WHAT DO WE KNOW?
HOW SHOULD WE PREPARE?

CIVIL DISORDER
A Compilation of Papers Presented Before the Police Foundation National Conference, April 1993, Washington, DC
CIVIL DISORDER: What Do We Know? How Should We Prepare? is intended to be a collection of readings based on material presented at the Police Foundation conference of the same name, held in Washington, D.C., April 6-8, 1993. It is not inclusive of all material. While the editors have attempted to maintain the style and certainly the content of presentation, they have edited for brevity, clarity and consistency in order to provide the best information in the most direct way.

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INTRODUCTION

Hubert Williams
President, Police Foundation

On April 6, 1993, The Police Foundation began its conference on civil disorder against the backdrop of a trial of four policemen in Los Angeles. And we began with the realization that we stood at a point in our nation's history where what we did and said would have a tremendous impact not only on American policing but on the quality of life in our cities as well.

We met not long after the Eisenhower Foundation published its report Investing in Children and Youth. We also found that not much had changed in the nation’s cities since the issuance of the Kerner Commission’s report in 1968.

We met two days after the marking of the anniversary of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., a tragedy that sparked civil disorder and mass destruction in 1968, and from which some cities have not yet fully recovered.

Indeed, ours is a time of great crisis as well as one of great opportunity. And it is up to us to determine the way our respective cities take up the challenge.

During the Kerner Commission hearings in 1967, one of the first witnesses was Dr. Kenneth Clark. In referring to reports of earlier riot commissions, he stated, “When I read the report of the 1919 riot in Chicago, it was as if I were reading the report of the Harlem riots of 1935, the report of the Harlem riot of 1943, and the report of the McCone Commission on the Watts riot .... It was the same moving picture being shown over and over again, the same analyses, the same recommendations, and the same inaction.”

I hope we do not add the report on the recent Los Angeles civil disorder to that list of reports and recommendations that have been followed by little or no action. For while that report specifically addressed the events of Los Angeles, it is relevant to each and every city of the nation.

When the Police Foundation was established in 1970, its original board members knew why they were called together. The disruptions of the 1960's had passed, but questions still lingered about how the police could carry out their mission within the cities and amidst the changing dynamics of the population residing there.

Police executives found themselves unable to answer questions raised by the citizenry. There were instances where police behavior sparked the disorders, and yet others in which the police behaved professionally while citizens continued to complain of unsatisfactory police service. Boards and commissions had indicated that the underlying causes of many of the disturbances were directly related to deep-rooted social problems.

Police executives wondered how they could prevent civil disorders when the forces that caused them were beyond police control. It is a question that still lingers.

The Police Foundation was created to help find answers to these difficult questions. It has since become the research and development arm of American policing.

A wise man once said that those who fail to learn from the past are doomed to repeat it. The challenge confronting our 1993 conference, “Civil Disorder: What Do We Know? How Do We Prepare?” was how do we best apply what we have learned from past experience.

Given our resources, the scope of our responsibilities and the mandate we have, how can the law enforcement community reduce the potential for civil disorders? If we cannot alter the underlying causes of civil disorder, can we diminish the potential for an action on the part of one of our officers to spark the flame of civil disorder?

These are the challenges that we face, and it is our hope that what arose from the conference on civil disorder, the contents of which are set forth in the following pages, will provide us with enough information to meet those challenges effectively.
THE FAILURES AND LESSONS OF LOS ANGELES

William Webster
Attorney, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy; former Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; former Director, Central Intelligence Agency

If there is anything that emerged from the Los Angeles study, “City in Crisis,” it was the need for what we in the Navy used to call “forehandedness.” In these situations, we do not have the luxury of time, so we must think ahead, prevent problems from happening whenever possible, and have contingency plans in place if our preparations fall short.

One year ago, the civil disorder in Los Angeles shocked the world. The second largest city of the most powerful nation on earth was rocked by fire and violence that quickly got out of control. Time will tell whether the lessons learned in this intervening year have been put to good use. I believe they have. But I also believe that though we have reduced the risk of a repetition of last year’s disturbances, we have certainly not eliminated the possibility.

On April 29, 1992, the night the verdict came in acquitting four Los Angeles police officers of the beating of Rodney King, I was in Hong Kong, getting ready to leave for Taipei. When I turned on the television and saw the verdict being returned, I said to my wife, “No good will come of this.” By the time we had reached Taipei, a good part of Los Angeles was in flames. We went on to Singapore, and continued to monitor what was taking place in Los Angeles. Ultimately, we reached Seoul, Korea, where we had a chance to talk to many people who were very affected by the number of Koreans who were being victimized in Los Angeles.

When I returned to the U.S., I had to change planes in Los Angeles. Stanley Sheinbaum, the president of the Police Commission, was standing there to meet me. He said, “We want to talk to you, we’ve cleared you through customs, we’ve talked to your law firm, and we have something we want you to do.” Out of that conversation, and with the assurance that Hubert Williams would come on board as the deputy, I agreed to become special advisor to the City of Los Angeles and undertake an evaluation of police performance. This evaluation would necessarily consider the actions of others: the government officials in Los Angeles, the governor, the National Guard, the fire department—all of the surrounding agencies that were part of the Mutual Aid Program.

We set up an organization, the General Counsel, and quickly formed groups containing 22 deputy counsel. Scores of volunteer lawyers from Los Angeles’s major law firms also participated. In the end, more than 100 lawyers took part in the evaluation effort.

Additionally, we were fortunate to obtain five police consultants from around the country, experts who had experience with civil disorder in their own cities. The consultants included Deputy Chief Jimmy Brown from the Metro Dade Police Department; Lieutenant Michael Cushing from Chicago; Lieutenant Barbara Frost, also from Chicago; Lieutenant Curtis McGhee from Detroit; and Sergeant Bryan Morris from Newark.

These consultants provided a “reality check” for the lawyers who knew how to collect information but did not necessarily understand the reasoning, training, and doctrine behind specific police instructions. We also used three senior consultants, including Roger Young, now with Union Pacific but formerly an official at the FBI during my tenure there, along with 15 other consultants and experts, and 9 staff assistants.

Altogether, the lawyers logged in 25,000 hours. If one considers what lawyers are charging these days, whether they earn it or not, that is a lot of capital invested in the interest of improving the situation in Los Angeles.

Because we raised more than $300,000 from patriotic, civic-minded citizens and businesses to cover expenses, including the printing of the report, not only did we have a valuable report when we finished 160 days later, but one that was produced without any cost to the citizens or government of Los Angeles.

We organized our task forces into four basic groups. One group reviewed all actions taken by the Los Angeles Police Department. It looked at police records, orders, movements, and deployments. Another task force was responsible for working with other agencies, such as the sheriff’s office and the National Guard. Still another group looked at the government response, that is, what did the City of Los Angeles and government agencies do or fail to do? Finally, a fourth group compared Los Angeles’s preparations for civil disorder, and its actions and decisions once disturbances erupted, with the actions and decisions taken in other cities throughout the country.

We found that the 911 system was quickly overwhelmed...
by the number of callers, an important fact for us to know.
We also conducted attitudinal studies on the perception of citizens in different areas of Los Angeles about what had happened, which interventions worked, and which did not. We searched for what was ultimately responsible for bringing the "riot," "disorder," or "rebellion"—depending upon your point of view—under control. Finally, we conducted seven town meetings, largely in the riot area, where victims had an opportunity to come in and talk to us. Ironically, we were the first official group to have gone into that area after the riots—and this was six months later. It was our view that our report would lack credibility if we did not provide this opportunity for riot victims to speak.

And they had a lot of things on their minds, not all of which related to the jury verdict. In fact, very few of their comments addressed the verdict in the King case. Rather, they expressed their pent-up anger, hatred, and resentment, their religious and ethnic rivalries. They voiced the unhappiness of people who feel they are not being treated in their neighborhoods and communities the same way as those in more affluent neighborhoods, particularly vis a vis the police.

One of the most moving moments of the entire investigation came when we listened to children, adolescents, and teenagers standing at the microphone, describing what it is like to live in neighborhoods where they have to dodge bullets going to school, where drugs are sold on playgrounds, where the seeds of future disorder are not being attended to.

Though there was a lot of political heat being generated in the aftermath of the riots, it is important to note that we had the full cooperation of the Los Angeles Police Department. People were sensitive to criticism, but there was no holding back on making all the records, orders, and anything else we wanted to see, available to us.

Before it was over, we had conducted extensive interviews with hundreds of people, which then became thousands of pages of material. In final form, it was condensed into a 200-page report.

In the end, we decided to leave out one chapter on intelligence, which we did with Hubert Williams's concurrence. We did this for a couple of reasons. First, given my background, I did not want people to think that the whole secret to successful law enforcement is intelligence, and I did not want the conclusions we reached about community-oriented policing to be translated into: "You need policemen there so they can spy on citizens." Moreover, we concluded that there was very strong evidence, based upon what individual police commanders and officials did, that they had all of the intelligence they needed prior to the disturbances. Our conclusion: There had not been a failure of intelligence.

Los Angeles's post-verdict civil disorder had not been a

planned exercise. It had been a spontaneous uprising, but the high level of citizen frustration in certain Los Angeles areas had been there, and was well known to the officials in the police department. It was because of this that we concluded the chapter on intelligence was unnecessary. And I mention it now only because there was some comment in the media about the fact that we had omitted that segment of the report.

We identified a number of failures, which I will summarize. Oliver Wendell Holmes said that generalizations are no damn good, but I must say that the following generalization is both appropriate and important. There was, in our view, a failure to plan, and, more importantly, a failure to exercise the plans that did exist.

We had reports of police officers with large volumes of old files from their division offices on the hoods of their automobiles, poring through the papers, trying to find out what it was they were supposed to do.

We found that there had been a failure to equip. There was a significant shortage of gas masks, for example, which therefore made the use of tear gas out of the question. There were not enough radios. Generally speaking, half the unmarked cars had been taken home that first night and were not readily available for use. There was also an absence of buses in areas where mass transportation was very important.

There was an extraordinary failure to communicate. The central emergency headquarters was four flights below ground in the Parker Center area, and consisted of little more than light switches and a coffee-maker. The people there simply could not get information into the command center, and they could not communicate their decisions, such as they were able to make, rapidly and effectively to people in the field.

There was also a failure in command. Although there are circumstances in Los Angeles that you may not find in other cities, there will always be something happening in a given city to affect the ability to command decisively. In this particular situation, there was a transition in progress; the chief of police was getting ready to leave the department. He was absent during a good part of the beginnings of the riot—first at a fund-raising rally, and later, for an hour-and-a-half, in a helicopter ride—and did not reach the scene of maximum conflict in the 77th Street Division until approximately 10:30 that evening.

In the meantime, no one else assumed active or effective command. Even though the LAPD supposedly subscribes to the doctrine that the original person in charge stays in charge until a senior officer arrives at the scene and assumes command, we found again and again that senior officers
Arrests became a problem. How were the police to deal with mass arrests? How were they to get those arrested properly interviewed and brought back behind lines, while proper records were maintained for possible prosecution? We found that the relationship with other agencies was awfully deficient at a time of great need. Fortunately, this problem was solved fairly quickly.

In most American cities, it is very unlikely that law enforcement could deal with a disorder of this dimension with its local resources alone. I suspect that New York and possibly Chicago have a ratio of officers to population sufficiently large to take care of most of their problems. But I don’t know of anywhere else. It certainly did not happen in Los Angeles. Though other law enforcement agencies in the area participated in the Mutual Aid Program coordinated by Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, the Los Angeles Police Department sent representatives who merely stated the position of their department, without cooperating with the other agencies in coming to terms with how to address particular situations.

When outside aid was offered to the LAPD, the department exhibited an uncertainty as to how it would be used. Rather than being mission-oriented, the LAPD often asked, for example, that 60 people be sent here, and 10 people there. As a result, the sheriff of Los Angeles County turned down many of the LAPD’s requests. Sheriff Block would say, “give us a mission and we’ll do it.” But the LAPD did not know how.

