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

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CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH

PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Volume IV

Guidelines for
the Patrol Commander

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ABSTRACT

This project produced a set of operational guidelines for police activities to prevent and control collective violence. The guidelines are based on the techniques and experiences of 14 city police departments and 5 state law enforcement agencies. The guidelines focus on the information required by police for planning, training, operations, and evaluation of both prevention and control measures.

Separate volumes of guidelines were prepared for officers who serve as Chief of Police, Community Relations Personnel, Intelligence Personnel, Patrol Commanders, and Patrol Personnel.

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PREFACE

This document constitutes one volume of the final report under LEAA Grant Award NI 71-097-G. The complete series of five volumes is designed to meet contractual requirements and provide an archival record for the interested law enforcement science community, and also to serve as operationally useful manuals in providing information and guidance to the various police decision-makers.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Because of the nature of this project, many individuals were involved in, and contributed to, its success. Mr. George Shollenberger of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration served as the award monitor during the last half of the award period. Mr. Adrian Jones, also of LEAA, served in the capacity during the first half.

A panel of law enforcement specialists selected by LEAA made a much appreciated contribution to the report. They provided a substantive review and criticism of the preliminary draft as well as guidance in adapting the study methods to the needs of the police. The consultants included: Winston Churchill, Chief of Police, Indianapolis; Arthur Grubert, Assistant Chief Inspector, Intelligence Division, New York City Police; John Knox, Chief, Patrol Division West, Los Angeles; Dr. Peter Lejins, Director, Institute of Criminal Justice and Criminology, University of Maryland; and Colonel Ray Pope, Director, Department of Public Safety for the state of Georgia.

The cooperation of the many police officers in the 14 cities and 6 state police departments visited during the data collection effort is greatly appreciated. Without their cooperation and assistance, this report would not have been possible.

The project team for Operations Research, Inc. (ORI) was headed by Mr. Richard L. Knoblauch, project manager and co-author of this report, and Mr. W. Thomas Callahan, senior author of this report. Dr. Lynn Llewellyn, formerly with ORI, was project manager during the early stages of the project. Administrative support and guidance was provided by Mr. Donald W. Walter, Program Director. Mr. Michael Brown of the ORI technical staff provided assistance in the reorganization and rewriting of the preliminary draft. The authors would particularly like to thank Mrs. Roberta Thompson for her patient assistance in typing and editing the report.

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I. INTRODUCTION

NEED FOR GUIDELINES

While massive civil disorders and violent protest demonstrations have become less frequent in this country over the past year, these and other acts of collective violence continue to threaten public safety and security. Incidents involving ambushes and assaults of police and other public safety personnel, bombings of public and private property, and various types of violent confrontations between police and organized groups persist. This indicates that, while smaller in scope and somewhat less visible, collective violence must continue to be dealt with as a serious national problem. Furthermore, the possibility that massive disturbances will erupt in the future cannot be ignored.

Perhaps the strongest assurance that occurrence of collective violence can be minimized, and that the dangerous effects of such incidents can be reduced rests with the continual improvement of the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. Police departments are increasingly successful in detecting and resolving conflicts before violence erupts, and when it does erupt, in safely containing the situation. The guidelines presented in the volume are intended to strengthen law enforcement agencies in their performance of these tasks.

PURPOSE

The development of these guidelines has been based upon descriptions of prevention and control practices which have already been implemented, and with which some success has already been achieved. The information contained in this volume was obtained from personnel in 14 city police departments and six state law enforcement agencies. Since such a sample does not support

broad generalizations concerning the most appropriate actions to be taken by police across the country, the appropriateness of the guidelines must be judged by each reader based upon his own circumstances and requirements. While some departments and agencies may discover little of value here, it is likely that others will be able to apply these guidelines to their needs for improved planning, training, operations, and evaluation pertinent to their collective violence problems. It should be emphasized that this volume is intended to provoke thoughts and introduce ideas and it in no way intends to stifle initiative.

METHODS OF PREPARATION

The development of these guidelines consisted of five steps.

a. A review was made to identify literature pertinent to topics of collective violence and the police role in prevention and control of CV.

b. A two-day seminar on police methods and organization was held in which four high-ranking police officers and a university professor of criminology—all of national repute—discussed questions of interest to the police regarding CV.

c. A survey of 14 police departments was made in cities with populations between 40,000 and 2,000,000 in the Northeast, Southeast, North Midwest, South Midwest, and Southwest United States; the survey consisted of 120 interviews. Wherever possible, the Chief of Police, intelligence, detective, community relations, patrol and communications personnel were contacted in each city. Although unstructured, the interviews were designed to elicit all information concerning how each department prepared for CV, what actions were taken during CV, and what daily operations were underway to prevent CV. Approximately 190 hours were devoted to interviewing police personnel in the cities.

d. Similar interviews were conducted with members of six state law enforcement agencies to determine how these organizations support local agencies with regard to CV control and prevention. This state agency survey was limited to high ranking officers—a total of 20 nation-wide.

e. A compilation of all descriptions of police decisions and information requirements in support of decision-making culminated in the preparation of the written guidelines which are presented in this document.

BASIC PROPOSITIONS

Certain basic views held by the writers of the guidelines will be observed in the tone and orientation of this volume. These views were developed during the review of the literature at the beginning of the study, and during the interviews which were conducted with police officers. They are listed here to demonstrate that the writers make no pretense of being completely objective.

a. Collective violence is apparently the result of growing tension among groups of communities. The growth of tension can be observed, over a period of time, by police in the performance of their normal duties. Following investigation and analysis of reports and behavior which indicate tension, police can take a number of actions which can serve, in some situations, to prevent violence. Prevention of collective violence in every case, however, is probably not possible.

b. All police officers are decision-makers in the context of their own assignments, and all provide information upon which other officers and unit (precincts, departments, etc.) commanders can base their decisions. The flow of information within law enforcement agencies consists of reports which reflect not only criminal activity but also a wide range of other social conditions including those which may indicate tension.

c. During a CV situation, the primary objective of law enforcement agencies is to end violence and restore order as rapidly as possible, while at the same time minimizing personal injury, property damage, animosity toward police and the likelihood of additional violence.

d. After CV has begun, or when crowds with potential for CV have formed, policemen must achieve their objectives through disciplined teamwork in support of command decisions. As a result, while continuing to maintain law and order to the best of their ability, police may find it necessary to refrain from

making arrests or otherwise enforcing the law when such actions would break up the team effort or provide an opportunity for the escalation of violence. Commanders must make the decisions affecting the nature of police responses based on their estimate of each situation, although it may be said that police efforts should concentrate first on actions against persons who are endangering life (with deadly weapons, fire, etc.).

e. Law enforcement and peace-keeping, although they are the specific duties of police, are general responsibilities of all citizens.

f. Police provide not only law enforcement and peace-keeping services but a number of their services in support of public health, welfare, education, sanitation, etc. Police may find it useful to increase these additional services from time to time in order to decrease tension in the community. Such increased effort—clearly not a duty of police—may be particularly effective when other public and private organizations fail to take action to reduce tension.

g. It should also be emphasized that the writers made no evaluative judgments of police practices, which are described herein as "guidelines." Accordingly, some of the guidelines which are included may be found unnaceptable to specific readers.

These guidelines assume, furthermore, that in every law enforcement agency, an individual or individuals fills the roles to be described below. The titles attached to these roles are intentionally general, and may not exist in any given department's table of organization. In very large departments, these roles are divided into more specialized roles. Small law enforcement agencies may require that one or two officers perform the duties entailed in all of these roles.

Chief of Police (Sheriff, Colonel, etc.). The commander and administrator of all law enforcement and peacekeeping forces in a specific jurisdiction. Also, the Chief is the law enforcement officer directly responsible to the overall government administration in the jurisdiction, and the primary point of contact between his agency and other public service departments within the same jurisdiction. The Chief is also the major link with heads of other law enforcement agencies.

Community Relations Personnel. The police officers whose primary responsibilities consist of maintaining an accurate, positive image of the police department and police officers in the minds of citizens, and assisting police in understanding the community. They are not involved in law enforcement activities directly, but support the actions of other officers by attempting to create an atmosphere in which police effectiveness will be high. They interact directly with citizens face-to-face or indirectly through the mass media. Community relations officers may also enlist the assistance of other police officers in fostering and supporting community development and human relations programs.

