



**BUSINESS, TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL**

THE EVALUATION OF RISK

INITIAL CAUSE VS. FINAL OUTCOME IN POLICE PURSUITS

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Initial Cause vs. Final Outcome in Police Pursuits

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DIRECTORY OF TABLES AND FIGURES	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
INTRODUCTION	3
METHODOLOGY	5
REPORT OF DATA	7
LITERATURE AND RESEARCH REVIEW.....	34
CONTEXT	42
RAMIFICATIONS.....	47
CONCLUSIONS	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY	51
ANNEX A-SURVEY	53
ANNEX B-CHP 187	54
ANNEX C-PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.....	55
ANNEX D-AGENCIES BY RESPONSE	57

DIRECTORY OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES:

TABLE 1: BREAKDOWN OF FINAL CHARGES.....	10
TABLE 2: PURSUIT FATALITIES NATIONWIDE, 1981-1993	20
TABLE 3: COMMON INFRACTIONS AND RESULTANT FELONY ARRESTS	26
TABLE 4: FELONY ARRESTS	26
TABLE 5: COMPARATIVE RISKS.....	43
TABLE 6: COMPARATIVE RISKS OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN CALIFORNIA.....	45
TABLE 7: COMPARATIVE RISKS OF PROPERTY CRIMES.....	46

FIGURES:

FIGURE 1: INITIAL VIOLATIONS AND FINAL CHARGES.....	7
FIGURE 2: INITIAL VIOLATIONS (PERCENTAGES).....	8
FIGURE 3: FINAL CHARGES (PERCENTAGES).....	9
FIGURE 4: BREAKDOWN OF FINAL CHARGES (NUMBERS).....	10
FIGURE 5: INFRACTIONS AND RESULTANT FELONY ARRESTS	11
FIGURE 6: INFRACTIONS AND RESULTANT ARRESTS (NUMBERS).....	12
FIGURE 7: INFRACTIONS AND RESULTANT ARRESTS (PERCENTAGES)	13
FIGURE 8: PURSUIT COLLISIONS (NUMBERS).....	14
FIGURE 9: PURSUIT COLLISIONS (PERCENTAGES).....	15
FIGURE 10: PURSUIT-RELATED DEATHS (NUMBERS).....	16
FIGURE 11: PURSUIT-RELATED DEATHS (PERCENTAGES).....	17
FIGURE 12: PURSUIT-RELATED INJURIES (NUMBERS).....	18
FIGURE 13: PURSUIT-RELATED INJURIES (PERCENTAGES).....	19
FIGURE 14: PURSUIT-RELATED DEATHS (NUMBERS).....	21
FIGURE 15: PURSUIT-RELATED DEATHS (PERCENTAGES).....	21
FIGURE 16: FELONY EVADING	23
FIGURE 17: MISDEMEANOR EVADING.....	24
FIGURE 18: COMPARATIVE RISKS, CALIFORNIA AND THE UNITED STATES.....	44

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The number of tragedies resulting from police pursuits is believed to be reaching epidemic proportions. It is a common perception that the risk of pursuing criminals is too great and the threat to public safety outweighs any results achieved. This perception is evident by numerous current attempts to severely limit the criteria by which a pursuit may be initiated, or to eliminate an officer's discretion to pursue entirely.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) and the California Peace Officers' Association (CPOA) have offered model pursuit guidelines in both the past and the present. It is the intent of the proposed policies to perfect the decision-making process used by law enforcement officers in pursuits. While well-meaning and developed in response to political pressures and concerns, these attempts may have consequences beyond those intended. It is not unreasonable to suggest that limiting pursuits will reduce pursuit-related fatalities, but it is dangerously simplistic to suggest that will be the only outcome.

Undeniably, such a policy would eliminate the worst-case scenario where an innocent person is killed and the pursued suspect is only wanted for an infraction. But it is also important to consider what else will be eliminated. To adopt such an extremely restrictive policy prior to examining the consequences would trade one risk for another. It is imperative to seek an accurate assessment of the risk involved.

In 1994, 5,339 pursuits were initiated in the State of California. 52 percent began when an officer attempted to make an enforcement stop for a minor violation and the violator fled.

Examining only this part of the risk equation is to examine only half the evidence. If, subsequently, 52 percent of the apprehended violators were charged with only an infraction, then criticisms that the pursuits were unwarranted would be valid. (This validity is based upon the premise that only those who submit to the law must comply with it.) However, in 1994, 73 percent of those apprehended in pursuits were charged with felony violations. A minimum of two-thirds of the felony arrests were for a charge other than evading a peace officer. Only 1 percent were ultimately charged with only an infraction.

It is apparent that the initiating violation is but a small part of the actual risk equation and will not serve to balance the equation as a whole.

Some may argue that these results are not compelling and that the death of innocents cannot be compared with the recovery of a stolen car or the arrest of an intoxicated driver. But it is far too easy to become inured to problems which are so familiar that they fail to impact or even imprint on public opinion.

In California, the odds of having a vehicle stolen are 10,000 times greater than those of being killed in a police pursuit. For every innocent person who became a victim in a pursuit-related collision, 196 others were killed in alcohol-related collisions. From a media perspective, it is as if attention was being focused on singular tragedies while elsewhere, fully loaded jumbo jets were crashing on a regular basis and no one was commenting on them.

These statistics are in no way an attempt to draw attention away from the very real public safety issues involved in police pursuits, nor are they meant to diminish or demean the loss of life incurred in a small number of pursuits. They are an attempt, however, to provide a larger context in the pursuit debate and to warn against resolutions which are based upon conviction and innuendo rather than fact.

A basic principle of empirical study recognizes that the standard of measure will determine the interpretation of results. In other words, what something is compared to will largely determine the results of that comparison. Many studies have attempted to determine an adequate level of risk in police pursuits. Few, however, have taken this principle into account.

There is only one variable that will balance the risk equation, and only one standard of measure that will adequately address the entire issue. **The only standard the "risk of pursuing" can be compared to is the risk of not pursuing.** If society accounts for this risk and after viewing all the available evidence, determines that the risks are still too great, then law enforcement agencies must respond to the wishes of the public they serve. However, it would be a disservice not to adequately inform the public of the larger picture.

Law enforcement agencies and legislative bodies must exercise both forethought and foresight in assessing the risks of police pursuits. It is the position of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) that pursuits are a necessary tool of law enforcement, a tool that must be used with judgment and discretion, but a tool that must be used.

INTRODUCTION

It has been ninety years since the first vehicle received an exemption for on-duty emergency operation. In the subsequent nine decades, the world has changed in ways both measurable and immeasurable. The lawmakers of that time could not anticipate the controversy their laws would generate in the future. The decade of the nineties has seen police pursuits spring to the forefront of national consciousness. It is discussed on talk shows, written about in magazines, and often headlines the evening news. Invariably the discussion is centered around a specific incident where tragically, someone has been severely injured or killed.

Numerous attempts to address this perceived "epidemic" have recently surfaced. On a national level, a bill entitled the "National Police Pursuit Policy Act of 1995" has been introduced in the United States Congress. In an attempt at self-regulation, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has proposed a "model" pursuit policy. The California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) has issued proposed pursuit guidelines and commentary. On a state level the California Peace Officers' Association (CPOA) has offered its own version of model pursuit guidelines.

There are many similarities between these proposals. All parties seem to agree on the need for policies, as well as the need for intensive and on-going training. Supervision is critical and self-evaluation is necessary so that police departments can continually improve their pursuit policies and the implementation of those policies.

The CHP is in complete agreement with the above standards and either meets or exceeds all of them. However, there is one point, if present in any proposed policy, with which the CHP must disagree. Any attempt to limit an officer's discretion to engage in pursuits for "minor" infractions should be viewed with extreme caution. Popular opinion holds that these pursuits pose too great a risk and that pursuits initiated for traffic violations are not worth the dangers they represent to public safety. The CHP must depart from this opinion, and this departure is neither arbitrary nor without thought. It is an inevitable conclusion drawn from this study.

The model policy proposed by the IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center states that a law enforcement officer may initiate a vehicular pursuit when:

The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid arrest by using a vehicle to flee apprehension for an alleged felony or misdemeanor that would normally require a full custody arrest.¹

¹ IACP National Law Enforcement Policy Center, "Vehicular Pursuit-Concepts and Issues Paper," Alexandria, VA, August 1, 1990.

It should be noted that this model policy is substantially different than the operational policy approved by the rank-and-file membership of the IACP.

California's POST has also proposed guidelines for the development of pursuit policies for California law enforcement agencies. In these guidelines it states, "The policy should define a 'pursuit,' articulate the reasons for which a pursuit is authorized and identify the issues that should be considered in reaching the decision to pursue." One of the suggested factors to consider when initiating a pursuit is the "nature of the offense and apparent circumstances."²

On the surface, the position of initiating a pursuit solely for "serious" crimes seems reasonable. Indeed, it may even qualify as "common sense." However, it would be negligent to adopt such a policy without first examining the possible ramifications of doing so. Herein lies the purpose of this paper.

In 1994 the CHP initiated 1,292 pursuits statewide. Of that number, 79 percent of the pursuits were initiated on the basis of a simple infraction or "minor" violation. Due to the nature of the CHP's mission, which is primarily traffic-related, this percentage is higher than the statewide percentage of 52 percent. Nationwide figures give estimates between 40 and 60 percent. Regardless of the actual percentages, it is not difficult to draw the conclusion that a large number of pursuits begin as infractions.

Opponents of police pursuits use these statistics to prove that most pursuits are not necessary, are unreasonable, and present unacceptable risks to public safety. Proponents of pursuits, on the other hand, say these statistics do not provide the whole story. Unfortunately, the whole story has remained largely unexplored in any kind of scientific manner.

It was for these reasons that the Commissioner of the CHP, M. J. Hannigan, proposed a study to examine the objective data available and to provide a larger picture of the relationship between the initial violation with which a pursuit begins, and the final charge with which it ends.

²Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST), "Vehicle Pursuit-Proposed Guidelines," Sacramento, CA, August 1995.