In addition, we had an unusual situation in that the mayor of Los Angeles and the chief of police had not spoken to each other for more than a year. That hardly made for good cooperation.

And the National Guard had its own problems. The system was laid out for calling up the National Guard, but it was not utilized. Requests for aid should have gone through the Mutual Aid Program first, then to the emergency set-up in Sacramento, and then lastly to the governor. But the request went directly from the LAPD to the governor—and I do not fault the governor. In an attempt to be responsive, the governor ordered the Guard deployed. Unfortunately, the Guard was not fully prepared and had to be brought ammunition after it had been deployed.

Once the National Guard was federalized and federal troops came on the scene, there was an open question as to whether the National Guard could continue to perform law enforcement functions rather than being subjected to Posse Comitatus Act prohibitions. I think it is very clear that when the President issued his emergency proclamation, the Posse Comitatus Act restriction was waived. However, there were still apprehensions about the use of the military in this case, particularly the National Guard.

To this I must add that a judgment had been made that when federal law enforcement agencies arrived on the scene they would perform as many of the law enforcement functions as possible, using the military only if needed. Yet, attitudinal surveys made clear that a majority in Los Angeles credited the presence of the National Guard and the enforcement of the curfew as the two things that ultimately calmed people down and got them to stop the destruction and the looting.

Perhaps the greatest problem was the attitude of the people in troubled areas toward their own law enforcement officers. The LAPD came in as a hostile stranger, when it came at all. In contrast to this, I am told that in New York as many as 30,000 phone calls were made that night to members of the community to make sure that the city did not react violently to what was occurring in Los Angeles. The NYPD had the contacts and the people, and it had the necessary leadership. In Los Angeles, there was very little of this. There was an effort by a small handful of church and community leaders to consider what to do next, but it did not reach far enough and it did not move fast enough.

The situation represents the contrast between the very popular paramilitary approach to law enforcement—the lean and tough approach that was effective for many years—and community policing.

Among other things, community policing takes into account the ethnic diversity within large cities. There are 102 languages spoken in Los Angeles. It is very important that the police not be strangers in these diverse communities. Time and time again, we have seen instances where police officers are able to engage the local community and positively affect its behavior. They may shout at each other, but the one ingredient that sparks riots—fear—is not present. The police and the residents know each other. They are not afraid of each other, and they can work out at least some of their problems. In these cases, neither side fast-draws or resorts to violence.

But in Los Angeles, it was very clear that the officers did not know their communities. They had been instructed to stay out and to come in only when there was a problem.

There is a long history of community disengagement in Los Angeles law enforcement. Long ago it had been established that, when corruption appeared among the force, the solution was to pull the officers away from the residents in order to diminish the temptation to accept the apples from the peddlers and the vendors. Knowing the community too well, it was thought, would lead to corruption. In my
view, that approach no longer works and it is important now to think in terms of how law enforcement officers can be a part of their community, not hostile strangers.

My hope is that the lessons we learned in Los Angeles are not forgotten and are, in fact, implemented. The first and perhaps most important lesson we learned is that plans must be reasonably specific to the threat. It does not do to have plans designed to take care of earthquakes when you are confronting major civil disorder. Plans must be understood by those charged with carrying them out and they must be exercised.

We also learned that mutual aid is indispensable in large urban crisis situations. Each party in the mutual aid program must participate. Each party must know the other's role. Logistical needs must be anticipated. The old story about “for want of a nail” pertains here. If you don’t have the buses, you can’t handle the arrests. If you don’t have escorts for the fire department, the fire department cannot continue to fight the fires that fuel the fear and the looting.

We learned, too, that city emergency operations must be well-planned and exercised. In every major city, there must be an effective command-and-control system understood by everyone and practiced periodically to be sure that it’s up to snuff.

We learned that delay and indecision can be fatal. In my Navy days, I was taught the doctrine of the great naval strategist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who said that the second- or third-best alternative, if acted upon forcefully, decisively, and with all your energy, will invariably be better than the first-best alternative if it takes you too long to figure out what the first-best alternative is and to act upon it.

We also learned something of the media’s role in this type of event. The media will play an important role whether we want them to or not, for good and for bad. In Los Angeles, they made the whole world witnesses to history, which put enormous pressure on officials in the decision-making process.

At one point, there were 14 or more helicopters from various media organizations recording what was taking place on the ground. As we all know, in the trial for the beating of Reginald Denny, the record of the scene came from media helicopters. They were there, they were informing the public.

Unfortunately, sometimes media coverage works the wrong way. People see that the police are not there. People see that stores are being looted without any interference, which may increase the crowds. On the other hand, many people in Los Angeles were rescued from small groups of violent people because citizens saw that the assault was happening right in their neighborhood. They rushed out and saved people from what could have been a violent death.

I should reiterate that delay, indecision, and failure to take charge is crippling. In Los Angeles, we had all the officers but no one was willing to take charge. This may have been partly attributable to a police department in a period of change, with no one wanting to take the heat in a time of transition. But clearly, we are going to have to address that potential problem in all our cities, in order to be sure that those who should take charge do take charge.

It is also important to keep in mind the importance of redeployment following loss of ground. When you are outnumbered and outgunned in a tight situation, you should withdraw—and that was police doctrine in Los Angeles. But the corollary is that you must quickly gather the forces and return order to the area you have lost. Contrary to this doctrine, in the forward area of the 77th Division in Los Angeles, more than 1,700 police officers were gathered and no one would take charge and order them forward to take back Normandy and Florence.

I think that we have to understand that community policing is going to be an important part of our future. It is essential that both for prevention and the handling of civil disturbances, we get our people out on the street where they will be known, understood, and respected. It is surprising to note that in a city with 8,000 police officers, the average number of police deployed on patrol at any time in Los Angeles during recent years was 340. With 340 officers in a city that size, they are not going to make much of an impression, nor are they going to be seen as part of the community.

I am pleased to say that every one of the lessons I’ve just mentioned today is being addressed effectively by the Los Angeles Police Department. I think the city can be proud of the change that has taken place and proud of their new chief, who is recognizing the need for action. The citizenry has also acted. Out of the failure to communicate came Proposition M, approved by the people of Los Angeles, authorizing a bond issue for $250 million to improve the command-and-control structure.

I would like finally to stress once again the importance of cooperating with other agencies and taking advantage of their strengths and resources in a time of crisis. There was a lot of cooperation in Los Angeles, but there wasn’t nearly enough.

I think about the words that appear in the courtyard of the FBI Headquarters: “The key to effective law enforcement is cooperation at all levels and with the support and understanding of the American people.” That’s the key.

Title 18 U.S.C. §1885, prohibiting the involvement of U.S. military personnel in domestic law enforcement functions, with specified exceptions.
REWEAVING THE PARTNERSHIPS OF AMERICA

Janet Reno
Attorney General of the United States

The first job I ever had in my life was in the Dade County Sheriff's Office in the Identification Bureau, in the summer that I graduated from high school and was getting ready to go to college. And then in a second year during the summer I worked again with the crime lab.

And I have watched law enforcement grow throughout America. Then the Dade County Sheriff's Office was basically on three floors of our courthouse, which was small, and the jail was also in the courthouse. And in those 35 years we have watched the face of America change and the face of law enforcement change. But much of what I learned in Dade and much of what police officers have taught me over these years is the foundation that brings me to Washington.

I think the issues that you have addressed in this conference, the issues that will be addressed throughout America, are going to be solved not in this city but in the communities of America. They will not be solved by police by themselves. But police, I have become convinced, must take the lead. It is the police of America who are on the front lines, who are on the streets, who are in daily contact with American citizens, who translate the dreams of American citizens when they succeed, and frustrate the dreams when they fail.

The message I bring today, both in terms of preventing the disorders that you have talked about in this conference but, more importantly, in developing the police function for the future, is that somehow or another we have to look beyond our disciplines. Police and prosecutors and the courts have got to talk together. And I think we have made great strides in that effort in the last ten years. But what frustrates me is that we think we have done the job when we get somebody arrested, prosecuted, and convicted, yet we know in our hearts they are going to be out in a relatively short time, because in many of our urban areas prison overcrowding will send them home having served only 20 to 30 percent of their sentence. So it becomes imperative that police, prosecutors, and correctional officials develop innovative approaches.

But more importantly, it is the police officers, more than any single other group, that have told me again and again with eloquence that the problems are not going to be solved by police officers on the streets. They have got to develop partnerships with school teachers, with social workers, with community organizers, with people in the community, and what we basically have got to do is to come back to the people.

In our attempts to be professional and our attempts to achieve excellence, it seems to me that what we have done in America in the last 25 years is do the very best in our professions. Police have become more professional. They have met together more. Prosecutors have their meetings and their training programs and their continuing education programs. Judges have their national judicial colleges. The American Correctional Association has its meetings.

But there are very few times that I see us meet together. There are very few times that I see us meet with the National Education Association or the National Association of Social Workers. And we do not understand how to start to reweave the fabric of society around communities where it has been really stripped away.

I think we can do it, and the group that makes me most believe that are police officers, because police officers, the good police officers, at every level of a department, are the people who have shown me how. It is the police officer on the street, who is not a community police officer—he is in uniform, he is in a car, but he takes the time to stop by that elementary school and to know the teachers and to know the ministers in the area. And he can do so much more in terms of investigation and detection as well as in prevention just by that extra effort in reaching out.

It is the chief of police who says, “We’re not going to do just stings. We’re going to go into the community and
Police Foundation Board Members meet with the Attorney General: (left to right) Lee Brown, Benjamin Ward, Janet Reno, Sally Suchil, Hubert Williams, William Webster and Al Slocom.

work with the community and get community advice as to what the problems are. We’re going to have a long-range, lasting strategy with respect to a particular neighborhood. We’re going to talk to the people in the neighborhood and involve them.”

I think the answer to civil disorder in America, the answer to police problems in America, the answer to jail overcrowding and all the problems that we see, the one answer is that government must go back to its people. It must believe in its people as being the group that will really in the long run have the answers. It is not us telling them we know better. This is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

But one of the problems that exists in America is that too many people feel disenfranchised. They sit behind doors and they glare out at officialdom in whatever its form—a building inspector, a HUD manager, a police officer—and they do not believe that person. They will not come out. They will not bring their child to the clinic five houses away because they are suspicious and unbelieving that government really cares.

If we are to address the problems that plague America, it seems to me that all of us working together are going to have to join in a major effort to take government literally and physically back to its people. I want to establish a message here in Washington that I want to do everything I can to take Washington to the people.

I was saying just a few minutes ago that when I headed an office of 900 in Miami for 15 years, I could return all my phone calls. My home telephone number was listed. I responded to every police inquiry I could. I responded to every media inquiry I could—sometimes with a “no comment, I can’t comment on a pending case,” but nonetheless I responded and returned the call. With 95,000 employees in 50 states I know that is not possible, but I want to work through groups like you to get Washington back down to the people.

I want a Department of Justice that is a true partner with local law enforcement. I have been on the receiving end of the Department of Justice telling me, “No, you can’t do that. We know better.” I want a new approach, which is, as a team we talk together with mutual respect, mutual regard, about what is the best thing to do.

I look at a bureaucracy here in Washington that has grown to over ten times in probably 30 years, and I look at police officers on the street strapped for resources. I want to try to see that, wherever possible, the resources of Washington and the resources of the federal government go to the streets and to the communities of America to reinforce what you do day in and day out.
But as we do that, I hope we then form the partnerships in our community. As a suggestion, one possibility is an effort that we started in Dade County, of teams composed of community-friendly, highly respected police officers, social workers, public health nurses, and community organizers working together full time as a team within a narrow neighborhood. One of our problems is that we spread ourselves too thin and we again become kind of top-down, because we are not in the neighborhood with the people.

