to respond through criminal investigations when terrorist acts are committed. The most significant efforts for us at the Department of Justice have been the Domestic Security and Terrorism Guidelines.

On March 7, 1983, Attorney General William French Smith announced new guidelines to clarify the scope of domestic security and terrorism investigations by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The revised guidelines, which became effective on March 21, 1983, succeeded the 1976 Domestic Security Guidelines, which were the first of their kind.

The new guidelines are needed to ensure protection of the public from the great sophistication and changing nature of domestic groups that are prone to violence. At the same time, the guidelines will adequately protect lawful and peaceful political dissent.

As the Attorney General has said, these revised guidelines are truly the result of an extensive and careful review process. The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Judge Webster devoted substantial personal attention to a review of our 7 years' experience with the 1976 Domestic Security Guidelines. The 8-month review process focused upon the operational experience of FBI field agents in implementing the 1976 guidelines, as well as our operational experience with the guidelines governing General Crimes and Racketeering Enterprise Investigations which were promulgated in 1980. Prior to the current revision, no changes have been made to the Domestic Security Guidelines since their promulgation on a trial basis in 1976. In the review process we considered the views of numerous commentators in the Congress, in other law enforcement agencies such as the Secret Service, and elsewhere.

In building upon the positive experience we have enjoyed with the FBI's racketeering enterprise guidelines, we now apply the "criminal enterprise" concept to domestic security and terrorism investigations. As the Attorney General has said, this common-sense concept will permit agents to address as one criminal enterprise all those persons who knowingly provide support to a group's criminal objectives, whether or not they are formal members of the "group" which may actually engage in criminal violence. If, for example, persons are knowingly providing safehouses or financing the criminal activities of a terrorist group, they would be investigated as part of the same criminal enterprise. This avoids the necessity of opening a separate investigation of the new supporting group, with a separate justification. The new approach recognizes that terrorist groups today have a *fluid membership* and *often lack organizational structure*, yet function as a single enterprise directed toward a common goal. This approach will also permit the FBI to focus upon violent factions of a larger organization without having to place the whole organization under investigation.

Like the General Crimes and Racketeering Enterprise Guidelines, the Domestic Security and Terrorism Guidelines now authorize just one level of investigation rather than the confusing and unnecessarily cumbersome three levels in the 1976 guidelines. Also like the existing criminal investigative guidelines, these revisions employ the "reasonable indication" threshold: An investigation can be conducted when the "facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States." This "reasonable indication" standard does not require that a crime be completed or be "imminent," but does require an objective factual basis. It has worked well in practice.

Under the revised standards, all "preliminary inquiries" are uniformly governed by the General Crimes Guidelines. This limited authority has been unchanged since 1980 and permits agents only to follow up on allegations or information indicating the possibility of criminal conduct in order to determine whether a full investigation is warranted.

In our view, the application of common concepts and terminology to all FBI law enforcement investigations will make the guidance clearer for our field agents and therefore lead to more effective investigations. This need for the clearest possible guidance also inspired certain guideline revisions which addressed ambiguities or omissions in the 1976 guidelines.

One of the most significant omissions in the 1976 guidelines concerned the issue of whether, or when, statements could prompt investigative activity. The fact that this "advocacy" issue is controversial underscored the need to address the issue directly in the guidelines. Understandable First Amendment concerns require agents to be especially circumspect in reacting to statements. By the same token, however, we must acknowledge that in some circumstances statements can be of great investigative significance. Some statements are crimes in and of themselves. For example, Title 18 makes it a crime to utter false bomb threats (Section 35), to threaten a foreign official (Section 112), or to threaten the President (Section 871). As a prosecutor and law enforcement official, I have seen many instances in which statements have constituted evidence of criminal conduct or criminal intent. In short, certain statements in certain contexts can and ought to require further inquiry by responsible law enforcement officials, and the guidelines revisions have been designed to address this narrow, but very troubling, type of advocacy.

We would stress that lawful and peaceful political dissent is not subject to investigation under the revised guidelines, just as it was not subject to investigation under the prior guidelines. As specific safeguards, the revised guidelines and implementing instructions expressly prohibit investigations premised solely upon the proper exercise of First Amendment rights, make it clear that statements must be viewed in context before any inquiry will be authorized, and provide that when response is appropriate the normal procedure will be by way of a preliminary inquiry. However, it is important to make clear that agents must follow up when confronted with statements that present a credible threat of criminal activity.

A number of other provisions in the revised guidelines address ambiguities or omissions in the 1976 version. The revised guidelines expressly authorize FBI collection of publicly available information to the extent such collection is permitted by the Privacy Act of 1974. To minimize the unnecessary burden of reopening investigations which had been prematurely closed, the guidelines expressly permit the FBI to monitor organizations which may be temporarily inactive, but whose prior record or stated objectives indicate a need for continuing investigation, so long as the minimum standard for investigation is satisfied. Also as matters of clarification, these guidelines expressly authorize cooperation with the Secret Service on matters of investigative interest to that agency and contain provisions permitting dissemination of investigative information to other agencies where it is lawful and appropriate.

In summary, we are pleased with the results of this careful review and revision of the 1976 Domestic Security Guidelines. As I have stated, the changes are not fundamental in character but are nonetheless significant and have been carefully crafted to ensure clear and consistent guidance for our FBI agents in all law enforcement investigations. We must remember that activities pursuant to these guidelines are subject to review by FBI and Department of Justice leaders, as well as oversight committees.

Public discussion is helpful to us as we implement and monitor the impact of these revised guidelines. This discussion also helps to reassure law-abiding members of the public of the FBI's investigative commitment and continued adherence to the rule of law. Finally, this discussion will help to send an important signal to those who would engage in criminal violence—whether they seek political, racist, or purely pecuniary advantage—that the Federal Government views law enforcement investigative activity in this area as a critical responsibility of the highest priority. As we have said on prior occasions, guidelines by their nature are not immutable, and as we assess our experience with these revisions in practice, we may find that further clarification is necessary. But there is a wrinkle to this story.

On April 18, 1983, shortly after the guidelines were issued, a Federal court in Chicago enjoined their enforcement in that district, declaring that their amendments violated a 1981 settlement of some lawsuits filed 10 years before, which had incorporated the 1976 guidelines. That case was appealed. Several weeks ago, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that District Court Judge. A decision on whether to appeal to the United States Supreme Court is now being weighed. The new guidelines are, however, in effect for the rest of the country.

On May 11, 1983, the House Judiciary Committee proposed delaying these new guidelines. The Attorney General appropriately called this proposal "extremely disappointing [and] ill-advised . . ." The full House and Senate saw fit to agree with the Attorney General.

One commentator noted that the

> . . . *Smith* guidelines are the first clear directive assigning an intelligence gathering function to the FBI on a statutory basis. The new guidelines are issued under the authority of 28 U.S.C. Sections 509, 510 and 533, which respectively set out the authority of the attorney general, authorize him to delegate his responsibility, and permit him to appoint officials not only to detect and prosecute crimes, but also "to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may be directed by the attorney general." The *Levi* guidelines contained no expression of the authority on which they were based.