Intelligence Personnel. These include officers who are specifically assigned to the support of decision-making by gathering, analyzing and disseminating information pertaining to potential or actual collective violence. These also include detectives or agents who, in the course of investigations of criminal offenses other than CV, may collect information pertaining to CV.

Patrol Commander. This category consists of commanders of patrol shifts and all police officers who serve as commanders of police during crowd control and CV control operations. It should be noted that no particular rank is implied by the title "patrol commander."

Patrol Personnel. This group of police officers, for the purposes of this volume, consists of officers whose primary duties involve patrol of streets and initial police response to illegal activity, complaints, or requests for assistance. Furthermore, this group includes officers who may not be assigned to patrol except during crowd control or CV control operations.

Separate guidelines have been prepared for each of these police roles. Readers of this volume may wish to read the others as well, since the roles of police in prevention and control of CV clearly overlap. Law enforcement officers whose duties may extend across several of the roles mentioned above may find it especially useful to read all of the volumes. Care was taken to state all guidelines as concisely as possible, in an effort to minimize the size, and thus facilitate the practical use of each volume.

DISCUSSION OF TERMS

a. Collective Violence—(a) any group activity which interrupts legal patterns of behavior and causes property damage or personal injury, or (b) any

activity of an individual or group which interrupts legal patterns of behavior and causes multiple incidents of property damage and personal injury.

b. Groups—Conceivably, any group has the potential of causing or becoming involved in CV. Most police efforts which were observed, however, have been keyed to preventing and controlling violence among the following:

1. Political Activists—persons who demonstrate their belief that the Federal, state, or local government, or a huge range of government policies, should be changed. This group potentially includes all Americans who may choose to exercise the right of assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, this group cuts across all others which are mentioned below, and includes persons who favor or permit violence, although most are committed to non-violent action as a political tactic.

2. Students—Within the general area of campuses, students have protested the administration of their schools and various other political issues. By far, the majority have chosen to be non-violent, but some have employed violent methods including the use of lethal weapons.

3. Urban Minorities—The most striking cases of large-scale street violence has occurred among members of urban minority groups, especially urban blacks. The underlying causes of violence and the incidents which triggered these disturbances have been widely studied by police. Again, only a small percentage of urban minorities were connected with the disorders, and an even smaller number were actively violent.

4. Violent Extremists—Especially in recent years, a number of groups have developed which are openly dedicated to the use of any means, including violence, to achieve their goals. Most of these groups are small in any one community, but they may be linked to similar groups in other areas. They may or may not

have a well articulated political ideology on the far left or far right. They may be of a single race, ethnic or religious group, or a mixture of several. Bombings, ambushes, shoot-outs with police and planned destruction of property are tactics of these groups.

5. Labor Unions—Strikes, especially at very large factories or in the streets continue to present the potential for violence.

6. Gangs—Youth street gangs and motorcycle clubs, especially when rivalries between gangs develop, can generate violence, sometimes over an extended period.

7. Crowds—Persons drawn by various kinds of entertainment such as music concerts or athletic contests have, at times, become violent.

c. Prevention of Collective Violence—Prevention is the result of all actions taken by citizens, including police, in order to

1. Reduce tension among members of the community

2. Neutralize the influence of persons or groups who have expressed or demonstrated an inclination towards violence

3. Abort the planned violent activities of persons or groups

4. Protect, pacify or disperse crowds which may generate violence

5. Avoid triggering violence by intentional or inadvertant abuse of police authority.

d. Control of Collective Violence—Control is the result of all actions taken by citizens, especially police, in order to

1. Limit the geographical area and the number of persons affected by CV

2. Disperse violent groups

3. Minimize personal injury and property damage

4. Restore the rule of law and the value of order

5. Minimize the probability of the recurrence of CV.

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Police officers gather information on events and trends in the community on a continual basis. Such information, if it has any significance for CV at all, will be applicable to both prevention and control, since police act in a "preventive" capacity even when they are "controlling" a full-scale CV incident. Furthermore, intelligence produced during control operations may be used in preventing future outbreaks of violence. Why, then, is it useful to separate pevention from control at all? The answer focuses on the context in which police operations occur as is described by the following observations:

- Prevention activities are extremely valuable if effective, since control activities presume that some personal injury or property damage is occurring
- Prevention activities include all police actions accomplished in the course of normal police operations
- Prevention operations may address long-run community problems, while control operations focus on one short-run problem—violence—and the need for restoring order
- Many elements of information gathered during times when the local jurisdiction is quiet can be used to plan in advance for control operations
- Control operations require extensive planning and a high level of training
- Control operations demand disciplined, coordinated efforts of police officers working as a team
- Control operations occur in an atmosphere of pressure which magnifies the necessity for rapid gathering, processing and dissemination of intelligence, efficient communication and pre-planned command and control procedures.

Having stated these primary differences between prevention and control operations, it is now appropriate to discuss both types of activities, including their similarities and differences in terms of the elements of information required to support them.

Locations of CV

General Locations. Police know from long experience the general neighborhoods that have presented the threat of CV in the past. Through constant monitoring and analysis of tension indicators (i.e., public opinion and social and economic conditions), police can identify other potentially troublesome areas.

The relationship of likely CV areas to the entire jurisdiction must also be considered. An incident of CV in a small area, for example, may affect traffic flows in a much larger area of the jurisdiction. Furthermore, the whole jurisdiction must be considered in terms of its closeness to other jurisdictions where persons known to favor violence reside. Clearly, then, police planning and action relative to CV control must extend beyond the boundaries of the areas in which violence actually occurs.

Particular Locations. Within the neighborhoods which present a general threat of CV, certain locations may be identified as important. These places may be considered as three types.

- Areas where crowds are regularly present. Taverns, pool halls, threatres, housing projects, college student unions. These areas commonly attract large numbers of people for recreation and other social functions. The potential for CV increases, especially when criminal operatives, political dissidents, youth gangs and juveniles frequent these places.

- Areas when crowds assemble less often. Public parks, government building, college quadrangles, business establishments (such as banks and factories), sports stadiums and open fields are sometimes centers of social and political activity. Political demonstrations and protests, labor picketing, and "rock concerts" usually occur at or near these places.

- Areas which may become targets of CV. Police can identify potential targets, primarily through intelligence activities, but sometimes from public announcements from dissidents themselves. Government buildings (especially defense facilities), police stations, public utilities, etc., have been targets. After widespread CV has broken out, liquor, grocery, clothing, appliance and furniture stores may become targets.

Location Characteristics. Police also consider the ways that the characteristics of locations affect control operations. Each neighborhood will present a number of hiding places for persons and weapons and perches for snipers, and some buildings may affect radio transmissions.

Reasons for CV

Historical trends, the social and economic environment, the physical environment and competition for leadership contribute to increasing the potential for CV.

Historical Trends. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, Indian-Americans, Orientals, and other minorities are attempting as groups to make social and economic progress. They raise the level of tension among their own group by recalling their heritage as victims of persecution and oppression.

Although many people agree that minority groups should seek social and economic improvement, many also disagree with the way in which the minority groups work. Individuals and groups take action to oppose the minority group movements. They often use racial or ethnic stereotypes to fortify their opposition to the emerging minority groups. These stereotypes and the actions taken by the opposition groups raise the level of tension further and increase the potential for violence.

A third important historical trend is the fact that police departments are improving in many ways, but the attitudes of people toward police is changing less rapidly. In some areas, among some groups, the police of today represent all the mistakes which police have made in the past.

Social and Economic Environment. In urban areas, people often feel and are victimized by merchants, politicians and police. Especially in slum areas, the whole "system" seems to prey on the people. Poverty brings ignorance and illness—which breed more poverty. All kinds of criminals—drug pushers, robbers, burglars, loan sharks, extortionists, pimps, con men, etc.—all seem to thrive in the poor areas. The merchants are endangered by crime and bad debts, so they raise prices and anger more citizens. The politicians promise rapid social changes, but they seldom deliver. The police seem to bring trouble when they do their job of enforcing the law, but they never seem to enforce the law enough to protect citizens from crime.

