

2778

A CRITIQUE OF RESEARCH  
REPORTS RELEVANT TO  
FAILURE ON RELEASE ISSUED  
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF  
CORRECTIONS, DISTRICT  
OF COLUMBIA

NCJRS

SEP 9 1976

ACQUISITIONS

Prepared for the Office of  
Criminal Justice Plans and  
Analysis by:

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09778

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The general method of using a cohort is sound and in accordance with the best standards of criminological research.
2. The sample sizes are usually adequate. This is not always the case but in most of the studies considered sample sizes are up to at least minimally acceptable standards.
3. The length of time for follow-up is usually but not always adequate.
4. Data are usually not presented in sufficient detail or clarity. An exception to this is "A comparison of the Community Performance of Community Correctional Center and Institution Releasees: Some Preliminary Findings."
5. The basic unit of measurement (Failure on release) is poorly defined. The definition of failure as "those convicted and sentenced to 30 days or more" is contra-intuitive. What of the cases of the releasees who are re-arrested for felonies, let out on some form of conditional release who flee from trial? Under the above definition such persons are counted as "successes" !?
6. The definition of failure is repeatedly switched when comparing jurisdictions. This alone invalidates the comparisons between the District and other jurisdictions.
7. The degree of follow-up is switched when comparing jurisdictions. Recidivism for a large state like California is based on failure anywhere within the state; recidivism in the District of Columbia does not include any but that inside the small geographic area of the District.
8. Several statistical Practices are Suspect
  - a. A dubious practice is employed by rejecting the actual high failure rate of D. C. releasees and "correcting" to make the data appear more favorable.
  - b. Curves are plotted with insufficient data in some cases based apparently, on one point !
  - c. Statistical tests to back up the claims advanced are either lacking or crudely employed.
9. The claims made in the research reports are frequently contradicted by the data presented.

It is not true that Youth Center Releasees fare better than Community Treatment Center releasees. It is not true that

Community Correctional Centers are performing better than Institutional releasees ! This is admitted in p.5 of Addenda (Bic) B but in spite of this the same report claims the contrary on pg. 1 ! The claim that the District fares better than other jurisdictions is certainly not substantiated by their data.

CRITIQUE OF RESEARCH REPORTS ISSUED BY  
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S DEPARTMENT  
OF CORRECTIONS

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This report summarizes and evaluates the research reports issued by the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia concerning failure on release. Each report is described, its principal claims put forth and evaluated. They are each accompanied by an appraisal of the methods used and the results obtained.

I. Parole Performance Trends Among Community Treatment Center Release  
Adams, Stuart, Wanda Heaton, Dimitri Monos and Margaret Upchurch.  
District of Columbia, Department of Corrections, Research Report No. 7  
(September, 1968).

A. Description

This study traces 259 men who were released 8/65 through 6/68 and whose follow-up ended 7/68; thus some were released for 30 months or more and some were out for less than 4 weeks. This latter group had little risk of recidivism due to their brief exposure and consequently they inflate the success rate. This brief exposure group comprises 53 of the 259 (over 20%) of the entire population. The cohort out the longest and which gives the best indicator of success or failure had a recidivism rate of 87%.

The recidivism rate for the total population however long at risk was 47.8%, with 34% of the total population having sentences of 30 days or more. It was suggested that particular attention be paid to those released for 18 months (N=58). Of this group of 58, more than half were arrested and 43% of the 58 were sentenced to 30 or more days.

B. Claim

Community Treatment Center for Youth Releasees are performing remarkably well on parole (p.ii).

C. Evaluation

The comparison of violation rates to those in California is dubious. The violation rates for three year risk is probably over 90% ! Any program where most will ultimately fail can hardly be called a "success".

D. Analysis

A very dubious comparison is made of the violation rate of 43% (only those convicted of a new crime) with the California Youth Act rate of 32% for "revocation of parole" (which includes conviction of a new crime and technical violation of parole conditions.) If the same definition were used in both

jurisdictions the recidivism rate could well be higher in D. C. compared to California. The failure rates among cohorts are unstable since there are vast differences among the violation rates of the various cohorts studied.

