


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IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF RESTITUTION PROGRAMS
ON SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

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Impact of Organizational Characteristics of Restitution
Programs on Short-Term Performance Indicators

Introduction

The growing popularity of restitution as a sanction for crime may well become one of the most significant innovations in the juvenile justice system during the decade of the 1980s. Although courts long have recognized that offenders should repay their victims whenever possible, such requirements traditionally have been added to other dispositions or used as informal settlements or diversions in lieu of sanctions (Jacob, 1976; Schneider, et al., 1977). Only recently -- in the latter half of the 1970s -- has restitution come to be viewed as a central rather than peripheral disposition, with concern given to programmatic and organizational issues arising from its use (Galaway, 1975; Schneider and Schneider, 1980).

The purpose of this paper is to isolate the organizational characteristics of a number of juvenile offender restitution programs and assess the impact of those characteristics on program performance. Specifically, we are seeking to determine whether different organizational approaches, or "models," have any effect on the likelihood of offenders to complete their requirements and "graduate" from the program without committing a new offense.

Sources of Organizational Variation

All of the programs included in this study were funded by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) as part of the National Juvenile Restitution Initiative. Grants were awarded to 41 projects in 26 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Six of the grants went to statewide agencies, which in turn instituted 50 programs at

the county level. Altogether, 85 programs were supported by the initiative, with all but a few created as a direct result of the federal effort. Funding for the projects spanned the years 1978 through 1982.

The types of restitution programs which emerged in the initiative depended, in large part, upon the constraints imposed by the federal guidelines, the philosophies of the applicants regarding the purposes and primary beneficiaries of restitution, and individually-held "theories" concerning the causes of juvenile delinquency. The guidelines set the parameters for the target population and, to some extent, shaped the methodology of the programs; however, beliefs about restitution and delinquency perhaps were equally important in contributing to differences among projects.

The guidelines, in specifying the population to be served by the initiative, were emphatic in insisting that referrals to restitution programs be serious offenders. They required, first, that projects accept only adjudicated offenders, and second, that referrals be in serious jeopardy of incarceration (OJJDP, 1978, 1980). Specifically declared ineligible were status offenders and those adjudicated for "victimless crimes," e.g., substance abuse. The crime of non-negligent homicide also was excluded, presumably because it poses a particularly difficult case for restitution.

While applicants for grants generally were free to design their own programs, OJJDP made it clear that certain components were desirable and that certain procedures would not be allowed. For example, the guidelines made specific reference to the use of restitution as a sole sanction,

provision of public service jobs and other employment opportunities, the use of arbitration or mediation in determining the amount of money ordered, and the involvement of victims in the restitution process (1978, *passim*). Moreover, limitations were placed on the use of OJJDP funds for subsidizing employment and paying restitution (1980: 4-5). The form of many restitution projects, therefore, was influenced by the guidelines.

However, beliefs among the applicants regarding the purposes of restitution and the causes of juvenile delinquency also had much to do with the nature of projects in the initiative. These beliefs triggered a chain of decisions affecting the types of services ordered, and for whom; the types of restitution required; the types of clients desired; the role of different parties in the restitution process, and so forth (Schneider and Schneider, 1980). For example, if victims are considered the primary beneficiaries of a restitution program, then victims are likely to be offered additional services; the preferred type of restitution would be monetary payments to victims rather than community service; and the eligibility criteria for offenders would be broadly defined in order to maximize referrals and hence serve larger numbers of victims.

Finally, other variables which can influence the form of a restitution program include the type of agency operating the project and the agency's objectives; the location of the program (both physically and administratively) within the juvenile justice system; the project's relationship with the juvenile court, and so forth. Even with the uniformity fostered by the federal guidelines, therefore, considerable variation among the initiative's projects was anticipated.

Organizing for Restitution: An Overview

In an earlier paper (Schneider and Schneider, 1980), we sought to specify the "organizational dimensions" of restitution programs. Based on in-depth interviews conducted during visits to 15 pre-initiative programs, we identified seven major aspects of restitution programs and showed how different decisions in relation to those aspects combine to generate different organizational models. Continuing with that approach, we propose for purposes of this paper to designate a set of decision points subsuming the options available to restitution project planners. These five decision points are essentially a refinement and reordering of the seven organizational dimensions presented in the previous paper.

