DEPARTMENT OF
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL

A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE FINDINGS OF THE

SPECIALLY MARKED PATROL VEHICLE STUDY

SENATE BILL 1873

OPERATIONAL PLANNING SECTION

This publication may be purchased for $5.70 plus California sales tax.

LDA

AUGUST 1988

DISCLAIMER

The opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this report are those of the California Highway Patrol and not necessarily those of the State of California. The contents of this report do not constitute standards, specifications, or regulations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Specially Marked Patrol Vehicle Pilot Program was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Senate Bill 1873. This legislation, approved by Governor George Deukmejian on September 26, 1986, was authored by State Senator John Seymour and sponsored by the California Trucking Association.

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Credit for the success of this pilot program is due, for the most part, to the Traffic Officers and Sergeants from participating Division and Area Commands. Field Commanders were instrumental in coordinating Field activities. Appreciation is extended to the staff of Operational Planning Section, with special thanks to Mr. Dan Germain, Research Analyst II, for assistance in preparation of this report.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



BACKGROUND

TRUCK ACCIDENTS

The issue of truck accidents on California highways is a significant concern to the California Highway Patrol (CHP), the Legislature, governmental and traffic safety agencies, and the motoring public. Truck accidents in California have increased 43 percent over the five year period 1982 through 1986. Truck-at-fault (TAF) accidents during this period increased from 45.6 percent of all truck accidents occurring statewide to nearly 51 percent. In 1986, there were 38,163 truck accidents, of which 19,443 were TAF, i.e., the truck driver or equipment caused the accident. Fatal and injury accidents involving trucks have increased 40.2 and 36.2 percent respectively for the period 1982 through 1986. Approximately nine out of ten TAF accidents during this period were caused by driver error. The three leading accident-causing driver errors were unsafe speed, turning, and lane changes.

For many years truck drivers have been held in high esteem as professionals; however, public regard for the trucking industry has slipped as congested highways and smaller profit margins have combined to set the stage for unsafe driving practices. Despite enhanced CHP enforcement strategies and education efforts, truck accidents continue to grow at an alarming rate.

LEGISLATION

The CHP implemented the Specially Marked Patrol Vehicle (SMPV) Pilot Program on January 12, 1987 and it ran through December 31, 1987. This program was instituted in compliance with Senate Bill 1873, which was sponsored by the California Trucking Association. Senate Bill 1873 required the CHP to institute a pilot program using patrol vehicles, not readily identifiable as CHP enforcement vehicles, to primarily enforce heavy truck rules of the road. In enacting this law, the Legislature acknowledged that a continued disregard for the safe operation of heavy commercial vehicles by some drivers existed. The Legislature recognized that the CHP had limited ability to combat the unsafe operation of commercial vehicles by drivers who employed various methods of communication to evade apprehension.

PROGRAM OBJECTIVE

The objective of the pilot program was to increase compliance with rules of the road relating to heavy truck operations. The perceived risk of apprehension was expected to contribute to the enhanced compliance. The goal of the program was to realize a reduction in the number of TAF accidents.

PROGRAM OPERATIONS

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

Management of the overall program and involved Field resources was accomplished through the established organizational role of CHP staff and Field commands. An operational plan and study design determined the objectives, scope, and methodology of the study. Field Commanders maintained functional control of participating Field personnel and involved resources. Field commands were responsible for implementing the program within the approved guidelines and study parameters. Specialized administrative positions were established to ensure the proper direction of the program and the effective use of CHP personnel and resources.

TEST SITES

Five test sites (e.g., segments of highway upon which SMPVs were deployed) were selected by the CHP Executive Management. These test sites involved ten CHP Area commands within four CHP Field Divisions. Several criteria were considered in the selection of test sites, the most important of which was TAF accident volume. The following test sites afforded the opportunity to study the use of SMPVs in rural and metropolitan environments, free-flowing traffic and dense commuter traffic, and level, straight highways, as well as graded curving highways.

- TEST SITE #1 — 34.5 mile segment of Interstate (I) 880 in the Oakland and Hayward CHP Areas.
- TEST SITE #2 — 61.8 mile segment of State Route (SR) 99 in the Modesto and Merced CHP Areas.
- TEST SITE #3 — 154.1 mile segment of SR 99 and I-5 in the Bakersfield, Fort Tejon, Newhall, and Verdugo Hills CHP Areas.
- TEST SITE #4 — 15.7 mile segment of I-5 in the Santa Ana CHP Area.
- TEST SITE #5 — 5.6 mile segment of I-710 in the Westminster CHP Area.

PERSONNEL/TRAINING

The pilot program was conducted without adding personnel positions to the CHP. Officers participating in the program were required to complete eight hours of classroom specialized commercial enforcement training and six hours of practical field training before operating SMPVs. Initially, 139 persons were trained. Forty-nine additional persons were trained during the program.

SPECIALLY MARKED PATROL VEHICLES

The pilot program used 15 SMPVs which were converted CHP Mustang, LTD, Diplomat, and Celebrity model patrol cars. The SMPVs were modified so that they would not be readily identifiable as CHP enforcement vehicles, but would not jeopardize officer and public safety. All SMPVs met the identification and color requirements specified by California law for law enforcement vehicles engaged in traffic law enforcement. Modification consisted generally of non-CHP colors and low-profile vehicle equipment, i.e., emergency lights, antennas, etc.

SMPV DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

Involved CHP Area commands attempted to deploy their SMPV(s) on test sites at the minimum rate of ten work shifts (80 hours) per week. There were, however, occasions when the minimum deployment rate could not be met due to a number of factors, i.e., SMPV mechanical failures or downtime for routine maintenance, and limited available personnel (Senate Bill 1873 did not provide funding for program personnel).

The SMPVs were normally operated on all test sites on A Watch (5:45 a.m. to 2:15 p.m.) and B Watch (1:45 p.m. to 10:15 p.m.), Monday through Friday. A total of 688,902 miles were traveled by the fleet of SMPVs.

ENFORCEMENT AND PATROL GUIDELINES

Senate Bill 1873 specified that the primary purpose of SMPV officers was to enforce highway safety laws pertaining to heavy trucks. The legislation specified the target vehicles, which were generally heavy three-axle trucks, truck combinations, and trucks transporting hazardous materials.

Target violations were those identified as being primary collision factors in TAF accidents. They were divided into two general categories: (1) moving violations, and (2) driver's hours of service violations.



Officers observing flagrant or unsafe passenger vehicle violations were permitted to take appropriate enforcement action.

Area Commanders deployed SMPVs, when possible, to provide maximum truck enforcement. However, in Areas not having adequate personnel to free SMPV officers from routine beat accountability, SMPV officers had to function with partial or full beat accountability.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The CHP conducted an ongoing public affairs program to gain public support for the program, provide information, and increase compliance with highway safety laws. Media attention was intense during the first four months but tapered off toward the latter part of the program.

Participating CHP Area commands presented orientation briefings to involved courts and district attorneys' offices prior to the beginning of the program. It was believed that a firm understanding of the program, by judges and district attorneys, was essential to the success of the program.

SUITABILITY OF SMPVs

Officers operating SMPVs were able to perform their duties without diminishing safety to themselves or the public. The low-profile equipment and less conspicuous markings and color schemes of the SMPVs did not have a negative effect on patrol car driving character. In other words, SMPVs proved to be just as suitable as black and white patrol cars for the various driving functions required of officers. Analysis of 79 survey questionnaires completed by SMPV officers, and review of reports by Area Commanders, indicated that SMPVs were as effective as black and white patrol cars in the following functions:

- Freeway patrol services (e.g., accident investigations, motorist services);
- Traffic control at emergency incidents;
- Code 3 (emergency) and Code 2 (urgent) vehicle operations; and
- Effecting enforcement stops on both trucks and passenger vehicles.

Officer comments and Area Commander reports indicated that SMPVs may have been more effective than black and white patrol cars in detecting truck and passenger vehicle violations.

TRUCK ACCIDENTS

Total, fatal, and injury TAF accidents on test sites dropped overall from 1986 to 1987. The reductions were at significantly higher rates than those experienced on non test site freeways.

Total TAF accidents on test sites dropped 3.5 percent overall, compar d to a 5.8 percent increase in total TAF accidents on freeways within the vicinities of test sites. S · injury (including fatal) TAF accidents on test sites dropped 11.2 percent overall, while in· dents decreased only 0.4 percent on freeways within the vicinities of test sites. Tc nts on test sites decreased from twelve in 1986 to eight in 1987. Conservati savings for the reduced fatal TAF accidents at nearly $5 million.

ENFORCEMEN

A total of 18,503 citations were issued by SMI
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State of California
DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL
P. O. BOX 898
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PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Overall, public acceptance of the use of SMPVs was refreshingly high for the duration of the program. All Area Commanders felt that the public was overwhelmingly in support of the program. Their perceptions were based on interaction with the general public, judges, attorneys, community leaders, local government representatives, and members of the media. Officers' responses on survey questionnaires indicated that, based on enforcement contacts, SMPV officers perceived that the public was in favor of SMPV enforcement against trucks.

CONCLUSIONS

FINDINGS

1. Reduction in TAF accident rates was achieved on SMPV test sites. The success experienced on test sites was significant when compared to the rate of decline on other groups of highways.

2. Officers operating SMPVs generated more truck citations per officer patrol hour and focused a much higher percentage of total enforcement activity toward truck drivers than did officers operating black and white patrol cars.

3. Specially Marked Patrol Vehicles proved to be just as suitable as black and white patrol cars for the variety of functions required of CHP officers.

4. Public and judicial acceptance of the pilot program was perceived by the CHP to be positive. Judicial concern for or against the use of SMPVs was nonexistent.

RECOMMENDATION

The CHP should retain the option to use SMPVs on any highway segment within the State that meets specified criteria relating to truck accidents or noncompliance with highway safety laws.

BACKGROUND



INTRODUCTION

Heavy trucks are an integral component of California's highway transportation environment, and are essential to the State's economy. More trucks than ever are operating in California to accommodate the State's expanding population and increased demand for consumer products. Today, there are more trucks registered in California than in any other state. The trucking industry transports 99 percent of all agricultural products and 98 percent of all manufactured goods which are produced or marketed in California. The service provided by this industry enhances the life of each member of the public. However, heavy trucks also present significant and unique traffic safety problems when they are involved in accidents.

TRUCK ACCIDENTS

The issue of truck accidents on California highways is a significant concern to the California Highway Patrol (CHP), the Legislature, governmental and traffic safety agencies, and the motoring public. When heavy trucks are involved in accidents with other vehicles, the potential for fatalities and serious injuries is increased dramatically. Also, extensive traffic congestion and costly traffic delays are often caused by truck accidents.

The CHP maintains a vested interest in truck accidents because of the ever-increasing number of such accidents on California highways. Statewide, the number of truck accidents has grown at a disproportionately higher rate than total motor vehicle accidents.



FIGURE 1. Accidents involving heavy trucks have an increased potential for serious and fatal injuries and often cause extensive traffic congestion.

Truck accidents in California have increased 43 percent over a five year period, from 26,651 in 1982 to 38,163 in 1986. While this increase is significant, it is necessary to place truck accidents into perspective with total motor vehicle accidents. From 1982 through 1986, truck accidents have represented between 5.9 and 6.9 percent of the total motor vehicle accidents in California. Approximately 50 percent of the truck accidents investigated statewide during this period were determined, by investigating officers, to be truck-at-fault (TAF) i.e., the truck driver or equipment caused the accident. Notably, there has been an upward trend in TAF accidents. In 1982, TAF accidents represented 45.6 percentage of all truck accidents occurring statewide. However, by 1986 the percent of TAF accidents had increased to nearly 51 percent.



FIGURE 2. Growth in truck-involved and truck-at-fault accidents.

More alarming than the growing number of truck accidents is the number of persons killed or injured as the result of such accidents. During the five year period 1982 through 1986, over 2,900 persons were killed and over 71,000 injured as the result of these accidents. On the average in 1986, one person was killed every 12 hours and 55 minutes, and one injured every 33 minutes, in a truck accident on California highways.

Fatal and injury accidents involving trucks have increased 40.2 and 36.2 percent respectively in California for the five year period 1982 through 1986. The number of persons killed in truck accidents increased 34.8 percent, from 503 persons in 1982 to 678 people in 1986. Persons injured in truck accidents during this period increased 37.5 percent, from 11,711 in 1982 to 16,097 in 1986.



FIGURE 3. Growth in fatal and injury truck-involved accidents.

CHP statistics for the five year period 1982 through 1986 show that approximately nine out of ten TAF accidents were caused by driver error. The three most prevalent causes of driver-caused accidents were unsafe speed, turning, and lane changes. Mechanical defects were responsible for less than five percent of all truck accidents.



FIGURE 4. Causes of truck-at-fault accidents.

CHP ENFORCEMENT

The CHP maintains an ongoing enforcement effort focused on the safe and lawful operation of large trucks on California highways. The CHP continues to give high priority to enforcing truck rules of the road, in addition to maintaining a commercial vehicle inspection program. Inspection and enforcement activities are designed to curtail the number of accidents resulting from driver errors and equipment deficiencies.

For the five year period 1982 through 1986, 13.2 percent of all citations issued statewide by the CHP were issued to truck drivers and owners. Approximately twelve and one half (12.6) percent of these 1.9 million truck citations were issued for unsafe speed, turning, or lane changes. Citations for unsafe truck speed have increased 17 percent over a five year period, from 41,715 in 1982 to 48,753 in 1986. While this represents a significant increase and reflects the efforts that the CHP is making toward truck enforcement, only 12 percent of all citations issued to truck drivers in 1986 were for speed. In comparison, 42 percent of all citations issued to passenger vehicle drivers in 1986 were for speed.

The CHP continues to explore new alternatives to address the truck accident problem. Strategies have included innovative and aggressive enforcement, truck inspection programs, and public education efforts, all of which are designed to reduce the number of truck accidents. The CHP has deployed surprise strike force teams at locations with heavy truck traffic to identify mechanically unsafe trucks and drivers suffering from fatigue. Innovative programs such as Operation Skywatch, which teamed CHP ground and air units, have been used in the enforcement efforts against speeding trucks. A Commercial Corridor concept has been used throughout the State on highways with high truck accident rates. This strategy of combining education and enforcement efforts is directed towards drivers of automobiles, as well as truck drivers. These approaches, coupled with renewed commitment from the trucking industry and other agencies, play an important role in ongoing CHP efforts to reduce truck accidents.



UNSAFE TRUCK OPERATIONS

Despite enhanced enforcement strategies and education efforts, trucking accidents continue to grow at an alarming rate. Motorists continue to write to legislators and the CHP about the menacing driving practices of a small percentage of truck drivers. They complain about truck drivers who tailgate, execute unsafe lane changes, and force cars off the highway. There continues to exist a total disregard for the safe and legal operation of large trucks by some drivers. Their unsafe and unlawful driving practices reflect negatively on the entire trucking industry. Some truck drivers utilize the various tools and techniques at their disposal to evade detection. From their vantage point, they can easily identify marked patrol vehicles through their large side mirrors. Further, through the use of citizen band (CB) radios they are able to communicate with each other and share information on the location of patrol vehicles.

For many years, truck drivers have been held in high esteem as professionals; courteous, friendly, ready and willing to assist stranded motorists. However, public regard for the trucking industry has slipped as congested highways, tighter schedules, and smaller profit margins have combined to set the stage for unsafe driving practices. Such driving practices contribute to the loss of positive regard for truck drivers.

LEGISLATION

The growth in truck accidents and the public's increased sensitivity to unsafe driving practices has caused a great deal of concern within the trucking industry. In addition to the human suffering caused by truck accidents, truck insurance premiums have increased, costly time delays have become more frequent, and public regard for the industry has diminished. In response to the problem, the California Trucking Association sponsored legislation to assist the CHP in combating the growing problem of truck accidents caused by unsafe driving.

On September 26, 1986 the Governor approved Senate Bill 1873, which required the CHP to implement a pilot program in 1987 using Specially Marked Patrol Vehicles (SMPVs) to primarily enforce truck rules of the road. In enacting this law, the Legislature found that, except for air patrol operations, the CHP had limited ability to detect unsafe truck drivers who employ various methods of communications to evade apprehension. Senate Bill 1873 directed the CHP to institute a pilot program using vehicles, not readily identifiable as standard CHP patrol vehicles, for the primary purpose of enforcing highway safety laws pertinent to trucks. Such patrol vehicles were required to display the CHP insignia and to meet the identification requirements specified by State regulations. Additionally, officers operating the SMPVs were required to be in full uniform.