For instance, during the first two quarters of release (table 3) the 30 month cohort had 33% violations, the 24 month cohort had 9% violations and the 0-6 month cohort had 18% violations.

If we use the experience of the oldest cohort (30 month) the ultimate recidivism rate will be over 90% ! This rate can be estimated because at 30 months it is already 87% and the so-called Glazer rule of detecting 90% of all violations at 36 months has not as yet been fulfilled.

The reiteration is dubious that the April 1968 riots artificially inflated the failure rate and that another lower parabolic curve of failure is to be preferred.


The techniques of graphing are occasionally misleading. The curious use of graphical data can be illustrated by an example in which it is made to appear to the casual reader that those Not Booked are increasing over time ! The following charts illustrate the two versions of the same data.

December  
1966

June  
1967

December  
1967

June  
1968



The same data properly plotted


### Incidence of Bookings, 30-Day Sentences, and Other Dispositions Over Time: 18-Month Cohort

December 1966

June 1967

December 1967

June 1968



II. Performance Trends Among Youth Center Parolees, Adams, Stuart, Wanda Heaton, Dimitri Monos and Margaret Upchurch. District of Columbia, Department of Corrections Research Report No. 8 (October 1968).

A. Description

The report states that 23% of 148 releasees from the Youth Center failed (were sentenced to 30 days in prison or more) after 15 months of release. These releasees include Youth Center cases released during August 1965 through December 1967 except CTC placements.

B. Claims

The Youth Center appears to be functioning at a relatively high level of effectiveness (p.ii).

C. Evaluation

The definition of failure changes from D. C. to California thereby invalidating the comparison. The population at risk is peculiarly defined. If various 'corrections' (proposed in the research papers) are made the failure rate is very high.

D. Analysis

The failure rate of 23% of Youth Center releasees 15 months after release are compared to California with a failure rate (switched to any parole violation) of 36% at 15 months. The same failure rate is claimed for D. C. Community Treatment Center. The latest comparison between Youth Center and Community Treatment Center releasees is in "Trends in Performance in the Community Youth Center and Community Treatment Center Releasees." The analysis of that report shows no differences proven between the two modes of release.

Why should persons who are released to detainers be included in the sample of releasees at risk? Is it not the case that these persons may be incarcerated in another jurisdiction and thus counted as "successes" by the peculiar definition employed? In "Post Release Performance of 432 Reformatory Releasees" detainers were excluded as being not suitable for follow up; what makes such persons suitable in this case? If we recalculate the failure rate without persons released to detainers it becomes 40/131 or 31%. If we correct for undercounting due to the lack of follow-up by using the estimated results of F.B.I. records then:

$$\frac{40}{131} = 44\%$$

.7

If we correct even further for the fact that this is only a 15 month follow-up then we do not even have 75% of the ultimate failures thus the ultimate rate will be surely more than 60%.



We do not advocate the use of these "corrections". I introduce them to show how the figures may be "corrected" to produce almost any desired result. What is needed is a follow-up of sufficient length using F.B.I. records and the same definition applied to insure some degree of confidence in an important matter such as the effectiveness of Youth Act releasees.

III. Post-Release Performance of 432 Reformatory Releasees, Adams, Stuart, Wanda Heaton, and John Spevacek. District of Columbia, Department of Corrections, Research Report No. 11 (February, 1969).

A. Description

A group of 432 releasees from the reformatory are traced for 36 months after release.

B. Claim

D. C. releasees are doing well compared to California Releasees.

C. Evaluation

The conclusion is unwarranted from the data.

D. Analysis

The D. C. failure figures are in all likelihood understated and bias is more severe in D. C. than in California.

According to this report (p.21) the use of F.B.I. records indicate that D. C. statistics underestimate the failure by 30%. Thus the statistics could be 'corrected' to take account of this fact. Specifically, let

a = District of Columbia statistics not corrected by F.B.I. data

b = the corrected statistics

then

$$a = b (1 - .30)$$

$$a = b (.7)$$

$$\frac{a}{.7} = b$$

this means that the D. C. figures should be divided by .7 ( or, equivalently, multiplied by 1.43) to adjust for undercounting.

