


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# Garden Grove Police Department

FRANCIS R. KESSLER  
CHIEF OF POLICE



97513

## DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE

*Executive Summary  
(Part 2)*

A Program of the NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE

DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE TO  
CITIZEN-INITIATED CALLS FOR SERVICE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
(Part II)

by  
Stanley L. Knee  
PROJECT DIRECTOR

and  
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PROJECT ANALYST

FEBRUARY 1984

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PREFACE

*This Executive Summary, Part II, is a continuation of Executive Summary, Part I, and the two combined, comprise the final research report of a study conducted by the Garden Grove Police Department under a grant from the National Institute of Justice (Grant award 81-IJ-CX-0030). The final evaluation report will be available at a later date upon its completion by Research Management Associates.*

*This report is part of a continuing research effort aimed at providing police executives with specific processes derived from the experiences of the Garden Grove Police Department as a participant in the Differential Police Response Field Test program. These experiences are intended to assist in the successful implementation of effective alternative responses to traditional policing methods.*

*The Executive Summaries are designed to aid readers in obtaining a comprehensive view of the full scope of Differential Police Response as well as facilitate identification of those areas that may be of particular relevance to police managers and their organizations.*

*The Garden Grove Police Department has benefitted substantially from having applied the results of research to increasing its police department's capability of managing calls for service by utilizing alternative methods of responding to calls. Other cities may well find a solution or at least ideas to resolve problems associated with personnel resource allocation by carefully adapting the concepts of the Garden Grove Police Department's Differential Response Model to their own settings.*

*With these objectives in mind, the Garden Grove Police Department is proud to share our research and results as presented in this Executive Summary, Part II, on Differential Police Response.*

*Lynn Heywood  
Project Analyst*

*February 1984*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Project Staff would like to commend the men and women of the Garden Grove Police Department, particularly those in the patrol force, without whom this Project would not have been successfully completed.

We are particularly indebted to Chief Francis R. Kessler for his constant support, enthusiasm, cajoling, and dominant presence throughout the Project which kept the Project Staff at a high level of productivity.

My special thanks to Captain Monte Davis, Operational Services Bureau Commander, whose concepts and ideas assisted in maintaining a high degree of professionalism throughout this portion of the Project. Also, his reference to "Carolina Missy" and his constant support assisted me greatly in maintaining a degree of sanity for the past two-and-one half years.

The contributions of Lt Ron Weigand, Team I Commander, Lt. Stu Finkelstein, Team II Commander, Lt. John Robertson, Team III Commander, and Lt. Panfilio Corona, Administrative Lieutenant, assisted tremendously in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of Phase II. Also the efforts of Sgt. John Baker, who successfully developed our Crime Analysis Unit, are to be commended.


The assistance provided by Dr. Tom McEwen and Ed Connors, Research Management Associates, is greatly appreciated as they kept the program functioning with their concepts and ideas, and also ensured that the Project Staff "walked the straight and narrow" during the Phase II experimental test period.

A special thanks to Gary B. Hayes, Police Executive Research Forum, whose infectious enthusiasm for our project during his visit in January inspired me to complete this Executive Summary, Part II.

I wish to personally thank Captain Stan Knee, Project Director, for his constant support, regard, and belief in me as Project Analyst and as a person.



CHAPTER VII  
POST-IMPLEMENTATION  
TEST DESIGN



CHAPTER VII

POST-IMPLEMENTATION  
TEST DESIGN

The Garden Grove Police Department completed an eight-month Implementation phase of the Differential Police Response to Citizen-initiated Calls for Service Field Test in April of 1983. Although a complete analysis of the Field Test is not yet available, initial findings indicate that 38 percent of all reports are capable of being diverted from patrol response *without* loss of citizen satisfaction. The diversion of non-critical calls for service resulted in priority treatment for those calls requiring immediate police response. Additionally, field patrol units have a reduced workload resulting in substantial amounts of free time for, what for many years has been called, *Random Patrol*.

Previous Field Tests conducted in Kansas City (1974), indicated that their Random Patrol was an ineffective use of patrol time. In response to this, some departments have created Crime Analysis Units and adopted various types of Directed Patrol schemes in an attempt to make the efforts of patrol officers more efficient, responsive, and effective.

As early as the mid-1960's, Bernard J. Garmire, then Chief of Police of Tucson, Arizona, began looking at utilizing *Split-Force Patrol* within the Police Department. Before he had an opportunity to implement this concept, Chief Garmire left the department. He has written extensively on the subject in the book, The Police and the Community, published in 1972.

The Wilmington, Delaware, Police Department field tested a Split-Force concept of Directed Patrol in 1975. The Split-Force concept is based on the recognition that the patrol division of a police department is primarily responsible for two of the four major police functions, namely the call-for-service response and crime prevention functions.

It is then hypothesized that the two patrol functions could be carried out more effectively if each were assigned to a separate patrol force. Thus, the splitting of the patrol force into two groups allows each group to concentrate on a single patrol function. The Split-Force patrol concept is, in essence, an approach in patrol specialization.

Wilmington's Split-Force structured patrol program was more than just a directed force. The structured force became both a functional and a professional bridge between the response-oriented patrol force and the investigation-oriented detective force.

Wilmington Chief of Police Manelski wrote, "The Split-Force experiment has significantly increased the efficiency of the Wilmington's patrol force without any adverse impact on its effectiveness." An analysis of the Wilmington Police Department's Split-Force, Directed Patrol field test indicates that the benefits achieved during the field test exceeded those achieved in other police agencies implementing other types of Directed Patrol efforts.

In the development of this portion of the Differential Police Response Field Test, the Garden Grove Police Department recognized the fact that Directed Patrol did not adequately describe our organizational efforts at improving patrol productivity. Therefore, we adopted the terminology of *Priority Patrol*, which is a concept of patrol management rather than an activity. The purpose of the Post-Implementation Phase of the Field Test was:

to compare the effectiveness of *Split-Force*, *Priority Patrol* and *Differential Police Response* with *Random Patrol* and *Differential Police Response*.

On May 2, 1983, police Team areas I and III instituted a Split-Force, Priority Patrol scheme. The two Teams currently represent 50 percent of the crime incidents in the City of Garden Grove. The remaining Team area, Team II, was to perform Random Patrol. All three Teams would benefit from diversion of non-critical calls for service. The intent was to divert 60-70 percent of all calls for service in the experimental Teams away from the basic patrol force. The implementation of this phase was conducted from May 2, 1983 through August 31, 1983.

Priority Patrol required a major restructuring of our current police service delivery systems. It caused some alteration in our highly successful

Team Policing format and attempted to integrate all operations of the Police Department toward specific goals and objectives.

The goals of *Priority Patrol*, during the experimental test, were:

1. To supply to field personnel, the names, physical descriptions, and other pertinent information on the people who are known to be engaged in criminal activity.
2. More effective utilization of man-hours through management control and direction of available patrol time.
3. Provide better correlation between identifiable crime problems or problem districts, priorities of the organization, and use of available patrol time.
4. To integrate all departmental operations in maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of patrol operations.

The Garden Grove Police Department specified seven objectives in support of the *Priority Patrol* goals. These objectives include:

- replacing *Random Patrol* with field service activities directed toward specific crime and service-oriented problems;
- developing a program to enable patrol officers to perform pre-planned crime, traffic, or community service-related activities during periods when they are not specifically assigned to responding to calls-for-service or related functions;
- developing a system that will make available large blocks of patrol time and resources;
- increasing the ability of patrol management to control the activities of the patrol force to assure that they are directing their resources toward the attainment of legitimate short and long-range Police Department objectives;
- increasing the rationality of the decision-making process of the patrol force through the development and utilization of analytical and quantitative data to support both long

and short-term tactical deployment of patrol resources;

- *increasing the productivity of the patrol force* through the initiation of a program of directed activity that deploys patrol officers to those places and at those times where their chances of taking effective action against identified problems are the greatest.

The Garden Grove Police Department's initial efforts at a formalized Directed Patrol program began in June of 1981. The program was in response to a continuous effort to evaluate and upgrade our police service delivery systems and the anticipated Differential Police Response Grant.

To evaluate the delivery of our police service systems required an extensive examination of the patrol function. Through this examination, it was determined that (conservatively) patrol officers were utilizing 35 percent of their total duty time in an undirected or random patrol design.

It was recognized that the Department had a source of untapped man-hours (35% in the daytime) which could be utilized more productively. Application of the 35% patrol time estimate, based on our current 29 daily position average, reflected 68 hours per day being spent in a random patrol function.

The initial Directed Patrol design included the following goals:

1. More effective utilization of man-hours through management control and direction of available patrol time.
2. Provide better correlation between identifiable crime problems or problem districts, priorities of the organization, and use of available patrol time.

The Directed Patrol program was designed within the parameters of the Team Policing structure of the department. The programs were to be administered on an individual Team basis and the Team Commanders would be directly responsible for their own programs. Primary Crime Analysis was to be provided by the three Community Service Officers, one assigned to each Team.

Directed Patrol, at that time, was divided into four types:

1. *GENERAL:* the most commonly used type, is an on-going effort geared to meet challenging crime and activity patterns. *Officers would normally be available to all requests for service, in or out, of the target area.*
2. *SPECIAL:* a long-term effort intended to alleviate or respond to continuous crime or activity problems in a target area. This type of effort is geared toward areas that have a continuous problem. *Officers are available for normal emergency response, but are limited to target area or district for non-critical calls-for-service.*
3. *SPECIFIED:* a short-term effort to deter an intermittent problem such as street vice, gang conflicts, etc. *Officers are assigned only to emergency calls, but not normally assigned to routine calls-for-service.*
4. *VISIBILITY:* the least used type is a form of random patrol and includes all reporting districts rather than target areas. *Officers are assigned all calls within their Team area.*

Three conditions had to be satisfied prior to a Team utilizing general, specific, or special Directed Patrol:

- the crime or activity must have identifiable hour-of-day and day-of-week patterns;
- the Team must develop an outline of tactics to be utilized to influence the crime or activity;
- most importantly, results must be measurable by either a change in frequency of occurrence, response time, or other similar documentation.

The Directed Patrol program was fully operational by December of 1981, with the main thrust aimed at the crimes of Burglary.

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF POST-  
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

CHAPTER VIII

DEVELOPMENT OF POST-  
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

Prior to the completion of our Differential Police Response Field Test, it was determined that we would have approximately four months available to use for further study and evaluation of the program, as we waited for the completion of the Field Tests from the other two test sites. It was decided to combine other innovative field tests conducted by the National Institute of Justice (Split-Force Patrol, Directed Patrol, and Crime Analysis) with our highly successful Differential Police Response program for an experimental test for the four-month period.

Preliminary study on the concept of Priority Patrol was conducted in March of 1983 in preparation for the anticipated start date of the program on May 2, 1983. During this study, it was determined that some major organizational changes would be required to accommodate our concept of Priority Patrol.

A. CIVILIANIZATION

One of the major organizational changes was to be the *civilianization* of Field Report Writing. It has been estimated that a large percent of police calls are service-oriented rather than enforcement-oriented. It is quite clear and has been repeatedly proven that many of these service calls do not require the trained expertise of a sworn officer and can be competently handled by civilian personnel. The concept offers a unique approach toward

streamlining and professionalizing police services. It allows for more professional handling of minor calls and more concentration on criminal activity on the part of the sworn officer. It also allows for more complete services at the most economical level and an improved level of citizen satisfaction.

The practice of specialization by job complexity level has a positive effect upon job satisfaction. This results in a more competent and satisfactory service level for the citizen. It has proven difficult for some officers to display adequate concern or enthusiasm while handling minor reports and services, while at the same time being held responsible for crime suppression in their Team area. Police officers who are relieved of these various duties may concentrate on the job for which they were hired and trained to perform. Their functions may be better directed at the actual 20% of law enforcement duties which have seemingly been pushed into the background due to the much larger demand for service-related calls.

During the Differential Police Response Field Test, non-sworn police Cadets were used to assist the Expeditor Unit and were responsible for writing 26% of the reports. During the experimental test period, the use of Cadet Report Writers was to be expanded to include *mobile field response*. It was anticipated that the Expeditor Unit and the Cadet Report Writing Unit, together, would be able to handle an estimated 60 percent of the reports previously assigned to sworn personnel.

With the anticipation of fully utilizing our Cadets as report writers, each Cadet received approximately 16 hours of intensive training on report writing, focusing on non-critical reports and traffic accident reports. With the Cadets ability for report writing, the Department planned on utilizing them for traffic accidents with *no injuries or minor injuries*; burglary, theft, and malicious mischief reports in Team I and Team III where *no suspect was listed and the incident was not in progress*. The Cadets were also to be responsible for the following activities: Expeditor Unit, found bicycles, abandoned vehicles, and vacation checks of residences. Their final duties are listed in Chapter IX.

Another major change for the organization was the development of a *Crime Analysis Unit*. The Unit would be comprised of both sworn and non-sworn

personnel. Utilizing data from the Computer-Dispatch system and other computer programs, the Unit would provide Team I and Team III Sergeants with information which would allow for more meaningful Priority Patrol assignments. The development of the Unit will be discussed more in detail in a later portion of this Chapter.

#### B. ADVISORY COMMITTEES

As part of the preparation for Priority Patrol, volunteers were requested to participate in a number of Advisory Committees for the project. As we had attained a high degree of success and satisfaction with our DPR Advisory Committee, we felt that this would provide line personnel with input in the new process as the impact on the patrol force would be the greatest. 37 officers responded that they were interested in participating in the planning portion of the Post-Implementation Phase.

The purpose for the Advisory Committees was to aid in the development of a Crime Analysis delivery system, information feedback systems, tactical approaches within Priority Patrol, reporting guidelines, and other Priority Patrol operational procedures.

The Advisory Committees were comprised of 10 Sergeants, 23 officers, and 4 non-sworn personnel (2 from Communications and 2 Community Service Officers). The volunteers received an overview of DPR and Priority Patrol at a meeting held in mid-April of 1983. The volunteers were then divided into the following four committees for the input into the planning phase: Crime Analysis Information Outputs; Forms and Logs; First Response Unit/25% Response Teams; and Input/Feedback Systems.

Each committee convened several times during the month of April and provided written guidelines for their respective areas of concern. The Forms and Logs committee was to develop several log forms to capture needed information during the test period. (Officer's Log, Report Writing Log, and Crime Analysis Forms). For the Officer's Log and the Report Writing Log, a "checklist" format was utilized wherever possible and with the specific intent to

make the form simple to complete but also to provide comprehensive information as to the officer's activities during a shift. All three Teams were to subsequently use the Officer Daily Logs through the trial period. In Team II, half of the officers would use the form for the first two months of the trial period, and the remaining half would use the log during the final two months. All of the report writers would maintain the Report Writing Log. It should be noted that the Officer's Log and the Report Writer's Log were different so that we would be able to capture pertinent information as to each specific activity.

The committee on Input/Feedback Systems developed a list of specific requests that would enable field officers to receive timely information on crime patterns and trends. Some of the information requested was: known criminal suspects and associates; nature of suspect activity; source of information (reliability factor); probation status; wants and warrants requested by investigation; photographs of wanted subjects; dangerous locations; distinctive property; neighborhood problems; gang information (from Special Investigations Unit); and information from other agencies. Some of the concerns of the committee included: how to obtain or relate information from or to the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) when the Unit was not in operation; what happens to the information given to CAU; cancellations of wants from patrol, Investigators, and CAU. It was recommended by this committee that the Crime Analysis Unit maintain a weekly Wanted Summary, a weekly Crime Summary, and a Vehicle "Hot Sheet" with description and wants of vehicle and/or suspects.

The committee on Crime Analysis Information Outputs was to design a system whereby the field officers could receive the maximum information within a designated 24-hour turn-around period. This committee was to work on a procedure with the cooperation from the Records Division as to how to obtain the necessary information from Crime Reports within a specified time period as to make the information timely for the field officers. The committee was also to develop a procedure as to how information could be received from the Investigation Unit and related to field officers through the Crime Analysis Unit.

The First Response Unit committee was to develop the guidelines as to the duties and responsibilities of the First Response Unit in conjunction with the sworn and civilian report writers. Their committee recommendations are to be found in Chapter IX on Implementation Procedures.

C. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

During the months of March and April, several meetings were held with departmental personnel to present the experimental design and procedures and to keep personnel apprised of the organizational and operational changes being made within the Department. Several rumors arose during this period as there was some initial confusion as to the procedures and specifically, as to the role of the Team II officers. The DPR Staff, the Team III Commander, and the Operational Services Bureau Commander conducted meetings with personnel from each of the three Teams, all Department supervisory personnel, and to the Investigation Unit. The concepts and preliminary procedures were also discussed at several weekly briefing sessions with patrol personnel.

All Department supervisors received a copy of Executive Summary, Part I, and were strongly advised to familiarize themselves with the work done to date on the DPR Project. It was anticipated that the Summary would answer many questions that would arise and explain several of the crucial points of the Project as it related to the Post-Implementation Phase.