The legislation limited the pilot program to four of the eight CHP Field Divisons and not more than 15 patrol vehicles. Senate Bill 1873 set a program termination date of December 31, 1987, and required that the CHP submit a report on the pilot program to the Legislature.

PILOT PROGRAM MISSION

The purpose of the pilot program was to increase traffic safety. The thrust of CHP efforts was to increase compliance with rules of the road relating to trucks. It was expected that the perceived risk of apprehension would increase through the use of SMPVs, thereby enhancing compliance. The goal of the program was to realize a reduction in TAF accidents through increased compliance.

PROGRAM OPERATIONS



INTRODUCTION

The major ingredients which were necessary to implement and maintain the field operation phase of the Specially Marked Patrol Vehicle (SMPV) Pilot Program are presented in this section. The logistical elements and operational guidelines which determined the scope and nature of field operations will be presented along with pertinent background information.

The preparation phase for the pilot program was relatively short. In late September 1986, the Governor signed legislation directing the CHP to institute a pilot program. Between early October 1986 and January 12, 1987 test sites were selected, SMPVs were prepared and distributed, initial personnel were selected and trained, deployment guidelines and general operating policies were established, and public affairs activities were initiated.

Field operations began on January 12, 1987 and terminated at midnight on December 31, 1987. During this time, 15 SMPVs were deployed on five test sites encompassing ten CHP Area commands.

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

Executive Management of the CHP had ultimate responsibility for the administration of the pilot program. Management of the overall program and involved field resources was accomplished through the established organizational roles of CHP staff and Field commands.

The CHP Headquarters staff developed the Pilot Program Operational Plan and Study Design which was approved by CHP Executive Management. The objectives, scope, and methodology of the study were determined by the study design. Headquarters staff was responsible for the development and continuous assessment of operational guidelines, policies, and procedures, as well as data analysis.

Field Commanders maintained functional control of participating Field personnel and involved resources. Field commands were responsible for implementing the program within the approved guidelines and study parameters.

Administrative positions were established to ensure the proper direction of the program and the effective use of CHP personnel and resources. Designated positions included the following:

- PROGRAM DIRECTOR - The Chief of the Planning and Analysis Division was designated as the Program Director. The prime responsibilities were: (1) overseeing all aspects of the program; and (2) informing Executive Management of the program status.



- PROGRAM MANAGER - The Commander of Operational Planning Section was designated the Program Manager. Responsibilities included: (1) monitoring program progress; (2) providing review and approval of study documents; (3) serving as liaison between Field commands and the Program Director; (4) advising the Program Director of problems affecting the program and making recommendations for resolution; and (5) overseeing data collection, analysis, and report preparation.

- PUBLIC INFORMATION COORDINATOR - The Commander of the Office of Public Affairs was designated as the Public Information Coordinator. Responsibilities included: (1) implementing statewide public affairs activities pertaining to the program; (2) ensuring that Division public affairs activities were coordinated with the statewide public affairs activities; and (3) monitoring public interest and media coverage.

- PROGRAM COORDINATOR/ANALYST - The Lieutenant in Operational Planning Section was designated as the Program Coordinator and Supervising Analyst. Responsibilities included: (1) overseeing data collection, analysis, and report preparation; (2) developing, in conjunction with the Program Officer, the study methodology; and (3) ensuring that Field and Staff concerns were addressed in a timely manner.

- PROGRAM OFFICER/ANALYST - The Sergeant in Operational Planning Section was designated as the Program Officer and Analyst. Responsibilities included: (1) providing coordinating assistance to commands participating in the program; (2) collecting and analyzing program data; (3) preparing program documents and the final report; and (4) identifying problems affecting the program and making recommendations for resolution to the Program Coordinator.

- INFORMATION SERVICES COORDINATOR - The supervisor of the Management Information Section, Information Services Unit, was designated as the Information Services Coordinator. Responsibilities included: (1) acting as liaison between data users and automated information systems; (2) programming or writing specifications to extract data from the CHP Management Information System and the Statewide Integrated Traffic Reporting System; and (3) determining the validity of data before it was released to data users.

- FIELD DIVISION COORDINATOR - Each participating Field Division appointed a program coordinator who was responsible for overall supervision of the program within the Division, and for coordination with other participating Division and Headquarters staff. Responsibilities included: (1) ensuring that SMPVs were deployed pursuant to established deployment criteria; (2) ensuring the timely completion of program documents, (i.e., questionnaires and evaluations), and routing to the Program Manager; (3) ensuring the prompt reporting of significant operational problems to the Program Officer; and (4) ensuring the documentation of significant events related to the program.



- AREA COMMAND PERSONNEL - The success of the program depended, to a great extent, upon acceptance by involved personnel of program objectives, goals, and guidelines. Area Commanders and their supervisory teams were responsible for: (1) monitoring of program activities within their Areas and promoting enthusiasm for the program; (2) ensuring that participating personnel adhered to the established enforcement/patrol guidelines; (3) carefully reviewing the activity summaries and citations generated by participating officers to make certain that officer activity was in compliance with program policies; (4) ensuring that SMPVs were deployed in accordance with established deployment criteria; and (5) ensuring that officer activity and enforcement data was entered in a timely manner into the Management Information System.

TEST SITES

DEFINITION

Test sites were segments of highway upon which SMPVs were deployed during the operational phase. Each site was defined as a specified number of miles on a highway route considered to be a major trucking corridor. The nature of the roadway was another common characteristic shared by all test sites; all were divided, multi-lane highways with full or partial control of access. They all had posted maximum speed limits of 55 MPH.

PRIMARY SELECTION CRITERIA AND METHODOLOGY

Several criteria were considered in the selection of test sites, the most important of which was TAF accident volume. A list of highway segments with high TAF accident rates was used in selecting test sites. The list was established by CHP staff, using data previously developed by an advisory task force convened in 1986 by the Commissioner of the CHP. The task force accomplished the following tasks:

- Identified highways that serve as major transportation routes;
- Divided those highways into the segments patrolled by each CHP Area command having patrol jurisdiction and determined the number of miles for each segment;
- Determined the number of 1985 TAF accidents for each of the segments;
- Established a TAF accident density factor for each segment in order to provide a common point of reference. This density factor is defined as the number of 1985 TAF accidents per highway mile by highway route and highway segment;



- Established a statewide TAF accident density factor to provide a figure with which to compare segment density factors. Using the total number of 1985 TAF accidents occurring within CHP jurisdiction (10,683) and the total miles of CHP patrol jurisdiction (95,528), a statewide density factor of 0.11 was determined. This density factor represents a 1985 statewide average of 0.11 TAF accidents for each mile of CHP patrol jurisdiction;

- Determined the percentage difference between the statewide density factor and the density factor for each highway, on a segment-by-segment basis. For example, I-880 within the Oakland CHP Area command consists of 12.3 highway miles, accounted for 164 TAF accidents in 1985, and had a density factor (TAF accidents per mile) of 13.3, which is about 12,000 percent above the statewide density factor of 0.11.

Highway segments which had a density factor 2,000 percent above the statewide density factor were identified as having a high TAF accident rate. Through trial application, it was determined that this criterion provided a reasonable balance between highway target miles and the number of TAF accidents on those highways.

SECONDARY SELECTION CRITERIA

In addition to a high volume of TAF accidents, the following criteria were considered in selecting test sites:

- The potential for the pilot program to impact TAF accident rates;

- The opportunity to study the use of SMPVs in various traffic conditions;

- A high degree of noncompliance with Vehicle Code laws pertaining to truck speed, turning, lane changes, following too closely, starting, and backing;

- Public opinion supporting the use of SMPVs.

SELECTED TEST SITES

After receiving input from CHP Field and Headquarters Divisions, CHP Executive Management selected five test sites within ten CHP Area commands. These sites afforded the opportunity to study the use of SMPVs in different environments: (1) rural and metropolitan regions; (2) light, free-flowing traffic and dense commuter traffic; and (3) level, straight highways, as well as graded curving highways.

TEST SITE #1 was a 34.5 mile segment of I-880 within the Golden Gate Division of the CHP. This Division encompasses the San Francisco Bay Area - the largest metropolitan and industrial region

in Northern California. This stretch of I-880 is a high volume trucking corridor traversing the Oakland and Hayward CHP Areas in the East Bay Region. The freeway is a primary link between San Jose and Oakland and passes through the cities of Oakland, San Leandro, Hayward, Union City, and Fremont.

Interstate 880 provides access to the commercial and industrial hub of the region. It is a critical artery serving the seaports of Oakland, Alameda and Richmond, two major rail facilities, numerous trucking terminals, and the Oakland International Airport. Two of the region's largest oil refineries are located just north of Test Site #1 and several more are located in an adjacent county.

The segment of I-880 forming Test Site #1 is a full north/south freeway crossing heavily populated and industrial intense regions. It traverses the relatively flat surface along the eastern margins of the San Francisco Bay. No significant grades exist on Test Site #1. Interstate 880 consists of two to four lanes in each direction with numerous on- and off-ramps. There are segments of super-elevation and stretches without shoulders.



FIGURE 5. Test Site #1.

Interstate 880 carries an extremely high volume of daily repeat truck traffic, as well as heavy commute traffic Monday through Friday. Stop and go traffic is the norm during regular commute hours. In 1985 this segment of I-880 experienced 323 TAF accidents, for an average of 9.4 TAF accidents per test site mile.

TEST SITE #2 was a 61.8 mile segment of State Route (SR) 99 within the Central Division of the CHP. This stretch of SR 99 traverses the Modesto and Merced CHP Areas and is located in the Northern San Joaquin Valley which is known as a great agricultural region. It is a major linking corridor between the Los Angeles metropolitan region and those of Northern California. Test Site #2 passes through the cities of Modesto and Merced and the rural communities of Ceres, Turlock, Livingston, and Atwater.

The segment of SR 99 forming Test Site #2 is a north/south highway which is mostly full freeway with two or three lanes in each direction. It is constructed on the level valley floor and is relatively straight. Broad, flat agricultural lands border both sides of SR 99.

State Route 99 carries a high volume of weekly and daily repeat truck traffic. Traffic is generally free flowing. In 1985 this segment of SR 99 experienced 142 TAF accidents, for an average of 2.3 TAF accidents per test site mile.

TEST SITE #3 was the longest of the five test sites - 154.1 miles in length. It consisted of a 57.6 mile segment of SR 99 and a 96.5 mile segment of I-5. Test Site #3 was located in the Central and Southern Divisions of the CHP and traversed the Bakersfield, Fort Tejon, Newhall, and Verdugo Hills CHP Areas.

The stretch of SR 99 included in Test Site #3 is a full north/south freeway forming a major trucking route between the metropolitan regions of Southern and Northern California. This freeway traverses the rural region of the Southern San Joaquin Valley and consists of two to three lanes in each



FIGURE 6. Test Site #2.



FIGURE 7. Test Site #3.

direction. It passes through the communities of Delano and McFarland and the city of Bakersfield. The freeway is located on the level valley floor and is relatively straight. Broad, flat agricultural lands and expansive oil and natural gas production sites border SR 99.

State Route 99 carries a high volume of truck traffic. Traffic is generally free-flowing. In 1985, this segment of SR 99 experienced 98 TAF accidents, for an average of 1.7 TAF accidents per test site mile.

The stretch of I-5 included in Test Site #3 is a full north/south freeway forming the primary corridor which links Southern California to the San Joaquin Valley and Northern California. Interstate 5 is the main connecting artery

between the Mexican Border and Oregon. Interstate 5 consists of two to four lanes in each direction in rural regions, and up to six lanes in each direction at metropolitan freeway interchanges.

Interstate 5 in San Joaquin Valley traverses relatively flat, broad lands used for agricultural business and oil and natural gas production. However, in northern Los Angeles County, I-5 is characterized by rolling hills, sweeping curves, and steep grades which require truck lane control. The "Grapevine" is a six-mile segment which ascends from the valley floor to 4,144 feet at Tejon Pass. This four to six percent grade is well known for major truck accidents. In some locations, the northbound and southbound lanes are on different elevations and separated up to half a mile.

Traffic on I-5 in northern Los Angeles County is generally free-flowing. In the vicinities of Glendale and Los Angeles, traffic is generally heavy with congestion occurring during commute hours. Interstate 5 carries a high volume of long-haul and repeat truck traffic. In 1985 this segment of I-5 experienced 260 TAF accidents. On the average, 1.4 to 2.5 TAF accidents occurred every test site mile in rural areas and 6.8 TAF accidents occurred every test site mile in metropolitan areas.



FIGURE 8. Test Site #4.

TEST SITE #4 was a 15.7 mile segment of I-5 within the Border Division of the CHP. This stretch of I-5 traverses the Santa Ana CHP Area and passes through the cities of Anaheim, Orange, Santa Ana, Tustin, and Irvine. It is a major transportation artery for trucks traversing Orange County, and connects the southernmost part of California with Los Angeles and Northern California.

The segment of I-5 forming Test Site #4 is a full north/south freeway consisting of three lanes in each direction. The entire freeway segment is situated in a densely populated, suburban region of Los Angeles. Surrounding landscape is flat and fully developed. Numerous on- and off-ramps are present. Traffic is generally very heavy and is subject to stop and go congestion during commute hours.

In 1985, Test Site #4 experienced 97 TAF accidents, for an average of 6.2 TAF accidents per test site mile.



TEST SITE #5 was the shortest of the five test sites - 5.6 miles in length. This segment of I-710 is within the Border Division of the CHP and traverses the Westminster CHP Area. It is completely within the city limits of Long Beach. This freeway is a major artery which provides access to the harbors of Long Beach and Los Angeles. The Port of Long Beach is the busiest port on the West Coast.

This segment of I-710 is a full north/south freeway consisting of three or four lanes in each direction. Numerous on- and off-ramps are present. The surrounding landscape is relatively flat and open, and industrial in nature. Traffic is generally heavy.

Interstate 710 carries the highest volume of truck traffic of any highway in the State. It carried approximately 23,000 trucks per day in 1985. The majority of the truck traffic is making local deliveries of containers to or from the Port of Long Beach. In 1985 this segment of I-710 experienced 100 TAF accidents, for an average of 17.9 TAF accidents per test site mile.



FIGURE 9. Test Site #5.

PERSONNEL

The pilot program was conducted without adding personnel positions to the CHP. The four participating CHP Field Divisions selected officers from existing rosters to participate in the program. A willingness to participate was a prerequisite for all officer selections. Prior commercial enforcement experience was not essential for selection, although it was considered a beneficial element.

Officers chosen to participate in the program could not be involved in any other special assignments during their participation in the program. The length of officer assignments varied at the discretion of participating CHP Division and Area Commanders. Most personnel changes were made in accordance with established shift schedules.

Each participating CHP Area initially assigned a minimum of five officers to the program for each SMPV deployed within its command. Over the duration of the program, additional officers were selected to rotate into the program to ensure that adequate staffing levels were maintained.

COMMERCIAL VEHICLE TRAINING

Eight hours of specialized commercial enforcement classroom training and six hours of practical field training were presented to involved officers, sergeants, and managers prior to implementation of the pilot program. Every officer initially assigned, or assigned thereafter, to the program was required to complete this training prior to operating a SMPV.

The training was provided by the CHP Operational Planning Section and Commercial and Technical Services Section. Initially, 139 persons were trained. An additional 49 persons were trained during the program.

The classroom curriculum consisted of the following classes:

- Program Orientation and Philosophy, 1/2 Hour.

  Overview of the pilot program including legislative intent, program goal and scope, and enforcement and patrol guidelines.

- Driver's License/Registration Requirements, 2-1/2 Hours.

  Presentation of driver qualifications and commercial vehicle registration laws. An analysis of current regulations governing the classes of operator licenses, required endorsements, and basic registration requirements for California-based and foreign-registered commercial vehicles.

- Driver's Hours of Service, 2-1/2 Hours.

  Instruction on driver's hours-of-service limitations under state and federal regulations, including log book requirements.

- Problem Recognition and Officer Safety, 2 Hours.

  Identification of audible air losses from truck brake systems, unsafe loads on vehicles, any other obvious hazardous condition observed during a walk-around inspection, proper enforcement tactics, and operations around large trucks.

- Reporting, 1/2 Hour.
  Presentation of special reporting procedures.

The practical field training occurred at CHP highway platform scale and inspection facilities. Officers conducted enforcement contacts with truck drivers traveling through these facilities. Personnel applied the concepts learned during the classroom training and, when appropriate, took enforcement action, i.e., issued citations, placed vehicles out-of-service, etc. Enforcement actions were made in accordance with existing CHP enforcement policies.