These guidelines are working and have been a major assist in providing a legal context for official actions in detecting, preventing, and prosecuting acts of terrorism.

In a related area, the Department supports, with some modifications, S. 2255, the Antiterrorism and Foreign Mercenary Act. It is our belief that S. 2255, as appropriately modified, would close gaps in existing law and give the President needed additional power to deal with international terrorism.

S. 2255 would prohibit the furnishing by Americans of various forms of assistance, primarily highly technical services, and skills of a military nature, to certain governments, factions, or terrorist groups. S. 2255 does not, itself, deal with the sale of munitions, weapons, or other military hardware by Americans to such groups. Existing statutes—primarily 22 U.S.C. 2278—cover these areas.

We believe the approach taken by S. 2255 is sound and provides a vehicle by which successful prosecutions can be brought against individuals who violate the restrictions when they are in force. Under accepted international law principles, the Congress has the power to regulate and punish conduct of United States citizens and others owing permanent allegiance to the United States wherever they may be. Hence, when the President or Congress determines that the national security, foreign relations, or commerce interests of the United States warrant *a ban* on certain kinds of assistance by American citizens or businesses to a particular foreign government, faction, or terrorist group, this assistance should cease. Failure to terminate such assistance in the time span provided under the bill exposes the individual to criminal sanctions and penalties.

One proposed section of the bill would make it unlawful for any citizen of the United States, any alien lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence (as defined in Section 101S(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, or association organized under the laws of the United States, its territories, or possessions *to knowingly and willfully perform or attempt to perform any of several enumerated acts with respect to* either the Government of Libya or any other foreign government, faction, or terrorist group named in a Presidential Proclamation. The prohibited acts are:

A. To serve in, or in concert with, the armed forces or in any intelligence agency;
B. To provide training in any capacity to the armed forces or any intelligence agency or their agents;
C. To provide any logistical, mechanical, maintenance, or similar support services to the armed forces, any intelligence agency, or their agents;
D. To conduct any research, manufacturing, or construction project which is primarily supportive of the military or intelligence functions; or
E. To recruit or solicit any person to engage in any activity described in subparagraphs (A) through (D).

Another portion of the bill provides that the President may, when he determines that it is warranted for the purposes of national security, foreign relations, or commerce interests of the United States, issue a proclamation naming any foreign government, faction, or terrorist group as one on which there is a ban as to the availability of services, resources, and other forms of assistance described above, thus triggering the prohibitions I enumerated earlier.

Some modifications to the bill are necessary, however.

First of all, we think it is important that the focus of the legislation be aimed at international terrorism. In doing so, we believe it would be wise to utilize the definition for international terrorism which the Congress has already adopted in section 101(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(c) note). By doing so, the import of the bill is aimed at that portion of the worldwide terrorism problem which would or could be most likely to affect United States interests.

Second, we believe the present definition of "businesses" in the bill should be modified to include most business operations involving United States citizens and corporations.

Third, we suggest that the criminal forfeiture provision be rewritten to correspond to existing legal requirements and practices and that it be drafted in such a fashion that future legislative improvements in the area of criminal forfeiture will be incorporated into this legislation.

Fourth, we suggest that the bill specifically exclude from its criminal justice liability any properly authorized and conducted intelligence activities of the United States Government.

In conclusion, it appears to us that any meaningful effort to thwart the furnishing of assistance supportive of terrorism by some American citizens and businesses requires a commitment on our part to impose the limited trade sanctions on the types of services set forth in the bill against the few pirate nations and groups in the world engaging in and supporting terrorism.

By the way, as you may recall, the President announced in his State of the Union address that a package of bills dealing with terrorism would be submitted to the Congress. That package should be forthcoming and will, no doubt, provide critical impetus to public and Congressional discussion of this vital matter.

So the answer to the paraphrase of Oliver Wendell Holmes' question "where are we going" is that we are gradually progressing toward a realistic assessment of our legal needs where terrorism is concerned. Henry Cabot Lodge once opined that "We have a big net that we can catch whales in, but the fine mesh net to catch the very deadly small fish of terrorism and assassination and kidnapping and so on is yet to be developed." That "fine mesh" is being developed now in this country and in the world community. It must be a legal, technological, intelligence, and political mesh strong enough to do what is necessary.

Let us hope that we retain the strength to see that job through to its completion and that we retain leaders strong enough to demand that it be completed.

Joseph E. diGenova is the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia. He has been responsible for, among other things, managing the John W. Hinckley case, ABSCAM cases, and major civil litigation including First Amendment issues such as the White House and Lafayette Park demonstration cases.

He has served as Special Counsel to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as Chief Minority Counsel for the District of Columbia Subcommittee.

Mr. diGenova has published articles on the insanity defense and the exclusionary rule and has spoken on these and other criminal justice topics to the American Bar Association, bar groups, and civil and community organizations. He has also testified before Congress and the District of Columbia Council on issues related to the criminal justice system in the Federal Courts and in the District of Columbia.

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Motives and Tactics of Terrorist Groups

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INTRODUCTION

International terrorism, an unsavory aspect of the world's political history, exists in complete contradiction to the establishment of stable societies. Despite increasing governmental attempts to curb terrorism, it has become a prominent international issue and, as such, requires governments to examine motivational and tactical concerns in order to seek treatment for this epidemic of political violence.

The explosive situation in the Middle East, the mounting opposition to United States policies in Europe and Central America, and the instability of regimes throughout Latin America, have generated a substantial amount of terrorist activity in the 1980's. This being the case, it has become necessary to survey the aims and objectives of terrorist elements (both indigenous and transnational) as well as trends and patterns of *modus operandi*. Many countries have been affected; motives and techniques existent in one area can be of significant importance in another. It appears that, if nothing else, terrorist groups tend to be imitative in their ideological and operational pursuits.

This paper presents a brief overview of major terrorist operations throughout the world and identifies common objectives and means of their achievement. In speaking of general principles, it is apparent that terrorism, in all of its manifestations, contains several common, recurring ingredients:

- A terrorist group is formed to change an existing political system or right an alleged wrong which, in its view, cannot be accomplished by working within the system;
- A fanaticism or fervor is manifested by a political or revolutionary ideology, sufficient to justify acts of violence (i.e., terrorism) by the group, to focus public attention on its goals;
- Elements of clandestinity and secrecy exist in the group's operation;
- The group procures and provides training, weapons, funding, and other support for its members; and
- Participants in terrorist activity are generally members of a group with some distinction of leadership.

GENERAL MOTIVATIONS

Prior to a discussion of the motivational aspects of worldwide terrorist activity, it is noted that two pragmatic concepts seem to run parallel to ideological beliefs: (1) The commission of terrorist acts is less expensive than waging war, in terms of manpower and revenue, and (2) such acts can be well publicized, through a sophisticated international media, thereby focusing attention on, and generating potential support for, the cause. These aspects, coupled with specific political desires, make for a complete package of motivation, and are a means of legitimizing the causes and the groups' violence.