On college campuses, the social and economic view is brighter, but the potential for violence can be just as great. Unlike a community, a college population is a very select group. Everyone is young, wanting to have fun, wanting to impress each other, wanting to find a way to make a living and possibly improve society. They want to assert their independence from parents and from other authorities. They want to demonstrate that they have their own ideas, their own interests, their own "life style."

As S. I. Hayakawa, President of San Francisco State College, has pointed out, college students are very good with words. Ability with words got them into college in the first place. Words enabled them to score high marks on high school tests and entrance exams. At college, students learn about life mostly through words—in books, in classrooms, in rap sessions, in rallies. Soldiers know about war and its horror because they have seen it in terms of jungle, rain, bullets and blood. Students see the same things—in words. Poor people know about poverty because they have felt hunger and sickness. They may have seen rats in the kitchen and muggings in the street. Students know these things exist—because they read about them. Police have witnessed crimes and have interviewed criminals. Students read the newspaper reports of crime. In each case, students are at a great disadvantage, because events like war, poverty and crime are complex, while words are simple. Consequently, students can gain real knowledge of events without necessarily facing all the difficulties which these events really entail. This is one reason why students are very good at discussing social problems, less good at providing solutions.

The combination of group pressures, youthful enthusiasm, growing knowledge and social impatience can increase the potential for violent action among students. The potential is increased even more when a large number of students on a campus are away from home. If they were arrested in their home towns, they would bring community disgrace on themselves and their families. The campus, on the other hand, may be far away from this social pressure. After college years, students will probably have relatively little contact with the university or the town. Accordingly, students from out-of-town are more willing to participate in potentially violent protests.

Physical Environment. A number of aspects of the physical environment also tend to raise the potential for CV. Apparently unequal public services can cause citizens, especially taxpayers, to become angry. In many areas, citizens are disturbed by the quality of street maintenance, trash collection, fire protection, police services, public transportation and recreation. Especially among tenants in low-income housing areas, dissatisfaction with public enforcement of building codes is deep and vocal. Failure of these public services gives residents the impression that society has physically isolated them in a holding camp for second-rate citizens.

Other aspects of the physical surroundings also increase tension. Crowding and abandoned buildings where rats breed and criminals hide sometimes lead people to think of themselves as helpless victims of "the system." When these physical conditions are removed by "urban renewal," the local environment actually becomes worse, at least temporarily. The demolition and re-construction of buildings, or the construction of highways and rapid transit facilities further disrupts the area, often without consideration of area residents. When new facilities, such as super-highways or

railways are completed, they become boundaries between communities. Those "on the other side of the tracks" may be depressed or feared. All of these physical conditions extend the potential for violent actions by residents.

Leadership Competition. The existence of organized political groups does not itself increase the potential for violence. Many groups and their leaders utterly oppose violence. But whenever an extremist group which advocates or condones violence emerges, competition for political leadership begins. The end result may be an increase in the potential for violence among all concerned.

Each group leader seeks political advantage by attracting as much attention as possible. In order to compete with other leaders, politicians tend to make hard, striking, and even outrageous statements which will be spread by the mass media and by word of mouth. These statements, even if completely non-violent, often create tension because they usually promise things which make current society look dismal.

When extremists enter the picture, the whole competition changes. They may actually advocate, incite, or perpetrate violence against society. Even if they only threaten violence repeatedly, they may be eventually forced, to take violent action. Otherwise, they may look foolish before their supporters, and their leadership status may be eroded.

During the control phase of CV operations, police have little opportunity to consider or influence the underlying reasons for violence. Police may be able to assist, however, in establishing meetings between community leaders who can reduce violence and government officials who can directly affect the conditions which led to violence. Furthermore, the fairness with which police control violence will affect the basic feelings of citizens toward police and society in the future.

Information must be collected even while violence is occurring to determing the reasons for continued violent action. The following paragraphs describe some of the reasons for the persistence of violent disturbances which have been reported by police.

a. An organized group, devoted to violence for its own sake or as an acceptable political tactic, is encouraging the continuation of the incident.

b. An organized group, devoted to a political or social change, is encouraging violence in the belief that it will further their cause.

c. Rumors are creating continuing tension.

d. Persons or groups believe that cases of apparent police misconduct will go unnoticed or unpunished and that "the people" must take their own revenge.

e. The general violence itself provides a mask for personal violent behavior which in "normal" times is prohibited by the customs and social pressures of the community.

f. Opportunities for looting or "rip-offs" encourage individuals to take advantage of the situation.

Time Considerations in CV

Collective violence can occur at any time, but police experience has shown that the potential for violence increases at the following times.

a. On Weekends. Time off from work means that people are free to gather in the streets. Since paydays are often on Fridays, many people have a surplus of cash on weekends. Weekend evenings are traditional times for drinking and recreation for many people. This leads to crowds, police involvement with traffic and other illegal actions, and perhaps, carless behavior by people "having fun."

b. During Hours of Darkness. Darkness provides a mask for vandals and persons intent on violent crimes such as arson to hide behind. People can shout at police, throw bottles and rocks or break into store fronts much more easily in the dark than during daylight hours. Crowds partially obscure the identities of individuals. At night, persons in a large group become almost anonymous.

c. After the Public Arrest (especially when physical coercion is necessary) of a Member of the Community. This may lead from charges of police brutality, to the formation of crowds, and finally to violence.

d. After or During Collective Violence in Other Areas of the City or Country. Most experts believe that the city riots of the 1960's were partially contagious. When dissident citizens of one city saw riots occurring elsewhere, they started "sympathy" demonstrations or riots in their own area. The best example of this kind of behavior was the widespread violence which followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April 1968.

e. After or During Local, National or International Events in Which Groups Have a Clear Interest. Spectacular incidents other than collective violence may become the occasion for CV. The treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, the United States incursion into Cambodia and other events have produced a collectively violent response among some groups. Such events are of great concern to many people, and consequently they receive extensive coverage in the media. Certain groups, such as militant American Jews or militant students may respond to these incidents with violence or with mass action which increases the potential for violence.

f. After or During Political Meetings or Demonstrations. Although they have been less frequent recently, mass political meetings and demonstrations are part of American life, and in most cases are non-violent.

The time of an outbreak can also have important effects on CV control efforts. Nightfall, rush hour traffic, convention or spectator crowds, groups of people leaving taverns at closing times—all of these exert extra pressures on police if violence breaks out at these times.

During the control phase, the most important aspect of time involves the rapidity with which police move from their normal operations, which emphasize individual decisiveness, to a CV control mode, which stresses disciplined, coordinated team effort.

The changeover to control operations is somewhat aided by the tendency of CV outbreaks to develop over a period of time. Prevention operations provide much information upon which decisions can be based during the control phase. Even the "triggering event" in a CV situation sometimes precedes overt violence by hours or even days. In the period between the first clear indication of violence and a large-scale outbreak, police can begin to execute control plans while intensifying preventive efforts as well.

Persons Involved in CV

The members of the community who are involved in CV and are of interest to law enforcement agencies include both those who are participating and those who are opposing the violence.

Participants in CV. The persons who may produce or participate in violence are listed here based on the level of their probable threat, and are described by the behavior which may indicate their potential danger.

- Persons may come to the area from outside for the purpose of confronting the police in the streets or for the purpose of committing another illegal act such as a bombing.
- Local groups may advocate violence and death for police, especially when these groups are fighting within themselves. Such groups are generally involved with isolated bombings and killings. They participate in mass violence only when the costs to them are low and the benefits high.
- Local individuals may have demonstrated animosity toward police or society and seek public support for their position.
- Ambitious political activists may attempt to gather large crowds in order to attract attention to their cause or to themselves.
- Juvenile gang leaders and members may try to draw attention to themselves.
- Group leaders may become convinced that collective violence is the correct way or at least an acceptable way to achieve benefits for the group These leaders may hold their position of leadership because of their material wealth in the midst of poverty, because they have achieved material success in the past or simply because they can act effectively as spokesmen for their groups (they need not be clergymen, club presidents or student body officers). They may even be involved in gambling, prostitution or more serious crimes and are leaders because they have expressed interest in group advancement. The group they represent may be as large as a whole race or class, or simply the "regulars" at the tavern or pool hall.
- Any other person may decide that his background and beliefs do not prohibit collective violence for the sake of personal or supposed community gain.