METHODOLOGY

This study incorporates data from the following resources:

Statewide Pursuit Information Database Resource (SPIDR)

The State of California is fortunate in that it has access to an invaluable resource in SPIDR. SPIDR was created by the CHP in January 1992 in response to legislation passed by the California State Legislature, which mandated that all pursuits be reported to the CHP for statistical purposes. The minimum amount of data required by law is as follows:

1. Whether any person involved in the pursuit or subsequent arrest was injured and how serious the injury was;
2. The violation which caused the pursuit to be initiated;
3. The identity of the officers involved in the pursuit;
4. The means or methods used to stop the suspect being pursued;
5. The charges filed with the court by the district attorney.

The CHP requires additional data to be submitted on its own pursuits for further evaluation.

In theory, SPIDR represents a survey with a 100 percent response rate, a sample that is highly representative of California pursuits in general, and the number of incidents far exceed any similar study. As a comparison, the study completed by the CHP in 1983 used pursuits initiated by its own members in addition to those initiated by ten allied agencies. The study examined 683 cases, one of the largest samplings to that date. SPIDR, on the other hand, compiles data from all CHP Area offices and nearly 500 allied agencies statewide. In 1994 alone, SPIDR recorded data from over 5,300 pursuits.

Although the data collected from this mandated process is substantial, there are limitations. Agencies reporting into the SPIDR system are required to list only a single final charge. Therefore, in incidents where multiple felony violations occur, or a felony and additional misdemeanors occur, only the "most serious" charge will be recorded.

Another problem inherent in this type of data collection is that agencies may list a pursuit-related final charge such as felony evading when other serious charges were filed. This can give a misleading picture as many critics allege that the numerous felony arrests arising from pursuits are a result of the pursuits themselves. Finally, federal agencies are not subject to California's pursuit reporting requirements and thus the data does not include pursuits by those agencies.

The second source of data in this study, the informal survey described below, attempts to address some of these limitations by analyzing trends in pursuit arrests.

Informal Survey

A survey soliciting both anecdotal and statistical information was sent to all California law enforcement agencies. The questions in the survey were specific with regard to incidents where a pursuit was initiated due to a minor violation and ended with a felony arrest.

Responses were received from 94 CHP Area offices, 113 police departments, and 12 county sheriffs offices. Approximately 2,600 pursuit reports were submitted for inspection, all occurring within 1993, 1994, and the first quarter of 1995.


Nineteen CHP Areas or allied agencies submitted negative reports, finding no records that met the requested criteria. Six of the agencies participated in the survey but submitted cases that did not meet the requested criteria. Five agencies declined to participate in the survey, citing reasons such as the unfeasibility of hand-searching their records or lack of personnel to do so.

REPORT OF DATA

The following statistical data was collected by SPIDR for the year 1994, compiled from 5,339 pursuits initiated statewide.

Figure 1 compares the number of pursuits initiated for infractions, misdemeanors, and felonies with the subsequent number of arrests in those categories. It illustrates the disproportionate number of pursuits that began as a result of an infraction, and the disproportionate number that ended in felony arrests.

Figure 1: Initial Violations and Final Charges



Note: The figures do not total the 5,339 total apprehensions because 21 of the initial violations and 30 of the final charges were listed as "other" in SPIDR. In the following pages, "other" may represent a small percentage of the totals but is not depicted because the percentage is insignificant (less than 1 percent).

Figure 2 compares the percentage of pursuits initiated for infractions, misdemeanors, and felonies in California in 1994. It illustrates the fact that the majority of pursuits in California are initiated for infractions.

Figure 2: Initial Violations (Percentages)




Figure 3 compares the percentage of pursuits which ended in arrests for infractions, misdemeanors, and felonies in California in 1994. Figure 3 illustrates the fact that the majority of pursuits in California end in felony arrests and only a small percent end in arrests for only infractions.

Figure 3: Final Charges (Percentages)




Table 1 and Figure 4 give a breakdown of some of the most serious violations charged at the end of pursuits in California in 1994.

Table 1: Breakdown of Final Charges

	FINAL CHARGES	NUMBER	%
1	RAPE	5	0.1
2	FELONY DUI	24	0.5
3	KIDNAPPING	50	1.0
4	HOMICIDE	66	1.3
5	ROBBERY	190	3.6
6	ASSAULT	314	6.0
7	MISDEMEANOR DUI	451	8.6
8	VEHICLE THEFT	1,251	23.8
9	OTHER FELONY	1,922	36.6

Figure 4: Breakdown of Final Charges (Numbers)




Figure 5 illustrates the number of felony arrests that resulted from pursuits initiated for certain common infractions. Figure 5 is in no way inclusive of all felony arrests resulting from pursuits in California in 1994, but is meant to show how certain traffic violations lead to a large number of major arrests.

Figure 5: Infractions and Resultant Felony Arrests




Figure 6 gives a breakdown of arrests resulting from pursuits specifically initiated for an infraction in California in 1994. It illustrates that pursuits initiated for "minor" or "traffic" violations result in a large number of felony arrests. Rarely is the final arrest on the same level as the initiating event when the initiating event is minor in nature.

Figure 6: Infractions and Resultant Arrests (Numbers)




Figure 7 compares the percentage of infraction, misdemeanor, and felony arrests resulting from pursuits initiated for infractions in California in 1994. Felony arrests represent the largest percentage while infractions represent only a small proportion of the final charges.

Figure 7: Infractions and Resultant Arrests (Percentages)




Figure 8 compares the number of pursuit-related non-injury, injury, and fatal collisions in California in 1994. Figure 8 illustrates that the collisions are primarily non-injury and to a lesser degree, injury collisions. Fatal collisions represent only a small number of the total pursuit-related collisions.

Figure 8: Pursuit Collisions (Numbers)




Figure 9 compares the number of non-injury, injury, and fatal collisions as a percentage of the total number of pursuits initiated and illustrates the fact that the majority of pursuits do not end in collisions. Those that do are primarily non-injury and to a lesser degree, injury collisions. Fatal collisions are the result in only a small percentage of the total pursuits initiated.

Figure 9: Pursuit Collisions (Percentages)




Figure 10 compares the number of officers, uninvolved persons, and suspects killed in pursuit-related collisions in California in 1994. Figure 10 illustrates that it is the suspect who is most likely to be killed in a pursuit-related collision.

Figure 10: Pursuit-related Deaths (Numbers)




Figure 11 compares the percentage of officers, uninvolved persons, and suspects killed in pursuit-related collisions in California in 1994. Figure 11 shows that the greatest percentage of pursuit-related fatalities involve suspects.

Figure 11: Pursuit-related Deaths (Percentages)




Figure 12 compares the number of officers, uninvolved persons, and suspects injured in pursuit-related collisions in California in 1994. Figure 12 illustrates that it is the suspect who is most likely to be injured in pursuit-related collisions.

Figure 12: Pursuit-related Injuries (Numbers)





Figure 13 compares the percentage of officers, suspects, and uninvolved persons injured in pursuit-related collisions in California in 1994. Figure 13 shows that the largest percentage of pursuit-related injuries are sustained by suspects.

Figure 13: Pursuit-related Injuries (Percentages)



FARS Data

Table 2 categorizes data compiled by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in their Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS). FARS collects data only on collisions that result in death which occur in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

The following chart lists both the total number of fatalities and the breakdown of the number of officers, suspects, and uninvolved persons killed in the United States in pursuit-related collisions in the 13-year period between 1981 and 1993.

During the four-year period between 1981 and 1984, only the total number of fatalities was recorded, so the actual breakdown during that time period is unknown. The totals for the different categories reflect only the known information.

Table 2: Pursuit Fatalities Nationwide, 1981-1993

YEAR	Occupant of Police Veh.	Occupant of Chased Veh.	Uninvolved Persons	Total
1981				266
1982				307
1983				295
1984				246
1985	4	225	48	277
1986		241	67	308
1987	6	205	44	255
1988		242	52	294
1989	5	223	72	300
1990		264	51	315
1991	4	252	55	311
1992	1	224	79	304
1993	1	280	62	343
AVG/YR	2*	240*	59*	294
TOTAL	21	2,156	530	3,821

*Averaged over the nine-year period from 1985–1993.

Figure 14 compares the number of officers, uninvolved persons, and suspects killed in pursuit-related collisions in the nine-year period between 1985 and 1993.

Figure 14: Pursuit-related Deaths (Numbers)





Figure 15 compares the percentage of officers, uninvolved persons, and suspects killed in pursuit-related collisions in the nine-year period from 1985 to 1993.

Figure 15: Pursuit-related Deaths (Percentages)



Informal Survey Data

The statistical data on the following pages was compiled from an informal survey conducted by the CHP in 1995. It includes pursuits occurring in 1993, 1994, and the first quarter of 1995, and is limited to reports of 2,601 pursuits initiated for an infraction and ending with a felony arrest.

Evading a peace officer is defined in the California Vehicle Code as "any person who, while operating a motor vehicle and with intent to evade, willfully flees or otherwise attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer's motor vehicle." Felony evading encompasses attempts to evade a peace officer that involve reckless driving or cause injury or death.

Critics of current pursuit statistics allege the resultant arrests are pursuit-related, but the following information may leave reasonable doubt as to the validity of this allegation.

Facts involving the charge of felony evading in the informal survey:

Of the 2,601 pursuit reports examined, there were 958 occasions where felony evading was charged. Of the 958 occasions where felony evading was charged, in 447 of those cases (47 percent), at least one additional felony or misdemeanor was charged as well.


The data was broken down into the following categories:

1. Felony evading was the only final charge listed.
2. Felony evading and at least one additional felony was charged.
3. Felony evading and at least one additional misdemeanor was charged.
4. Felony evading was charged and the suspect was also wanted for parole violation or warrants.

These categories were calculated as if mutually exclusive, in the order listed above, and with no overlapping of data. In other words, if felony evading was charged with at least one additional felony, it does not preclude the possibility that the suspect was charged with additional felonies, misdemeanors, or parole/warrant violations. It simply means the suspect was charged, at a minimum, with an additional felony violation.

Figure 16 illustrates this breakdown of charges.

Figure 16: Felony Evading



Facts involving the charge of misdemeanor evading in the informal survey:

Of the 2,601 pursuit reports examined, there were 104 occasions where misdemeanor evading was charged. Of the 104 occasions where misdemeanor evading was charged, in 67 of those cases (64 percent), at least one additional felony or misdemeanor was charged as well.


The data was broken down into the following categories:

1. Misdemeanor evading was the only final charge listed.
2. Misdemeanor evading and at least one additional felony was charged.
3. Misdemeanor evading and at least one additional misdemeanor was charged.
4. Misdemeanor evading was charged and the suspect was also wanted for parole violation or warrants.