Thus the "true" rate is over 40% more than the reported rate !

From the above, the failure figures can be corrected to increase comparability and this again sharply reduces the vaunted success rates.

This bias is most important for D. C. since its small size entails missing many offenders who go only short distances to commit crimes.

The paper presents a very dubious comparison to the California Prison System. Why should we assume as the authors do that all California prisoners returned to prison received a sentence of over 1 year? Some probably were technical violations returned to prison without any sentence. Why assume a one-year sentence other than an artificial expedient to make them comparable to the D. C. population?


NOTE: The Department of Corrections assumes that all California parolees who are returned to prison get a sentence of 1 year or more. Their own D. C. Chart (table 8) shows that of all parolees in D. C. who get a prison sentence 62/126 get 1 year or more. We can question, should the same likelihood apply to California? If so, one-half of the figures offered on p.23 table 10 seem to apply to California felonies and therefore, by this standard:

Comparison of D. C. Corrections and California  
Corrections Releases Performance

	<u>D.C.</u>	<u>California*</u>
12 months	8%	6%
24 months	16%	15.25%
36 months	26%	20.5%

\* 'corrected' as above

Trends in Recidivism in Five Adult Male



**IV. Community Performance of Three Categories of Institutional Releasees, Heaton, Wanda and Stuart Adams. District of Columbia, Department of Corrections, Research Report No. 15 (June 1969).**

**A. Description**

This study traces releasees divided into parole, conditional release and sentence expiration. All were traced for 36 months after release in 1965.

**B. Claim**

Parolees recidivate less than conditional releasees and they in turn recidivate less than expirees.

**C. Evaluation**

This claim is substantiated by the data presented.

**D. Analysis**

There are some peculiar results: consider the 101 who were paroled with characteristics of 3.8 previous arrests and 1.9 prior commitments (Note: 5.3 years served with current offense). 29% were booked and 14% were convicted of new crimes. 205 released under Good Time Release Conditions with characteristics of 5.7 previous arrests and 3.5 prior commitments (Note: 4.7 years served with current offense), 43% were booked and 29% convicted of new crimes. 126 released because of Sentence Expiration with characteristics of 7.4 previous arrests and prior commitments (Note: 1.3 years served on current offense) were booked and 41% were convicted of new crimes.

NOTE: The very peculiar nature of the worst population - Sentence Expiration - who fail the most and yet, whose last stay in prison after an average of 7.4 previous arrests and 4.5 prior commitments served only 1.3 years! Is this category composed of violators who are by definition extremely likely to recidivate and be the greatest failure in any population? This question should have been pursued.

**V. A Comparative Study of Recidivism Rates in Six Correctional Systems, Adams, Stuart. District of Columbia Department of Corrections, Research Report No. 21 (January, 1970).**

**A. Description**

This study compares recidivism rates for a number of releasees from D. C., California, Wisconsin, New York and Washington State and the Federal Bureau of Prisons.

**B. Claim**

The "partially" adjusted ultimate recidivism rates" for D. C. are lower than those of other jurisdictions. In the memorandum to Deputy Mayor Watt (dated April 21, 1971) the claim becomes that this report "provides evidence that our recidivism rate is the lowest of any major correctional system in the United States."

### C. Evaluation

Neither claim, especially the latter version, is warranted on the basis of the data reported.

### D. Analysis

#### D1 Lack of Sufficient data:

This study tries to compare recidivism rates by reconstructing a curve based on the experience of other jurisdictions but 3 of 5 other populations have only estimated rates of failure, thus any comparison with them is not justified. It seems true that in the one state with actual experimental data there is only one data point? If this is so, how then can the proper curve be drawn? Examination of Figures 1 and 2 do not indicate the use of sufficient data points with any non-D.C. cohort and therefore one can't really determine if these curves follow the form suggested.

#### D2 Shifting Definition of Recidivism:

The comparison of the District's failure rates to those of other jurisdictions is invalid because the same definition is not used as a basis for comparison. In the District a failure is anyone who is convicted and sentenced to at least 30 days but in Wisconsin for, instance, a failure is anyone convicted of a new offense or declared in violation of parole or conditional release. If we restrict Wisconsin to only those convicted of a new offense their failure rate is 13.7%. It is a fundamental requirement that whatever definition is chosen, the same definition should be employed in the comparison area. The present study persistently fails in this regard.