Opponents of CV. Since the prevention of CV is a relatively long-run effort, many citizens can be recruited by police to support programs that will reduce tension in the community.

Any person who has a clear interest in preserving the community or in frustrating those who seek violence can help. Even criminal operatives and political extremists may help to prevent violence if they can see that peace, at least temporarily, is in their best interests. More often, assistance to police in preventing CV will come from community action leaders, local businessmen, religious leaders, youth groups, and administrators of health, welfare, housing and education programs. Representatives of the mass media can also be very helpful.

During the control phase, police must determine who has actually become involved in participating in CV. These persons will include all those who have fostered, planned or committed acts of violence—perhaps to achieve a goal—and other citizens who have joined in the violence for their own reasons.

Groups and individuals must be identified, as well as their addresses and vehicles. The number of persons who are participating must also be estimated since police employ formations and tactics which are suited to crowd size. The number of participants will also indicate whether reserve forces should be readied or deployed.

An accurate assessment of who is involved may be hindered by two factors.

a. The sudden, apparently unorganized nature of many large civil disorders may disguise the characteristics of the groups and individuals involved.

b. Police may encounter difficulty in attempts to infiltrate groups who advocate violence; even though such infiltration may be necessary for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the triggering and sustaining of civil disorders. Infiltration is considered the single most effective way to determine who is involved in a violent event.

Assistance for police control operations is likely to come first from individuals or groups who attempted to help police in preventing CV. In some localities, active community relations boards—with many contacts in the community—have supplemented the police in taking rapid action to effectively control efforts. Members of such boards as well as other citizens can be asked to help, if circumstances permit, by taking direct action, especially in rumor control and other community relations efforts. It should be emphasized that the use of community resources can serve to prevent unfounded accusations of arbitrary police action or police brutality following the CV incident.

Types of CV Events

CV events and events which have been included in CV in the past consist of bombings, ambushes, shoot-outs, demonstrations, strikes and crowds. After any of these events has produced widespread violence or other illegal activity, they may be referred to as riots or mobs. It should be stressed that many demonstrations, strikes and crowds are completely legal gatherings in which police activity is devoted both to the protection of life and property and the guarantee of rights of free speech and assembly. Thus, these events should not be viewed beforehand as essentially violent, although each should be reviewed in terms of its potential for causing or providing the setting for violent activity.

Bombings may be the result of conspiracies, although some have been carried out by individuals. Bombings and ambushes usually require extensive planning and secrecy. Shoot-outs appear to be the result of general plans which can be enacted at any time, usually against police.

Demonstrations vary greatly in size and are organized in support or protest of government or institutional policies. Although most demonstrations are legal and intended to be peaceful, violence may develop within them on a small- or large-scale. Some demonstrations, furthermore, are essentially illegal, such as traffic disruption or the occupation of public or private buildings. A very small number of demonstrations have been not only illegal, but intentionally violent.

Strikes have the same characteristics as demonstrations, except that they are undertaken by persons who are very well organized (over many years, perhaps) and usually involve action of specific labor groups against specific business organizations or public service agencies.

Crowds vary greatly in size and usually are disorganized. Violence in crowds is usually not planned, and is small-scale, although it may grow.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

Actions which are most likely to require police action are listed in the following paragraphs in the order of their urgency.

Planned violence may be organized by individuals or groups against persons or property, especially against groups of persons. The bombing or burning of buildings, ambushes and ritual murders can be considered in this category which takes first priority for police preventive action.

Planned confrontations with police or confrontations with groups of citizens may occur. These will require police action to restore traffic flow or public order.

Spontaneous formation of groups of citizens to protest police action may follow public arrests. Whether the police action was correct or mistaken, crowds may react violently. Thus, in every case when arrests or other police work leads to spontaneous confrontation between police and groups, prompt action is required to prevent violence.

Crowds may grow or move beyond the limits of police capability to protect lives and property. This requires direct intervention by police to provide for orderly crowd growth and direct movement. When police intervention occurs, a confrontation between citizens and police can develop, and violence may result.

Violent reaction to the words of speakers or violent acts incited by speakers may occur at meetings and rallies. Potentially inflammatory speech, although protected from abridgment by the First Amendment, is reason for police to prepare to take action to prevent violence.

Tension may grow within a group in a place where potential for violence is high. This may occur, for example when performers fail to appear for concerts, and at athletic contests which excite feelings of participants.

If violence actually begins to occur, a virtually limitless number of different violent acts may be performed. Some of the most significant actions which have been reported by police include those in the following list.

- Threats to life are posed by snipers, arsonists, and persons with incendiary and explosive bombs.
- Fire and explosive also threaten real property
- Rioters attempt to destroy police vehicles with fire or other means.
- Violent persons throw a wide variety of missiles at police and other passers by, both in vehicles and on foot.
- Large or small groups attempt to break through police lines by force.
- Barricades are built to hinder traffic flow and to conceal and cover persons who are throwing missiles or sniping.
- Vandals break windows and may attempt to loot retail business stores or warehouses.

- Non-violent militants illegally block streets and building entrances or occupy buildings or offices. Although these acts are not violent in themselves, violence often results when police attempt to remove these persons who are breaking the law.

OUTLINE OF THE REMAINDER OF THIS VOLUME

Chapter II consists of introductory notes for the personnel for whom the volume was prepared. Chapters III, IV, V, and VI are entitled Planning, Training, Operations, and Evaluation, respectively. Relative to each of these activities, each chapter discusses the information which police require in support of decisions regarding both prevention and control of CV. Within each chapter, prevention and control guidelines are listed separately. Prevention and control guidelines are further broken down into categories based upon six essential intelligence elements:

- Locations of CV
- Reasons for CV
- Time Considerations in CV
- Persons Involved in CV
- Types of CV Events, and
- Ways in Which CV Occurs.

A similar format has been used in all the volumes of this series: Volume I, Chief of Police; Volume II, Community Relations Personnel; Volume III, Intelligence Personnel; Volume IV, Patrol Commander; and Volume V, Patrol Personnel.

II. INTRODUCTORY NOTES FOR PATROL COMMANDERS

Police officers who are in command of daily police patrol operations play an extremely important role in the prevention and control of collective violence. Such commanders are often in the best position to sense the problems of police in providing their services to the community and to evaluate the performance of individual policemen. Furthermore, patrol commanders are capable of monitoring, virtually on a minute-to-minute basis, the activities of police and providing rapid assistance when necessary.

In terms of planning and training, patrol commanders are, perhaps, the officers most capable of fitting personnel, equipment, communications and procedures together to produce a patrol organization which is effective in preventing and controlling CV. Attempts at planning and training a Tactical Patrol Force (TPF) and in preparing an Emergency Operations Manual and Plan will rely heavily on the operational expertise of patrol commanders.

When CV occurs, the patrol commander usually assumes the role of operational field commander of a part of the control forces or the entire force. At that point the most important duty of the commander is to assist other patrol officers in making the shift from individual to team effort.

Following violence, the patrol commander takes an active role in the evaluation of the personnel under his command. It is essential that the commander assess the performance of both individuals and his entire team. The patrol commander, accordingly, usually is heavily involved in the compilation of information to be included in the "after-action" reports which are submitted after CV control operations.

In most of the departments visited, the patrol commander had the rank of captain, chief of patrol or inspector. However in some localities, during some shifts, officers of other ranks function as the patrol commander. This volume is intended for those individuals (regardless of their rank) who are in command of patrol personnel.

III. PLANNING

Planning for prevention consists of all analyses and decisions undertaken by police to prepare operations which will reduce tension among normally nonviolent persons and to interrupt the potentially violent activities of persons who see violence as necessary or acceptable. Planning efforts include identification of needs, organization of action groups, formulation of prevention strategies, generation of tactics, selection and purchase of equipment and materials, and recruitment and training of personnel. Specific CV planning supplements a variety of police general orders, regulations and procedures which are inherent in routine police operations.