International Groups

Although it can be established that the fundamental motivation for most international terrorist activity is political, this general concept can be separated into two categories; subnational groups and statesponsored groups. A characterization of each type, with appropriate examples, is as follows:

Subnational Groups. Groups seeking political change; anti-regime elements operating to create their own independent state within an existing governmental boundary (e.g., Armenian, Croatian, Palestine Liberation Organization, and Irish groups), or antiregime elements seeking to overthrow present governments, as is the case throughout much of Latin America. Such revolutionary terrorist activity was successful in Nicaragua with the overthrow of the Anastasio Somoza regime by the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front). Groups representing these interests are generally active worldwide as well as in the areas of dispute.

State-Sponsored Groups. Governments or governmental factions which support terrorism as an instrument of state policy; groups seeking to further foreign policy objectives of the state and monitor antiregime elements worldwide; activity also utilized to quell any domestic unrest. This activity is most prominent among Middle Eastern governments (e.g., Iran, Libya, Syria). These regimes train and use terrorists and also make use of their intelligence and military services in terrorist operations. A fundamental aim is the "showcasing" of their revolutionary concepts abroad.

In some cases, especially in Iran, underlying religious motivations exist to complement political beliefs. In Iran, a fanatical fundamentalist sect of the Shiite religion, whose leader is the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, emphasizes strict obedience to the religious leader while exercising temporal power over the coun-

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try. Khomeini has justified the use of terrorism in exporting his revolutionary beliefs through his "interpretation" of the Islamic religion. To be sure, Khomeini's interpretation is unquestioned. Therefore, the theocracy of Khomeini, that is, his interpretation of the religious teachings, becomes justification for any act, and creates the existence of surrogate terrorists throughout the world to carry out these acts, in furtherance of Khomeini's religious interpretations.

United States Domestic Groups

Domestic terrorist elements native to the United States are a collection of groups representing both left-wing and right-wing interests. In both instances, their arena is the United States and their causes are beholden to issues relating to the American social and political scene. The common goal of both left- and right-wing groups is to bring about change in the existing Government.

Left-Wing. These groups generally profess a Marxist-Leninist doctrine and view themselves as "protectors" of the American people against capitalism. Their aim is to bring about revolution in the United States. Common to these groups is the belief that their aim will be realized through well-orchestrated action rather than solely through reliance on theoretical precepts. In the past, these groups, such as the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee and the Communist Workers Party, have claimed alliances with groups (both domestic and international) supporting a myriad of issues (e.g., prison revolts, United States policy issues, anti-imperialism views).

The causes these groups become involved in tend to shift with the political wind and therefore seem to gain impetus from the emergence of "trendy" political issues. As an example, these groups were very active in the protest movement during the Vietnam era and quieted down significantly following the resolution of that conflict. At present, with a new antiwar movement emerging in regard to the Central American issue (especially in El Salvador), the groups have another popular cause on which to focus their efforts.

Also a cause of renewed activity in the 1980's has been these groups' increased frustration in response to United States policies under the current administration, which they perceive to be very conservative. Leftist elements tend to perceive themselves as isolated from the mainstream of United States society. This frustration radicalizes, to further extremes, ideologies that are already leftist and activist. This, in turn, results in further acts of terrorism.

Right-Wing. These organizations represent the belief in the doctrine of superiority of the white race, and consequently are strongly antiblack and anti-Semitic in their emphasis. Groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party strive for the establishment of an all white America. Although the goal of all right-wing groups is essentially the same (i.e., white dominion over the United States), the emphasis and manifestation of the particular doctrines they exhibit tend to differ along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines.

While the ultimate objectives appear similar, the emphasis and means of achievement are not necessarily the same. One prominent group, the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, expresses not only antiblack and anti-Semitic views, but has recently demonstrated a propensity for violence toward law enforcement elements as well.

GENERAL TACTICS

Tactics employed by terrorists in various countries include bombings (including the use of letter bombs, pipe bombs, and firebombs), kidnappings, assassinations, hijackings, and even robbery of funds and material for political purposes. By far the most widely used tactic is that of the various types of bombings. The reasons are that (1) the terrorist can set the bomb to go off at a later time, thereby minimizing the changes of his or her injury and allowing for an escape, and (2) potential evidence is consumed in the explosion.

Before the various aspects of weaponry, targeting, means of claiming credit, and methods of support are reviewed, some tactics common to the vast majority of terrorist groups should be noted:

- The use of threats, harassment, and violence to serve as methods of systematic persuasion and to create an atmosphere of coercion and/or fear;
- The use of unprovoked attacks;
- The selection of targets and acts which gain maximum publicity and hold maximum propaganda value; and
- Utilization of the element of surprise to overcome countermeasures.

Weapons

The different types of weapons at the terrorist's disposal appear to be utilized in two general areas: traditional acts of terrorism (i.e., bombings, assassinations) and organized guerrilla warfare activity.

In the traditional sphere, the use of various types of bombs or incendiary devices appears to be a favorite of most groups. These weapons are utilized by the two types of international groups previously mentioned—subnational and state-supported groups—as well as most United States domestic elements. Croatian, Armenian, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Irish, Syrian, and domestic groups are included in those that utilize bombs. Although the bomb may be the favorite weapon, international and domestic groups do use other means, as mentioned.

In the United States, active domestic groups generally utilize simply constructed bombing devices, with the explosive connected to a simple watch mechanism. There has been no evidence of electronic wizardry or complex timing mechanisms being used in the construction of these weapons.

In guerrilla warfare and invasions in foreign nations, more prominent is the use of tools of conventional war, such as RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, SAM-7 heat-seeking missiles, 50-caliber machine guns, and other automatic weapons.

Again, this activity includes both international group types. Domestic groups in the United States, though in support of some of this activity, generally do not take part in actual fighting. Salvadorans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization are examples of international groups involved in guerrilla warfare. However, some traditional acts, in the United States and abroad, have been claimed by these groups as well.

In recent months, a new weapon has been added to the arsenal of terrorism: the mobile suicide bomber, as demonstrated in the bombings in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983, of the American Embassy in April and the U.S. Marine Corps installation in October.

Targets

In most cases, targets selected by groups seeking governmental overthrows are those individuals or institutions that represent regime interests, such as government buildings, officials, or any regime-sponsored activity.

For those groups spreading the doctrine of their respective governments, antiregime elements are the likely targets. For example, the Libyan Government monitors Libyan students in the United States as well as organizations professing anti-Libyan views. Regime elements are involved in efforts to halt or curtail any type of ideological opposition.

In the United States, domestic groups have been known to have contact with international groups, depending on the cause. In communiques issued by some domestic groups following terrorist incidents, solidarity with international groups has been claimed. In strictly domestic activities, governmental, educational, and business institutions are common targets.

As previously noted, acts against these targets are intended to capture a wide audience. Also, selection of a target is generally the result of careful planning in logistics as well as an examination of the resultant value of the incident itself in furthering the particular cause.

United States presence in Europe is continually a target of both sophisticated and developing terrorist groups. In fact, approximately 40 percent of all incidents abroad since 1968 have been targeted against United States interests. Although we have been fortunate in the United States not to have suffered a spectacular event, such as the Marine Corps installation bombing in Lebanon, we have seen an increased propensity on the part of terrorist groups to plan and carry out acts of terrorism in the United States. This is typified by the destruction of $50 million worth of aircraft in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1981, by the pro-independence Puerto Rican terrorist group, the Macheteros.

