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
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Volume I

Guidelines for
the Chief of Police

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ABSTRACT

This project produced a set of operational guidelines for police activities to prevent and control collective violence. The guidelines are based on the techniques and experiences of 14 city police departments and 5 state law enforcement agencies. The guidelines focus on the information required by police for planning, training, operations, and evaluation of both prevention and control measures.

Separate volumes of guidelines were prepared for officers who serve as Chief of Police, Community Relations Personnel, Intelligence Personnel, Patrol Commanders, and Patrol Personnel.

PREFACE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Because of the nature of this project, many individuals were involved in, and contributed to, its success. Mr. George Shollenberger of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration served as the award monitor during the last half of the award period. Mr. Adrian Jones, also of LEAA, served in the capacity during the first half.

A panel of law enforcement specialists selected by LEAA made a much appreciated contribution to the report. They provided a substantive review and criticism of the preliminary draft as well as guidance in adapting the study methods to the needs of the police. The consultants included: Winston Churchill, Chief of Police, Indianapolis; Arthur Grubert, Assistant Chief Inspector, Intelligence Division, New York City Police; John Knox, Chief, Patrol Division West, Los Angeles; Dr. Peter Lejins, Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Maryland; and Colonel Ray Pope, Director, Department of Public Safety for the state of Georgia.

The cooperation of the many police officers in the 14 cities and 6 state police departments visited during the data collection effort is greatly appreciated. Without their cooperation and assistance, this report would not have been possible.

The project team for Operations Research, Inc. (ORI) was headed by Mr. Richard L. Knoblauch, project manager and co-author of this report, and Mr. W. Thomas Callahan, senior author of this report. Dr. Lynn Llewellyn, formerly with ORI, was project manager during the early stages of the project. Administrative support and guidance was provided by Mr. Donald W. Walter, Program Director. Mr. Michael Brown of the ORI technical staff provided assistance in the reorganization and rewriting of the preliminary draft. The authors would particularly like to thank Mrs. Roberta Thompson for her patient assistance in typing and editing the report.

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I. INTRODUCTION

NEED FOR GUIDELINES

While massive civil disorders and violent protest demonstrations have become less frequent in this country over the past year, these and other acts of collective violence continue to threaten public safety and security. Incidents involving ambushes and assaults of police and other public safety personnel, bombings of public and private property, and various types of violent confrontations between police and organized groups persist. This indicates that, while smaller in scope and somewhat less visible, collective violence must continue to be dealt with as a serious national problem. Furthermore, the possibility that massive disturbances will erupt in the future cannot be ignored.

Perhaps the strongest assurance that occurrence of collective violence can be minimized, and that the dangerous effects of such incidents can be reduced rests with the continual improvement of the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. Police departments are increasingly successful in detecting and resolving conflicts before violence erupts, and when it does erupt, in safely containing the situation. The guidelines presented in the volume are intended to strengthen law enforcement agencies in their performance of these tasks.

PURPOSE

The development of these guidelines has been based upon descriptions of prevention and control practices which have already been implemented, and with which some success has already been achieved. The information contained in this volume was obtained from personnel in 14 city police departments and six state law enforcement agencies. Since such a sample does not support

broad generalizations concerning the most appropriate actions to be taken by police across the country, the appropriateness of the guidelines must be judged by each reader based upon his own circumstances and requirements. While some departments and agencies may discover little of value here, it is likely that others will be able to apply these guidelines to their needs for improved planning, training, operations, and evaluation pertinent to their collective violence problems. It should be emphasized that this volume is intended to provoke thoughts and introduce ideas and it in no way intends to stifle initiative.

METHODS OF PREPARATION

The development of these guidelines consisted of five steps.

a. A review was made to identify literature pertinent to topics of collective violence and the police role in prevention and control of CV.

b. A two-day seminar on police methods and organization was held in which four high-ranking police officers and a university professor of criminology—all of national repute—discussed questions of interest to the police regarding CV.

c. A survey of 14 police departments was made in cities with populations between 40,000 and 2,000,000 in the Northeast, Southeast, North Midwest, South Midwest, and Southwest United States; the survey consisted of 120 interviews. Wherever possible, the Chief of Police, intelligence, detective, community relations, patrol and communications personnel were contacted in each city. Although unstructured, the interviews were designed to elicit all information concerning how each department prepared for CV, what actions were taken during CV, and what daily operations were underway to prevent CV. Approximately 190 hours were devoted to interviewing police personnel in the cities.

d. Similar interviews were conducted with members of six state law enforcement agencies to determine how these organizations support local agencies with regard to CV control and prevention. This state agency survey was limited to high ranking officers—a total of 20 nation-wide.

e. A compilation of all descriptions of police decisions and information requirements in support of decision-making culminated in the preparation of the written guidelines which are presented in this document.

BASIC PROPOSITIONS

Certain basic views held by the writers of the guidelines will be observed in the tone and orientation of this volume. These views were developed during the review of the literature at the beginning of the study, and during the interviews which were conducted with police officers. They are listed here to demonstrate that the writers make no pretense of being completely objective.

a. Collective violence is apparently the result of growing tension among groups of communities. The growth of tension can be observed, over a period of time, by police in the performance of their normal duties. Following investigation and analysis of reports and behavior which indicate tension, police can take a number of actions which can serve, in some situations, to prevent violence. Prevention of collective violence in every case, however, is probably not possible.

b. All police officers are decision-makers in the context of their own assignments, and all provide information upon which other officers and unit (precincts, departments, etc.) commanders can base their decisions. The flow of information within law enforcement agencies consists of reports which reflect not only criminal activity but also a wide range of other social conditions including those which may indicate tension.

c. During a CV situation, the primary objective of law enforcement agencies is to end violence and restore order as rapidly as possible, while at the same time minimizing personal injury, property damage, animosity toward police and the likelihood of additional violence.

d. After CV has begun, or when crowds with potential for CV have formed, policemen must achieve their objectives through disciplined teamwork in support of command decisions. As a result, while continuing to maintain law and order to the best of their ability, police may find it necessary to refrain from

making arrests or otherwise enforcing the law when
such actions would break up the team effort or
provide an opportunity for the escalation of violence.
Commanders must make the decisions affecting the
nature of police responses based on their estimate
of each situation, although it may be said that
police efforts should concentrate first on actions
against persons who are endangering life (with
deadly weapons, fire, etc.).

e. Law enforcement and peace-keeping, although they
are the specific duties of police, are general respon-
sibilities of all citizens.

f. Police provide not only law enforcement and peace-
keeping services but a number of their services in
support of public health, welfare, education, sani-
tation, etc. Police may find it useful to increase
these additional services from time to time in order
to decrease tension in the community. Such increased
effort—clearly not a duty of police—may be particularly
effective when other public and private organizations
fail to take action to reduce tension.

g. It should also be emphasized that the writers made
no evaluative judgments of police practices, which
are described herein as "guidelines." Accordingly,
some of the guidelines which are included may be
found unnaceptable to specific readers.

These guidelines assume, furthermore, that in every law enforcement
agency, an individual or individuals fills the roles to be described below. The
titles attached to these roles are intentionally general, and may not exist in
any given department's table of organization. In very large departments, these
roles are divided into more specialized roles. Small law enforcement agencies
may require that one or two officers perform the duties entailed in all of these
roles.

Chief of Police (Sheriff, Colonel, etc.). The commander
and administrator of all law enforcement and peacekeeping
forces in a specific jurisdiction. Also, the Chief is the
law enforcement officer directly responsible to the overall
government administration in the jurisdiction, and the
primary point of contact between his agency and other
public service departments within the same jurisdiction.
The Chief is also the major link with heads of other
law enforcement agencies.

Community Relations Personnel. The police officers whose
primary responsibilities consist of maintaining an accurate
positive image of the police department and police officers
in the minds of citizens, and assisting police in under-
standing the community. They are not involved in law
enforcement activities directly, but support the actions of
other officers by attempting to create an atmosphere in
which police effectiveness will be high. They interact
directly with citizens face-to-face or indirectly through
the mass media. Community relations officers may also
enlist the assistance of other police officers in fostering
and supporting community development and human relations
programs.

Intelligence Personnel. These include officers who are
specifically assigned to the support of decision-making
by gathering, analyzing and disseminating information
pertaining to potential or actual collective violence. These
also include detectives or agents who, in the course of
investigations of criminal offenses other than CV, may
collect information pertaining to CV.

Patrol Commander. This category consists of commanders
of patrol shifts and all police officers who serve as com-
manders of police during crowd control and CV control
operations. It should be noted that no particular rank is
implied by the title "patrol commander."

Patrol Personnel. This group of police officers, for the
purposes of this volume, consists of officers whose pri-
mary duties involve patrol of streets and initial police
response to illegal activity, complaints, or requests for
assistance. Furthermore, this group includes officers
who may not be assigned to patrol except during crowd
control or CV control operations.

Separate guidelines have been prepared for each of these police roles.
Readers of this volume may wish to read the others as well, since the roles of
police in prevention and control of CV clearly overlap. Law enforcement officers
whose duties may extend across several of the roles mentioned above may find
it especially useful to read all of the volumes. Care was taken to state all
guidelines as concisely as possible, in an effort to minimize the size, and thus
facilitate the practical use of each volume.

DISCUSSION OF TERMS

a. Collective Violence—(a) any group activity which
interrupts legal patterns of behavior and causes
property damage or personal injury, or (b) any

activity of an individual or group which interrupts legal patterns of behavior and causes <u>multiple</u> incidents of property damage and personal injury.

b. <u>Groups</u>—Conceivably, any group has the potential of causing or becoming involved in CV. Most police efforts which were observed, however, have been keyed to preventing and controlling violence among the following:

1. <u>Political Activists</u>—persons who demonstrate their belief that the Federal, state, or local government, or a huge range of government policies, should be changed. This group potentially includes all Americans who may choose to exercise the right of assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, this group cuts across all others which are mentioned below, and includes persons who favor or permit violence, although most are committed to non-violent action as a political tactic.

2. <u>Students</u>—Within the general area of campuses, students have protested the administration of their schools and various other political issues. By far, the majority have chosen to be non-violent, but some have employed violent methods including the use of lethal weapons.

3. <u>Urban Minorities</u>—The most striking cases of large-scale street violence has occurred among members of urban minority groups, especially urban blacks. The underlying causes of violence and the incidents which triggered these disturbances have been widely studied by police. Again, only a small percentage of urban minorities were connected with the disorders, and an even smaller number were actively violent.

4. <u>Violent Extremists</u>—Especially in recent years, a number of groups have developed which are openly dedicated to the use of any means, including violence, to achieve their goals. Most of these groups are small in any one community, but they may be linked to similar groups in other areas. They may or may not

have a well articulated political ideology on the far left or far right. They may be of a single race, ethnic or religious group, or a mixture of several. Bombings, ambushes, shoot-outs with police and planned destruction of property are tactics of these groups.

5. <u>Labor Unions</u>—Strikes, especially at very large factories or in the streets continue to present the potential for violence.

6. <u>Gangs</u>—Youth street gangs and motorcycle clubs, especially when rivalries between gangs develop, can generate violence, sometimes over an extended period.