During the first week of April, a meeting was held with the Team Commanders, the Operational Services Bureau Commander, and the Project Director for the DPR Project. Several tentative guidelines for the experimental period resulted from this meeting. An Administrative Lieutenant would supervise a Response and Report Unit which would be comprised of two patrol officers and one motor officer from Team III and one patrol officer and one motor officer from Team I. Also three probationary officers would be assigned to the Report Unit. 10 Cadets, with all additional new hires, were to be assigned to the Report Unit. Reserve officers capable of functioning in a solo report writing capacity were to be utilized also. The hours of operation of this Unit would be from 0700-0300 hours, Sunday through Saturday.

The Report Unit's responsibilities would include responses and reports in the Team I and Team III areas not designated with a Priority dispatch code of 99, 98, or 97. (Priority dispatch codes: *Attachment A*) When not busy with reports, the Unit would conduct random patrol in the Team I and Team III area but not in the Team II area. Their workload would be evaluated every two weeks to determine manpower needs and workload assignments.

Team I and Team III would maintain 15 patrol officers for the test period. Team I and Team III would each transfer 3 Sergeants to Team II to be utilized for Watch Commander duties on a rotating basis. All department Sergeants, with the exception of the Crimes Against Persons Sergeant, the Crime Analysis Unit Sergeant, and the DPR Project Analyst were to be eligible to assist with Watch Commander duties if needed. The remaining Team I and Team III Sergeants, three per Team, would not be required to handle Watch Commander duties.

Duties, responsibilities, and operations of Team I and Team III would include all Priority 99, 98, and 97 dispatched calls. Also included were public and community relations programs.

The planning and development of a Crime Analysis Unit was to prove to be a difficult and time-consuming task. As this was a totally new Unit for our Department, some organizational changes had to be planned, as well as staffing considerations, location of the Unit, and the procedural guidelines for the Unit. The Crime Analysis Unit was to be comprised of both sworn and civilian personnel with a Sergeant in charge of the Unit. The personnel would utilize the data from the CAD system and other computer programs. The Unit would provide Team I and Team III Sergeants with information which would allow for more meaningful Priority Patrol assignments.

The Crime Analysis Unit, utilizing computerized information, would be responsible for identifying individuals and groups involved in criminal misconduct, charting crime trends, identifying traffic problems, and in general, providing Team I and Team III supervisors with information that would allow for deployment of patrol officers to those places and at those times where their chances of taking effective action against identified problems is the greatest.

The total planning effort utilized printed information on the successes of other cities, as well as their failures, to be used as a basis for our goals and objectives. The MPO Field Test Final Evaluation Report and several other publications were used to assist in designing a workable program for our Department. We also reviewed our original objectives for Directed Patrol and incorporated some of the objectives into the Priority Patrol program format.

Several strategy sessions were held with Department personnel and Mr. Ed Fennessey, Consultant, who has had extensive experience in the evaluation

of Priority Patrol (Directed Patrol) systems throughout the United States. His assistance in developing directional guidelines greatly enhanced our planning efforts and our Priority Patrol program format.

A final strategy meeting was held on April 22, 1983, to finalize procedures and guidelines for the test period. Some of the processes and guidelines were modified in order to be more flexible with working hours, activity levels, and manpower utilization. These procedures and guidelines are explained in detail in Chapter IX, Implementation Procedures.

#### D. EFFECTS OF THE PLANNING PHASE

The expansion of the original Differential Police Response Field Test, to include Priority Patrol and civilianization of the report writing process, was a monumental task. Since its preliminary conceptualization in December of 1982, and through the planning stages, a significant amount of time was expended researching methods of delivery of police services and their successes and failures.

In reality, more time was spent on the research portion of the program than on the actual procedures and guidelines due to the short time frame for the planning phase. Basic guidelines and procedures were developed to start off the program with modifications coming as the program progressed through the four-month period. From this effort, the Project Staff, assisted by Department personnel, originated the calls-for-service management and Priority Patrol scheme detailed in this report.

The road to success was not without obstacles and pitfalls. Unlike the DPR Field Test, which affected organizational change primarily in one Bureau, the Post-Implementation Phase was to have a major impact on all three Department Bureaus. Traditional methods of responding to community requests were altered and, in some cases, eliminated; and civilian job descriptions were modified to meet the requirements brought about by the expanded duties of those positions.

The key element in the development of the Post-Implementation Phase was

communications among organizations (Police Association, City Management) and individuals (Bureau Commanders down through the ranks to patrol officers). Initially, as the Project Staff began its development of this Phase, a lack of communications between Bureau Commanders (Operational Services Bureau and Technical Services Bureau) was noted by the Chief of Police and quickly resolved. Additionally, negative rumors about the Project spread throughout the Department, particularly in the areas of specialty assignments and with members of the Police Association.

It was difficult to deal with these rumors as the framework of this Phase had not yet been completed and the Project Staff, as well as the Department Management Team, was not able to publicize concrete guidelines for the test period, which may have clarified the intent of the program and allayed some fears as to how the program would impact on Department personnel. This issue was resolved to a large degree during the month of April when the conceptual structure of the Post-Implementation Phase was completed and meetings were held with the various units within the Police Department, the Police Association's Board of Directors, and the civilian personnel.

It was anticipated that the month of May 1983 would be critical in establishing the credibility of the program among civilians, officers, and Sergeants. To ensure that potential or real problems were brought quickly to Management's attention, weekly meetings were scheduled where Team Commanders, selected department managers, and invited guests were to discuss implementation problems and progress. The invited guests were individuals, usually Sergeants, who had recommended a change in implementation policy or whose Unit would have been affected by a future change in policy. The committee's recommendations for change would be reviewed and either approved or disapproved by the Operational Services Bureau Commander and the Technical Services Bureau Commander, who was also the Project Director for the DPR Project.

The weekly committee meetings were conducted by the DPR Project Analyst. The committee was crucial to the success of the Project in that the committee provided a channel for cross-Bureau communications and served to keep the Project Staff fully informed on patrol operations. Initially, in the planning phase, there was a communication barrier and some confusion between the Project Staff and the Operational Services Bureau as to who was responsible for the

planning and implementation of the Post-Implementation Phase. The Project Staff had been responsible for the DPR Field Test and was ultimately responsible for the Post-Implementation Phase as this program remained under the guidelines of the National Institute of Justice. However, since the Operational Services Bureau would be the Bureau most strongly impacted by the Priority Patrol program, they believed that the planning and implementation should be under their direction and control.

The Project Staff and Operational Services Bureau Commander dealt with this problem by assigning Operational Services the task of organizing support committees and generally, development of the Post-Implementation Phase policy and procedures. The Project Staff provided research and technical assistance and coordinated technical support offered by Research Management Associates, the evaluation team selected by the National Institute of Justice for the DPR Field Test.

RESPONSE PRIORITY MODEL

<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>COMPUTER</u>	<u>RESPONSE</u>
1	99	Immediate Dispatch - Injury
2	98	Immediate Dispatch - Crimes Against Persons
3	97	Immediate Dispatch - Crimes Against Property
4	96	Fifteen (15) Minutes
5	95	Thirty (30) Minutes
6	94	One (1) Hour
7	93	When Available - Exceeds One Hour
8	92	Non-Mobile Patrol Response Expeditor Unit Response

CHAPTER IX  
IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES

CHAPTER IX

IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES

On May 2, 1983, the Garden Grove Police Department commenced a multi-faceted approach to Priority Patrol. This approach was conducted on an experimental basis for a period of four months concluding on August 31, 1983. The goal of this new approach was concentrated on increasing the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.

To meet the stated goals and objectives required reorganization and reassignment of certain functions and personnel, and in some cases, individual job functions were modified to facilitate the change.

Our current mode of police service delivery is our highly successful Team Policing format. A recap shows that the City is divided into three geographic areas creating three distinct Team areas. Teams I and III have 19 uniformed patrol officers and one traffic officer for each Team, while Team II has 29 uniformed officers and one traffic officer.

At the same time as the commencement of the Priority Patrol program, the DPR system initiated during the DPR Field Test escalated into full-scale operation. It was estimated that the Expeditor Unit would be capable of handling 40% of the Crime Reports that would normally be dispatched to field units. With the full utilization of the call classification system, call intake procedures, and the Expeditor Unit, it was anticipated that a large block of uncommitted patrol time would be created.

A. EXPEDITOR UNIT

The primary purpose of the Expeditor Unit is to handle those calls-for-service which do not require the presence of an officer or the dispatch of a patrol car to the scene. By taking reports over the telephone and from citizens who walk-in to the Police Department, the Expeditor Unit diverts a portion of the calls-for-service workload from the mobile patrol force.

By diverting these calls, the Police Department will be able to provide more rapid and comprehensive service to emergency situations requiring police presence, while at the same time, provide a better quality of service for non-emergency situations.

On April 20, 1983, approximately one-and-one-half weeks prior to the implementation of the experimental test, the Expeditor Unit, formed as a result of the Differential Police Response Field Test, began handling 100% of the incidents designated as grant criteria calls. (During the Field Test 50% of the grant criteria calls were handled by the Expeditor Unit and 50% were dispatched to the patrol officers.) The early start date for the Expeditor Unit was initiated to study the Unit's workload and ability to effectively handle all of the grant criteria calls utilizing the existing personnel. The Project Staff also was considering extending the Expeditor Unit hours so that the Unit personnel would be able to complete their duties without having to hold calls over for the next Expeditor Unit shift, and also to provide better service to the citizens who may report incidents during the late evening or early morning hours.

Except for the two permanent Expeditor officers, all sworn officers who had been utilized for fill-in and week-end staffing of the Unit were reassigned to the field duties. They were replaced by the sworn personnel assigned to Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) who staffed the Unit as well as performed their own specified duties. The following guidelines were developed for CSI personnel who were assigned to the Expeditor Unit:

1. At least once an hour, CSI personnel will examine the computer for pending telephonic reports. If there are reports pending, CSI personnel will immediately call the victim and take the report over the telephone. (Barring an unforeseen disaster, each CSI officer should complete those calls coming in during his/her tour of duty.)

2. If the CSI officer is at a crime scene or in the field longer than one hour without returning to the station, he/she will inform the dispatcher and ascertain if there are Expeditor Unit reports pending. If one or more reports are pending, the officer will return to the station as soon as possible to complete those telephonic reports.
3. If the CSI officer is assigned a crime scene that will take longer than three hours to process, the officer will advise the Watch Commander who has the option of calling in a field officer or waiting until the next CSI officer becomes available.

A CAD terminal was placed in the CSI office to facilitate their duties as Expeditors as well as permit them to handle their own assigned duties and responsibilities. Sworn officers from the field would be utilized on a limited basis if one of the regular Expeditor Unit officers and/or CSI officers were unable to staff the Unit due to illness, vacation, training, etc.

As of the start date of the experimental test, the Expeditor Unit was handling approximately 41% of the total number of Crime Reports taken by departmental personnel, with some days approaching the 50% mark of the total number of reports.

After monitoring the workload of the Expeditor Unit, it was decided to leave the staffing intact as it appeared that the two Expeditor Unit officers, supplemented by Cadets, would be able to handle the number of calls assigned to the Unit. The number of requests for telephone reports during the late evening and early morning hours was so minimal that it was decided that the hours of the Expeditor Unit (0800-2230 hours) would remain the same as manpower could be more effectively utilized during the peak hours of reporting during the daytime and early evening hours.

While monitoring the Expeditor Unit's workload, we determined that the Expeditors were being used for assignments other than telephonic reports causing them to not be available for handling the reports assigned to them. A memorandum was directed to the Watch Commanders stating that Expeditor Unit personnel were to be utilized only for the purposes of handling telephonic or walk-in reports. They were not to be used for issuing car keys, pack sets, handling citation checks, or other routine jobs of the desk officer. These duties were assigned

to the Cadets working the front desk and/or the Sergeants serving in the position of Watch Commander.

B. CIVILIAN REPORT WRITERS

The Police Department's non-sworn Police Cadets were utilized as civilian report writers during the test period of the Post-Implementation Phase. Ten Cadets were initially assigned to the Administrative Unit to staff the Report Writing Unit ; however due to manpower needs in other areas of the department, five Cadets were assigned to the Report Writing Unit with the remaining five assigned to perform duties in Investigation, Communications, Property and Evidence, and one Cadet assigned to the Crime Analysis Unit.

During the week, Cadets were assigned to 50 hours at the front desk ( including the Expeditor Unit), 25 hours to Investigation, 20 hours to the Crime Analysis Unit, and 145 hours to the field Report Writing Unit, for a total of 245 hours of Cadet services per week. The Cadets were assigned to the various areas of the Police Department based on experience in the specialty areas such as Investigation and Property and Evidence as it takes a substantial amount of time to train in these areas. The remainder were assigned field report writing duties.

Our Cadets received 18 hours of training in report writing skills with additional assignments to ride with sworn field personnel for the purposes of applying what they learned to actual report taking of non-critical calls for service. Each of these reports was critiqued by the officer with whom the Cadet was working with corrections being made and procedures re-emphasized. The Cadets also received training in basic Crime Scene Investigation as an aid to their report writing duties.

After the training, the Cadets were capable of taking "short-form" (non-injury or minor injury/non-prosecutable) traffic accidents; burglaries, thefts, and malicious mischief reports where *no suspect was listed, the incident was not in-progress, and there was no immediate follow-up required*

on the report. The report writing Cadets were assigned these duties in the Team I and Team III areas. They were also responsible for handling the following types of activities: vacation checks, found bicycles, abandoned vehicles and the storage of those vehicles. These activities were dispatched by Communications for all of the three Team areas.

Cadets were NOT to be sent to handle the following types of incidents:

- Major felony reports (robbery, rape, assault with a deadly weapon, etc.)
- Interviewing victims/witnesses involved in major felonies
- any call requiring immediate follow-up

Quality control on all reports handled by the civilian report writers was maintained by the Administrative Lieutenant who routinely reviewed all of the reports submitted by the Cadets. He worked very closely and individually with the Cadets to improve their report writing skills, particularly in the area of traffic accident reports, to assist them in becoming more effective and efficient in the field, as well as maintaining the quality of report writing required by the department. We placed a tremendous amount of responsibility on the Cadets by requiring that they adhere to the same set of standards required of police officers in the area of report writing, even though they had less training and less experience in dealing with the public and the report writing procedures.

The Administrative Lieutenant, daily, reviewed a complete list of computer tickets of incidents sent to the civilian report writers to monitor the accuracy as to dispatch policy and appropriateness of the call to the Report Writing Unit. Consideration as to the safety factor of the Cadets when responding to calls was monitored as well.

One of the major problems at the very beginning of the test period, and an area which we had not considered in our planning phase, was the lack of vehicles available for the Cadet report writers. With additional manpower being assigned to the field, the lack of marked police units became an immediate problem. The Cadets were to use marked patrol vehicles with an out-of-service

designation across the light bars on the top of the vehicle. On the very first day the Report Writing Unit was operational, the Cadets were using marked patrol units when they all were called to the station as an Investigative Unit needed the cars for a special patrol activity. Our Report Writing Unit had *literally* been "grounded" for lack of vehicles to use for their responsibilities in the field. The Cadets were then assigned three unmarked vehicles to use in the event that all of the marked patrol units were being used by field personnel.

Another problem emerged early in the test period, in that some of the report writing Cadets were being inappropriately assigned to handle calls in the Team II area against the criteria established for their function. In checking the force behind this, it was determined that Communications personnel were assigning these calls to the Cadets because there were no other units available in Team II and they didn't want the citizens to have to wait for a Team II unit to become available to take the report. The old *Human Element* came prominently into play once again.

However, the major problem emerging during the first few weeks of the test period was the report writing difficulties experienced by some of the Cadets. The consensus of opinion was that they did not receive enough training in report writing skills, particularly in the areas of traffic accident reports and related knowledge of vehicle code violations as pertained to the primary cause of the accident. It was also discussed that we may have been expecting too much from these non-sworn Cadets who are basically college students working part-time for the Police Department. Retraining for individual Cadets who were having the most trouble was scheduled and completed. During the test period, those Cadets who still were unable to meet the standards of the Department in report writing were transferred to other duties in the Department and Cadets working in the station were assigned to field duties.

C. SWORN OFFICER REPORT WRITERS

Sworn officer positions in the Report Writing Unit were staffed by

selected Team II officers. Team I and Team III each transferred one officer to Team II to assist in staffing this Unit. Also the three probationary officers, who were recently out of training, were assigned to Team II as Report Writers. Team I and Team III motor officers were dropped from the original plan of being part of the Report Writing Unit and remained with their respective Teams.

Team II was responsible for scheduling a *minimum* of two officers to staff the Report Writing Unit for Team I and Team III, each being assigned one Team as a primary area. The Unit was to be in effect 7 days a week between the hours of 0700-0300. Team II was also responsible for any sick, holiday, or vacation relief of the Report Writing Unit.