Important to the near-term threat in the United States is the holding of the Olympic Games in Los Angeles during the summer of 1984. Although there are no confirmed indications of specific terrorist targeting of Olympic venues or participants, various Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are giving close examination to this possibility.

Notification

Terrorist groups want recognition for the commission of a terrorist act in order to gain media coverage and spread their causes. These groups utilize various means of claiming responsibility, including written communiques, telephone calls, and taped messages.

These contacts can come before or after the incident and may or may not be specific as to the exact location or type of weapon. This keeps the element of surprise and secrecy intact; in some cases, it is a means of taunting governmental authorities. As an example, in the case of acts committed by the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation [FALN]), a Puerto Rican group based in the United States, responsibility is usually claimed by an anonymous telephone contact or written notification, received immediately after the incident. Also, some recent bombings committed by domestic groups (American motivations) are preceded by a telephone contact to the police

or the media, followed by another call stating where a communique or public declaration can be located. These written notices usually contain statements defining the cause and possibly making some demands. In some cases, the tactic of forewarning is a means of protecting innocent individuals, thereby isolating the perpetrators from charges of wanton brutality. This notwithstanding, there are terrorist elements not concerned with the eventual bloodshed resulting from a terrorist act.

Support

Assistance to various terrorist groups takes forms such as monetary donations, material (e.g., medical, clothing, military), and propaganda support. Relating to the propaganda concept is political support in terms of tacit recognition of a government in exile (as is the case of the Palestine Liberation Organization). Leaders of terrorist elements can, in this sense, play diplomatic roles in order to lend legitimacy and credibility to their cause. This form of self-sustaining propaganda can be useful in regard to broad-scope recognition. Most of the prominent international groups are in existence, at least via support organizations, throughout many parts of the world. Worldwide solidarity movements support many of the causes represented, although they do not overtly condone terrorist activity. Various issues involving these groups are prominent in the World Peace Movement.

In addition, some concerns, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization and Irish groups, have their own representatives throughout the world to procure funding and weapons for transport back to the areas of conflict. Some state-supported groups have organized proregime factions which support and further their doctrines in areas outside their boundaries.

United States domestic organizations generally gain funding from bank robberies, donations from sympathetic supporters, the sale of pamphlets, and group member donations. Explosives and weaponry are usually stolen or obtained via contact with underground criminal elements.

SELECTED PROFILES

The following is a representative sample of group types (international and domestic) from various regions of the world. It provides further clarification of motivations and tactics utilized by terrorist groups.

Middle Eastern

Libyan. The Libyan Government and its leader, Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhafi, have displayed a propensity for support of various international terrorist movements around the world. In the United States, Libya has established liaison with black extremist, American Indian, and Puerto Rican radical groups. Also, through the Libyan Revolutionary Committee (LRC), Libya has directed an intelligence collection and terrorism program against the Libyan exile and dissident student community in the United States.

The LRC evolves from the revolutionary political ideas of Qadhafi and its major function is to spread the Qadhafi dogma and control the action of Libyans (both internally and externally) opposed to Quadafi and his revolutionary theory. The LRC uses physical and financial threats to control Libyan students and has recalled students in the United States to Libya for expressing anti-Qadhafi views. In the United States, the LRC utilizes the People's Committee for Libyan Students to monitor student activities and anti-Qadhafi concerns.

The Qadhafi regime has also sponsored violence in Europe (primarily in England and Italy), which has taken the form of assassinations of Libyan exiles and bombings of individuals and institutions representing anti-Qadhafi interests.

Iranian. The main Iranian group that generally has claimed credit for terrorist acts in the Middle East recently is a fanatical Shiite sect of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many acts of Iranian-inspired terrorism have been claimed by the Islamic Jihad, which may be a concept rather than a specific group, wherein a state of "holy war" exists. Although not all Shiites adhere to this philosophy, those who do believe that no sacrifice is too great for the furtherance of their cause. This is evidenced in their use of suicide missions in carrying out spectacular acts.

Though this type of activity has been confined to the Middle East, there is the possibility that it could spread elsewhere, including the United States, especially since the United States is one of several nations viewed as an enemy by these fanatic Shiites. Many Shiites now reside in the United States and are involved in Shiite organizations such as the Islamic Society and the Islamic Guerrillas of America. Iran has also utilized American Black Muslims in the United States as surrogate terrorists, as evidenced in the case of the assassination of outspoken anti-Khomeini Iranian Ali Akbar Tabatabai, in a northern suburb of Washington, D.C., in 1980.

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Al Fatah is considered the most important of the Palestinian fedayeen groups. Its leader is Yassir Arafat, who claims

leadership of the umbrella organizaton, the PLO. Al Fatah operates guerrilla training bases throughout the Middle East and Near East and is responsible for some terrorist incidents committed against Israel. In addition, the massacre at the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany, was claimed by the Black September Organization, an Al Fatah clandestine terrorist element.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is another PLO group and is anti-Arafat. The PFLP is considered more violent than Al Fatah and proposes more military activity against Israel for the return of Palestinian lands, than does Al Fatah. Though both groups appear to be motivated toward the same ends, their means differ. In fact, most recent activity involves guerrilla warfare among these splinter groups for control of the PLO.

Support groups in the United States are responsible for propaganda activity, funding, recruitment for training, and weapons procurement. Many of the various splinter groups have their own support mechanisms, separate from each other, in the United States.

European

Armenian. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) is a radical leftist (Marxist-Leninist) pro-Soviet terrorist organization. Its goals are retaliation against the Turks for the alleged massacre of 1.5 million Armenians in 1915; the liberation of historic Armenian homelands from Turkey; and reunification with Soviet Armenia as a socialist democratic state.

Since 1975, the ASALA has been responsible for terrorist incidents in Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. These have included bombings, hostage takings, and assassinations.

The Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide (JCAG) is a right-wing terrorist group dedicated to avenging the alleged genocide by the Turks in 1915, and the establishment of an Armenian state, free from Turkish influence. The JCAG has primarily targeted only Turkish diplomatic establishments and personnel for its attacks. The majority of these incidents have been assassinations of high-ranking Turkish diplomats, although some bombings have been committed. Attacks have occurred in many European countries as well as the United States.

Croatian. Radical Croatian nationalists, seeking the separation of their homeland from Yugoslavia and/or the creation of an autonomous Croatian state within Yugoslavia, have utilized terrorism as a means to further their cause. They have used the name Croatian Freedom Fighters, which is a generic term used by the Croatian National Resistance. Targets selected worldwide have included Yugoslav or pro-Yugoslav interests.

In the United States, only a few Croatian nationals have actually been involved in terrorist activity, but they have received support from a substantial segment of the Croatian emigre community, which often viewed them as heroes. However, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, when terrorist elements began to target moderate Croatian nationals who did not support them, community attitudes changed and support declined. Tactics have included murders, bombings, hijackings, and letters of extortion.

Irish. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, was founded in 1975 by dissident members of the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and is a leftist group dedicated to the formation of a united 32-county Democratic Socialist Republic in Ireland. It subscribes to violence as a means of ousting the British from Ulster and overthrowing the Government of the Republic of Ireland. Although regarding itself as essentially Marxist, the INLA is critical of the Stalinist or pro-Soviet stance of the OIRA. Its activities often parallel actions of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), although there is no apparent formal alliance between the two organizations.