SPECIALLY MARKED PATROL VEHICLES

STANDARD CHP PATROL CAR MARKINGS

Since its formation in 1929, the CHP has utilized distinctly marked patrol vehicles. Currently, the CHP maintains a fleet of over 2,000 distinctly marked patrol cars. These cars display the uniform color configuration and markings of the CHP and are easily identifiable statewide as enforcement vehicles. They meet the color specifications established in the California Code of Regulations (CCR) for traffic law enforcement vehicles.

Section 1140 in Title 13 of the CCR applies to the color of motor vehicles used by officers on duty for the main purpose of enforcing vehicle code laws pertaining to accidents and rules of the road. This Section requires that such cars and trucks have one of the exterior finishes described below:

- Entirely white; or
- White, except that an area not less than and including the front door panels shall be black; or
- Black, except that an area not less than and including the front door panels shall be white; or
- Any other color that contrasts sharply with white, providing an area not less than and including the front door panels is white and the indicia or names of governmental entities operating the vehicles are displayed on the front door panels.

CHP patrol cars are painted with a black and white color scheme; the front doors and roof are white, while the body is black. Gold colored, 3 1/2 inch high reflectorized "Highway Patrol" decals are present on the rear. Also, a 15 inch wide star, with the words "Highway Patrol" arched above it, is mounted on each front door.

The maximum contrast of the CHP's present black and white scheme provides very high visibility, consistent with the Department's policy of high-profile, in-view patrol. Generally, it is the Department's belief that rapid recognition of enforcement units is important both to deter potential traffic violators and to identify officers when motorists are being stopped for a violation or require assistance.

The visibility of CHP vehicles can also be a disadvantage during enforcement operations. During daylight hours, drivers are easily able to identify the presence of a CHP vehicle, and may temporarily alter their driving behavior accordingly. In addition, CHP officers generally determine the speed of violators on maximum limit highways through line-of-sight "pacing," i.e., matching the speed of the violator's vehicle. The length of this pace may be up to several miles in rural areas. During the pace, violators have an additional opportunity to observe the distinctive CHP vehicle behind them. Habitual and/or extreme violators are especially vigilant, and closely monitor their rear-view mirrors.

STANDARD CHP PATROL CAR EQUIPMENT

In addition to the distinctive color configuration and markings, CHP patrol cars can be easily recognized by the law enforcement equipment mounted upon them. Such equipment includes the following:

- Emergency Lighting - patrol cars not equipped with overhead emergency lights (light bars) are equipped with two front 5 3/4 inch diameter emergency lamps: one red spotlamp mounted on the left windshield post and one white mounted on the right post. Three rear-facing warning lamps are mounted on the rear seat shelf.

- Heavy Duty Pushbumpers - all patrol cars, except Mustangs, are equipped with pushbumpers which are 21 inches high and extend ten inches forward of the front bumper.

- Whip Antennas - each patrol car is equipped with at least one 68 inch high metal antenna which is mounted on a left rear quarter panel. A 19 inch high antenna is also mounted on the roof of each patrol car.

- Shotguns - shotguns are secured to dashboards in a vertical position with barrels extending almost to the roof.

DEVELOPMENT OF SMPVs

The pilot program used 15 SMPVs which were not readily identifiable as CHP patrol units. Two additional SMPVs were held in reserve: one in Sacramento, and the other in Torrance.





FIGURE 10. Traditionally marked and equipped CHP Mustang patrol car.

FIGURE 11. Specially marked CHP Mustang patrol car.

The original 17 SMPVs were converted CHP Mustang, LTD, Diplomat, and Celebrity model patrol cars. These cars were transferred into the pilot program from CHP Field commands throughout the State. On the average, each car had logged 44,000 patrol miles when brought to the CHP Motor Transport Section for conversion. Conversion of the 17 cars was accomplished in the three-week period of late December 1987 and early January 1988. The focus of the modification process was on the development of patrol cars that were not readily identifiable as CHP enforcement vehicles, but which did not jeopardize officer or public safety.

SMPV MARKINGS

All SMPVs met the color requirements specified in the CCR. Although the SMPVs were not painted in the standard CHP configuration, they were "fully-marked patrol cars", not "unmarked" or "undercover" cars. Exteriors were painted entirely white or conservative colors which contrasted with white front door panels. The full size CHP star, with the words "Highway Patrol" arched above, were displayed on front doors.

SMPV EQUIPMENT

The SMPVs were equipped as follows:

- Emergency Lighting - No overhead emergency lights were mounted on SMPVs. Vehicles were equipped with (1) flashing "wigwag" headlamp systems; (2) one 4 1/2 inch diameter adjustable red spotlamp mounted at the left windshield post; (3) one 4 1/2 inch diameter adjustable white spotlamp mounted at the right windshield post; (4) three rear-facing, low profile (2 1/2 inches high, 7 1/2 inches wide) "Bac-Off" flashing lamps mounted on the rear seat shelf - one red, one amber, one blue;

- Sirens - Electronic siren and public address speakers were mounted behind the grills;

- Pushbumpers - SMPVs were not equipped with pushbumpers, except the two cars assigned to the Oakland CHP Area on Test Site #1 had low-profile pushbumpers (Buddy Bumpers).

- Antennas - A standard passenger car antenna was mounted on the right front fender to replace the standard whip antenna. The 19 inch high antenna was moved from the roof to the midline of the trunk lid. These changes eliminated the nighttime silhouette which is characteristic of the standard antennas.

- Scanners - Programmable 30 channel scanners, capable of monitoring CB radio frequencies as well as law enforcement frequencies, replaced the standard CHP scanners.

- Shotguns - Horizontal and diagonal mounting positions were used to secure shotguns in the SMPVs. Placement of the guns in these positions eliminated the prominent nighttime vertical silhouette which is characteristic of standard CHP patrol cars.



FIGURE 12. Diagonal mounting position of a shotgun.

SMPV DISTRIBUTION

The SMPVs were assigned to CHP Area commands in which test sites were located. Table 1 provides initial Field distribution and vehicle information.

Commands to which SMPVs were assigned were responsible for the maintenance and repair of the SMPVs. When an SMPV was placed out of service due to mechanical problems, it was repaired on a priority bases. In those cases in which a SMPV could not be placed back in service in a timely manner, a reserve SMPV from the CHP Motor Transport Section was placed into service.

LOCATION		VEHICLE DESCRIPTION			
TEST SITE	CHP AREA	YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	COLOR
1	OAKLAND	8 4	FORD	LTD	FAWN METALLIC
1	OAKLAND	8 5	CHEVROLET	CELEBRITY	WHITE
1	HAYWARD	8 5	CHEVROLET	CELEBRITY	SLVR BLUE METALLIC
1	HAYWARD	8 5	FORD	MUSTANG	WHITE
2	MODESTO	8 5	CHEVROLET	CELEBRITY	DRIFTSAND BEIGE
2	MERCED	8 5	FORD	MUSTANG	SILVER METALLIC
3	BAKERSFIELD	8 4	FORD	LTD	CREAM BEIGE
3	BAKERSFIELD	8 5	CHEVROLET	CELEBRITY	WHITE
3	FORT TEJON	8 5	FORD	MUSTANG	WHITE
3	NEWHALL	8 4	FORD	LTD	LIGHT BUCKSKIN
3	NEHWALL	8 5	DODGE	DIPLOMAT	WIND BLUE
3	VERDUGO HILLS	8 5	CHEVROLET	CELEBRITY	FAWN BROWN
4	SANTA ANA	8 5	CHEVROLET	CELEBRITY	CHESTNUT METALLIC
5	WESTMINSTER	8 5	FORD	MUSTANG	WHITE
5	WESTMINSTER	8 5	FORD	MUSTANG	WHITE
	RESERVE SMPV	8 6	DODGE	DIPLOMAT	WHITE
	RESERVE SMPV	8 6	DODGE	DIPLOMAT	WHITE

TABLE 1. SMPV distribution and descriptions.

Five SMPVs which reached the CHP's "run-out" mileage of 85,000 miles were replaced with white SMPVs converted from the CHP enforcement vehicle fleet.

Operational guidelines permitted SMPVs to be transferred between CHP Area commands participating in the pilot program. However, only one vehicle trade occurred during the program. Four months into the pilot program, the Santa Ana CHP Area (Test Site #4) exchanged a chestnut metallic Chevrolet Celebrity with the Westminster CHP Area (Test Site #5) for a white Ford Mustang.

SMPV DEPLOYMENT AND OPERATIONS

Guidelines for the deployment of SMPVs were established prior to the commencement of Field operations. These guidelines provided that each SMPV should be operated on a test site at the minimum rate of ten work shifts (80 hours) per week. Each participating Area command was to make reasonable efforts to maintain this rate on a monthly basis. Such a minimum deployment standard would ensure that a consistently high level of SMPV exposure occurred at all test sites.

The minimum deployment standard represented a challenging goal for participating Areas. There were, however, times when the participating Areas were unable to meet that standard due to a number of factors, i.e., SMPV mechanical failures or downtime for routine maintenance. Although SMPVs were repaired on a priority basis, Area commands were not always able to operate them at ten shifts per week.

Deployment problems were further encountered due to limited available personnel (officers off on sick leave, vacation, or regularly scheduled days off). Senate Bill 1873 did not provide for additional personnel, especially for the pilot program, and officers had to be reassigned to the program from other beats. However, an adequate level of coverage for CHP beats was necessary in order to provide an acceptable level of public service. In those instances when the level of personnel was insufficient to provide minimum beat coverage and also staff SMPVs operations, Area Commanders could not deploy the SMPVs.

Involved Area Commanders determined the hours of SMPV deployment based on the truck-related problems associated with their respective test sites. All the commanders elected to deploy SMPVs in accordance with traditional work schedules. Participating Area commands primarily deployed SMPVs on A Watch (5:45 a.m. to 2:15 p.m.) and B Watch (1:45 p.m. to 10:15 p.m.), Monday through Friday. Limited deployment occurred on C Watch (9:45 p.m. to 6:15 a.m.) and on weekends because of the sharp decrease in truck traffic volume during those times. However, SMPVs were occasionally deployed on C Watch or the weekend to meet the minimum deployment standard.

Area Commanders deployed SMPVs, when possible, to provide maximum truck enforcement, whenever adequate personnel were available. However, in CHP Areas not having adequate personnel to free SMPV officers from routine beat accountability, SMPV officers had to function with partial or full beat accountability, i.e., respond to and/or investigate accidents, aid motorists with disabled vehicles, investigate crimes, store unattended vehicles, etc.

All CHP policies pertaining to the operation of standard CHP patrol cars applied to the operation of SMPVs. However, it was felt that public nonrecognition of SMPVs could cause confusion to motorists during emergency operations (lights and siren) and that SMPVs may not be provided the right of way customarily afforded a black and white patrol car. Therefore, a revision was made to the pursuit policy in order to ensure safety. The revision provided that when a SMPV was involved in a pursuit, a black and white patrol car, if available, should take over as the primary unit.

A total of 688,902 miles were traveled by the fleet of SMPVs. No safety problems pertaining to the operation of SMPVs were encountered during the pilot program. Motorists yielded for SMPVs as readily as for black and white patrol cars not equipped with light bars. The SMPVs experienced emergency operation on both freeways and surface streets without incident.

Two minor accidents involving SMPVs occurred on Test Site #1 in the Oakland CHP Area. However, neither accident was attributed to the absence of traditional CHP vehicle markings or equipment. Ironically, in the first accident, the SMPV was struck by a truck tractor/semitrailer combination making an unsafe lane change on a freeway. In the second accident, the SMPV was slowing for an accident blocking the freeway ahead when an inattentive motorist rear-ended the SMPV.



Motortrucks of three or more axles which are more than 6,000 pounds unladen weight

Any motortruck, or any combination of a motortruck and any other vehicle, with an unladen weight of more than 6,000 pounds, transporting hazardous materials



TRUCK TRACTORS



Any vehicle combination that exceeds 40 feet in length and consists of a

(1) motortruck and any
(2) trailer
(3) semi trailer
(4) pole, pipe, or logging dolly
(5) auxiliary dolly

FIGURE 13. Target vehicles.

ENFORCEMENT AND PATROL GUIDELINES

TARGET VEHICLES

Senate Bill 1873 required that the primary purpose of officers operating SMPVs was to enforce highway safety laws pertaining to specified vehicles. These target vehicles are depicted in Figure 13 and consisted of the following:

- Any motortruck of three or more axles which is more than 6,000 pounds unladen weight.
- Any truck tractor.
- Any combination of vehicles that exceeds 40 feet in length, consisting of a motortruck and any trailer, semitrailer, pole or pipe dolly, auxiliary dolly, or logging dolly.
- Any truck, or any combination of a truck and any other vehicle, transporting hazardous materials with an unladen weight of more than 6,000 pounds.

TARGET VIOLATIONS

Officers operating SMPVs were required to focus their enforcement efforts on truck rules of the road violations which had high potential for causing accidents. For purposes of the pilot program, violations of the following California Vehicle Code (VC) and Code of Regulations (CCR) Sections were considered target violations:

• 21658(a)	VC			Unsafe Lane Change
• 21703	VC			Following Too Closely
• 22106	VC			Unsafe Starting/Backing
• 22107	VC			Unsafe Turning
• 22350	VC			Unsafe Speed
• 22406	VC			Maximum Speed For Designated Vehicles
• 34506(a)	VC	1212a	CCR	Driving Over Hours For Interstate Operators
• 34506(a)	VC	1213b 3	CCR	Driving Over Hours For Intrastate Operators
• 34506.3	VC	1213a	CCR	Driver Log Book Not In Possession
• 34506.3	VC	1213c	CCR	Driver Log Book Not Current

In addition to target violations, the pilot program enforcement guidelines provided that officers should take appropriate enforcement action for unsafe mechanical, loading, and size or weight violations. Officers had the discretion to conduct cursory safety inspections of target vehicles for obvious unsafe conditions. However, such inspections were required to be conducted commensurate with an officer's commercial expertise and to not needlessly delay target vehicles. Officers could also take appropriate enforcement action against target vehicle violators for other observed violations, such as driver's license and registration violations.

FIGURE 14. A SMPV on an enforcement stop for a loading violation.

NONTARGET VEHICLE VIOLATIONS

Officers operating SMPVs were required to focus their enforcement activities toward target vehicles to the greatest extent possible. However, in the event an officer observed a flagrant or unsafe violation associated with a nontarget vehicle, e.g., passenger vehicle, the officer was permitted to take appropriate enforcement action.

PATROL RESPONSIBILITIES

The pilot program patrol guidelines provided the following:

> "Officers should be mindful that the SMPVs do bear the official insignia of the Department and that motorists expect the Department to provide roadside service to the public. Therefore, officers shall assist motorists with disabled vehicles, respond to traffic accidents as necessary, and provide other necessary assistance to the public."

Area Commanders determined the degree of beat accountability of SMPV officers.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public acceptance of the SMPVs was an important aspect to be considered in determining the success of the pilot program. Therefore, public affairs activities were initiated from the onset of the program and throughout its duration. It was felt that the most direct approach to gaining public acceptance was meaningful publicity which stressed the need for, and the effectiveness of, SMPVs.

The public affairs activities were designed to: (1) provide the public, governmental agencies, and traffic safety entities with information about the pilot program in order to gain public acceptance of the use of SMPVs; and (2) increase compliance with highway safety laws on the part of truck drivers. The following elements formed the foundation of public affairs activities:

- News conferences.
- Media ride-alongs in the SMPVs.
- Initial and periodic news releases.
- Distribution of public affairs packages to legislators, local civic leaders, and local judicial officials.
- Effective liaison between CHP Commanders and local judicial districts and district attorneys' offices.
- Submission of articles about the pilot program to publishers of trucking magazines.
- Distribution of radio spots about the pilot program to local radio stations.

Public affairs activities were directed toward informing the public that SMPVs were another enforcement tool with which the CHP could enhance public safety. Additionally, the public was made aware that the SMPVs were not "unmarked" or "undercover" vehicles and that officers would stop to provide roadside assistance.

Participating CHP Area commands presented orientation briefings to involved courts and district attorneys' offices prior to the beginning of the pilot program. Program administrators believed that a firm understanding by judges and prosecuting attorneys of the specific provisions of Senate Bill 1873, the legislative intent, the purpose of the pilot program, and CHP policy and procedure was essential to the success of the program.

Senate Bill 1873 did not provide funding for a statewide public information campaign, however, CHP Division and Area Public Affairs Officers did generate considerable media and public interest in the program. Annex C provides a chronological listing of selected news articles. In addition to

newspaper articles, television and radio stations provided the public with information about the program. It was not possible to document the frequency of such information dissemination.