Our Report Writing Unit then was comprised of Officers, Reserve Officers, and Cadets assigned to handle all non-priority calls-for-service, traffic accidents and traffic problems in Team I and Team III, excluding those calls which were assigned to the Expeditor Unit. The Report Unit was staffed as follows:

Report Unit - Officer	0700-0300	Daily
Report Unit - Reserve	As Available	
Report Unit - Cadet	0800-2000 1400-2000	M-F S-S

The responsibilities of the *Report Writing Unit* included:

- the Report Writing officer will handle designated non-priority reports and responses to calls-for-service in the Team I and Team III areas on an interchangeable basis;
- when not responding to designated reports and responses, the Report Writing officer will utilize a random patrol concept *only* in his/her assigned primary Team area;
- the Report Writing officer will respond to calls-for-service designated by a Priority 95, 94, or 93 as his/her primary function;
- the Report Writing officer *can be* utilized for follow-up in Team I and Team III;

- under *no circumstances* can Report Writing officers be utilized for Priority Patrol assignments;
- all traffic accidents that fit a "short-form" criteria (no injuries or minor injuries/non-prosecutable) will be assigned to a Report Unit Cadet when available.  
  
all other traffic accidents will be assigned to a motor officer or a Report Unit officer;
- all traffic problems with the possibility of a citation will be assigned to a motor officer or a Report Unit officer.  
  
all other traffic problems may be assigned to a Report Unit Cadet, when available;
- if the Team I Report Unit is busy, and no Cadet is available, and a non-priority call-for-service is dispatched in the Team I area, the Team III Report Writing officer may be assigned to handle the call.  
  
If the Team III Report Unit is busy, and no Cadet is available, and a non-priority call-for-service is dispatched in the Team III area, the Team I Report Unit may be assigned to handle the call; \*\*
- if *all* Report Units are busy, and a non-priority call-for-service is to be dispatched, the call may be assigned to a Team II, non-Report Unit officer;
- Team I and Team III motor officers may assist the Report Writers with the traffic functions in those Team areas.

Team II continued to operate in the traditional method of service delivery. Team II calls-for-service were dispatched under the normal guidelines prior to Priority Patrol/Differential Police Response. The Team assumed some additional responsibilities including the handling of certain dispatched reports and calls for the Team I and Team III areas. Team II continued to operate without a highly structured Directed Patrol program, restricting special efforts to those necessary to achieve pre-planned Team goals and objectives.

\*\*denotes change from original guidelines (revised 5-17-83)

Team I and Team II assigned three Sergeants to remain with each Team with the remainder of the Sergeants being temporarily assigned to Team II for the duration of the test period. These Team II Sergeants were responsible for staffing the Watch Commander position, 24-hours a day, 7-days a week. If there was a vacancy during the normal day shift, on-duty station Sergeants were utilized to assist in manning this position.

The Sergeants remaining with their Teams were assigned a permanent shift, either days, swings, or graveyards, with 7-day a week responsibility for planning, implementing, and supervising the experiment throughout the test period. This was a major change in our operational and organizational structure. Master patrol officers provided supplemental supervisory coverage in the experimental areas when the assigned Sergeant was off-duty. The Sergeants were assigned the task of developing Priority Patrol programs within their Teams and were advised that they would have final responsibility for the Priority Patrol efforts in their respective areas.

D. FIRST RESPONSE TEAM/25% RESPONSE

A *First Response Unit* is a regular Team I or Team III field unit, not participating in the capacity of a Report Writing Unit. First Response Units were assigned all calls-for-service with a priority of 99, 98, 97, or 96 (basically the emergency-type calls). Team I and Team III officers were handling two primary functions: responsibility for responding to life threatening calls or calls of a serious nature; and Priority Patrol assignments. The following criteria was used when dispatching a *First Response Unit* to a call-for-service:

1. *all in-progress or just-occurred incidents* (Priority 96 and above);
2. *all alarms* (both burglary and robbery);
3. *Code Alex A's and Code Alex B's* (county-wide alert network);
4. *all calls classified with a priority 99, 98, 97, or 96.*

When a First Response officer is assigned a call, he/she may request a Report Writing officer to respond to the scene when the following conditions exist:

- the crime is over and the report is now "cold"
- no immediate follow-up is required
- the First Response officer does not get directly involved in the call, i.e., interviewing victims, witnesses, etc.
- a Report Writing officer is available to respond

The following criteria was used in dispatching *either* a First Response officer, Report Writing officer, or Cadet to traffic accidents:

1. Under *normal circumstances* Cadets will be dispatched to handle non-injury or non-prosecutable traffic accidents;  
  
if the Cadet is not available, a motor officer from the Team area will be sent to handle the report;  
  
if the motor officer is not available, a Report Writing officer *may* be sent to handle the report;  
  
reports may be held until a Cadet is available, based on the circumstances of the call and the time limit set by the call priority (i.e., 95 priority is a thirty minute time limit).
2. For injury or unknown injury traffic accidents, the *closest available* unit will respond to the initial call;  
  
if a First Response officer is assigned the Code-3 run and determines that it is a non-injury or minor injury traffic accident, he/she can request a Cadet, motor officer, or Report Writing officer to handle the report, so that the First Response unit will be available for emergency calls-for service;  
  
if the Cadets are available, they should be dispatched before the other units.

3. If a First Response officer is assigned the Code-3 run and determines that it is a major injury accident or "long form" traffic accident report, he/she can request a motor officer or Report Writing officer, *if available*, to handle the report.
4. Whenever possible, a Cadet will be used for traffic control. First Response officers *will not* be used for traffic control *unless* there are no other units available or the situation is such that immediate traffic control is necessary.

E. CRIME ANALYSIS UNIT

"Crime Analysis support is the key component for directing patrol activity. Preliminary investigations, reports, and call information provide the *input* for Crime Analysis. Directed patrol assignments are the *output*. Critical factors involved in integrating Crime Analysis into the management of patrol operations include the capabilities and acceptability of the Crime Analysis staff, the organizational placement of the Unit, the nature and quality of the crime data (including automated capabilities), types of reports produced, and dissemination mechanisms."<sup>1</sup>

A major organizational change became necessary with the addition of a Crime Analysis Unit to the Garden Grove Police Department. The role of the Crime Analysis Unit is to *support patrol operations*. The Unit was to provide a data base for directing patrol towards specific crime, traffic, and service-oriented problems. The data base combined crime analysis, crime information, and personnel input/feedback systems. The Crime Analysis Unit was to evaluate the impact of police intervention upon targeted problems.

The Unit is staffed by both sworn and non-sworn personnel with a supervising Sergeant and two civilian Community Service Officers on a full-time basis. One Cadet is also assigned to the Unit on a part-time basis. The Unit is assisted by Team I and Team III Investigators who provided

the Unit with updated information on criminal activity and persons involved in criminal activities in specified areas of the City. Other Investigators and department personnel were assigned as needed. The Unit is under the command of the Team III Commander and is located within the organizational structure of the Operational Services Bureau.

The Crime Analysis Unit was to gather information via data collection and other listed inputs. These inputs involved face-to-face communications with officers and Investigators. The Crime Analysis Unit was to analyze the information and disseminate the information via the described delivery systems. Using the feedback systems and information returns (gathered from Priority Patrol assignments), the Unit was to measure the impact of Priority Patrol assignments.

The Unit utilized the following computer programs to gather information:

- *Alpha Program:* contains names of persons and businesses involved in a police report of any type.
- *Arrest File:* contains names of all persons arrested by the department for any crime. Information from the arrest program "falls" into the Alpha Program.
- *Pawn Slip Program:* California law requires that all pawn shops and certain second-hand stores complete a state approved form when dealing with customers. This form contains a description of property, name, description of the customer, and his/her home address. The shop must send copies of this form to the police jurisdiction where the business is located and to the Police Department where the customer lives.

When a pawn form is received at the Department, all information on the form is entered into the Pawn Slip File. Periodically, a print-out is provided to Investigators listing by name, individuals who have pawned articles and a specific description of the articles pawned.

- *Event Program:* captures Method of Operation indicators, stolen property by type, and miscellaneous information such as time of occurrence, type structure, and type of commercial or residential area.

- *Field Interview Program:* information obtained by officers to complete the Field Interview Cards is entered into this file. Data can be obtained by referencing any one of the information fields. This program has a Prior History File which contains information on individuals who are known drug abusers, repeat robbery suspects, and theft suspects. Information in this file comes from a wide variety of sources, including Investigators, patrol officers, and other jurisdictions.

Realizing the importance of providing Crime Analysis personnel with current updated information, a separate data processing group was given the responsibility for all input. The goal was for reduced errors and a 24-hour or less turn-around time on the entry of information.

The Crime Analysis Unit, utilizing computerized information, was to identify individuals and groups involved in criminal misconduct, chart crime trends, traffic problems, and in general, provide Team I and Team III supervisors with information that would allow for deployment of patrol officers to those places and at those times where their chances of taking effective action against identified problems were the greatest.

The following support delivery systems were to be developed by the Crime Analysis Unit for the dispersal of information to the field officers and other support officers of the Department:

- *Daily Team Crime Summary:* provides a list of major cases that occurred in the previous 24-hour period.
- *Crime Pattern Report:* provides information regarding possible crime patterns of which the patrol Teams should be aware.

No feedback is required from patrol, however, the Crime Analysis Unit carefully monitors all arrests for any offenses that were included in the pattern.

- *Crime Series Pattern Report:* contains information on a definite series of related offenses.

Feedback reports on actions taken by patrol are required for certain types of violent series of crime.

- *Special Crime Analysis Bulletins:* information that needs to be disseminated rapidly. May be used to update prior information.
- *Patrol Information Bulletins:* general information regarding crime activity or target hardening.  
May be used for "attaboys", feedback requests/responses, and for informational purposes.
- *Weekly Crime Statistical Summary*
- *Monthly Crime Statistical Summary*
- *Wanted Vehicle Summary:* information regarding stolen vehicles, vehicles involved in criminal activity, etc.

The Crime Analysis information described on the last few pages was distributed to the following personnel: Team I Commander, Sergeants, and officers; Team III Commander, Sergeants, and officers; Team I and Team III Investigators; Special Investigations Unit; and Communications personnel. Our prior level of crime-related information provided to Team II personnel did not change during the Priority Patrol experimental phase.

Responsibility for coordinating the flow of crime and crime support-related information among all Garden Grove Police Department Divisions was assigned to the Crime Analysis Unit.

#### F. PRIORITY PATROL

As blocks of available uncommitted patrol time emerged as a result of the assignment of Report Writing Units to the field, one of the major tasks

of the field Sergeants was to develop *meaningful* Priority Patrol assignments for their officers to utilize the uncommitted patrol time and to structure patrol officers activity during those periods of time.

As we progressed to this phase, it became apparent that our Sergeants were attempting to be too sophisticated and fancy in their approach to Priority Patrol assignments, completely missing the first step of the process by starting off with the basics. The Priority Patrol assignments were of the nature of the "funny" types of assignments (i.e., bicycle patrol, roller skate patrol, and other numerous types of plainclothes activities) and were not utilizing the very basic approach to Priority Patrol activities.

It was decided that a meeting should be held with the Field Sergeants to discuss this problem. The meeting was held on May 25, 1983, almost a month into the Post-Implementation Phase, where the basic Priority Patrol scheme was addressed and direction was given as to how to develop Priority Patrol assignments utilizing the information from the Crime Analysis Unit.

The first order of business was to provide a *basic*, workable definition of Priority Patrol:

*a projection of where and when certain acts are likely to occur AND the deployment of people to those areas.*

A projection must be based on both historical knowledge and "seat of the pants" working knowledge. Under the above definition, the basic goals of Priority Patrol are as follows:

- reduce activity (burglaries, robberies, traffic accidents, street vice, anything with a distinguishable M.O.)
- increase arrests, Field Interviews, etc.
- reduce response time to calls-for-service (placing units in high activity areas during free time).

With these basic goals in mind, the field Sergeants were responsible for developing and supervising programs for Priority Patrol. These programs were to be developed utilizing information provided by the Crime Analysis Unit and relayed to the field officers with strict direction given as to where to go and what activities to handle during their uncommitted patrol time.

After discussing the basic goals of Priority Patrol, the field Sergeants agreed that they had, in effect, skipped the first basic step (placing units where the activity was determined to be) in developing Priority Patrol programs.

Also discussed during this meeting was the role of the Crime Analysis Unit during the Priority Patrol experimental phase. As was stated prior, Crime Analysis was a new Unit for this Department, and they were struggling with determining the types of information to be disseminated to the field Sergeants and also with a standard format that would provide accurate, up-to-date information for each of the Teams.

The role of the Crime Analysis Unit is *to provide information to patrol Sergeants to assist in Priority Patrol assignments and structure officers' uncommitted patrol time.* The Crime Analysis Unit was directed to design a form that would provide activity projections for specific time spans, Saturday through Saturday. The form was to include:

- a list of time by one hour increments
- categories of crimes (burglary, robbery, accidents, etc.)
- highest level of activity by district number
- specific problems in areas by district number
- on residential/commercial burglaries, the time span was to be in eight-hour increments to correspond with the M.O. Data Sheet on Crime Reports;

the last hour of a heavy eight-hour span would reflect the entire previous eight hours of activity;

if the exact times were known, it would be shown on a supplemental information sheet, i.e., primary cause of collision for traffic accidents and intersection of occurrence.

Following this meeting, with the basic goals stated and new direction given for the Priority Patrol program, the Post-Implementation Phase began to take shape, meaningful assignments were developed, and the anticipated results of the program began to emerge based on statistical information from the Crime Analysis Unit.

FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>McEwen, Dr. J. Thomas, and Conners, Edward F. "Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Program", presented at the "Policing: State of the Art" Conference, Anaheim, California, June 2-3, 1983.

CHAPTER X  
ISSUES RELATED TO  
IMPLEMENTATION

CHAPTER X

ISSUES RELATED TO IMPLEMENTATION

A. EVALUATION COMMITTEE

During this Chapter, several issues will be brought to light which had a significant impact on the implementation of the Priority Patrol (Post-Implementation Phase) program. As was stated in Chapter VIII, it was anticipated that the month of May would be critical in establishing the credibility of the program among civilians, officers, and Sergeants as our initial planning phase was extremely short in duration.

To ensure that real or potential problems were brought quickly to Management's attention, weekly meetings were scheduled where Team Commanders, selected Department managers, and others involved in the program were to discuss implementation problems and progress. The weekly committee meetings were conducted by the DPR Project Analyst and were crucial to the success of the Project in that the committee provided a channel for cross-Bureau communications and served to keep the Project Staff fully informed on patrol operations.

Recalling the guidelines stated in Chapter IX regarding the implementation procedures for the various units involved (Expeditor Unit, Civilian Report Writers, Sworn Officer Report Writers, First Response Team, and the Crime Analysis Unit) will assist the reader in the following paragraphs. Numerous changes were made during the test period as we struggled through the first weeks of implementing the Priority Patrol program.

## 1. Expeditor Unit

With the Expeditor Unit operating Monday-Friday, 0800-2230 hours, there were some initial problems with staffing the Unit during the other time periods when the regular officers were off-duty. It was reported that Expeditor Unit calls were being stacked for long periods of time (up to 8 hours and occasionally more than 8 hours) during the time period when the Unit was not staffed.

As explained in the guidelines, the CSI officers were to be assigned to Expeditor Unit duties in addition to their own duties to pick up the slack with calls assigned to the Expeditor Unit. The CSI officers, initially, were unable to maintain a balance between their CSI duties and the Expeditor Unit duties which brought to light that "we were robbing Peter to pay Paul". CSI functions are critical and often-times lengthy, involved investigations leaving the Expeditor Unit unstaffed for long periods of time. Also the CSI officers felt that their duties had priority over the Expeditor Unit function, even though the Department was totally committed to the diversion of calls to this Unit. In that sense, the problem in staffing appeared to be partly human rather than a total systems problem.

It was decided that we would utilize more civilian Cadet manhours in the Expeditor Unit, especially in the morning hours (0800-1200) on Saturday and Sunday, in an attempt to alleviate the problem of large blocks of time in which the Expeditor Unit was not staffed. It was anticipated that this additional coverage would also maintain our high level of citizen satisfaction which was evident during the DPR Field Test.

This same situation surfaced again towards the end of the first month of the Priority Patrol program when it became apparent that there were conflicts between the CSI workload and the Expeditor Unit workload. In evaluating this problem, it was determined that there were some conflicts in workloads, but there was also a tremendous amount of resistance from CSI officers towards handling Expeditor Unit reports.

The committee decided to alter the guidelines for the Expeditor Unit in the following areas:

- when available, light-duty officers would be assigned to the Expeditor Unit for staffing on the week-ends.

- CSI personnel were to have *minimal* Expeditor Unit responsibilities, when light-duty officers were available.
- CSI Supervisors were to closely monitor their personnel regarding CSI duties and responsibilities when assigned as an Expeditor.
- Police Cadets were to be utilized to staff the Expeditor Unit on the week-ends when they completed their school terms in June 1983.

## 2. Civilian Report Writers

As was explained in previous Chapters, we experienced numerous problems with our civilian (Cadet) report writers. Their lack of training and experience was the primary cause for the majority of the problem areas; however, some of the problems arose as a result of some Cadets' belief that they were more than supplemental report writers and were trying to play "policeman", thereby placing themselves outside the parameters of their assigned functions.

When the Cadets were not busy taking assigned reports, they were field-initiating numerous abandoned vehicle reports, thereby removing themselves from "in-service" status and causing report calls to stack until they returned to an "in-service" status. On one hand, they should be commended for their initiative and enthusiasm in their assigned jobs, but on the other hand, their overzealous nature on these types of incidents removed them from the primary function of report writing and very few actual Crime Reports were handled by the Cadets at the beginning of the test period.