7. <u>Crowds</u>—Persons drawn by various kinds of entertainment such as music concerts or athletic contests have, at times, become violent.

c. <u>Prevention of Collective Violence</u>—Prevention is the result of all actions taken by citizens, including police, in order to

1. Reduce tension among members of the community

2. Neutralize the influence of persons or groups who have expressed or demonstrated an inclination towards violence

3. Abort the planned violent activities of persons or groups

4. Protect, pacify or disperse crowds which may generate violence

5. Avoid triggering violence by intentional or inadvertant abuse of police authority.

d. <u>Control of Collective Violence</u>—Control is the result of all actions taken by citizens, especially police, in order to

1. Limit the geographical area and the number of persons affected by CV

2. Disperse violent groups

3. Minimize personal injury and property damage

4. Restore the rule of law and the value of order

5. Minimize the probability of the recurrence of CV.

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Police officers gather information on events and trends in the community on a continual basis. Such information, if it has any significance for CV at all, will be applicable to both prevention and control, since police act in a "preventive" capacity even when they are "controlling" a full-scale CV incident. Furthermore, intelligence produced during control operations may be used in preventing future outbreaks of violence. Why, then, is it useful to separate pevention from control at all? The answer focuses on the context in which police operations occur as is described by the following observations:

- Prevention activities are extremely valuable if effective, since control activities presume that some personal injury or property damage is occurring

- Prevention activities include all police actions accomplished in the course of normal police operations

- Prevention operations may address long-run community problems, while control operations focus on one short-run problem—violence—and the need for restoring order

- Many elements of information gathered during times when the local jurisdiction is quiet can be used to plan in advance for control operations

- Control operations require extensive planning and a high level of training

- Control operations demand disciplined, coordinated efforts of police officers working as a team

- Control operations occur in an atmosphere of pressure which magnifies the necessity for rapid gathering, processing and dissemination of intelligence, efficient communication and pre-planned command and control procedures.

Having stated these primary differences between prevention and control operations, it is now appropriate to discuss both types of activities, including their similarities and differences in terms of the elements of information required to support them.

Locations of CV

General Locations. Police know from long experience the general neighborhoods that have presented the threat of CV in the past. Through constant monitoring and analysis of tension indicators (i.e., public opinion and social and economic conditions), police can identify other potentially troublesome areas.

The relationship of likely CV areas to the entire jurisdiction must also be considered. An incident of CV in a small area, for example, may affect traffic flows in a much larger area of the jurisdiction. Furthermore, the whole jurisdiction must be considered in terms of its closeness to other jurisdictions where persons known to favor violence reside. Clearly, then, police planning and action relative to CV control must extend beyond the boundaries of the areas in which violence actually occurs.

Particular Locations. Within the neighborhoods which present a general threat of CV, certain locations may be identified as important. These places may be considered as three types.

- Areas where crowds are regularly present. Taverns, pool halls, threatres, housing projects, college student unions. These areas commonly attract large numbers of people for recreation and other social functions. The potential for CV increases, especially when criminal operatives, political dissidents, youth gangs and juveniles frequent these places.

- Areas when crowds assemble less often. Public parks, government building, college quadrangles, business establishments (such as banks and factories), sports stadiums and open fields are sometimes centers of social and political activity. Political demonstrations and protests, labor picketing, and "rock concerts" usually occur at or near these places.

- Areas which may become targets of CV. Police can identify potential targets, primarily through intelligence activities, but sometimes from public announcements from dissidents themselves. Government buildings (especially defense facilities), police stations, public utilities, etc., have been targets. After widespread CV has broken out, liquor, grocery, clothing, appliance and furniture stores may become targets.

Location Characteristics. Police also consider the ways that the characteristics of locations affect control operations. Each neighborhood will present a number of hiding places for persons and weapons and perches for snipers, and some buildings may affect radio transmissions.

Reasons for CV

Historical trends, the social and economic environment, the physical environment and competition for leadership contribute to increasing the potential for CV.

Historical Trends. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, Indian-Americans, Orientals, and other minorities are attempting as groups to make social and economic progress. They raise the level of tension among their own group by recalling their heritage as victims of persecution and oppression.

Although many people agree that minority groups should seek social and economic improvement, many also disagree with the way in which the minority groups work. Individuals and groups take action to oppose the minority group movements. They often use racial or ethnic stereotypes to fortify their opposition to the emerging minority groups. These stereotypes and the actions taken by the opposition groups raise the level of tension further and increase the potential for violence.

A third important historical trend is the fact that police departments are improving in many ways, but the attitudes of people toward police is changing less rapidly. In some areas, among some groups, the police of today represent all the mistakes which police have made in the past.

Social and Economic Environment. In urban areas, people often feel and are victimized by merchants, politicians and police. Especially in slum areas, the whole "system" seems to prey on the people. Poverty brings ignorance and illness—which breed more poverty. All kinds of criminals—drug pushers, robbers, burglars, loan sharks, extortionists, pimps, con men, etc.—all seem to thrive in the poor areas. The merchants are endangered by crime and bad debts, so they raise prices and anger more citizens. The politicians promise rapid social changes, but they seldom deliver. The police seem to bring trouble when they do their job of enforcing the law, but they never seem to enforce the law enough to protect citizens from crime.

On college campuses, the social and economic view is brighter, but the potential for violence can be just as great. Unlike a community, a college population is a very select group. Everyone is young, wanting to have fun, wanting to impress each other, wanting to find a way to make a living and possibly improve society. They want to assert their independence from parents and from other authorities. They want to demonstrate that they have their own ideas, their own interests, their own "life style."

As S. I. Hayakawa, President of San Francisco State College, has pointed out, college students are very good with words. Ability with words got them into college in the first place. Words enabled them to score high marks on high school tests and entrance exams. At college, students learn about life mostly through words—in books, in classrooms, in rap sessions, in rallies. Soldiers know about war and its horror because they have seen it in terms of jungle, rain, bullets and blood. Students see the same things—in words. Poor people know about poverty because they have felt hunger and sickness. They may have seen rats in the kitchen and muggings in the street. Students know these things exist—because they read about them. Police have witnessed crimes and have interviewed criminals. Students read the newspaper reports of crime. In each case, students are at a great disadvantage, because events like war, poverty and crime are complex, while words are simple. Consequently, students can gain real knowledge of events without necessarily facing all the difficulties which these events really entail. This is one reason why students are very good at discussing social problems, less good at providing solutions.

The combination of group pressures, youthful enthusiasm, growing knowledge and social impatience can increase the potential for violent action among students. The potential is increased even more when a large number of students on a campus are away from home. If they were arrested in their home towns, they would bring community disgrace on themselves and their families. The campus, on the other hand, may be far away from this social pressure. After college years, students will probably have relatively little contact with the university or the town. Accordingly, students from out-of-town are more willing to participate in potentially violent protests.

Physical Environment. A number of aspects of the physical environment also tend to raise the potential for CV. Apparently unequal public services can cause citizens, especially taxpayers, to become angry. In many areas, citizens are disturbed by the quality of street maintenance, trash collection, fire protection, police services, public transportation and recreation. Especially among tenants in low-income housing areas, dissatisfaction with public enforcement of building codes is deep and vocal. Failure of these public services gives residents the impression that society has physically isolated them in a holding camp for second-rate citizens.

Other aspects of the physical surroundings also increase tension. Crowding and abandoned buildings where rats breed and criminals hide sometimes lead people to think of themselves as helpless victims of "the system." When these physical conditions are removed by "urban renewal," the local environment actually becomes worse, at least temporarily. The demolition and re-construction of buildings, or the construction of highways and rapid transit facilities further disrupts the area, often without consideration of area residents. When new facilities, such as super-highways or

railways are completed, they become boundaries between communities. Those "on the other side of the tracks" may be depressed or feared. All of these physical conditions extend the potential for violent actions by residents.

Leadership Competition. The existence of organized political groups does not itself increase the potential for violence. Many groups and their leaders utterly oppose violence. But whenever an extremist group which advocates or condones violence emerges, competition for political leadership begins. The end result may be an increase in the potential for violence among all concerned.

Each group leader seeks political advantage by attracting as much attention as possible. In order to compete with other leaders, politicians tend to make hard, striking, and even outrageous statements which will be spread by the mass media and by word of mouth. These statements, even if completely non-violent, often create tension because they usually promise things which make current society look dismal.

When extremists enter the picture, the whole competition changes. They may actually advocate, incite, or perpetrate violence against society. Even if they only threaten violence repeatedly, they may be eventually forced, to take violent action. Otherwise, they may look foolish before their supporters, and their leadership status may be eroded.

During the control phase of CV operations, police have little opportunity to consider or influence the underlying reasons for violence. Police may be able to assist, however, in establishing meetings between community leaders who can reduce violence and government officials who can directly affect the conditions which led to violence. Furthermore, the fairness with which police control violence will affect the basic feelings of citizens toward police and society in the future.

Information must be collected even while violence is occurring to determining the reasons for continued violent action. The following paragraphs describe some of the reasons for the persistince of violent disturbances which have been reported by police.

    a. An organized group, devoted to violence for its own sake or as an acceptable political tactic, is encouraging the continuation of the incident.

    b. An organized group, devoted to a political or social change, is encouraging violence in the belief that it will further their cause.

    c. Rumors are creating continuing tension.

    d. Persons or groups believe that cases of apparent police misconduct will go unnoticed or unpunished and that "the people" must take their own revenge.

    e. The general violence itself provides a mask for personal violent behavior which in "normal" times is prohibited by the customs and social pressures of the community.

    f. Opportunities for looting or "rip-offs" encourage individuals to take advantage of the situation.

Time Considerations in CV

Collective violence can occur at any time, but police experience has shown that the potential for violence increases at the following times.

    a. On Weekends. Time off from work means that people are free to gather in the streets. Since paydays are often on Fridays, many people have a surplus of cash on weekends. Weekend evenings are traditional times for drinking and recreation for many people. This leads to crowds, police involvement with traffic and other illegal actions, and perhaps, carless behavior by people "having fun."

    b. During Hours of Darkness. Darkness provides a mask for vandals and persons intent on violent crimes such as arson to hide behind. People can shout at police, throw bottles and rocks or break into store fronts much more easily in the dark than during daylight hours. Crowds partially obscure the identities of individuals. At night, persons in a large group become almost anonymous.

    c. After the Public Arrest (especially when physical coercion is necessary) of a Member of the Community. This may lead from charges of police brutality, to the formation of crowds, and finally to violence.

    d. After or During Collective Violence in Other Areas of the City or Country. Most experts believe that the city riots of the 1960's were partially contagious. When dissident citizens of one city saw riots occurring elsewhere, they started "sympathy" demonstrations or riots in their own area. The best example of this kind of behavior was the widespread violence which followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968.

e. **After or During Local, National or International Events in Which Groups Have a Clear Interest.** Spectacular incidents other than collective violence may become the occasion for CV. The treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, the United States incursion into Cambodia and other events have produced a collectively violent response among some groups. Such events are of great concern to many people, and consequently they receive extensive coverage in the media. Certain groups, such as militant American Jews or militant students may respond to these incidents with violence or with mass action which increases the potential for violence.

f. **After or During Political Meetings or Demonstrations.** Although they have been less frequent recently, mass political meetings and demonstrations are part of American life, and in most cases are non-violent.

The time of an outbreak can also have important effects on CV control efforts. Nightfall, rush hour traffic, convention or spectator crowds, groups of people leaving taverns at closing times—all of these exert extra pressures on police if violence breaks out at these times.

During the control phase, the most important aspect of time involves the rapidity with which police move from their normal operations, which emphasize individual decisiveness, to a CV control mode, which stresses disciplined, coordinated team effort.

The changeover to control operations is somewhat aided by the tendency of CV outbreaks to develop over a period of time. Prevention operations provide much information upon which decisions can be based during the control phase. Even the "triggering event" in a CV situation sometimes precedes overt violence by hours or even days. In the period between the first clear indication of violence and a large-scale outbreak, police can begin to execute control plans while intensifying preventive efforts as well.