But to get to the people, to get that lady to bring her child to the clinic, to get her to come out and talk to that public health nurse so she can advise her about infant nutritional programs, about immunization programs, we have got to break down that wall of suspicion and mistrust that exists at every level. And to do that, that public health nurse needs to feel free to go knock on the door. And if she has that community-friendly police officer with her, she is going to feel more free to do so, and together they can address the problem of a family as a whole. Now we have the police officer addressing the problem of the delinquent son, somebody else talking about the mother's problem, but nobody talking about the family's problem as a whole. If we address one problem in the family, three other problems will go unaddressed and the lady will end up as frustrated as ever before.

But what we have got to believe in most of all is, yes, there are some bad people in this world and we have got to prosecute them and convict them and get them put away for as long as we can ever get them put away. To do that, we are going to have to have enough prisons, we are going to have to get some of the people in the prisons now out, back to the community, as constructive citizens, and use the prisons for what they were meant to be, places to lock up bad people for as long as we can get them locked up.

But those bad people are few and far between. There are other people that have gone over to the realm of the bad that we can pull back. There is that lady that six weeks ago would not come out from behind her door because she mistrusted people, who has seen some significant actions the government has taken that can mean something in her life in a realistic way, and she is beginning to believe in government. She is beginning to believe in that police officer, that social worker. She is beginning to come to meetings.

But then something else happens. She says, "I want to get a job," and she gets a job, and she makes the minimum wage and she suddenly discovers she is worse off than if she had not gone to work in the first place, because she loses benefits. We have got to involve all of us in efforts to break through this federal bureaucracy that we have created, to enable that woman to get off welfare and to see a light at the end of the tunnel and to be a constructive person. That lady wants to be off welfare. Most of those juvenile delinquents that are causing so many of the crime problems that we see basically want to be self-respecting people who can participate and contribute and be constructive in their communities. But they kept taking the wrong road, they kept being beaten down.

It is the police officers that are bringing them back. Is the police officer who will go down to Juvenile Court and say, "Give that kid another chance and let me take him home." But, to use Miami as an example, if that police officer sends him off to a program in a youth camp in Lake Okeechobee that has no real reference whatever to the inner city of Miami, and expects him to sit up there for six months and come back without any transition whatsoever, that is going to be more of what we have done for the last 20 years. But if that police officer takes him home to community programs, to mentoring programs after school, to special programs that can make kids have creative, wonderful opportunities after school, we may pull that kid back. That kid is going to be one of those people participating in the civil disorders that you have talked about unless we pull him back now, unless we pull his sister back and give her an opportunity to do something besides sit at home with the first baby that she had had, because she cannot find child care for that baby and cannot get back to school—and she sits and watches her dreams frustrated at every step of the way.

Police officers have given me more of a sense of the possible, more of a sense that we can address this problem, more of the sense that we can have a real voice. I think police officers have the hardest job of anybody I know. They have to be lawyers without having gone to law school, most of them. They have to make hard legal decisions within seconds on a street with an angry crowd. They expose their lives to danger day in and day out. They cannot sit with their feet propped up and decide what next to do about a case in too many instances. They have to quell the angry crowd, provide first aid under very difficult circumstances, do so many incredible things.

Police officers are on the front line of America, and I would like to join with you in getting more people there to help you and in reweaving the partnerships of America, bringing all disciplines together to take government back to the people, with the police leading the way.
WHY ARE OUR CITIES SMOLDERING?

Henry G. Cisneros
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; former Mayor of San Antonio, Texas

The subject, "Civil Disorder: What Do We Know? How Should We Prepare?" is a manifest concern for urban America, and it is a subject that opens for consideration a host of issues and circumstances surrounding the cause and effects of civil disorders.

I would like to begin by sharing a personal story that is rooted in the subject of this conference. It was a Wednesday night, and I had stayed up to watch the late news on television and then to catch a few minutes of the Los Angeles Lakers and Portland Trailblazers in an exciting overtime game at the Forum in Inglewood. The play-by-play man drew the attention of the television audience to the advisories being given by the announcers to the crowd inside the forum about the fires and violence raging a few blocks away.

As the game proceeded, the network began to show split-screen pictures, taken from helicopters, of entire blocks ablaze. I stayed up half the night and switched around the dial to see the coverage on various stations. I finally went to bed that night full of dread and apprehension.

The next morning, I spoke to members in the office of my friend, Mayor Tom Bradley of Los Angeles. My purpose was simply to express encouragement and to offer any assistance I could. In the course of several conversations with Mayor Bradley's staff and with city council members' offices in Los Angeles, it became clear that it might be useful if persons such as myself, who were able to speak to particular segments of the Los Angeles community—in my case the Latino community—could be on hand to help. I decided to do what I could and flew to Los Angeles that afternoon.

When I met with Mayor Bradley on Thursday evening, he asked me to do two things: work with Latino leaders to urge Latino youth to observe the curfew; and ask parents to take control and keep their children away from the looting, burning, and violence. At that time, it was unclear to what extent the Latino community was involved and to what extent possible tensions between ethnic groups could intensify violence.

I spent that evening, the next day, and Saturday working primarily in the Latino community and with the Spanish news media, urging calm and drawing a picture of how large a setback the destruction of the community would be. Communities that had needed jobs would be without them; neighborhoods that had been working for economic development would watch their homes go up in flames; and hundreds of millions of dollars that could have been put to use in training programs, educational investment or in community improvements would have to be spent just rebuilding burned-out blocks. And the human toll, further alienation, deeper divisions, anger, fear, injury, and death would bring tears to many families for a long, long time.

Well, we all tried to do what little we could as individuals. As painful and exhausting as it was, it was important, I believe, to be there. Like many Americans, I have felt awe, admiration and hope for the Pacific Rim economic powerhouse that is Los Angeles. I felt a special affection for the city—as the most vibrant center of the Hispanic community in the United States—and I wanted to help a friend, Tom Bradley, who needed all hands on deck.

And I could not help but feel real sadness for our country and for the ideals that sustain a spirit of striving, all of which had been associated with the unique place that is Los Angeles, and all of which were suffering a devastating setback. What I saw, smelled and felt there makes it possible for me to speak here with greater clarity and certainty than ever.

In Los Angeles that Thursday night, the smoke was everywhere. It smelled of burning wire and plastic. The smoke was so thick that it obscured the lights of a helicopter circling directly overhead. One could hear it but could not see it. Sirens screamed every few seconds, as strike teams and fire engines, escorted by California highway patrol cars, convoyed—and that is the right word, "convoyed," because firemen at that point did not dare go to areas without police protection because they came under attack when trying to put out fires.

Pick-up trucks carrying men of all ethnic groups pulled in front of electronic stores, the glass fronts bashed in, and people then hurriedly loaded VCR's and television sets. One friend, actor Edward James Olmos did heroic duty that night and in the subsequent days, urging people to
begin the clean-up process. Eddie told me that as he turned the corner just in front of the television station where we were speaking to the community, he had passed a young man who had been shot in the head. The teenager was lying arms wide, sprawled out on a city sidewalk, eyes open, staring straight up, dead.

It was the urban apocalypse in smoky, smelly, orange—an assault on all the senses. People were wide-eyed, full of all-out fear.

That was Los Angeles that Thursday night, but it could be any city in America some other night. "No," you say. "Los Angeles is different." Well, Los Angeles is bigger and it is more diverse. It is riper street-smart. Maybe its edges are a little sharper and cooler, tougher, maybe even readier to take offense.

"No," you say. "It could not happen in my city, not in Miami, or in Washington, or Atlanta; not in Cleveland or Detroit or Chicago; not in Newark or San Francisco or Dallas." Really?

"Not in Denver or Kansas City or Memphis; not in Minneapolis or Charleston or Houston or Philadelphia." Maybe yes, maybe no. Maybe not the same form, maybe not the same intensity, maybe not the same scale, maybe not the same flashpoint. But the white-hot intensity of Los Angeles was the combustion of smoldering embers long waiting to ignite, like piles of dry wood with red-hot coals underneath. Scores of American cities can ignite like this—or, maybe they will just smolder away, taking a human toll at a slower, less visible rate.

Why are our cities smoldering? Perhaps it is a matter of economics. Poverty in the United States became more widespread, more severe, and more long-lasting during the 1980's than in other Western democracies. Unemployment rates among youth cause nearly one-quarter of young households to fall below the poverty line. When adjusted for inflation, the median income of families headed by people under 30 is 13 percent lower than it was in the middle of the 1970's. The real wages for the average American worker have declined by almost 10 percent during the 1980's; as a result, living standards have worsened for many workers and their families.

In 1987, a male high school graduate with one to five years of work experience was earning 10 percent less than his counterpart in 1979. And the young black man, age 25 to 34, was earning more than 20 percent less after adjusting for inflation.

Inequality, which had been declining for almost 20 years, began widening again in the 1980's. The average after-tax income of the richest 1 percent of Americans more than doubled from 1977 to 1988, while middle class households gained little and low income households suffered losses.

What is happening to our economy, to our workers, to their wages? Slower growth in national productivity, the loss of high-wage manufacturing jobs, their replacement with lower-wage service jobs, the use of more part-time and contract workers are all combining to keep incomes down for young and poor workers. Need we really ask why our cities are smoldering?

Well, perhaps it is also a matter of race, something with which America has not yet come to terms. We literally run from it. Fifty of our cities with populations of more than 100,000 are now more than 50 percent African American, Hispanic, and Asian. That is 50 cities where the majority of the population is "minority." Among those with populations over 60 percent African American, Asian, and Hispanic, are Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Chicago, Detroit, El Paso, Hartford, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Oakland, my home town of San Antonio, and Washington, D.C.

Detroit, which is almost 80 percent minority, is a case in point. It is the most segregated city in the United States. White populations leave, some seeking the advantages of the suburbs, some fleeing the deterioration of a crime-ridden city, and others trying to escape the minority populations themselves. The result is desperation; distressed and poor populations are left behind to fend for themselves in what can only be called modern versions of reservations, urban reservations. And then we ask why our cities are smoldering.

Well, perhaps it is as simple as a matter of rage, of people angry beyond words. The drug-fed crime epidemic has resulted in a larger proportion of the United States population in jail than in any other country except South Africa. The lack of affordable housing is so severe that some urban dwellers must now spend as much as 70 percent of their income on rent. The black infant mortality rate is worse than in some Third World countries. And we live in an America, our nation, where every day 27 children die from poverty-related causes; 10 young people are killed by guns; 30 are wounded; and 6 commit suicide. Every day more than 1,600 youths are incarcerated in adult jails; 2,700 teenagers get pregnant; and 1,500 teenagers confront the crises of life by dropping out of school.

In Los Angeles, and in the slow burn of 100 other cities, we are reaping the harvest of inattention, withdrawal, and our unwillingness or incapacity to invest in our people. The events in Los Angeles were a wake-up call to America.
I must say I have not seen a report as fine as the one Judge Webster and Hubert Williams prepared on the Los Angeles disorders. It makes clear what happened, what the stakes are, and what it means for the country. It also makes clear that it is time we try to do things differently.

I know we can not go back to the big bureaucracy answers of the 1960's. First, we do not have the money—not with a $300 billion dollar-plus deficit. Secondly, we would not go back to approaches that in some instances failed to deliver on their promises. I also know, however, that we as a country have paid a price for the cuts in job training, housing funds, and community re-development. And I know as well that it is no solution for people to blame each other.

This conference addresses what we know about civil disorder and how to prepare for it. And it is also devoted to investigating the relationships between the community and the police. It is these relationships that will help determine whether the future of urban America is a dream or a nightmare.

When disorders flare we read and hear about communities in conflict. But does that really describe what is happening? Are these really disorders of communities in conflict or are they, more precisely, conflicts among alienated collections of frustrated people, whose rage is vented against disconnected and polarized populations? Can there be a community in conflict if there is no sense of community, no sharing of any common purpose, no shared dream?

Isn't it really nothing more than a shattered society, a cluster of people segregated between despair and opportunity, segregated in space, segregated by walls that are so thick and so high that they might as well be impenetrable?