The decision points, and the options available under each, are displayed in Figures 1 through 3 (this "decision tree" is broken up into three figures for typographical purposes; conceptually, it constitutes one unbroken chain of decisions). In Table 1 are shown the percent of restitution projects which have adopted each option, and the percent of referrals across all projects found in each category.

The data contained in Table 1 were collected by the author and his colleagues as part of the national evaluation of the Juvenile Restitution Initiative. The information presented under the column headed "percent of projects" was obtained through a questionnaire administered over the telephone to members of the project staffs -- usually the project director. The questionnaire was administered initially in March, 1979, and

Figures 1, 2 and 3, and Table 1 about here

updated versions of the instrument were re-administered in February, 1980, and March, 1981. Repeated administrations of the questionnaire were intended to clarify existing information and collect new data on any changes that had occurred.

The information contained under the column headed "percent of referrals" is based on individual-level client intake and case closure data. These data are drawn from extensive records maintained on every referral to every project in the initiative during the first two years of each project's funding. The records were kept as part of a management information system designed and installed for purposes of monitoring and evaluation. The total number of cases (or referrals) in the dataset is 17,354.

Figure 1 displays the options available for siting the project and for arriving at the restitution requirements. About half (49 percent) of the projects were located within the court or probation department, while, of those outside the court, 17 percent were sited within nonprofit agencies. Approximately one-third (32 percent) of the projects reported that they utilized mediation between the offender and the victim, or a victim's representative, in determining the restitution order; however, even in those projects it apparently was used sparingly, as only six percent of the referrals were engaged in mediation.

Figure 2 contains some of the choices available in formulating a restitution plan for the offender. First, the appropriate type of restitution is determined, and then the details are worked out. In this study, attention is focused on the details of monetary restitution which, as

indicated by Table 1, is by far the most common type. About three-quarters of the projects report using subsidies to stimulate employment opportunities, although a number of these have used them in less than 10 percent of their cases and seemingly as a last resort. Only 25 percent of all referrals actually received cash subsidies in their jobs. Generally, they retained less than 50 percent of their earnings, with the remainder paid as restitution.

In Figure 3 are shown the choices available for supervising the referrals and imposing sanctions in lieu of compliance with the restitution order. Most commonly, restitution is ordered as a condition of probation, but 13 percent of the referrals are required to make restitution only, as a sole sanction. Sole sanction dispositions are used, at least occasionally, in 73 percent of the projects, but only 21 percent order restitution as a sole sanction for as many as 10 percent of their clients.

The extent to which restitution was required of serious offenders by these projects is indicated by the fact that 72 percent of the projects may impose the harshest of sanctions -- commitment -- if the client fails to comply with the court order. Twenty-eight percent of the clients whose cases were closed for noncompliance actually were committed. Many projects reported that offenders are given another chance -- simply warned or re-referred -- but the actual number of these clients could not be obtained.

Impact of Organizational Characteristics

Three indicators of short-term client performance were selected to assess the impact, if any, of the choices made by the organizers of the programs in the Juvenile Restitution Initiative. The variables, drawn from

the management information system data referred to earlier in this paper, are (1) successful completion of restitution, including community or victim service; (2) proportion of the monetary restitution order paid or community service requirement worked; and (3) the in-program reoffense rate, or the proportion of referrals who commit new offenses while still serving in the restitution program. These measures are considered "short-term" because they are bounded by the clients' time in the projects. An assessment of long-term impact -- such as the client's behavior after his release from the jurisdiction of the court -- will not be undertaken here.

Table 2 shows the effect of organizational variables on the rate of successful completion of restitution requirements. Obviously, a major goal (if not the major goal) of restitution programming is to maximize the clients' probability of completing their requirements and compensating their victims. Any component which hampers the offenders' chances of success obviously is counter-productive. Following Blalock (1972) the choice of statistical techniques to evaluate the relationships in this

Table 2 about here

table (and Table 3 below) was determined by the type of variables, i.e., the level of measurement, and the number of categories. Chi-square was calculated for tables larger than four cells (categories) with at least one nominal variable; Kendall's tau_c for tables larger than four cells involving an ordinal variable, and phi for four-celled tables. In Table 3, the gamma statistic was computed in addition to Kendall's tau. This statistic

picks up associations between variables which are non-linear in nature, and hence frequently is of greater magnitude.