Persons Involved in CV

The members of the community who are involved in CV and are of interest to law enforcement agencies include both those who are participating and those who are opposing the violence.

Participants in CV. The persons who may produce or participate in violence are listed here based on the level of their probable threat, and are described by the behavior which may indicate their potential danger.

- Persons may come to the area from outside for the purpose of confronting the police in the streets or for the purpose of committing another illegal act such as a bombing.

- Local groups may advocate violence and death for police, especially when these groups are fighting within themselves. Such groups are generally involved with isolated bombings and killings. They participate in mass violence only when the costs to them are low and the benefits high.

- Local individuals may have demonstrated animosity toward police or society and seek public support for their position.

- Ambitious political activists may attempt to gather large crowds in order to attract attention to their cause or to themselves.

- Juvenile gang leaders and members may try to draw attention to themselves.

- Group leaders may become convinced that collective violence is the correct way or at least an acceptable way to achieve benefits for the group. These leaders may hold their position of leadership because of their material wealth in the midst of poverty, because they have achieved material success in the past or simply because they can act effectively as spokesmen for their groups (they need not be clergymen, club presidents or student body officers). They may even be involved in gambling, prostitution or more serious crimes and are leaders because they have expressed interest in group advancement. The group they represent may be as large as a whole race or class, or simply the "regulars" at the tavern or pool hall.

- Any other person may decide that his background and beliefs do not prohibit collective violence for the sake of personal or supposed community gain.

Opponents of CV. Since the prevention of CV is a relatively long-run effort, many citizens can be recruited by police to support programs that will reduce tension in the community.

Any person who has a clear interest in preserving the community or in frustrating those who seek violence can help. Even criminal operatives and political extremists may help to prevent violence if they can see that peace, at least temporarily, is in their best interests. More often, assistance to police in preventing CV will come from community action leaders, local businessmen, religious leaders, youth groups, and administrators of health, welfare, housing and education programs. Representatives of the mass media can also be very helpful.

During the control phase, police must determine who has actually become involved in participating in CV. These persons will include all those who have fostered, planned or committed acts of violence—perhaps to achieve a goal—and other citizens who have joined in the violence for their own reasons.

Groups and individuals must be identified, as well as their addresses and vehicles. The number of persons who are participating must also be estimated since police employ formations and tactics which are suited to crowd size. The number of participants will also indicate whether reserve forces should be readied or deployed.

An accurate assessment of who is involved may be hindered by two factors.

    a. The sudden, apparently unorganized nature of many large civil disorders may disguise the characteristics of the groups and individuals involved.

    b. Police may encounter difficulty in attempts to infiltrate groups who advocate violence; even though such infiltration may be necessary for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the triggering and sustaining of civil disorders. Infiltration is considered the single most effective way to determine who is involved in a violent event.

Assistance for police control operations is likely to come first from individuals or groups who attempted to help police in preventing CV. In some localities, active community relations boards—with many contacts in the community—have supplemented the police in taking rapid action to effectively control efforts. Members of such boards as well as other citizens can be asked to help, if circumstances permit, by taking direct action, especially in rumor control and other community relations efforts. It should be emphasized that the use of community resources can serve to prevent unfounded accusations of arbitrary police action or police brutality following the CV incident.

Types of CV Events

CV events and events which have been included in CV in the past consist of bombings, ambushes, shoot-outs, demonstrations, strikes and crowds. After any of these events has produced widespread violence or other illegal activity, they may be referred to as riots or mobs. It should be stressed that many demonstrations, strikes and crowds are completely legal gatherings in which police activity is devoted both to the protection of life and property and the guarantee of rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, these events should not be viewed beforehand as essentially violent, although each should be reviewed in terms of its potential for causing or providing the setting for violent activity.

Bombings may be the result of conspiracies, although some have been carried out by individuals. Bombings and ambushes usually require extensive planning and secrecy. Shoot-outs appear to be the result of general plans which can be enacted at any time, usually against police.

Demonstrations vary greatly in size and are organized in support or protest of government or institutional policies. Although most demonstrations are legal and intended to be peaceful, violence may develop within them on a small- or large-scale. Some demonstrations, furthermore, are essentially illegal, such as traffic disruption or the occupation of public or private buildings. A very small number of demonstrations have been not only illegal, but intentionally violent.

Strikes have the same characteristics as demonstrations, except that they are undertaken by persons who are very well organized (over many years, perhaps) and usually involve action of specific labor groups against specific business organizations or public service agencies.

Crowds vary greatly in size and usually are disorganized. Violence in crowds is usually not planned, and is small-scale, although it may grow.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

Actions which are most likely to require police action are listed in the following paragraphs in the order of their urgency.

Planned violence may be organized by individuals or groups against persons or property, especially against groups of persons. The bombing or burning of buildings, ambushes and ritual murders can be considered in this category which takes first priority for police preventive action.

Planned confrontations with police or confrontations with groups of citizens may occur. These will require police action to restore traffic flow or public order.

Spontaneous formation of groups of citizens to protest police action may follow public arrests. Whether the police action was correct or mistaken, crowds may react violently. Thus, in every case when arrests or other police work leads to spontaneous confrontation between police and groups, prompt action is required to prevent violence.

Crowds may grow or move beyond the limits of police capability to protect lives and property. This requires direct intervention by police to provide for orderly crowd growth and direct movement. When police intervention occurs, a confrontation between citizens and police can develop, and violence may result.

Violent reaction to the words of speakers or violent acts incited by speakers may occur at meetings and rallies. Potentially inflammatory speech, although protected from abridgment by the First Amendment, is reason for police to prepare to take action to prevent violence.

Tension may grow within a group in a place where potential for violence is high. This may occur, for example when performers fail to appear for concerts, and at athletic contests which excite feelings of participants.

If violence actually begins to occur, a virtually limitless number of different violent acts may be performed. Some of the most significant actions which have been reported by police include those in the following list.

- Threats to life are posed by snipers, arsonists, and persons with incendiary and explosive bombs.

- Fire and explosive also threaten real property.

- Rioters attempt to destroy police vehicles with fire or other means.

- Violent persons throw a wide variety of missiles at police and other passers by, both in vehicles and on foot.

- Large or small groups attempt to break through police lines by force.

- Barricades are built to hinder traffic flow and to conceal and cover persons who are throwing missiles or sniping.

- Vandals break windows and may attempt to loot retail business stores or warehouses.

- Non-violent militants illegally block streets and building entrances or occupy buildings or offices. Although these acts are not violent in themselves, violence often results when police attempt to remove these persons who are breaking the law.

OUTLINE OF THE REMAINDER OF THIS VOLUME

Chapter II consists of introductory notes for the personnel for whom the volume was prepared. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI are entitled Planning, Training, Operations, and Evaluation, respectively. Relative to each of these activities, each chapter discusses the information which police require in support of decisions regarding both prevention and control of CV. Within each chapter, prevention and control guidelines are listed separately. Prevention and control guidelines are further broken down into categories based upon six essential intelligence elements:

- Locations of CV

- Reasons for CV

- Time Considerations in CV

- Persons Involved in CV

- Types of CV Events, and

- Ways in Which CV Occurs.

A similar format has been used in all the volumes of this series: Volume I, Chief of Police; Volume II, Community Relations Personnel; Volume III, Intelligence Personnel; Volume IV, Patrol Commander; and Volume V, Patrol Personnel.

II. INTRODUCTORY NOTES FOR THE CHIEF OF POLICE

In the course of the discussions concerning collective violence which provided the basis for this volume, police officers often repeated several themes regarding the role of the Chief of Police. All of these themes are related to the Chief's position as the leader and planner of his own department's activities, and as the primary representative of the department in dealing with government executives, other law enforcement agencies, citizen groups and individual citizens.

The Chief of Police must actively support, over an extended period, perhaps, any new police programs which are designed to prevent or control CV.

Some police mentioned that the whole subject of collective violence has helped to create confusion among police officers about how the law is to be enforced and the peace maintained. Many departments are instituting new specialized units, training programs, new equipment and new patrol procedures to attempt to deal with the potential for CV. Many of these innovations are sometimes difficult to fit into the practices of police work to which experienced officers have become accustomed. Some officers may see CV as simply an extension of their daily law enforcement activities, and any attempt to treat CV as a special problem a waste of time. In such an atmosphere, the Chief of Police may be required to "campaign" for the new practices over an extended period of time. In some departments, active community relations programs, specialized intelligence units, internal review units and various kinds of advanced human relations training have required special support from the Chief.

The Chief must also defend his innovations to the general public. Citizen groups of various kinds have opposed many of the innovations which police have adopted to deal more effectively with CV. Intelligence operations, Tactical Patrol Forces (TPF), and community relations units have been criticized, and Chiefs of Police, in conjunction with government executives have been required to defend the new practices.

Planning for control operations must be initiated and supervised by the Chief of Police. As will be noted on the following pages, many police believe that a written plan and manual, periodically updated, is essential if police are to achieve high levels of effectiveness in controlling CV. The generation of such planning documents will require active participation by the Chief.

The importance of the Chief is magnified by his role as coordinator of mutual aid activities with other law enforcement agencies in planning for emergency operations. Every law enforcement agency contacted during the preparation of this volume expressed a desire for greater coordination of emergency activities. The need for mutual action is particularly great in those areas where a large number of law enforcement agencies operate in a relatively small geographical area, or where one department, such as a college campus police force, operates entirely within the jurisdiction of another force.

Several departments agreed, furthermore, that for the present, the problem of CV seems to have changed from large-scale street disorders to carefully planned, well-executed, conspiratorial attacks on police, other citizens or property. In this context, the Chief of Police may increase intelligence efforts within the department by establishing a separate intelligence unit which will serve as the hub into which and from which all information regarding CV will flow.

The Chief must also play an important role in supporting the actions of community groups who are attempting to improve adverse conditions within the jurisdiction. In some localities, Chambers of Commerce, large Community Relations Boards, church organizations, etc., are expanding efforts to improve the social, economic and physical environment of towns and cities. In every jurisdiction, the participation of the Chief of Police in these programs may increase their effectiveness and enhance the reputation of the police department.

The training of police officers in the prevention and control of CV was also a general concern of the departments which were contacted. The Chief of Police must provide such training within the limitations of the department budget. At the same time, the number of officers available for training will be limited by the need for most officers to be actively involved in law-enforcement and peace-keeping activities. Accordingly, the Chief of Police must develop creative approaches to the planning and funding of training programs.

III. PLANNING

Planning for prevention consists of all analyses and decisions undertaken by police to prepare operations which will reduce tension among normally non-violent persons and to interrupt the potentially violent activities of persons who see violence as necessary or acceptable. Planning efforts include identification of needs, organization of action groups, formulation of prevention strategies, generation of tactics, selection and purchase of equipment and materials, and recruitment and training of personnel. Specific CV planning supplements a variety of police general orders, regulations and procedures which are inherent in routine police operations.

Planning for control includes all of the steps of planning for prevention, but is oriented toward preparing operations to restore order rapidly and to decrease the likelihood of further violence. Planning for control emphasizes the development of standard procedures which can be exercised swiftly and coordinated effectively. A recommended product of planning for control is an Emergency Operations Manual which prescribes Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Command and Control practices to be used during violent incidents. This manual is supported by all other police planning documents and procedures which are used by police during periods when CV is not occurring.

PLANNING FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1.   Identify all areas of the jurisdiction where the crime rate is high, where political dissidents or youth gangs congregate, and where political demonstrations are commonly held. These will vary from town to town. Members of the force will usually know these places, based upon their experience.