Again, these categories were calculated with no overlap in the data. A suspect charged with at least one additional felony may have been charged with additional felonies, misdemeanors, or parole/warrant violations.

Figure 17 illustrates this breakdown of charges.

Figure 17: Misdemeanor Evading



It should be noted these figures represent a minimum as respondents to the survey were not specifically directed to list more than one final charge. The Los Angeles Police Department, which submitted 758 pursuits out of the total 2,601 (29 percent), listed only a single final charge due to the fact their method of data collection is similar to that of SPIDR's. It is not unreasonable to suggest, however, that when "felony evading" is the final charge indicated in this type of data collection, it is often not the only charge.

Table 3 links commonly observed infractions that led to pursuits and the resultant number of felony arrests.

Table 3: Common Infractions and Resultant Felony Arrests

"Minor" Violation	Felony Arrests
Speed	934
Stop sign	265
Red light	195
Seatbelt	125
Unsafe lane change	122
Registration	88
License plate	67
Headlights	55
Taillights/Brakelights	52
Unsafe turning movement	46
Following too closely	25
Disobey traffic sign	13
Unsafe passing	12
Tinted windows	11

Table 4 lists certain felonies and the number of arrests that resulted from pursuits initiated due to infractions.

Table 4: Felony Arrests

Felony	Number of Arrests
Vehicle theft	945
Controlled substance violations	204
Firearms violations	78
Possession of stolen property	65
Grand theft	35
Driving under the influence (DUI)	32
DUI with three or more priors	15
Escaped prisoners	2

Additional facts involving pursuits initiated as infractions:

- 117 suspects were arrested for misdemeanor DUI
- 66 suspects were on parole
- 64 suspects had outstanding warrants for their arrest
- 6 suspects were on probation

PERSPECTIVE

Perhaps the most productive way to examine the data provided in the earlier section is to address some of the misconceptions currently circulating on the topic of police pursuits. "Belief" and "fact" are not synonyms, and it is important to differentiate between the two when making informed decisions.

The following is a direct comparison of what is "believed" to be the situation, and what it actually is.

"Sixty to Eighty percent of all 'hot pursuit' chases originate over minor traffic violations."³ United States Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.)

Making a broad statement of why pursuits are initiated without addressing how they end is to examine only half the risk equation. In 1994, 52 percent of the pursuits in California were initiated because of a "minor" infraction.

At the end of these pursuits, 73 percent of the suspects were arrested for at least one felony, 26 percent were arrested for at least one misdemeanor, and only 1 percent were arrested for the original infraction or a similar "minor" violation.

Opponents of pursuits will attack the above position on the grounds that the subsequent arrests are pursuit-related. The figures from SPIDR indicate that one-third of the felony arrests were attributed to evading. At the risk of stating the obvious, this means that two-thirds of the suspects were arrested for a felony not associated with evading the police.

Even the one-third figure must come under question in light of the results of the survey. Although non-statistical in nature, several trends become apparent. In 37 percent of the pursuits where felony evading was charged, at least one additional felony was also charged. In eight percent of the pursuits where felony evading was charged, at least one additional misdemeanor was charged. SPIDR is currently incapable of tracking this data in its current configuration because it requests only a single final charge.

³ Dorgan, Byron D., "Senate Bill Would Limit Police 'Hot Pursuits'." Crime Control Digest, June 23, 1995, pg. 7.

“Each year hundreds of Americans are killed and many thousands injured as a result of high speed police chases. Most victims are innocent bystanders.”⁴ United States Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.)

The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) has compiled nationwide data on “fatalities involving high speed chase with police in pursuit.” In the nine-year period from 1985 to 1993, there were 2,707 people killed in police pursuits. The overwhelming number of persons killed were suspects in the pursued vehicle. Pursued suspects accounted for 79 percent of the sustained fatalities while uninvolved parties accounted for 20 percent of the deaths.

“There are an estimated 250,000 police pursuits a year, causing about 2,500 deaths and 55,000 injuries nationally.”⁵

Letitia E. Landry, Solutions to Tragedies of Police Pursuits (STOPP)

According to FARS, there were 3,821 pursuit-related deaths in the 13 years between 1981 and 1993. The highest number of fatalities occurred in 1993 with 343 deaths and the lowest number in 1984 with 246 deaths. The average over the 13-year period was 294 fatalities per year.

In 1994, 5,339 pursuits were initiated in California. If an estimated 250,000 pursuits are occurring annually, the other 49 states must be facing a similar number of police pursuits on a yearly basis. This is unlikely in light of the fact that California possesses nearly 1/8 of the population of the United States and nearly 13 percent of the registered vehicles nationwide.

“There are rare occasions when a traffic offender is wanted for a larger crime ...but there are no studies showing how often that is the case.”⁶

Letitia E. Landry (STOPP)

The statistical information from SPIDR and the informal survey indicate these occasions are not rare.

The following anecdotes were obtained from the narratives of the survey, and although not inclusive, are representative of the experiences of law enforcement officers statewide.

⁴ Dorgan, Byron D., “Senate Bill Would Limit Police ‘Hot Pursuits,’” Crime Control Digest, June 23, 1995, pg. 7.

⁵ Landry, Letitia E., “Critics Sound Alarm Over Police Chases,” The Sacramento Bee, July 6, 1995, pg. A12.

⁶ Landry, Letitia E., “Critics Sound Alarm Over Police Chases,” The Sacramento Bee, July 6, 1995, pg. A12.

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- On February 16, 1995, Sacramento County Sheriff's deputies attempted to stop a vehicle for **expired registration**. The suspects fled and after a three-minute pursuit, the vehicle collided with a parked car. Both suspects fled on foot and were subsequently apprehended by the deputies. A **carjacking** victim was found still alive in the trunk of the suspect vehicle. He had a bullet wound in his neck.
 - On January 9, 1993, San Joaquin County Sheriff's deputies observed a vehicle traveling at an **unsafe speed** and attempted an enforcement stop. The suspect fled, first in the vehicle, then on foot. When apprehended, the suspect was charged with **kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, possession of a stolen vehicle, and assault with a deadly weapon**. The suspect was wanted by the Los Angeles Police Department and was considered "armed and dangerous."
 - On April 17, 1993, a CHP officer working in the Victorville Area clocked a vehicle at **81 miles per hour** on radar. The officer attempted an enforcement stop and the suspect vehicle accelerated away. The pursuit covered 4 1/2 miles at which time the fleeing vehicle became trapped in sand. A foot pursuit ensued and the suspect was captured. A search of the suspect vehicle revealed a **pipe bomb** and a **loaded pistol** in the passenger area. A search of the suspect revealed 2.75 grams of **methamphetamine** on his person.
 - On September 20, 1993, an Oxnard police officer tried to stop a vehicle for running a **stop sign**. A one mile pursuit ensued. The suspect was taken into custody and was found to be wanted for **armed robbery**.
 - On September 19, 1994, a San Jose police officer attempted to stop a vehicle for **speeding** and the suspect fled. At the termination of the pursuit, it was discovered the suspect had taken the vehicle at gunpoint in a **carjacking** and was an **escapee** from an Arizona juvenile facility.
 - On September 18, 1994, a Woodland police officer observed a **registration violation** and initiated an enforcement stop. The suspect fled and a short pursuit ensued. The suspect was taken into custody and found to have **3 felony warrants** and one misdemeanor warrant for his arrest.
 - On December 11, 1993, Antioch police officers attempted to stop a **reckless driver**. The ensuing pursuit lasted one minute. Upon capture they discovered the suspect was wanted for **armed robbery and aggravated mayhem**.

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- On April 19, 1995, a Scotts Valley police officer tried to stop a vehicle for **defective stop lamps**. A pursuit ensued, which was turned over to Santa Cruz Sheriff's Department and then to the Santa Cruz CHP Area. The pursuit lasted 33 minutes. When it ended, CHP officers discovered the suspect was wanted for **carjacking** and **armed robbery** of a bank. At the time of his arrest, the suspect was charged with possession of **marijuana for sales** and possession of a billy club. He had been released from Massachusetts State Prison three months earlier where he had served time for armed robbery.
 - On December 29, 1994, Riverside CHP officers attempted to stop a driver for not wearing his **seatbelt**. The driver fled, covering a little over one mile before he drove into a canal. He escaped, but his passenger was captured. It was discovered that the passenger was **wanted for attempted murder** and the involved firearm was located in the vehicle. The passenger was also in possession of **methamphetamine**. The vehicle was stolen.
 - On October 17, 1994, Chico police officers attempted to stop a vehicle for a **seatbelt** violation. The suspects fled, first in the vehicle, then on foot. The female passenger was captured and determined to be in **violation of parole**. The male driver was identified for later capture and was also on parole. **Methamphetamine** and **drug paraphernalia** were found in the suspect vehicle.
 - On February 3, 1995, Chico police officers attempted to stop a vehicle for having a **missing headlight**. The vehicle fled for two minutes and the suspect was apprehended after a struggle. The suspect was wanted for **armed robbery**.
 - On March 20, 1995, Glendale police officers tried to stop a vehicle for running a **stop sign**. The pursuit lasted approximately one minute at which time the vehicle was forced to the curb by the police vehicle. The driver of the suspect vehicle was wanted for **four counts of murder** and four counts of **armed robbery**. The passenger was wanted for a parole violation.
 - On August 11, 1993, a Fullerton police officer attempted to stop a motorcycle with no **rear license plate**. The suspect fled and the pursuit covered approximately 10 miles. The suspect struck a curb and although unharmed, was apprehended. He was in possession of a **loaded .380 handgun** and **methamphetamine** in sufficient quantities to be charged with possession for sales.