We need to build the sense of community, of belonging, a shared vision of hope, a stake in the future that is inclusive of the urban poor. Our institutions need to do a better job of helping people connect with expectations and with responsibilities, to help people optimize their opportunities by doing a better job of supporting them and responding to their needs.

This is early in the new Administration and in our work at HUD, but we have begun to think about how one takes our mandate—the responsibility of housing and urban development—and tries to forge a sense of community. In fact, in trying to capture in one phrase what our department is about, we have come up with this: "The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development—dedicated to helping people create communities of opportunity."

We are not in the housing business; we are in the community business. We are not in the urban development business; we are in the opportunity business. Our job is to try to create an ethic, a sense of lift in American life, and the themes that are implicit in that brief slogan describe the essence of what we are after.

First of all, it is important that at a department like ours we recognize that the federal government, and certainly the 5,000 people in our central headquarters, should not build one single building. We must rely on people in communities, non-profit organizations, community development corporations, church-related groups, local communities, counties, cities, and states working together.

The thrust of HUD's efforts is to create a department that enables communities to take mastery over their own destinies. That is a very important change in the way we do business, because we will do a better job of listening to people, and create not just the physical reality of community but a spirit of community as well—a place where people can talk to each other and conduct a civil dialogue.
As we develop these themes, it is also critical that we focus on a sense of upward lift. It is not good enough to concentrate on static policies. We must infuse into everything we do, including housing, a sense of lift. As I say, our business is not just to create housing—that is not the end. Instead, it is a platform from which we create opportunity for people, opportunity to go from homelessness to an affordable rental house or public housing, to eventual homeownership—opportunity to go from a public housing experience without a job, without training, without education, to the self-sufficiency and empowerment that allows people to take the next step.

I recently had a sad experience in Atlanta. I was walking in a housing project when, across the street, I noticed a man, his wife, and three little children—two little girls and a smaller little boy, perhaps a year old. That is a rare enough sight in public housing, as you and I both know, to see an intact family together that way.

I walked across the street in order to visit with them. I talked with the man and was taken by the love shared among the family members. This was not an estranged family, a broken family, in any sense of the word. The man described his occupation: He is a roofer who works on commercial roofing projects nearby. I was happy for him. But then he said something that made me pause. He said, “And I come by every afternoon to visit my family.”

He explained to me that he came every afternoon after work to visit with the children he obviously loves, because the rules of public housing make it impossible for him to live in the unit without his family being taken out—since their income would rise so quickly with his income that they would not be able to stay in the unit.

That kind of circumstance is repeated a million times across America. We have created Catch-22 rules and regulations that take out the lifting opportunities for people to make something of their lives.

That is one instance from public housing. We could describe others in other parts of our system of support and service that we must change.

The other thing we have to do at HUD is to be honest and truthful, and speak to the one dirty secret in American life, and that is race. Both sides of the racial divide must speak to each other truthfully across the chasm. We must speak about racism and what it continues to do in American life. On the basis of nothing other than skin color, it denies people opportunity, access to rental housing in the suburbs, or to homeownership, or to bank loans, or insurance, or to the other essentials of being able to make it in American life.

These are the circumstances of racism in America.

They are real. They exist. We do not like to acknowledge them. But there are also the realities of the other side of the racial divide, which are equally difficult to talk about in polite company. These are the realities of what people fear, what has been bred by chronic subordination, what has been bred by the isolation of ghetto life: patterns of behavior that result in crime, dissolved families, the reality of the wrongs perpetrated on children, the shortened childhoods that result in chronic and measurable depression and trauma.

HUD is the department where we must engage this discussion if we are going to make progress. All of these things I have mentioned—addressing a concept of community, addressing a spirit of lift in our policies, and addressing the issue of race forthrightly—will of necessity then promote initiatives, programs, policies, and changes that begin to create a coherent whole as we try to speak truth to the American people.

Our cities must be places that function as they really are, subunits of a national government, tied to a national economy. They must function as the places that make it possible to relate to the realities of the American economy. If we are going to create growth and progress in the American economy, it must affect life in our cities. We must relate to the opportunities of trade in technology and the global relationship of the future, and create jobs in our cities that relate to this national and international picture.

We must also deal with the reality of segregation in our cities. We are not going to get a handle on the problems of civil disorder in cities like Los Angeles until we can deal with the concentration of large numbers of poor people, the poorest of our society. We must focus on the de-concentration of populations in big public housing projects in the poorest neighborhoods, while creating opportunities in schools. Such goals are critical in how we think about the future of our cities.

And it is also critical that HUD lead the way in thinking about how the federal government does business. In addition to going beyond top-down programs, it must also integrate the efforts of other departments. We need the Department of Education working on schools. We need the Department of Health and Human Services working on child-care and welfare reform. The disincentives in welfare rules are just as serious as those in public housing. We need the Department of Labor working in the same geographic areas as HUD, developing training programs for young people to acquire skills in housing. We also need the Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice to get in the mix.
Unfortunately, there is really no model in our government today for how we are going to make this come together. We must think imaginatively and use new programs, like President Clinton’s proposal for enterprise zones.

All of these concepts involve community. What we will try to do at HUD and across the board on the federal level will be to create a new spirit of community. Clearly, however, in the here and now, the lack of a sense of community creates the problems that we all must face. That being the case, we must act in the short-run to address these issues. The concept of community policing or problem-oriented policing, fathered by Herman Goldstein, can play a major role in helping to build a sense of community.

As I understand it, problem-oriented policing cuts across the entire department, working from the beat, the community, up through the entire structure to the chief. In San Diego’s neighborhood policing systems, it is recognized that police, community, and city services must share the responsibility for finding and maintaining long-term solutions to problems. The San Diego Police Department recognizes and accepts the role of the community as an active, full partner in the responsibility of policing.

In an interview with Police Magazine, Herman Goldstein cited four advantages of problem-oriented policing. First, it has the potential for substantially improving the ability of the police department to respond effectively to problems in a particular neighborhood. Second, it makes use of rank-and-file personnel. Third, it engages the community and lends support to all the approaches commonly identified under the umbrella of community policing. Fourth, it provides police officers with a greater sense of reward and satisfaction, making the job of the officer a much more attractive opportunity. And I would like to add a fifth advantage. As Hubert Williams would put it, it reinforces law enforcement’s role as part of the glue that holds a community together.

In a paper on urban problems, community policing, and the criminal justice system, Lee Brown and Mark Moore of Harvard referred to a different strategy of policing that has come to be called “community policing” or “neighborhood policing” or “problem-solving policing,” or simply “community problem-solving.” Two features of their strategy have particular significance for me.

First, the overall goals of policing are widened to include crime prevention, fear reduction, and emergency social services. Second, the organizational structures are flattened to give greater room for initiative at the street level. That kind of flexibility and re-thinking of roles, that which we are attempting to do in the massive bureaucracy of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is needed throughout the institutions and agencies that serve urban America.

In this same paper, Lee Brown and Mark Moore have noted that violence has become the leading cause of death among young black men between the ages of 15 and 24—not automobile accidents, not heart attacks, not diseases of any kind, except the disease of our cities, violence. The chances that a young black man born in Harlem will be murdered by the time he is 35 years of age are too high, about 1 in 30.

I have had the opportunity to see examples of good policing projects in recent weeks. I recently met with the police chief of Portland, who described how they have worked with the housing authority to re-configure the architecture of housing projects, to locate police substations within the units, and to locate within the same facilities—not next door, but in the same unit—emergency social workers who can answer people’s inquiries. One desk has a police officer; another set of desks have people who are working on other problems in the community. And the result has been police officers who relate to the community in new ways.

In my recent trip to Atlanta I met with Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson, who had just signed an agreement between the police department and the housing authority to add an additional 28 full-time officers to the Atlanta Housing Authority, on top of the 17 it already had. Beyond just adding police officers, however, they are doing such things as completely fencing off the project so that
there is only one way into or out of the complex.

One might argue that that is a terrible disadvantage for the residents, except for the fact that it is the residents who are asking for the fences. They compare it to the security that is afforded in the most exclusive neighborhoods today, where exactly that same kind of fence has been established.

In this case, they will have a 24-hour guard at the door, and because they have no electronic communications devices linked to the apartments, a second person, not a police officer, but a housing authority employee will personally check to make sure that the visitor is welcome. Drive-by shootings will not be a problem in that housing project, and other unwelcome persons selling drugs and so forth will not be a problem there either.

Joe Shuldiner, the new Assistant Secretary designee for Public Housing at HUD, has been doing this kind of thing in Los Angeles, where he gets high marks as the director of public housing. He tells me that limiting ingress and egress alone makes a lot of difference. Nobody is going to drive through a point to conduct drive-by shootings randomly, knowing that they have to come back through that same narrow point of exit. So, even without a guard there, even without a police officer there, just the physical reality of limiting the exits and the entrances helps immensely, and the residents have truly benefitted.

These are the kinds of things we will have to do together—thinking in unorthodox ways, forging new solutions, breaking down some of the traditional ways of thinking. Because it never worked before does not mean it will not work now. Because it has never been tried before does not mean it should not be tried now. Because our predecessors in the policing profession or public housing or the federal government did not do it does not mean that we should not consider it today. These are new times, new realities.

Let me close by recalling another incident that occurred in Los Angeles, this being the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy more than 25 years ago. I quote Senator Kennedy, because of all of the phrases I have encountered that capture the potential and the responsibility that each of us has, this phrase does it best. It has become much more than just a quotation from a statesman's speech. It is for me a philosophy of life. This is what he said:

"Our future may lie beyond our vision, but it is not entirely beyond our control. It is the shaping impulse of America, that it is not fate, nor is it chance, nor is it the irreversible tides of history that determine our destinies as individuals, as a nation. Rather it is reason and it is principle, and it is the work of our own hands."

He went on to say, "There is pride in that, even arrogance. But there is also truth and experience, and, in any event, it is the only way we can live."

It really is the only way we can live and call ourselves a civilized society—not defeat ourselves with the rationalization that things cannot be done because they have not been done that way before, or because history is already written, or because some random toss of the dice is going to bring us out in some uncertain place.

I hope you agree with me that America's cities and indeed America's dreams are something we cannot afford to give up on; we must keep working as best as we can.
LEARNING FROM THE KERNER
COMMISSION OF 1967

David Ginsburg
Attorney, Ginsburg, Feldman and Bress; former Executive Director, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders

My knowledge of civil disorders is primarily based upon my experience with the Kerner Commission. Twenty-five years ago, we drafted a 600-page report that cost approximately $6 million. A core group of some 90 people worked nearly a year on it. What were our findings? What has been said recently about Los Angeles, Miami, and elsewhere parallels much of what we found a quarter-century ago.

It was toward the end of July, 1967. That summer, I was on the West Coast with my wife and three kids, about to leave on a rafting trip on the Salmon River. That fateful afternoon, the White House called. President Johnson got on the line and said there had been great trouble in Newark and Detroit, and asked that I return to Washington. I did so that night.

I remember that Senator Wayne Morris of Oregon was on the plane, and we discussed what had happened, what the causes were, what we could do about it. As the plane rose from the Portland Airport, we saw flames in the city behind us, and some eight or nine months later we saw similar flames rising over the city of Washington.

The next morning in Washington, the President showed me an executive order establishing the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. President Johnson called for answers to three basic questions: What were our findings? What happened? Why did it happen? What can we do to prevent it from happening again?

A few hours later, in Johnson's address to the nation, the President said that the only genuine long-range solution to civil disorder is an attack mounted at every level upon the conditions that breed despair and violence: ignorance, discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough jobs. We should attack these conditions, he said, not because we are frightened by conflict but because we are fired by conscience. We should attack them because there is simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America.

In the first nine months of 1967, there were 164 reported disorders. Eight were major, in terms of violence and damage; 33 we described as serious, but not major; 123 were minor and probably would not have been called riots if the country had not already been sensitized by the other disturbances. Most of the 83 deaths and more than half the injuries occurred in Newark and Detroit. About 10 percent of the dead and nearly 40 percent of the injured were public employees, mostly law officers and firemen. Almost all of the persons killed or injured were black.