Media participation commenced on January 7, 1987 when a news conference introducing the pilot program was held at the State Capitol. The State Senator who authored Senate Bill 1873, the Commissioner of the CHP, and a representative from the California Trucking Association, (the sponsor of the legislation), were present.

Parallel events occurred on all the test sites and were well attended by the news media. For example, on Test Site #3 the news conference held in Los Angeles was covered by eight television stations, and five newspaper organizations.

Media attention statewide was intense during the first four months of the pilot program. During this period, the program was one of the top five issues which generated media inquiries to the CHP on a daily or weekly basis. Thereafter, media inquiries made to the CHP tapered off so that by the fifth and sixth month of program operations, interest was generally localized with statewide interest rekindled only in response to CHP news releases or other significant events. Nevertheless, the pilot program was a high-profile CHP media issue for 1987.

Media attention assisted CHP efforts by creating an awareness of the truck accident problem and of the goal of the program. The combination of enforcement, media attention, and motorist observation of SMPVs developed motorist awareness and contributed to a decrease in truck accident rates.

SUITABILITY OF SPECIALLY MARKED PATROL VEHICLES



INTRODUCTION

A significant aspect in the study of SMPVs is the identification and evaluation of problems resulting from the use of such vehicles. It was realized from the onset of the program that the use of enforcement vehicles, not readily identifiable as CHP vehicles, could increase the risk of accidents to officers and motorists during emergency vehicle operations (Code 3). Furthermore, the potential existed that nonrecognition of patrol cars could cause confusion to the motoring public during enforcement stops, at accident scenes, or while officers perform other traffic management duties. The overall safety and effectiveness of SMPVs was an important consideration during the program.

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION

A survey of officers was one method used to gather subjective information regarding safety aspects associated with the operation of SMPVs. Identical questionnaires (see Annex B) were distributed in April and September of 1987 to the ten CHP Area commands participating in the program. The questionnaires were completed by officers who were currently assigned to the program and who had driven SMPVs. Officers completed 100 April questionnaires and 101 September questionnaires.

SELECTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES TO BE ANALYZED

Seventy-three officers completed both the April and September questionnaires. The opinions of these officers would have been given more weight than the opinions of those officers who only completed one questionnaire, if all questionnaires were analyzed. Therefore, to avoid a data analysis problem, April questionnaires completed by the 73 officers were removed from the analysis, leaving a total of 128 questionnaires.

Seven of the 128 questionnaires indicated that the respondents, prior to participation in the program, had only operated one type of black and white patrol car during his or her CHP career: either slick top cars (without roof lights) or cars with roof lights. These seven questionnaires were removed from the analysis because the officers' experience in patrol car operation differed substantially from that of the majority of respondents who had operated both patrol car types. It was felt that the seven officers may have had an inherent bias for or against SMPVs in relation to their limited experience with only one type of patrol car.

Forty-two of the remaining 121 questionnaires indicated that the respondents had driven SMPVs 20 shifts or less. These 42 questionnaires were removed from the analysis because it was felt that an

officer who had driven a SMPV only a few times may have expressed opinions based on a very limited number of experiences.

A total of 79 questionnaires were analyzed. All the respondents had experience with both slick top patrol cars and patrol cars with roof lights. All respondents had driven SMPVs for at least 21 shifts. Thirty-two (40.5%) of the questionnaires were completed by officers who had driven SMPVs for 21 to 40 shifts. Only 13 respondents (16.5%) had driven a SMPV between 41 to 60 shifts. Thirty-four respondents (43.0%) had driven a SMPV 61 or more shifts.

LIKERT SCALE

Officers expressed their opinions about SMPV operational characteristics by responding to 16 statements in which SMPVs were compared to black and white patrol cars. A 1- to 5- point Likert scale was used to agree or disagree with the statements. Ratings of "1" and "2" were defined respectively as "strongly disagree" and "disagree" while ratings of "3", "4", and "5" were defined respectively as "neutral", "agree", and "strongly agree".

Before proceeding into this analysis, a shortcoming of the Likert scale approach should be acknowledged, because it influences the inherent value of the statistics being presented. A tendency to gravitate toward the middle rating has been documented by many studies employing this technique. That tendency is evident in this study. With few exceptions, the most frequent rating was "3" and the mean rating fell between "2" and "4."

Even though the tendency to gravitate to the middle value diminishes the value of the Likert scale as a discriminating tool, the relative mean score for each of the questionnaire statements can be compared to one another. Mean scores toward either extreme of the Likert scale indicate that the respondents had strong opinions while those toward the middle often indicate the lack of a strong impressions.

ANALYSIS CATEGORIES

One aspect of this study was to determine if SMPVs were suitable for CHP patrol and enforcement operations. Questionnaire statements related to this concern can be assigned to one of three groups for analysis: those addressing effectiveness, driving concerns, or SMPV shotgun mounting positions. Statements pertaining to public attitude constitute a fourth group which will be discussed in a following section, "Public Attitudes."

SMPV EFFECTIVENESS

Table 2 presents the mean ratings for the statements addressing the overall effectiveness of SMPVs when compared to the effectiveness of black and white patrol cars.

RATING SCALE	STRONGLY DISAGREE 1	DISAGREE 2	NEUTRAL 3	AGREE 4	STRONGLY AGREE 5	
OVERALL, SMPVs ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS:						MEAN RATING
• WHEN EFFECTING STOPS ON LARGE TRUCKS.						3.85
• WHEN EFFECTING STOPS ON PASSENGER VEHICLES.						3.53
• WHEN PROVIDING CONTROL AT EMERGENCY INCIDENTS (I.E., ACCIDENTS, LANE CLOSURES, ETC.).						3.19
• IN FREEWAY PATROL.						3.49

TABLE 2. Mean ratings for SMPV effectiveness.

Table 2 displays ratings in the low to high 3 range, between "neutral" and "agree." It does not appear that the numerical difference between the ratings is significant. The ratings suggest that, generally, respondents did not have strong positive or negative impressions about SMPV effectiveness in contrast to the effectiveness of black and white patrol cars. Nevertheless, SMPV effectiveness in making enforcement stops on large trucks received the highest mean rating for the issues addressed in Table 2.

DRIVING CONCERNS

Eight statements from the questionnaire are included in Table 3. The statements are related to driving concerns associated with SMPVs. One statement pertains to SMPV movement through moderate freeway traffic while five pertain to Code 3 operation. Two statements address public nonrecognition of SMPVs.

Table 3, as with Table 2, displays mean ratings in the low to high 3 range, between "neutral" and "agree." This suggests that, overall, officers did not have strong positive or negative impressions about SMPV operation in freeway traffic or in Code 3 situations.

The statements pertaining to SMPVs being tailgated and not being readily identified received the second and third highest rating, respectively, of all questionnaire statements. The ratings of 4.23 and 4.06 indicate that respondents mildly agreed that motorists tailgate SMPVs more often than black and white patrol cars and that motorists do not readily identify SMPVs as patrol vehicles.

RATING SCALE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEUTRAL	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	
	1	2	3	4	5	
						MEAN RATING
OVERALL, SMPVs ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS WHEN RAPIDLY MOVING THROUGH MODERATE FREEWAY TRAFFIC DURING DAYLIGHT WITHOUT USING EMERGENCY LIGHTING OR SIREN (I.E., PACING A SPEEDER, CODE 2 RESPONSE, ETC).						3.14
OVERALL, THE EXTENT OF OFFICER SAFETY AFFORDED BY A SMPV IN CODE 3 OPERATION IS LESS THAN THAT PROVIDED BY A BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CAR.						3.29
IN THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES, MOTORISTS YIELD TO A SMPV IN CODE 3 OPERATION AS READILY AS A BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CAR IN CODE 3 OPERATION:						
• FREEWAY, DAYLIGHT.						3.15
• FREEWAY, DARKNESS.						3.96
• SURFACE STREET, DAYLIGHT.						3.06
• SURFACE STREET, DARKNESS.						3.78
MOTORISTS TAILGATE SMPVs MORE THAN BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS ARE TAILGATED.						4.23
MOTORISTS DO NOT READILY IDENTIFY SMPVs AS PATROL VEHICLES.						4.06

TABLE 3. Mean ratings for driving concerns associated with SMPV operations.

SHOTGUN MOUNTING POSITIONS

Table 4 pertains to officers' preference on shotgun mounting positions. Respondents rated the horizontal and diagonal mounting positions used in SMPVs in comparison to the vertical mounting position used in black and white patrol cars. Generally, respondents did not have strong positive or negative impressions. However, the mean rating of 2.77 associated with the diagonal mounting position was the lowest mean rating for any questionnaire statement. This suggests that of all questionnaire statements, respondents felt the strongest disagreement with the statement about the diagonal mounting position.

RATING SCALE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEUTRAL	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	
	1	2	3	4	5	
COMPARED TO THE VERTICAL SHOTGUN MOUNTING POSITION USED IN BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS, I PREFER THE FOLLOWING SHOTGUN MOUNTING POSITIONS:						MEAN RATING
• HORIZONTAL MOUNT BETWEEN FRONT BUCKET SEATS.						3.47
• DIAGONAL MOUNT, MUZZLE DOWN AND STOCK UP.						2.77

TABLE 4. Mean ratings for officer preference on shotgun mounting positions.

OFFICER COMMENTS

Throughout this section, quantitative data from the questionnaires have been analyzed. In addition to the numerical ratings, officers were given an opportunity to offer subjective comments. Given the limitations of the quantitative information, these brief assessments may provide insight into various aspects of SMPV operations.

The comments included here are a general representation of those made on the questionnaires. There were complaints about limited SMPV enforcement against passenger vehicle drivers, however, those comments are not included here because they fall outside the scope of the questionnaire survey. Actual comments which follow address issues related to SMPV suitability.

EFFECTIVENESS

Several respondents commented on the effectiveness of SMPVs in terms of enforcement and patrol. Five comments are included here.

SMPVs are more effective than black and white patrol cars.

Good program. I have found it effective for truck speed enforcement.

I feel SMPVs are more effective than black and white patrol cars in effecting stops on trucks and passenger vehicles. They could prove beneficial if used in routine patrol in conjunction with a public awareness program.



The public is getting used to the white cars [SMPVs], as much as the black and white cars. Different colored cars would help confuse them. These cars would be excellent for regular patrol use.

CB radios have effectively negated the advantages of SMPVs. Truckers are very alert to SMPVs. They know what the main objective of the SMPV program is and immediately warn all truckers about a SMPV's location. It is rare to be on a freeway more than two or three minutes without being "burned." Solution: completely unmarked vehicles for commercial enforcement or drop the program.

DRIVING CONCERNS

Several respondents made comments pertaining to the driving of SMPVs in traffic. The three comments provided below allude to the inconspicuous characteristic of the SMPVs. The first two comments indicate that public nonrecognition of the SMPVs assisted in the movement of SMPVs through traffic. The third comment addresses the concern that SMPVs may not be afforded the right-of-way which is customarily provided to a black and white patrol car.

The SMPV is much more effective [than black and white patrol cars] when rapidly moving through traffic without using emergency lights.

The SMPV is very easy to move through traffic without emergency equipment, due to motorists not suddenly slowing in front of you when they recognize a traditional patrol car.

I found I had to drive much more defensively at night when operating a SMPV.

SHOTGUN MOUNTING

A few respondents commented on the shotgun mounting positions used in the SMPVs. Their comments are provided below.

I prefer the horizontal shotgun mounting position between the bucket seats because of safety for the passenger if involved in a collision.

This [horizontal shotgun mounting position between bucket seats] allows the shotgun to be unlocked prior to making a known felony car stop. If you choose not to use the shotgun, it can be secured by flipping the lock closed as you exit the car.



As an officer safety item, I believe that the horizontal and diagonal shotgun mounting should be changed. In a tense moment, I believe valuable time would be wasted in removing the shotgun from its present rack position(s).

I won't use the diagonal mount shotgun.

EVALUATIONS BY CHP AREA COMMANDERS

Commanders of the ten CHP Areas in which the SMPVs were deployed prepared overall evaluations of program operations twice during the Field operation phase of the program. The evaluations were prepared in June, and again in December 1987. The evaluations addressed SMPV operations and safety, as well as other issues. The following discussion addresses issues related to the suitability of SMPVs and is a consolidation of the comments submitted by Area Commanders.

The CHP did not experience any safety problems relating to the nontraditional character of SMPVs. During the beginning phase of the program, it was anticipated that patrol vehicle collisions might increase due to public nonrecognition of the SMPVs as enforcement vehicles. Officers' driving attitudes and safety awareness were stressed during the required program training. No CHP-at-fault collisions occurred with the SMPVs. However, as previously discussed, two minor accidents involving SMPVs occurred but were not attributed to the absence of traditional CHP vehicle markings or equipment.

When the SMPVs were first deployed, some officers noticed a slower response by motorists to emergency lights. However, after the second month of Field operations, the slower response had disappeared. The SMPVs were used effectively on felony enforcement stops and were operated Code 3 (lights and siren activated) on freeways and surface streets without incident.

The two SMPVs assigned to the Oakland CHP Area on Test Site #1 were equipped with low-profile chrome pushbumpers mounted directly to the front bumpers. Officer safety and motorists services were enhanced by the addition of these bumpers to allow the safe removal of disabled vehicles from traffic lanes.

PROGRAM OFFICER INTERIM REPORTS

The Program Officer monitored all aspects of the program, including the suitability of SMPVs for truck enforcement and general CHP Field functions. Suitability of SMPVs was viewed in terms of safety and effectiveness, when compared to black and white patrol cars. Interim reports describing program development and operations were prepared throughout the Field phase of the program.

The following discussion represents a consolidation of these reports.

No problems of officer or public safety arose out of the Field deployment of SMPVs. No CHP commands expressed concerns related to safety when queried by the Program Officer. It was felt at the commencement of Field operations that public nonrecognition of SMPVs as enforcement cars might increase CHP-involved accidents or cause confusion to motorists, however no such problems arose.

Nonrecognition of SMPVs appeared to enhance violation detection . This is supported by numerous incidents which were related to the Program Officer by Area commands. The following real life situations are representative of the many violations observed by officers who were assigned to the program:

- A SMPV, positioned immediately behind a "big rig", paced the truck for two miles at 80 MPH before a CB radio report advised the violator of the officer's presence.

- A "big rig" passed a SMPV at 70 MPH on a freeway without slowing after completing the passing movement.

- A "big rig", well in excess of the maximum speed limit, passed a SMPV on the freeway. When stopped, the violator said he had thought the SMPV was "with an air pollution control department" rather than a CHP patrol car.

The inability to readily identify SMPVs as CHP patrol cars caused some truck drivers to erroneously identify nonlaw enforcement vehicles as SMPVs. It was not uncommon for CB radio reports to warn truck drivers of taxi cabs, private security vehicles, and expensive passenger cars, e.g., Cadillac, Mercedes Benz, etc. Such CB reports caused truck drivers in the vicinity to maintain lawful speeds and to suspect that a patrol car was nearby.

Truck drivers often recognized SMPVs as soon as the cars entered the freeways. Within minutes, highway corridors were flooded with CB radio transmissions tracking the movement of the SMPVs. It was observed by many officers that truck drivers in the vicinity rarely committed violations after a "smokey" report was broadcast. While CB radio broadcasts announcing SMPV description and movement undoubtedly caused officer frustration, such broadcasts served as a deterrent to unsafe driving practices.

SUMMARY

Officers operating SMPVs were able to perform their duties without diminishing safety to themselves or the public. The low-profile equipment and less conspicuous markings and color schemes of the SMPVs did not have a negative effect on patrol car driving character. In other words, SMPVs proved to be just as suitable as black and white patrol cars for the varied driving functions required of officers. Analysis of the survey questionnaires and review of reports by Area Commanders and the Program Officer indicates that SMPVs are as effective as black and white patrol cars in the following functions:

- Freeway patrol.
- Traffic control at emergency incidents.
- Code 3 (emergency) and Code 2 (urgent) vehicle operation.
- Effecting enforcement stops on both trucks and passenger vehicles.

Likert scale ratings suggest that officers did not have strong positive or negative impressions about SMPV effectiveness and driving character compared to black and white patrol cars. Officer comments and Area Commander and Program Officer reports indicate that SMPVs may be more effective than black and white patrol cars in detecting truck and passenger vehicle violations.

TRUCK ACCIDENTS



INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of the SMPV Pilot Program was to make California highways safer for travel by limiting the number and severity of truck accidents. The program involved aggressive and focused enforcement against truck drivers to enhance compliance with Vehicle Code laws. While enforcement activity was important to the success of the program, truck-accident profiles ultimately determine goal attainment. Foremost to this evaluation, is whether or not SMPV enforcement activity translated into a reduced rate of TAF accidents. This section will examine the TAF accident data pertaining to test sites.