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- On June 11, 1993, Simi Valley police officers observed a motorcycle rider **without a helmet**. They attempted an enforcement stop and the motorcycle fled. Upon apprehension, it was discovered the suspect had **three warrants** for his arrest and was wanted for **brandishing** and **assault with a deadly weapon**.
 - On January 17, 1994, Cypress police officers attempted to stop a vehicle for **speeding**. The suspect failed to yield and rammed the police vehicle at the end of the pursuit. He was apprehended and charged with the **assault on a peace officer**, as well as possession of a **stolen vehicle**, **possession of a firearm**, and **possession of stolen credit cards**. The suspect was a convicted felon and in **violation of the terms of his parole**.
 - On February 6, 1995, Torrance police officers observed a vehicle run a **red light**. They initiated an enforcement stop and the vehicle fled. The pursuit was terminated through legal intervention, at which time it was discovered that the three suspects in the vehicle were **armed and had just committed a robbery of a liquor store**. At the time of the robbery, no one had been able to obtain a description of the suspect vehicle.
 - On April 9, 1993, Torrance police officers tried to stop a motorcycle for a **speed** violation. The motorcycle fled and one mile later struck a parked car. The suspect had an outstanding **warrant for murder**.
 - On July 15, 1994, San Joaquin County Sheriff's deputies attempted to stop a vehicle for **speeding**. A two minute pursuit ensued and at the end, the suspect surrendered. The suspect was charged with illegal **possession of a firearm** and possession of a **stolen vehicle**. It was later determined he was wanted for **carjacking**.
 - On June 18, 1995, a Clear Lake CHP officer attempted to stop a vehicle for having **tinted windows**. The vehicle initially stopped, then accelerated away. The suspect was eventually taken into custody and found to be a **parolee who had failed to appear for sentencing to state prison**. He also had a "**no bail**" **warrant** out for his arrest.
 - On April 14, 1995, Santa Clara police officers tried to make an enforcement stop on a vehicle with a **defective taillight**. The vehicle fled and the pursuit terminated 14 miles later. The suspect was charged with possession of **methamphetamine and cocaine**.
 - On January 1, 1993, an officer from the San Luis Obispo Police Department attempted to stop a **speeding** vehicle. A five minute pursuit ensued, which ended in a solo collision of the suspect vehicle. The suspect was wanted for **carjacking** and **assault with a deadly weapon**.

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- On May 2, 1994, San Jose police officers observed a vehicle traveling at an **unsafe speed**. The vehicle fled when they attempted an enforcement stop for the traffic violation. The suspects began throwing items out the window, including a **.357 magnum** and **4.6 pounds of cocaine**. Upon termination of the pursuit, **\$10,000 in counterfeit money** was found in the vehicle.
 - On May 22, 1994, a Roseville police officer observed a vehicle driving without its **headlights** on. The officer attempted to stop the vehicle and the vehicle accelerated away. The pursuit lasted one minute and the suspects were subsequently taken into custody. It was discovered the **suspects had committed an armed robbery** just prior to the pursuit.
 - On October 9, 1993, CHP officers in the South Los Angeles Area attempted to stop a carload of suspects for **suspicion of vandalism**. The vehicle fled for a mile, at which time the suspects fled on foot. Two were taken into custody. While at the scene, a witness stopped and advised the officers that the **suspects had been involved in a gang shooting only moments prior** to the pursuit. The Los Angeles Police Department confirmed the shooting.
 - On February 12, 1995, CHP officers in the Los Angeles area attempted to stop a vehicle for a **speed** violation. The vehicle fled and the ensuing pursuit lasted approximately 3 minutes, at which time the two suspects fled on foot. One suspect was captured. It was discovered the suspects were wanted for **carjacking, armed robbery, attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a deadly weapon**. The crimes had been committed just prior to the pursuit.
 - On March 9, 1995, Vacaville police officers tried to stop a vehicle for **driving on the wrong side of the roadway**. A two minute pursuit ensued, which resulted in the apprehension of the suspect. The **vehicle was stolen** and it was later found that the suspect was **wanted for attempted murder**.
 - On January 15, 1993, a San Bernardino police officer observed a vehicle **parked illegally in a disabled persons parking stall**. The officer attempted to take enforcement action and the vehicle fled. Upon capture of the suspect, it was learned that the **vehicle was stolen** and the driver was a wanted **parole violator**.

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- On September 30, 1993, officers of Modesto Police Department tried to stop a vehicle for a **missing license plate**. The vehicle fled and upon apprehension, it was discovered the suspect was wanted for **assault with a deadly weapon**.

Critics will argue that incidents such as these are the exception rather than the rule, but when 52 percent of the pursuits in California begin as infractions and 73 percent end in felony arrests, it is unlikely these are isolated occurrences.

LITERATURE AND RESEARCH REVIEW

The Pursuit Study completed by the CHP in 1982 and published in 1983 is often referred to as the "first scientific study of police pursuits."⁷ Prior to that date, only two studies of note had been completed, Rapid Pursuit by the Police: Causes, Hazards, Consequences,⁸ by the Physicians for Automotive Safety (PAS) in 1968, and A Study of the Problem of Hot Pursuit by the Police,⁹ by the Center for the Environment and Man, Inc., in 1970.

Both studies have been largely dismissed as "mythology"¹⁰ due to their unscientific nature and flawed methodologies, and the findings of both were addressed in the 1983 study completed by the CHP. Of greater interest are the studies that have been completed since 1983.

It is the finding of this study that pursuits originating for minor violations often end in major arrests. Upon examining the available data, this does not appear to be a radical conclusion. However, previous studies have reached quite different conclusions. It is necessary to examine some of these differing opinions to understand the significance of this study and to understand the nature of the CHP's departure from popular mythology, that pursuits initiated for minor violations pose too great a risk to the public.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

In 1984 Michigan State University (MSU) conducted a study using an edited version of the questionnaire utilized by the CHP in 1982. They added new variables, including a comparison between the initiating violation and the ultimate charges for which the suspects were booked. The MSU study was geographically broad, examining 424 pursuits gathered from 40 police departments and 35 sheriff's departments throughout nine states, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.

⁷ Beckman, E., "Identifying Issues in Police Pursuits: The First Research Findings," The Police Chief, July 1987, pg. 57.

⁸Physicians for Automotive Safety, Rapid Pursuit by the Police: Causes, Hazards, Consequences, 1967, Springfield, NJ.

⁹ Fennessy, E. F., Hamillton, T., Joscelyn, K. B., Merritt, J. S. A Study of the Problem of Hot Pursuit by The Police, Hartford, CT, 1970.

¹⁰ Beckman, E., "Identifying Issues in Police Pursuits: The First Research Findings," The Police Chief, July 1987, pg. 57.

Dr. Erik Beckman, an associate professor in the School of Criminal Justice at MSU, wrote:

It is a common police belief that when a suspect flees from the police in a motor vehicle, even though the preceding event appears to be minor, there is probably a more serious crime linked to the suspect's decision to flee.¹¹

To test this assumption, he analyzed the data from the MSU study and determined:

These findings appear to indicate that when a suspect flees from a traffic violation, there generally is no evidence of a more serious crime at booking time.

Dr. Beckman concludes:

A particularly useful finding is the fact that there is a relationship between the preceding event and the booking charges. This serves to shatter the myth that when a driver flees from a minor traffic offense, the only reason can be the driver's responsibility for a major crime. The knowledge that, generally, pursuits that begin because of a traffic violation result in traffic-related bookings... would serve to indicate that only minimal hazards should be permitted in traffic-related pursuits.

When 52 percent of all pursuits in California begin as infractions and 73 percent end as felony arrests, it appears that in this instance, the findings of the CHP significantly differ from those in the MSU study. Of the 52 percent that began specifically as infractions, 67 percent ended in felony arrests, 30 percent ended in misdemeanor arrests, and only 2 percent ended on the same level as the original infraction.

¹¹ Beckman, E., "Identifying Issues in Police Pursuits: The First Research Findings," The Police Chief, July 1987, pg. 57.

ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SCIENCES

In April of 1992 Illinois State University (ISU) published Police Pursuit in Pursuit of Policy: The Pursuit Issue, Legal and Literature Review, and an Empirical Study.¹²

This publication is an ambitious two-volume effort that attempts to provide a general summary of the subject of pursuits (Volume I) and an empirical study of pursuits involving police agencies in the state of Illinois (Volume II).

Volume I:

The authors begin this volume with a general overview of the “tragic consequences that can result from police pursuits of law violators.” It is their belief that figures representing fatalities from pursuits are vastly underreported and that current estimates are “a gross underestimation.”

As evidence, the authors provide information on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reporting criteria for fatalities involving police pursuits. They state:

These figures represent only those police interventions, which intentionally caused the pursued vehicle to lose control resulting in a fatal accident... This would include... forcing of a pursued vehicle off the roadway or erecting a road barrier causing the pursued vehicle to crash... These figures, therefore, do not represent all deaths resulting from police pursuits, but only those where there was intentional police intervention... It is difficult to determine the degree of underreporting that occurs due to the selection criteria incorporated by the NHTSA. (pg. 6.)

This is a definitive statement in support of their position. **It is also false.**

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration bases its selection criteria on the “Manual on Classification of Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents” approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). In its criteria involving police pursuits, incidents involving legal intervention or deliberate intent **are excluded**. If “gross underestimation” is occurring, the authors will have to look elsewhere rather than at NHTSA’s reporting criteria.

¹² Charles, Michael, Falcone, David, Wells, Edward, Police Pursuit in Pursuit of Policy: The Pursuit Issue, Legal and Literature Review, and an Empirical Study, Normal, IL , 1992.

It is the view of the authors that it is unacceptable “for police agencies to base their decisions affecting life and property on unproved assumptions or police folklore” (pg. 21), and that they should instead be made on recent and relevant research. Few would argue with this assertion. However, it is odd how this assertion is defended.

The point of view of police officers is presented by quoting the 1983 Pursuit Study completed by the CHP, whose authors contemplated the following:

- If approximately 700 people (in this study) will attempt to flee from the officer...knowing full well the officers would give chase, one can imagine what would happen if the police suddenly banned pursuits. Undoubtedly, innocent people may be injured or killed because an officer chooses to pursue a suspect, but this risk is necessary to avoid the even greater loss if...agencies were not allowed to aggressively pursue violations.

The reader is then assured that “not all police chiefs, sheriffs, or police officers agree with the position taken by the CHP,” and is asked “Is this simply another example of police folklore?” Another opposing view is then offered from an “equally influential group” which maintains that “high-speed hot pursuits result in an unacceptable number of casualties.”

This is an odd juxtaposition of statements as the CHP study was published in 1983. The statement cited in the above paragraph was taken from the Physicians for Automotive Safety study published in 1967, destroying the illusion of any kind of direct debate between the two organizations. The highly questionable PAS study was discredited by the ISU authors themselves when they admitted that the PAS study was of little more than “historical” importance.