Guidelines were changed to provide clearer instructions to the Cadets as to their role. Cadets were to remain "in-service" while handling abandoned vehicle reports or while writing reports (Cadets were not permitted to dictate reports) so that they would be listed in the computer as capable of being assigned report calls. Stolen Vehicle System (SVS) forms were to be completed by Communications and Cadets were no longer required to return to the station to fill out the forms. Cadets *were not to be dispatched or respond to calls-*

for-service in Team II, other than for found bicycles or abandoned vehicles.

It was anticipated that by being more specific in the Cadets' role and area of responsibility would alleviate the problem of the Cadets being unavailable to handle their primary function of Crime Report calls.

There was some initial confusion in Communications as to which units to dispatch when the Report Writing Units were unavailable. It was decided that calls would be stacked in Communications until Report Writing Units were available. It was during this initial confusion that an oversight in Communications created a potentially dangerous situation. An unarmed civilian Cadet, in uniform, and in a marked patrol unit was dispatched to a "shots fired" call in one of our highest violent crime rate areas. The Cadet started to respond to the call, but through the quick intervention by a field officer who realized the Cadet had been dispatched, the officer recalled the Cadet, and responded to the call himself, thereby averting what could have been a dangerous and/or tragic situation.

### 3. Sworn Officer Report Writers

Initially, there was chaos in this area as Report Writing Units were to handle calls only in Team I and Team III and there were conflicts as to which officers would handle a report if the Report Writing Unit in that Team was unavailable. The First Response Officers were reluctant to handle reports stating "that's what the Report cars are for".

Several crucial changes were made early on in the test period with regard to the Report Writing Unit. Other than dispatched calls, once the field unit and/or the field Sergeant made the decision to request a report car and the Team report car was busy, the other Team report car or a Team II field unit would respond. (*Initially, Team report cars were to remain in their respective Teams.*)

Under this concept, the criteria was also changed for requesting a report car. It was decided that "*whatever was easiest and would best serve the interest of the particular call*" would determine who would actually handle the report,

(*i.e.*, if the First Response Officer was already involved in the call, such as taking statements, interviewing victims/witnesses, etc., he/she would continue with the report. In this instance, a request for a report car would only be a duplication of effort.)

During this initial period of time, some areas of concern were brought up in the Committee meeting. When not busy handling report calls, the Report Writing Units were patrolling in the wrong Team area, including Team II, even though they were specifically assigned to Team I and Team III. Also of concern was the early statistical report which revealed that the Report Writing Units were handling very few designated reports. Some of this was attributed to confusion as to how the report cars were to be utilized and the report car officers' own perception as to their function.

The Committee had to continually re-emphasize the Report Writer's responsibilities:

- priority calls classified 95 and below;
- "cold" priority calls classified 96 and above;
- follow-up on "hot calls" in Team I and Team III.

Toward the latter part of May 1983, minor problems were still being encountered with regard to the Report Writing Unit. It was determined that Report Units were handling calls *other than report calls* in specific conflict with the basic criteria developed and emphasized for the Report Writing Units. In monitoring this aspect of the program, it became apparent that there was still some confusion in Communications as to the function of the report cars; Communications personnel were reluctant to stack calls and so dispatched report cars to handle calls outside their scope of responsibility. Also, the officers, themselves, were volunteering to handle calls other than specific report calls.

Communications personnel received further instructions as to the dispatching of calls to the Report Writing Units, and the officers of the Unit were instructed not to volunteer to handle calls other than specified report calls, except in emergency situations where they may be the closest unit available to respond. They were also told that the dispatcher would call them if a report unit was needed. Too often, the report units would get tied up on

other types of calls and then there were no report cars available when needed. This resulted in calls being held, or Team II units dispatched to handle Priority 95 and below calls in Team I and Team III. This resulted in Team II being "stripped" of the personnel assigned to handle calls in their own Team area.

Also a change in Department policy was deemed necessary for the Report Units. Our policy is to have the officers dictate all reports taken with only a few exceptions. This policy was revised for the Report Units permitting them to hand-write their reports in the field, unless the report was so complicated or lengthy that it was more beneficial and expeditious to have it dictated. However, if a unit returned to the station to write a report, that unit became unavailable to handle further calls. Being available for report calls was the function of the Report Units and a return to the station or an "out-of-service" depleted the Report Writing force very quickly.

#### 4. First Response Team

There was some initial reluctance and resistance on the part of the First Response officers when they were required to take report calls during shift change and when the Report Writing Units were not on duty. There was a feeling that the report calls should be held until the Report Units were available or on-duty, thereby freeing the First Response units for responding to emergency calls. It was decided that report calls could be held, if the circumstances warranted, during shift change; however, report calls assigned between the hours of 0300-0700 would be handled by the First Response officers in Teams I and III, and regular field officers in Team II.

The First Response Units in Team I and Team III developed the feeling of an "elite" unit whose only function was to respond to emergency calls and then to leave the scene if the call turned out to be a report call situation, "having all the fun but none of the routine work".

In this respect, the transportation policy for all officers became an area of conflict for the Department. To settle the conflict, the Committee discussed guidelines for the transportation of suspects and/or arrestees. A determination was made that the First Response Unit would handle their own

transportation duties, as well as the Report Writing Unit handling their own, and Team II following suit. It was left up to the decision of the Watch Commander to determine which Unit would handle transportation of arrestees for the plain-clothes officers. It was also decided, in conjunction with the transportation policy, that the First Response Team would be dispatched to and handle calls of all shoplifters in custody.

#### 5. Crime Analysis Unit

Areas of concern regarding the Crime Analysis Unit have been discussed in earlier sections of this Executive Summary and will be discussed later in this Chapter.

One of the major problems for the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) was in obtaining pertinent information rapidly, caused by delays in entering information, due to reports not being turned in, reports held for correction, etc. Also, we were developing a new programming format for our informational system which made it very difficult to receive adequate and up-to-date computer information which would be useful to CAU. The CAU also experienced some initial problems of keeping up-to-date information flowing from the CAU to the Teams who were to receive the information.

Partially to resolve this problem, it was decided that all reports would be turned in at the end of each shift, regardless of circumstances, thereby enabling CAU to receive information they needed to disseminate to the Sergeants and field officers. Without this pertinent information it was almost impossible to develop meaningful Priority Patrol assignments.

To assist CAU in performing their function, simple guidelines were provided by the Committee to enhance their output:

- *increase* projections of crime activities;
- *identify* "hot districts" and amount of calls and Priority Patrol calls;
- *provide* detailed accounts of suspect information;

- *provide* suspect information on parolees, criminal associates, Field Interview information, and Pawn Shop information.

B. IMPORTANT SIDELIGHTS

During the planning phase and the implementation of Differential Police Response/Priority Patrol, several sidelights emerged, some anticipated and others unanticipated, that had either a direct or indirect effect on the guidelines and direction set by the Priority Patrol program.

1. As the direction and guidelines for the Priority Patrol program were being divulged to the line personnel, we became aware of a tremendous rise in the "competitive spirit" among the three Teams, particularly evident with the officers assigned to Team II. As the information came out that Team II would be the "control group", and therefore not involved in the new procedures, these young, eager officers started to devise ways of obtaining all of the information that was being given to the other two Teams.

Several of the officers got together and convinced two of our Reserve officers to surreptitiously make copies of the Crime Analysis information, this task being completed with the full cooperation of some of our Records personnel. When the officers were told that they were not entitled to receive this information, they contracted with a private printer to make copies of the information for them.

Team II personnel also decided on their own that they would find ways to develop programs that would increase their activity level to "make Team II look good" as a result of the increased activity levels of Team I and III.

We appreciated their enthusiasm and competitiveness; however, we were forced to put a damper on their spirit for the period of the experiment for a more accurate evaluation of the program.

2. Team I had very little activity as compared to the other Teams. The Team III Report Writing officer was being used most frequently as a follow-up

officer to the First Response Units. At this point, we could have definitely utilized a Report Writing officer or two in the Team II area.

3. Reserves were working mostly with the Team I and III officers to utilize the two-man unit concept. As a result, Team II received more than their share of ride-along program, and was not able to utilize Reserves as a second officer in the unit.
4. The Team II Community Service Officer handled all community service activities for schools, community, etc., for all three Teams. The other two Community Service Officers were assigned to the Crime Analysis Unit.

Team II officers were being assigned to assist the CSO on school programs and Neighborhood Watch programs, thereby taking all responsibility for community service programs for all three Teams.

A direct result of this change was that Team II was unable to attain all of its' goals and objectives for the year. Also, due to time constraints, the CSO was limited in the amount of crime information she was able to develop for the Team II officers.

5. During the program of Priority Patrol, Teams I and III had some difficulty developing meaningful assignments and direction to keep the officers interested and busy. "Busy work" type assignments were developed but were not effective as they had little impact on the crime picture and the officers, in time, became frustrated with the meaningless work.

There was some minor success in motivating the Team Sergeants to start thinking about what to do with the blocks of uncommitted patrol time that resulted from the diversion of calls to Civilian and Sworn Report Writers and the Expeditor Unit.

6. There remained a certain degree of confusion throughout the Department as to how all of the components of the program were to work in conjunction with each other. Guidelines needed to be very specific as to what types of calls were sent to which units, as the guidelines were openly and unevenly interpreted by those who were involved and those who had the responsi-

bility for the decision-making as to call assignment.

*In police work, common sense and "using one's own judgment" is critical to the effectiveness of the police operation. However, in this instance, "using one's own judgment" detracted from the program as the decisions did not necessarily fall within the guidelines of the program, and certain personnel "made up the rules as they went along", oftentimes in direct conflict with the objectives of the program.*

7. As with all new programs, policies, or procedures, there was some difficulty in communicating the composition of the program as the program involved, virtually, the entire Department in the various components of Priority Patrol. Crossing Bureau lines contributed to some of the confusion, however, regular meetings with Team Commanders, Administrative personnel, Communications personnel, and the DPR Staff significantly assisted in resolving this all important issue.

C. DEPARTMENTAL ANALYSIS

As a portion of the analysis for both Differential Police Response and the Priority Patrol program of the Project, several members of the Department were interviewed and surveyed for their opinions as to the effectiveness of the total program. The three Team Commanders were asked for their opinions on the overall impression of the program; advantages, if any, of the program; did the Department adequately prepare for the 4-month test phase?; and did they feel that the DPR/Priority Patrol experiment worked, stating both positives and negatives of the program.

The Administrative Lieutenant, supervising the Report Units, was asked similar general questions, but also included his opinions on the Department's utilization of the Report Writers; the feasibility of expanding their role or the necessity of a reduction in the function of the Report Writers. The Crime Analysis Unit was asked for their input regarding the program as it pertained to their all important role during the test period. Patrol officers

from each Team were interviewed regarding their perceptions and impressions of the program as the impact of the program was the greatest at their level of execution and their role changed dramatically.

1. Team Commanders

Overall, the Team Commanders expressed a very favorable and positive attitude regarding the DPR/Priority Patrol/Civilianization effort. However, they did have mixed feelings and opinions on certain aspects of the test phase itself.

There was no doubt that DPR is an excellent, innovative, workable system for dealing with the ever-increasing calls-for-service workload. This Department maximized the utilization of Differential Police Response, however it is still believed that there are many more calls-for-service which could be diverted at this point. Eventually, we may be able to expand the role DPR plays in our Department, but it was an unanimous opinion that we successfully attained the goals and objectives of the Differential Police Response Project.

With regards to Priority Patrol and Civilianization, the Department only touched the surface during the four-month test period. The Department feels that we have only begun to realize our full potential in these areas, and have just started to fully utilize these techniques. In fact, the Team Commanders in rating the Priority Patrol and Civilianization program on a ten-scale, gave Priority Patrol a 6+ rating, while our efforts at civilianization received a 3 rating.

The Priority Patrol effort in our Department was a general success, but much less than was anticipated and less than what it could become in the future. It is felt that even though our Priority Patrol efforts were not what we anticipated, based on input and knowledge of other departments, our conceptual program is one of the best in the State of California. There are many areas in which we have not followed through in the Priority Patrol program. In general terms, the program effort needs a more substantial commitment from all members of the Department from the staff level through the line level. Some of the lack of commitment can be blamed on a rather short planning phase prior

to implementation, as well as a resistance to change on the part of some Department personnel. Also, our Department must, at least, partially resolve our manpower shortages to make this effort a maximum benefit for our Department. During the test phase, we suffered an average manpower shortage of ten officer positions and one Sergeant position.

The civilianization effort was rated very low with the opinion that we did not properly plan for or utilize the concepts and guidelines developed for civilianization. There was a general feeling by the Team Commanders, that the Expeditor Unit should be *totally civilianized* through the use of Police Service Aides or Cadets. Since the start date of the Differential Police Response Project, this issue has generated many heated discussions as to whether civilians would be able to handle this intricate and very important role in the Department. The Grant Staff feels that the success of the Expeditor Unit has been due to the fact that the two highly experienced police officers have been able to make decisions on border-line cases as to whether or not a police officer should be dispatched to the scene of an incident based on their experience and the nature/circumstances of the call.

*The question arises as to whether we would be able to adequately train civilians in Criminal Law and the uniqueness of service requests to enable them to screen calls, and handle decision-making in border-line calls without reducing the level of police service currently in practice. Also, a contention is whether we would be able to maintain a high level of citizen satisfaction in the Expeditor Unit if we were to go to a total civilian concept. This is a question that still remains to be answered.*

In this same light, the Cadet function should be expanded further as we add to the number in the Cadet program. Also, the entire Department should be examined for areas of further civilianization in some sworn police functions. There is a belief that the Department should be willing to trade vacant sworn positions for civilian positions throughout the Department.

The feedback on Differential Police Response from management personnel has been very positive and comments made were instrumental in revising some of the guidelines of the program to provide increased benefits to the Department and to the citizens of Garden Grove. However, some "traditionalist" managers (and officers) have not been in agreement with the concepts of DPR,

both within our organization and in our contacts with personnel from other Departments.

The Team Commanders received very positive feed-back that the patrol officers are strongly in favor of DPR as the program removes non-critical reports from their scope of responsibility resulting in the officers becoming "crime-fighters" again. However, the same feeling is not expressed about Priority Patrol. This is due in part to the tremendous amount of change taking place in this Department since 1981, but also has been generated by the lack of total commitment and support from some managers and a majority of the Sergeant-level positions. The feed-back received included the fact that the Priority Patrol effort, specifically in the area of Crime Analysis, did not receive the manpower or equipment it needed to make the program totally effective. Priority Patrol definitely was impaired by a "robbing Peter to pay Paul" situation due to the manpower shortages.

There is absolutely no doubt that *DPR/Priority Patrol* is far better than *DPR/Random Patrol*. From a management perspective, there are very few advantages with Random Patrol; on the other hand, the advantages with Priority Patrol are numerous:

- DPR/Priority Patrol concepts are in direct line with the Team Policing or service-oriented policing concept;
- management has more control and increased capability to direct and supervise patrol operations;
- more responsiveness to neighborhood problems as well as crime problems;
- directly aligns with a goal/objective-type of policing format;
- permits the Department to deal more effectively with manpower shortages; and
- directly relates to the Chief's function to operate the Department in the most effective and efficient manner.

With regards to the planning portion, the prevailing opinion is that we

more than adequately prepared for the DPR portion of the Field Test, utilizing "test runs" to identify and correct problems and enjoyed a total Department commitment to DPR. During the Phase II, Priority Patrol test period, the general feeling is that we did not have the luxury of a lengthy period of time to prepare for the test and the total commitment was not in evidence. The "test runs" of the program were actually conducted during the test period and "the change as we go" philosophy was quite evident. At times, this was difficult to deal with as we encountered a degree of resistance from several members of the Department who only thought about how the change would affect them personally, and not how the change would benefit the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department as a whole.

During Phase II of the test program, Team II was operating under a different set of circumstances and guidelines as they were designated as the "control group" during the test period of Priority Patrol. Therefore, the Team II Commander's perceptions and opinions of the DPR/Priority Patrol program are somewhat different.

During the initial test program, it was apparent that Team II could benefit from the DPR/Split-Force concept even though they were the "control group". Team II was permitted to retain a limited number of specialized programs which had been set down as part of the Team's Goals and Objectives for the period prior to Priority Patrol. Team II's role in the "control group" was initially structured so that officers not assigned as report cars would be assigned to Random Patrol. Although this concept was initiated to a certain degree, it did not meet the expectations of the Team II Commander. Due to vacant positions in the Team, programs were limited to uniform-type assignments with the officers still subject to handle calls-for-service.

It is doubtful that Team II would have had the opportunity to work any specialized programs without the diversion of calls and utilization of Report Writers to reduce the volume of calls handled by field personnel. Although Team II received additional personnel to aid in staffing the Report Writing Unit, they still experienced a drain on Team resources. In this respect, the test program had an unanticipated, disruptive impact on the Team. When the Report Writers were busy on lengthy calls, other Team II personnel were used to supplement the needs of the other two Teams. As the program progressed,

some adjustments were made and this problem lessened, however, it still remained a concern for Team II and the Team Commander.

Another area which was recognized as a potential problem in this Team was the factor of "burn-out" experienced by officers who remained in the Report Writing Unit for a long period of time. The more aggressive, productive officers generally took more reports at the onset of the program, but as the routine of taking report after report set in, the officers appeared less interested and some complained about the lack of "police activity". On the other hand, older, less aggressive officers did not voice the same complaint nor was job dissatisfaction noted during their tours of duty as Report Writers.