Accident data were collected from traffic accident reports completed by CHP officers. Officers completed reports following uniform guidelines to ensure that accident information was identical in definition and type of data. After officers submitted accident reports for review and approval to their CHP offices, the reports were then forwarded to CHP Headquarters. Data processing clerks at Headquarters entered pertinent information from these reports into the Statewide Integrated Traffic Records System (SWITRS). This system provides for the uniform collection, reporting, and retrieval of traffic collision data, and was used for the following analysis.

TOTAL TAF ACCIDENTS

Table 5 provides total TAF accident data and illustrates the percentage of change between 1987 and 1986 (January 12 through December 31). Total TAF accidents on test sites dropped 3.5 percent overall in 1987 compared to 1986. This decrease exceeds the 0.6 percent decrease experienced statewide on interstate freeways for the same period. In contrast, TAF accidents on all non-test site freeway beats within CHP Areas participating in the program increased 5.8 percent. When all freeway beats within CHP Areas participating in the program are considered, the overall increase is 1.4 percent. Therefore, the overall decrease of 3.5 percent on test sites is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level (chi-square equals 3.45).

	TRUCK-AT-FAULT ACCIDENTS					
	TEST SITES			NONPRGM FREEWAY BEATS		
	1986	1987	% OF CHANGE	1986	1987	% OF CHANGE
TEST SITE #1	280	252	-10.0	444	459	3.4
TEST SITE #2	110	111	0.0	18	19	5.6
TEST SITE #3	295	278	-5.8	129	124	-3.9
TEST SITE #4	48	60	25.0	205	238	16.1
TEST SITE #5	77	81	5.2	94	102	8.5
TOTAL	810	782	-3.5	890	942	5.8
INTERSTATES	3425	3403	-0.6			

TABLE 5. Comparison of 1986 and 1987 total TAF accidents.

TOTAL INJURY TAF ACCIDENTS

Table 6 provides injury (including fatal) TAF accident data and illustrates the percentage of change between 1987 and 1986 (January 12 through December 31). Injury TAF accidents dropped 11.2 percent overall on test sites in 1987 compared to 1986. This decrease exceeds the 6.2 percent decrease experienced statewide on interstate freeways for the same period. In contrast, injury TAF accidents on all non-test site freeway beats within CHP Areas participating in the program decreased only 0.4 percent. The overall decrease in injury TAF accidents on freeway beats within CHP Areas participating in the program was 5.8 percent. Therefore, the 11.2 percent decrease in injury TAF accidents on test sites is significant.

ACCIDENTS					
TEST SITES			NONPRGM FREEWAY BEATS		
1986	1987	% OF CHANGE	1986	1987	% OF CHANGE
86	81	-5.8	119	139	16.8
33	32	-3.0	10	7	-0.3
103	97	-5.8	47	33	-29.8
15	6	-60.0	52	53	1.9
22	14	-36.4	33	38	-15.2
				26	
259	230	-11.2	261	260	-0.4
1057	991	-6.2			

TABLE 6. Comparison of 1986 and 1987 injury (including fatal) TAF accidents.

SOCIETAL SAVINGS

So far in this section, TAF accidents have been examined in terms of numbers and percentage of change. However, raw numbers do not translate into either costs or savings to society as the result of such accidents. It is impossible to place a quantifiable value on human life or suffering, however, associated values can be used to provide a basis for estimating the cost/benefit potential of the pilot program. It is not within the scope of this study to perform in-depth societal costs/benefits analyses, but rather to provide information that best illustrates the basic value of the pilot program.

The CHP Long Range Planning Section researched several state-of-the-art publications on the subject of measuring societal costs of accidents, and formulated a methodology for applying federal costing concepts to California accident data. In 1987 the Urban Institute, one of the more active researchers in the field of accident costing, estimated the costs of different accident categories, including fatality, injury, and property-damage-only costs. Using a methodology developed by Dr. Ted Miller of the Urban Institute, the following average accident costs per incident were estimated for each accident category:

- Person killed $1,220,000
- Severe injury 31,000
- Other visible injury 8,000
- Complaint of pain 4,000
- Property-damage-only accident 2,000

The pilot program proved to be a benefit to society even when only the reduction in fatal TAF accidents is considered. In terms of overall success, TAF fatal accidents accounted for a very small proportion of overall accident reduction. Total TAF fatal accidents occurring on all test sites decreased from twelve in 1986 to eight in 1987. Societal savings were $4,880,000 ($1,220,000 per person killed x fewer persons killed), when the accident costing information previously discussed is applied, and it is conservatively assumed that only one person was killed in each TAF fatal accident.

The success of the pilot program is highlighted even further when considering the fewer number of persons injured as the result of 25 fewer TAF injury accidents occurring on test sites. These societal savings far outweigh the pilot program estimated operational cost of $1,556,355 ($196,337 in SMPV operating expenses plus $1,360,018 in personnel expenses).

COMPARISON OF TEST SITE TAF ACCIDENT TRENDS

The deployment of SMPVs was successful in reducing total and injury TAF accident rates when the experience of all test sites is considered. However, the overall experience is not applicable to each test site individually. For example, Table 5 indicates that on Test Site #4, total TAF accidents increased 25 percent on freeways patrolled by SMPVs while such accidents increased only 16.1 percent on nonprogram freeway beats within the same CHP Area. This divergence from the overall experience raises the question, "why did some test sites have TAF accident rate patterns substantially different from the general pattern?"

Unfortunately, a definitive comparative analysis of test site accident rates and their causes is not feasible within the scope of this study. The intrinsic nature and varied environmental elements of each test site preclude such an analysis. Program operations, for example, differed from test site to test site. Differences in SMPV and black and white patrol unit deployment among test sites could have had an indirect influence on TAF accident rates. Also, the extent and duration of highway construction zones and lane closures could have affected such accident rates.

ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY



INTRODUCTION

The focus of the SMPV Pilot Program was to increase voluntary compliance with rules of the road relating to the operation of trucks. It was anticipated that the use of SMPVs would enhance a truck drivers perceived risk of apprehension, thereby increasing compliance and reducing TAF accidents. It was not possible within the scope of this study, however, to directly determine the deterrent value of the SMPVs.

Unlike deterring the unsafe and unlawful operation of trucks, the apprehension of violators is a tangible, measurable event. For this reason, enforcement levels are sometimes used as a surrogate measure of officer effectiveness. In this section, SMPV enforcement activity is analyzed and compared with the enforcement activity of black and white patrol units. The disposition of citations issued by SMPV officers is also examined.



NOTICE TO APPEAR DP 00048

JUNE 17 87 | 11:05 A. | WED

JAMES GREGORY WARD

1410 ELM AVE.

NO. HIGHLANDS CA 95660

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B&L INSURANCE *551-88-421 237169

☒ 22406 V.C. EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT

66 | 55 | 55 | 420 | 506 | 74

I-5 2 MI. NORTH OF WHEELER RIDGE

KERN COUNTY

DAN BAILEY 10198 NONE

James G. Ward

1215 TRUXTON AVE. BAKERSFIELD 93301

17 JULY 87 9:05A

FIGURE 15. CHP 215.

COLLECTION OF ENFORCEMENT DATA

Enforcement data were collected from CHP 215s and retrieved by the CHP Management Information System (MIS). The CHP 215 is a Notice to Appear (citation) which is issued by officers to violators. At the end of each work shift, officers deposit copies of completed CHP 215s at their CHP offices. Specific information contained on the CHP 215s is entered on an ongoing basis into the MIS by CHP clerks at each Area office. When the MIS retrieved the enforcement statistical data used in this section, it identified the first violation recorded on each CHP 215 as the major violation for which the CHP 215 was issued.

Information pertinent to this study, which was entered into the MIS from CHP 215s, included: (1) vehicle type; (2) the section number and code abbreviation of the laws violated; (3) the assigned CHP command of the officer; (4) the beat where the violation occurred; and (5) the date of issuance. In the event a CHP 215 was issued by an officer operating a SMPV, the special project code "74" was also entered on the citation.

CHP officers used two-digit numerical codes to indicate vehicle types on CHP 215s. For purposes of the pilot program, the vehicle type codes listed in Figure 16 designated target vehicles.

25	Truck Tractors
27	Three or More Axle Trucks
31	Semitrailers
33	Two Trailers (includes semi- and pulltrailer)
38	Pole, Pipe, or Logging Dollies
75	Truck Tractors in Combination With a Vehicle Transporting Hazardous Substance
76	Two Axle Trucks Transporting a Hazardous Substance
77	Three or More Trucks Transporting a Hazardous Substance

FIGURE 16. Numerical codes used to identify vehicle types.

CITATION ACTIVITY: SMPV VERSUS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL UNITS

Officers involved in the pilot program generated high levels of enforcement activity. A total of 18,503 citations were issued by SMPV officers, including 87 arrests for drunk driving and 20 arrests for reckless driving. Consistent with the intent of Senate Bill 1873, the primary target of SMPV enforcement was against truck drivers. Nearly seventy-three percent (13,459) of the 18,503 total citations issued, were for truck violations and 27.3 percent (5,044) were issued for flagrant or unsafe passenger vehicle violations.

In order to understand the significance of SMPV enforcement levels it is necessary to place SMPV statistics into perspective. Four categories of black and white patrol units will serve as points of reference for this analysis. The enforcement activity of SMPV units will be compared to the enforcement activity generated by the following personnel:

- Officers operating black and white patrol cars on test sites.
- Officers operating black and white patrol cars on all freeways, excluding test site beats, within CHP Areas participating in the program.

- Officers operating black and white patrol cars on interstate highways/freeways statewide, excluding test site beats.

- Mobile Road Enforcement (MRE) officers operating black and white pickups statewide, excluding test site beats. Mobile Road Enforcement Officers are trained in commercial vehicle enforcement and have a primary responsibility to enforce truck equipment, size, weight, and registration laws.

Figures 17 and 18 graphically compare the proportion of citations (broken down by type of violation) issued to truck drivers by officers operating SMPVs and each of the four categories of black and white patrol units. The fact that 72.7 percent of all SMPV citations were issued to truck drivers is, in itself, impressive. However, it is even more impressive when compared to the level of activity directed against truck drivers by black and white patrol cars operating on the same test site beats, adjacent freeways, or interstates statewide.

It is notable that 72.4 percent of all SMPV citations for moving violations were issued to truck drivers. This is significant when one considers that black and white patrol units operating on the same test site beats issued 11.6 percent of citations for moving violations to truckers. It is equally notable that 71 percent of SMPV speed citations were issued to truckers, while only 13.2 and 2.2 percent of black and white patrol unit speed citations were issued to truck drivers on the same test site beats and on adjacent freeways, respectively.

Officers operating SMPVs issued 48.4 percent of all unsafe lane change citations to truckers. While this percentage is low compared to citations issued for following too closely, speeding and total moving and nonmoving citations, it is still substantially higher than such citations issued by black and patrol units.

Figures 19 and 20 break down total citations by violation types and depict the proportion of all citations that were issued to truck drivers. For instance, of all citations issued by officers operating SMPVs, 42 percent were issued for truck speed. Black and white patrol units operating on the same test site beats issued 5.8 percent of all citations for truck speed, while MRE officers statewide issued 1.5 percent for truck speed. When the overall enforcement activity of SMPVs and black and white patrol units are compared, it is evident that citations for moving truck violations comprised a substantially higher percentage of total SMPV citations than of black and white unit citations.



FIGURE 17. Percentage of total enforcement activity for which specified truck citations accounted.



FIGURE 18. Percentage of total enforcement activity for which specified truck citations accounted.



FIGURE 19. Percentage of citations issued to truck drivers for each citation classification indicated.



FIGURE 20. Percentage of citations issued to truck drivers for each citation classification indicated.

CITATIONS PER OFFICER PATROL HOUR

One method that is often employed to determine enforcement efficiency is the ratio of citations to officer patrol hours. Table 7 provides a summary of the number of citations issued per officer patrol hour for SMPVs and three categories of black and white patrol units. A patrol hour is defined as the time an officer spends driving a patrol vehicle within public view. Patrol hours include such activities as enforcement contacts, motorist services, warrant/registration/license checks, and suspicious circumstances checks.

PATROL VEHICLE CATEGORY	CITATIONS ISSUED PER PATROL HOUR					
	TOTAL CITES	TOTAL TRUCK CITES	TOTAL PASSENGER VEHICLE CITES	TOTAL MOVING CITES	TOTAL TRUCK MOVING CITES	TOTAL PASSENGER MOVING CITES
SMPV	0.70	0.51	0.19	0.57	0.41	0.16
B &W UNITS ON TEST BEATS	0.85	0.08	0.77	0.61	0.07	0.54
B & W UNITS ON ALL NONPROGRAM FREEWAYS WITHIN CHP AREAS PARTICIPATING IN PROGRAM	1.08	0.03	1.05	0.83	0.02	0.81
B &W UNITS ON INTERSTATE FREEWAYS STATEWIDE	0.91	0.04	0.87	0.68	0.03	0.65

TABLE 7. Total citations and moving violation citations issued per officer patrol hour by patrol vehicle category

Overall, black and white patrol units produced more total citations per officer patrol hour than SMPVs. For example, black and white patrol units on test site beats produced 0.85 total citations per officer patrol hour, compared to SMPV enforcement of 0.70 total citations per officer patrol hour. A similar relationship exists when total moving citations are considered: 0.61 versus 0.57 citations per officer patrol hour for black and white units on test site beats and SMPV enforcement respectively. Thus, black and white unit enforcement on the test site beats produced 21.4 and 7 percent more total citations and total moving citations respectively per officer patrol hour than SMPV enforcement . Black and white units on interstates statewide and on nonprogram freeways within participating CHP Areas experienced an even higher ratio of total and speed citations to officer patrol hours.

A factor which probably influenced the lower number of total citations and total moving citations issued by SMPV officers is related to selective enforcement by SMPVs. It is reasonable that SMPV total and moving citations issued per patrol hour would be lower than nonselective enforcement, since SMPV officers focused enforcement against trucks, which constitute only nine to ten percent of traffic statewide. Additionally, on most of the test sites the ratio of trucks to passenger vehicles dropped significantly after dark, even though SMPVs were still operating.

Another factor which may have influenced SMPV total citations and total moving citations issued per officer patrol hour is related to drivers' attitudes toward SMPV enforcement. Truck drivers were

generally more cognizant of the SMPV program than passenger vehicle drivers. Truck drivers generally perceived that trucks were the target vehicles of the program, as evidenced by the words of one truck driver talking on the CB radio, *"The CHP has declared war on us truckers!"* Truck drivers were aware of the vicinities in which SMPVs were deployed, through CB radio and familiarity with the highways upon which they drive. Therefore, truck drivers who would otherwise be driving in an unlawful manner, brought their driving into compliance while traversing test sites.

Specially Marked Patrol Vehicle enforcement produced significantly more total truck and truck moving citations per officer patrol hour than any of the three categories of black and white black patrol units. For example, SMPVs generated 0.51 total truck citations and 0.41 moving truck citations per officer patrol hour, while black and white units on test site beats produced 0.08 total truck citations and 0.07 moving truck citations per officer patrol hour. Thus, SMPV enforcement produced 537 and 485 percent more total truck citations and truck moving citations respectively per officer patrol hour than black and white unit enforcement on test site beats.

CITATION DISPOSITION RATES

An important element in evaluating the overall effectiveness of any innovative traffic enforcement tactic is the disposition of citations. The issuance of a citation is only one step in a series of events that ends with the adjudication of a case. The process of officers issuing citations for traffic law violations involves detection of an offense, identification of the violator, and collection of sufficient evidence to present a credible case in court. Therefore, a newly implemented enforcement strategy should be evaluated to determine whether it inherently causes judicial concern. To this end, information about citation disposition rates is examined.

Each CHP Area command, in conjunction with local courts, developed a system to track disposition rates of the following citation types:

- SMPV citations issued to drivers of target trucks for moving violations.
- Citations issued by black and white patrol units to drivers of target trucks for moving violations.
- SMPV citations issued to passenger vehicle drivers for moving violations.
- Citations issued by black and white patrol units to passenger vehicle drivers for moving violations.

The disposition of the citations issued by black and white patrol units served as a control group with which SMPV citation dispositions could be compared. Specially Marked Patrol Vehicle citations were identified by special project code "74" written on the CHP 215. Citations issued to target trucks by SMPV and black and white units were identified by the vehicle type codes listed in Figure 16.

The tracking system used to gather citation disposition data varied from test site to test site, usually depending on the sophistication of a court's filing system. Some courts had automated files and information was readily available, while courts not yet computerized had difficulty with data retrieval. In some cases, court and CHP clerks had to search files by hand to locate the necessary information.