2.   Require of community relations, intelligence, and patrol command personnel a best estimate of the political, social and economic problems that contribute to the general potential for violence in these areas.

3.   After the problems have been estimated, decide which of them can be partially solved by police action.

4.   Develop an overall area-by-area plan for arranging police activities to decrease the political, economic and social potential of violence. Concentrate first on training the police to provide the most professional service to all areas of the jurisdiction. This task, although obvious, is not easy. Many citizens have great prejudices against police and serve as antagonists to police work even when it is highly·professional. At the same time, some policemen have prejudices based on racial or social stereotypes. Police prejudice can discount the professionalism of police service. Only a concentrated effort over a long period can reduce prejudice, especially when the daily relationships between police and citizens are unpleasant or even dangerous.

5.   Allocate specially trained personnel and other special resources to the areas that most need help. Make known to the government of the jurisdiction that more and/or better resources are needed, e.g., better trash pick-up, street cleaning, weed cutting in vacant lots, etc.

Reasons for CV Potential

7.   A policeman was heard to say, "The police have no problems. Society has problems and demands that police solve all of them." Although it is patently unfair for society to lay such a burden on police, think of the jurisdiction in terms of all of its problems, even those that cannot be addressed by by police. Relate each of the problems to the potential for violence.

8.   The problems of each jurisdiction are unique, but those which are most widespread in the United States are: racism and ethnic prejudice, poverty, housing, crime, political and social dissension. Review the characteristics of the jurisdiction to determine which of these or other problems are important locally, and how they may tend to cause collective violence in the future.

9.   Designate the problems, beginning with crime and equality of law enforcement, that police can address directly.

10.   Devise a plan for reducing racial, ethnic or youth group prejudices existing within the police force. Include hiring of police from minority groups if possible.

11.   Identify the problems, from a long-run viewpoint, that police can help to solve. Identify other organizations who are seeking solutions to those problems and offer police assistance.

12.   Organize, if none already exists, a police community relations program to coordinate police efforts in solving social problems.

13.   After viewing the problems of the jurisdiction, consider the probable effect of nationwide social trends on the local community. Does the community have any facility, such as a campus or military base, which might attract outsiders devoted to organizing protests? Does any labor-management problem exist which could attract national attention of outside groups? Police will not desire to limit the lawful entry of these outsiders into the community, but a plan for dealing with them once they have arrived should be considered.

Time When CV May Occur

14.   Outline a yearly calendar of events which have historically presented a potential collective violence problem to the jurisdiction, or which might present such a problem in the future. This calendar can be used to plan intelligence operations and patrol manning schedules far in advance of these recurring events.

15.   Assign the task of anticipating CV problems to community relations and intelligence personnel.

16.   Contact other community leaders and point out to them that their planned events, if occurring during a time of tension, may increase the potential for CV. Ask their cooperation in adapting their schedules as much as possible to the needs of public order.

Persons Who May be Involved in CV

17.   Require that community relations and intelligence personnel compile as complete a list as possible of the important groups and individuals who have the potential for contributing to violence.

18.   Compile a list of all members of the community who exercise leadership. Determine which of these is likely to help or hinder police efforts to prevent violence.

19.   Require that intelligence personnel develop a plan for coordinating investigations of potentially violent persons with other local law enforcement agencies—municipal, county, state, and Federal. This coordinating task may require the full support and cooperation of the Chief. Investigations often present coordination problems, and the various agencies may develop jealousies which will impede the flow of information.

20.   Develop a plan for contacting, in priority order, the important persons outside the department when the potential for violence increases. The government executive of the jurisdiction—major, city manager, county executive or governor—must be included. Municipal, campus, county and state law enforcement agencies must also be on the list. Local or state National Guard liaison officers should be included. Hold periodic conferences to assess the practicality of these procedures for notification of key individuals.

21.   Prepare another list of community leaders whose assistance can be enlisted when the potential for violence increases. The priorities for contacting these people will vary with the situation. If student violence seems to be impending, the superintendent of schools or the president of a college will be an important contact as well as student leaders who may be able to moderate the situation. If urban violence appears to be developing, community action leaders or youth group leaders may be most crucial. Police community relations personnel can assist in preparing the list.

22.   Set up a procedure to be followed for organizing a crisis conference whenever violence is threatened (or occurs). At the first level, the conference should be internal—the Chief, intelligence, community relations and tactical patrol force personnel (if any), other patrol commanders, and the communications chief. This conference should meet whenever any incident with either potential or real implications of violence occurs. It should reconvene periodically until the issue is resolved.

At the second level, the conference should also include a representative of the pertinent government administration to plan responses (if any) to the grievances of dissidents. At this meeting, the Chief, community relations and intelligence personnel may present their reports, especially reports of meetings with dissidents.

The third level conference occurs only when the Chief decides that other law enforcement agencies will be required to prevent (or control) violence. This conference will include the Chief and his staff, and liaison officers from other law enforcement agencies with responsibilities in the jurisdiction. This conference should review all intelligence concerning the developing incidents (information on who, where, why, when, what and how), and should also review standard procedures and make specific plans for dealing with the incident.

Plans for calling each of these conferences should be prepared and approved by all parties concerned before any trouble arises.

Events Which May Lead to CV

23.   Require that intelligence personnel devise a plan for detecting planned violence or planned confrontations with police. This necessitates the recruitment, training, and handling of undercover agents and/or the development of informants among members of dangerous groups.

24.   Devise a plan for training officers to deal with the buildup of group tension at scenes of arrests or at rallies, demonstrations, entertainments and other events which are intended to be peaceful and orderly.

25.   Provide or obtain training in crowd control for all officers, or as many as possible given the budget constraints of your jurisdiction.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

26.   Devise a plan for coordinating patrol, intelligence, and crime analysis functions to estimate what tactics and weapons are available to persons or groups felt to have an inclination toward violence.

PLANNING FOR CONTROL

Although many of the prevention guidelines (above) are clearly applicable to control planning as well, the following discussion specifically oriented to control planning should be considered.

Planning for control consists primarily of three major steps: (1) the development of a set of written operational procedures for use by the local department during crowd control and CV (these written procedures will be referred to as the Emergency Operations Manual and Plan); (2) the institution of a mutual aid arrangement with other nearby law enforcement agencies; and (3) the design of a centralized, well equipped command center. Many police departments have achieved success with these three steps.

A discussion of the procedures to follow in preparing an Emergency Operations Manual or "ready book" is beyond the scope of this report, although the guidelines support such a manual. The preparation of a manual is described well elsewhere:

- *Civil Disturbances and Disasters*, Department of the Army, FM 19-15, March 1968.

- *Staff Organization and Procedures*, Department of the Army, FM 101-5, June 1968.

- *Civil Disturbance Orientation Course Material*, Department of the Army, the Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.

- *Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning*, Smith and Kobetz.

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) should be a secure, centrally located facility from which the commander of local or overall mutual aid forces can provide effective direction for all personnel. The EOC should include a situation map, a communication center, an operations center, an intelligence center, briefing rooms and offices. Arrangements must be made to provide space for any National Guard or other state officers who may establish headquarters. Fuller's discussions of the EOC is included in the publications cited above concerning the Emergency Operations Manual.

The mutual aid plan will now be discussed as a separate topic.

The Mutual Aid Plan

27.   Make sure that the list of agencies and individuals to be contacted during a civil disorder is continuously revised and updated. In some jurisdictions, people who should be contacted include the Mayor's office, local military bases, the FBI, utility companies, sanitation department, state and local disaster offices, medical facilities, fire companies, and representatives from adjacent communities. When banks have been targets of violence, they should be alerted.

28.   In a mutual aid situation, the person with local command responsibility should make every effort to identify specific missions for assisting law enforcement units. Whenever possible, let local police handle crowd control duties. Assign traffic control, perimeter control, and reserve missions to outside groups. You know what the capabilities of your men are; you don't know what to expect of outside units. Citizens will often respond more favorably to local police—men they know.

29.   The importance of knowing who has the responsibility for directing disorder control operations cannot be overstressed. This becomes even more important in small towns—responsibility must be designated in advance. Where this was not done in the past, jurisdictional disputes seriously hampered police effectiveness.

30.   Small towns can develop very effective tactical squads, even with as few as five men. Often, larger jurisdictions are willing to assist in providing training for such a squad and should be approached with requests for training.

31.   Plans for mutual aid should include procedures for whom to call and how to call. In some jurisdictions it is not possible to call for mutual aid before local resources have been committed. One rule of thumb is that local resources are considered exhausted after 50% have been used.

32.   Good mutual aid depends on cooperative intelligence acitivities, an established communications system, and sound procedures for solving logistical problems including a central supply location and stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, and other critical items.

33.   Plans for mutual aid should also consider whether or not geographical zones used by local law enforcement units are the same as those used by state agencies. Are good maps available of the area? Is the scale sufficiently large to be useful? Is the type of map projection (or grid coordinates) the same for adjacent units? Are the same maps used by local and state agencies including the National Guard? Are overlapping radio bands available for emergency situations?

34.   Another requirement for mutual aid is that specific procedures for entering campuses to quell CV should be worked out well in advance with college officials. Some law enforcement units will not act without a written request from specific college officials. Other jurisdictions have tried to make sure that there is only one person, either the head of campus security or the school president, who must be contacted when quick decisions are required. Know who to contact on campus and which college officials must call for assistance.

35.   If possible, law enforcement agencies operating in the same or adjacent communities in a mutual aid force should use a "common language". Initials such as APC, EOC should mean the same to all groups concerned. Common codes, particularly emergency codes (e.g., "1033") would avoid much initial confusion. The common code must be disseminated to all mutual aid units and any necessary training provided.

36.   In planning for mass disturbances, don't overlook such things as VIP security measures, the prevention of sabotage to police vehicles, and the protection of police installations. Know the statutes that might be invoked.

Locations of CV

37.   Locate all areas where CV control may be needed within the local juris-
diction. Considering these areas, be certain that all plans include police
staging areas, field command posts, and other tactical operation centers
that are convenient to each area.

Reasons for CV

38.   Assign an officer or team to receive and investigate all reports of police
brutality or misconduct during CV. The very fact that this assignment has
been made will reassure the citizenry that police are concerned with their
own behavior.

39.   Develop procedures for creating a rumor control center to be in full oper-
ation during the threat or actual outbreak of a CV episode. Rumor control may
be carried out with the help of private citizens or groups.

40.   Develop good relationships with the news media. If CV erupts, you can
enlist the news media to avoid spreading rumors or concentrating on sensa-
tional accounts of police control action. Police operations, even when
appropriate and proper, may seem brutal or inhumane when dissected from the
situation by a television camera. Individuals, increased by the coverage,
may join in the CV activities and make the outbreak more difficult to control.

Time Considerations in CV

41.   Curfews are a powerful tool for stopping large scale collective violence.
Procedures for announcing a curfew should be carefully through through in
advance. Things to be considered include how and when the curfew should
be announced, the period the curfew should be in effect, whether or not
sufficient force is available to enforce the curfew without mutual aid, the
procedures for notifying authorized individuals and what sort of proper iden-
tification which police may require before giving citizens permission to be
in a particular area during curfew.

Work out the necessary procedures for enacting curfews in several steps
of strictness. The first stage of the curfew might be used when a situation
is threatening. A more stringent stage would be appropriate once CV has
erupted. Often local ordinances must be checked (and in some cases, changed)
to assure that curfew procedures are legally acceptable. Remember that a
curfew imposed in hot weather confines people to hot buildings. This may
produce resentment and anger and lend support to violent groups.