Even though certain unforeseen developments took place during the test period, the flexibility build into the Team Policing concept allowed for necessary adjustments which were beneficial to and enhanced the productivity of the Priority Patrol program.

## 2. Report Writing Unit

*(Most of the comments in this section were received from the Lieutenant who was responsible for the Report Writing Unit)*

From the perspective of the Report Writing Unit, the DPR/Priority Patrol/Civilianization concept was good, but unfortunately we did not have the resources necessary to give it "our best shot". We relied heavily on the Cadets and Reserves to supplement the Report Writing Unit, but there were few Reserves adequately trained for the report writing function. Also, as has been discussed earlier, very few of our Cadets were actually prepared for the report writing function. During the entire test period, we were forced to tap the resources of Team II which impacted directly on the effectiveness of Team II as the "control group" in the program.

With regards to the question about appropriate utilization of the Report Writing Unit during the test period, and in the future, it was the opinion that the Report Writing Unit was not utilized to its full capacity and was not able to directly follow the guidelines initially stated. At the onset, the Report Units were to handle only those calls in their assigned Team area. We

found that the Team I report car led a "country club" life while the Team III report car carried a tremendous workload. We then changed the guidelines and permitted the report cars to cross Team lines, but the Team I report car was quickly overwhelmed with reports from the Team III area, leaving Team I without an assigned report car. As a result, Team II officers were utilized to handle reports in the Team I area.

In the opinion of the Lieutenant, the Cadets' report writing capabilities were a definite problem for the Unit. They did not have the training and background to conduct an investigation, nor ask the proper questions in order to accurately complete the report. Normally, a police officer is sent to the Academy for 16 weeks where he/she learns report writing, elements of a crime, investigation, vehicle code, traffic investigation, etc. After the Academy, the officer serves another 12 weeks of field training and more report writing under the supervision of a Field Training Officer. On the other hand, the Cadets received an 8-16 hour course in report writing and were then sent out along to handle the responsibilities of the Report Writing Unit.

In the area of adequate preparation for the test period, there was not enough thought given to the number of personnel needed for the Unit. Initially, 5 officers, 2 motor officers, 10 Cadets, and 3 Reserves were assigned to the Unit. A week prior to the test period, this plan was modified as we were unable to utilize all of the personnel originally assigned, due to manpower shortages in other areas of the Department. A modified plan was then implemented, but proved to be inadequate as other Team personnel were utilized to keep the program progressing along the anticipated lines.

With regards to the expansion or reduction of the Report Writing Unit for future utilization, the belief was that if we are to continue to have sworn officers as report writers, there must be an adequate number to effectively handle the assignment, and there must be constant manning of these positions. *If we are to maintain the credibility and efficiency of the Unit, all positions must be staffed during the designated time slots and should remain a top priority in our patrol operations as part of the total concept of alternative response.*

Another opinion was that the most beneficial product of this experiment is the Expeditor Unit position. It has proven to be the most effective and efficient Unit, however it is now treated as a "bastard child". The Expeditor

Unit diverts a large number of calls from the field officers, yet when the Expeditors are off-duty, this position becomes a "nuisance" when we need to assign personnel to staff the Unit. Initially, CSI personnel were used to staff the Unit on the week-ends, but workload conflicts and vacancies in that Unit restricted their utilization. Then, we staffed the Expeditor Unit with Cadets, and then more Cadets in an attempt to maintain proper manpower to handle the volume of calls. Team personnel were later used for this purpose but in time, they too had to return to their field responsibilities.

The Administrative Lieutenant recommended that we should expand the number of Expeditor Unit positions so that the problem of adequate staffing does not occur. By adding positions to the Unit, the Unit would be able to handle its own off-duty, training, vacation relief, and not call upon other Department personnel for this position. *During the initial planning phase of DPR, it was suggested that a 3-position Expeditor Unit would provide the coverage necessary to handle the volume of calls; however, we elected to utilize two positions for the Expeditor Unit which appeared to be adequate during the test period.*

There was also a question raised in the reply to this survey about the quality of reports taken and the feeling that the citizens may be "short-changed" by having reports taken over the telephone or being handled by non-sworn personnel. *In the following Chapter, there are statistics showing that our citizen satisfaction level was extremely high during the entire 2-year implementation of the Differential Police Response concept.*

### 3. Crime Analysis Unit

*(The comments in this section were received from the Sergeant who is responsible for the Crime Analysis Unit.)*

Not only is the DPR/Priority Patrol program workable for our Police Department, it has quickly become an integral and essential part of the patrol function. Over the years, several studies have concluded that there are various calls-for-service that can be handled very effectively by telephone or in the field by civilian report takers. The citizens are satisfied, there is

no adverse effect on case clearances, and the officers on patrol have more time to concentrate on specific problems utilizing Priority Patrol. The DPR/Priority Patrol program is "tailor-made" for police departments facing the limitations of reduced manpower.

Regarding the question "did Department personnel take advantage of CAU information by developing leads and apprehending suspects?", the opinion was that there were some officers who made every effort to take advantage of the information and as a result they developed clues that did lead to the apprehension of suspects. These individuals were, for the most part, enthusiastic officers who were even more eager to take advantage of a system that allowed them more time to do "real police work". It was noticed that these same officers exhibited a greater sense of accomplishment and overall job satisfaction as a result of their more proactive and productive role.

On the other hand, there were a few officers who simply ignored the information disseminated to the Teams. It was these same officers who were the most resistant to the new program as well as the Department's self-briefing concept. They argued that without daily briefings, they were not receiving vital information concerning activity in their areas. It was apparent that they did not realize that they contradicted their own arguments by leaving a stack of unread Crime Analysis Bulletins in their mailboxes.

In the area of adequate preparation, the opinion was that we definitely needed more time to develop the Crime Analysis Unit. Although the 4-month program started on May 2, 1983, the Unit was not fully functional and the information output was extremely limited. While the lack of sufficient time was one factor affecting the planning phase, two other areas had an impact as well. Manpower was then, and is now, a significant problem.

But the most significant factor was a general lack of familiarity with the Crime Analysis function. It took personnel some time to develop the Garden Grove format as it now exists. From this process, it was determined that every Crime Analysis Unit functions basically the same with only minor differences caused by the uniqueness of each Department. It is the development of this individuality of the Unit that requires the most time, planning, and preparation.

During the 4-month experiment, the Unit personnel were not fully satisfied with their progress in the area of analyzing crime patterns and crime series. The progress, which was slow, started to step up in the fourth month, and unfortunately, it was not until after the test period that the addition of a fourth person in the Unit enabled them to do an even better job of assisting field officers with information.

Since that time, CAU personnel have attended a Crime Analysis school and have met with various people involved with Crime Analysis. All other departments involved in Crime Analysis have indicated that it takes at least one full year for a Crime Analysis Unit to become fully functional and it would take at least six people to be assigned to the Unit. With this in mind, our Crime Analysis Unit has performed remarkably well, considering the circumstances under which they worked during the test period.

The majority of field officers seem to be very enthusiastic about the way the program is affecting their workload and their productivity in critical areas of their job. They like the idea that they may be able to work a special assignment now and then, and fortunately most are using their uncommitted patrol time to work a specific problem or problem area. *But just as there are officers who use the time wisely, the program has afforded some officers a chance to "do nothing more often". When these officers take advantage of the system, it affects the enthusiastic, hard-working officers and has, in some cases, put a damper on their morale and enthusiasm for the program.*

#### 4. Patrol Officers

*(Statements in this section are combined comments from surveys and interviews conducted with patrol officers in each Team).*

Overall, the patrol officers expressed a favorable and positive attitude toward the program of Differential Police Response. It is common knowledge that patrol officers are very enthusiastic about the DPR Project, particularly with the Expeditor Unit (refer to Chapter XI for Patrol Officer Surveys). However, it became apparent early on in the Phase II test period, that the patrol officers were less than enthusiastic and very resistant to the Priority Patrol experiment.

While the officers were impressed and excited by the DPR processes which substantially reduced their report workload in the field and provided them more time to do "real police work", they were often confused when it came to Priority Patrol assignments developed to utilize their free patrol time. All of the officers receiving Priority Patrol assignments, initially, felt that the assignments were not worth the effort and were not much better than our old system of saturating high activity areas which only pushed the activity to another area. One of the officers explained that he felt as if he were playing a large game of "Tic-Tac-Toe" with the districts in the City.

The officers initially felt that the concepts of Priority Patrol were not adequately explained to them as to how their role would change during the experiment. They felt a lack of continuity and common purpose among the Sergeants and it appeared as if each Sergeant interpreted the concept individually and planned a program based on his own idea as to how the program should work. Field officers working for more than one Sergeant became frustrated and disillusioned with the program as they oftentimes received mixed signals and disjointed assignments. Also a primary cause of the confusion was that the patrol officers were receiving instructions from a number of field Sergeants as well as receiving assignments from the Master Officers assigned to each Team which sometimes caused a conflict as to which assignment was of a priority nature.

The patrol officers also felt a lack of commitment on the part of the Sergeants towards the concept of Priority Patrol, citing examples of Sergeants stating "the program will never work, so we will do the least amount of work", and "this is management's way of controlling us, so we'll do it our way". With these thoughts in mind, the officers began receiving "busy work" and soon saw through the meaningless tasks they were given to make it appear as if the Priority Patrol effort was very effective.

Approximately half way through the experiment, all of the officers agreed that they were receiving better assignments as the Sergeants started utilizing the CAU information as to crime trends and patterns. The elation was felt by all patrol personnel when a specific Priority Patrol assignment, geared towards robbery, netted the patrol officers three robbery incident arrests shortly after the incidents were committed. In some respects, these incidents were helpful in proving to the officers that there were some benefits to be gained

when dealing with strong, meaningful Priority Patrol assignments.

As a result of these incidents and other incidents related to drug offenses, the officers started to open their eyes as to the potential of the program and realized that their free time could be spent in a productive manner. Some of the officers then started to develop and initiate projects on their own, based on their experience in their respective Team areas and with the approval of their Sergeants, regained control of the job duties they felt they were hired to do, specifically, "serious police work" and "catching bad guys".

All of the officers surveyed reacted very favorably to the Expeditor Unit taking minor, non-critical calls over the telephone and at the front desk. The officers realized the full benefit of the Unit and all felt that the Unit is doing an excellent job, both for the community and for the Department. However, none of the officers interviewed expressed an overwhelming desire to be assigned to the Expeditor Unit.

During an interview with one of the officers, a specific point was brought up which had never been considered during the entire DPR Project. In telephone reporting, particularly in the area of information or insurance only reports, how can we be sure that the citizen is not filing a fraudulent report without sending an officer to verify that a crime has actually occurred. Good point!!! And one area in which we will definitely look at very carefully.

Another point brought up during the survey regarding the Expeditor Unit was the fact that the patrol officers are not receiving the information from reports taken over the telephone, therefore they have an incomplete picture of all the activity occurring in their Team area. In the Expeditor Unit's list of responsibilities, it is the discretion of the Expeditor whether or not to immediately relay the information to the field units which may relate to special Priority Patrol efforts in progress, and/or suspect and suspect vehicle information. The remainder of the information from telephonic reports should be monitored by the Crime Analysis Unit.

The largest disparity in opinions emerged in the area of the Report Writing Units. Ironically, the greatest divergence came as a result of the officers who had actually worked as a Report Writer and those who did not, but reaped the benefits of having Report cars in the field. Even though "both sides" related specific problems in this area, it was the prevailing

opinion that the problems were as a result of lack of manpower, *rather than with the concept itself.*

All of the officers agreed that the Report cars were of benefit to the Department, however the program needs some restructuring to maximize the utilization of the concept. Initially, Report cars were assigned to specific Team areas with strict guidelines as to how they were to operate (i.e., Team I Report car took reports only in Team I, and Team III only in Team III). As the test period progressed, the policy was changed so that the Report cars were not restricted by Team boundaries. This was necessary as the Team III Report car was running wildly all over the Team while the Team I Report car enjoyed a leisurely shift.

Report car officers felt that the change could have been beneficial as both Team Report cars would be busy and more productive. However, the patrol officers were less than enthusiastic about the change to city-wide Report cars. Since the Team III Report car was always overwhelmed with reports, the Team I Report car was spending the majority of time in Team III to assist. This left no Report car in Team I for long periods of time, thereby forcing the First Response Team to take reports even though it was the Report car's function. This situation caused some conflict as the First Response Team specifically stated that they were to handle emergency or critical calls-for-service only (or so they thought).

Another complaint stated by the patrol officers was the fact that during the shift change of Report cars, other officers had to handle reports as no Report car was available. It was the general opinion that the majority of reports could have been held until a Report car was available or came on-duty.

In line with this, towards the end of the experiment, frequently one Team would field a Report car and the other Team would not, leaving only one Report car for the entire City. This became a specific complaint, not only of the Report car officers, but of the Team II officers as they were then required to handle reports in other Team areas as well as handle their own Team assignments and responsibilities.

The officers interviewed offered several recommendations to make the Report car system more effective and efficient and equally distribute the workload among the Teams:

1. Assign Report cars to each specific Team and have them respond to calls only in that particular Team area,
2. Increase the number of Report cars for each Team. Even with the manpower shortage, it was felt that more Report cars would provide more time and manpower to respond to the emergency or critical calls-for-service.
3. Rotate officers assigned to the Report cars every two weeks to avoid a "burn-out" factor which was evident during the test period.

Assign only volunteers to the Report cars. Those officers who do not want to or cannot handle everyday, routine report calls will, eventually, not participate fully in the Report car program, while those who would like to be in the Unit, would make the program more beneficial to the Department.

4. Utilize probationary officers for six months so they can learn the report writing process and become more proficient in report writing, which will be of great assistance, both to the Department and the individual, when they are assigned to normal field duties.

Initially, the field officers felt that they were not receiving enough information from the Crime Analysis Unit as to crime patterns and incidents which were occurring. At the end of the experiment, the officers felt that they were receiving far too much *quantity* and far too little *quality* in the area of information that they were receiving from CAU. As one put it, "too much stuff to read through and digest". Although, the officers did state that some of the information provided assisted them in their work and their knowledge of the activity in their areas. None of the officers had any recommendations as how to improve this situation regarding the relaying of information to them.

Generally, the officers felt that the Priority Patrol program worked fairly well "once the bugs were worked out", but their main comments centered around the lack of manpower to carry out comprehensive Priority Patrol efforts. and the inconsistency on the part of supervisors as to the patrol officers' role in the Priority Patrol program.

CHAPTER XI

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

## CHAPTER XI

### STATISTICAL INFORMATION

#### A. RESULTS OF DIFFERENTIAL POLICE RESPONSE

The Differential Police Response to Citizen Calls for Service goal of increasing the efficiency of the management of the calls-for-service function has five objectives. This section will discuss each objective and analyze the results achieved during the Implementation Phase.

*Objective: to assure that calls-for-service of a greater urgency receive priority treatment.*

In order to achieve this objective, three changes were introduced at the Garden Grove Police Department. The first change dealt with examining the various types of citizen requests for service and identifying those calls requiring an immediate police response. After careful analysis of calls-for-service, it was determined that approximately 36.2 percent of these calls required an *immediate* response; 44.9 percent qualified for a *delayed mobile* response; and 18.7 percent could be handled by a *non-mobile* response.

The second change resulted in the development of a Matrix which allows for the proper classification of service requests based upon a structured set of questions. In previous Chapters, the development process which was used to construct the Matrix and establish the questions was thoroughly discussed. The process allowed for user input and peer-guided training sessions. Still, there was an atmosphere of resistance to the change, especially among the senior dispatchers who were, in most cases, very comfortable with the old system and apprehensive about the new one.

For this reason, an audit was conducted of 322 calls-for-service, randomly selected, which occurred between May 16 and July 13, and 103 computer tickets from the period July 11 through July 13. The audit revealed that a total of 56 service tickets or 30 percent failed to contain required information from the standardized questions, with 98% of these errors involving the area of suspect description. In most cases, a review of the conversation, which had been taped, revealed that the dispatcher could have questioned the caller about the suspect as the callers were not hysterical or belligerent. The only other major error was found in a failure to request information on a suspect vehicle. This occurred on 5 dispatch tickets. The audit resulted in a review of the tickets with each dispatcher who was responsible for the errors, and in essence, an on-the-job retraining effort was conducted.

The third change was the development of dispatch priorities which would match the set of circumstances developed as the call taker obtained information from the citizen. The result was a list of 8 priorities which allow for the identification of situations requiring *immediate* dispatch, calls that could be *delayed*, and calls that could be *diverted* to an Expeditor Unit. The 8 dispatch priorities are listed below:

<u>Priority</u>	<u>Response</u>	<u>% of C.F.S.</u>
99	Immediate - Injury	5.8%
98	Immediate - Crimes Against Persons	5.2%
97	Immediate - Crimes Against Property	25.2%
96	Fifteen (15) minute	) ~ 44.9%
95	Thirty (30) minute	
94	One (1) hour	
93	Exceeds one hour	
92	Non-mobile (Expeditor Unit)	18.7%

The identification of calls-for-service requiring *immediate* dispatch and implementation of a priority system allowed for effective and efficient handling of all calls-for-service.