Now, what about the Commission? Whom did LBJ appoint? He was castigated by many, because the Commission was too moderate in character. Many asked, "Why not Stokely Carmichael, Floyd McKissick, Tom Hayden?" Indeed, why not Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was still alive then? The answer was that LBJ and his advisors felt that it was essential for the commission to speak with a voice that could be heard clearly by the white, moderate, responsible Americans, because that is where they all felt the trouble lay—with white, moderate, responsible Americans.

The Commission did include two blacks: Edward Brooke, the senator from Massachusetts, and the respected Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, who contributed so much to the Commission's work. Both were regarded as moderates. Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois was designated chairman of the Commission because of his extraordinary efforts to integrate the Illinois National Guard. Under Kerner, Illinois had more blacks in the National Guard than any other state in the Union—about 1.5 percent. John Lindsay, the liberal Republican mayor of New York, served as vice-chairman. He had a first-rate record in civil rights, and he had worked hard and courageously to keep New York quiet. Additionally, the Commission consisted of Senator Fred Harris of Oklahoma; Representative Jim Corman of California; Congressman Bill McCulloch of Ohio; Katherine Peden, who had been the former Commissioner of Commerce in Kentucky; L.W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of America; Herbert Jenkins, Chief of Police of the City of Atlanta; and Tex Thornton, Chairman and CEO of Litton Industries. All together, the members included a black senator, a governor, a mayor, a female state official, a labor leader, a black leader, an industrialist and a chief of police — two blacks and one woman, and it was middle class all the way.

I was designated as staff director by the President, and described by Tom Wicker of the New York Times as "a prosperous Washington attorney without visible qualifications for understanding the uneasy ghetto." Wicker may have exaggerated my affluence, but was not far off otherwise.

For me, the next eight months were composed of revelation, tension, and pain. We had a year to report, but most of us felt that it would be wise to report well
before the summer. We reported on March 1, 1968. Vietnam was still burning, both abroad and at home. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated in early April. And Robert Kennedy was killed soon thereafter.

We had anticipated the possibility of trouble, but not to this degree. Indeed, throughout the winter of 1967 and 1968, we and the Justice Department had conducted approximately 125 training seminars with mayors, chiefs of police, and heads of fire departments throughout the country. What we could do to encourage preparation and training that winter, we did. But violence in the spring came too soon.

We spent most of our time on the disorders that had taken place in the late summer and fall of 1967, and we very carefully examined 24 of the disturbances that took place in 23 of the cities.

There was no "typical" riot. They were all complex and unpredictable. The final inciting incident prior to the violence generally took place in the evening or on a hot, humid night when many people were on the streets. Violence usually occurred almost immediately following a final precipitating incident, and then escalated rapidly. Trouble usually began with rock and bottle throwing and window breaking. Looting followed immediately. Generally, disorder dropped off during the day.

Disorder certainly did not erupt as a result of a single precipitating incident, but grew from a profoundly disturbed social atmosphere in which there had been a series of tension-heightening incidents over a period of weeks and months. In the minds of many in the black community, the incidents could all be linked to a reservoir of underlying grievances. And at some point in the mounting tension, a further incident, often routine and trivial, became the breaking point where tension became violence.

In almost half the cases, the prior incidents that gave rise to the underlying tensions, and ultimately led to violence, were police actions. In 12 of the 24 disturbances we studied, they were also the final incidents before the outbreak of violence. No particular peace-control tactic was successful in every situation, which made the need for advanced training, planning, intelligence systems, and information gathering about the inner-city communities absolutely clear.

In 1967 and 1968 the typical rioter was a teenager or young adult. He was a life-long resident of the city in which he rioted. He was not a newcomer from the South, and was often a high school dropout. Most rioters in 1967 and 1968 were young black males. More than 50 percent of those arrested were between 15 and 24 years of age; more than 80 percent were between 15 and 35.

Many black counter-rioters walked the streets urging the rioters to cool it, and the typical counter-rioter was better educated and had a higher income than either the rioters or the bystanders. Today, we lack the counter-rioters.

Now, what were the underlying grievances? We identified a dozen deeply held grievances, and we ranked them by levels of intensity. Three were at the highest level of intensity. First were police practices: discriminatory physical and verbal abuse, no adequate channels for complaints against police, discriminatory employment and promotion practices, lack of respect for black citizens, and failure to provide adequate protection for the blacks. Second, obviously, was unemployment or underemployment. And third was inadequate housing, lack of enforcement of building and safety codes, discrimination in sales and rentals, and overcrowding.

The second level of intensity pertained to inadequate education, poor recreational facilities and programs, and ineffective political structures and grievance mechanisms. Then, there were half-a-dozen more at the third level of intensity: disrespectful, discriminatory administration of justice; inadequate federal programs; inadequate municipal services; unfair and discriminatory commercial, consumer, and credit practices; and inadequate welfare practices.

As to why the civil disorder occurred, the Commission emphasized a few fundamentals, one of the most signifi-
cant being white racism. The Commission said that white racism was essentially responsible for the explosive mixture that had been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II. Blacks had been subjected to pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education, and housing.

A second cause was the black migration to and the white exodus from our major cities. Somehow, we had overlooked the fact that six million blacks were coming out of the South, moving in streams up through Richmond, Washington, Baltimore, Wilmington, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston; in the Middle West through Detroit into Cleveland and Chicago; and on the West Coast, largely into the Los Angeles section of Watts. The inability to recognize the migration factor was one of the really absurd consequences of our lack of observation.

A third cause had to do with the creation of black urban ghettos where segregation and poverty destroyed opportunity for the young and enforced failure. There we found men and women without jobs; families without men; schools where children were processed, not educated, until they returned to the streets to crime; drug addiction, dependency, welfare, bitterness, and resentment.

To this we must add television, which flaunted before the eyes of the inner city youth a world they could not enter. Finally, we must note that the great victories of the civil rights movement and the struggle for equal rights in the South had aroused great expectations that could not be realized. This led to frustration, hostility, and cynicism. Of course, there was much more, and it was all of this combined that made the role of the police so tough and so important.

Harlem, Watts, Newark, Detroit—all the major outbursts that the Commission studied—began with routine arrests by white police officers of blacks for minor offenses. What became clear during the study was that just below the surface there was a snake pit of often justifiable grievances, arising from widespread white attitudes and reflected in police action.

In 1967 and 1968, we unquestionably found an abrasive relationship between the largely white police and minority communities. However, to define the problem solely as hostility to the police is clearly wrong. In the inner city, the policeman is the symbol not only of law, but of the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice. He becomes the target for grievances against the entire system. With overcrowded courts, disparate sentences, antiquated correction facilities, inequities and all the rest—including white-society pressures on the police for order—the inner city resident too often sees the police as agents of repression and therefore defies an order maintained at the expense of justice as he sees it. And because other basic institutions are weakened or have failed—families, schools, churches—the police are required to fill the vacuum, and they are resented.

The police cannot solve these problems. In fact, they have themselves become victims. These are responsibilities that belong first to parents, then to mayors, city officials, and community leaders, and only ultimately to the states and the federal government. Yet, because the police in the inner city symbolize so much, it becomes their responsibility to address the grievances that flow from a sense of injustice, tension, and turmoil. The police are responsible for securing life and property, and they hold society's maximum power: discretion in the use of force. But effective law enforcement requires community support; it cannot be earned if the community regards the police as an occupying force.

The Kerner Commission proposed some obvious recommendations, which by now are probably routine requirements: ensure proper conduct by police officers; redress grievances against the police and other municipal employees; develop guidelines to help officers faced with complicated situations, enabling them to resolve them; and much more. And, as we see what has been happening over the last quarter century, it is essential that we have minorities throughout the police forces—and, of course, women.

To local officials, the Commission addressed a long series of other recommendations, including training for disturbances in the inner city; planning for quick mobilization of maximum police power; and the deployment of fully qualified senior commanders at the outbreak of disorders; and, of course, special training and preparations for riot control and operations in units that possess effective command-and-control and field communication.

Now, 25 years later, we are facing the heat of the summer, and the likelihood that the federal government will have found fresh funds is remote. So what can be done that will make a difference but will not require a great deal of money?

To begin, it is important to point out that conditions have changed in the last 25 years. Until now, I have used the term “blacks” in identifying the people most at risk in the inner cities. In the Kerner report we used the term “Negroes.” Today, I suppose we should speak of “African Americans.”

But today we must also take into account the millions of Latinos who have become major social and political factors in many states and communities. We also have
accepted as neighbors and for citizenship Asians from many countries. Besides Asians, immigration is continuing at a massive rate from Europe, including Eastern Europe, the states of the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. And finally, we have begun to recognize the responsibilities—if not to discharge them—for our Native Americans. In the inner city, all of these people are at risk.

And there have been other major developments. Twenty-five years ago we recognized the existence of a small but important and growing middle class of blacks. It was small but we saw what was happening. As a consequence of their own efforts and changes in laws, regulations, and priorities, they moved in substantial numbers from the inner cities to the suburbs, seeking a better life for their children and themselves. This has been a tremendous human accomplishment. But to those who remained behind, this accomplishment has meant a bitter, human loss. Many who remain deprived of potential leaders and role models are the poorest, the most helpless, the least healthy, the least educated, and the most at risk. They are the ones who remain within the inner city.

Further, as a result of this second black internal migration from inner city to suburb, the police in the inner cities are left with fewer potential allies and even more enemies. Drug money and private armies have given many with neither conscience nor pity almost unlimited power over lives and property. Drug users not only kill themselves but help bankrupt the health system.

And there is still another obvious change. Alcohol and drugs have long been accompaniments to misery but never to the extent that they are today. Drug distribution in some cases is being facilitated by the use of military-type weapons—automatic and semi-automatic handguns, rifles, and all the rest.

The final responsibility for dealing with the control of military-type weapons must rest with the federal government. I know something of what the Police Foundation and municipal police forces throughout the country have done in support of gun control. You are on the front line. It is most often you who are killed or maimed when these weapons are used. It is your families and your children who are left behind to mourn and to suffer. But I believe you do not fully use your power to encourage public opinion to exercise reasonable controls over weapon distribution.

The American public, I think, is coming to understand that the free and open sale of handguns and military-type weapons is simply inconsistent with the preservation of a free and democratic society. You, as individu-
on the night of July 27, 1967. In conclusion, I would like to cite it again. President Johnson said, "Let there be no mistake about it: The looting, arson, plunder and pillage that have occurred are not part of any civil rights protest. There is no American right to loot stores or to burn buildings or to fire rifles from the rooftops. That is crime, and crime must be dealt with forcefully and swiftly and certainly under law."

Then he continued: "But laws are only one answer. Another answer lies in the way our people respond to disturbances. There is a danger that the worst toll of this tragedy will be counted in the hearts of Americans in hatred, in insecurity, in violence, in heated words, which will not end the tragedy but prolong it. So let us acknowledge the tragedy, but let us not exaggerate it. Let us condemn the violent few, and let us remember that it is law-abiding Negro families who have really suffered most at the hands of the rioters. It is the responsible Negro citizens who most fervently and urgently need to share in America's growth and prosperity."

This is not the time to turn away from that goal. And for Americans other than rioters, especially for those of you in positions of public trust, LBJ had this message: "Yours is the duty to bring about a peaceful change in America. If your response to these tragic events is only business as usual, you invite not only disaster but dishonor."

The operative word in that message was "duty." In his final appeal, LBJ summarized much of what I have been trying to speak about. "Let us then act," he said, "in the Congress, in the city halls, and in every community so that this great land of ours may truly be one nation under God, with liberty and justice for all."

And the operative word in that last sentence is "act."
inner city black problems we have today.

Civil disorders in the United States are as American as apple pie. And, placed in the proper perspective, civil disorders are not really cause for a great degree of pessimism. We must not despair. We have new strategies. And it will be a long time before anyone discovers that our new and latest solutions to civil disorders are old and need to be made new again. We cannot cease trying because we realize we shall never solve all the problems. Remember, this is America, and America is a very young country. And only in America do we have this notion that if there is a problem, there must be a solution.