The ISU authors later discuss the CHP’s 1983 Pursuit Study in detail, quoting the purpose of the study which was:

...designed to identify the true magnitude of the pursuit phenomenon and to gather information about those causes and relationships of pursuits that are presently left to assumptions and speculation.¹³

Specifically, the purpose was to refute the findings of the earlier PAS study and its follow-up, A Study of the Problem of Hot Pursuit by the Police.

Initially, the ISU authors provide an objective comparison between the findings of the CHP study and the earlier works. However, under the heading “Study Limitations,” the authors level the following criticism:

¹³ California Highway Patrol, California Highway Patrol Pursuit Study, 1983, Sacramento, CA

The research staff took a rather cavalier attitude with regard to the number of fatalities reported. The authors state simply, 'Fifteen individuals who were not originally involved in a pursuit were injured...The number of fatal accidents was small'.

The ISU researchers then state:

▲ The CHP study concluded that pursuits were worth the risk. While the CHP is free to take this position, it is disconcerting that they did not review or propose methods that would reduce the number of fatalities and accidents caused by pursuits... Safety to those in the vicinity of the pursuit was obviously secondary. (pg. 107.)

Again, at the risk of indifference, it should perhaps be pointed out that was not the original intent of the study, which is obvious from the statement of purpose above. The authors then go on to speculate:

The CHP seem to justify pursuits based on their study that found "only" 29% of the pursuits resulted in an accident, that they had "only" a 1% fatality rate.

The word "only" in the context of the CHP study is obviously used in contrast to the previous wild claims of the earlier studies, and not in a trivialization of human life. The original wording of the study is as follows:

Contrary to the 1968 study that reported that 7 out of 10 police pursuits result in an accident, this study found that less than 29% involve collisions,

Although past studies claim that up to 20 percent of pursuits cause death, the present study found that only 1% result in death.

The ISU authors end this rather harsh criticism with, "It is unfortunate that they did not pay more attention to increasing the safety of police pursuits."

The stated purpose and mission of the CHP is "to ensure safety and service to the public." The CHP achieves this goal in the area of pursuits by maintaining one of the most comprehensive pursuit training programs in the world.

The CHP's policy on pursuit driving is continually reviewed and has been refined to the point where it continues to be the basis for legislative judicial review. It is recognized as a model by federal, state and local agencies and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation "Alert Committee" of 50 major agencies across the United States. Pursuits are conducted within the parameters of this policy, which is required to be reviewed a minimum of every three months by all officers and supervisors. Officers receive extensive, practical training which does not end at Academy graduation, but continues throughout their careers.

It is the practice of the CHP to engage in continual self-critique. Several task forces have been formed over the last decade to review the adequacy of the pursuit policy and the pursuit training. Changes have been suggested and implemented. This analysis continues to the level of the pursuit itself, as each pursuit is subject to review and completion of an in-depth pursuit report and critique.

In 1993, Chief Earl R. Morris of the Utah Department of Public Safety spoke of this process in Law and Order magazine.

The California Highway Patrol (CHP) uses the information compiled to justify one of the most comprehensive driving programs in the Nation. Its critique of every pursuit allows the department to identify those officers who need to be retrained and to communicate problems to all employees, in order to minimize the danger to the public.¹⁴

Volume II:

The second part of the study is the report of findings of a one-year study in the State of Illinois. The purpose was to "examine the role of formal policy on pursuit activities by both departments and individual police officers." The authors emphasize the importance of empirical investigation and warn of "a priori assumptions that have plagued past policy development efforts" (pg. 3).

The ultimate conclusions of this study are as follows:

- 1) Police officers must be trained, both initially and on a regular basis.
- 2) Police agencies should be required to collect and maintain relevant data on police pursuits.
- 3) Supervision is crucial.
- 4) Departments should develop a critical incident review board to review all police pursuits.
- 5) States should review statues pertaining to pursuits which should encourage safety and "provide alternatives to police pursuits for less serious offenses."

¹⁴ Morris, Earl R., "Modifying Pursuit Behavior: The 9Ts Approach," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January 1993, pg. 3.

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- 6) Police agencies should have well developed "highly restrictive police pursuit policies and stringent procedures for their department. *The policy should be severely cautioning or highly restrictive of any pursuit, except in the most extreme circumstances*" (emphasis added).

Again, it is the final two points with which the CHP must disagree. It is the policy of the CHP to seek viable alternatives to any pursuit, which is incorporated into the body and language of the departmental pursuit policy. However, placing restrictions on an officer's discretion to engage in a pursuit based on the "seriousness" of the offense, or to restrict pursuits to "the most extreme circumstances" is to miss the larger picture, a position which is clearly supported by the data in this study.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS POLICE TRAINING INSTITUTE

James Auten, a professor at the University of Illinois Police Training Institute, conducted a study in 1991 in which 129 Illinois law enforcement agencies participated. He presented his findings in three consecutive articles in Law and Order magazine in 1994.

Auten addresses the following question: "Can we objectively assess the traffic collision risks associated with the conduct of police pursuit driving operations?"¹⁵

Combining the results of previous studies, he calculates an approximate 1 in 3 probability that a pursuit will end in a collision of some type. He utilizes data provided by the National Safety Council to estimate the costs involved in these pursuit-related collisions, calculating that "every time a pursuit was initiated, it was going to cost society over \$8,500 in estimated economic loss." From various figures he concludes, "**From an economic loss perspective vs. results produced it hardly seems that these pursuits were 'worth the effort.'**"

On the surface, this might seem a compelling method to evaluate risk. The problem, however, is that public service is inherently a non-profit enterprise. If every DUI arrest incurs a loss of \$2,127, which Auten adds into the loss equation, would it not be reasonable to suggest that police officers stop making arrests for drunk driving? If economic loss is the criteria for risk evaluation, then the CHP "loses" over \$240 million a year arresting drunk drivers.

Auten continues his risk evaluation, examining the different factors an officer must consider when deciding to initiate a pursuit. He concludes that:

- "No factor is more important than the initiating event."

¹⁵ Auten, James, "Pursuit-Related Traffic Collisions," "Initiating Events in Pursuits," "Pursuit-Related Arrests," Law and Order, Oct, Nov, Dec 1994.

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- “There is only one objective basis for assessing the public safety hazard associated with the escape of the suspect: the initiating event itself.”
 - “The initiating event is not the only factor to be considered in making the ‘pursue/don’t pursue’ decision, but it clearly provides the overriding framework within which all the other factors must be considered.”

If one considers the outcome of the 5,339 pursuits that were initiated in 1994 in California, 3,887 of which resulted in felony arrests, it would not be presumptuous to suggest that the initiating event is only a small piece of the actual risk puzzle.

SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW

It should be evident by the brief review of material already published on the subject of pursuits that opinions vary widely. Different researchers will arrive at different conclusions for various reasons. In some cases it is a matter of flawed methodologies or poor sampling; in others it is simply a matter of interpretation or difference of opinion. Some of the studies find common ground and depart only on the details; others do not lend themselves to compromise.

Unfortunately, there is a wealth of misinformation available on the subject as well. Some of this misinformation is given undeserved credibility as it is cited by other sources, which are in turn cited by others in a dangerously circuitous route.

Regardless of the similarities or differences of the studies completed, to date, one factor seems to be missing from all of them: None has discussed this issue in a larger context.

CONTEXT

The entire issue of police pursuits can be summed up in a single question, "What is an acceptable level of risk?" In order to answer that question, another, perhaps even more important question must be posed, "What exactly is at risk?"

People whose lives have been touched by tragedy may answer that innocent human lives are at stake. Police pursuits endanger the public unnecessarily. The news media shows the aftermath of particularly disastrous events on the 6 o'clock news. Newspapers quote studies showing that the death toll from police pursuits is reaching epidemic proportions. Researchers themselves publish their results, shaking their heads.

In a book titled The Evolution of Consciousness, Robert Ornstein writes:

Unexpected or extraordinary events seem to have fast access to consciousness, while an unchanging background noise or a constant weight or a chronic problem soon is shunted into the background.¹⁶

Little is done about the chronic dangers of highway safety or the 500 murders per week or the 100 billion cigarettes smoked each year—because they are familiar problems.

It is curious how many researchers dismiss "driving under the influence" charges as unimportant in their debate on pursuits. Auten's words seem to sum up this pervasive attitude.

Without ignoring the public safety and reasonableness issues associated with the DUI-related pursuit initiations and arrest outcomes, **the felony arrest outcomes are of the most interest. It is reasonable to presume that pursuits resulting in this arrest type produce the greatest public safety benefits.** After all, the removal of a dangerous felon from society, albeit briefly in many instances, surely produced some safety benefit to society.¹⁷

¹⁶ Ornstein, Robert, The Evolution of Consciousness, Prentice Hall Press, New York, NY, pg. 106, 260.

¹⁷ Auten, James, "Pursuit-Related Traffic Collisions," "Initiating Events in Pursuits," "Pursuit-Related Arrests," Law and Order, Oct, Nov, Dec 1994.

In 1993 in the State of California, 38 people lost their lives in pursuits, 8 of whom were uninvolved victims. In the same year, nearly 1,600 people in California lost their lives in alcohol-related collisions.

Driving under the influence is a familiar problem that perhaps needs to be viewed in an unfamiliar way.

- In 1993, an inhabitant of California had a **1 in 7,625** chance of being killed in a traffic collision.
- The same person had a **1 in 20,231** chance of being killed in an alcohol-related traffic collision.
- This person had a **1 in 835,339** chance of being killed in a police pursuit collision.
- If the person was not a police officer or a suspect actively fleeing the police, the chances of being killed in a police pursuit rose to **1 in 4 million**.

To give these final two statistics a relative measure of comparison, the United States Department of Commerce estimates that the odds of a person being struck by lightning are approximately **1 in 600,000**.¹⁸

This final statistic is in no way meant to suggest that any death is insignificant or give the impression that these people were simply "in the wrong place at the wrong time." This statistic is quoted only to provide context as it is often difficult to grasp the meaning of large numbers, and to suggest that "epidemic" is a word that does not apply to pursuit-related deaths.

Table 5 illustrates the comparative odds of being killed or injured in a traffic collision, a DUI-related traffic collision, and a police pursuit collision.