#### D3. The Use of Selected Corrections of the Data:

Some 'corrections' make the District appear better off compared to other jurisdictions while other 'corrections' (undercounting due to the District's small size) would make the District seem worse. This paper uses the ones which favor the District compared to other jurisdictions. Indeed the uncorrected raw data (Figure F) do not at all support the claims made. Thus the use of 'corrections' becomes central. What is needed is information that does not need dubious 'corrections' introduced after the fact.

#### D4 Basic Unit of Measurement:

The basic unit of measurement is failure upon release, however, it is not the same for the several studies compared. Data is not even given sufficient detail to be sure of what represents failure in several of the studies used for comparative purposes.

Even within the category uniquely applied to the D. C. population (new crime), Adam's basic unit of evaluating success (sentenced to 30 days or more) is not adequate. He must include those fined and dismissed (guilty of a new crime) and then make some allowance for those whose cases have not yet been disposed of. I feel this is a particularly bad definition of failure and most individuals who have studied this problem in detail (England, Reeves) have concluded that the best definition of failure is a notation in the releasee's file that he has engaged in some act for which his parole officer chose to do so. Admittedly, most studies use revocation of parole, but this clearly involves new crimes committed and technical violation, not the very bizzare unit used here: Convicted and sentenced to at least 30 days.

VI. Trends in Performance in the Community Youth Center and Community Treatment Center Releasees, Clarence Allen and Kathleen O'Brien.  
District of Columbia, Department of Corrections, Research Report No. 36 (November, 1970)

A. Description:

This study examines the post-release performance of 372 youthful offenders who were released from the D. C. Youth Center during 1967-69. Of the total group of subjects, 217 were released direct from the Youth Center to parole. The remaining 155 were in the Community Treatment Center for six to eight weeks.

The 372 releasees were grouped into ten cohorts, each cohort having been released during one of the five half-year periods in the time covered by the study. There were five Youth Center cohorts, YC-1 through YC-5, and five Community Treatment Center cohorts, CTC-1 through CTC-5.

B. Claims:

1. Failure rates have increased (p.ii).
2. Youth Center releasees fail less than Community Treatment Center Releasees. (p.ii)

C. Evaluation:

The first claim is supported by their data but the second is not. There are no significant differences between failure rates of the two groups as claimed.

D. Analysis

We may compare the cohorts in several ways, based on data taken from Tables 4 and 5. Each pair of cohorts has been at risk the same length of time thus the cohorts with the lower failure rate is faring better on release.

% of Failure for 5 Cohorts

	<u>Pair A</u> 12 months	<u>Pair B</u> 18 months	<u>Pair C</u> 24 months	<u>Pair D</u> 30 months	<u>Pair E</u> 36 months
Youth Center	22%	31%	38%	63%	38%
Community Treatment Center	30%	29%	29%	33%	65%

From the above five separate cohorts at risk for varying lengths of time CTC is better in 2 cases, YC is better in two cases and they are about even in one case. No superiority for either mode of release seems warranted.

But we may better test the claim made that at 12 months out the YC was doing better by examining failure rates for all cohorts when they all were at risk 12 months. The relevant data become:

	<u>% Failure at 12 months</u>					<u>OVERALL</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	
Youth Center	22%	27%	16%	37%	24%	25%
Community Treatment Center	30%	29%	29%	14%	32%	28%

Translating the above percentages into number we may test the hypothesis concerning three-factor interactions in a 2x2xk table following the techniques described by Leo A. Goodman. The null hypothesis is  $H_0: \Delta_{jk} = \Delta_k$  for all k where  $\Delta_k$  is "a measure of the two-factor interaction in a 2x2 table corresponding to the k table layer and the null hypothesis specifies that this two-factor interaction is the same for each layer." None of the comparisons is significant at commonly accepted levels. Thus none of the cohorts differ appreciably from each other. In addition the overall performance of CTC versus YC at 12 months can be calculated by using chi-square. The results of these calculations show that overall there is no difference in the proportion of failures between CTC and YC at 12 months contrary to the claim advanced.