The PIRA is a militant organization composed of Irish Roman Catholic residents of Northern Ireland who are committed to achieving British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and establishment of the 32-county united government. The PIRA is extremely violent, having performed numerous terrorist acts against the British military, Irish Protestants, and those it perceives as supporters of British rule in Northern Ireland. It is an extremely well-organized and well-armed group.

Activities in the United States have included participation by individuals, who are either operatives or supporters of both the INLA and the PIRA, in acquiring weaponry and funds for transportation to Northern Ireland.

There has been no evidence of activity by Irish Protestant groups in the United States to procure weapons or funding for shipment to Northern Ireland to further the conflict.

Central American and Caribbean

Cuban. Omega Seven is a fanatical, anti-Fidel Castro, Cuban exile organization, based in the United States, which was founded in 1960 to keep alive the continuing fight by Cuban exiles against the Castro Communist government in Cuba. This group has, for over 20 years, committed numerous terrorist acts, including murders and bombings, under the guise of fighting Communism. Primary targets are representatives of the Cuban Government or any individual, organization, facility, or business that deals with or supports, in any fashion, the Communist government of Fidel Castro. Several members of Omega Seven, including its leader, Eduardo Arocena, are presently awaiting trial for their involvement in terrorist activities in the United States. Conversely, the Castro Government itself has been involved in supporting terrorist activity in Central America.

Salvadoran. The Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN]) is the umbrella organization for terrorist groups currently engaged in guerrilla warfare in El Salvador. The FMLN is a leftist organization striving for the overthrow of the incumbent democratic Salvadoran Government. It is aligned with solidarity and support groups in the United States who oppose United States involvement in El Salvador. In addition to guerrilla warfare activity, the FMLN also engages in traditional acts of terrorism and has claimed credit for bombings in El Salvador, other areas of Central America, and the United States.

Domestic (Left-Wing)

Puerto Rican. Some common beliefs of virtually all Puerto Rican terrorist groups (both in the continental United States and on the island of Puerto Rico) are: The liberation of Puerto Rico justifies any and all means utilized to gain that objective; the U.S. Government has no jurisdiction over Puerto Rico since Spain had already granted autonomy to the island prior to the Treaty of Paris (1899); because of this, their acts are "acts of war" against invading forces and, when arrested, they are "prisoners of war" and must be treated as such according to the rules of the Geneva Convention.

Motivation is solely the liberation of Puerto Rico from the United States, by any means. Clandestinity and security are of utmost importance in these groups' activities. Any act that brings funds, weapons, and other supplies into these organizations is believed to be justified, including the gleaning of funds from religious institutions.

In the continental United States, the main group is the FALN, a Chicago-based entity which has claimed responsibility for many terrorist acts (mainly bombings) over the past several years. On the island itself, the group considered to be the most violent is the Ejercito Popular Boricua-Macheteros (Boricuan People's Army-Machete Swingers or (EPB-Macheteros). The EPB-Macheteros have committed numerous terrorist acts in Puerto Rico, including bombings, rocket attacks, and armed robberies.

United Freedom Front (UFF). The UFF, an anti-capitalist, revolutionary element, emerged in December 1982, when this group claimed credit for the bombing of an IBM building in Harrison, New York. Since that time, the UFF has claimed credit for the bombings of the South African Purchasing Office in December 1982; the Naval Reserve Center in May 1983; the Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., Army Reserve Center in May 1983; the Sergeant John Moelher Army Reserve Center in August 1983; the Motorola Corporation in January 1984; and the IBM building again in March 1984. All of the above targets are located in the Greater New York City area. The UFF has expressed opposition to United States policies regarding Central America and South Africa. It is not known at this time whether this is an actual group or a nom de guerre for another domestic terrorist group.

Domestic (Right-Wing)

Ku Klux Klan (KKK). The KKK is an extremist right-wing group which was very active during the 1960's and early 1970's, secretly planning and executing acts of terrorism and violence to promote white racial supremacy and total segregation of the races. Although there is not one national KKK organization, each of the local Klaverns espouses the same racial rhetoric and supports anti-Semitic, and anti-black sentiments.

Sheriff's Posse Comitatus (SPC). The SPC, also known as the Citizens Law Enforcement Research Committee, started in 1973 in Portland, Oregon, by Henry Lamont (Mike) Beach, was a nonaffiliated offshoot of the Identity Group, a California-based tax rebellion organization. The SPC claimed that the Federal Reserve System and the graduated income tax were not lawful and the Federal Judiciary had attempted to establish a dictatorship of the courts over the citizens of the republic. The SPC called for the establishment of a posse in each county to assist the only legitimate law enforcement authority, the county sheriff, in combatting the alleged unlawful acts of others, particularly those of Federal and State officials. In one incident during 1983, SPC members were involved in an exchange of gunfire with

law enforcement officials. This incident resulted in two deaths and four injuries.

CONCLUSION

The primary motivation of terrorist groups is to effect change in existing economic, political, and social conditions which are embodied in policies of various governments. The successful result of this motivation is perhaps best exemplified in Yassir Arafat's statement, "Today's terrorist is tomorrow's government leader."

The FBI'S Role

The FBI defines terrorism as the "unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." The FBI's Terrorism Program was elevated to national priority status in October 1982, to reflect the increased emphasis this agency places on these investigations and to ensure that sufficient resources are committed to countering the terrorist threat posed by both domestic and international groups. Terrorism, and other forms of violence in the United States, require a prudent assessment of this nation's capacity to respond, in an effective and timely fashion.

The FBI derives its authority as the lead Federal law enforcement agency in the United States Government's fight against terrorism from certain investigative responsibilities assigned to it by virtue of Federal Statutes. In addition, President Reagan, in October 1982, issued a directive confirming the FBI as the lead agency for managing operational responses to terrorist incidents within the United States.

Within its statutory mandate, the FBI has a twofold mission in combatting terrorism: preventive and reactive. The preventive phase involves obtaining, through legal means, intelligence data relating to terrorist groups presenting a threat within the United States. The greatest utility of this intelligence is to prevent these groups from committing criminal acts, including the disruption of functions of the United States Government. This collection has led to prosecution of group members, expulsions, and other legal actions to neutralize terrorist activities.

The reactive phase involves the response to and investigation of criminal acts committed by terrorist groups. While many acts committed by known terrorist groups fall within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI, local law enforcement entities may have concurrent jurisdiction.

In speaking of these two phases, it is often difficult to separate them. The FBI believes it is able to reduce future acts of terrorism by identifying and prosecuting those responsible for present acts. This is particularly evident when key group leaders are successfully prosecuted.