Surveys were conducted twice during the pilot program. The first group of surveys was conducted during the first half of the pilot program, while the second group covered the second half of the program. Courts from which data were retrieved were the same for both surveys.

The following courts participated in the citation disposition surveys.

- Test Site #1: Oakland Municipal Court
- Test Site #2: Merced Municipal Court
- Test Site #3: West Kern County Municipal Court and Newhall Municipal Court
- Test Site #4: North Orange County Municipal Court
- Test Site #5: Long Beach Municipal Court

A total of 2,741 citations were tracked during the program. These citations had the following distribution:

- 888 SMPV citations issued to drivers of target trucks for moving violations.
- 594 citations issued by black and white patrol units to drivers of target trucks for moving violations.
- 570 SMPV citations issued to passenger vehicle drivers for moving violation.
- 689 citations issued by black and white patrol units to drivers of passenger vehicles for moving violations.

Citation dispositions were divided into the following categories:

- Conviction
- Not guilty

- Traffic school in lieu of trial
- Failure of violator to appear in court
- Unknown dispositions

Figure 21 graphically depicts the disposition of citations issued to drivers of target trucks and passenger vehicles, expressed as percentages of total citations tracked. There does not exist any significant difference in dispositions between citations issued by SMPVs or black and white patrol units.

The minor differences may be explained by a number of factors, including different judges who adjudicated the cases, and different policies among the courts. For example, during the first survey the Oakland Municipal Court authorized traffic school for 36 percent of the passenger vehicle violators who received SMPV citations. This figure was similar to the 38 percent of passenger vehicle violators who had received citations from black and white units. However, in the second survey, the court authorized traffic school for 72.5 percent of passenger vehicle violators who had received SMPV citations. This variation may be due to the wide discretion exercised by different judges within the same judicial district.



FIGURE 21. Disposition of citations issued by SMPV units and black and white patrol units.

OFFICER ACTIVITY



INTRODUCTION

This section discusses the nonenforcement activity of officers operating SMPVs. Even though the primary purpose of SMPV officers was the enforcement of safety laws pertaining to trucks, they often had full or partial beat responsibilities. These added tasks often diverted SMPV officers from their primary purpose, but such diversion was necessary to ensure that an adequate level of public service was maintained. This section presents information which indicates the extent to which SMPVs were used for other than enforcement activities.

Information regarding the time and activities of CHP officers was collected from CHP 415s and retrieved by the CHP Management Information System (MIS). The CHP 415, Daily Field Record, is completed by each officer during a work shift. The CHP 415 is the primary source of information regarding attendance and field activities. Data from the form were entered by each CHP command into the MIS. The MIS is a computerized system designed to serve as a reliable method of communicating and processing information.

Officers assigned to the program provided a high level of assistance to the public. During the program, a total of 10,856 motorist services were provided by the 15 SMPV units. These services included assisting motorists with disabled vehicles, providing information and general assistance, removing road hazards, and clearing CHP enforcement documents.

WORK AND PATROL HOURS

Officers assigned to the program logged a total of 39, 977 work hours which were divided into specified activities (see Table 8). Officers spent 26, 561 hours on patrol, i.e., driving a SMPV within view of the motoring public. Patrol hours included such activities as enforcement contacts, motorist services, warrant/registration/license checks, and suspicious circumstances checks.

Patrol hours accounted for 66.4 percent of the total hours that SMPV officers worked. SMPV officers spent 23 percent more of their work time on patrol than did officers operating black and white patrol cars in the same CHP Area commands. This higher percentage of patrol time is due to the limited purpose of SMPV units, i.e., truck enforcement. Table 8 provides, by activity category, a comparison of SMPV and black and white patrol unit work hours.

Examination of the data contained in Table 8 indicates that SMPV officers generally spent a smaller proportion of their total work time performing nonpatrol functions than did officers operating black and white patrol cars. The most notable differences occurred in three activity categories: accident investigation, in-custody arrests, and partner assists. When compared to officers operating black and white patrol cars within the same CHP Area commands, SMPV officers spent 3.7, 3.9, and 7.0 percent less of their total work time respectively, investigating accidents, conducting in-custody arrests, and assisting their partner officers.

ACTIVITY CATEGORIES	SMPV (All Test Sites)		B &W UNITS OPERATING ON NON-TEST SITE BEATS WITHIN PARTICIPATING CHP AREAS		B &W UNITS STATEWIDE	
	HOUR COUNT	% OF TOTAL HOURS WORKED	HOUR COUNT	% OF TOTAL HOURS WORKED	HOUR COUNT	% OF TOTAL HOURS WORKED
PATROL (PRIMARY BEATS)	26,561	66.4	375,594	43.4	2,741,402	46.7
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION	2,603	6.5	88,364	10.2	552,638	9.4
IN-CUSTODY ARRESTS	936	2.3	55,330	6.2	343,982	5.9
VEHICLE STORAGE	392	1.0	11,279	1.3	75,716	1.3
COURT	1,432	3.6	42,621	4.9	240,816	4.1
ASSIST OTHER CHP UNITS OR ALLIED AGENCIES	1,820	4.6	56,965	6.6	322,463	5.5
PARTNER ASSIST	558	1.4	71,679	8.3	466,541	8.0
TRAFFIC CONTROL	909	2.2	22,798	2.6	134,106	2.3
EMERGENCY SERVICES	12	0.0	1,209	0.1	12,179	0.2
VEHICLE THEFT	63	0.2	2,938	0.3	32,148	0.6
TRAINING	409	1.0	34,168	4.0	248,481	4.2
ADMINISTRATIVE	187	0.5	9,760	1.1	50,846	0.9
OTHER	624	1.6	20,551	2.4	133,235	2.3
SPECIAL/OTHER BEATS	3,471	8.7	73,875	8.5	514,384	8.8
TOTAL HOURS WORKED	39,977	100.0	865,131	100.0	5,868,937	100.0

TABLE 8. Comparison of SMPV and black and white patrol car officer work hours. Work hours are broken down by activity categories and expressed as a percentage of total hours worked.

The reduced involvement in accident investigation is because of the SMPV focus on specified target violations. When possible, Area Commanders freed SMPV officers from on-scene and follow-up accident investigations. The reduced activity with in-custody arrests and partner assists is due to limited SMPV operation on C Watch (9:45 p.m. to 6:15 a.m.). The majority of CHP drunk driving arrests are made during this watch and CHP units are not normally staffed with partner officers except on C Watch.

The overall trends in SMPV nonenforcement activity have been discussed thus far in this section. One aspect of this analysis, however, is an examination of the differences in SMPV activity among the various test sites to determine if SMPV performance is significantly influenced by different environments.

Specially Marked Patrol Vehicle patrol time, expressed as a percentage of total SMPV work time, ranged from 57.8 percent for Test Site #5 to a high of 72.9 percent for Test Site #1. Both these test sites carry high volumes of traffic and are metropolitan in nature. One would expect that SMPV activity patterns would be similar due to the common characteristics of both test sites. However, examination of the data contained in Table 9 does not produce distinguishable patterns.

The percentage of total SMPV work time that was expended in accident investigation, for example, was similar for Test Site #1 (4.5 percent) and Test Site #2 (4.4 percent) even though these test sites were respectively metropolitan and rural. Conversely, Test Site #5, which was similar in nature to Test Site #1, had 12.0 percent. Again, when SMPV activity is compared among the test sites, no correlation between SMPV activity and the environment is evident.

ACTIVITY CATEGORIES	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HOURS WORKED					
	SITE #1	SITE #2	SITE #3	SITE #4	SITE #5	ALL SITES
	SMPV					
PATROL (PRIMARY CHP BEATS)	72.9	65.8	66.3	65.6	57.8	66.4
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION	4.5	4.4	5.8	8.4	12.0	6.5
ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES	22.6	29.7	27.9	26.0	30.2	27.1
	BLACK & WHITE					
PATROL (PRIMARY CHP BEATS)	45.4	50.0	43.4	35.4	36.8	43.4
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION	10.3	8.6	10.1	13	9.2	10.2
ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES	44.3	41.4	46.5	51.6	54.0	46.4
	SMPV COMPARED TO BLACK AND WHITE					
PATROL (PRIMARY CHP BEATS)	27.5	15.8	22.9	30.2	21.0	23.0
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION	-5.8	-4.2	-4.3	-4.6	2.8	-3.7
ALL OTHER ACTIVITIES	-21.7	-11.7	-18.6	-25.6	-24.2	-23.8

TABLE 9. Percentage of total hours worked: SMPV units compared to black and white patrol units.

Table 9 provides data pertaining to the activity of black and white patrol cars within the Area commands participating in the program. The data is Areawide rather than being confined to the test site beats as with SMPV data contained in Table 9. Nevertheless, a point of comparison with the SMPV data is established. It was expected that SMPV activity patterns would emerge when SMPV activity for each site was compared to black and white patrol car activity. However, such is not the case. The bottom portion of Table 9 indicates the comparisons.

Lack of direct correlation must be acknowledged when SMPV activity is compared among the test sites. First, activity patterns may not be evident because SMPV operations differed from test site to test site depending on a number of factors. The most significant of these factors include: (1) the degree of SMPV beat accountability necessary to maintain acceptable service levels; (2) problems with SMPV deployment due to unavailability of personnel or mechanical disorder; and (3) the number of black and white patrol units that were deployed when the SMPVs were deployed.

The second data analysis incongruity is the fact that a "control group" did not exist with which SMPV activity could be compared. As noted earlier, Senate Bill 1873 did not provide funding for this study. Therefore, it was not fiscally practical to dedicate 15 black and white patrol units as a control group.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES



INTRODUCTION

The primary mission of the CHP is the management and regulation of traffic to achieve safe, lawful, and efficient use of California highways. The CHP primarily uses preventative enforcement tactics to minimize the loss of life, personal injury, and property damage resulting from traffic accidents. Traditionally, the CHP has emphatically adhered to an in-view patrol policy based on the belief that visible patrol is a deterrent to accident-causing violations.

The motoring public has generally supported and has become accustomed to high-visibility patrol and the use of standard black and white patrol vehicles. Visible patrol promotes compliance with traffic laws by reminding motorists of the CHP's universal presence on California highways. Most drivers are reassured by the presence of marked CHP patrol vehicles. They are visibly reminded that the CHP's highway coverage and emergency response capabilities are among the best in the nation. Some drivers, however, consider a CHP unit simply an obtrusive enforcement presence. These drivers often perceive in-view patrol as the only "fair" enforcement strategy that the CHP should employ to apprehend violators.

Use of SMPVs was a deviation from the CHP policy of high-visibility patrol. As such, public opinion is an important aspect in thoroughly evaluating the program. Even though public attitude does not dictate CHP policy, it does play an important role in public compliance with traffic safety laws and in CHP goal attainment.

No formal public opinion survey was conducted as part of this study. Consequently, evaluation of public attitude is based on the perception and experience of the CHP during the program.

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

As discussed in a previous section, officers who had driven SMPVs completed questionnaires addressing the suitability of SMPVs. Among other issues, officers responded to two statements relating to public attitude. Seventy-three questionnaires were analyzed.

Table 10 on the next page pertains to officers' perceptions about public acceptance of the program. Generally, respondents did not have strong positive or negative impressions about how the public felt toward the use of SMPVs for enforcement against drivers of passenger vehicles. However, the perception of public attitude toward the use of SMPVs for truck enforcement received a mean rating of 4.42, between "agree" and "strongly agree." This rating was the highest of all responses and implies the strongest agreement with any of the questionnaire statements.



RATING SCALE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DISAGREE	NEUTRAL	AGREE	STRONGLY AGREE	
	1	2	3	4	5	
BASED ON ENFORCEMENT CONTACTS, THE PUBLIC IS RECEPTIVE TOWARDS THE USE OF SMPVs FOR:						MEAN RATING
• HEAVY TRUCK RULES OF THE ROAD ENFORCEMENT.						4.42
• PASSENGER VEHICLE RULES OF THE ROAD ENFORCEMENT.						3.62

TABLE 10. Mean ratings for officer perception of public attitude.

OFFICER COMMENTS

Officers completing questionnaires were given the opportunity to offer comments about public attitude. The following five comments exemplify officers' perceptions about public acceptance of the program.

The program has been very well received by the public in all my enforcement stops. They are behind us in this program.

I believe the SMPVs are extremely effective (especially from a psychological standpoint). I've heard no one make a negative comment.

The public is receptive to SMPV enforcement of heavy truck violations but appear to be aware of SMPV restrictions and drive accordingly.

In the contacts I have made, even though a citation was issued, the commercial operators are very receptive to the SMPV program. Many have stated, "it's about time" we got a program like this.

Only one negative comment was made by a citizen about a passenger vehicle enforcement stop. He quoted a newspaper article incorrectly.

LEGISLATIVE CONCERN

Media coverage was intense during the first four months of operations. The coverage was generally positive, however, in February and March of 1987 some negative coverage was encountered. This coverage resulted from some legislators' concerns about the number of passenger vehicle drivers who were issued citations by SMPV officers. That coverage resulted in some mail to the media and editorials supporting the use of SMPVs to cite unsafe passenger vehicle operators.

In February 1987, after 30 days of program operations, the CHP released preliminary enforcement data. This data indicated that 32.2 percent of total citations issued statewide by SMPV officers were to drivers of passenger vehicles. The number of citations issued to passenger vehicle operators drew legislative attention, causing the program to come under renewed scrutiny by some members of the Assembly Transportation Committee. The Committee questioned whether or not the SMPV program was being focused primarily toward truck enforcement as required by Senate Bill 1873.

The Commissioner of the CHP testified before the Committee, explaining the SMPV program enforcement guidelines pertaining to passenger vehicles. He reaffirmed that SMPV officers would issue citations for flagrant or unsafe passenger vehicle violations. The Commissioner also assured the Committee that the program was being administered within the mandates of Senate Bill 1873 and that truck enforcement was the focus of the program.

During this period of legislative concern, some Legislators' offices reported receiving phone complaints about the program, while others reported that constituents were in support of the program. One office reported that phone calls were running six to one in favor of the program.

PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE

Judicial response to the program was overwhelmingly positive. Officers who appeared in court on SMPV citations did not encounter any opposition by judges during the proceedings. In every court case that was monitored, the marking of the patrol vehicles was not an issue.

Overall, public acceptance of the use of SMPVs was refreshingly high for the duration of the program. Many officers while on patrol received favorable comments from motorists. It was not unusual for SMPV officers conducting truck enforcement stops to observe passing motorists give the "thumbs up" sign, wave, or smile. Most negative reaction to the program came from truck drivers, even though most truckers supported the program.

Public correspondence to the CHP about the program was minimal but generally positive. Few adverse comments were received and only one known citizen complaint was received as the result of a SMPV enforcement contact. (The complaint was from a truck driver who felt he did not deserve a speeding citation. The complainant made no reference to the program). In fact, telephone calls were received from passenger vehicle operators commending the CHP for its truck enforcement efforts.

All Area Commanders felt that the public was overwhelmingly in support of the SMPV program. Their perceptions were based on interaction with the general public, judges, attorneys, community leaders, local government representatives, and members of the media. This perception of public support addresses the suitability of the concept of using enforcement vehicles not readily identifiable as CHP patrol cars.

The Bakersfield Californian Tues., June 30, 1987 A11

Cal Poll: Should the CHP use unmarked vehicles?

LES INGRAM
Self employed: "Yes. Some truck drivers are completely out of control on the highway and it's the only way to catch them."

NORMAN BROOME
Retired: "Why not? People are more apt to slow down when they see a squad car, but if they don't see any cops around, they'll drive as they please. Arizona uses unmarked patrol cars and it's helped cut down on speeders because people never know where they are."

NAOMI WITMER
Lending officer: "I don't mind. If people are obeying the law, it shouldn't make a bit of difference."

JULIE ENGLISH
Teacher: "No. It's sneaky! I think when you see a black and white patrol car on the road it does the job it's intended to do — drivers slow down. The CHP ought to be more interested in slowing people down than trying to find new ways to sneak up on them. Their motives are all wrong."

MIKE WATKINS
Bartender: "Definitely. They need to be able to catch speeders any way they can, even if it means going undercover. Sometimes, you've got to fight fire with fire."

FIGURE 22. Informal newpaper poll.

CONCLUSIONS



CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the effects of using SMPVs for the enforcement of heavy truck rules of the road. Paramount to the success of the pilot program was whether or not a reduction in the rate of TAF accidents was realized. The Department measured t he TAF accident rate on test sites where SMPVs were deployed and on other freeways. The most significant reduction occurred on the test sites.