With the exception of "amount of subsidy kept," all of the relationships in Table 2 are statistically significant, primarily because of the large number of cases. Only two relationships might be considered substantively significant, however, with differences of five percent or greater in the successful completion rate. These are (1) subsidized employment for offenders making restitution, and (2) the use of restitution as a sole sanction rather than as a condition of probation.

That subsidization can help maximize completion rates would seem obvious. The issue for policy makers is whether an increase in the rate of approximately five percent is worth the additional cost. Griffith (1983) points out that the overall increase in completion due to subsidization is an average based on all subsidized referrals, and that it masks a more noteworthy effect. According to his study, the provision of a subsidy can improve the successful completion rate of those clients most likely to fail -- poor, nonwhite, serious offenders with large restitution orders -- by up to 28 percent.

The higher successful completion rates (and, as will be shown later, the lower reoffense rates) of offenders making restitution as a sole sanction was examined more fully in a previous paper (Schneider, et al., 1982). The relationship remains strong even when a wide variety of possible intervening factors -- such as race, gender, income, priors and offense seriousness -- is statistically controlled. The reasons for this observed correlation are speculative, but it may be due to "positive

labelling;" in other words, offenders trusted to make restitution without any additional sanctions may make a greater effort in order to reward that trust. On the other hand, the higher failure rate among offenders on probation may be related to greater surveillance over these clients.

Table 3 shows the associations between different organizational characteristics and the proportion of restitution paid (or, in the case of community service, the proportion of the order worked). Since there is a strong correlation between successful completion of restitution and the proportion paid or worked, it is not surprising that the findings with respect to subsidization and sole sanction are similar to those in the

Table 3 about here

previous table. Two other findings deserve mention: apparently, clients of projects located within the court or probation department are more likely to pay all of restitution order than those in projects outside the court. Also, offenders required to make only one kind of restitution -- either monetary or community service -- are more likely to complete the entire order than those referrals with a combination of monetary restitution and community service.

The data in Table 4 reflect the impact of restitution project organizational characteristics on the in-program reoffense rate. This rate is the proportion of referrals who commit new offenses while still serving in the program. It is an important indicator for at least two reasons. First, it provides projects with a quick diagnostic -- a kind of "early

warning system" -- concerning the effectiveness of the treatment in stemming future delinquency. Second, it suggests the extent to which the program is taken seriously by the client.

The method used to calculate the in-program reoffense rate is survival analysis. This procedure generates a "survival rate," which actually is the cumulative proportion of cases that have failed, or reoffended, at each of many different time lags beyond referral (Berecochea, et al., 1972). Thus, this method produces a nonreoffense rate for one or more months

Table 4 about here

beyond referral, controlling for the time "at risk," and the reoffense rate can be determined by simply subtracting the proportion of nonreoffenders from 100 percent. In Table 4, survival rates for projects with the specified organizational characteristics were computed. Statistical significance was assessed using the Lee-Desu statistic, which is similar to a Chi-square (Nie, et al., 1975).

Again, the largest apparent difference in these rates is between the offenders making restitution as a sole sanction (15 percent) as compared with those making restitution in conjunction with some other sanction (22 percent). The provision of a subsidy did not attain significance -- despite a four percent difference in reoffending -- but the proportion of subsidy retained by the offender was significant, at a marginal .07 level. The location of the project also had a statistically significant impact on reoffense rates, with referrals to projects located in courts or probation departments slightly more likely to reoffend.

Estimating the Relative Impact of Organizational Characteristics

In the previous analyses the effect of organizational characteristics on program performance was assessed one at a time, or variable by variable. To estimate the relative impact of program components, a multivariate model is appropriate. The approach employed in this paper is multiple regression, in which each of the specified organizational characteristics is correlated with the indicator of program performance, while controlling for all of the other characteristics. The multivariate model posits that client performance in a restitution project is due to a set of selected organizational characteristics. It takes the form of an equation in which the performance indicator, or dependent variable (Y), is expressed as a function of the organizational characteristics, or independent variables (X_1, X_2 , etc.). This technique generates a statistical coefficient for each characteristic which is directly interpretable as the independent effect of that variable on the client's performance when all other specified variables in the equation are controlled, or held constant.