Table 5: Comparative Risks

	Collision	DUI Collision	Pursuit Collision
Injured	1 in 101	1 in 739	1 in 86,729
Killed	1 in 7,625	1 in 20,231	1 in 3,967,859

¹⁸ United States Department of Commerce/American Red Cross. "Thunderstorms and Lightning: The Underrated Killers," Jan 1994.

The odds calculated in the pursuit column are those for an uninvolved victim. There will be those who will charge indifference to human life by not considering the death of the suspect in these odds. Ironically, these are generally the same people who will argue that a police officer accepts a certain amount of risk as a condition of employment. It would be unconscionable, therefore, not to suggest a suspect might accept the same risk when unlawfully attempting to evade the police.


To gain a national perspective, the same odds can be calculated for fatalities occurring in the United States. In 1993, 343 people lost their lives in pursuits, 62 of whom were uninvolved victims. In the same year, 17,461 people in the United States lost their lives in alcohol-related collisions.¹⁹

In 1993, a resident of the United States had a

- 1 in 6,429 chance of being killed in a traffic collision,
- 1 in 14,771 chance of being killed in an alcohol-related traffic collision,
- 1 in 751,918 chance of being killed in a police pursuit collision,
- 1 in 4.1 million chance of being killed in a police pursuit if the person was not a police officer or a suspect actively fleeing the police.

The following table summarizes the odds of being killed in different types of collisions both in California and nationwide using the California sample population of 4 million.

Figure 18: Comparative Risks, California and the United States.



¹⁹ United States Department of Transportation, NHTSA, Traffic Safety Facts 1993, pg. 107.

If one examines the economic costs of fatal collisions in California according to Auten's methodology, the 32 pursuit-related collisions (resulting in 38 fatalities) cost an average of \$410,000 each for a total of \$13 million in 1993. In other words, the citizens of California lost \$13 million due to pursuit-related fatal collisions in 1993. Applying the same logic to DUI-related fatalities, the economic losses incurred due to alcohol-related fatal collisions exceeded one billion dollars.

In this light, it is difficult to see why driving under the influence is considered to be of "less interest" than "more serious" crimes when considering the outcome of pursuits.

It is possible to evaluate the risks of the "more serious" crimes, as well. The significance of these figures increases when taking into account the fact that in 1994 in California, 73 percent of all pursuits and 67 percent of pursuits initiated for an infraction ended in a felony arrest.

The following table lists the number and type of crimes reported in California,²⁰ and the odds that a person would be a victim of the indicated violent crime.

Table 6: Comparative Risks of Violent Crimes in California

	Number	Odds
Murder	4,095	1 in 7,752
Forcible Rape	11,754	1 in 2,701
Robbery	126,347	1 in 251
Aggravated Assault	193,904	1 in 164
Total Violent Crimes	366,100	1 in 87

To bring the above numbers into perspective, it should be noted that the odds of being a victim of a violent crime in California in 1993 were 45,608 times **greater** than those of being killed in a police pursuit collision.

To gain a national perspective, it is estimated that 2 million violent crimes were committed in the United States in 1993, one every 16 seconds.²¹ Recorded figures show that 24,526 people were murdered, approximately 500 every week. This means that one out of every 129 people in the United States was a victim of a violent crime in 1993, and the odds of being murdered were 1 in 10,516. Again, the odds of being a victim of a homicide in the United States were 400 times greater than those of being

²⁰ California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Crime and Delinquency in California, 1993, pgs. 7-13.

²¹ IACP, Murder in America: Recommendations for the IACP Murder Summit, May 1995, Alexandria, VA, pg. 5.

killed in a police pursuit collision, and those of being a victim of any violent crime were 32,000 times greater.

Another familiar problem which is either minimized or deemed insignificant in the majority of studies completed is "property felonies," presumably theft. Auten states, "It is difficult to reasonably justify a police pursuit when the resultant arrest is for a felony property crime." Again, the question restated is, "What is an acceptable level of risk?" No one will argue that the theft of a vehicle is worth more than a human life. No one will say a human life is a fair trade for ten vehicles, or a hundred vehicles, or a thousand. But is this the actual equivalence in the risk assessment equation? Are these fair comparisons?

In 1993 there were over 730,000 property crimes committed in California.²² Statistically speaking, one out of every 72 vehicles in the state was stolen. The following table summarizes property crimes committed in California in 1993.

Table 7: Comparative Risks of Property Crimes

	Numbers	Odds
Burglary	413,671	1 in 77
Vehicle Theft	319,225	1 in 99
Total	732,896	1 in 43

The odds that an inhabitant of California will be a victim of a property crime are over 2000 times greater than those of being injured in a pursuit-related collision, and over **92,000 times greater** than those of being killed.

The critics of such a comparison will argue the risk is still too great, but it is a fact that people assume such risks all the time. A person driving to the grocery store for a carton of milk is aware that a certain number of people are killed every day in traffic collisions. It is unlikely this person will make the decision to stay at home based upon this knowledge because, 1) they feel this is an acceptable level of risk and 2) no one equates a carton of milk with a human life.

If one again utilizes Auten's "cost-effective" strategy, it is important to consider that the total property value of the vehicles stolen in California in 1994 is estimated to be 1.5 billion dollars. It is perhaps also important to point out that vehicle theft was charged in 24 percent of the pursuit apprehensions throughout the state that year.

Herein lies the fallacy of equating the stolen vehicle with the human life and should illustrate, once again, the difficulty of determining a true measure of risk.

²² California Department of Justice, Division of Law Enforcement, Crime and Delinquency in California, 1993, pgs. 7-13.

RAMIFICATIONS

Although many studies have been completed on the cost of police pursuits, little has been done to analyze the possible costs of not pursuing. It is difficult enough to analyze the risks of something already occurring; the issue simply grows more complex when it ventures into the hypothetical.

Critics will argue there is no way of telling what will happen, as illustrated in the ISU study when the authors state,

There is no data to demonstrate that more people would or, for that matter, would not attempt to evade the police if there were policies not to pursue.²³

This may or may not be true regarding the availability of data; however, there are certain common threads that run through human behavior which are not difficult to extend to this subject.

With any illegal activity, regardless of motivation or the seriousness of the crime, a criminal considers the possibility of detection and apprehension. Arguments that this statement is invalid due to lack of empirical evidence or laboratory studies are illogical and ignore the bulk of acquired knowledge on human behavior. This can be illustrated with simple examples.

Motorists traveling on the freeway will often exceed the speed limit by ten to fifteen miles per hour in complete disregard of the law. However, when a marked police vehicle enters the freeway, the motorists will immediately slow down. Why do they do this? Is it necessary to conduct a survey to determine why they slowed down? Or is it logical to assume they realize their chances of being apprehended for speeding just markedly increased?

This may appear to be a simplistic example, but it is not one without foundation. Some may argue that exceeding the speed limit is not a serious crime. Others may feel that stealing a car is not a serious crime. Does society allow people to decide which laws they will obey and which ones they will not?

If these arguments are unacceptable due to their hypothetical nature, it is not necessary to dwell on speculated losses when the loss of the actual number of felony arrests cannot be denied.

²³ Charles, Michael, Falcone, David, Wells, Edward, Police Pursuit in Pursuit of Policy: The Pursuit Issue, Legal and Literature Review, and an Empirical Study, Normal, IL, 1992.

In 1994 nearly 4,000 felony arrests were made as a result of pursuits in California. If police were not allowed the discretion to engage in pursuits 1,251 auto thieves, 475 felony and misdemeanor drunk drivers, 314 assault suspects, 190 robbers, 108 persons possessing stolen property, 66 murderers, 65 persons under the influence/possession of controlled substances, 63 persons illegally possessing a firearm, 50 kidnapers, 35 felony hit-and-run suspects, and 5 rapists would have escaped apprehension simply by accelerating away. Again, this is a minimum number, assuming that no more would flee if they knew the police would not pursue them.

In evaluating the risks involved in not pursuing criminals, it is important to recognize the danger of repeat offenders. A study in Washington, D.C. reported that seven percent of the adults arrested were responsible for 24 percent of the crimes committed.²⁴ A 22-state study of young parolees revealed that 10 percent of this group accounted for 40 percent of their later arrest offenses. A study of California offenders found that more than 45 percent of the persons convicted of crimes such as robbery, burglary, assault and theft were already on probation or parole at the time of their conviction.

The U.S. Department of Justice in the Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice states, "Despite repeated convictions and incarcerations, many offenders continue to believe they can get away with committing crimes."²⁵ When inmates were asked, "Do you think you could do the same crime again without getting caught?", 50 percent of the inmates in California, 34 percent of the inmates in Michigan, and 23 percent of the inmates in Texas said "yes."

These are criminals who have already been caught, convicted, and are serving time in jail. These are criminals who are confident they could commit their crime again, this time without apprehension. It requires no great speculation to assume that a "no-pursuit" policy would only add to their confidence.

Critics admonish such "hypothetical" thinking. The following anecdotes should give pause to such admonishments.

- In April of 1995, Sacramento County Sheriff's deputies observed a vehicle with fraudulent registration stickers and attempted to make an enforcement stop. The vehicle fled and a pursuit ensued. The deputies aborted the pursuit and the suspect escaped. The next day, the suspect killed a deputy in Sonoma County.
- On January 25, 1995, Burbank police officers observed a driver fail to obey a traffic sign. After the attempted enforcement stop, the driver drove recklessly and the officers lost sight of the vehicle and ended their pursuit. The abandoned vehicle was located a short time later and it was determined to be stolen. The suspect was captured three hours later. In

²⁴ United States Department of Justice, Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, March 1988, pg. 45.

²⁵ United States Department of Justice, Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, March 1988, pg. 45

the interim, he had burglarized a house to obtain new clothing. He was wanted in Utah for parole violations.

Obviously, neither of these incidents are hypothetical. They are actual events where a pursuit was initiated due to a minor traffic violation and the pursuit was aborted. In the first incident, the suspect took another human life within 24 hours. In the second incident, the criminal had already committed another crime within three hours of the aborted pursuit. The risks of not pursuing begin to become more apparent.

Another issue that must be addressed in considering ramifications of not pursuing is liability. Granted, liability is a serious issue when considering whether or not to engage in a pursuit, but in this current litigious atmosphere, punitive measures for omissions are as great as those for commissions. Therefore, liability must also be considered in the decision not to pursue.