Planning for control includes all of the steps of planning for prevention, but is oriented toward preparing operations to restore order rapidly and to decrease the likelihood of further violence. Planning for control emphasizes the development of standard procedures which can be exercised swiftly and coordinated effectively. A recommended product of planning for control is an Emergency Operations Manual which prescribes Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics and Command and Control practices to be used during violent incidents. This manual is supported by all other police planning documents and procedures which are used by police during periods when CV is not occurring.

PLANNING FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1. From your assessment of the characteristics of the community, provide the Chief of Police with an estimate of the areas of the jurisdiction where the potential for violence is greatest. These will usually be the areas where hostility towards police is greatest and arrests are most frequent.

2. Based upon the characteristics of the potentially troublesome areas, develop plans for recruiting, training and operations that will help the police to better prevent violence. Bilingual officers and/or officers from minority groups may be needed. Extra training in family crisis intervention may be justified. Special assistance from community relations personnel may be required. Submit the plan to the Chief.

3. Evaluate the current complement of patrol personnel for their strengths and weaknesses in preventing collective violence. Devise a plan for exploiting and improving the strengths and fortifying the weaknesses.

4. Devise a plan (consisting of training and counselling) for emphasizing collective violence prevention to patrol personnel. Some officers may see some necessary prevention activities as outside the scope of police work since these activities may stress community development action and a "helping" relationship with citizens. Point out to them that the traditional law enforcement role of police, as well as the lives of policemen can probably be preserved only through such additional service to the community. Citizens other than police probably should be responsible for such preventive action. Those other citizens are not doing enough during the present period. If the role of professional police in a free society is to be preserved and improved, police for a time must learn some of the skills of social workers and counsellors as well as those of policemen.

5. Enlist the assistance of community relations and intelligence personnel in developing training for patrol personnel concerning the potential collective violence problems of specific areas of the jurisdiction.

6. Encourage patrol personnel to try to understand the problems of the overall jurisdiction, as well as those of specific neighborhoods. Such understanding does not imply that police enforce the law any less vigorously or that police must sympathize with criminal behavior. Rather, a full understanding of the social problems of a community may actually improve each officer's ability to perform his law enforcement and crime fighting duties.

Reasons for CV Potential

7. Encourage individual patrol members to broaden their appreciation of the community by taking courses given by the police department or by universities, colleges, or high schools.

8. Personal example is an effective method of encouragement. Develop an understanding of local social problems that can be used in the daily activities of the department. Take department courses in community relations and/or academic courses in related subjects if they are available.

9. Express the desire to wipe out racism or other prejudice within the department. Identify specific members of the patrol who continue to use racial or ethnic epithets, some of which may be directed to other members of the force. Counsel them that although these words may appear not "to bother anybody," they cannot help to eradicate prejudice either. Such behavior cannot be tolerated in any public service, especially the police force. In the same category belong references to stereotypes such as "hippies," "freaks," "weirdos," etc.

10. When men have been trained in courses dealing with the social problems of the community, formulate a plan for using their special skills.

Times When CV May Occur

11. Schedule manning levels to allow for the potential for violence at times identified by the Chief of Police, community relations personnel, intelligence personnel or by members of the patrol.

12. Develop a clear procedure for quick response to calls for coordinated police action to prevent public disorder. Make sure that all members of the force are aware of the procedure. Incorporate this procedure into the Emergency Operations Manual which is discussed before Guideline 19 below.

13. Develop a series of decision points for determining when to call for help involving more departmental manpower or for help from other law enforcement or National Guard organizations. Having such decision thresholds will help to prevent the use of emergency procedures when not warranted by the situation. Too frequent use of emergency procedures can ultimately result in police officers' underestimating the seriousness of emergency procedures.

Persons Who May be Involved in CV

14. Try to understand the goals, ideologies, and customs of all community organizations. In a non-violent confrontation with a group, "speaking their language" and understanding their motivations may help to encourage the group to disperse peacefully. Some confrontations can be avoided if police know the beliefs and behavior patterns of groups. Many young people will gather in public parks, for example, and become noisy or careless with food wrappers, bottles, etc. In most cases, they come not to antagonize anyone, but simply to enjoy the outdoors. If police challenge them to take care of the environment and respect the rights of others, they may respond favorably. On the other hand, if police incorrectly assume that they have come to cause trouble or violate the law, and greet them with tough language or rough treatment, the group may decide to actually make trouble.

15. Similarly, encourage patrol personnel to know as much as possible about the goals, ideologies and customs of community groups.

16. Estimate the number of men needed to control crowds of various sizes in various parts of the jurisdiction. This estimate is needed in making the decision to ask for manpower from other law enforcement agencies to assist in containing a situation.

Events Which May Lead to CV

17. Analyze the state of training among patrol personnel to determine what additional training is needed for dealing with group tension, especially at the scene of arrests or demonstrations that police might consider outrageous. Suggest needed training to the Chief of Police.

18. Review the adequacy of vehicles and communications devices that are available and that would be called into action in prevention of CV. Mobility and the efficiency of communications equipment is important in taking action to reduce tension. Suggest needed improvements to the Chief of Police.

PLANNING FOR CONTROL

Although many of the prevention guidelines (above) are clearly applicable to control planning as well, the following discussion specifically oriented to control planning should be considered.

Planning for control consists primarily of three major steps: (1) the development of a set of written operational procedures for use by the local department during crowd control and CV (these written procedures will be referred to as the Emergency Operations Manual and Plan); (2) the institution of a mutual aid

arrangement with other nearby law enforcement agencies; and (3) the design of a centralized, well equipped command center. Many police departments have achieved success with these three steps.

A discussion of the procedures to follow in preparing an Emergency Operations Manual or "ready book" is beyond the scope of this report, although the guidelines support such a manual. The preparation of a manual is described well elsewhere:

- Civil Disturbances and Disasters, Department of the Army, FM 19-15, March 1968.
- Staff Organization and Procedures, Department of the Army, FM 101-5, June 1968.
- Civil Disturbance Orientation Course Material, Department of the Army, the Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
- Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planng, Smith and Kobetz.

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) should be a secure, centrally located facility from which the commander of local or overall mutual aid forces can provide effective direction for all personnel. The EOC should include a situation map, a communication center, an operations center, an intelligence center, briefing rooms and offices. Arrangements must be made to provide space for any National Guard or other state officers who may establish headquarters. A more complete discussion of the EOC is included in the publications cited above concerning the Emergency Operations Manual.

The development of the mutual aid plan is usually the responsibility of the Chief.

The patrol commander's responsibilities in planning for control involve working with the Chief to insure that an effective "ready book" is developed; and being familiar with all such procedures and making certain that all men under his command are properly prepared to perform their duties.

Locations of CV

19. In those areas that are likely sites for CV, locate possible sites for use as police staging areas, command posts, access routes, etc. Review these areas, taking into account their geographical and structural characteristics. Make sure that all tactical plans can be implemented in these areas.

20. Planning for effective curtailment of police response and withdrawal from areas of violence can be just as important as mobilization planning.

Time Considerations in CV

21. Whenever an event approaches which has the potential for CV, prepare a schedule for relief of patrol personnel assigned to control operations if violence should occur. This schedule may be used, with slight modification, again and again.

22. Analyze the effects of various light and weather conditions on the usefulness of your equipment, materials, tactics, and personnel. Prepare altemative combinations of these resources which will be most effective at various times.

23. In coordination with intelligence personnel, consider the effects of daily, weekly and seasonal differences in personal and vehicular traffic. CV, during rush hours, or weekend nights, during conventions or tourist seasons might present special problems that you may be able to anticipate.

Persons Involved in CV

24. Estimate the number of men needed to control crowds of various sizes in various parts of the jurisdiction. Use the estimate in planning decisions of the following types:

a. The commitment of specially trained forces (such as a Tactical Patrol Force)

b. The commitment of all available personnel from within the department

c. The request of help from nearby law enforcement agencies

d. The request of the Chief of Police that he inform the local government that the National Guard should be readied or deployed.

25. Arrange for the interrogation of suspects arrested during CV as to the reasons for their participation. There may be legal problems involved in these interrogations so great care is needed. However, some prisoners probably will talk with officers.