VII. A Comparison of the Community Performance of Community Correctional Center and Institution Releasees: Some Preliminary Findings, Hardy, Kenneth L. District of Columbia, Department of Corrections, Statement of Findings (March 15, 1971).

A. Description:

This study traces 120 Community Correctional Center (CCC) releasees and 119 Institutional releasees (INST) and compares their failure rate after 8 months of community exposure.

B. Claims:

1. CCC releasees have a lower rate of recidivism than INST releasees in the sample.
2. Those persons who have problems like a history of drug or alcohol abuse are aided more by CCC than INST.
3. CCC's are sound investments.

C. Evaluation:

1. There is no significant difference between failure and mode of release as long as they receive the same proportion of handicapped persons. (Claim 1 is false)
2. CCC does no better than INST in lowering the failure rates of handicapped releasees. (Claim 2 is false)
3. CCC's can not be justified as superior to INST insofar as failure on release goes on the basis of the data presented (Claim 3 is false).

D. Analysis:

In making this analysis we shall use the definitions and techniques used in the paper itself.

"Handicapped" includes men with a known history of drug use or alcohol abuse as follows:

79	Drug Handicap
29	Alcohol Handicap
5	Other Handicap
<u>113</u>	Total

We shall also adopt their own definition of success (men convicted of sentences resulting in new confinements of 30 days or more including parolees whose parole were revoked due to the new conviction; parolees whose parole was revoked for a new arrest but for whom there has been no conviction; parolees whose parole was revoked for technical violations; and men incarcerated pending disposition of arrest revocation status). We shall further utilize their own key data from Table 6a.\* Further, we

\* Table 6a contains some obvious errors on line 1.b these were corrected for the present analysis.



shall adopt the statistics used by them in evaluating their own efforts. Finally, we shall consider the effects of two variables (felony vs misdemeanor and handicap/no handicap) which they themselves have noted. Within these confines the result is clear: CCC releasees fare no better than INST releasees.

To demonstrate these conclusions the overall table (Table 1) should be examined. It breaks down all releases by handicap/no handicap, by misdemeanor vs felony and by institutional vs community correctional center releases. For each handicap/crime/release condition the number of successes and failures is indicated. All this is derived from Table 6a. It will be voted that the chi-square is significant for the overall table. But from what point of the table does the significance arise? To answer this crucial question the standard technique of partitioning the overall chi-square into its separate components was adopted. The detailed components are displayed in tables 2, 3 and 4. The results, may be summarized as follows:

1. There is a significant difference between handicapped and non-handicapped releasees. Handicapped releasees fail more frequently.
2. Among handicapped released felons fare no differently than misdemeanants.  
The same is true among non-handicapped.
3. Among handicapped felons INST fare no differently than CCC.
4. The same is true for all other groups.

Thus the only significant result is that handicapped persons fail more than non-handicapped persons.

In addition the relationship between type of release and success is trivial in any case. To demonstrate this we employed the technique of partial association using Goodman and Kruskal's tau-b. To interpret the results of the analysis, let 100% represent the case where we could predict success or failure on release from a knowledge of handicap/crime/release condition and 0% represent where knowledge of handicap/crime/release were worthless in specifying failure or release. It turns out that knowledge of whether or not an individual is handicapped adds 12%; the additional knowledge of type of release contributes 1% more and felony vs misdemeanor contributes less than that. Thus, whether a person was released from CCC or INST adds only 1% to our ability to predict success or failure on release once we know whether a person was handicapped or not.

ADDENDUM A:

The statistical methods used in this paper are described in the two following sources.

Leo A. Goodman, "Simple Methods for Analyzing Three-Factor Interaction in Contingency Tables," Journal of the American Statistical Association, June, 1964, Vol 59., No. 306, pp. 319-352.

Bresnahan, Jean Lard; Shapiro, Martin M., "A General Equation and Technique for the Exact Partitioning of Chi-Square Contingency Tables," Psychological Bulletin, 1966, 66, 256-262.