Table 5 displays the multivariate model for successful completion of restitution orders. The relative magnitude of the regression coefficients

Table 5 about here

indicates that community service (X_3) is more likely to be completed than other types of restitution, and that sole sanction restitution (X_1) has comparatively more impact on completion rates than subsidization (X_2) or victim-offender mediation (X_6). The location of the project was not

statistically significant (at the .05 level) when all other characteristics were controlled, and therefore was not included in the equation.

The first number in the equation (.576) is called the intercept and denotes the value of Y when all the X's are zero. In this equation it indicates that the successful completion rate in an average project would be nearly 60 percent even in the absence of these organizational characteristics. The strength of the association between the organizational characteristics and successful completion is represented by the letter "R." As this value can range from zero to unity (1.0), the relationship observed here is quite modest. This is due largely to the fact that, with an overall completion rate in the initiative of 86 percent, there is little variation on this indicator across offenders. The number of cases, or offenders, is denoted by the letter "N."

The model for the proportion of the restitution order completed is contained in Table 6. This equation suggests that approximately 89 percent

Table 6 about here

of the order can be expected to be completed in an average project regardless of program components, but that the proportion can be increased by (in order of importance) subsidization, a sole sanction disposition, and victim-offender negotiation. The proportion completed is likely to decrease when the court order involves monetary restitution or a combination of monetary payments and community service.

Table 7 depicts the multivariate model for the in-program reoffense rate. The relationship of organizational characteristics with in-program reoffending is slight (.053) and therefore these coefficients must be interpreted with caution. They indicate, however, that sole sanction restitution is relatively more important in reducing the rate (represented by a plus sign, or positive coefficient), but that locating the project with a nonprofit agency and ordering unpaid community service may also help lower the rate. All other organizational characteristics entered into this equation failed to attain statistical significance and hence were deleted from the model.

Table 7 About Here

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests that while particular "models" of restitution projects -- defined as mixes of organizational components -- have some impact on the success of clients in those programs, the effect is, in most instances, slight. Even the most potent components included in this study appear to affect successful completion rates, for example, by less than 10 percent, and the impact on reoffense rates is even less. Unless we have overlooked other components which have much greater influence, the obvious conclusion is that restitution is, in and of itself, a disposition that is likely to be heeded regardless of organizational arrangements. This information should be received with

satisfaction by juvenile courts and other agencies, for it implies that they can shape their restitution programs to suit local conditions or preferences without fear of disadvantaging their clients.

These findings should not be taken to mean, however, that offenders in restitution programs with essentially no organization may succeed at the same high level as those referred to projects in the Juvenile Restitution Initiative. Since all of the projects included in this study did have a program of some kind available to the offender, a test of the "null" model, or the absence of organization, was not possible. Pending such a test, it probably is fair to say that any kind of program, pursued conscientiously, is better than no program at all.

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Figure 1. Location of Project and Determination of Restitution Order




Figure 2. Details of the Restitution Plan




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


Figure 3. Supervision Options and Sanctions in Lieu of Compliance




TABLE 1. BREAKDOWN OF INITIATIVE PROJECTS BY ORGANIZATIONAL AND CASE MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS

LOCATION OF PROJECT	PERCENT OF PROJECTS	PERCENT OF REFERRALS
Within Court	49	67
Nonprofit	17	16
Other Agency	34	17
	100 (N=75)	100 (N=17,232)
<u>DETERMINATION OF RESTITUTION ORDER</u>		
Project Arranges Mediation Between Victim and Offender	32 (N=75)	6 (N=17,349)
<u>TYPE OF RESTITUTION PLAN</u>		
Monetary Restitution + Community Service	67	11
Monetary Restitution Only	94	49
Unpaid Community Service Only	78	29
Victim Service	53	1
Other	--	11
	(N=83)	(N=17,354)
<u>JOB SUBSIDY</u>		
Subsidy Used	74	25
For at Least 10% of All Project Referrals	63 (N=81)	NA (N=15,427)
<u>AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY KEPT</u>		
None	18	36
1-25%	27	21
25-50%	39	28
50-100%	16 (N=51)	15 (N=3,783)
<u>SOLE SANCTION RESTITUTION</u>		
Sole Sanction Ordered	73	13
For at Least 10% of All Project Referrals	21 (N=81)	NA (N=17,349)
<u>SANCTIONS AVAILABLE IN LIEU OF COMPLIANCE</u>		
Commitment	72	28*
Probation	15	42*
Warnings by Judge & Restitution Personnel	39	NA
Additional Restitution	18	NA
Ordered Back Into Restitution Project	27 (N=81)	NA (N=1,837)