Trends, 1979-1983

In the United States, there were 52 terrorist incidents in 1979, 29 in 1980, 42 in 1981, 51 in 1982, and 31 in 1983. The 1982 incidents resulted in 7 deaths and 26 injuries. The 1982 number reflected a 21 percent increase in incidents from 1981 and a 76 percent increase from 1980. After more emphasis was placed on this threat in late 1982, we saw almost a 40 percent decrease in 1983 incidents compared to 1982. Also during 1983, the number of persons killed and injured decreased to 6 and 4 respectively. The reductions can be at least partially attributed to a coordinated effort between the FBI and other law enforcement and intelligence agencies and to refinement of the FBI's analytical research capability. (Statistical/graphic representations are presented in Appendix A.)

Proposed Current Legislation

The U.S. Department of Justice (USDJ) is in the process of proposing specific legislation in an effort to combat terrorism further. This proposed legislation is in a draft format and has not been finally approved by the President, so no specific comments on it can be offered at this time. However, the FBI has supported the efforts of the USDJ in preparing anti-terrorism legislation in the past and continues to do so.

The following represents a brief summary of the proposed legislation:

The Terrorism Control Act of 1984. This would make conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism a violation of United States criminal statutes, enabling the USDJ to attack the problem of terrorism more effectively at the planning stage.

The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking. This legislation would amend the Federal Kidnapping Statute to provide for Federal jurisdiction over any kidnapping in which a threat is made to kill, injure, or continue to detain a victim in order to compel third parties to do or abstain from doing something.

Aircraft Sabotage Act of 1984. This bill establishes criminal jurisdiction over certain aircraft-related of-

fenses involving aircraft or air navigation facilities of other contracting countries if the perpetrator is found in a country that is a signatory to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorism Act. This legislation remedies the lack of authority for the payment of rewards for information on acts of terrorism abroad. The payment of rewards in connection with an act of terrorism abroad poses a political and foreign relations problem which is within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State.

The Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984. This legislation is designed to prevent the harm of our foreign relations by United States nationals or businesses, or by other persons within the United States, who seek to provide training and technology to certain governments that support terrorism or to international terrorist groups.

Accomplishments

The 1983 decline in terrorist incidents can be attributed, in part, to the success of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in investigating individuals such as the Armenian terrorists and the Puerto Rican pro-independence terrorists. For example, in October 1982, five members of the Justice Commandos of Armenian Genocide, who were under FBI surveillance, were arrested after attempting to bomb the Turkish Honorary Consulate in Philadelphia. The arrest of these five marks the first time members of this group have been arrested prior to the commission of a terrorist act. Those arrests, along with the arrests and subsequent convictions of three members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, for attempting to bomb an Air Canada cargo building, have discouraged activities by those groups in the United States. Although Armenian terrorist groups were responsible for five attacks in this country in 1982, including two assassinations, in 1983 there were none.

In addition, as a result of an intensive investigation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), the FBI identified a safehouse in Chicago and arrested four individuals in possession of semiautomatic weapons, homemade silencers, and explosives. These arrests prevented the FALN from carrying out planned bombings, armed robberies, and prison breaks. This investigation also resulted in the June arrest of FALN leader and bomb maker, William Guillermo Morales, in Mexico. Morales, who had been a fugitive since his escape from a prison hospital in May 1979, remains in Mexico pending extradition proceedings.

In 1982, 25 acts of terrorism were attributable to Puerto Rican terrorist groups. In 1983, there were only three. This reduction in incidents is partially a result of the FBI's investigation of the FALN in Chicago and other cities.

As a result of the FBI's investigation of the Brinks armored truck robbery in New York in October 1981, it was determined that remnants of the Black Liberation Army, Republic of New Afrika, Weather Underground, and the May 19th Communist Organization were responsible. A summary of the accomplishments in this investigation, referred to as NYROB, is contained in Appendix B. Appendix C contains examples of the FBI fliers regarding wanted fugitives.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces, composed of FBI and local law enforcement officials, have been established in both the New York City and Chicago Divisions of the FBI. The Chicago group was formed to focus on the alleged criminal activities of the FALN. In New York City, the group was created to investigate the NYROB incident. To date, these task forces have been successful in obtaining numerous arrests and convictions.

The FBI has weakened the efforts of several of the major terrorist groups active in the United States. However, these successes do not preclude the potential for future terrorist activity in this country. In fact, four of the FBI's current "Ten Most Wanted Fugitives" are known terrorists. These individuals are Mutulu Shakur, Thomas William Manning, Raymond Luc Levasseur, and Katherine Ann Power.

The terrorist threat will continue to exist; however, the FBI is confident that appropriate steps have been taken to make sure that terrorists do not succeed in establishing any type of foothold, such as they have enjoyed for years in other parts of the world.

Oliver B. Revell is the Assistant Director in charge of the Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. He is responsible for the FBI's criminal investigations and programs, including the Terrorism Program. He was apppointed a Special Agent of the FBI in 1964 and has been assigned to five field offices. He was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Division and Special Agent in Charge of the Oklahoma Division. In 1980 he was promoted to Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division.

Mr. Revell holds a bachelor's degree from East Tennessee State University and a Master of Public Administration degree from Temple University. He is an active member of the American Society for Industrial Security and serves on the International Advisory Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Appendix A

CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS, U.S., 1983

DATE 1983	LOCATION	TYPE OF INCIDENT	GROUP CLAIMING CREDIT
1-11	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega Seven
1-12	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Omega Seven
1-12	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega Seven
1-28	New York, NY	Bombing	Revolutionary Fighting Group
2-13	Medina, ND	Assaults	Sheriff's Posse Comitatus
2-15	Killeen, TX	Hijacking	Individual Action
2-19	Washington, D.C.	Bombing	Jewish Defense League
3-20	San Antonio, TX	Bombing	Republic of Revolutionary
4-26	Washington, D.C.	Bombing	Armed Resistance Unit
4-27	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Unknown Group
4-27	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Unknown Group
4-27	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Unknown Group
4-27	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Unknown Group
4-29	Rio Piedras, PR	Attempted Robbery	Ejercito Popular Boricua - Macheteros
5-12	Uniondale, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front
5-13	New York, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front
5-27	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega Seven
7-08	Miami, FL	Kidnaping	Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo
7-15	Rio Piedras, PR	Robbery	Ejercito Popular Boricua - Macheteros
8-08	Detroit, MI	Assassination	Unknown Group - FUQRA
8-08	Detroit, MI	Attempted Bombing	Unknown Group - FUQRA
8-09	Detroit, MI	Arson	Unknown Group - FUQRA
8-16	Los Angeles, CA	Foreign Consulate Takeover	Individual Action
8-18	Washington, D.C.	Bombing	Armed Resistance Unit/FMLN
8-21	New York, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front
8-27	Washington, D.C.	Fire Bombing	Unknown Group
10-12	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega Seven
10-30	Hato Rey, PR	Rocket Attack	Ejercito Popular Boricua - Macheteros
11-07	Washington, D.C.	Bombing	Armed Resistance Unit
12-13	East Meadow, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front
12-14	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	United Freedom Front

TOTAL INCIDENTS: 31
TOTAL DEATHS: 6
INJURED: 4

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TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES — 1983



MEDINA, NORTH DAKOTA (1)

SHERIFF'S POSSE COMITATUS
1 ASSAULT
FEBRUARY 13 1983

DETROIT, MICHIGAN (3)