In the recent case *Carlton v. Town of Framington*,²⁶ two police officers spoke to an intoxicated man in a donut shop. One of the officers inquired as to whether the man was driving and he told them he was with a friend. The man subsequently drove off in his vehicle, and the officers, observing this, gave chase. The pursuit was quickly abandoned due to unsafe road conditions, and shortly thereafter, the intoxicated driver was involved in a collision, killing several people.

The issues in this particular case revolved around the officers' responsibility to prevent the man from driving when they suspected he was intoxicated. The town was found liable for the officers' failure to act. Although it appears this case is not directly applicable, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court created a "special relationship" exception, ruling that a "special relationship existed between an officer who negligently failed to remove an intoxicated motorist from the highway and a member of the public who suffered injury as a result of that failure."²⁷

It is not unreasonable to see how this ruling could easily encompass pursuits. If an officer aborts a pursuit because it was initiated due to an infraction and the suspect subsequently kills someone in a traffic collision, it is not difficult to predict who the family of the deceased will blame.

²⁶ *Carlton v. Town of Framington*, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 686, 615 N.E.2d 588 (1993).

²⁷ Legal Defense Manual, Brief #94-2, The Law Enforcement Legal Reporter, Inc., pg. 25.

CONCLUSIONS

It may seem this issue is infinitely complex and this study poses more questions than it answers. But perhaps that is what is needed at this level of the debate, for it is better to be well-informed and uncertain than uninformed and certainly wrong.

Few argue that training and supervision in emergency pursuit driving are crucial. All see the need for continual review and self-analysis to target weaknesses or trends in these areas. All agree on the need for a comprehensive pursuit policy which is strictly enforced and strictly adhered to.

It is the acceptable level of risk which is generally disagreed upon. Even the question of how to evaluate that risk finds few in agreement.

It is the position of the CHP that pursuits are necessary, but should be conducted in a responsible, controlled manner to enhance public safety through the apprehension of fleeing violators. **It is an oversimplification, however, to suggest that the initiating event of a pursuit is the overriding consideration in whether or not the pursuit can be continued, or indeed, if it should even begin.**

Last year, fifty-two percent of the pursuits in California were initiated because of minor infractions. Seventy-three percent of the pursuits resulted in felony arrests. It is not unreasonable to draw a connection between a fleeing suspect and the probability of a greater crime.

To severely limit the conditions under which a pursuit may be undertaken is to ignore the totality of evidence that suggests "flight" is rarely taken without reason. To eliminate the discretion of engaging in pursuits for "minor" violations is to trade consequence for consequence, and to accept increased risk on a greater scale.

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ANNEX A-SURVEY

REPORT OF PURSUIT

Department: _____

Date of Pursuit: _____

Traffic violation(s) that preceded pursuit: _____

Name of Arrestee(s): _____

Criminal violations charged by your department (felonies); other special circumstances (parole violator, suspect in crime just committed, wanted felon): _____

If another department concluded the pursuit, enter the name of the other department and, if known, list the actions taken by that department: _____

Briefly describe the incident (length of the pursuit, any unusual aspects, involvement of any third parties, etc.): _____

NOTE: Do not include pursuits initiated because the pursued party was a known felon. The intent of this survey is to document incidents that begin as pursuits of traffic violators and conclude with a felony arrest or apprehension of a wanted person as described above. We especially want to capture specific information on the apprehension of dangerous felons or the termination of a crime in progress.

ANNEX B-CHP 187

DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL
PURSUIT REPORT
 CHP 187 (Rev 2-94) OPI 044

NUMBER - For CHP Use Only
NUMBER - Other Agency Use Only

IMPORTANT - READ CAREFULLY

Vehicle Code Section 14602.1 requires that "every state and local law enforcement agency, including, but not limited to, city police departments and county sheriff's offices, shall report to the Department of the California Highway Patrol, on an approved form, all vehicle pursuit data". This form has been developed to record this information.

The definition of "vehicle pursuit" and instructions for completing and submitting this form are on the reverse.

SECTION I - THIS SECTION IS MANDATORY FOR ALL CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

A. CHP AREA/AGENCY NAME		B. AGENCY NCIC	C. DATE OF PURSUIT	D. TIME OF PURSUIT	E. TOTAL TIME OF PURSUIT (Minutes)
F. DID YOUR AGENCY/AREA INITIATE THE PURSUIT? a <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b <input type="checkbox"/> No		G. I.D. NUMBERS OF OFFICERS INVOLVED (Do Not List Names)			
H. IF THE SUSPECT WAS <input type="checkbox"/> WAS NOT <input type="checkbox"/> APPREHENDED, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING MOST NEARLY DESCRIBES THE EVENT TERMINATING THE PURSUIT?					
a <input type="checkbox"/> Pursued driver voluntarily stopped	f <input type="checkbox"/> Pursuit aborted by law enforcement agency	i <input type="checkbox"/> Pursuit continued by allied agency		j <input type="checkbox"/> Pursued vehicle and pursuing vehicle collided	
b <input type="checkbox"/> Forcible stop	g <input type="checkbox"/> Pursued vehicle became disabled	k <input type="checkbox"/> Pursued vehicle escaped pursuing vehicles		l <input type="checkbox"/> Pursuing vehicle became disabled	
c <input type="checkbox"/> Pursued vehicle became disabled	h <input type="checkbox"/> Pursuing vehicle became involved in collision	m <input type="checkbox"/> Other:			
I. ORIGINAL VIOLATION OBSERVED BY AGENCY INITIATING THE PURSUIT SECTION: _____ CODE: _____ a <input type="checkbox"/> Felony b <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor c <input type="checkbox"/> Infraction					
J. MOST SERIOUS VIOLATION SUSPECT(S) CHARGED WITH UPON TERMINATION OF THE PURSUIT SECTION: _____ CODE: _____ a <input type="checkbox"/> Felony b <input type="checkbox"/> Misdemeanor c <input type="checkbox"/> Infraction d <input type="checkbox"/> Other:					
K. WERE THERE ANY INJURIES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF A COLLISION? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If yes, indicate the number of each type of injury.			L. WERE ANY INJURIES INCURRED AFTER THE VEHICLE PURSUIT? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No If yes, indicate the number of each type of injury.		
Police Officer(s)		Suspect(s)		Other(s)	
Fatal Injury _____		Severe Injury _____		Other Visible Injury _____	
Severe Injury _____		Complaint of Pain _____		Police _____	
Other Visible Injury _____		Fatal Injury _____		Severe Injury _____	
Complaint of Pain _____		Other Visible Injury _____		Complaint of Pain _____	

SECTION II - THIS SECTION IS MANDATORY FOR CHP

M. LOCATION AND/OR ROUTE(S)					
N. AGENCY INITIATING THE PURSUIT		O. CHP PARTICIPATION REQUESTED? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> N/A		P. NAME OF REQUESTING PERSON	
Q. NAME OF SUPERVISOR IN CHARGE		R. TIME NOTIFIED		S. SUPERVISORY INVOLVEMENT IN PURSUIT a <input type="checkbox"/> In Pursuit b <input type="checkbox"/> Via Radio c <input type="checkbox"/> Via Telephone d <input type="checkbox"/> None	
T. HIGHEST NUMBER OF CHP UNITS IN PURSUIT AT ONE TIME Ground _____ Air _____		U. NUMBER OF ALLIED AGENCY UNITS INVOLVED Ground _____ Air _____		V. OTHER CHP AREAS INVOLVED (Enter 4-digit NCIC's)	
W. TOTAL PURSUIT LENGTH (Distance)		X. ROADWAY TYPE - MAXIMUM SPEED ATTAINED a <input type="checkbox"/> Maximum Freeway _____ b <input type="checkbox"/> Maximum Surface Street Speed: _____			
Y. IF THE "YES" BOX WAS CHECKED FOR SECTION "K" ABOVE, COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING BOXES REGARDING THE COLLISION					
a <input type="checkbox"/> CHP involved		c <input type="checkbox"/> Other law enforcement agency involved			
b <input type="checkbox"/> Pursued vehicle involved		d <input type="checkbox"/> Other party involved			
Z. TYPE OF FORCIBLE STOP IMPLEMENTED: a <input type="checkbox"/> None b <input type="checkbox"/> Spike Strip c <input type="checkbox"/> Roadblock d <input type="checkbox"/> Ramming e <input type="checkbox"/> Channelization f <input type="checkbox"/> Other					
AA. CHP GUIDELINES FOLLOWED? a <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b <input type="checkbox"/> No		BB. DAMAGE TO CHP EQUIPMENT? a <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b <input type="checkbox"/> No		CC. INJURY TO CHP PERSONNEL? a <input type="checkbox"/> Yes b <input type="checkbox"/> No	
DD. SUSPECT NAME(S)					
EE. SUSPECT STATUS a <input type="checkbox"/> In-custody b <input type="checkbox"/> Released			FF. EVADED ARREST a <input type="checkbox"/> In vehicle b <input type="checkbox"/> On foot c <input type="checkbox"/> Other		
GG. PURSUED VEHICLE TYPE a <input type="checkbox"/> Automobile b <input type="checkbox"/> Truck/Tractor/Trailer c <input type="checkbox"/> Motorcycle d <input type="checkbox"/> Pickup/Van e <input type="checkbox"/> Other		HH. YEAR	II. MAKE	JJ. MODEL	KK. LICENSE
FORMS ATTACHED: <input type="checkbox"/> CHP 555 <input type="checkbox"/> CHP 202 <input type="checkbox"/> CHP 208 <input type="checkbox"/> Sid 270 <input type="checkbox"/> Sid 268			COPY OF CHP 187 FORWARDED TO: <input type="checkbox"/> Production Controls <input type="checkbox"/> Division		
SUPERVISOR'S SIGNATURE		COMMANDER'S SIGNATURE		DIVISION APPROVAL	

CHP ONLY - REFER TO HPM 70.6, CHAPTER 4, FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING SECTION II AND THE NARRATIVE/CRITIQUE
 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS UNTIL DEPLETED

ANNEX C-PARTICIPATING AGENCIES

Alameda County SO
Alhambra PD
Altadena CHP
Alturas CHP
Amador County SO
Anaheim PD
Anderson PD
Angels Camp PD
Antelope Valley CHP
Antioch PD
Arcata PD
Arrowhead CHP
Arroyo Grande PD
Atwater PD
Auburn CHP
Bakersfield CHP
Baldwin Park CHP
Baldwin Park PD
Banning CHP
Barstow CHP
Belmont PD
Benicia PD
Bishop CHP
Blythe CHP
Brea PD
Buellton CHP
Buena Park PD
Burbank PD
Buttonwillow CHP
California City PD
Campbell PD
Capistrano CHP
Capitola PD
Carmel PD
Central Los Angeles CHP
Ceres PD
Chico PD
Chino PD
Chowchilla PD
Clayton PD
Clear Lake CHP
Clearlake PD
Coalinga CHP
Contra Costa CHP
Corona PD
Coronado PD
Costa Mesa PD