42.   In certain sections of the country, procedures should be developed to
handle the looting/CV that may follow a hurricane, tornado, or other natural
disaster.

43.   An increase in opportunities for CV activity is likely during weekends.
It is important to control CV episodes before the weekend so that additional
activity will be discouraged.

44.   Develop procedures for requesting the governor to call out the National
Guard. If such procedures are not ready, requests for assistance can be
time consuming. In some cases, a change in local or state legislature may
be needed.

45.   Develop procedures for activating all command level personnel and
alerting all other personnel rapidly.

46.   Recognize that some time usually exists for planning for control of each
kind of CV. Actions that might lead to CV take time to develop. Activists
must plan large demonstrations well in advance. Civil disobedience and
other acts designed to confront police must also be announced well ahead
of the action itself, in order to attract a massive number of people. Planned
activities such as political bombings or assassinations, although often
carried out completely clandestinely, can take considerable time. Even
violent reactions to police work may take several hours or days to develop,
although others may seem to explode without warning.

The significance of these periods is that a vigilant police force can often
detect indications of potential CV with at least some time for planning. All
indications must not be overlooked or discounted until adequate investigation
has confirmed that violence is unlikely.

Persons Involved in CV

47.   Determine who in the community is likely to join in attempting to control
CV. Require a list of names, addresses and phone numbers of these citizens.
This list should be periodically revised and updated. Plan to have these in-
dividuals contacted if they or their group are not participating in violence to
request help in controlling the outbreak. Contacting them is an important
gesture of recognition of their position in the community.

48.   When police react against collective violence, the identity of individual
officers should be retained. Nameplates and badges should be worn so the
individual officer can be held accountable for his actions. Try to avoid
alienating the community—this is very important in decreasing the chances
of future confrontations. Legitimate complaints against the police should
be investigated and adjudicated.

49. Mass arrests (or individual arrests made in large numbers) require careful and thorough pre-planning. Some of the things which must be considered include the following.

- Participants must be informed of their legal and constitutional rights.

- Use field arrest forms if available.

- Photograph circumstances of arrest because visual evidence appeals to juries. Show area of arrest and weapons connected with suspect. Confiscate cameras used by demonstrators and book as property for identification—develop film and, if it is usable, subpoena it.

- Pictures taken by news media can be used to counter charges of police brutality.

- Problems of transporting demonstrators from demonstration area to temporary confinement must be worked out in advance—know where supplementary vehicles can be obtained.

- Identify areas for temporary mass detention—remove drunks and public nuisances from jails if more room is required—be sure to make arrangements for food and sanitation for detainees.

Types of CV Events

50. Through study and personal contact with other members of the law enforcement community, determine what types of collective violence are most probable in your jurisdiction. Use this information to plan for similar episodes in your area.

51. Using the intelligence-gathering system in your jurisdiction, estimate what types of CV are likely to occur. Be certain that the procedures specified in the Emergency Operations Manual allow for control of these situations.

Ways in Which CV Can Occur

52. Know the legalities in having private events canceled and in restricting the sale of liquor, firearms and gasoline in containers. In some areas, the executive branch of government may not have the power or authority to do this, and a legislative modification may be needed.

53. Determine which CV tactics are most likely to be used in your jurisdiction. Also consider the costs and potential effectiveness of law enforcement activities to deal with each type. Utilize this information to set priorities for training and planning and in preparing budgets for these purposes.

54. The radical extremist tactic of creating a "closed society" by prompting police overreaction should be brought to the attention of all department personnel.

IV. TRAINING

Training for the prevention of CV consists of all efforts to prepare police for preventive operations. Training familiarizes police with underlying causes of tension in the community with local groups which exploit or increase tension, the ways in which violence develops, and the times and places where CV may occur. The goal of training is to prepare officers to recognize and reduce tension, detect approaching violence and thwart the attempt of individuals or groups to commit violence. Training for prevention of CV can be incorporated into police recruit training, and it can be given as supplemental training to experienced officers. A large number of universities, colleges and adult evening schools also support police training for prevention of CV with courses in the fields of sociology, psychology, and economics.

Training is clearly a responsibility of command. It is also clear that all police officers, including the Chief of Police, receive training. The discussion below will focus on the steps that the Chief should take to <u>plan</u> and <u>provide</u> training, not receive it. Accordingly, the impression may be given that the Chief of Police <u>receives</u> <u>no</u> training. This is clearly incorrect, since the Chief can avail himself of briefings and information sessions whenever he desires.

Although police at higher ranks may have a high level of professional expertise, opportunities for in-service or school training in both prevention and control of CV should be made available whenever time and budgetary constraints permit. Advances in law enforcement techniques are occurring at a rapid rate, and the problems which police are asked to address are increasing in number and complexity. In such an environment, all officers are likely to benefit from training.

TRAINING FOR PREVENTION

Potential Location of CV

1. Make sure that the CV training program includes a consideration of all of the problems of each geographic area of the city. Community leaders will often be willing to assist in the design and implementation of such training.

Reasons for CV Potential

2. Many of the administrative studies which are prepared to support budget presentations, proposals for grants, etc., can be used to support training. The police department may have studies which show crime rates by area. Welfare data may show that certain groups have concentrations of poverty. Boards of education can sometimes provide information on the relationship of dropout rates, family income, racially-separate housing, language differences and unemployment. In many areas, the Chief of Police can use all of these studies to show police why tension and the potential for collective violence are high in specific areas.

3. Invite qualified representatives of community groups, colleges or universities to support human relations training. These outside resources may discuss race relations, family crisis intervention, rumor control, public relations and other subjects relevant to the community.

Time When CV May Occur

4. When indications are noted that tension is building, preventive action must increase rapidly and the actions must be swift. Under this type of pressure situation, police work becomes much more difficult.

All police must increase the number of contacts they make with the community—over and above the normal level—to stifle rumors and to gather information. The ability to expand efforts in this way can be developed to some extent by training which stresses the importance of community contact in potential violence situations and the techniques of rumor control and field intelligence.

Persons Who May be Involved in CV

5. Stress the fact that collective violence represents the actions of only a very small percentage of citizens. Most labor union members, students, long-haired youths, blacks, war protesters, etc., do not cause or commit acts of collective violence. Police, accordingly, need not fear that contact with all obviously dissident people will lead to violence. Rather, the task of professional police is to prevent violent and other illegal action by the few members of every social group who cause violence or commit crime.

6. Cite examples to trainees of individuals and groups who were once completely unfriendly to police, but who have come around to a more reasonable attitude because of effective police community relations efforts. Try to explain the reasons for the change.

7. Mention some examples of persons who are now active in supporting police or in helping with community efforts who formerly did little publicly and were formerly unknown to police. Tell how police became aware of these people, especially those who became involved after encouragement from police.

8. If possible, provide trainees with planned experience in dealing with persons who hold views and express ideas that may be difficult for police to accept. Many colleges and universities are interested in assisting with such training. Regardless of the planned level of such training, emphasize that the best training for dealing with "different" people is repeated contact between police and these people before trouble arises.

9. Mention the names of persons and groups in the community, on campus, in the "counterculture," etc., who have been helpful in improving relations between their group and police. Trainees may be able to enlist the help of such people in emergency situations, either directly or through community relations personnel.

Events Which May Lead to CV

10. Admit that some actions of persons who plan violence cannot be prevented within the law. Persons who are clever and truly dedicated may be able to maintain effective security and carry out their intentions.

11. Police can, however, take steps to prevent two specific kinds of violence—that which escalates from open non-violent action, and that which occurs in response to police mistakes. If the training can adequately cover these topics, much of the collective violence in the jurisdiction will probably be prevented.

12. The substance of the training should be related to training in the techniques of crowd control. Training at the U.S. Army Military Police School at Ft. Gordon, Georgia, Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (CDOC) provides training which has been highly recommended by many civilian police officers who have attended.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

13. Emphasize that every policeman can "take the pulse" of the community on a continual basis. Whenever any of the indicators of developing CV appear, the whole department can move to take preventive action.

14. •   Explain that although an individual policeman may not be able to take action based on a new piece of information, the community relations, intelligence or detective personnel may use this same information to take action to prevent violence.

TRAINING FOR CONTROL

Training for control consists of familiarizing police personnel with the Emergency Operations Manual and exercising the instructions contained in the Manual until proficiency is achieved. Police also require familiarity with various types of crowd control formations and with the kinds of threats which may be encountered during a violent incident. As opposed to training for daily police work which emphasized individual judgment and action, training for CV control stresses coordinated, disciplined team work. Training in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies who are components of a mutual aid plan may be required. Some departments have provided special training for a small number of personnel, called, roughly, a "Tactical Patrol Force." Training for control may also be supplemented by courses such as the Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (CDOC) given by the U.S. Army at Ft. Gordon, Georgia.

Location of CV
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15.   Assure that training programs and training-oriented briefings consider potential locations of CV activity. Training should stress tactics that are effective in the types of environments that exist in the local jurisdiction.

16.   For purposes of training the force for CV control, the jurisdiction should be broken down into districts. Detailed maps of each district are needed. The maps would be constantly updated so that the following critical information on each area is included in training sessions: descriptions of locations and buildings, access routes, mobilization points and staging areas. (See "Planning for Control" and "Operations for Control").

Reasons for CV

17.   Determine which grievances are most likely to lead to CV in the local jurisdiction. Require that training courses cover these topics.

Time Considerations in CV

18.   Training courses should make all personnel aware of the endurance, both physical and mental, which may be required of police during control operations. The most serious incidents of CV lasted for several days. Police must be very well disciplined and very cool to withstand verbal abuse and physical attack for that long a period. Confidence, gained through a high level of training, can strengthen discipline and morale.

19.   Stress the need for coordinated team work to achieve rapid response to threats or outbreaks of CV.

Persons Involved in CV

20.   A number of audio-visually oriented training programs are available which can be used to increase police officers' powers of observation in rapidly changing situations. The aides can be effectively used to train officers to estimate the number of persons in a crowd, their characteristics and their actions in a brief period.

21.   Instruct trainees in ways to identify leaders and members of groups that are active in disorderly crowds and mobs. Once the leaders are identified, they can be quickly approached and removed if necessary. By removing leadership from the crowd, the police may be able to greatly reduce a group's enthusiasm for committing acts of violence and destruction.

Types of CV Events

22.   Training programs should be designed to introduce trainees to the types of CV that they might encounter. Roll-call briefings can be used to reinforce previous training and to explain to all personnel the type of CV activity that is in progress. Demonstrations, cases of civil disobedience and strikes or labor disputes require flexible approaches by law enforcement personnel if control of the situation is to be attained.

23.   Provide some guidelines for the use of deadly force to control a CV situation. Some departments have limited the use of deadly force to those situations in which human life is threatened by persons with firearms, bombs, firebombs, or other lethal materials.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

24.   Set up training programs to stress those police tactics that are most likely to be of value in your jurisdiction. Disorganized mobs, planned disturbances, student unrest, snipers and sabotage each require different approaches. For example, the use of a mass formation in the disturbance where sniping and bombing is prevalent would be an unfortunate choice since it would present a prime target for the participants in violence.

V. OPERATIONS

Operations for prevention of CV include all efforts by police or encouraged by police to detect and reduce tension and to repel attempts at initiating violence. These operations include community relations, press relations, information collection, verification, processing and dissemination, street patrol, crowd control and various types of community services. Although some extraordinary actions may be required to prevent CV, most preventive efforts are part of daily police work.