Most older societies in the world understand that there are problems to which there are perhaps no solutions. They understand that you just have to move forward in your time, place, and space and do the very best you can to address problems as they exist. But never let it be said that we should do nothing because we cannot do everything.

By now we should know—as professional criminologists, lawyers, and people engaged in law enforcement—that civil disorders are most frequently a reaction to some unanticipated action by police enforcers. This is true whether the spark is set off by an untrue rumor of police misconduct or not. In the 1940’s, Harlem erupted after a rumor started that a police officer had shot and killed a black woman on the street. In Watts, the rumor was that police officers were beating defenseless black youths. These stories, which usually grow out of unsubstantiated rumors and misunderstood police practices, are not the underlying cause for the civil disorders, but they are very often the spark that ignites them.

In the past, we have tried to control these precursors of civil disorders through repression, which just led to more rebellion. We have also tried “professionalism.” Remember Sergeant Friday, the Los Angeles police, and “Just the facts, ma’am.” That kind of approach only resulted in greater separation of the police from the public. Then after the Kerner Commission Report, we tried “public relations.” This was not a very nice phrase, so we called it “community relations,” which was really only a euphemism used to refer to relations with minority communities. Yet this effort merely resulted in creating a group of specialists, frequently resented by the people whom they were supposed to be helping and certainly rejected by the great body of police officers, who saw that they, and not the P.R. people, were engaged in real policing.

Now we are trying “community policing”—more properly called “problem-solving policing”—and, of course, in this we believe we at last have the solution to civil disorders. I do. Just as everything old is new again, I believe that this will work for a time, because I believe that most truths outside of the Bible are based on assumptions. So, if we make the assumption that problem-solving policing can work, and apply ourselves to this assumption, we will make it work—at least for a time.

We must use problem-solving policing—community policing—in coordination with organizations like the Police Foundation and some of the more progressive police departments, such as the New York Police Department. Already, we are well on our way toward developing a computer-assisted system to better predict the probable precursors of the next civil disorder, and toward establishing early intervention mechanisms to better prevent police responses that might precipitate a civil disorder or exacerbate an incipient civil disorder.

David Ginsburg set forth the three leading modern causes of civil disorders: police practices, unemployment and underemployment, and inadequate housing. We know that law enforcement will have a very limited effect on improving employment prospects or housing opportunities, even with problem-solving policing. Though some very meaningful steps have been taken in New York City, where Lee Brown has put community policing into full operation, there will always be limits. We do not control the building departments and those who have the funding sources to provide adequate housing.

However, there is an existing body of knowledge that can modify police practices. Some departments are already utilizing some of this knowledge to control police practices. Some departments are even controlling police practices without knowing that they have embarked on new designs and strategies.

The Police Foundation is attempting to integrate and implement this body of knowledge, assisted by computer technology, to better control police practices and to reduce the probability that police practices will precipitate or exacerbate civil disorder. Will we prevent all future
civil disorders? I do not think so. Can we reduce civil disorders? Maybe. Particularly if we listen to what Mr. Ginsburg has said and speak out, not only on gun control but on those other factors about which we can do very little, namely unemployment and inadequate housing.

I do not believe that bigots can be changed, but if bigotry is at the root of much of what happens to cause civil disorders, perhaps we should go back to the strategy of so-called "professionalism" in policing; that is, holding people strictly accountable for their actions, even if we cannot control their thinking.

Though civil disorder in one form or another has always been with us, one part of it has changed significantly: the amount of looting involved, which in turn has affected the prioritization of police response. The criticism the police have received for their response to looting has begun to shape their reactions when civil disorders begin to break out—because they know they will be criticized for days and weeks if they do not protect commercial and retail property.

As we look back at some of our more recent civil disorders, we may be seeing the beginning of a misdirection in how police chiefs are responding to riots. They may be placing too much emphasis on protecting their commercial strips, only to see, in at least a few instances, the spill-over from the commercial strips into areas where police are not deployed; this can have rather disastrous effects.

In sum, we have the means, the knowledge and the machinery available today to successfully address at least one of the key precipitating factors David Ginsburg spoke about—police practices—which can be brought under much tighter control than we have had in the past.

CIVIL DISORDERS: SOME DISPUTED STEREOTYPES AND ONE INDISPUTABLE FACT

Antony Pate
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 recently was fortunate enough to bump into Senator Bill Bradley, a former basketball star for the New York Knicks. He told me a story of a basketball game he played and lost. He said that after the loss, he was in the locker room with a couple of his teammates and some stranger walked in with a note, handed it to him, and left. Bradley opened the note and it said, "Dear Bill, I am very, very disappointed. I have never seen you perform so poorly. You are a disgrace. If you do not win the next game I will kill your dog."

"Now," Bill said, "I was taken aback. First of all, I was really let down at my own performance. I knew I had not done my best. But I was even more surprised that the man had his name and address on the note."

So Bradley went to the trouble to write this man a letter, which said, "Dear Mr. Jones, I feel just as bad—if not more so—about losing this game. I have my standards and I did not meet them, and I certainly plan to do better next time." He ended the note with, "P.S. I do not own a dog."

Exactly ten days later, a package arrived on Bradley's doorstep. Inside, he said, was the cutest puppy he had ever seen, and around its neck was a note saying, "Do not get too attached to this dog."

Bradley had told me this story in response to my expressions of frustration at having done so much research—and coming up with so much good information—on use of force for The Police Foundation and not being able to do anything with it, because the time just was not right.

He ended his dog story by saying, "That is the way you have got to feel about these findings. Do not get too attached to these findings because they may change, and you do not want to release those findings until you can be confident they are correct."

So, based on the advice of Senator Bradley, I will discuss the topic I have entitled, "Civil Disorders: Some Disputed Stereotypes and One Indisputable Fact." Now, just to set the stage:

On July 16, 1964, two weeks after Congress passed President Lyndon Johnson's Civil Rights Bill, a white police officer shot and killed a black teenager in New York
City. Two days later, following a rally protesting police brutality, a crowd marched through Harlem and demonstrated in front of the 28th Precinct Headquarters. The police tried to disperse the demonstrators but succeeded only in arousing them further. That evening, the first full-scale riots in two decades erupted in Harlem.

From July 18th to July 20th, blacks not only defied and attacked the police, but also assaulted white passersby and looted and burned neighborhood stores. Moderate black leaders, including such national figures as James Farmer and Bayard Rustin, pleaded with the rioters to return to their homes—to little avail.

In the meantime, the police department ordered all available personnel into Harlem to quell the rioting. On July 21st, order was finally restored. By then, however, the riots had spread to Bedford-Stuyvesant, the vast black ghetto in Brooklyn. It was not until July 23rd—with one dead, more than 100 injured, nearly 500 arrested, hundreds of buildings damaged, and millions of dollars of property destroyed—that both communities were brought under control.

A day later, riots broke out in Rochester, New York, after police arrested a black teenager outside a neighborhood dance. A crowd tried to free the prisoner, stoned the chief of police, and then rampaged through the ghetto, looting and burning for two days. This rioting, in what had previously been a peaceful city, was so widespread that Governor Nelson Rockefeller mobilized 1,000 National Guardsmen. Except for the relatively minor disturbances in Jersey City the following weekend, and in Elizabeth and Paterson, New Jersey, the next month passed without serious incident.

Then, on August 28, 1964, when it seemed as if the worst was over, riots erupted in Philadelphia after two patrol officers arrested a black woman for blocking traffic at a busy intersection. Intoxicated and apparently angry at her husband, she resisted. The police dragged her out of her car. A crowd quickly gathered, shouted abuse at the police officers, tossed stones and bricks at the reinforcements, and looted and burned nearby stores.

Again, despite the efforts of the Philadelphia police and the appeals of moderate black leaders, the rioting continued for two more nights, finally subsiding on August 31st—leaving two dead, more than 300 injured, and another 300 arrested.

These riots left many people appalled and perplexed: appalled, because the riots were used to discredit the vibrant civil rights movement, which was so strong at the time; perplexed, because blacks had probably made more progress in the two decades preceding the riots than at any time since Emancipation.

Whites were also bewildered because blacks were disavowing the principles and tactics of non-violent protest, applied so successfully by Martin Luther King and others in the South in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

Viewed in isolation, the 1964 riots showed no clear pattern. It was still conceivable as late as mid-1965 that these disorders were just one summer’s deviation from the mainstream of the civil rights movement. However, the Los Angeles riots of August 1965, which devastated the Pacific Coast’s largest black ghetto, proved that this was not to be the case.

The 1965 Los Angeles riot closely resembled the 1964 riots in that in Los Angeles, as in Rochester, an ordinary arrest triggered the rioting. There, too, the rioters looted and burned stores and assaulted police officers and passers-by; moderate black leaders tried but failed to restrain the rioters; and local police, and eventually the National Guard, eventually quelled the rioting.

However, the Los Angeles riots were the country’s worst racial disorder since the East St. Louis Massacre of 1917. By the time order was restored in Los Angeles, 34 persons were dead, more than 1,000 were injured, nearly 4,000 had been arrested, hundreds of buildings had been damaged, and tens of millions of dollars of property had been destroyed. Within days, Governor Edmund Brown appointed the McCone Commission to investigate the causes of this riot and to make suggestions about how to prevent a repetition of such bloodshed.

Although there were disturbances in Chicago and San Diego, the summer of 1965 was less tumultuous than the
summer of 1964, but so vast, awesome, devastating, and widely reported were the Los Angeles riots that there could be no doubt that a distinct pattern of summer violence was emerging in the black ghettos.

There were a number of steps the government took to try to quell these eruptions of violence, but none of the measures were designed to alleviate ghetto conditions—only to prevent severe disorders. And so it was with mounting apprehension that local and federal officials awaited the summer of 1966. That June, rioting erupted in Los Angeles, Chicago, and Cleveland. More than two dozen cities experienced riots in July and August, among them Omaha, Dayton, San Francisco, and Atlanta. The 1966 riots battered cities previously stricken and cities heretofore spared, cities believed to be tense and cities thought to be quiet. None of these matched the 1965 Watts riot in magnitude or intensity, but taken together they made the summer of 1966 the most violent yet.

By June 1967, other riots had erupted in Nashville, Cleveland, and Boston, and most Americans—white and black—expected another turbulent summer. Yet the riots that erupted that summer in Cincinnati, Buffalo, Newark, Detroit, and Milwaukee, to again list only a few of the flashpoints, far exceeded their worst expectations. Indeed, the Detroit riots, which left 43 dead, more than 1,000 injured, more than 7,000 arrested, and at least $50 million of property destroyed, were the worst riots since the Civil War draft riots in New York City.

On July 28, 1967, President Johnson appointed another commission, an Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders headed by Governor Otto Kerner. By the end of that summer, city officials, federal administrators, editors—people of all stripes—were trying to explain why these riots were happening. Yet wherever criticism was directed and however blame was apportioned, one conclusion was clear: The Los Angeles, Newark, and Detroit riots had assumed a place in the history of American race relations no less important than the East St. Louis, Chicago, and Washington riots of a generation before.

Many other riots, including those in Miami and Los Angeles, have occurred subsequently. We had a brief quiescent period, but we now know that the long hot summer may very well again be upon us.

There is no agreement among whites and blacks or liberals and conservatives about where responsibility for these riots lies, nor is there agreement among the individuals within those groups themselves. There is, however, substantial agreement that the riots that began in the 1980's culminated in those of 1992, and their likelihood in the future continues to present America with a tremendous threat to public order. Therefore, it is important that we learn as carefully as possible the lessons of the last several years. It is also important that we assure that those lessons are based on solid research, and not stereotypes based on our own biases.

Briefly, I would like to go through a few stereotypes and the evidence I think calls these stereotypes into question.