UNKNOWN GROUP FUQRA
1 ASSASSINATION
AUGUST 8, 1983
1 ATTEMPTED BOMBING
AUGUST 8, 1983
1 ARSON
AUGUST 9 1983

UNIONDALE, NEW YORK (1)

UNITED FREEDOM FRONT
1 BOMBING
MAY 12 1983

EAST MEADOW, NEW YORK (1)

UNITED FREEDOM FRONT
1 BOMBING
DECEMBER 13, 1983

NEW YORK, NEW YORK (4)

REVOLUTIONARY FIGHTING GROUP
1 BOMBING
JANUARY 28 1983

UNITED FREEDOM FRONT
1 BOMBING
MAY 13 1983
1 BOMBING
AUGUST 21 1983
1 ATTEMPTED BOMBING
DECEMBER 14 1983

WASHINGTON, D.C. (5)

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE
1 BOMBING
FEBRUARY 19 1983

UNKNOWN GROUP (PHILIPPINE)
1 FIREBOMBING
AUGUST 27 1983

ARMED RESISTANCE UNIT/FMLN
1 BOMBING
AUGUST 18 1983

ARMED RESISTANCE UNIT
1 BOMBING
APRIL 26 1983
1 BOMBING
NOVEMBER 7 1983

LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA (1)

INDIVIDUAL ACTION
1 TAKEOVER
AUGUST 16 1983

KILLEEN, TEXAS (1)

INDIVIDUAL ACTION
1 HIJACKING
FEBRUARY 15 1983

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS (1)

REPUBLIC OF REVOLUTIONARY
1 BOMBING
MARCH 20, 1983

PUERTO RICO (3)

EJERCITO POPULAR BORICUA
MACHETEROS
1 ATTEMPTED ROBBERY
APRIL 29 1983
1 ROBBERY
JULY 15 1983
1 ROCKET ATTACK
OCTOBER 30, 1983

MIAMI, FLORIDA (10)

OMEGA 7
1 BOMBING
JANUARY 11 1983
1 ATTEMPTED BOMBING
JANUARY 12 1983
1 BOMBING
JANUARY 12 1983
1 BOMBING
MAY 27 1983
1 BOMBING
OCTOBER 12 1983

EJERCITO REVOLUCIONARIO
DEL PUEBLO
1 KIDNAPING
JULY 8 1983

UNKNOWN GROUP (HAITIAN)
4 ATTEMPTED LETTER BOMBINGS
APRIL 27 1983

TOTAL NUMBER OF INCIDENTS: 31

1983 TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY TERRORIST GROUP, NUMBER AND TYPE OF INCIDENT

Type of Incidents	Actual Bombing	Attempted Bombing	Actual Firebombing	Hijacking	Attempted Robbery	Armed Robbery	Rocket Attack	Kidnaping	Takeover	Arson	Assassination	Assault	Total Incidents	Injured	Killed
CUBAN TERRORIST GROUPS													6		
Omega Seven	4	1													
JEWISH TERRORIST GROUPS													1		
Jewish Defense League (JDL)	1														
PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS													3		
Ejercito Popular Boricua - Macheteros (EPB-Macheteros)				1	1	1									1
OTHER DOMESTIC TERRORIST GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS													16		
*Armed Resistance Unit (ARU)	3														
Individuals' Actions				1				1							
Republic of Revolutionary	1														
Revolutionary Fighting Group (RFG)	1														
Sheriff's Posse Comitatus (SPC)												1		4	2
United Freedom Front (UFF)	4	1													
Unknown Group - FUQRA		1							1	1					3
OTHER INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS													6		
Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP)								1							
Unknown Haitian Group		4													
Unknown Philippine Group			1												
TOTALS	**14**	**7**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**	**31**	**4**	**6** **

* One of these bombings was claimed jointly with the Farabundo Marti Liberacion Nacional.

** It should be noted that 2 additional deaths resulted from the arrest of a SPC member on 6/3/83.

TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY TARGETS 1982 & 1983



TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE U.S.
BY TYPE
1982 - 1983



Appendix B

NYROB—INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY

PREDICATION:

At approximately 4:00 p.m., 10/20/81, a Brinks armored truck was in the process of making a pickup at Nanuet, New York (Rockland County), at a shopping center. During the delivery, a red van pulled up behind the Brinks truck and two suspects armed with shotguns and wearing ski masks got out of the van and immediately fired upon and killed one Brinks guard and wounded the other. Attempts to kill the driver in the cab of the truck were made, but were not successful. Approximately 1.6 million dollars was taken from the cargo area of the Brinks truck.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS:

Arrests on 10/20/81, at Nyack, New York:
1. Kathy Boudin—Murder 2nd degree (New York Statute)
2. Judith A. Clark—Murder 2nd degree (New York Statute)
3. David Joseph Gilbert—Murder 2nd degree (New York Statute)
4. Samuel Brown—Murder 2nd degree (New York Statute)

Arrests on 10/23/81, at Bronx, New York:
1. Jeffrey Carl Jones—UFAP (New Jersey)
2. Eleanor Stein Raskin—UFAP (New Jersey)

Arrests on 10/23/81, at Queens, New York:
1. Nathaniel Burns (attempted murder of police officer, assault on police officer—New York Statute)
2. Samuel Smith (killed in shoot-out with New York City Police Department officers)

Arrest on 10/27/81, at Gallman, Mississippi:
1. Cynthia Boston—Bank Robbery, Conspiracy (Federal Statute)

Arrest on 10/27/81, at New York, New York:
1. Eve S. Rosahn—Criminal Facilitation 2nd degree (New York Statute)

Arrest on 12/19/81, at New York, New York:
1. Betty Jean Abramson—UFAP, Murder (California)

Arrest on 1/8/82, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
1. Anthony Nicholas LaBorde—UFAP, Murder (New York)

Arrest on 1/20/82, at Bronx, New York:
1. Donald Gregory Weems—UFAP, Armed Robbery (New Jersey)

Arrests on 3/26/81, at New York, New York:
1. Cecil Ferguson—Bank Robbery, Conspiracy (Federal)
2. Edward Lawrence Joseph—Bank Robbery, Conspiracy (Federal)

Arrest on 4/21/82, at New York, New York:
1. Margaret Renee Thornton—Material Witness (Federal)

Arrest on 5/18/82, at Atlanta, Georgia:
1. William Lee Moore—UFAP, Parole Violation (New York)

Arrest on 6/4/82, at New Orleans, Louisiana:
1. Wendy Sue Heaton—UFAP, Murder (California)

Arrest on 6/8/82, at New Orleans, Louisiana:
1. Ricky Marcus Blanchard—UFAC, Escape, Child Molestation (California)

Arrest on 11/9/82, at New York, New York:
1. Silvia Pia Baraldini—Bank Robbery, Conspiracy (Federal)

Arrest on 11/15/82, at Belize, Central America:
1. William Roger Johnson—Bank Robbery, Conspiracy (Federal)

Arrest on 11/17/82, at New York, New York:
1. Iliana Robinson—Accessory After the Fact (Federal)

Arrest on 11/24/82, at New York, New York:
1. Cynthia Priscilla Boston—Contempt of Federal grand jury (Federal)

Arrest on 8/24/83, at Washington, D.C.:
1. Nilsa Cobeo—Accessory After the Fact, Material Witness (Federal)

INDICTMENTS:

On 4/21/82, the Federal grand jury, Southern District of New York, returned indictments on Cecil Ferguson, Edward Lawrence Joseph, and Mutulu Shakur. Indictment charges violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2113 (A) (D) (E) (Armed Bank Robbery, involving personal injury/death) and 371 (Conspiracy).