Use of SMPVs proved to be a valuable tool in the detection and apprehension of truck drivers operating in an unlawful manner. Officers operating SMPVs generated more truck citations per officer patrol hour and focused a much higher percentage of total enforcement activity toward truck drivers than officers operating black and white patrol cars.

Use of SMPVs had no impact on officer or public safety. Specially Marked Patrol Vehicles proved to be just as suitable as black and white patrol cars for the varied functions required of CHP officers.

Public acceptance of the SMPV program was perceived by the CHP to be high, and judicial response was perceived to be positive. A survey of citation dispositions did not reveal any judicial bias in favor of, or against, the use of SMPVs.

Even though the SMPV pilot program was successful in reducing the number of TAF accidents and in focusing enforcement efforts toward truck drivers, the program was not without problems. Because the Department had to re-direct existing resources to administer the program, other CHP activities may have been affected. However, the impact was not measured empirically.

The SMPV program demonstrated that officers operating SMPVs and deployed to primarily enforce truck rules of the road were successful in reducing TAF accident rates.

It is recommended that the CHP maintain the option of using SMPVs for truck enforcement on segments of highways that meet one or more of the following criteria:

- A highway segment experiencing a high rate of truck accidents in which the primary collision factor is well suited for the use of SMPVs.

- A highway segment experiencing a high degree of noncompliance with Vehicle Code laws pertaining to truck speed, lane change, turning, starting, backing, and following too closely.

- A highway segment that carries a high volume of truck traffic and experiences a moderate-to-high rate of noncompliance with pertinent Vehicle Code laws, where traditional enforcement strategies have been ineffective.

Truck-at-fault accidents constitute a small proportion of total motor vehicle accidents. The CHP broad-based commercial enforcement activities, hazardous materials programs, and liaison with the trucking industry play a major role in keeping this proportion small. The CHP must, however, seek ways to reduce the number of truck accidents caused by driver error. The use of SMPVs is suitable for this purpose.

FIGURE 23. Four models of SMPVs.

Senate Bill No. 1873

CHAPTER 1243

An act to add and repeal Section 2423 of the Vehicle Code, relating to vehicles.

[Approved by Governor September 26, 1986. Filed with Secretary of State September 26, 1986.]

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

SB 1873, Seymour. Department of the California Highway Patrol: special patrol vehicles.

Under existing law, the Department of the California Highway Patrol has responsibility for the patrol of and the investigation of motor vehicle accidents on the highways.

This bill would direct the department to institute a pilot program that would utilize vehicles not readily identifiable as regular patrol vehicles, but which meet identification requirements specified by regulation and exhibit the official insignia of the department, with enforcement personnel wearing the official uniform of the department, for the primary purpose of enforcement of highway safety violations by drivers of motortrucks of 3 or more axles over 6,000 pounds unladen weight, truck tractors, combinations of a motortruck and another vehicle or vehicles over 40 feet in length, and any truck or combination of vehicles over 6,000 pounds unladen weight transporting hazardous materials. The bill would limit the pilot program to 4 department geographical divisions with not more than 15 vehicles, and personnel assigned as specified. The bill would direct the department to prepare and submit a report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Legislature on or before March 15, 1988.

The bill would repeal these provisions on January 1, 1988.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. (a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows:

(1) The current increase in truck accident rates has created great concern from the public, governmental agencies, the Legislature, and other entities interested in traffic safety.

(2) There is continued disregard for safe, legal operation by some drivers of heavy commercial vehicles.

(3) These drivers are able to use various methods of communication to provide a network affording evasion from apprehension for unsafe, illegal driving practices.

(4) The Department of the California Highway Patrol, other than a limited air patrol operation, has no equal ability to combat

professional evaders with respect to illegal driving of heavy commercial vehicles.

(5) When a heavy commercial vehicle is involved in an accident with other vehicles, the potential for fatalities is increased dramatically.

(6) This increased potential for fatalities in heavy commercial vehicle accidents needs special action to reduce the accident rate and control illegal, unsafe driving practices.

(b) It is, therefore, the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to create a pilot program authorizing the use of special patrol vehicles by Highway Patrol officers in enforcing heavy commercial vehicle highway safety and in apprehending violators who drive those heavy commercial vehicles.

SEC. 2. Section 2423 is added to the Vehicle Code, to read:

2423. (a) The department shall conduct a pilot program involving its use of vehicles not readily identifiable as regular patrol vehicles, but which meet the identification requirements of Section 1141 of Title 13 of the California Administrative Code and exhibit the official insignia of the department, for the primary purpose of enforcement of highway safety violations by drivers of vehicles described in subdivisions (a), (b), and (f) of Section 34500 and drivers of vehicles of more than 6,000 pounds unladen weight described in subdivision (g) of Section 34500 and the apprehension of those violators. For this purpose, the department may employ any existing unmarked vehicle which is determined to afford the highest likelihood of continued nonrecognition, and may periodically repaint or remark any vehicle so used for this purpose if the vehicle continues to meet the identification requirements of Section 1141 of Title 13 of the California Administrative Code and exhibits the insignia of the department. Vehicles authorized by this section shall be used primarily for purposes of this section.

(b) The pilot program shall be limited to four of the eight department geographical divisions with not more than 15 vehicles assigned to the program, and shall utilize personnel already assigned for commercial vehicle enforcement purposes. Enforcement personnel participating in the pilot program shall wear the official uniform of the department.

(c) The department shall prepare and submit to the Legislature on or before March 15, 1988, a report of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations concerning the pilot program.

(d) The report shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(1) The cost effectiveness of special commercial vehicle enforcement.

(2) The impact on the commercial vehicle accident rate in the pilot program areas.

(3) A comparison of program area citation and conviction activity with regular road enforcement citation and conviction activity.

(4) The extent to which vehicles are used for purposes other than the primary purpose set forth in subdivision (a).

(5) Public acceptance.

(6) Problems resulting from the use of specifically marked patrol vehicles.

(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1988, and as of that date is repealed unless a later enacted statute which is enacted before January 1, 1988, deletes or extends that date.

ANNEX B

SEPTEMBER QUESTIONNAIRE

SPECIALLY MARKED PATROL VEHICLE PILOT PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION: The Department is currently evaluating the effectiveness of Specially Marked Patrol Vehicles (SMPVs) as tools in the enforcement of heavy truck rules of the road. The Legislature has directed the CHP to submit a report regarding this evaluation by March 15, 1988. Incorporated in the Department's study is a questionnaire survey of officers who have participated in the pilot program.

The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect subjective information regarding safety aspects associated with the operation of SMPVs.

INSTRUCTIONS:

- This questionnaire shall be completed by State Traffic Officers who have operated one or more SMPVs.
- Unless otherwise indicated, any comparison with black and white (B/W) patrol cars should be made on the basis of comparable emergency equipment, (i.e., an SMPV compared to a B/W with no roof lights).
- Only one answer shall be selected for each statement.
- Select an answer for each statement by circling the number in the answer column that best describes your opinion.
- Complete this questionnaire during the workshift in which you received it and return it to your supervisor for forwarding to Operational Planning Section.
- Commanders are to batch completed questionnaires and route them directly to Operational Planning Section no later than October 30, 1987.

PRINT IN UPPER CASE ONLY

LAST NAME:_____ FIRST NAME:_____

ID #:_____ LOCATION CODE:_____

			ANSWERS
(1)	DURING MY CAREER WITH THE CHP, I HAVE OPERATED THE FOLLOWING TYPE(S) OF BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS ENOUGH TO BE FAMILIAR WITH THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.	1 = ONLY SLICK TOP CARS 2 = ONLY CARS WITH ROOF LIGHTS 3 = BOTH SLICK TOP CARS AND CARS WITH ROOF LIGHTS	(1) 1 2 3
(2)	SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE PILOT PROGRAM (JANUARY 12, 1987), I HAVE DRIVEN A SMPV THE FOLLOWING NUMBER OF SHIFTS.	1 = 20 SHIFTS OR LESS 2 = 21 TO 40 SHIFTS 3 = 41 TO 60 SHIFTS 4 = 61 OR MORE SHIFTS	(2) 1 2 3 4

(Continued on reverse side)

STUDY (9/87) 041

Use the following rating scale to select answers for statements (3) through (18).

STRONGLY DISAGREE 1	DISAGREE 2	NEUTRAL 3	AGREE 4	STRONGLY AGREE 5

		ANSWERS
(3)	OVERALL, SMPVs ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS WHEN EFFECTING STOPS ON LARGE TRUCKS.	(3) 1 2 3 4 5
(4)	OVERALL, SMPVs ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS WHEN EFFECTING STOPS ON PASSENGER VEHICLES.	(4) 1 2 3 4 5
(5)	OVERALL, SMPVs ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS WHEN PROVIDING CONTROL AT EMERGENCY INCIDENTS (I.E., ACCIDENTS, LANE CLOSURES, ETC.).	(5) 1 2 3 4 5
(6)	OVERALL, SMPVS ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS WHEN RAPIDLY MOVING THROUGH MODERATE FREEWAY TRAFFIC DURING DAYLIGHT WITHOUT USING EMERGENCY LIGHTING OR SIREN (I.E., PACING A SPEEDER, CODE TWO RESPONSE, ETC.).	(6) 1 2 3 4 5
(7)	MOTORISTS TAILGATE SMPVs MORE THAN BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS ARE TAILGATED.	(7) 1 2 3 4 5
(8)	MOTORISTS DO NOT READILY IDENTIFY SMPVs AS PATROL VEHICLES.	(8) 1 2 3 4 5
(9)	OVERALL, SMPVs ARE AS EFFECTIVE AS BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS IN FREEWAY PATROL.	(9) 1 2 3 4 5
(10)	BASED ON ENFORCEMENT CONTACTS, THE PUBLIC IS RECEPTIVE TOWARDS THE USE OF SMPVs FOR HEAVY TRUCK RULES OF THE ROAD ENFORCEMENT.	(TO) 1 2 3 4 5
(11)	BASED ON ENFORCEMENT CONTACTS, THE PUBLIC IS RECEPTIVE TOWARDS THE USE OF SMPVs FOR PASSENGER VEHICLE RULES OF THE ROAD ENFORCEMENT.	(11) 1 2 3 4 5
(12)	OVERALL, THE EXTENT OF OFFICER SAFETY AFFORDED BY A SMPV IN CODE THREE OPERATION IS LESS THAN THAT PROVIDED BY A BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CAR.	(12) 1 2 3 4 5

IN THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES, MOTORISTS YIELD TO A SMPV IN CODE THREE OPERATION AS READILY AS A BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CAR IN CODE THREE OPERATION:

(13)	FREEWAY, DAYLIGHT.	(13) 1 2 3 4 5
(14)	FREEWAY, DARKNESS.	(14) 1 2 3 4 5
(15)	SURFACE STREET, DAYLIGHT.	(15) 1 2 3 4 5
(16	SURFACE STREET, DARKNESS.	(16) 1 2 3 4 5

COMPARED TO THE VERTICAL SHOTGUN MOUNTING POSITION USED IN BLACK AND WHITE PATROL CARS, I PREFER THE FOLLOWING SHOTGUN MOUNTING POSITIONS:

(17)	HORIZONTAL MOUNT BETWEEN FRONT BUCKET SEATS.	(17) 1 2 3 4 5
(18)	DIAGONAL MOUNT, MUZZLE DOWN AND STOCK UP.	(18) 1 2 3 4 5

COMMENTS: (ATTACH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF NECESSARY).

ANNEX C

THIS ANNEX INCLUDES A CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF SELECTED NEWSPAPER ARTICLES WHICH APPEARED BETWEEN DECEMBER 26, 1986 AND AUGUST 8, 1987 ON THE CHP'S DEPLOYMENT OF SPECIALLY MARKED PATROL VEHICLES. FIVE OF THOSE ARTICLES HAVE ALSO BEEN INCLUDED.

ARTICLE TITLE	DATE	PRIMARY LOCATION SERVED	CIRCULATION Daily (D) Weekly (W)		PUBLICATION
Of 1500 New Laws, Some Make Sense	12-26-86	Long Beach	D	51,340	Press Telegram
CHP Speed Patrols to Soon Use Less Identifiable Cars	12-30-86	Los Angeles	D	1,076,466	Los Angeles Times
Plain Wrap Bears to Curb Speeding Trucks	12-31-86	Long Beach	D	51,340	Press Telegram
Black and Whites Disguised in State Police Crackdown	12-31-86	San Jose	D	243,078	Mercury News (AM)
Give CHP a Chance	01-01-87	Santa Barbara	D	47,308	News Press
Low-Profile CHP Patrol Cars Eyed	01-02-87	San Gabriel	D	49,250	San Gabriel Valley Daily Tribune
Highway Patrol's Truck Crackdown a Necessary Move	01-07-87	Arcadia	W	2,597	Durtean Dispatch
Smokey Dons Plain Wrap to Nab Speeders	01-07-87	Los Angeles	2xW	2,850	Wilshire Press
CHP to Discreetly Nab Lawless Trucks	01-08-87	Bakersfield	D	66,867	Californian
CHP Will Field Fleet of "Plainclothes" Cars to Monitor Errant Truckers	01-08-87	Oakland	D	149,828	Oakland Tribune
CHP to Put on New Face to Chase Truckers	01-08-87	San Francisco	D	630,954	Chronicle
CHP to Use Less Visible Cars to Nab More Errant Truckers	01-08-87	Walnut Creek	D	77,358	Contra Costa Times
Speeders Beware; CHP Gets New Look	01-08-87	Hayward	D	44,335	Review
Hello, Mister Chips; Cars in Mufti to Cruise 880	01-08-87	San Jose	D	243,078	Mercury News (AM)
CHP Stealth Plan Targets Reckless Rigs	01-08-87	Sacramento	D	219,057	Bee
CHP Cars Take on New Look, Truckers	01-08-87	Costa Mesa	D	39,000	Daily Pilot

ARTICLE TITLE	DATE	PRIMARY LOCATION SERVED	CIRCULATION Daily (D) Weekly (W)		PUBLICATION
Help for the CHP	01-09-87	Merced	6xW	22,942	Sun Star
"Smokey" Will Pose Greater Threat to Speeding Truckers	01-09-87	Whittier	D	27,128	Whittier Daily News
New Laws Clamp Down on Trucks, Buses	01-10-87	Los Angeles	W	9,544	Eagle Rock Sentinel
Truckers Back CHP Crackdown	01-13-87	Morgan Hill	2xW	10,029	Morgan Hill Times and San Martin News
Low-Profile Cars Catch Speeding Truck Drivers	01-13-87	San Francisco	D	630,095	Chronicle
CHP Goes Trolling for Trucks	01-14-87	San Francisco	D	158,722	Examiner
Low-Profile CHP Cars Pulling Over Speeders	01-14-87	Van Nuys	D	132,936	Daily News
California Cracks Down on Speeding Trucker	01-15-87	New York, NY			Journal of Commerce
A Sneak at The Wheel	01-15-87	Saint Helena	W	4,299	Star
Sneaky Smokeys	01-17-87	Glendale	W	33,000	The Leader
Chips are Down for Those Who Speed	01-17-87	Hayward	D	44,335	Review
Low-Profile CHP Cars a Headache for Truckers	01-19-87	Hayward	W	44,335	Review
CHP Off Base in Use of Unmarked Cars, Plans to Use Radar Without Legislative OK	01-22-87	Napa	W	2,100	Record
Cool it, Truckers: That Good Buddy in the Chevy May be CHP	01-24-87	Los Angeles	D	1,076,466	Los Angeles Times
Should CHP Use Unmarked Cars to Patrol the Highways?	01-28-87	Lake Elsinore			The Valley Tribune
Thumbs Up for the California Highway Patrol	01-29-87	Carlsbad	W	5,000	La Costan