Types of CV Events

26. Assure that the Emergency Operations Manual and other planning documents adequately cover the types of incidents that appear likely to produce CV.

27. Make inspections to determine if the unit and personal emergency equipment which is needed to execute plans is available and is maintained in a high state of readiness.

28. Include in the training program sufficient coverage of the tactics and equipment prescribed for control of CV in various plans.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

29. Consider the CV tactics that you have seen employed against the police, read reports and talk with patrol officers in other cities, to learn what CV tactics are being experienced elsewhere. Use this information to develop procedures and plans for the operations manual that will be effective against these tactics as well as in ongoing training for patrol personnel.

IV. TRAINING

Training for the prevention of CV consists of all efforts to prepare police for preventive operations. Training familiarizes police with underlying causes of tension in the community with local groups which exploit or increase tension, the ways in which violence develops, and the times and places where CV may occur. The goal of training is to prepare officers to recognize and reduce tension, detect approaching violence and thwart the attempt of individuals or groups to commit violence. Training for prevention of CV can be incorporated into police recruit training, and it can be given as supplemental training to experienced officers. A large number of universities, colleges and adult evening schools also support police training for prevention of CV with courses in the fields of sociology, psychology, and economics.

Training is clearly a responsibility of command. It is also clear that all police officers, including the patrol commander receive training. The discussion below will focus on the steps that the patrol commander should take to plan and provide training.

Although police at higher ranks may have a high level of professional expertise, opportunities for in-service or school training in both prevention and control of CV should be made available whenever time and budgetary constraints permit. Advances in law enforcement techniques are occurring at a rapid rate, and the problems which police are asked to address are increasing in number and complexity. In such an environment, all officers are likely to benefit from training.

TRAINING FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1. On orientation tours of neighborhoods for patrol personnel newly assigned to an area, point out the areas which have potential for CV, as well as those areas that are often centers of criminal activity. Avoid, when possible, the assignment of new patrolmen to potentially violent areas.

Reasons for CV Potential

2. Stress the role of police on patrol in working to decrease the reasons for violence, primarily by executing their duties in a well-planned, professional, courteous manner.

3. Discuss forthrightly the problem of prejudice and how it might be overcome. Emphasize that citizens (including police) can do absolutely nothing to re-write the past higtory of prejudice, and so no purpose is served by by feeling guilty. All citizens can act now, however, to reduce prejudice in their own lives. One example of a way in which this subject might be brought to the attention of police is the statement which follows. "All people, it may be said, can be put into three groups:

   a. Those who are prejudiced against certain groups, are proud of it, and by word and action strengthen their prejudice

   b. Those who are prejudiced and refuse to try to change

   c. Those who are prejudiced in some way, recognize it, and try every day to change, to reduce their prejudice in dealing with individuals or in considering thier problems.

   For policemen to be true professionals, they must be included in the third group. Anything else is unacceptable and dangerous to the community and to the police officers themselves."

4. Prepare some examples of how political leaders (non-violent and violent) have used the characteristics of a deprived area, a factory, or a campus as issues in building their political fame and power. Point out that this sort of campaigning can be done for clearly humanitarian reasons or for misguided reasons. In any case, political campaigns which emphasize the need for change in communities increase the level of tension. Police assist in the orderly process of change by maintaining public order and enforcing the law. Only the prevention of violence makes a rational, gradual approach to change workable.

5. Inform trainees that the conversations of citizens on the street, especially in crowds and when arrests are being made, can often indicate why citizens are angry. Police action often encourages people to complain about every dissatisfaction they have. Some dissatisfactions which are felt very deeply, if left unnoticed, they may increase tension. Police can note them and bring them to the attention of their superiors.

6. Discuss the desire and ability of organized conspiracies to perpetrate violence in the United States. Cite examples. Discuss, if security allows, the importance of any conspiratorial groups which may exist as a potential cause of violence in the local community. There is a danger, in this instance of exaggeration which may mislead trainees into overestimating the number and danger of conspiracies. State only the facts available on this topic.

Persons Who May Be Involved in CV

7. Advise patrol personnel to rely on other members of the force as much as possible when dealing with individuals or groups that seem to be leaning toward violence. Information available at the police station can be made available rapidly and effectively, via patrol car radio, to help patrol personnel in estimating the danger of a specific situation. The patrol commander can respond with instructions over the radio or with more manpower if he thinks a number of people in a group, or specific individuals, are likely to start trouble.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

8. Cite examples of ways in which crowds can be turned into mobs. Small groups can hand out small weapons (bags of feces, rocks, bottles, golf balls with nails in them, etc.). Speakers can use inflammatory language, point at police as examples of oppression, etc. Women may make abusive sexually-oriented remarks about police or other members of the crowd. Persons may attempt, by assaulting police, to have themselves arrested.

The patrol commander should relate these examples to the procedures for reporting and for controlling violence.

9. Alert patrol personnel against the tendency of police to start rumors before and during very tense situations.

TRAINING FOR CONTROL

Training for control consists of familiarizing police personnel with the Emergency Operations Manual and exercising the instructions contained in the Manual until proficiency is achieved. Police also require familiarity with various types of crowd control formations and with the kinds of threats which may be encountered during a violent incident. As opposed to training for daily police work which emphasizes individual judgment and action, training for CV control stresses coordinated, disciplined team work. Training in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies who are components of a mutual aid plan may be required. Some departments have provided special training for a small number of personnel, sometimes called a "Tactical Patrol Force." Training for control may also be supplemented by courses such as the Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (CDOC) given by the U.S. Army at Ft. Gordon, Georgia.

Locations of CV

10. During training sessions or roll-call briefings, describe the characteristics of particular area(s) which have a high potential for violence. Using available maps, explain how the procedures contained in the operations manual will be applied to the area(s) concerned.

11. If the training budget permits, have a field exercise in a mock-up of a disturbance area.

Reasons for CV

12. Help patrol members to understand why individuals in the community are likely to be involved in CV episodes. Teach them that some of the reasons may be very deep and lead to extreme violence. The only protection against such violence and the only effective way to end CV is organized, disciplined team work among police.

Persons Involved in CV

13. Instruct patrol personnel in ways to determine (a) the number of persons in a crowd, (b) their activities, and (c) the composition of the group, e.g., age, social and economic background, distinctive clothing, level of organization in movements, apparent level of discipline and training. During a disturbance, reports from patrol personnel about such factors may become important in assessing the danger of the situation, anticipating targets, etc.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

14. Describe the tactics to be used against persons who are breaking the law in various situations. Use after-action reports from other violent incidents to suggest how formations, arrest procedures, relief schedules, cooperation with citizens and leaders, and use of chemical agents and other weapons have proven useful in the past.

15. Insure that patrol personnel have been thoroughly trained in operational procedures.

16. Prepare training for patrol personnel which will familiarize them with the probable citizen actions which increase tension in a group. Make sure that the weapons and tactics of all groups known to be potentially violent are included in the training, as well as all police responses to them which are available. Consider exercises in using various procedures and equipment which are available to the department.

V. OPERATIONS

Operations for prevention of CV include all efforts by police or encouraged by police to detect and reduce tension and to reped attempts at initiating violence. These operations include community relations, press relations, information collection, verification, processing and dissemination, street patrol, crowd control and various types of community services. Although some extraordinary actions may be required to prevent CV, most preventive efforts are part of daily police work.

Operations for control includes the deployment, movement, command, control and support of police officers to end violence, protect persons and property, restore order and preclude the recurrence of violence. During control operations, patrol, intelligence, community relations and command functions focus on curtailing violence while continuing to perform law enforcement and other services outside of the area of violence.

OPERATIONS FOR PREVENTION

Potential Locations of CV

1. Brief members of regular patrol on areas where CV is likely. Advise patrol members to use extra caution in making arrests and in taking other police action. When tension is high, and when feasible, plan arrests by warrant during early morning hours. Effect the arrest as quietly and as quickly as possible.

2. If potential for violence is known to be great, order patrolmen to report immediately all information indicating the possible development of violence. Monitor complaints and radio transmissions during the shift, especially during periods of high tension. Radio receivers, tuned to police car radio frequency can be kept on commanders' desks while they are performing administrative work. Remind officers responding to incidents or complaints in high-tension areas to be cautious. Order other officers to stand by when incidents occur in potentially violent areas.