*These percents are for cases which were not in compliance at the time of closure.

TABLE 2. EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND CASE MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS ON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS

LOCATION OF PROJECT	PERCENT SUCCESSFUL	PERCENT UNSUCCESSFUL	NO. OF CASES
Within Court	86.1	13.9	9,034
Nonprofit	87.2	12.8	2,338
Other Agency	84.6	15.4	2,183
	86.0	14.0	13,555
$\chi^2 = 6.50 \text{ df} = 2$ $\alpha < .05$			
<u>MEDIATION BETWEEN VICTIM AND OFFENDER</u>			
No	85.8	14.2	12,721
Yes	89.6	10.4	933
	86.1	13.9	13,654
$\phi = .03 \alpha < .002$			
<u>TYPE OF RESTITUTION ORDERED</u>			
Monetary Restitution + Community Service	85.6	14.4	1,718
Monetary Restitution Only	87.1	12.9	6,993
Unpaid Community Service Only	88.0	12.0	4,410
	87.2	12.8	13,121
$\chi^2 = 6.47 \text{ df} = 2$ $\alpha < .05$			
<u>SUBSIDY</u>			
No	84.5	15.5	9,827
Yes	90.2	9.8	3,827
	86.1	13.9	13,654
$\phi = .07 \alpha < .001$			
<u>AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY KEPT</u>			
None	90.4	9.6	1,318
1-25%	91.0	9.0	733
26-50%	91.3	8.7	1,071
50-100%	88.5	11.5	582
	90.5	9.5	3,704
$\tau_c = .01 \text{ n.s.}$			
<u>SOLE SANCTION RESTITUTION</u>			
No	85.1	14.9	11,530
Yes	94.0	6.0	1,986
	86.4	13.6	13,516
$\phi = .09 \alpha < .001$			

TABLE 3. EFFECT OF ORGANIZED AND CASE MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS ON PROPORTION OF RESTITUTION PAID TO VICTIM

LOCATION OF PROJECT	PROPORTION OF RESTITUTION PAID				NO. OF CASES
	None	1-60%	60-99%	All	
Within Court	6%	7%	4%	83%	8,708
Nonprofit	3	12	8	77	2,265
Other Agency	<u>6</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>2,139</u>
$\chi^2 = 147$ df = 16 $\alpha < .01$	6%	8%	5%	81%	13,112
<u>MEDIATION BETWEEN VICTIM & OFFENDER</u>					
No	6%	8%	5%	81%	12,289
Yes	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>920</u>
$\tau_c = .01$ $\alpha < .002$ $\gamma = .12$	6%	8%	5%	81%	13,209
<u>TYPE OF RESTITUTION ORDERED</u>					
Monetary Restitution + Community Service	4%	17%	13%	67%	1,718
Monetary Restitution Only	6	7	4	84	6,993
Unpaid Community Service Only	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>4,410</u>
$\chi^2 = 471$ df = 6 $\alpha < .001$	6%	8%	5%	81%	13,121
<u>SUBSIDY</u>					
No	8%	8%	4%	80%	9,449
Yes	*	<u>10</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>3,760</u>
$\tau_c = .04$ $\alpha < .001$ $\gamma = .13$	6%	8%	5%	81%	13,209
<u>AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY KEPT</u>					
None	0%	10%	8%	82%	1,321
1-25%	0	10	6	84	740
25-50%	0	8	7	85	1,068
50-100%	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>542</u>
$\tau_c = .01$ n.s. $\gamma = .03$	*	10%	7%	83%	3,671
<u>SOLE SANCTION RESTITUTION</u>					
No	6%	9%	5%	80%	11,224
Yes	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>1,985</u>
$\tau_c = .05$ $\alpha < .001$ $\gamma = .31$	6%	8%	5%	81%	13,209