*Objective: to reduce the rate of non-critical calls-for-service handled by immediate response.*

The purpose of this objective was to develop a system whereby calls-for service that were *non-critical* were capable of being delayed or diverted from immediate dispatch thus providing uncommitted blocks of patrol time for Directed Patrol (Priority Patrol).

Prior to the Implementation Phase of Differential Police Response, the Garden Grove Police Department dispatched 97 percent of all calls-for-service as an *immediate* response. Only 3 percent of the service requests were delayed or diverted. After initiating the DPR process, the number of calls dispatched as an *immediate* response was reduced to 71 percent. This was an improvement of 26 percent; however, careful analysis of these calls-for-service indicated that 50-60 percent were capable of being *delayed* or *diverted*.

*Objective: to increase the rate of non-critical calls-for-service handled by delayed mobile response.*

While every effort was made to divert calls to the Expeditor Unit, many non-emergency calls-for-service required scene inspection or citizen contact and could not be diverted; however, the nature of these calls did not meet the requirement for immediate dispatch. As stated previously, it was estimated that 44.9 percent of the calls-for-service could be *delayed*. The implementation of a priority dispatch system allowed for the identification of these calls, however, the dispatchers were reluctant to delay dispatching the calls. The reason most often given was that if calls are allowed to collect in the pending file, it suddenly becomes busy, and Communications plays "catch up" for the remainder of the shift. It was difficult to restructure this thinking which was also supported, in concept, by many field Sergeants.

During the test period, the amount of time a *non-critical* call-for-service was delayed, awaiting dispatch, increased to 10 minutes. The Project Staff's analysis indicated that it continued to be difficult to convince the dispatchers to hold calls, especially when the patrol officer was not on a Directed Patrol assignment. This "*Human Element*" remained a critical

component in all phases of the Field Test, including the Post-Implementation Phase of the Priority Patrol experiment.

Although non-critical calls-for-service were not delayed an average of 30 minutes, continued effort will be made to deal with this issue.

*Objective: to increase the rate of non-critical calls-for-service handled by non-mobile response.*

Prior to the implementation of Differential Police Response strategies, the Garden Grove Police Department dispatched virtually all calls-for-service to the field officers. The only exception was Supplemental Reports which were taken by the Desk Officer during day shift hours (0800-1700 hours). The Field Test required the establishment of an Expeditor Unit that would screen calls-for-service which had been prioritized with a dispatch code of 92. The Expeditor Unit would then determine an appropriate *non-mobile* response.

During the Field Test, 50 percent of all calls classified as an Expeditor Unit call were sent to the field officers, with the remaining 50 percent being diverted and handled by a *non-mobile* response. The number of calls-for-service diverted was approximately 8 percent. While this figure may appear insignificant, when examined it was found that 91 percent of the diverted calls required formal Crime Reports. The Expeditor Unit handled over 3100 Crime Reports during the DPR Field Test period. The statistics listed below are Expeditor Unit reports by Category:

<u>Category</u>	<u>%</u>
Crimes Against Persons	4.4%
Disturbances	3.3%
Assistance Reports	4.8%
Crimes Against Property/Theft	56.9%
Crimes Against Property/Burglary	23.2%
Traffic Accidents	5.9%
Suspicious Circumstances	.9%
Public Morals	.6%

During the Field Test, 6 days of *Priority 92* dispatch tickets were examined. The calls dispatched to the field were compared to the calls which were diverted to the Expeditor Unit. The six-day audit determined that in the four most frequently utilized categories, the time saved by diverting the call was substantial.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Av. Time from Dispatch to Completion</u>	<u>Av. Time by Expeditor</u>	<u>Time Saved</u>
<i>Crimes Against Persons</i>	43.2 mins.	13.0 mins.	30.2 mins.
<i>Crimes Against Property</i>	35.5 mins.	8.6 mins.	26.9 mins.
<i>Disturbances</i>	32.9 mins.	11.4 mins.	21.5 mins.
<i>Traffic Accidents</i>	39.5 mins.	5.6 mins.	33.9 mins.

The above table demonstrates the tremendous time savings realized when a call is *diverted*. Therefore, although the Expeditor Unit handled only 8 percent of the total calls-for-service, the Unit handled 18 percent of all Crime Reports taken by the Department during the Field Test. As a reminder, the 8 percent of the total calls-for-service and the 18 percent of the total Crime Reports represent only *one-half* of the calls that were capable of being diverted.

There was a fear that surfaced numerous times during the Field Test in that the Investigators and Sergeants believed that case follow-up would be adversely effected by the implementation of DPR strategies. The following table compares clearance rates during the implementation period of the DPR Field Test and the same period one year prior for Burglary, Theft, and Assault.

Offenses Cleared by Arrest\*

	Sept. 1981- April 1982	Sept. 1982- April 1983	% Change
Burglary	14.6%	17.9%	+ 3.3%
Assault	58.1%	86.6%	+ 28.5%
Theft	17.5%	17.3%	- .2%

\* includes exceptional clearances  
(Source: Uniform Crime Report)

There is no indication that the clearance rate suffered as a result of the diversion of calls-for-service from *immediate* dispatch or to the Expeditor Unit for a *non-mobile* response.

Objective: to increase the amount of officer time available for non-calls-for-service activities.

As previously indicated, the Expeditor Unit handled approximately 3200 Crime Reports at a substantial time savings for the field officers. Patrol officers responded to this reduced workload by increasing self-initiated activity. The following table illustrates the *increased levels of productivity* during the implementation phase of DPR as compared to one year previous:

Activity	% Increase
Arrest Reports Taken/Dispatched (citizen-initiated calls-for-service that <u>resulted</u> in an arrest)	+ 11.5%
Arrest Reports/Field Initiated (incidents discovered by officers that <u>resulted</u> in an arrest)	+ 51.0%
Field Interview Cards	+ 16.0%

The implementation of the Differential Police Response process not only saved substantial amounts of patrol officers' time, but also had a positive side effect of improving patrol officers' duties, thus raising morale among the troops. It was not uncommon for officers working an active area to move from one call to another without time to "snoop" around, which is an inherent nature of police officers. The officers found themselves taking Crime Reports that, under our Managing Criminal Investigations program, would not even be assigned an Investigator for follow-up work.

The new call classification system identified those "secretarial-type" reports and diverted them from the system. The reports were then taken over the telephone (72%), the victim came to the Department to file a report (24%), or for a short period of time, a mail-in report form was utilized (4%). The workload relief was experienced throughout the patrol division and officers responded by increasing their activities which led to large increases in self-initiated arrests (+ 51%), Field Interviews (+ 16%), and arrests at crime scenes to which they were dispatched (+ 11.5%).

The implementation of Differential Police Response strategies has been proven to be highly successful and the efforts of the Garden Grove Police Department has enable us to satisfy the five objectives dealing with the GOAL: *Managing Calls-for-Service*.

Research Management Associates, Inc., (RMA) was awarded a separate grant in June of 1981 to evaluate the Differential Police Response program. The evaluation team was, therefore, a part of the program at the time the three test sites began their Projects. This greatly facilitated the evaluation effort, since it provided time to collect baseline data and to work with the sites to plan activities amenable to formal evaluation techniques.

When the test sites began considering alternatives, one of the first questions was whether citizens would accept responses other than the immediate dispatch of a patrol unit. Would citizens be willing to (1) have their report taken over the telephone?; (2) accept an appointment with an officer?;

(3) come to the Department to report the incident?; or (4) complete a report to be mailed back to the Police Department?

To answer these questions, RMA conducted an extensive telephone survey during the planning phase of DPR in which citizens were asked a series of questions concerning acceptance of these alternatives. Telephone interviews were conducted with citizens who had called the Police Department and received service by mobile patrol units for non-emergency incidents. In total, 1,539 surveys were conducted in Garden Grove.

The results were beneficial during the planning phase since they supported the concepts of the program in establishing alternative procedures, and many of the alternatives were implemented for the Test Phase.

One of the questions on the survey asked whether the citizen would have been willing to wait for a period of time before the dispatch of a patrol unit. Their responses were as follows:

Wait less than 30 minutes	25.2%
Wait 30 minutes to 1 hour	17.4%
Wait more than 1 hour	57.3%

As seen by these figures, about 75 percent of the respondents in Garden Grove would have been willing to wait more than 30 minutes before the arrival of a patrol unit to their incident.

Further questions on alternatives were asked of the respondents. The potential alternatives included: (1) taking a report over the telephone rather than an officer coming out in person; (2) arranging an appointment for an officer to come at a later time; (3) completing a report and mailing it back to the Department; and (4) coming to the Police Department in person to file the complaint. Acceptance of these alternatives is indicated in the results from the respondents listed on the following page.

Telephone Report	30.9%
Appointment with an Officer	45.8%
Mail-In Report	23.2%
Come to the Department	25.9%
-----	-----
Accept at least one alternative	61.0%

These responses indicate the degree to which the alternatives being considered could actually divert calls from the field units. It should be noted, the most acceptable alternative was an appointment with an officer, followed by a telephone report. The least acceptable alternatives are mail-in reports and coming to the Department to have the report taken. Of particular significance is the percent of respondents who would have been willing to accept at *least one* of the listed alternatives.

#### B. PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE FIELD TEST

In September of 1982, the Garden Grove Police Department instituted an Expeditor Unit at the Department. The Expeditor Unit is the core of the alternative procedures at the Department. The process operates as follows: the call takers in the Communications Center determine whether a citizen's call meets the criteria for an alternative response. If it does not meet the criteria, then a patrol unit is, of course, dispatched since the nature of the call is such that a patrol officer's presence is required at the scene. Otherwise, the call taker records the information from the citizen and inputs the data into the Department's Computer-Assist Dispatch (CAD) system.

Under the experiment, half of these calls were then routed to the Expeditor Unit and the other half were routed to the dispatcher for assignment to a patrol unit. This procedure meant that the system was operating at half of its maximum capacity and it allowed for a key evaluation activity of comparing the satisfaction of citizens who received the alternatives to citizens


who received a mobile dispatch for the same types of calls during the same time period. Alternatives available for the Expeditor Unit included: taking reports over the telephone; requesting the citizen to come to the Department to report the incident; and a limited option of completing a report to be mailed to the Department at a later time.






RMA collected and analyzed data for the first three months of the experiment, October through December, 1982. Adjusting for the calls which were dispatched, but could have been taken over the telephone, the results were:

<u>Type of Response</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Immediate Mobile Response	9,024	70.6%
Alternative Response (Telephone report, delayed response, community service officers, etc.)	3,761	29.4%

It should be kept in mind that prior to this Project, the Garden Grove Police Department had NO call alternatives which meant that the entire 12,785 calls-for-service would have been eligible for an immediate mobile response. Therefore, the test had already shown a 29.4 percent diversion from immediate mobile responses. By the end of the experiment, more calls were being diverted— up to 50-6- percent use of alternatives other than immediate mobile response.

Figure 1 on the following page illustrates, graphically, the progress of the experiment along with the projection of more utilization of the alternative response strategies.





 Alternatives Include:  
Telephone Reporting  
Delayed Mobile Response  
Mail-in Reports  
Crime Scene Investigators

Figure 1  
GARDEN GROVE ALTERNATIVES

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**CONTINUED**

**1 OF 2**

C. CITIZEN SATISFACTION WITH THE ALTERNATIVES

During the course of the experiment, Research Management Associates continued calling citizens who had received police service to determine their level of satisfaction with the alternatives being used. The following paragraphs give results of these surveys with emphasis on the level of satisfaction among *immediate mobile dispatches; delayed mobile dispatches; and the Expeditor Unit.* These results are preliminary only because not all of the citizen surveys have been keypunched. As will be seen, however, the early results are favorable to the Project and it was anticipated that this trend would continue as more surveys were analyzed.

In conducting the telephone surveys during the experimental period, every attempt was made to match the types of calls being handled by immediate mobile dispatches and by the Expeditor Unit. In Garden Grove, the dispatch tickets for the immediate mobile responses indicated whether the call was eligible for the Expeditor Unit. Only the calls so designated were included in the sample. The main call categories included in RMA's sample were Petty Theft (488), Grand Theft (487), residential Burglary (459), commercial Burglary(459C), vehicle Burglary (459V), harassment (653), damage to vehicles (10852), and malicious mischief calls (594). These categories constituted *94.6 percent* of the Expeditor Unit respondents and *90.1 percent* of the immediate mobile dispatch respondents in their survey.

The only area which may be deficient, in terms of sample size, is the volume of surveys for delayed mobile dispatches. The reason for this is that it was not deemed advisable to delay calls *intentionally* during the Field Test. The general criteria is that a call-for-service will be delayed if the unit in the area of responsibility is busy with another call-for-service. If the unit is still busy after 30 minutes, then the call would be assigned to the closest available unit. Thus, delayed calls must have occurred naturally during the dispatch process and, in all three sites, the number of times that delays actually occurred was relatively low.

1. Satisfaction with Call Takers and Alternatives

Table 1, on the next page, gives the responses to two questions in

regard to satisfaction. The first question has to do with satisfaction with the call taker during the initial telephone call by the citizen. In Garden Grove, there was a high level of satisfaction with the call taker *no matter what the type of alternative.* Satisfaction levels are at the 97-98 percent level for immediate mobile dispatches, delayed mobile dispatches, and the Expeditor Unit calls. There are, however, some differences between "very satisfied" and "satisfied" categories. With immediate mobile responses, *46.8 percent* of the respondents stated they were "very satisfied" as compared to *34.6 percent* with delayed mobile dispatches and *32.2 percent* with Expeditor Unit calls.

TABLE 1

Satisfaction with Call Taker

Survey Question: Let me ask you about the initial phone call to the police. Overall, how satisfied were you with the manner in which the police telephone operator handled your call?

	<u>Immediate Mobile Dispatch</u>	<u>Delayed Mobile Dispatch</u>	<u>Expeditor Unit</u>
Very Satisfied	46.8%	34.6%	32.2%
Satisfied	51.2%	64.4%	65.1%
Dissatisfied	2.0%	1.0%	2.4%
Very Dissatisfied	0.0%	0.0%	.3%

Table 2 gives the results of a question asked of all respondents of their satisfaction with the response time of the police department. With the Expeditor Unit, the response time is interpreted as the time it took for the officer in the Expeditor Unit to call the citizen back to take the report.

TABLE 2

Response Time

Survey Question: How satisfied were you with the response time?

	<u>Immediate Mobile Response</u>	<u>Delayed Mobile Response</u>	<u>Expeditor Unit</u>
Very Satisfied	42.0%	13.5%	21.0%
Satisfied	56.0%	70.2%	70.7%
Dissatisfied	1.7%	13.5%	7.4%
Very Dissatisfied	.3%	2.9%	.9%

The figures in this table show that there is, as might be expected, dissatisfaction with the response times of the delayed mobile response more than with the other two alternatives. In Garden Grove, 16.4 percent of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the response time of the delayed calls as compared to 25 percent in Greensboro, and 23 percent in Toledo.

The dissatisfaction with the delayed mobile can be related to whether the citizen was told that such a delay might occur. The respondents to the delayed mobile response survey were asked whether they were told that a delay might occur. In Garden Grove, 46 percent of the respondents recalled that they were told of a delay in the response time to their call.

Dissatisfaction with delayed mobile responses can also be related to the type of call. In Garden Grove a special analysis was conducted on the 50 Burglary calls which had been delayed. A total of 22 percent of the respondents stated that they were dissatisfied with the response time by the police. This figure is slightly higher than the overall figure of 16.4 percent previously given.

Table 3 on the following page gives the results of a more generalized question on the overall satisfaction of the respondents with the service provided

by the Police Department. The question asks how satisfied the person was with the conversation with the officer. This question was believed to be a general indicator of their satisfaction with the particular method of handling their call. In spite of the reservations that respondents had on the delayed mobile responses, the figures in Table 3 support the alternative responses.

In Garden Grove, 97 percent of the immediate mobile dispatch respondents expressed satisfaction with the service they received. With delayed mobile dispatches, 96.1 percent of the respondents expressed satisfaction, and with the Expeditor Unit, 94.7 percent of the respondents expressed satisfaction.

TABLE 3

Overall Satisfaction

	<u>Immediate Mobile Dispatch</u>	<u>Delayed Mobile Dispatch</u>	<u>Expeditor Unit</u>
Very Satisfied	52.6%	44.2%	31.4%
Satisfied	44.4%	51.9%	63.3%
Dissatisfied	2.0%	2.9%	4.7%
Very Dissatisfied	1.0%	1.0%	.6%

In Garden Grove, a higher level of dissatisfaction with the telephone reports was expected with the Burglary category. Of the 130 Burglary respondents of the telephone report survey, a total of 29 percent stated that they were "very satisfied", 64.9 percent were "satisfied", 6.1 percent were "dissatisfied", and none stated that they were "very dissatisfied". This level of dissatisfaction is only slightly higher than the overall average for the telephone report option. In Greensboro and Toledo, the pattern of satisfaction is similar with 93.3% of Telephone Report Unit respondents expressing satisfaction.

2. Expeditor Unit Alternative

On the surveys for immediate and delayed mobile dispatches, the respondents were asked whether they would have been agreeable to having their report taken over the telephone rather than having a patrol officer dispatched to the incident. *Table 4* gives the results of this question. In Garden Grove, 27.6 percent of immediate mobile dispatch respondents and 33.7 percent of the delayed mobile dispatch respondents indicated that they would have been willing to have their report taken over the telephone.