The following tables present the results of partitioning for the data described; the casual reader should be warned against calculating chi-squares in the ordinary fashion.

$$\chi^2 = 32.15; d.f. = 7; p < .005$$

			SUCCESS	FAILURES	TOTAL
HANDICAPPED	S-NAUSEWUQZ	INST	28	18	46
		CCC	14	10	24
	WZOFUW	INST	10	9	19
		CCC	16	8	24
NON HANDICAPPED	S-NAUSEWUQZ	INST	30	5	35
		CCC	36	1	37
	WZOFUW	INST	15	4	19
		CCC	32	3	35
TOTAL			181	58	239

$$\chi^2_{\alpha} \approx 28.22; p < .005$$

	SUCCESS	FAILURE	TOTAL
HANDICAP	68	45	113
NO HANDICAP	113	13	126
TOTAL	181	58	239

$\chi^2 = .003$   $p > .90$

		B1		
		SUCCESS	FAILURE	TOTAL
HANDICAPPED	MIS	42	28	72
	FEL	26	17	43
TOTAL		68	45	113

$\chi^2 = 0.86$   $.75 > p > .50$

		B2		
		SUCCESS	FAILURE	TOTAL
NO HANDICAP	MIS	66	6	72
	FEL	47	7	54
TOTAL		113	13	126

HANDICAPPED  
MISDEMEANOR

$\chi^2_{c1} = .06; p > .75$

	S	F	
INST	28	18	46
CCC	14	10	24
	42	28	70

FELONY

$\chi^2_{c1} = 1.17; p > .25$

	S	F	
INST	10	9	19
CCC	16	8	24
	26	17	43

NO HANDICAPS  
MISDEMEANOR

$\chi^2_{c1} = 1.37; p > .25$

	S	F	
INST	30	5	35
CCC	36	1	37
	66	6	72

FELONY

$\chi^2_{c1} = 1.04; p > .25$

	S	F	
INST	15	4	19
CCC	32	3	35
	47	7	54

ADDENDUM B:

Was the increase in failure in 1968 due to temporary social unrest or was it due to a real increase in failure ?

I. The research reports reiterate that the increase in failure rate in the 2nd quarter of 1968 as being due to the April riots and thereby choosing, instead of actual failure rates, a projected hypothetical curve of what their behavior should have been like had there been no riot. This claim does not appear to be based on their own data. In study I, (Releasees from CTC) the left marginal description of Table 3 is difficult to understand and therefore I will use 6 months periods.


Comparing the increase in failure during the 1st six months of 1968 with that of the last 6 months of 1967 (7/67 - 12/67), it will be noted that for the 30 month cohort there was a 6.6 percent increase for 1/68 - 6/68 and a 6.7 percent increase in 7/67 - 12/67. The 18 months cohort shows a 6.9 percent increase in 1/68 - 6/68 and an identical 6.9 percent increase a 7/67 - 12/67.

In Study II, (Releasees from Youth Center) if Table 3 is taken to mean that the last quarter studied is 4/68 - 6/68, once again the supposed massive increase in failure for the population - compared to previous patterns of failures is not borne out. Even should my original supposition be wrong, then by combining the last 2-~~quarters~~ studied (which must then include the April riots) the comparison with six months periods immediately proceeding them reveals for several cohorts, no enormous shift in failure rate.

NOTE: Although published data into 1970 is available, the research still does not go beyond 6/68, possibly feeling that the late data may confirm the upswing in the 4/68 - 6/68 quarter as something other than a temporary and peculiar rise due solely to the April riot. It seems to me that this point is essential to their early argument, and considering the availability of the failure rate for his early cohort populations for the quarters after 6/68, they would use this information (for 7/68 - 9/68, 10/68, 12/68) to confirm their belief in the spurious nature of the 4/68 - 6/68 rise, if the data did indeed confirm this. The very fact that they never deal with this information (although available by 1970) may indicate data would not substantiate this prett parabolic curve construed in the early studies.