Stereotype number one: Civil disorders are a rare phenomenon. As Benjamin Ward has already mentioned, civil disorders are as old as history itself. America—born in revolution and requiring a bloody civil war to bring an end to the institution of slavery—has been plagued by violence and riots throughout its history. As the work of the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions have made clear, riots have been a recurring feature of our civic life, whether they involve Protestants against Catholics, Irish against English, labor against management, or, most often, whites against blacks.

A staff report of the Eisenhower Commission plotted out violent events since the beginning of the United States, and it shows very clearly that although the violence of the late 1960's was somewhat higher than that of earlier periods, it was only marginally higher.

In fact, police departments as we know them today were actually created specifically to deal with riots in the South. They were created to deal with slave rebellions, and in the North they were created to deal with disorders and riots in our major cities. However, it is important to point out that the nature of the riots we have experienced recently is quite different from that of previous eras.

There was a series of vicious race riots between 1829 and 1840, and again in 1880. The greatest number occurred during and just after the First World War, in response to the tremendous migration of blacks to the North. In 1919 alone, there were riots in 26 cities. These riots reached one peak around World War I in East St. Louis, Washington, and Chicago, and another peak during World War II in Detroit and Los Angeles, only to subside and then reignite again in the 1960's.

At first glance, the earlier race riots resemble those of the 1960's, 1980's, and 1991. For example, blacks played a prominent role in both times of disorder—and so did excitement, rumor, violence, death, and destruction. Nevertheless, a closer examination of the early riots reveals them to be very different from the more recent ones. Though I do not have the time to go into great detail on that point, the fact is that though we have gone through a number of different types and stages of riots,
throughout our history riots have been a continuous phenomenon, one that has kept the police on the frontline.

Stereotype number two: Disorders are irrational activities and incited by outsiders. Make no mistake about it; if you accept this stereotype there are significant political ramifications that stem from it. If politicians or police can convince themselves that riots are meaningless outbursts, rather than revolts based on underlying causes, politicians and police excuse themselves from blame for the causes of the rioting and are thus relieved of the pressure to alleviate long-standing problems in the areas where these riots are occurring.

This stereotype is untenable, not only because no social phenomenon is meaningless, but also because a closer look at the historical context of riots reveals that for three-and-a-half centuries Americans have resorted to violence in order to reach goals otherwise unattainable: whites assaulted blacks in Washington and Chicago in 1919; Protestants attacked Catholics in Boston in 1834; vigilantes lynched lawbreakers in San Francisco in 1856; mobs massacred Wobblies in Washington in 1919.

Indeed, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the U.S.-born white majority has rioted in some way and at some time against nearly every minority group in America. Yet most Americans regard rioting not only as illegitimate, but even more significantly as a "minority problem."

It is true that nowhere did rioters prepare a formal statement of their grievances. Whatever one understands "Burn Baby Burn" to mean—the slogan of the Watts riot—or "No Justice, No Peace," the anthem of last year's riot in Los Angeles, they are not clearly articulated political agendas. Whatever the meaning of the riots, it must be sought in the rioting and the rioters themselves—something even sympathetic observers might have trouble finding. But here again we are fortunate to have the Kerner Commission, the Eisenhower Commission, the Webster Commission, and all of the other inquiries into the meaning and causes of our urban riots. The meaning is there, but only if the riots are viewed as violent protests.

With startling consistency those reports found that the most frequent grievances, in descending order of importance, were: police practices, unemployment, inadequate housing, poor schools, poor recreation facilities—all points that have been mentioned earlier. That rioters perceived there to be such a message is indicated by a conversation that Bayard Rustin and Martin Luther King, Jr. had while walking around Watts during the riots.

A young man said to Rustin and King, "You know, we won." Rustin asked what he meant and the man said, "They finally listened to our manifesto."

Rustin then asked what the young man meant by "manifesto."

"Would you mind letting Dr. King and me see a copy of it?" he asked.

The man pulled out a match box, lit a single match, and said "Daddy, that is our manifesto: Burn Baby Burn."

Rustin said, "But you still have not told us how you won."

"Well, I will tell you how we won, man. For years we have been telling these white folks peacefully what we needed. We asked them to come and talk to us. They did not come. But after our manifesto, the mayor, the governor, you, and even Dr. King came."

Now, Rustin saw this as sad, but sad with a message. His conclusion: Watts was a warning and an appeal. If a few blacks get drunk and go berserk, that is criminal behavior; but if an entire community goes berserk, it signals the presence of a social sickness that has sprung from social germs. It is not surprising that we do not all see these problems or understand this manifesto. Even Martin Luther King himself did not see them until he walked the streets of Watts.

King, who was on his way to Puerto Rico for a vacation, decided he had to see the devastation for himself. After spending several hours walking the streets with Bayard Rustin, he told Bayard that his visit had brought home to him for the first time the material and spiritual desolation that shattered the lives of the millions of black citizens trapped in America's ghettos. And, according to Rustin, King said, "I will never forget the discussion we had that night." King, Rustin said, "was absolutely undone, and he looked at me and he said, you know Bayard, I work to get these people the right to hamburgers and now I have got to do something to help them to get the money to buy them."

Rustin had been telling King for almost two years that the most serious issues facing the civil rights movement were economic problems of class rather than race, but on this evening Rustin sensed that the day's experiences had finally convinced King of the truth of that analysis. "That struck Martin very deeply," Rustin has written. "I think it was the first time he really understood."

Stereotype number three: Disorders are joined by few and repudiated by the rest. I have alluded to this third stereotype in my earlier discussion, and just as with stereotype number two, this stereotype is also heavily laden with political consequences. If we can convince ourselves that riots are perpetuated by only a small number of criminal types, we can focus on arresting those types
without addressing the wide variety of problems identified by the various commissions we have talked about today.

The McCone Commission, based on only impressionistic evidence, estimated that only 2 percent of the Watts population participated in the 1967 riots, and that the rest of the community opposed their actions. However, looking at approximately a dozen different riots, and the data that has been generated from surveys, interviews, and arrest reports, we have concluded, number one, that instead of the 2 percent that was estimated by the McCone Commission, anywhere from 11 to 45 percent of the community in the distressed areas actually participated in the riot and, in fact, that anywhere from 30 to 51 percent of the community felt sympathy for the rioters—not that they thought it was a good thing, but they thought the rioters were expressing a point of view that they too held.

Although there may be debate about the validity of the stereotypes I have discussed, there is one indisputable fact: Police action or perceived police misconduct has been involved in many, if not most, of the civil disorders of both the earlier and the recent variety. The two-day Harlem riot of 1964 was set off by the shooting of a black teenager by a New York City police officer. The best estimates are that police actions were involved in precipitating at least 84 of the 136 major riots in the 1960's.

The 1980 Miami riot stemmed from allegations of police brutality in the McDuffy case. And we hardly need to be reminded of the controversial arrest of Rodney King, which eventually led to last year's riot in Los Angeles.

In closing, let me just say that things are not that bleak. In fact, there are a number of recommendations that were made by various commissions about improving police behavior and performance accountability. One of the recommendations of the various commission reports has been that police departments increase minority employment. The goal would be to have proportionately as many blacks in the police department as are represented in the city at large. Generally, the numbers have been going up in police departments, to the point now where most of these agencies are at least at the .5 or even almost .8 level—with 1.0 meaning that the department has exactly the same number of blacks, proportionately, as in the city they serve.

I hasten to add, however, that the one city that has a perfect 1.0 representativeness index is Los Angeles. So, though this may be a desirable goal, it is certainly not sufficient. In looking at similar data for Hispanic police representation, the increase has not been quite so dramatic, but nevertheless in most departments it has in fact gone up. And, in those few places where the representativeness indices are down—in Los Angeles and Houston, for example—we are told that there have been hiring freezes or layoffs, which accounts for much of the downward change.

In any case, a lot of other positive developments in policing have already been addressed. Community policing, for example, is clearly a very effective method of dealing with excessive force and bad relationships between the police and the community. And a number of use-of-force policies have been changed around the country.

After serving on the 1969 Violence Commission, U.S. District Judge A. Leon Higginbotham proposed a national moratorium on any additional temporary study commissions to probe the cases of racism, poverty, crime or the urban crisis. He said that the rational response to the work of the great commissions of recent years is not the appointment of still more commissions to study the same problems but rather the prompt implementation of their many valuable recommendations.

In ending I would like to note that a few days before he died, Martin Luther King said, "A riot is the language of the unheard." I hope today that we are listening to that language.
A MATTER OF TRUST: POLICE AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY

Arthur Fletcher
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Professor of Business Administration and Director, International Institute for Corporate Social Policy, University of Denver

My grandson helped me understand the uniqueness of this conference when I told him I was going to speak here.

He said, "What do you mean, Grandpa?"

I said, "I am going to speak about 400 or 500 chiefs of police."

He said, "You mean you're running with them in front, instead of in front of them for a change?"

I said, "It is not quite like that."

And then he went into a rap number: "Grandpa Fletcher, sure under pressure! He going to the Hyatt, to see if he can get the cops to buy it."

I said, "That is enough, Tina. That is enough."

Normally, before I get into what I think are going to be substantive remarks, I like to identify myself, make sure people understand what I perceive myself to be at this stage of my life. As you have just heard, I am a grandfather. Let me raise my head and say I am also a great-grandfather. Are there any great-grandparents in the audience? Any grandparents? Parents?

Let me say it another way. Are there parents here with youngsters who are toddlers, from one year to three years of age? Or parents with youngsters in elementary school—first grade through the sixth grade? Parents with youngsters who are in the seventh through the ninth grade? And parents with youngsters who are in high school, tenth through the twelfth?

And how about anyone in here with someone in a community college or a four-year institution of higher learning?

Finally, is there anyone here who is struggling to help somebody get through graduate school?

Now, let me ask that all of you who had your hand up at any time, please raise it again? Look around the room.

As we look, we recognize what we have in common: black hands, white hands, Hispanic hands, female hands, male hands. We are all responsible for a human life. Some of us are responsible for several of them.

Your mission is to help create an environment in which those human lives cannot only be safe but allowed to develop, to experience their full potential, and then an environment in which they can pursue that potential, whatever it might be. If anyone is at the cutting edge of change, it is you.

And if there is anyone whose mission is not quite well understood, it is yours. People know very, very little about how you go about securing your community.

I would like to speak a little about my assignment as deputy assistant for urban affairs in the White House, because I think it will have a direct impact on the rest of my remarks.

I got that assignment because New York City was going broke. Back in the 1970's, New York City was about to go down the drain. The federal government had just loaned Chrysler some money. We had also bailed out Lockheed. So the people of New York City decided that since the government was in a bailout mood, they would go down and see if Washington would bail out their city.

President Ford asked me if I would come over and head a task force to look at why New York City went bankrupt so that he could determine whether the federal government had a responsibility of any kind.

I agreed, and began to do the research. Of course we found out that the federal government had indeed had an impact. Some good economic policy legislation had had a horrible social consequence. For your information, that economic development legislation was the Interstate Highway Act that was passed in the 1950's, during the Eisenhower presidency.

The Interstate Highway Act made it possible to go from New York to San Francisco, supposedly, without hitting a stop sign. We were supposed to be able to do that on highways going east and west across the United States and highways going north and south, up to the Canadian border.

The reason for that legislation was that during World War II or shortly thereafter, the federal government discovered that Detroit could build six million cars a year and sell them—but we did not have highways. What we had then was what we called farm-to-market growth. At that point, we had the too-little-too-late blacktop highways, with six million people able to buy six million cars.

Finally, a decision was made to expand the size of the highways, which resulted in passage of the Interstate Highway Act.

As a consequence of that one bill and the building of those highways, one could see the change in America's culture. And, I might add, if you go back and do some research with respect to the police profession, the highway
nomic development banks in the inner city, a proposal set of bleak economic circumstances exists today. If we step toward creating security, stability, and prosperity in super highways. economic opportunity into the inner city. Yet the same dedicated to America and the American way. I have said the minute you take up that role and decide that this, creating an environment where there can be prosperity. The minute you take up that role and decide that this, too, is a part of your assignment, we have taken a giant step toward creating security, stability, and prosperity in those communities.