TABLE 4

Telephone Report Alternative

Survey Question: Would you have agreed to someone taking your complaint over the telephone and writing a report rather than an officer coming out in person?

	<u>Immediate Mobile Dispatch</u>	<u>Delayed Mobile Dispatch</u>
Yes	27.6%	33.7%
No	67.9%	64.4%
No Opinion	4.4%	1.9%

Survey Question: If you were to report the same type of incident again, would you be willing to use the Telephone Report Unit again?

Yes	79.9%
No	17.5%
No Opinion	2.6%

These results are lower than what might be expected given that calls were selected which met the criteria of the Expeditor Unit. In Garden Grove, the immediate mobile dispatch calls would have been routed to the Expeditor Unit under normal conditions. Perhaps the citizens would have accepted the telephone report alternative under these circumstances, but the survey results for Garden Grove indicated that a mobile response is generally favored by the respondents.

The bottom portion of *Table 4* shows the results of a question asked on the Expeditor Unit survey. It asks whether the citizen would have been willing to have their report taken over the telephone in the future for a similar type of incident. The results are very favorable to the continuation of this type of alternative. Almost 80 percent of the respondents indicated that they would use the Expeditor Unit again.

D. RESULTS OF PATROL OFFICER SATISFACTION WITH ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES

One of the important aspects of the DPR Project was the assistance the new call procedures provided the field officers. To determine this degree of assistance, and the field officers' attitudes toward DPR, Research Management Associates conducted a survey of the officers.

Actually, two surveys of patrol officers and Sergeants were conducted. The first survey, administered during the first quarter of 1982, was designed to obtain information about what field personnel wanted in a call classification system as well as their opinions about the accuracy of information from dispatchers at that time. The second survey was administered during the first quarter of 1983. The sample size included approximately 75 percent of the field officers. In summary, the first survey provided baseline data for the evaluation which could be compared to the second survey after changes had been implemented.

1. Detail of Information

Table 5 gives the results of questions asked on both surveys in regard to whether there is enough detail provided in the radio transmission on three specific types of calls: (1) in-progress Part I Crimes; (2) Suspicious Activity calls; and (3) Domestic Disputes. These three call categories were selected because of their importance and frequency of occurrence. In addition, suspicious activity and domestic dispute calls were believed to be among the most difficult for call takers to obtain information from citizens.

In Garden Grove, there was a significant improvement with the suspicious activity and domestic dispute types of calls. With suspicious activity calls, the increase in agreement is from 55.7 percent for the first survey to 78.6 percent for the second survey. With domestic dispute calls, the increase is from 71.4 percent to 83.9 percent.

TABLE 5

Survey Results on Detail of Radio Transmissions to Officers

Survey Statement: There is enough detail provided in the radio transmission so that I have a good idea of what to expect at the scene before I arrive at the following:

- a) In-progress Part I Crimes
- b) Suspicious Activity calls
- c) Domestic Disputes

<u>In-Progress Part I Crimes</u>	<u>1st Survey</u>	<u>2nd Survey</u>
Agree	84.3%	85.8%
Disagree	15.7%	14.3%
<u>Suspicious Activity Calls</u>		
Agree	55.7%	78.6%
Disagree	44.3%	21.4%

TABLE 5 (con't)

<u>Domestic Disputes</u>	<u>1st Survey</u>	<u>2nd Survey</u>
Agree	71.4%	83.9%
Disagree	28.6%	16.1%

In summary, the results in Table 5 support the new call classification systems which have been implemented in the Department. Improvements have been found in all areas with particular improvements in the categories of suspicious activity and domestic dispute calls.

2. Opinions on Accuracy of Information

Another series of questions on both surveys asked about the accuracy of information on (1) the location of the call; (2) the description of the crime or situation; and (3) being able to locate the caller. Table 6 shows that there have been improvements in the accuracy of information in these areas.

In Garden Grove, there was particular improvement between the two surveys with the accuracy of the description of the crime or situation. In the first survey, 78.6 percent agreed with the statement on description as compared to 89.3 percent in the second survey.

TABLE 6

Survey Results on Accuracy of Dispatcher Information

Survey Statements:

- 1. I currently receive accurate information about the location of a call to enable me to find the address rapidly.
- 2. Based on information from the dispatcher, when I arrive at

the scene, I generally find the description of the crime or situation to be correct.

3. Based on information from the dispatcher, when I arrive at the scene, I am generally able to locate the caller.

<u>Accuracy of Location</u>	<u>1st Survey</u>	<u>2nd Survey</u>
Agree	97.1%	98.2%
Disagree	2.9%	1.8%
<u>Accuracy of Situation</u>		
Agree	78.6%	89.3%
Disagree	21.4%	10.7%
<u>Locate the Caller</u>		
Agree	88.6%	89.3%
Disagree	11.4%	10.7%

### 3. Opinions on Self-Initiated Reports

On the second survey, a question was asked on whether the field personnel believed that their field-initiated activities had increased in January and February of 1983 as compared to the same months in 1982. As shown in *Table 7* the Department responded favorably to this question with 93.2 percent of the respondents stating that their self-initiated reports had increased over the last year.

TABLE 7

#### Survey Results on Self-Initiated Reports

Survey Statement: My *self-initiated* reports have increased in January and February of 1983 as compared to last year (January and February, 1982).

	<u>GARDEN GROVE</u>	<u>GREENSBORO</u>	<u>TOLEDO</u>
Agree	93.2%	73.4%	83.6%
Disagree	6.8%	26.6%	16.4%

It can be conjectured that these results are due to the increases in the amount of free time which officers have as a result of the implementation of the alternatives at the Department. The results are particularly noteworthy since all three Departments were conducting tests during the time that the second survey was being conducted. Thus, in Garden Grove the alternatives were operating at only half their capacity during January and February, 1983.

### 4. Opinions on Plain-English and 10-Code Dispatching

During the Differential Police Response Field Test, all communications or dispatches to the field units were done in "plain-English" rather than a Code series type of dispatching. On the second survey in Garden Grove, three questions were asked in regard to the use of "plain-English" dispatching versus "Penal-Code" dispatching. *Table 8* shows the results of these questions. A total of 85.4 percent of the respondents agreed that "plain-English" dispatching provided more information than codes and 74.1 percent agreed that clearer information was provided with "plain-English" dispatching.

TABLE 8

#### Dispatching Options

Survey Statement: Dispatching in "plain-English" rather than previous codes numbers has provided: (a) more information; (b) clearer information.

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
More Information	85.4%	15.6%
Clearer Information	74.1%	25.9%

However, when asked their preference, 43.6 percent stated that they preferred code numbers, 27.3 percent preferred the "plain-English" system, and 29.1 percent had no preference.

E. SURVEY OF CALL TAKERS/DISPATCHERS

During February and March of 1983, Research Management Associates staff conducted the third and final survey of the dispatchers in Garden Grove. The first round of surveys which took place in March of 1982 included 14 dispatchers, the second survey in the fall of 1982 included 10 full-time dispatchers and 1 part-time dispatcher, and the third survey included 11 full-time dispatchers and 2 part-time dispatchers.

A number of questions on various aspects of the DPR Project were included in the questionnaire to determine the dispatchers' satisfaction with Project implementation.

Overall, dispatchers do not feel that the DPR Project has improved the operations of the Communications section. There has been a considerable negative increase in Garden Grove with 54.6 percent of the dispatchers in the second survey stating that the Project has not improved Communications operations. This figure jumped to 83.3 percent in the final survey. However, over two-thirds of the dispatchers feel that since DPR has been implemented, the Department has continued to meet the needs of the citizens.

The majority of call takers felt that the DPR Project interfered with their ability to carry out their normal job duties with 58.3 percent in agreement with this statement. The dispatchers agree that the assignments in the DPR Project were clearly defined and logically structured. There was a small increase in the strength to which the dispatchers agreed with this statement, from 54.6 percent to 61.6 percent. 63.7 percent of the dispatchers felt they had an adequate understanding of changes in policies and procedures caused by the DPR Project. Over three-fourths of the dispatchers believe they have an adequate understanding of the purposes and objectives of the DPR Project.

There was a large drop in the proportion of Garden Grove's dispatchers who felt that the DPR Project had improved relations between dispatchers and patrol officers in the field. In the second survey, 36.4 percent of the dispatchers felt the Project would improve the relations, which dropped to 8.3 percent in the third survey.

50 percent of the dispatchers felt that DPR training had been timely and beneficial and stated that areas for improvement in training included Expeditor Unit training, the need for more knowledgeable trainers, need for follow-up sessions, more "fine tuning", and a suggestion that the second round of training take place just one week before the Project so it would still be fresh when implementation started.

1. Call Intake

The dispatchers were asked several new questions on the new call intake procedures. While most felt as confident handling calls for service using the new call intake procedures as they did before, there was more divergence of opinion as to whether the new call intake procedure required paying more attention to the caller. 63.7 percent felt confident with the new call intake procedures, while 46.2 percent felt that the new procedure required them to pay more attention to the caller.

Several open-ended questions on the advantages and disadvantages of the new call intake procedure were included in this questionnaire. Dispatchers overwhelmingly cited the same pros and cons: the ability to get more information from the caller was most often cited as the biggest advantage, while the complaint that it takes too much time with each caller was mentioned as the biggest disadvantage. Specific comments on the procedure taking too much time included comments that it takes too long to code the call; learning the Matrix slows things down; sometimes it is necessary to use the old code and then go back and put in the new code; and calls that fall into more than one category, or are non-specific, are hard to classify.

Several dispatchers reported that the new intake procedure simplifies call classification and that it is good to have procedures. Several additional

comments were made by the dispatchers, including a comment that the new procedures are easier for the dispatcher, that they don't have to memorize all of the radio codes, that too much unnecessary information is taken, and that they must read through every ticket to decide who gets dispatched first.

## 2. Opinions on the Project

The use of the Expeditor Unit was cited most often by dispatchers as the thing they liked the most about the DPR Project. They felt the Unit is "beneficial to the patrol officers", that it "gives more time to investigate more serious crimes", that there is now "more time for arrests", that it is "good for taking cold reports over the phone", and that it is "good for the community".

When asked to discuss the thing they disliked most about DPR, the dispatchers frequently cited the use of "plain-English" while dispatching calls. The comments made about the "plain-English" dispatching were: "it's slow", "it has deteriorated professionalism", "officers don't understand it", "the codes are too general", and "the numerical codes were simpler". There was some feeling that the Radio and Penal Codes are quicker and more professional and some would like to return to using these codes. Several other suggestions included the dispatchers ability to use more discretion as to when to use the Expeditor Unit, that field officers should be educated more about the dispatcher's job, and the public doesn't like the Expeditor Unit— they want to see an officer in person.

## 3. Organization Policy and Procedure

The first round of surveys showed that, in general, the policies and procedures associated with the Communications Center operations were felt to be clear and logical, though there was some staff feeling that operations were less than fully efficient. 57 percent agreed that assignments were clearly defined and logically structured; a slight majority felt that some disorganization was apparent. 70 percent agreed that there was little deviation from

standard policies and procedures.

Two major changes in the second round of surveys were noted: (1) an increase in the proportion of dispatchers who felt improvement had been made in the degree to which assignments were clearly defined, and (2) an increase in the usefulness of formalities and procedures. There was a 31.8 percent increase in the number of dispatchers who agreed that assignments were clearly defined and logically structured in the second round of surveys (from 50 percent to 81.8 percent). This drops back down to 69.3 percent in the third survey. Correspondingly, there was a decrease in the percentage of dispatchers who felt that formalities and procedures slowed down their performance. 53.8 percent in the third survey disagreed that formalities and procedures slowed down performance.

## 4. Information Communication

Several changes were noted in the areas of policies, procedures, and decisionmaking in the first and second surveys. In the third survey, all dispatchers showed a decline in response to the statement that they have a good understanding of the changes in policies and procedures affecting their job. The largest decline was seen among the Garden Grove dispatchers, where agreement had fallen from 72.8 percent to 53.9 percent.

There was a prevalent feeling that dispatchers are seldom or never asked for their ideas when decisions are being made, however Garden Grove dispatchers show a sizeable increase (18.9 percent) in the extent that they are asked for their ideas. In the second survey, dispatchers' lack of input into decision-making was noted among the top of the things they did not like about their job.

## 5. Training

The issue of more on-going training is cited frequently, specifically the need for more classroom training, developing a how-to classroom manual, a need for uninterrupted time with the trainer, and a need for individualized

attention and coaching during training. Also mentioned was a need for training to update all Communications personnel on changes in procedures, laws, and other related areas; and a need for experienced personnel to do the training. More emphasis on telephone courtesy was mentioned as well as practice in manners and termination of calls.

Additional comments on training concerned the need for training to be consistent and for everyone to receive the same information; for training to be convenient for all shifts; for training on stress management and back exercises; and the possibility of sending dispatchers to dispatch school at the Community College. Also mentioned was a need for patrol officers to be assigned to Communications for one day to learn and understand more about how they operate.

#### 6. Coordination with Patrol Officers

There has been a change in the proportion of dispatchers who felt the Communications section has a good reputation with patrol officers in the field, with over 75 percent feeling they have a good working relationship with officers in the field.

In earlier surveys, there was unanimous agreement that dispatchers often had to unnecessarily repeat the same call information to field officers once they arrived at the scene because the officers did not record or remember the information. Some change was noted during the third round of surveys with a drop from 100 percent to 77 percent agreeing that this is the situation.

#### 7. Job Satisfaction

In the first survey, dispatchers were found to be satisfied with the job activities and pay on the whole, and to feel the job is as important as that of a patrol officer. They noted that the job was sometimes discouraging and frustrating, and many were not satisfied with their chances for getting ahead or with the effect of the job on their health.

#### F. RESULTS OF PRIORITY PATROL

The statistical analysis of the Post-Implementation Phase is not meant to compete with the analysis to be completed by the Project consultants, Research Management Associates, who are far better suited to perform this function. The statistical review presented in this chapter is to "whet the appetite" of the reader and to provoke the thought process to justify probing further into the Project material.

The purpose of the Post-Implementation Field Test was to compare the field activities of Team I and Team III with Priority Patrol, Crime Analysis, Report Units, and Differential Police Response with the activities of Team II whose only assistance was in the form of full implementation of Differential Police Response. The statistics compiled for this report will allow for this comparison, by Team, whenever possible. The first test dates used for gathering statistical data are May through September of 1983. Frequently data from this time period will be compared with data gathered from the same period in 1982.

#### 1. Calls for Service

During the test period, May through September, 1983, a total of 23,654 calls-for-service were received in Communications. From this total, 3,178 or 13.4 percent of the calls were diverted to the Expeditor Unit and 1,148 or 4.8 percent were handled by Communications personnel or the Watch Commander with no further action required. The remaining 19,328 calls-for-service were dispatched to field units. The calls were assigned to the following units:

	Teams I & III	Team II
Total C.F.S. Dispatched	11,236 (58.1%)	8,092 (41.9%)
Assigned to Sworn Report Unit	2,180 (19.4%)	600 ( 7.4%)
Assigned to Civilian Report Unit	484 ( 4.3%)	228 ( 2.8%)
Assigned to Investigators	104 ( .9%)	101 ( 1.2%)
Assigned to Patrol	8,468 (75.3%)	7,163 (88.5%)

The Expeditor Unit handled 13.4 percent of all calls-for-service, however, virtually all of these calls resulted in a formal Crime Report. (Attachment B), a comparison of time spent on similar incidents dispatched versus telephonic reports, clearly demonstrates that considerable time is saved when a call-for-service is diverted to the Expeditor Unit. An example is a Crime Against Property where the new saving was 44.66 minutes per call, dispatched versus telephone report.

The number of calls-for-service dispatched to the civilian Report Unit was considerably less than expected. The reason was that initially the Cadets were given a brief training session on Field Crime Reporting, handling of Traffic scenes, and proper collection of evidence. Once the test period began, it became apparent that the Cadets needed additional training to properly function in the field with minimal supervision. As the test period progressed, the Cadets began to handle a larger workload. The figures below list the breakdown, by type, of the calls handled by Cadets.

	<u>No. of Reports</u>
Crimes Against Persons	3
Disturbances	2
Assistance	31
Crimes Against Property	134
Traffic Accidents	260
Suspicious Circumstances	8
Public Morals	0
Miscellaneous Service	217
Alarms	1
Burglary	31
Traffic Problems	25
	-----
	712 total C.F.S.

Once again by referring to (Attachment B), it becomes apparent that the utilization of Cadets for field report situations saves substantial amounts of patrol officer time, otherwise spent handling "secretarial-type" reports. As an example: on traffic accident reports, the estimated time savings would be 391 patrol hours.

The Sworn Officer Report Units' primary function was to handle report situations where there was little, if any, follow-up investigation required, but the *type of crime*, the *extent of the crime scene*, or the *condition of the victim* precluded the dispatch of the call to a Civilian (Cadet) Report Unit. During the Test Period, the Report Units handled 19.4 percent of the calls-for-service in Team I and Team III, while also handling 7.4 percent of the calls-for-service in Team II. The Report Unit workload may appear misleading, however, their impact on patrol operations was significant. The Report Units handled 789 calls-for-service in Team I and Team III, that required a formal police Crime Report. A combination of this total and the number of Crime Reports taken by the Cadets, 305, shows that the two Report Units handled 49.3 percent of all multi-page Crime Reports taken in Team I and Team III.