3. Relay all newly obtained information on the subject areas from patrolmen to intelligence personnel.

Reasons for CV Potential

4. Tell members of patrol that whenever a crowd gathers, the potential for CV exists, especially in high-tension areas.

5. Remind patrol officers that hasty action and overreaction by police have contributed to CV in the past. Remind them to keep as calm as possible.

6. Remind the patrol officers to be aware of the historical, economic and social pressures in the community. Although they are not responsible, in most cases, for the development of these complex trends, the police can often do the most to correct them.

Times When CV May Occur

7. Remind patrolmen to be especially watchful for developing CV on weekends and weekend nights, and during other known periods of high tension.

8. Request assistance immediately following any incident involving police and large crowds of people. Maintain high level of readiness until information is found to indicate that the potential for CV is low.

9. Consult with intelligence personnel to determine what events are upcoming, their potential for violence, and at what times during the events violence is most likely to occur.

10. Plan alternative manning schedules for deploying men to handle various CV situations which may occur at times when police are needed for other duties.

11. Coordinate with traffic patrols to plan a traffic routing schedule to avoid congestion of private vehicles which might disrupt the movement of potentially violent crowds, police, or interrupt the flow of other services needed to control crowds.

Persons Who May Be Involved in CV

12. Inform patrolmen of the names and probable locations of all individuals in the area who are known to be members of groups which advocate violence, especially physical violence directed to police.

13. Advise patrolmen in each patrol area to be listening for the names of persons who are supposedly trying to increase the potential for violence. Citizens will talk about these people if they are sufficiently worried about the prospect of CV.

Events Which May Lead to CV

14. Inform all members of the patrol to watch for the most likely ways that violence could develop from each specific crowd situation. Also, based on intelligence reports, tell them which kinds of violence (some of which may be rumored) will almost definitely not occur.

15. Have ready the equipment and manpower which is appropriate for the potential CV situation, including the help of other law enforcement agencies and the National Guard.

Ways Which CV May Develop

16. Plan manning and formations to fit the most probable pattern of development of violence.

17. Inform patrol personnel of the level of danger of violence. Never exaggerate the potential for violence, since this will make the officers more concerned than necessary. Simply tell the patrol personnel whether they have special assignments, special gear, special areas of operation.

OPERATIONS FOR CONTROL

The control phase, in general, consists of implementing the Emergency Operations Plan and Manual, the Mutual Aid Plan, when necessary, and the supervision of the Emergency Operations Center. The guidelines which are presented below, therefore, are oriented toward some command (and liaison) activities which may be undertaken during control operations to insure that plans are executed effectively.

Locations of CV

18. Determine where patrolmen are most needed; avoid saturation patrols in quiet neighborhoods if animosity is apt to increase.

19. Modify beat and patrol assignments to provide needed coverage; utilize state police and National Guard assistance if available to supplement police patrols during CV.

Time Considerations in CV

20. Have patrolmen report as precisely as possible, activities of crowds which seem about to become violent.

21. Request assistance from reserve forces when things look like they might get out of hand, not after they are totally uncontrolled. The costs of requesting aid either unnecessarily or too soon is small compared to the personal injury and property losses that can result from collective violence.

22. Be alert to the situations in which the radio net is overloaded or the communication system appears to be overwhelmed. This is an indication of increased police activity and therefore might indicate that CV is out of control in a particular area.

Persons Involved in CV

23. In planning for announced mass gatherings, do not take the estimates of crowd size furnished by organizers at face value. They generally tend to overestimate the number of participants considerably. Check other sources. Try to determine which local and outside groups might participate.

Types of CV Events

24. Before committing forces and before briefing men, determine the exact nature of the disturbance. Exactly what is happening can be even more important than where it's happening or who's doing it. The unlawful nature of the group activity must be demonstrated and documented before police control action is appropriate.

Ways in Which CV Occurs

25. Determine how violent persons intend to achieve their objective. Such information is essential in order to formulate a specific plan of action, and to rapidly and firmly execute the plan.

26. Locate and protect any police, military or private, arms, equipment, and supplies which might be seized by violent persons if left unguarded.

27. Determine if snipers are apt to be used, and if so, station guards on all high buildings in the troubled area.

28. Patrolmen should be carefully briefed about how not to trigger riots: avoid confronting crowds; avoid use of maximum cruising speed and use of sirens the last two or three blocks before entering an area in patrol cars, particularly where hostile crowds have gathered; don't raise clubs or make any other bluff.

29. If the route of a planned protest march or parade is known, have patrol personnel keep watch for cars parked nearby that are known to belong to militants or appear suspicious. In some areas, militants have used this tactic to move weapons, bricks, and bottles on the scene. Also note nearby construction areas where bricks and other weapons may be obtained. Have cans filled with trash removed by the sanitation department.

30. Never assume that radio transmissions are not being monitored. If monitoring becomes a serious problem, consider the purchase of scramblers or UHF equipment. Some jurisdictions with American Indian policemen have used Indian dialects (e.g., Navajo) in the transmission of important messages when scramblers were not available.

31. Tactical units should make a maximum effort to maintain communications with the command post. Serious problems occur when officers become isolated or cut-off from the bulk of the force. If budget permits, equip all officers in tactical squads with portable radios.

32. A large show of force in response to a group disturbance may not always be a good tactic. With certain groups this will only arouse their hostility. Sometimes it is better to use the minimum number of police necessary to control the crowd. Do keep a strong force in reserve nearby which can respond quickly if necessary.

33. Use imagination in the implementation of riot control tactics. Trail bikes, scooters, and horses are often useful in pursuing small bands of rioters or splinter groups who might be able to elude police on foot. When armored vehicles have not been available, municipal dump trucks have provided protection for tactical units moving short distances. Dump trucks are also very difficult to overturn.

34. Stationing police behind demonstrators and in the crowd sometimes discourages rock throwing.

VI. EVALUATION

This section will discuss the ways in which the patrol commander can assist the Chief of Police in conducting assessments of prevention and control actions. Evaluation is undertaken to determine how well police are conforming with prescribed procedures and how effective their actions are. Inadequacies will indicate the need for an increase or reordering of operations.

The evaluation function is a responsibility of command. The Chief of Police may delegate the task of evaluation to a Deputy Chief, to a separate internal review section, to a strategic intelligence or community relations unit or to another high-ranking officer. In smaller departments, or as needed, the Chief may perform the evaluation on his own.

Each policeman should make an evaluation of his own performance. Any inadequacies should be identified, with no implication of fault or guilt necessary. Supervisory and command personnel should also evaluate the capabilities of their subordinates without implying the necessity of assessing blame or prescribing punishment. Improvement in performance is the primary objective of evaluation.

EVALUATION OF PREVENTION

Evaluation of any preventive activity in CV is always difficult, because when problems do not become acute, there is usually little solid evidence that CV would have occurred if police had not intervened effectively. The evaluation criteria listed below, therefore, are numerous, and although each is related to tension in the community, estimates of a small number of them will probably suffice for evaluation of the prevention activities of most departments.

Recently, many departments have developed and implemented "Management Information Systems (MIS)." These systems, which emphasize rapid storage, retrieval and dissemination of accurate data, would be very compatible with the evaluation criteria mentioned below.

Suggested Evaluation Criteria

1. When violence does not occur at the scene of a crowd, police performancy may be judged entirely successful if:

    a. Patrol commander(s) made a decision concerning deployment of forces to the scene and prepared a contingency plan for further deployment

    b. Patrol commander notified and coordinated internal support functions including communications and traffic patrols.

2. In order to appraise the ability of the department to detect rising tension, the following information is required:

    a. The ability of patrol commanders to increase community information collection by patrol personnel

    b. The ability of patrol commanders to increase the accuracy and completeness of reports of community developments which are submitted by patrol personnel

    c. The ability of patrol personnel to perform their law enforcement role without denying their own dignity or that of citizens.

3. The attitudes and behavior of citizens in dealing with police indicate to some extent the effectiveness of attempts by police and other citizens to reduce tension in the community.