*Less than 0.5 percent

TABLE 4. EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND CASE MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS ON IN-PROGRAM REOFFENSE RATE

LOCATION OF PROJECT	12-MONTH IN-PROGRAM REOFFENSE RATE	NO. OF CASES
Within Court	16%	9,799
Nonprofit	11%	2,519
Other Agency	10%	<u>2,761</u>
Lee-Desu Statistic = 13.27 df = 2 $\alpha < .01$		15,079
<u>MEDIATION BETWEEN VICTIM AND OFFENDER</u>		
No	14%	14,197
Yes	11%	<u>986</u>
n.s.		15,183
<u>TYPE OF RESTITUTION</u>		
Monetary Restitution + Community Service	17%	1,916
Monetary Restitution Only	14%	7,977
Unpaid Community Service Only	15%	<u>4,649</u>
n.s.		14,542
<u>SUBSIDY</u>		
No	20%	9,508
Yes	24%	<u>3,724</u>
n.s.		13,232
<u>AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY KEPT</u>		
None	24%	1,287
1-25%	22%	718
25-50%	25%	1,057
50-100%	23%	<u>546</u>
Lee-Desu Statistic = 7.08 df = 3 $\alpha < .07$		3,608
<u>SOLE SANCTION RESTITUTION</u>		
No	22%	11,285
Yes	15%	<u>1,947</u>
Lee-Desu Statistic = 4.16 df = 1 $\alpha < .05$		13,232

TABLE 5. MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF RESTITUTION ORDERS USING SELECTED PROGRAM COMPONENT VARIABLES

$$Y = .576 + .082X_1 + .065X_2 + .288X_3 + .251X_4 + .244X_5 + .038X_6 + e$$

(.015) (.008) (.007) (.016) (.015) (.017) (.012)

R = .197

N = 13,654

Y = Completion Status (0=Unsuccessful; 1=Successful)

X₁ = Sole Sanction Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₂ = Subsidy (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₃ = Community Service Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₄ = Monetary Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₅ = Monetary Restitution + Community Service Restitution Combined (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₆ = Face-to-Face Victim-Offender Negotiation (0=No; 1=Yes)

e = Error Term

Location of restitution project (nonprofit or in-court) did not meet the minimum criteria (p = .05) for inclusion into the model.

The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.

TABLE 6. MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL FOR THE PROPORTION OF A RESTITUTION ORDER FINALLY PAID BY YOUTHS, USING SELECTED PROGRAM COMPONENT VARIABLES

$$Y = 89.51 + 8.94X_1 + 6.60X_2 - 8.06X_3 + 3.76X_4 - 5.14X_5 + e$$

(.439) (.603) (.681) (.819) (.959) (.598)

R = .167

N = 13,209

Y = Proportion of a Restitution Order Paid

X₁ = Subsidy (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₂ = Sole Sanction Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₃ = Monetary Restitution + Community Service Restitution Combined (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₄ = Face-to-Face Victim-Offender Negotiation (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₅ = Monetary Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

e = Error Term

Location of restitution project (nonprofit or in-court) and unpaid community service restitution did not meet the minimum criteria (p = .05) for inclusion into the model.

The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.

TABLE 7. MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL FOR IN-PROGRAM REOFFENDING
USING SELECTED PROGRAM COMPONENT VARIABLES

$$Y = -.045 + .029X_1 + .012X_2 + .016X_3 + e$$

(.003) (.007) (.003) (.005)

R = .053

N = 13,232

Y = In-Program Reoffense Rate (Higher Values = Lower Rate)

X₁ = Sole Sanction Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₂ = Nonprofit Restitution Project (0=No; 1=Yes)

X₃ = Unpaid Community Service Restitution (0=No; 1=Yes)

e = Error Term

Face-to-face victim-offender negotiation, monetary restitution, monetary + community service restitution combined, subsidy, and whether the project was located within the court or not did not meet the minimum criteria (p = .05) for inclusion into the model.

The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.

END