During the period May through September, 1983, Teams I and III patrol officers responded to only 75.3 percent of the calls-for-service which would normally have been assigned to them. Additionally, all three Teams benefited from the prioritization process developed during the initial Differential Police Response Field Test period. Non-critical calls-for-service (Priority 94) were held for an average of 15 minutes. During peak activity periods and periods of intense Priority Patrol activity, calls remained pending for up to one hour.

The effort to provide blocks of uncommitted patrol time did not meet our initial projections. However, the uncommitted patrol time coupled with the delay of non-critical calls-for-service, created substantial blocks of time for Priority Patrol activities in Team I and Team III.

## 2. Patrol Statistics

The personnel in Teams I and III not only benefited from a reduced workload, they also benefited from information supplied by the *Crime Analysis Unit*. Crime Analysis Bulletins were published 64 times during the test period. The average bulletin contained 8 pages and described approximately 500 wanted persons or individuals engaged in criminal conduct. On 30 occasions, arrests were made

of individuals as a result of this information. On 19 occasions, individuals listed in the Crime Analysis Bulletins were contacted and Field Interview cards and photographs were obtained. The majority of individuals arrested of F.I.'d could easily be classified as career criminals; their contact by the Police Department, no doubt, had a positive impact on crime in Garden Grove.

There were 304 Priority Patrol assignments designated to Team I and Team III officers; 184 were based on information contained in the Crime Analysis Bulletins.

Two areas of self-initiated activity were examined to ascertain productivity of Teams I and III as compared with Team II. These two areas were *self-initiated arrests* and *Field Interviews* conducted on suspicious persons. Field-initiated arrests reflect that Teams I and III *increased* activity during the test period while Team II experienced a *decrease* in activity. On incidents discovered by police officers that resulted in at least one person being arrested, Team I and Team III officers *increased* productivity by 27.2 percent when compared with 1982. Team II officers' activity showed a *decrease* of 9 percent over the same period in 1982.

When comparing the number of Field Interview situations, again Teams I and III *increased* activity by 78 percent while Team II *decreased* activity by 46 percent.

Overall, the Department *increased* the number of persons arrested by 18 percent. Teams I and III *increased* the number of persons arrested during the test period by 16.7 percent as compared to the same period in 1982. Team II *increased* the number of persons arrested by 29.2 percent as compared to the same period in 1982.

An effort was made to judge the quality of arrests by comparing the activity of Teams I and III with Team II, and test period 1983 versus the same period in 1982. The activities compared were in the areas of Robbery, Auto Theft, Burglary, and Drug Offenses. A statistical breakdown by Teams of the reported incidents of Robbery, Burglary, and Auto Theft are not available; however, city-wide, the following crimes were reported during the test period and during the same period in 1982: (source: *Uniform Crime Report*)

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<i>Robbery</i>	124	116	- 6.5%
<i>Burglary</i>	977	872	- 10.8%
<i>Auto Theft</i>	239	235	- 1.7%

A comparison of Burglary arrests by Team is made in the table below:

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>% Change</u>
<i>Team I &amp; III</i>	115	149	+ 22.8%
<i>Team II</i>	50	77	+ 35.1%

DISPOSITIONS FOR ADULT ARRESTEES 1982 (May-Sept.)



	<u># of Arrestees</u>	<u># Released at Station No Charges</u>	<u># Submitted to D.A. for Filing</u>	<u>Dispo Examined*</u>	<u>Guilty as Charged</u>	<u>Guilty Lesser Offense</u>
<i>Team I &amp; III</i>	59	9	50	48 (96%)	16 (33%)	15 (31%)
<i>Team II</i>	31	1	30	20 (66%)	11 (55%)	8 (40%)

\* 1982 dispositions were not computerized; unable to retrieve all dispositions.

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	<u>Dismissed by D.A.</u>	<u>Dismissed by Court or Acquitted</u>
<i>Team I &amp; III</i>	9 (18%)	8 (16.6%)
<i>Team II</i>	1 (.5%)	0

Of the dispositions examined, 95% of Team II adult Burglary suspects were convicted of Burglary or a lesser offense. Team I and III arrestees' conviction rate was 64%.



DISPOSITIONS FOR ADULT ARRESTEES 1983 (May-Sept.)

	<u># of Arrestees</u>	<u># Released at Station No Charges</u>	<u># Submitted to D.A. for Filing</u>	<u>Dispo Examined</u>	<u>Guilty as Charged</u>	<u>Guilty Lesser Offense</u>
<i>Team I &amp; III</i>	114	0	114	57 (50%)	5 (9%)	39 (68%)
<i>Team II</i>	55	2	53	30 (56.6%)	4 (13%)	21 (70%)

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	<u>Dismissed by D.A.</u>	<u>Dismissed by Court or Acquitted</u>
<i>Team I &amp; III</i>	6 (10.5%)	7 (12%)
<i>Team II</i>	3 (10%)	2 (6.6%)

In 1983, the adult arrestee conviction rate for Burglary in Team II was 13 percent. This was a decrease over 1982 figures of 42 percent. Convictions for any crime also decreased from 95 percent in 1982 to 83 percent in 1983. Teams I's and Team III's conviction rate for Burglary dropped from 33 percent in 1982 to 9 percent in 1983. Convictions for any crime increased 13 percent from 1982's 64 percent conviction rate to 1983's 77 percent conviction rate.

There must be caution used when examining these results; however, the 1983 cases have not been in the justice system a sufficient amount of time to obtain a balanced set of dispositions. It is likely that subjects awaiting trial for Burglaries committed in May-September 1983 will not be tried until the early months of 1984. These cases should increase the "guilty as charged" percentage since they would normally be strong cases as weaker cases are usually dispositioned quickly (plea bargaining, dismissal at preliminary hearing, etc.) once they are set in motion in the judicial system.

During the test period, arrests city-wide for Robbery, and Drug violations increased while arrests for Auto Theft decreased.

	Robbery 1982	Robbery 1983	% Change
Team I & III	18	18	0
Team II	8	14	+ 43%
City-wide Total	26	32	+ 18.7%

	Drugs 1982	Drugs 1983	% Change
Team I & III	125	245	+ 96%
Team II	79	69	- 12.7%
City-wide Total	204	314	+ 53.9%

	Auto Theft 1982	Auto Theft 1983	% Change
Team I & III	16	7	- 57%
Team II	5	4	- 20%
City-wide Total	21	11	- 52.3%

There was insufficient data on dispositions at the time of this report to make comparisons among Teams and 1982. The number of arrests for Drug violations can be attributed to increased enforcement utilizing Priority Patrol to remove drug dealers and heroin users from a low income, highly transient area in Team III. This program appears successful as Team III increased drug arrests from 76 in 1982 to 189 arrests in 1983. Although Robbery arrests show a decline, there were three instances in which Priority Patrol assignments were responsible for the arrests of Armed Robbery suspects.

### 3. Recovery of Stolen Property

During the test period, Teams I and III recovered a total of \$150,523.00 worth of stolen property. This figure represents all recovered property with the exception of motor vehicles. The amount of recovered property signifies a 110 percent increase over the same period in 1982. Team II recovered \$35,462.00 worth of stolen property representing a 10 percent decrease in the amount recovered over the same period in 1982.

4. Clearance Rates

Clearance rates for cases were a concern of many Department personnel during the Field Test of Differential Police Response and the test period of Priority Patrol. It was a belief that by taking Crime Reports over the telephone or by sending Cadets to the Crime scene would prevent Investigators from initiating follow-up investigations. The lack of an experienced police officer's examination of the scene or his/her field-initiated follow-up would result in poor quality of reports, with little possibility for follow-up investigation. The end result of this belief was a fear of lower Department clearance rates.

Individual Team statistics are retained on residential and commercial burglary cases cleared by arrest. The table below indicates that Teams I and III *increased* "Cleared by Arrest" cases during the test phase by *18.9 percent*. Team II, benefiting from Differential Police Response strategies suffered a minimal *decrease* of *7.0 percent*.

*Residential/Commercial Burglaries  
Cleared by Arrest*

	May thru Aug. 1982	May thru Aug. 1983	% Change
<i>Team I &amp; III</i>	77	95	+ 18.9%
<i>Team II</i>	57	53	- 7.0%

Clearance rates for other Part I Crimes remained consistent with rates prior to Differential Police Response and the test period of Priority Patrol.

*Clearance Rates  
City-Wide*

	1982	1983	% Change
Robbery	39.2%	45.8%	+ 6.6%
Assault	62.6%	62.6%	0
Larceny	21.6%	21.0%	- .6%
Auto Theft	35.8%	28.2%	- 7.6%
<i>Average Clearance Rate</i>	39.8%	39.4%	- .4%

5. Summary

Statistically, Teams I and III *increased* field-initiated arrest situations and *increased* Field Interviews of suspicious persons. Utilizing Crime Analysis information, the Teams arrested 30 Crime Analysis-targeted persons, all with previous criminal backgrounds. Three Priority Patrol activities resulted in arrests for Armed Robbery shortly after the crimes were committed. Team III utilized Priority Patrol to deal with an overwhelming drug problem in a low income, transient, high density, rental residential area. This resulted in a tremendous upsurge in Narcotic violation arrests, and according to the Team Commander, the program, which will be further developed with the aid of federal funds, will be greatly expanded.

Team II suffered *decreases* in the number of on-sight, field-initiated arrest situations, and in the number of Field Interview cards submitted. However, Team II *increased* the number of arrests for Robbery and Burglary.

While there may not be a significant difference between Teams I and III versus Team II, the statistics reveal that the potential for Priority Patrol, Differential Police Response, and the Split-Force concept to improve patrol operations is overwhelmingly present. This concept needs only to be expanded, monitored, and fully utilized by Department personnel to capture the full dimensions of this three-fold program.

DISPATCHED CALLS  
FIELD OFFICERS VS. EXPEDITORS  
(May 2 - 7, 1983)

	Calls Handled by Patrol Officers	Average Time (Minutes)	Number of Expeditor Calls Examined	Average Time (Minutes)	Average Time Saved per Call by Expeditors
CATEGORY 1 (Crimes Against Persons)	58	54.36	10	13	41.36
CATEGORY 2 (Disturbances)	137	28.13	10	11.4	16.73
CATEGORY 3 (Assistance)	74	45.75	40	9.8	35.95
CATEGORY 4 (Crimes Against Property)	76	53.26	125	8.6	44.66
CATEGORY 5 (Traffic Accidents)	82	32.96	25	5.6	27.36
CATEGORY 6 (Suspicious Circumstances)	103	29.17	10	5.0	24.17
CATEGORY 7 (Public Morals)	10	26.9	10	10.25	16.65
CATEGORY 8 (Miscellaneous Service)	11	32.09	3	5.0	27.09

TOTAL MINUTES SAVED: 8,774.87

TOTAL HOURS SAVED: 146.25

ATTACHMENT B



CHAPTER XII  
SUMMARY

CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY

The goal of this particular Field Test was to develop and assess the utility of a comprehensive differential response system for managing the calls-for-service functions of police departments. The design consisted of program elements that were uniformly implemented in three city police departments in the 100,000 to 500,000 population range and evaluated by the National Institute of Justice. The test had three primary evaluation objectives:

- *to assess the impact of a differential response system on police practices;*
- *to assess the impact of a differential response system on citizens;*
- *to assess the transferability of the program.*

Although the concept of alternative response strategies is not a new one, few departments have developed comprehensive differential response systems in which the full range of possible responses is considered for the total scope of citizen-initiated calls. The traditional method of handling calls-for-service is to dispatch an officer as soon as possible. Although this process may have been altered by various attempts to divert calls from the field and prioritize calls, there was no real attempt to explore the limits of call diversion and more importantly, measure the impact on the organization and the community.

Previous studies provided varying levels of support for the utility of differential response systems involving call prioritization techniques and alternative response strategies as mechanisms for managing the calls-for-service demand. Prior to the Differential Police Response Field Test, these studies raised numerous issues which we feel have been addressed in the reports detailed in Executive Summary, Part I, and Executive Summary, Part II.

The issues raised in the previous studies are as follows:

- 1) The *optimal use* of alternative response techniques had not been demonstrated. While it was *suggested* that as much as 55% of the calls-for-service can be handled by delayed mobile response and 30% of the calls-for-service can be handled by various non-mobile responses, the evaluations available prior to the DPR Field Test indicated that the percentage of calls-for-service handled by these responses was much lower.
- 2) It had yet to be determined what types of alternative response techniques were appropriate for what types of calls.
- 3) It was not clear what procedures were necessary to increase the use of alternative techniques. It had been pointed out that call classification schemes which were based on existing signal codes did not provide sufficient information to determine the appropriate police response.

Also, it appeared that Communications personnel were not adequately trained to use the simple call classification schemes, let alone more sophisticated models. Both of these factors were viewed as possible contributors to the under-utilization of alternative response techniques.

- 4) In light of the limited use of comprehensive differential response systems minimal attention had been focused on the *impact of patrol practices*. Further, information was needed on the extent to which patrol resources devoted to responding to calls-for-service could be decreased and used for non-calls-for-service activities. An important issue in this area and where significant information was needed was on *patrol officer acceptance* of alternative responses.
- 5) The costs of implementing alternative response techniques did not receive adequate attention. While it was *suggested* that alternative responses would be less costly than the traditional responses, the issue arose as to the cost effectiveness of the program in the police department.

Did the anticipated savings of the program *outweigh* the cost of training in the new procedures and in the assigning of personnel to handle the non-mobile responses? Also, an issue to be considered, if we were more effective by utilizing alternative response strategies, might the community and City Government then have an expectation of the police department "doing more with less"?

*Executive Summary, Part I*, takes the reader through the Garden Grove Police Department's Differential Police Response Field Test, including the original Test Design goals and objectives, the intricate planning phase, the excitement of the implementation of alternative response strategies, the

crossed-fingers and small prayers while we awaited the statistical information on the Field Test which would prove that alternative responses were well received by both citizens and officers, and decreased the workload of the patrol officers by a significant amount.

We feel that the question posed by *Issue 1* regarding the optimal use of alternative response techniques was demonstrated during the Field Test and the actual number of calls which were diverted *exceeded* the percentage suggested in the earlier studies. In response to *Issue 2, Executive Summary, Part I*, very carefully and very specifically explains what types of alternative response techniques were deemed appropriate for our department. The *3rd Issue* is thoroughly examined in *Part I*, as to the procedures for the use of alternative techniques, the change over from signal codes to "plain-English" dispatching, and the training of Communications personnel which was highly successful and did not restrict the utilization of alternative response techniques.

The issues raised by the organization during the initial phases of DPR related to managing patrol operations. DPR had given us the necessary control of managing calls-for-service, but there was a concern that a reduction in calls to the patrol force could possibly result in reductions of manpower. It was determined that the organization needed to manage the *uncommitted patrol time* provided to patrol by examining the impact of DPR, Directed Patrol, and the Civilianization of the report writing process.

*Executive Summary, Part II*, guides the reader beyond Differential Police Response through, what we refer to as, the "Post-Implementation Phase" which compared Split-Force, Priority Patrol, and DPR with Random Patrol and DPR. In other words, *Executive Summary, Part II*, explains what we anticipated and what we accomplished with the blocks of uncommitted patrol time that emerged as a result of the utilization of alternative response techniques. *Part II* explains the planning phase, the expansion of our civilianization efforts, the implementation of the experiment, the statistical information gathered, and most importantly, the effects of the program on citizen and officer satisfaction. Also included is a section on the final results of the original DPR Field Test which were not available for publication in *Executive Summary, Part I*.

*Executive Summary, Part II*, graphically answers the questions posed by

*Issue 4*, in that several sections deal with the impact on patrol practices, the utilization of patrol resources made available as a result of alternative response techniques, and the question posed about officer and citizen acceptance of alternative responses. This report also describes the problems associated with implementing change when such change is both controversial and a break from the traditional methods of performing police tasks.

Finally, the *5th Issue*, weighing the anticipated savings by the utilization of alternative response techniques against the costs of training and assignment of personnel has not been fully explored. With the rising costs of police services and the decrease of police budgets, a costing police services formula completed by the Project Staff for our department revealed that we are approaching *47 cents per minute* for one fully-equipped police officer. It is obvious that a substantial savings is involved if, for instance, a mobile police officer takes 37 minutes to take a report, and a non-mobile police officer 9 minutes to complete the same report. The savings may be realized only if all the components of the program are effective and efficient in dealing with the delivery of police services.

In 1983, at a "State of the Art" Seminar conducted by the National Institute of Justice, Dr. Tom McEwen, President of Research Management Associates, described a series of innovative police procedures. These included *Managing Criminal Investigations, Directed Patrol, Manpower Allocation, and Managing Calls-for-Service*. Dr. McEwen indicated that in order to properly implement these innovative procedures in today's economic climate, an organization must develop Differential Police Response techniques. It is only through the introduction of Differential Police Response that sufficient amounts of time can be captured leading to the successful implementation of other programs.

While the Differential Police Response system provides benefits to be gained by a police department it is only one rung in the ladder of resource allocation and utilization. However, it does provide the *key ingredient* for the utilization of law enforcement's principal resource: the officers and their uncommitted patrol time.

**END**