Operations for control includes the deployment, movement, command, control and support of police officers to end violence, protect persons and property, restore order and preclude the recurrence of violence. During control operations, patrol, intelligence, community relations and command functions focus on curtailing violence while continuing to perform law enforcement and other services outside of the area of violence.

OPERATIONS FOR PREVENTION

Potential Location of CV

1. Review periodically the places where potential for CV exists.

2. Mention these places to public officials and to other community leaders, such as executives of media, clergymen, school principals, business club leaders, social and service club leaders, human relations councils, etc. Reassure them that the police are attempting to reduce the potential for violence in those areas. Ask them to make similar efforts in areas where they have influence.

Reasons for CV Potential

3. Be prepared for continuing changes in the role of the police force. Although it is basically naive and unfair of citizens to expect the police to solve all the historical, social, economic, physical and political problems which lead to CV, many localities are challenging the police to do just that. Since no other agency has the ability and resources to face directly the problem of preventing violence, the police are asked to fill this role.

4. Be prepared to exercise leadership in the campaign against the potential causes of violence in the jurisdiction. Don't be modest. Don't believe that the economic and social problems of the area are too difficult to grasp. You probably understand the real problems in your jurisdiction as well as anyone, even though you may not be comfortable with the way they are described by economists, sociologists and psychologists. You can put the analyses of problems together in language that other community leaders, policemen and citizens can understand.

5. Support all efforts of police to assist in improving community development. Without the support of the Chief, policemen who try to help through means other than law enforcement may become discouraged. Community relations officers, for example, usually receive verbal abuse and criticism from other policemen, especially at the beginning of a community relations program. With the expressed support of the Chief, the community relations officers are better able to stand up against such pressure if it develops.

6. Be prepared to defend your efforts to prevent violence. Social progressives may say that the police are oppressive and brutal. Social conservatives may say that efforts like community relations are a waste of police manpower. The Chief will be called upon periodically to describe to all citizens the conditions in the community which maintain the potential for violence, and to show how the police department is attempting to reduce this potential.

7. Supervise a police community relations program which is as active as possible. Review with community relations personnel the social and economic problems in the community. Communicate to community relations personnel all information about community problems which other community spokesmen have identified in your contacts with them.

8. Continually challenge every policeman to improve his ability to enforce the law and provide community service in a way that acknowledges the dignity of all people and reflects credit on himself and the force.

9. Exercise appropriate legal authority over all crowds. Consult with the police legal advisor to determine the limits of police authority. In most cases, local laws clearly establish a role for police in planning for and protecting persons and property in mass gatherings. This planning role should affort police the opportunity for gathering information about the group. It is an opportunity, furthermore, for police contact with the members of the group who are planning the gathering. This interaction, itself, may reduce the potential for CV.

Time When CV May Occur

10. Impress all members of the force with the possibility that CV may occur at any time. The flexibility of police in shifting from a law enforcement to a CV preventive role should be a constant concern.

11. Assign intelligence personnel the task of assessing the CV potential of every upcoming group event.

12. Require intelligence or crime analysis personnel to keep records of the times of the week, month, and year when crimes are most frequent. At these times, the need for police law enforcement action, among crowds in some cases, will be greatest. If these times of particular stress are known by all police officers, they will be more likely to anticipate potential CV situations when responding to reports of crime or minor disorder.

13. Assign intelligence personnel the responsibility for investigating the local potential for CV which results from events within the jurisdiction, as well as in other areas of the state, the nation, or the world.

Persons Who May be Involved in CV

14. Compile a list of all members of the community who appear to exercise leadership. Determine which of these deal with agencies of the local government, especially police, most frequently. Make contact with all of these leaders on a formal or informal basis.

15. Personally assure all leaders that the police department is devoted to professional law enforcement. Explain the role that high quality police service on a daily basis plays in reducing community tension. Acknowledge that community leadership also prevents violence. Describe how community leaders' efforts can be combined with police efforts to improve conditions in the entire jurisdiction, thereby reducing the potential for violence.

16. If a Community Relations Board or Human Relations Council exists, participate actively. The members of these boards may have considerable influence in the community. Learn the specific strengths of each member.

17. If a Community Relations Board or Human Relations Council does not exist, consider founding one. Sound out other community leaders on the subject. Perhaps such a formal organization is not required in the area, but the discussion itself demonstrates police interest and opens lines of communication which will be useful in the future.

18. Make contact with all leading members of the news media, including publishers, editors, and reporters. Explain the role that the media can play in preventing violence. The role of news reporting is fully discussed in Mass Media and Violence, A Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 9, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970.

19. Reassure all members of the media that the police department is not interested in limiting their freedom of the press. Actually, the police department, in a potential CV situation, will be best served by opening its doors to the media. In return, professional reporters will usually agree not to enter exceptionally dangerous areas and not to report hearsay stories.

20. Coordinate activities with those of community relations personnel.

21. Require intelligence personnel to maintain a list of all persons who have the potential for contributing to violence.

Events Which May Lead to CV

22. Reassure all members of the force that coordinated police work can control any situation that arises, and that most CV situations can be minimized if not prevented.

23. Stress the importance of preventing violence—even if a confrontation with police occurs—and at the same time enforcing the law.

24. Require intelligence personnel and patrol commanders to prepare manning plans and deployment plans based on the number of people expected to be involved in a mass gathering, their location, and their probable routes and means of movement.

25. Make sure that all other law enforcement agencies (local, county, state, and National Guard) are ready to provide assistance before police capabilities are overwhelmed. This can be done most easily when planned demonstrations or confrontations involving large numbers of people are announced. Hold intelligence and operational briefings before the event if necessary.

26. Invite the media to send representatives to the department to observe police action in dealing with crowds.

27. Formulate a careful plan of action for the department in case collective violence develops. The existence of this operations plan reassures the members of the force, and reduces their anxiety. This decreases the probability of undisciplined behavior in reaction to fear.

28. Require periodic briefings from intelligence personnel on the potential of various kinds of violence—both spontaneous and in conjunction with specific upcoming events.

29. Require community relations personnel to undertake activities to prevent violence at athletic contests, demonstrations, entertainments and other events where potential for confrontation exists.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

30. Assure that the police force and its equipment are ready to control the kind of disturbance which is at all likely, and that the police are taking appropriate steps to prevent such a disturbance.

OPERATIONS FOR CONTROL

The control phase, in general, consists of implementing the Emergency Operations Plan and Manual, the Mutual Aid Plan, when necessary, and the supervision of the Emergency Operations Center. The guidelines which are presented below, therefore, are oriented toward some command and liaison activities which the Chief may undertake during control operations to insure that plans are executed effectively.

Location of CV

31. Direct operations from a nearby yet safety and effectively established command post. If a helicopter is available, operations against snipers and other violent persons who have occupied roof tops may be effectively directed from the air.

4. Establish staging areas near areas of greatest probable need for reserve forces. Keep the majority of support personnel in a position from which effective response in any other potential troublesome area in the local jurisdiction is possible.

33. Arrange to secure: valuable property, access routes (primary and secondary), potential command post sites, medical facilities, fire stations, etc.

34. Have the following places and areas identified: locations of likely crowd congregation, escape routes, vulnerable merchants, traffic controls, sheltered mobilization points or staging areas for police personnel, medical facilities, check or screening points, topographical features, night illumination, public utility system and fire protection facilities.

35. In cases involving snipers, be certain you know the exact location of the sniper. Consider taking a defensive posture, that is, control the sniper's effectiveness by removing targets and keeping people clear of snipers. During periods of unrest, station men on high buildings. This will discourage snipers as well as provide a good view of activities in the street below. Some cities have found it useful to equip these men with wide-angle sound cameras to obtain a permanent record of the activities on the street.

Reasons for CV

36. Attempt to clarify the reasons why CV has occurred and to arrange contact with important figures who are encouraging or tacitly approving CV. Talking to such people may halt a minor outbreak before it develops into a more serious disturbance.

Time Considerations in CV

37. Be ready to admit that attempts at CV prevention have failed and that the use of control tactics is needed.

38. Request the assistance of state police and/or the National Guard before additional help is critically needed. Once the need has become acute, help may be too late. Additional support personnel can be stationed in a nearby staging area and not committed to action unless the situation demands it.

Persons Involved in CV

39. Consider who may be involved in violence both actively and behind the scenes. Even if an unpopular activist group caused the outbreak, the brunt of control tactics may be borne by local citizens who are drawn into the scene. Remind all personnel that punishment is never the concern of the police.

40. Utilize members of the community whenever possible to assist in control efforts.

Types of CV Events

41. Consider the best available information on what kind of collective activity is being dealt with. If possible, observe the activities first-hand. Video tapes or films may also be used. These approaches may give a clearer picture of the situation at the scene than will written or verbal reports. Keep top-ranking officers on the scene who can provide accurate up-to-date reports.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

42. Develop procedures to handle the full range of problems that the various CV tactics can cause. In particular, snipers and attempted bombings should be handled by a previously selected and trained team.

43. Be certain that squad and platoon leaders are familiar with team techniques and deployment tactics to be used against rock-throwing assailants.

44. Have all personnel turn in any activist literature found during the course of their assignment. Be alert for psychological warfare pamphlets intended to discourage or demoralize members of the department. Take steps to counter the effectiveness of this and similar propaganda.

VI. EVALUATION

This section will discuss ways in which the Chief of Police can conduct assessments of prevention and control actions. Evaluation is undertaken to determine how well police are conforming with prescribed procedures and how effective their actions are. Inadequacies will indicate the need for an increase or reordering of operations.

The evaluation function is a responsibility of command. The Chief of Police may delegate the task of evaluation to a Deputy Chief, to a separate internal review section, to a strategic intelligence or community relations unit or to another high-ranking officer. In smaller departments, or as needed, the Chief may perform the evaluation on his own.

Each policeman, including the Chief, should make an evaluation of his own performance. Any inadequacies should be identified, with no implication of fault or guilt necessary. Supervisory and command personnel should also evaluate the capabilities of their subordinates without implying the necessity of assessing blame or prescribing punishment. Improvement in performance is the primary objective of evaluation.

EVALUATION OF PREVENTION

Evaluation of any preventive activity in CV is always difficult, because when problems do not become acute, there is usually little solid evidence that CV would have occurred if police had not intervened effectively. The evaluation criteria listed below, therefore, are numerous, and although each is related to tension in the community, estimates of a small number of them will probably suffice for evaluation of the prevention activities of most departments.

Recently, many departments have developed and implemented "Management Information Systems (MIS)." These systems, which emphasize rapid storage, retrieval and dissemination of accurate data, would be very compatible with the evaluation criteria mentioned below.

Suggested Evaluation Criteria

1. When violence does not occur at the scene of a crowd, police performance may be judged entirely successful if:

    a. Community relations personnel made contact with leaders or members of the crowd before and during the gathering

    b. Intelligence personnel correctly estimated that the potential for violence was low

    c. Intelligence personnel correctly estimated that the potential for violence was high and disseminated this estimate to other police who took action to prevent violence

    d. Intelligence personnel monitored the crowd, either in person or through detective personnel

    e. Detective personnel followed up any requests from intelligence

    f. Patrol commander(s) made a decision concerning deployment of forces to the scene and prepared a contingency plan for further deployment

    g. Patrol commander notified and coordinated internal support functions including communications and traffic patrols

    h. Chief notified and coordinated actions of government officials, other public services, and other control forces as needed

    i. Patrol personnel followed orders of patrol commander and maintained discipline and personal dignity

    j. Patrol personnel maintained orderly and timely communication with each other and with command personnel

    k. Community/public relations officers coordinated actions with news media as needed.