II. An additional test of the claim could have been carried out but was not. The following tables describe the offense and arrest distributions for the period under consideration (Fiscal 1968). Inspection show that the only main effect noticeable is an increase in Burglary arrests - further analysis reveals that these arrests are overwhelmingly for Burglary II. Thus the records of the cohorts could have been checked to ascertain if the increase in failure rates in the cohort was due to increased arrests for Burglary II. If they were not the claim advanced would be weakened considerably.





(one unit = 50 offenses or arrests)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

43637

FY 1968

MONTH	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE
4	14	10	19	17	14	14	13	19	10	18	24
5											
10											
15											
20											
25											
30											
A	4	14	10	19	17	14	13	19	10	18	24
	O = offenses * = arrests										

Σ O 139  
Σ A 177

FY 1968

(four units = one offense or arrest)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

O	14	12	18	13	13	18	11	13	25	16	16	18
A	8	3	12	8	6	7	6	11	7	15	9	9

○ = Offense  
 ☆ = Arrests

28  
 26  
 24  
 22  
 20  
 18  
 16  
 14  
 12  
 10  
 8  
 6  
 4  
 2


	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	JANUARY	FEBRUARY	MARCH	APRIL	MAY	JUNE
28												
26									○			
24												
22												
20												
18			○			○						○
16									○	○		
14	○			○	○			○	☆			
12		○	☆									
10							○	☆				
8	☆			☆		☆		☆		☆	☆	
6					☆		☆					
4		☆										
2												

FY 19 68

(five units = one arrest or offense)  
 SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

OFF YEAR BY MONTHS

MADE IN U. S. A.



(one unit = five offenses or arrests)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

Σ A 6588  
1991

	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	TOTAL		
0	304	294	308	243	217	238	226	230	261	247	268	270
A	142	219	154	196	147	149	149	158	163	145	180	166
	O = Offenses A = Arrests											
350												
300												
250												
200												
150												
100												
50												

Σ 0 [3/34

FY 1968

(each offense or arrest is 2.5 units)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN
1600	1611	1622	1633	1644	1655	1666	1677	1688
1500	1511	1522	1533	1544	1555	1566	1577	1588
1400	1411	1422	1433	1444	1455	1466	1477	1488
1300	1311	1322	1333	1344	1355	1366	1377	1388
1200	1211	1222	1233	1244	1255	1266	1277	1288
1100	1111	1122	1133	1144	1155	1166	1177	1188
1000	1011	1022	1033	1044	1055	1066	1077	1088
900	911	922	933	944	955	966	977	988
800	811	822	833	844	855	866	877	888
700	711	722	733	744	755	766	777	788
600	611	622	633	644	655	666	677	688
500	511	522	533	544	555	566	577	588
400	411	422	433	444	455	466	477	488
300	311	322	333	344	355	366	377	388
200	211	222	233	244	255	266	277	288
100	111	122	133	144	155	166	177	188
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

1153 1096 1220 1337 1371 1428 1385 1253 1370 1781 1674 1902  
 A 164 213 263 200 189 217 197 230 236 1341 438 382  
 O = OFFENSE  
 A = ARREST

16470  
 16470  
 16470

FY 1968

(each unit=10 arrests or offenses)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
 Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

LARCENY \$50.00 and OVER

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
Offenses	33	42	42	66	31	34	30	23	37	44	20	34	585
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	602
Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	651
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	729
Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	777
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	745
Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	515
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	469
Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	578
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	369
Offenses	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	556
Arrests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	669

(One unit=5 arrests or offenses)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
 Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968


FY 1968

### AUTO THEFT

O	741	820	805	830	818	885	723	623	655	790	1071	1119
A	109	113	95	97	97	70	74	93	73	115	196	195

O = Offense  
 O = Arrest

1300  
 1200  
 1100  
 1000  
 900  
 800  
 700  
 600  
 500  
 400  
 300  
 200  
 100



(one unit= 10 arrests or offenses)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
 Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968

FY 1968



UNIT	APRIL	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER	NOVEMBER	DECEMBER	TOTAL
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FY 19 68

(one unit = 20 offenses or arrests)

SOURCES: Offenses, MPD Annual Report FY 1968  
Arrests, MPD Annual Report FY 1968