On 9/20/82, the Federal grand jury, Southern District of New York, returned a superseding indictment in this matter. Charged in this indictments are Mutulu Shakur, Nathaniel Burns, Edward Lawrence Joseph, Cecil Rodrigo Ferguson, Cheri Dalton, and Susan Rosenberg. All were charged with violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2113 (A) (D) (E) (Federal Bank Robbery Statute) and Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1961 (C) (D) (RICO and RICO-Conspiracy).

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CONTINUED

1 OF 2

On 11/17/82, the Federal grand jury, Southern District of New York, returned a superseding indictment in the NYROB matter. Charged are Mutulu Shakur (Top Ten Fugitive), Nathaniel Burns, Cecil Ferguson, Edward Lawrence Joseph, Silvia Pia Baraldini, Susan Rosenberg (fugitive), Cheri Dalton (fugitive), Iliana Robinson, Nilsa Cobeo, and Alan Berkman, M.D. (fugitive). Charged are violations of the RICO Statute (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1961); Interference with Interstate Commerce by Robbery (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1951); Obstruction of Justice (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1510); Armed Bank Robbery (Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2113 (A) and 2); Bank Robbery Killings (Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 2113 (E) and 2); and Aiding and Abetting (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 3).

On 11/24/82, the Federal grand jury, Southern District of New York, returned a true bill indictment on William Roger Johnson for violations of RICO and Bank Robbery Statutes (Title 18, U.S. Code, Sections 1962 (C) (D); 2113 (A) (D) (E).

FINES, SAVINGS, AND RECOVERIES:

The stolen loot from the 10/20/81 incident ($1,589,000) was recovered.

Convictions on 9/3/83, Southern District of New York:

1. Silvia Pia Baraldini—RICO and RICO-Conspiracy—sentenced on 2/15/84 to 40 years and $25,000 fine. U.S. District Judge recommended no parole.
2. Nathaniel Jerome Burns—RICO and RICO-Conspiracy, sentenced on 2/15/84. Same as Baraldini.
3. Cecilio Rodrigo Ferguson—Abiding and Abetting—2 counts—sentenced on 2/15/84 to 12-1/2 years, recommendation of no parole.
4. Edward Lawrence Joseph—Abiding and Abetting—2 counts—sentenced on 2/15/84 to 12½ years.

Convictions on 9/14/83, Orange County, New York (State Court):

1. Judith Alice Clark—three counts of murder and four counts of robbery—sentenced 10/7/83 to three consecutive 25 years to life sentences, not eligible for parole for 75 years.
2. David Joseph Gilbert—convicted and sentenced as Clark above.
3. Donald Gregory Weems—convicted and sentenced as Clark above.

Sentenced on 11/28/83, Southern District of New York:

1. Chockwe Lumumba, true name Edwin Taliafero—3 years probation for contempt of court during NYROB trial.
2. Cooperative witness Tyrone Rison was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Vincent Broderick for his part in the 6/2/81 Brinks Armored Truck robbery and his role in racketeering with the NYROB subjects. Rison was sentenced to 12 years on the 6/2/81 robbery and 8 years for racketeering activities. Sentences are to be served concurrently. He will be eligible for parole in 4 years.

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

February 8, 1984

WANTED BY FBI

Marilyn Jean Buck

Susan Lisa Rosenberg

Mutulu Shakur

Alan Berkman

Cheri Laverne Dalton

The individuals whose photographs appear above are being sought by the FBI in connection with the armed robbery of a Brink's armored truck on October 20, 1981, at Nanuet, New York. One Brink's guard and two police officers were murdered during the commission of the robbery while another Brink's guard was seriously wounded.

Federal warrants have been issued for the above individuals charging them with a variety of Federal violations including one or more of the following: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Statute, escaped Federal prisoner, armed bank robbery resulting in death and injury, obstruction of criminal investigation, material witness, aiding and abetting, Hobbs Act-Commercial Institution, and conspiracy.

Joanne Deborah Chesimard

In addition, Joanne Deborah Chesimard, whose photograph appears above, is a close associate of one or more of the above fugitives and may currently be with them. Chesimard is charged with unlawful interstate flight to avoid confinement for murder. At the time of her escape from prison in 1979, she was serving a life sentence for killing a New Jersey State Trooper.

FBI/DOJ

WANTED BY FBI

July 6, 1982

The four individuals whose photographs and descriptive data are shown below, are being sought by the FBI based on Federal arrest warrants charging them with a variety of Federal violations including one or more of the following, bank robbery, interstate flight to avoid prosecution for murder, and interstate flight to avoid prosecution for unlawful possession of a weapon. They are members of a group which has claimed credit for bombings and which allegedly finances its activities through violent criminal acts. All are known to use automatic weapons and make extensive use of fictitious identification.

Thomas William Manning and Richard Charles Williams are also being sought for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper on December 21, 1981.

Raymond Luc Levasseur
W/M, DOB 10/10/46, 6', 185, brn hair, green eyes; aliases: John Joseph Boulette, Jack Mills, John R. Mills, Joseph Michael Mocchi, Edward John Pichette, Robert Raymond, Walter Rogers, "Animal", "Jimmy", "Melville"

Thomas William Manning
W/M, DOB 6/28/46, 5'10" to 5'11", 150 to 160, brn hair, hazel eyes; aliases: Barry Annese, Barry Collins, Barry Eastbury, Barry A. Eastbury, Barry G. Easterly, James Graves, James Peter Graves, Michael Harris, Thomas J. Stockwell

Carol Ann Manning
W/F, DOB 1/3/56, 5'6", 125, brn hair, aliases: Diane Annese, Diane S. Collins, Diane Eastbury, Diane S. Easterly, Carol Ann Harris, Diane Henderson, Carol Ann Saucier

Richard Charles Williams
W/M, DOB 11/4/47, 6', 190 to 200, brn hair, blu eyes; aliases: Robert A. Dawkins, Robert Alan Dawkins, Robert A. Farnham, Robert Farnum, Jesse Lockman, Jessee Lockman, "Dickey"

Levasseur and the Mannings may be traveling and living with their families whose photographs and descriptions follow. **None of these family members are wanted by law enforcement authorities.**

LEVASSEUR FAMILY

Patricia Helen Gros
W/F, DOB 8/2/54, 5'4", 140, blonde hair, blue eyes, wears glasses; aliases: Patricia Levasseur, Jean Mills, Jean Johnson Mills, Jeanne M. Mills

Carmen Jeanette Levasseur Gros
W/F, DOB 1/12/76, or 12/12/75
alias: Carmen Jane Mills

Simone Mills
W/F, DOB 4/2/78;
alias: Simone Eva Mills

Rosa Mills
W/F, DOB 3/8/80
alias: Rosa Helen Mills
(no photo available)

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