ARTICLE TITLE	DATE	PRIMARY LOCATION SERVED	CIRCULATION Daily (D) Weekly (W)		PUBLICATION
Beware the Banana Bitch	02-14-87	San Francisco	D	630,954	Chronicle
CHP Rates Special Car Sting a Success So Far	02-17-87	San Jose	D	243,078	Mercury News (AM)
Smokey Driving the "Silver Bullet"	02-21-87	Merced	6xW	22,942	Sun-Star
CHP Starts Special Problem Truck Patrol	03-01-87	Coming	5xW	2,068	Observer
CHP 'Truckbusters" Accused of Nailing Cars	03-05-87	Oakland	D	195,937	Tribune
Lawmakers Not Amused	03-05-87	Merced	6xW	22,942	Sun-Star
Crackdown on Speedy Trucks Also Nets Speedy Cars	03-05-87	Los Angeles	D	1,076,466	Los Angeles Times
Special CHP Patrols Draw Capitol Fire	03-05-87	Tulare	6xW	8,813	Advance Register
CHP's Unmarked Cars Draw Fire	03-07-87	Turlock	6xW	8,744	Journal
Let's Hear It For The CHP	03-08-87	Oakland	D	195,937	Tribune
Camouflaged CHP Effective Here	03-11-87	Newhall	3xW	12,586	The Signal
Effort to Slow Trucks Tickets Too Many Cars, Legislator Says	03-19-87	Santa Ana	D	271,281	Orange County Register
Suprise! CHP Project Designed to Nail Truckers Also is Nabbing Auto Drivers	3-19-87	Napa	W	2,100	Record
CHP Trying Sporty Ap-proach	03-20-87	Palo Alto	D	60,288	Peninsula Times Tribune
That's The Ticket	03-28-87	Santa Ana	D	27,281	Orange County Register
Curtailing Slaughter on Highways	03-30-87	San Gabriel	D	49,250	Tribune

ARTICLE TITLE	DATE	PRIMARY LOCATION SERVED	CIRCULATION Daily (D) Weekly (W)		PUBLICATION
CHP May Expand Special Patrol	04-27-87	San Jose	D	63,680	Mercury News (PM)
Going After Speeders	04-27-87	San Jose	D	243,078	Mercury News (AM)
"Camouflaged" CHP Cars Are Cutting Crashes	06-17-87	San Francisco	D	630,594	Chronicle
Accidents Down	06-19-87	Modesto	D	74,100	Bee
CHP: Proud of Pastel Patrol	06-21-87	Newhall	3xW	12,586	The Signal
CHP Plan Tames Truckers	06-23-87	Bakersfield	D	81,721	Bakersfield
Tickets by the Truckload	07-21-87	Los Angeles	D	266,102	Los Angeles Herald Examiner
"Plain Wrappers" Put Dent in Truck Mishaps	07-22-87	Los Angeles	D	1,076,466	Los Angeles Times
CHP Rides Herd on Speeding Trucks	07-27-87	Long Beach	D	51,340	Long Beach Press Telegram
Patrol Success	08-1-87	San Gabriel	D	49,250	San Gabriel Valley Daily Tribune

SPORTS

'New' GGF opens today
Page D-1

LOCAL

Fremont council OKs age limit for nightclub
Page A-9

THE TRIBUNE

GOLDEN GATE FIELDS HANDICAP

Oakland, California Tuesday, February 10, 1987 25 cents

CHP 'truckbusters' nailing too many cars, critics say

By Michael Collier
The Tribune

Speeding motorists have become unwilling — and often unhappy — targets of a month-old highway patrol crackdown on errant truckers using the Nimitz Freeway.

Nearly half of 704 tickets written by the California Highway Patrol's so-called "truckbuster" force in Alameda County were handed to drivers of cars, according to figures released yesterday.

Some of the ticketed motorists, and a growing number of Eastbay legislators, accuse the highway patrol of playing dirty tricks with the one-year test program.

Critics say the program, which deploys white, blue or brown patrol cars without roof-mounted lights rather than the familiar black-and-white patrol cars, is a back-door move by the highway patrol to use virtually unmarked cars to snare speeding motorists.

"The public doesn't like the CHP to be sneaky or covert," said Assemblyman Johan Klehs, D-San Leandro.

"The public may have been misled on this one," he said.

Assemblyman Elihu Harris, D-Oakland, who sits on the Assembly's Transportation Committee, agreed that the measure authorizing the test program was sold to legislators as a trucks-only campaign.

Harris said he wants to grill highway patrol officials about the situation at an upcoming meeting of the committee.

"It seems the CHP is turning its attention to speeding motorists instead of doing what I believe is their primary intent — roadside assistance," Harris said.

Highway patrol officials deny any charges of

See CHP, Back Page

CHP

Continued from Page A-1

falsely advertising the "truckbuster" campaign, in which 15 regular patrol officers across the state were retrained and reassigned.

"Nothing improper is going on," said Kent Milton, a CHP representative in Sacramento. "We said all along that we'd be citing some cars."

"What's an officer supposed to do when someone blasts by him doing 75 or 80 miles an hour?" Milton asked.

Statewide, about 25 percent of citations issued in the first week of the special campaign went to motorists, Milton said. Current totals were not available.

In Alameda County, however, the percentage of car drivers being cited by the special force is nearly twice that high, or 45 percent, local highway patrol officials said yesterday.

Virtually half of the 408 tickets issued since Jan. 12 on the Hayward-Fremont stretch of the Nimitz went to motorists, said Officer Fred Martin.

On the northern stretch of the freeway, from San Lorenzo to the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, 115 of 296 tickets have gone to motorists, said Pat Nelson of the CHP.

Nelson said the CHP's special force would like to cite a higher percentage of truckers — but officers have been thwarted by an unexpected rush of errant motorists.

He asserted that the special patrol effort has curbed the kind of bad truck driving — tailgating, speeding and unsafe lane changes — that causes most fatal accidents blamed on truckers.

About 60 percent of the trucks cited by the "truckbuster" force were nabbed for such violations, Nelson said.

Four of the specially colored cars, with flashing lights mounted on the sides rather than the roofs, are assigned to the Nimitz.

The Nimitz, also known as Interstate 880, is the only Bay Area freeway included in the special campaign. Also targeted because of heavy truck traffic is Interstate 5 and three Los Angeles-area freeways.

The California Trucking Association and the highway patrol lobbied for the program in response to statistics showing truckers were at fault in more than half the accidents in which they were involved.

The test program was authorized by legislation sponsored by state Sen. John Seymour, R-Anaheim.

The program's "primary purpose," according to the enabling legislation, was to crack down on truckers.

Patrol officials say virtually all motorists stopped by the "low-profile" cars have said they think the special campaign is a good idea.

But some motorists say they fear highway patrol officers may not see truckers driving dangerously when the officers' attention is focused on speeding car drivers.

Said Cynthia Chavez, who regularly drives the Nimitz from her home in San Leandro to work in Berkeley:

"A moving van just about rammed me into another lane the other day."

Oakland Tribune
February 10, 1987

Truckers back CHP crackdown

Nimitz Freeway designated as target area for undercover vehicles

By Steve Gibson
McClatchy News Service

A new California Highway Patrol program using low-profile cars to crack down on speeding and recklessly driven big trucks drew a mostly positive response from truck drivers pausing for lunch last week in Sacramento.

"Sounds like a good idea to me," said 35-year-old Lee Thompson of Omaha, Neb. "What's the sense of having laws on the books if you don't enforce 'em.

"I think I'm in the minority," the driver said, "but there's an awful lot of junk out there on the highways, and I've seen an awful lot of abuse."

Like most of the other drivers at the truck stop, Thompson hauls freight on a giant 18-wheel rig the kind targeted by the CHP's new effort to stem a steady rise in truck-at-fault accidents.

Since 1982, said CHP Commissioner James E. Smith, truck-at-fault accidents in California have climbed 50 percent from 12,149 to 18,029.

For the average motorist confronting big trucks on freeways, "it can be a very scary thing," said state Sen. John Seymour, R-Anaheim, author of legislation authorizing the pilot program.

The legislator said his office had received complaints from truckers saying their jobs are "hard enough now without having Smokey (the CHP) breathing down our necks."

"I think we're giving Smokey an equal opportunity here," Seymour said.

Smith and Seymour spoke at a Capitol press conference to announce the program which will utilize 15 specially-marked patrol cars not readily identifiable as CHP vehicles.

The crackdown starts this week and will run through Dec. 31 on five freeways with heavy truck traffic and high truck accident rates.

"If this is successful," Seymour said, "I'd like to see it implemented on a statewide basis. We're asking for a a very in-depth report" at the end of the year.

The target areas:

* Interstate 880, also known as the Nimitz Freeway or old Highway 17, in the Oakland-Hayward areas.
* Highway 99-Interstate 5 between Bakersfield and Verdugo Hills.
* Highway 99 from the San Joaquin-Stanislaus County line on the north to the Merced-Madera County line on the south.
* Interstate 5 in Anaheim, Santa Ana and Irvine.
* A 5.5-mile segment of Interstate 710 in Westminster in Orange County which has the highest volume of truck traffic in the state — 23,000 per day.

According to CHP statistics, about 90 percent of truck-at-fault accidents during 1985 were caused by driver error, with the four leading errors being unsafe speed (23 percent), unsafe lane changes (18 percent), improper turns (18 percent) and improper starting/backing (11 percent).

Unlike regular CHP cars, these Dodges, Chevrolets and Fords don't have whip antennas, overhead lights and push bumpers. And instead of black-and-white, they are painted conservative red, blue, gray and green, while retaining white doors with the CHP seal.

Smith said uniformed drivers in the cars will concentrate on truck violations. He said plans calls for operating each car at least 80 hours per week and that officers assigned to these cars would also assist at accidents and other emergencies.

The program has the enthusiastic endorsement of the California Trucking Association, according to association representative Karen E. Rasmussen.

At the truck stop in Sacramento, driver Wayne Malley, 36, of Milroy, Pa., shrugged when told of the CHP's pilot project.

"Don't bother me, because I don't drive in a hurry anywhere," Malley said while waiting to place at call at a pay telephone. "I go at a slow pace and listen to the music."

For Pat Inman, 28, who drives an 18-wheel rig based in Omaha, Neb., the question was moot.

"My truck don't go fast because it's got a governor," he said. "Sixty miles an hour that's as fast as it goes."

"TRUCKERS . . . ."
Morgan Hill Times and San Martin News
January 13, 1987

Accidents down

THE CALIFORNIA Highway Patrol notes with satisfaction that accidents are down throughout the state, but especially on highways patrolled by specially marked cars, where decreases of between 20 to 40 percent were recorded.

The CHP cars are are marked on the sides, but are not recognizable from the front or back.

Overall truck accidents were down 6.8 percent for the first quarter, but in areas patrolled by the specially marked cars, truck accidents were down 12.7 percent and truck-at-fault accidents were down 19.6 percent.

That's good news. Now, if the Legislature would just authorize the use of radar by the CHP, we could expect even further gains in highway safety.

"ACCIDENTS . . . ."
Modesto Bee
June 19, 1987

Tickets by the truckload

Unmarked CHP cars put brakes on accident rate

By Timothy Carlsen
Herald staff writer

A pilot program using unmarked CHP cars to crack down on reckless driving by commercial vehicles has significantly reduced truck accidents statewide and particularly in Los Angeles County, officials said.

Citing a reduction in truck-involved accidents of 12.8 percent statewide and 24 percent locally on roads involved in the program in the first quarter of 1987, spokesman Michael Maas said that California Highway Patrol Commissioner James Smith is pleased with the results so far. "If this trend continues, there will be a good chance they will be asking for an extension" past its original deadline of Dec. 31, said Maas.

Maas said that truck-at-fault accidents statewide have been reduced by 19.3 percent in the first quarter.

"We have received zero complaints so far and a lot of people have called in to thank us," said Lt. Don Bossingham, the southern division coordinator of the specially marked patrol vehicle program for the CHP that uses 15 cars. "We were not convinced this would happen when we began, but accidents are way down in our area."

The "alternately marked patrol vehicles," known on the truckers' citizens band radio channels as "smokey in a plain wrapper," do not have emergency lights on the roof, amber lights on the rear deck or vertical dashboard mounts for shotguns and are painted solid colors rather than the traditional black and white.

But to assure truck drivers and other motorists that the cars are operated by actual law enforcement officers, they do have an 18-inch CHP insignia on the side door, carry less conspicuous side-mounted red lights and are driven by uniformed officers.



A trucker on I-5 signs speeding ticket he got from Officer John Davis, whose cruiser appears unmarked to drivers in front of it.

The unmarked cars are being used on highways with significant truck-accident rates, including California 99 from Bakersfield to Stockton, Interstate 880 near Oakland, Interstate 710 in Los Angeles and Interstate 5 from the Grapevine in Kern County to Glendale in L.A. County.

No other state has a program utilizing unmarked cars solely for catching commercial vehicles, said a CHP spokesman. But several other states, mainly in the Midwest and East, use unmarked vehicles for all types of traffic enforcement.

California laws have traditionally forbidden the use of radar and unmarked vehicles for regular traffic enforcement. The program has not cost any extra money. The 15 cars have come from the regular fleet of 2,200 patrol cars and are just repainted. The officers have been reassigned, not added.

The legislation was sponsored by state Sen. John Seymour, R-Anaheim, who was concerned that truck drivers with CB radios and high views from atop their tractor trailer cabs were defying speed limits and truck accidents were rising at an alarming rate.

Since 1982, truck accidents have increased dramatically. According

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to CHP statistics, in 1982 there were 26,651 truck involved accidents in California. In 1986, there were 35,470, an increase of 33 percent. The increase of truck-at-fault accidents from 12,149 in 1982 to 18,029 in 1986 was nearly 50 percent.

Bossingham says that the pilot program is not working as well in the metropolitan areas. "When our unmarked cars are caught in bumper-to-bumper traffic, they can't observe as many violations," said Bossingham. "Truck accidents have remained the same at our Verdugo Hills location in Glendale. But we feel it's still doing some good there because traffic volume is up 5 percent from last year. Maybe there is a carryover of good driving from the other areas."

The greatest success rate is in the area from the north end of the Grapevine Pass at Fort Tejon to the Newhall-Saugus area, said Bossingham. While truck traffic there is the highest in the state for a rural area — an average of 6,500 traveling each way pass this area every weekday (an average of one every 14 seconds) — there are few bumper-to-bumper jams and the unmarked cars have good mobility.

Los Angeles Herald Examiner
July 21, 1987

Let's hear it for the CHP

Just imagine the scene. It's been a tough day, and the husband is both late and livid as he pulls to a tire-screeching stop in front of his home.

"The @$%*&# CHP!" he yells at his wife, slamming the front door in anger. "One of those 'truckbuster' Highway Patrol cars had the nerve to pull me over! I was doin' 80, but those guys are only supposed to stop *trucks!* I'm calling my local assemblyman!"

You expect that kind of ludicrous thinking on simplistic TV cop shows, where the bad guys jeeringly flip the bird at the poor officers who have to stop chasing them on some technicality. But in real life, complaints just like that are getting a sympathetic ear from Eastbay Assembly members Elihu Harris, Delaine Eastin and Johann Klehs.

The legislators seem to feel it's unsporting for the low-profile CHP cars — put on the road in January specifically to go after dangerous and illegal trucks — to also haul down flagrantly illegal car drivers.

True, the cars don't have the distinctive black-and-white paint scheme and rooftop light bars that give determined speeders a chance to spot them in time to slow down.

But catching dangerous drivers isn't some sporting event where the lawbreakers get a special handicap.

Speeding and reckless driving on California freeways cost hundreds of lives, maim thousands of people and do millions of dollars worth of damage every year. Every reckless driver stopped is a potential accident prevented. It shouldn't matter whether the vehicle is a truck or a car. The game a lot of car drivers like to play — cursing trucks for speeding while they speed along themselves — should not be defended by lawmakers.

"The perception of the voters is that they have been hoodwinked and tricked by you," Assemblywoman Eastin, D-Union City, told CHP Commissioner James Smith at a Transportation Committee hearing last week.

Hoodwinked because the CHP is doing its job of citing lawbreaking and dangerous motorists? That stretches logic past the breaking point.

The CHP said clearly before the program began that there would be arrests for "aggravated passenger vehicle violations," car drivers so reckless or so fast that there's an imminent danger of an accident. Officers in the program are told their main job is to reduce truck accidents, but they shouldn't ignore flagrantly illegal car drivers. Those instructions should be praised, not condemned.

"I've received more phone complaints on this than any other issue," said Harris, D-Oakland, the committee chair. By that logic, Harris would have to go to bat for thieves if enough of them called to complain that they were being caught.

"The public doesn't like the CHP to be sneaky," said Klehs, D-San Leandro. Sneaky?? The low-profile cars do still have the familiar CHP logo on their doors. What about the sneaky motorists who want better odds on breaking the law?

These legislators seem to have forgotten that the issue here is saving lives. They



should have the guts to stand up to people who think the game isn't fair because they got caught.

Statewide, one-third of the program's citations are going to car drivers, who make up 85 percent of the traffic in the test areas. Truckers, only 15 percent of the traffic, get two-thirds of the citations.

"It is not my understanding that officers are expected to ignore violations of the law," CHP Commissioner Smith said at last week's hearing.

Smith is right. Legislators — and the public — should applaud the CHP for helping to make dangerous highways safer, not condemn it for hassling speeding car drivers.

Oakland Tribune
March 8, 1987