2. Even if violence in crowds is avoided, and even if crowds seldom assemble in a jurisdiction, evaluation of efforts to prevent collective violence can proceed. The focus of this evaluation will be brought to bear on the capability of the department to deal with long-run community problems, and to recognize growing tension.

    Measures which the Chief might use to judge such capabilities are:

    a. The number of police who have received training which is specifically designed for dealing with community problems

    b. The number of police studying formal courses in police-related subjects in schools, colleges or universities

    c. The number of police who are members of or advisors to community service organizations such as Boys' Clubs, Boy Scouts, PTA's, etc.

    d. The number of presentations by police to public meetings, and the number of police involved.

    If all of these are growing, success can be claimed in improving the capability of the department to take part in confronting local problems outside of law enforcement per se.

3. In order to appraise the ability of the department to detect rising tension, the following information is required:

    a. The number of community leaders with whom police community relations officers have contact, especially in dangerous areas

    b. The number of community leaders who refuse to assist police

    c. The number of community leaders who encourage others to thwart police efforts

d. The procedures which intelligence personnel have developed to identify, monitor and analyze positive and disruptive forces in the community

e. The number of reports of community trends which are communicated to intelligence personnel by other members of the department

f. The ability of intelligence personnel to obtain information from other law enforcement agencies

g. The ability of intelligence personnel to deliver estimates of the danger of collective violence in specific areas

h. The ability of intelligence personnel to identify dangerous individuals, to disseminate information concerning them, their location, their plans and tactics to other officers

i. The ability of intelligence personnel to infiltrate organizations which have been identified as potentially violent.

j. The degree of coordination between intelligence and detective personnel to avoid conflicts between the peace-keeping and law enforcement functions of police

k. The ability of patrol commanders to increase community information collection by patrol personnel

l. The ability of patrol commanders to increase the accuracy and completeness of reports of community developments which are submitted by patrol personnel

m. The ability of patrol personnel to perform their law enforcement role without denying their own dignity or that of citizens.

4. The attitudes and behavior of citizens in dealing with police indicate to some extent the effectiveness of attempts by police and other citizens to reduce tension in the community.

Some of the indicators of citizen attitude which police can estimate directly are:

a. Number of physical attacks on policemen in view of other citizens (in a year or month)

b. Number of physical attacks on police vehicles or other property

c. Number of reported cases of resistance to arrest

d. Number of reports of police brutality (accurate reports, reports that are exaggerated because of emotion, reports that are inaccurate and deliberate lies)

e. Number of anti-police demonstrations

f. Number of physical attacks on other public servants (especially firemen) or employees of utilities, or on their vehicles or property

g. Number of citizens who support actively or participate in the activities of groups who preach hatred of police or of other groups

h. Number of instances of verbal abuse of police in the performance of their duties or as private citizens.

5. Some other measures will be ambiguous. It may be difficult to separate increased indications of trouble from the increased willingness of people to help police by reporting. Some examples of ambiguous responses from the people are:

a. Number of complaints made to police about public services. These may indicate greater dissatisfaction with local government. On the other hand, increased reporting may also indicate improved reliance on the police and on local government to correct local conditions.

b. Number of youths who ask for police help, especially in schools, in order to solve personal problems or to reduce the severity of criminal prosecution for minor offenses. Increases in this number are probably a favorable indication because they imply that the police are gaining the confidence of youth.

c. Number and intensity of rumors reported to police. These should be expected to increase when a rumor control center is established. Thereafter, the number of rumors should level off until tension increases.

d. Number of complaints of police corruption or in-
competence. The tone and accuracy of these re-
ports will indicate their value. If most of the
complaints appear to be highly emotional or delib-
erately false, tension is probably increasing. If
most of the reports are correct, or at least plausible,
citizens are probably displaying their confidence
that police are interested in improving the depart-
ment.

Potential Locations of CV

6. Assess the performance of police in carrying out prevention operations
and the response of citizens in each local area to these operations. Consider
the results of the evaluation in terms of decisions concerning shifts of police
personnel, increased community relations or intelligence effort, or modifi-
cations of the level of training. Also examine the possibility of increasing
or improving liaison with community leaders in areas that seem to need more
attention.

Reasons for CV Potential

7. Drawing on reports from police and other public service agencies, eval-
uate the social, economic, and physical problems of the community. What
have police accomplished by training and operations to resolve these problems?
Has all available expertise within the department, and among private citizens,
been brought to bear on these situations? Can any talent by shifted or further
developed to address the needs of the community?

Times When CV May Occur

8. Based on knowledge of the lag time required to mobilize local and state
law enforcement agencies and the National Guard for intensive prevention
activities, estimate how far in advance police should know about situations
which are intended to be, or may become, violent. Do the department's
community relations, intelligence and patrol functions always know about
such situations at least that far in advance? The answer will probably be
no, but this does not necessarily mean that police have failed. Secretly
planted bombs, for example, may explode as a complete surprise, and po-
lice may not have been able to do anything beforehand to find out about
them. As always, the capability of police to anticipate violence or other
crime is intentionally limited by the society's devotion to freedom from any
suggestion of police control.

The most effective state that can be achieved is one in which all police
attempt to be aware of all relevant conditions or events which are occurring
or about to occur. Are intelligence personnel aware of demonstrations, rallies,
etc., at about the time the public becomes aware of them? Are police re-
ceiving and acting on reports of rumbles or gang warfare which are about to
take place? Does each section of the department plan for the times of the
week, month, or year that are known to be the most troublesome?

Persons Who May Be Involved In CV

9. Evaluate the intelligence files on groups and individuals who are known
to have some potential for becoming involved in violence. Are the estimates
of the inclination of the persons toward violence firmly grounded in facts and
credible reports?

10. Review community relations files. Are the names of leaders and organ-
izations who support police in preventing CV known to you? Are they given
credit for their support by the police department and by other community
organizations? Is their support publicized?

11. Does the community or public relations section have on file media reports
of outstanding police action in providing service to the community? Do these
reports reflect both law enforcement and other community action?

12. Does media coverage extend to newspapers and electronic media operated
by or for racial, ethnic or linguistic minority groups?

13. Can all police officers identify the major groups who favor violence in
the jurisdiction? Are any written materials which describe these groups
available to all officers? Have these groups, their leaders, and their charac-
teristics been mentioned in any type of training session?

14. Do all police officers know the names and neighborhoods of groups who
support police in opposing violence?

Events Which May Lead To CV

15. Review the performance of police in dealing with previous incidents that
presented a threat of CV. Did the various sections of the department seem to
step up their activity commensurate with the size and intensity of the threat?
Was the level of police concern and the number of police involved appropriate?

16.   Review the tactics used by police in preventing violence. Was a clandestine plot met with intensive intelligence and detective investigations, for example? Did community relations activities increase when trouble began to develop in a slum? Did the whole department prepare for possible violence during demonstrations? Were control operations ready, and was liaison completed with other law enforcement agencies and the National Guard?

17.   Did the Chief of Police coordinate prevention operations with other appropriate leaders, such as government officials, university presidents, media representatives, factory managers, etc.?

Ways in Which CV May Develop

18.   Has your department been actively engaged in seeking information on the plans, tactics and weapons, if any, of individuals or groups who are inclined to violence in your community?

19.   Does the department have men and equipment suitable for meeting the types of threats which have been detected? Has a list of priorities been developed for introducing new equipment, providing additional training, or recruiting new personnel to meet these threats?

EVALUATION OF CONTROL

Evaluation of control operations, of course, begins while violence is still occurring. Based upon this type of evaluation, the Chief of Police and patrol commanders make decisions concerning the deployment and tactics of control forces. These considerations were mentioned in the "Operations for Control" section of this volume.

The type of evaluation which is discussed below begins _after_ violence has ended and is intended to support decisions concerning changes in the organization, equipment, training and operational procedures of control forces.

The essence of the evaluation which follows control operations is the "after-action" report. This report should be a detailed, overall description of the violence itself, the actions which police and òther forces took to end the violence and the level of effectiveness which was achieved. The preparation of this over-all report, in some departments, has been assigned to a single high-ranking officer who is then responsible for compiling and supervising reports from patrol, intelligence, community relations and command personnel who were directly involved in control operations. Some departments have made such a task more efficient by instituting a separate evaluation unit—independent of all other operational units. This independent unit is designed to function at all times, but may be particularly important during CV operations when charges of misconduct are often levied against police.

In cases where very serious incidents of CV occur, evaluation of control operations by agencies outside of the law enforcement community may be necessary. In recent years, the bulk of collective violence has emanated from political issues. In such a context, the community and the entire nation need an in-depth view of the achievements of law enforcement agencies in dealing with CV. Many persons, including members of the mass media, the academic community, legislative bodies, etc., have attempted to produce such evaluations, and police have solicited other studies. Such investigations by persons outside of law enforcement may often assist police, and they may be accomplished by local groups or by persons from outside the jurisdiction. Many experts have worked extensively to understand collective violence, and many other persons representing public opinion discussion and thought may be available to evaluate serious outbreaks of CV.

Locations of CV

20.   Determine which areas of the jurisdiction were most difficult for police to control. Also determine the approximate boundaries of the troubled area.

21.   Consider the hindrances to police efforts in each area of special difficulty. Was the number of people who frequent the area the cause of the problem? Was access adequate for police control personnel and supply vehicles? Did tall buildings hamper communications and command and control? Were command posts set up in appropriate spots?

Reasons for CV

22.   Require an estimate of why individuals became involved in violence and why some people continued to participate. If possible attempt to distinguish between crowds which assembled for a peaceful purpose and became destructive mobs and crowds which assembled for the avowed or implied purpose of committing acts of violence.

Time Considerations in CV

23.   Determine, as precisely as possible, when the CV actually was triggered. Was the department ready? Did the outbreak occur on the date or at the time of a planned event or on the anniversary of an important historical event? What steps can be taken to improve the department's state of readiness during similar periods in the future?

Persons Involved in CV

24.   Require an estimate in the after-action report of the participation of groups or members of groups who were identified before the violence commenced. This report should show possible changes in the value of these groups as threats or as allies of police efforts to control violence.

The after-action report may also show newly identified persons or groups who appeared to encourage or discourage violence. Estimates of participation of both previously known and newly discovered groups can be used to plan police operations for prevention and control in the future.

Typically, the after-action report will also include the number of people in the crowd, an estimate of the number of persons actively engaged in violent action, the number of police and other citizen casualties (by severity) and the number of persons arrested.

Types of CV Events

25.   Because CV episodes vary, so must the tactics used to control them. Evaluation of police effectiveness, therefore, hinges as much on identifying the type of episode involved as it does on knowing what police tactics were successfully employed. All intelligence gathering personnel should be required to determine, as precisely as possible, what type of CV episode has occurred.

Ways in Which CV Occurred

26.   Require a section in the after-action report which identifies all weapons and tactics employed by CV participants. The report should highlight any weapons or methods that were especially dangerous to police or which presented police with unusual problems. Dissident groups, for example, have developed many ways in which to tempt police to over-react or to force police to physically remove women, children, clergy and others with whom bystanders (and television viewers) have great sympathy.

27.   When broadcasting equipment or loud-speaker systems are used in crowd control, designate individuals to tape record the sequence of events. A recording made in the crowd or behind it will serve as proof that police commands to disperse, etc., could be heard.