Some of the indicators of citizen attitude which police can estimate directly are:

a. Number of physical attacks on policemen in view of other citizens (in a year or month)

b. Number of physical attacks on police vehicles or other property

c. Number or reported cases of resistance to arrest

d. Number of reports of police brutality (accurate reports, reports that are exaggerated because of emotion, reports that are inaccurate and deliberate lies)

e. Number of anti-police demonstrations

f. Number of physical attacks on other public servants (especially firemen) or employees of utilities, or on their vehicles or property

g. Number of citizens who support activity or participate in the activities of groups who preach hatred of police or of other groups

h. Number of instances of verbal abuse of police in the performance of their duties or as private citizens.

4. Some other measures will be ambiguous. It may be difficult to separate increased indications of trouble from the increased willingness of people to help police by reporting. Some examples of ambiguous responses from the people are:

a. Number of complaints made to police about public services. These may indicate greater dissatisfaction with local government. On the other hand, increased reporting may also indicate improved reliance on the police and on local government ot correct local conditions.

b. Number of youths who ask for police help, especially in schools, in order to solve personal problems or to reduce the severity of criminal prosecution for minor offenses. Increases in this number are probably a favorable indication because they imply that the police are gaining the confidence of youth.

c. Number and intensity of rumors reported to police. These should be expected to increase when a rumor control center is established. Thereafter, the number of rumors should level off until tension increases.

d. Number of complaints of police corruption or incompetence. The tone and accuracy of these reports will indicate their value. If most of the complaints appear to be highly emotional or deliberately false, tension is probably increasing. If most of the reports are correct, or at least plausible, citizens are probably displaying their confidence that police are interested in improving the department.

Potential Locations of CV

5. Appraise the ability of the patrol force to accomplish its law enforcement and community service roles in each area of the command. In considering areas where difficulties have arisen or persist, take into account the number and level of training of police personnel who work in those areas.

6. Report to the Chief of Police your assessments of police efforts and citizen response to police action.

Reasons for CV Potential

7. Assess changes in the community which have been reported by patrol personnel. Has verbal abuse of police become less frequent or less intense? Has the quality of public services such as sanitation, road maintenance, or recreation changed? Have the police helped, and have they been given credit for assisting, in community improvements? Have the most violence-prone militant groups gained or lost members or community support?

8. Can all patrol personnel perform their duties effectively in a social and economic environment which has some potential for CV? Is additional training for patrol personnel necessary, or should the emphasis of police operations be placed on better community relations or intelligence? Are patrol personnel actively reporting community problems other than illegal activity?

9. Report the results of the evaluation to the Chief.

Times When CV May Occur

10. Consider how quickly patrol personnel make reports about apparent trouble developing in the community. Police officers, after trouble has already developed, should never say things like "I could have told you" or "Nobody ever asked me." The goal is to achieve a level of interest in every officer which motivates him to report his observations of the community "atmosphere" promptly.

11. Does information gathered by detectives and intelligence personnel always arrive on time for patrol personnel to take effective action to prevent CV? Is there time for briefings, reviews of plans and rehersals? Could dissemination of information by improved by new standard procedures or by more personnel coordination between the patrol commander and intelligence personnel?

12. Would communications equipment such as a teletype in every patrol car greatly increase the ability of police to prevent CV?

13. Report your appraisal and recommendations to the Chief.

Persons Who May be Involved in CV

14. Do patrol personnel know the names and probable locations of persons and groups who may attempt to cause CV? Do patrol officers know their insignia, their vehicles, and the likelihood of their carrying weapons?

15. Do patrol personnel know the goals and programs of dissident groups who are opposed to violence? Such understanding might prevent violence from developing out of minor confrontations.

16. Does the patrol commander remind patrol officers of dangerous indivduals (relative to CV) during roll-call briefings?

17. Would greater detail concerning such individuals be more helpful to patrol members if intelligence officers could provide it?

18. Report observations and suggestions to the Chief of Police.

Events Which May Lead to CV

19. Consider which types of potential CV are the most difficult for police to handle. Have patrol members achieved a high level of readiness for handling demonstrations, confrontations, and individual arrests in high-tension areas?

20. Have patrol personnel developed the ability to correctly assess the level of threat of violence in a group? Have any individual officers become highly competent in sizing up a crowd situation so that when a crowd is expected to be peaceful, they can be assigned to watch the crowd alone, or with just a few other officers? Some departments have found that a few highly trained men are less threatening to a crowd than a large number, and are less likely to antagonize groups or present them with targets for verbal or physical abuse.

Ways in Which CV May Develop

21. Was all available intelligence information on weapons and tactics of potentially violent groups or persons communicated to patrol personnel through the patrol commander?

22. Were patrol personnel able to react to the threats that were presented without personal injury to themselves or to others? Would additional planning, training, or equipment have helped?

23. Report your findings and recommendations to the Chief of Police.

EVALUATION OF CONTROL

Evaluation of control operations, of course, begins while violence is still occurring. Based upon this type of evaluation, the Chief of Police and patrol commanders make decisions concerning the deployment and tactics of control forces. These considerations were mentioned in the "Operations for Control" section of this volume.

The type of evaluation which is discussed below begins after violence has ended and is intended to support decisions concerning changes in the organizations, equipment, training and operational procedures of control forces.

The essence of the evaluation which follows control operations is the "after-action report." This report should be a detailed, overall description of the violence itself, the actions which police and other forces took to end the violence and the level of effectiveness which was achieved. The preparation of this overall report, in some departments, has been assigned to a single high-ranking officer who is then responsible for compiling and supervising reports from patrol, intelligence, community relations and command personnel who were directly involved in control operations. Some departments have made such a task more efficient by instituting a separate evaluation unit—independent of all other operational units. This independent unit is designed to function at all times, but may be particularly important during CV operations when charges of misconduct are often levied against police.

In cases where very serious incidents of CV occur, evaluation of control operations by agencies outside of the law enforcement community may be necessary. In recent years, the bulk of collective violence has emanated from political issues. In such a context, the community and the entire nation need an in-depth view of the achievements of law enforcement agencies in dealing with CV. Many persons, including members of the mass media, the academic community, legislative bodies, etc., have attempted to produce such evaluations, and police have solicited other studies. Such investigations by persons outside of law enforcement may often assist police, and they may be accomplished by local groups or by persons from outside the jurisdiction. Many experts have worked extensively to understand collective violence, and many other persons representing public opinion, discussion and thought may be available to evaluate serious outbreaks of CV.

The patrol commander can support the Chief in the evaluation process by providing complete information in his "after-action reports." The following guidelines discuss the kinds of information that should be included.

Locations of CV

24. Determine if any areas presented problems that police could not deal with successfully. Did the lack of success result from lack of police capability; or, were the needed police resources available but not at the problem area on time?

Reasons for CV

25. Consider the nature of resistance to police control efforts. Did a number of people fight police even after their anonymity was taken away? This would indicate a high level of anger, dedication, or desire to "show-off."

Time Considerations in CV

26. Were patrol personnel effective in controlling violence during hours when traffic normally peaks or when crime tends to increase? Did darkness greatly affect the ability of police to respond?

27. Was the rotation of police schedules accomplished without overtaxing the capabilities of individual patrol personnel?

28. Did the department and other agencies mobilize within an acceptable length of time? Were emergency notification procedures within the department and between the department and other agencies effective?

29. Did intelligence personnel inform the patrol commander of all available information indicating the development of violence before the outbreak? Or was information held back or "lost" until violence had begun?

30. Were back-up manpower, equipment and material delivered to patrol personnel rapidly?

Persons Involved in CV

31. In the after-action report, include all available information on the CV participants and group or mob leaders. Be alert for any new information on the identification or "actual" versus "apparent" leaders of the action.

32. Did patrol officers utilize field interrogation forms and pass along any information? Were correct arrest procedures followed which preserved evidence that would be admissable in court?

Ways in Which CV Occurred

33. From observations and reports from patrol personnel and others, rate the performance of police in combatting the various weapons and tactics which violent persons employed during the incident.

34. Did police communications or command and control falter or break down during the disturbance? Did radio traffic become so undisciplined that control seemed to be breaking down? Did the formations used during the CV incident allow all officers to maintain contact with the commander? Did the liaison with other law enforcement agencies result in effective coordination of activities?

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