Crescent City CHP
Cypress PD
Daly City PD
Davis PD
Downey PD
Dublin CHP
East Los Angeles CHP
El Cajon CHP
El Dorado County SO
El Monte PD
Ferndale PD
Folsom PD
Fontana PD
Fort Tejon CHP
Fortuna PD
Fountain Valley PD
Fresno CHP
Fresno PD
Fullerton PD
Galt PD
Garberville CHP
Gilroy PD
Glendale PD
Glendora PD
Gold Run CHP
Grapevine Scales CHP
Grass Valley CHP
Gridley PD
Hanford CHP
Hayward CHP
Hayward PD
Heraldsburg PD
Hercules PD
Hillsborough PD
Hollister/Gilroy CHP
Humboldt CHP
Huntington Park PD
Indio CHP
Inglewood PD
Irvine PD
Irwindale PD
King City CHP
King City PD
Kings County SO
La Palma PD
La Verne PD
Lincoln PD

Livermore PD
Lompoc PD
Long Beach PD
Los Angeles PD
Los Angeles County SO
Los Banos CHP
Los Banos PD
Madera CHP
Mammoth Lakes PD
Manhattan Beach PD
Marin CHP
Menlo Park PD
Merced CHP
Milpitas PD
Modesto CHP
Modesto PD
Mojave CHP
Mono County SO
Montclair PD
Montebello PD
Monterey CHP
Morongo Basin CHP
Mount Shasta CHP
North Sacramento CHP
Napa CHP
Napa PD
National City PD
Newhall CHP
North Sacramento CHP
Northern Division CHP
Novato PD
Oakland CHP
Oceanside CHP
Ontario PD
Orange County SO
Oroville CHP
Oxnard PD
Pacifica PD
Palos Verdes Estates PD
Patterson PD
Placerville CHP
Porterville CHP
Porterville PD
Quincy CHP
Rancho Cucamonga CHP
Red Bluff CHP
Redding CHP

Redding PD
Redlands PD
Redondo Beach PD
Redwood City CHP
Riverside CHP
Rohnert Park PD
Roseville PD
Sacramento County SO
Solano CHP
San Andreas CHP
San Bernardino CHP
San Bernardino PD
San Diego CHP
San Diego PD
San Diego County SO
San Francisco CHP
San Gabriel PD
San Jacinto PD
San Joaquin County SO
San Jose CHP
San Jose PD
San Leandro PD
San Luis Obispo CHP
San Luis Obispo PD
San Luis Obispo County SO
San Pablo PD
Santa Ana CHP

Santa Ana PD
Santa Barbara CHP
Santa Barbara PD
Santa Clara PD
Santa Cruz CHP
Santa Fe Springs CHP
Santa Maria CHP
Santa Maria PD
Santa Paula PD
Santa Rosa CHP
Santa Rosa PD
Sausalito PD
Scotts Valley PD
Seaside PD
Sierra County SO
Sierra Madre PD
Simi Valley PD
South Lake Tahoe CHP
South Sacramento CHP
Sonoma PD
Sonora CHP
Sonora PD
South Los Angeles CHP
South Lake Tahoe PD
South San Francisco PD
Stockton CHP
Stockton PD

Susanville CHP
Temecula CHP
Templeton CHP
Torrance PD
Tracy CHP
Truckee CHP
Tustin PD
Ukiah CHP
Ukiah PD
Upland PD
Vacaville PD
Ventura CHP
Vernon PD
Victorville CHP
Visalia CHP
Walnut Creek PD
West Los Angeles CHP
West Valley CHP
Williams CHP
Willows CHP
Winterhaven CHP
Woodland CHP
Woodland PD
Yreka CHP
Yuba-Sutter CHP

ANNEX D-AGENCIES BY RESPONSE

Altadena CHP (5)
Alturas CHP (1)
Antelope Valley CHP (10)
Arrowhead CHP (2)
Auburn CHP (5)
Bakersfield CHP (9)
Baldwin Park CHP (4)
Banning CHP (11)
Barstow CHP (5)
Bishop CHP (1)
Blythe CHP (4)
Buellton CHP (4)
Buttonwillow CHP (1)
Capistrano CHP (8)
Central Los Angeles CHP (54)
Clear Lake CHP (4)
Coalinga CHP (2)
Contra Costa CHP (18)
Crescent City CHP (1)
Dublin CHP (7)
East Los Angeles CHP (27)
El Cajon CHP (39)
Fort Tejon CHP (1)
Fresno CHP (66)
Garberville CHP (1)
Gold Run CHP (4)
Grapevine Scales CHP (1)
Grass Valley CHP (1)
Hanford CHP (4)
Hayward CHP (13)
Hollister/Gilroy CHP (4)
Humboldt CHP (2)
Indio CHP (11)
King City CHP (3)
Los Banos CHP (3)
Madera CHP (7)
Marin CHP (6)
Merced CHP (4)
Modesto CHP (8)
Mojave CHP (1)
Monterey CHP (5)
Morongo Basin CHP (8)
Mount Shasta CHP (1)
Napa CHP (2)
Newhall CHP (9)
North Sacramento CHP (38)
Northern Division CHP (3)

Oakland CHP (21)
Oceanside CHP (33)
Oroville CHP (2)
Placerville CHP (3)
Porterville CHP (1)
Quincy CHP (1)
Rancho Cucamonga CHP (11)
Red Bluff CHP (3)
Redding CHP (6)
Redwood City CHP (13)
Riverside CHP (38)
Solano CHP (1)
San Andreas CHP (1)
San Bernardino CHP (49)
San Diego CHP (14)
San Francisco CHP (6)
San Jose CHP (48)
San Luis Obispo CHP (9)
Santa Ana CHP (15)
Santa Barbara CHP (5)
Santa Cruz CHP (8)
Santa Fe Springs CHP (4)
Santa Maria CHP (1)
Santa Rosa CHP (25)
South Lake Tahoe CHP (1)
South Sacramento CHP (40)
Sonora CHP (2)
South Los Angeles CHP (14)
Stockton CHP (37)
Susanville CHP (1)
Temecula CHP (26)
Templeton CHP (1)
Tracy CHP (4)
Truckee CHP (1)
Ukiah CHP (5)
Ventura CHP (4)
Victorville CHP (7)
Visalia CHP (10)
West Los Angeles CHP (8)
West Valley CHP (9)
Williams CHP (2)
Willows CHP (1)
Winterhaven CHP (1)
Woodland CHP (5)
Yreka CHP (4)
Yuba-Sutter CHP (2)
Alhambra PD (14)

Anaheim PD (15)
Anderson PD (12)
Angels Camp PD (1)
Antioch PD (10)
Arcata PD (5)
Arroyo Grande PD (1)
Atwater PD (6)
Baldwin Park PD (1)
Belmont PD (3)
Benicia PD (2)
Brea PD (15)
Buena Park PD (2)
Burbank PD (4)
California City PD (1)
Campbell PD (1)
Capitola PD (1)
Carmel PD (1)
Ceres PD (16)
Chico PD (3)
Chino PD (32)
Chowchilla PD (1)
Clayton PD (1)
Clearlake PD (3)
Corona PD (13)
Coronado PD (3)
Costa Mesa PD (3)
Cypress PD (6)
Daly City PD (3)
Davis PD (16)
Downey PD (12)
El Monte PD (6)
Ferndale PD (1)
Folsom PD (7)
Fontana PD (15)
Fortuna PD (1)
Fountain Valley PD (9)
Fresno PD (1)
Fullerton PD (3)
Galt PD (4)
Gilroy PD (1)
Glendale PD (17)
Glendora PD (2)
Gridley PD (1)
Hayward PD (5)
Heraldsburg PD (1)
Hercules PD (2)
Hillsborough PD (1)

Huntington Park PD (6)
Inglewood PD (2)
Irvine PD (2)
Irwindale PD (5)
King City PD (1)
La Palma PD (1)
La Verne PD (8)
Lincoln PD (1)
Livermore PD (6)
Lompoc PD (1)
Long Beach PD (11)
Los Angeles PD (758)
Los Banos PD (1)
Mammoth Lakes PD (1)
Manhattan Beach PD (5)
Menlo Park PD (3)
Milpitas PD (2)
Modesto PD (13)
Montclair PD (18)
Montebello PD (24)
Napa PD (1)
National City PD (18)
Novato PD (4)
Ontario PD (26)
Oxnard PD (4)
Pacifica PD (1)

Palos Verdes Estates PD (5)
Patterson PD (3)
Porterville PD (8)
Redding PD (12)
Redlands PD (19)
Redondo Beach PD (12)
Roseville PD (8)
San Bernardino PD (28)
San Diego PD (258)
San Gabriel PD (2)
San Jacinto PD (5)
San Jose PD (26)
San Leandro PD (6)
San Luis Obispo PD (1)
San Pablo PD (3)
Santa Ana PD (26)
Santa Barbara PD (1)
Santa Clara PD (4)
Santa Maria PD (4)
Santa Paula PD (1)
Santa Rosa PD (12)
Sausalito PD (6)
Scotts Valley PD (6)
Seaside PD (2)
Sierra Madre PD (1)
Simi Valley PD (1)

Sonoma PD (1)
Sonora PD (2)
South Lake Tahoe PD (1)
South San Francisco PD (8)
Stockton PD (65)
Torrance PD (9)
Tustin PD (11)
Ukiah PD (1)
Upland PD (21)
Vacaville PD (10)
Vernon PD (1)
Walnut Creek PD (3)
Woodland PD (8)
Rohnert Park PD (6)
Alameda County SO (13)
Amador County SO (3)
El Dorado County SO (10)
Kings County SO (2)
Los Angeles County SO (1)
Mono County SO (2)
Orange County SO (1)
Sacramento County SO (79)
San Diego County SO (7)
San Joaquin County SO (28)
San Luis Obispo County SO (4)
Sierra County SO (1)

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