VII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

NATURE OF THE PROBLEM/PURPOSE

Collective violence has increased in frequency and variety in the United States over the past few years, in the form of antiwar protests, campus turmoil, spontaneous riots, mass looting and arson, racial disturbances, clashes between ideologically motivated groups, bombings perpetrated by extremist organizations, and even carefully planned attacks on law enforcement personnel. It is apparent that effective prevention and control of mass disorders requires some form of timely police intervention, based on an accurate estimate of the existing danger. Unfortunately, law enforcement officials often have been forced to make important decisions on the basis of incomplete, inaccurate, and sometimes contradictory information. The importance of this problem was underscored in the Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice:

> The tactics chosen at the beginning of disorder may well be the crucial factor in controlling a riot. The kinds and extent of police force employed, and equipment involved must be thought out well in advance, taught to personnel through training, and constantly reassessed. Procedures for the acquisition and channeling of intelligence must be established so that information is centralized and disseminated to those who need it.[1]

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[1] The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society: A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, United States Government Printing Office Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 119.

More recently, the Scranton Commission noted the critical need for valid information in the context of campus disturbances. Their findings indicated that

> If the police are to do their job of law enforcement on the campus properly, they need accurate, up-to-date information. Only if they are well informed can the police know how and when to react and, equally important, when not to react.[2/]

The objective of this study by ORI is to provide local law enforcement agencies with guidelines for the collection and dissemination of essential elements of information required for sound decision-making in response to the threat, or actual initiation, of collective violence.

To develop this set of recommendations, ORI conducted informal, semi-structured interviews in 14 selected cities and 6 state police departments with law enforcement officials who have been, or are likely to be, acting in a key decision-making capacity during an episode of collective violence. To develop this set of recommendations, four steps were followed which included

- Literature survey
- Consultation with Panel of Active Law Enforcement Specialists
- Field survey
- Analysis, Interpretation, and Review of Data.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature survey consisted of the identification, collection and examination of more than 100 references related to the problem. A listing of this literature is contained in the Bibliography, Appendix A in this volume.

PANEL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT EXPERTS

ORI convened a panel of experts from the law enforcement community to serve as a source of guidance and knowledge prior to the field data collection effort. The law enforcement experts, selected by LEAA, who participated on the advisory panel included:

[2/] The Report of The President's Commission on Campus Unrest, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 171.

Name	Title
Winston Churchill	Chief of Police, Indianapolis, Indiana
Arthur Grubert	Assistant Chief Inspector, Intelligence Division, New York City Police Department
John Knox	Chief, Patrol Division West, Los Angeles, California
Dr. Peter Lejins	Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Maryland
Colonel Ray Pope	Director, Department of Public Safety for the State of Georgia

Members of the ORI study team met with the advisory panel to review the objectives and methodology of the study.

The 2 day meeting covered the following items:

1. Definition of Collective Violence
2. Changes in Posture of Collective Violence
3. Types of Intelligence Information
4. Levels of Information Exchange
5. Needs of Small Police Departments
6. Format of Study Output.

The results of the two-day meeting of the panel were incorporated into the field survey portion of the study. The chief result of the meeting was that all agreed that the format of the study output must be designed to serve the needs of policemen directly. The study report must cover all types of collective violence and focus on the continual collection processing and dissemination of information, even by small police departments. The panel also pointed out a number of internal characteristics of many police departments which ORI could use to ease the collection of information in the field survey. The panel agreed that a second meeting of the panel would not be necessary, that a written review of the study output would probably suffice.

Each member of the panel reviewed a preliminary draft version of this report and offered their suggestions for its improvement. In many cases their comments were incorporated into the final draft version. In others, the authors did not consider their suggestions either feasible or appropriate.

The approval of each individual panel member of the results of this research effort is not to be implied from their association with the study.

FIELD SURVEY

Survey Sites

Law enforcement agencies in a purposive sample of 16 cities and 6 state police departments were contacted. The sample of 16 cities was designed to cover the range of possibilities along the following characteristic dimensions:

- o Geographic location
- o Type of jurisdiction
  - . State
  - . County
  - : City
- o Recent history of collective violence (preferably within the last 12 months) or the noticable absence thereof
  - . Agencies with broad experience
  - . Agencies with little experience
- o Types or categories of collective violence.

In addition, it should be noted that the cities which had supplied a panel member were excluded from the sample. ORI felt that data might be biased unnecessarily by having the same individual participate in the formulation of the information requirements and later supply data that might reinforce their earlier assumptions.

The sites selected for the survey are indicated in the table below.

TABLE 1

SURVEY SITES BY POPULATION CATEGORY

Population / Region	Northeast	South	North Central	West
Cities over 700,000 population	Philadelphia	Houston	(Chicago)	San Francisco
Cities 300-700 population	Newark	Miami	St. Louis	Phoenix
Cities 150-300,000 population	Hartford	Jackson	Madison	Albuquerque
Cities under 150,000 population	(Harrisburg)	Chatanooga	Rockford	Santa Barbara
State Police Departments	Pennsylvania Connecticut	Mississippi	Wisconsin	New Mexico California

With the exceptions of Chicago and Harrisburg, all of the agencies contacted agreed to cooperate in the survey.

INTERVIEWS

As indicated earlier, the present study was primarily concerned with the kinds of information needed for the successful prevention and control of collective violence. With the aid of the expert panel, the critical data elements to be collected in the field were identified. The interviews were conducted by professional research staff personnel and focused on the information requirements for decision-making concerning collective violence planning, training, operations, and evaluation.

The primary source of data for the study of information requirements were law enforcement officials who have been, or are likely to be, in (1) a key decision-making position and/or (2) a position of responsibility for supplying information during operations designed to prevent the onset or further development of a mass disturbance. Although the number of individuals contacted varied somewhat between jurisdictions, the majority of the interviews were conducted with police Chiefs, deputy superintendents and other knowledgeable officials in the operations, community relations, and intelligence divisions (where those categories were appropriate).

Data Collection Scheme

The nature of the information to be sought in the field dictated that a semi-structured and informal interview format be employed. Past experience indicated that an informal open ended interview frequently elicits a rich variety of information often lost or unavailable if a rigid format is imposed. (Another advantage is that it precluded the usual lengthy Office of Management and Budget approval cycle which would have certainly been required if a formal questionnaire were used.) The use of experienced senior level interviewers, pretesting of the interview procedure prior to actual field research, and frequent checks with the interviewers in the field helped to insure consistency and comparability among interviewers and that the full range of pertinent questions was covered. Interviewers spent between 1 and 3 days at each location depending on the availability of police personnel and the number of interviews conducted.

Data Elements

Three general areas of inquiry were identified although not necessarily treated separately in the interview: (1) the types of decisions that are made relative to the prevention and control of collective violence; (2) the information required to make and implement decisions in the areas of planning, training, and operations in addition to that needed for evaluation of these functions; and (3) the strengths and weaknesses of the information system presently used to gather the required information. The areas of inquiry are discussed in greater detail below.

Decision-making. Data was collected on the types of decisions that are made by key law enforcement officials in planning, training, and operations designed to prevent and control collective violence. Despite the apparent differences between the kinds of decisions that might be made relative to planning, training, operations and evaluation, these four functions are intimately related. Planning, whether effective or ineffective, has an impact on the adequacy of training, which in turn has serious implications for the success of operations against collective violence. Similarly, the evaluation of success or failure of law enforcement operations will dictate changes in both planning and training. These functions were treated as part of an interrelated system or network of decision-making and the following information was sought during the interviews:

- Functions performed
- Types of decisions
- Specific goals or objectives
- Alternatives available
- Critical incidents of collective violence occurrence or prevention, and the role of information in each incident
- Action taken
- Outcome (favorable or unfavorable)
- Long-range versus short-range consequences
- Evaluation criteria.

Information Requirements. A second area of primary importance was the variety and categories of information required for timely, effective decision-making. This included information not only critical to planning, training, and operations, but also for evaluation of each of these functions. In some cases certain types of information would be of great importance in terms of police operations (e.g., meteorological data such as wind direction) but of limited importance from the standpoint of long-range planning. Other elements of information (e.g., availability of manpower and equipment) would be critical across all three functions and also for any post disturbance evaluation of decision-making.

ORI attempted to elicit information requirements from interviewees in several stages. Initially, law enforcement officials were queried as to what kinds of information they think they need.3/ If critical elements of information—as determined by the expert panel and/or other interviewees—were not mentioned

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3/ Information requirements were also derived from analysis of functions and decisions—not just from what police identify explicitly.

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by the respondent, he was asked about these specifically. In some cases, items not mentioned may be of equal or greater importance from the standpoint of the analysis than those items that were mentioned.

Additional questions were asked to insure that each interviewee had ample opportunity to describe in detail the information necessary for planning, training, operations, and evaluation. When possible, respondents also provided judgments as to whether specific elements of information could be classified as "essential" (or critical) to decision-making or "nice to know."

Information System. The third area of inquiry was the information system presently being used to provide the essential elements of information required for decision-making. Attempts were made to identify and analyze the capabilities and deficiencies of the information network.

ORI also asked interviewees for "critical incidents" when the information system functioned well or functioned poorly. Particular attention was given to (1) how well the system performs under stress (i.e., during an episode of collective violence in contrast to routine operations); (2) where the system is most likely to malfunction; (3) where the most serious gaps in information exist (what the system provides and what law enforcement officials feel should be available); and (4) how well it supports command and control functions and the need for interface with other agencies or departments.

ANALYSIS, INTERPRETATION AND REVIEW OF RESULTS

The nature of the information collected precluded the use of sophisticated, computerized data compilation, tabulation or analysis programs. Also, since the project in no way intends to evaluate or even compare the departments visited, the use of formal data reduction programs was not considered desirable. Also, as was expected, the interviewers were not always able to elicit an appropriate or useful response to each of the interview items from every city. Thus, any data compilation program would have had to contend with the problem of null or void cells.

The analysis of the information collected during the interviews consisted mainly of an informal type of content analysis. When considering a particular information requirement, the notes from each interview were searched for statements relevant to that particular topic. This approach was particularly useful in this situation because: (1) each interview contained a myriad of information bits that were nearly impossible to categorize completely in any meaningful way; (2) a comment or statement made in one context might have particular relevance to an entirely different situation when examined from the total perspective which was achieved during the field survey.

This approach to data analysis is especially appropriate when the purpose or goals of the project are considered. No effort whatsoever was made to evaluate or even compare the departments visited. The Guidelines are not intended to present just the best or most frequent approaches to a given problem. Instead, it is hoped that the Guidelines contain, in addition, some unusual and perhaps even thought provoking ideas on the prevention and control of collective violence.

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FORMAT OF THE GUIDELINES

The standard format for technical reports as traditionally used and described in the GPO Style Manual* was not considered to be appropriate for effectively organizing the information to be presented in the Guidelines. In order to assure maximum reader interest and operational usefulness, a manner of presentation was devised which ORI feels will best suit policemen.

The report is organized into 5 volumes intended for each of 5 general personnel categories: Chief of Police, Community Relations Personnel, Intelligence Personnel, Patrol Commander, and Patrol Personnel. Each volume has the same format. Chapter I is a general introduction that is the same in all volumes. Chapter II consists of introductory notes for the personnel for whom the volume was prepared. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI are entitled Planning, Training, Operations, and Evaluation, respectively. Relative to each of these activities, each chapter discusses the information which police require in support of decisions regarding both prevention and control of CV. Within each chapter, prevention and control guidelines are listed separately. Prevention and control guidelines are further broken down into categories based upon six essential intelligence questions:

Where?	—Locations of CV
Why?	—Reasons for CV
When?	—Time Considerations in CV
Who?	—Persons Involved in CV
What?	—Types of CV
How?	—Ways in Which CV Occurs

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*United States Government Printing Office, Style Manual, Washington, D.C., 1967.

APPENDIX

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