Granted, that is going to be a tough mountain to climb, not least because of the lack of trust between the minority communities and law enforcement.

I have felt for some time that the security community—to this I will add chiefs of police—has doubts as to whether black Americans and other minority Americans, particularly non-white, minority Americans, were truly dedicated to America and the American way. I have said this several times from public platforms and, afterward, in private conservations, members of those communities ask, “Are you telling us that this country does not trust us? After being involved in every struggle for freedom, they still do not trust us?”

Well, the Commercial Appeal validated this assumption, in an article about how the United States Army openly spied on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. It would be enough if that particular issue focused on one specific incident, but it actually reported on the instruments that the United States Army Intelligence put in place to keep us—African Americans—under control. According to this article, this intelligence service was at one time so desperate and fearful it actually gave sniper rifles to the Ku Klux Klan.

My point is that they are making your job hard when they do that. For me, someone who believes in the American promise and who has benefitted from it to a considerable degree, it makes it difficult to say to youngsters, “Keep on keeping on, son. That is not the way folks really feel.”

Let me move on to one other point, and quickly discuss the Civil Rights Commission. The commission was thus established to look at voting rights violations, housing rights violations, employment rights violations, public accommodation rights violations and business opportunity rights violations.

The NAACP finally convinced the government that it needed an agency to study the problem before it could write legislation. The United States Civil Rights Commission was thus established to look at voting rights violations, housing rights violations, employment rights violations, public accommodation rights violations and business opportunity rights violations.

We at the Commission have no enforcement powers. Our job is to go into the field and investigate the extent to which laws are being violated, and then make recommendations in the following several areas.

If we issue a statutory report, it is then used to write new laws, regulations or rules. We have just issued one on
violence, called “Racial and Ethnic Tensions in American Communities: Poverty, Inequality and Discrimination.” Volume number one of the statutory report is about the Mt. Pleasant uprising in that Washington, D.C., Hispanic community. Its purpose is to inform city government of the new ordinances, rules, regulations, and guidelines they must put in place or ones they need to enforce if they are already on the books.

In addition, this report is to be used by Congress for writing new immigration legislation or whatever is needed to improve and enhance the ability of Hispanics, in this instance, to enjoy a full measure of U.S. democracy. I might add that we just issued another one on Asians, the first that has ever been issued.

How popular are our reports? Normally, it takes us eight years to distribute 10,000 copies of a requested report. We distributed the Asian report in two months. We are having to reprint another 20,000 copies of them—that is how big the demand is. With regard to the Hispanic report, which has also been very popular, we stated that the Mt. Pleasant uprising started because of flawed police-community relations. You should know that we have SAC’s—State Advisory Committees—and as of this hour, each of the 50 states’ SAC’s are looking into three areas: police-community relations, education, and economic opportunity for depressed neighborhoods.

With that said, I am finding as I speak off the record to black firemen, black policemen, Hispanic policemen, female firemen, Hispanic firemen—occasionally some of them have guts enough to tell me on the record—that there is one common complaint. I have always maintained that you cannot send a law enforcement person into the streets to create an environment where commerce can take place when that law enforcement individual is being maltreated inside the agency that he or she works for.

Let me be very specific. I have been told, “I am being bypassed after I measure up to all the standards, pass all the tests, have an excellent performance rating. After all that, when it is promotion time I get bypassed, then I have to go out and try to maintain peace and tranquility.” I hear the same complaints when I go abroad to talk to blacks, whites, and Hispanics in the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force.

I am 68 years old, and what bothers me about this is that I thought—many in my generation thought—that when we pushed for Hispanic, black, and female police representation, we would improve the instrument that delivered security. I hate to say it, but at all our hearings on police-community relations, our dream of an enhanced quality of service is fractured, if not non-existent.

There are many reasons for this, but some we have found to be key are that minority law enforcement officers often do not want to go into the areas they were recruited from to police those communities, and that minority law enforcement officers are too quick to adapt to the status quo, rather than having an impact that would change the status quo and reflect the subcultures they represent.

In sum, we hope to be able to work together to develop a strategic alliance between minority officers, their law enforcement mission, and the people in the neighborhoods that they are supposed to protect.
NO LONGER A BLACK-WHITE EQUATION: THE KOREAN AMERICAN FACTOR IN RACE RELATIONS

Angela Oh
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I want to begin by saying that I am really not the spokesperson for the Korean American community in Los Angeles, and in fact I am probably every Korean American parent's nightmare of a daughter.

I identify myself as being a second generation Korean American, which means my parents immigrated here in the early 1950's and I was born here. My parents were among an early wave of immigrants that came to this country and they have, as a result, a qualitatively different perspective on how we begin to participate as newcomers to a land we have decided to make our home.

That said, I would now like to share some information about Los Angeles. It is a community that should be viewed as a testing ground and a place from which many communities can learn valuable lessons. We paid a high price for our knowledge. In last year's disorder, Korean Americans in particular had to painfully bear witness to what happens when violence meets vengeance and there is no vision.

The riot was not a surprise for any of us who have been active in the community, dealing with the physical and human infrastructure challenges that exist in every major U.S. city in a growth pattern. We knew, for instance, that one of the key problems in our community had to do with the LAPD and then-Police Chief Daryl Gates. He did not have the confidence of the community. He lost it due not only to the way he was training his officers but to the way he conducted himself when the public rightly questioned things that were going on in the department. His reaction was complete and utter indignation—meaning complete and utter disregard for the legitimate concerns of the community he was there to serve.

The mentality of Chief Gates was frightening, particularly for any African American male between the ages of 14 and 25. They did not want to be on the street after dark, especially in certain parts of Los Angeles.

The data from a group called Police Watch, which receives complaints about the police department and other law enforcement agencies, tells us that in 1990 there were over 2,600 complaints about police brutality and misconduct in the Los Angeles area. About 616 of those complaints had to do with the LAPD, and these cases were mostly about the use of excessive force. There were also some problems related to canine units.

But by October 1991, the numbers told us that there were more than 2,425 complaints against the LAPD alone, and by that point the city had already paid out $13 million in settlement claims related to police misconduct cases. Clearly, the city had a problem.

The institution in which I have chosen to direct my talent, energy and experience—the criminal justice system—also failed our community in a major way. Everyone focuses on the beating case of Rodney King, but there was another case that helped ignite the city in April of 1992, and that was People vs. Du, a case in which a Korean American store owner was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, with the victim being a 15-year-old African American teenager. The Korean American received probation, a fine, and was told to do 500 hours of community service.

I am in the criminal courts building every day, and I must honestly say that, as a criminal defense lawyer, when the reporters first started calling me about this sentence, my reaction was that I did not believe it. I just did not believe that she received a straight probationary sentence, particularly since there was an 11-year state prison term that was pronounced but subsequently suspended.

My second reaction was, “Damn! How come I cannot get those kinds of results for my clients?”

Then, my third reaction was, “Uh-oh, there are going to be major problems here.”

There was not a riot in response to this particular ruling, but one must understand that the two incidents were very close in time. The verdict on Du happened about March 3, 1991; Rodney King was videotaped on March 16, 1991. The first case traveled through the system much more quickly.

Now, let me tell you a little bit about the community I
have come to know very well—the Korean American community. I must begin by saying, in all candor, however, that this is not the community in which I came up—in other words, in which I developed my perspective about what this country has to offer its citizens. I came up in the women’s movement. That is how I began to challenge some of my culture’s stereotypes regarding females—that you are quiet, that you do not act too smart because nobody will ever want to hang around with you, that you do not waste your time pursuing your intellectual interests because you are never going to get anywhere, that your role is to be a mother. First, you would be a good daughter, then you would be a good wife, then you would be a good mother, and then you would be a good daughter-in-law; that is your role as a woman.

It took a lot to break through that, and the women’s movement helped me do it.

Then I got involved in labor issues, and I worked with the Federated Firefighters of California in Sacramento for two-and-a-half years doing worker health and safety education, teaching firefighters about their right to know what hazardous materials they are exposed to on the job, that there are options to protect themselves, that if they do not have personal protective equipment made available, that they can mobilize politically to get it. Because in the 1980’s it was not about broken backs and cut-off fingers and lost arms and legs; it was about cancer, mutagens and teratogens creating deformed children, respiratory disease that over time took away their capacity to breathe. Those were the stakes. It was hard to convince people that things they could not see, feel, or touch were worth working on, but I did learn about justice and power differentials through the labor movement.

I also learned about the importance of these issues through my work with the environmental movement. I canvassed Northern California, talking to people about the fact that if we do not care about the quality of our lives—the air, the water, the communities in which we live—none of this other stuff matters, because we will not be around long enough for it to matter.

Now, after all of that, I found myself confronted with the riots in April of 1992 in Los Angeles. Someone taps me on the shoulder and says, “Angela, we need somebody to articulate for this community what has happened here and how it was that we sustained $400 million worth of damage out of the $750 million that the entire city sustained. You need to explain to people that we are not greedy, money mongering, selfish, rude, discourteous people on the whole. We did not even know that the Rodney King beating trial was that significant in the community’s consciousness.”

It is true. Most of the Korean small-business people were really not that focused on the trial proceedings, and they truly were caught off guard when the anger exploded in their faces and their lives were destroyed. And, as with a burn victim, their period of recovery has been much more excruciating than the burning, the looting, the arson, the vandalism that physically removed everything from them and their hopes and their dreams and all their hard work. The police departments are saying, “We are going to take care of you,” but nobody believes they are going to be taken care of. That is why you read the stories about firearms being purchased.

I am not an advocate of having guns. In fact, I was, until April of 1992, an advocate of gun control. But when you are a small-business person and you have called the local police department for assistance 20 times and they tell you, “Yeah, we will be there,” and they are not, you just go ahead and do what you need to do. That is why you had people who had guns.

I was on the street on April 30th in Los Angeles. I drove into Koreatown because a friend represents one of the plazas in the Koreatown area and his client called, panicked because the private security people he had there wanted to leave. There were droves of people—and by the way, they were not African Americans in Koreatown, but for the most part Latinos and young whites.

I know that the images across the country showed black youths and black faces on the screen as being the source of the problem. That is not a true picture of what happened.

South Central is a mix of about 50 percent Latino, 50 percent African American. But again, even the pictures in South Central show only African Americans engaged in the kind of activity we are all here talking about and trying to prevent.

As I drove through the streets, I saw women, children, grandmothers; I saw pregnant women in the streets. This was not just about going and tearing things up. This was about people, the working poor, who did not have assets, who did not feel a stake in their community, who did not feel any connection to or faith in those systems that were supposed to be there to serve them.

So where do we go from here? Let me tell you what I think we can learn from what happened in Los Angeles.

Number one, in large urban centers it is not a black-white equation anymore; it is multi-ethnic. Look at Los Angeles and you will see 30 percent non-Hispanic white, 13 percent African American, 10 percent Asian-Pacific islanders, and 40 percent Hispanic. We have a new
majority in Los Angeles, and I will venture a guess that in large urban centers across this country we will see similar changes, and we will need to be sensitive to what that means.

In preparation for the new verdicts in the King case, I found that there was no line dedicated to 911 emergency services for Korean-speaking people, and we know that they are targets. In the seven weeks prior to this latest trial, we have seen 13 small-business people victims of gunshot. Five are dead; seven have survived. One was an 11-year-old child.

Before this year, the data told us that in the last 15 years there were 38 deaths among Korean small-business people. When we compare this information with the most recent data, it tells those of us in the Korean American community that we could be targets too. When we look at the facts from the last crisis in Los Angeles, we can see that we were indeed targets.

So, when asked to make an educated guess about what might happen if there is another situation that gets out of control, we believe we will be targets. As a consequence, people are arming themselves.

And, by the way, mainstream media does not pick up the stories we hear in the Korean language press and media every day—about another gunshot incident, another assault. One of my very own board members in the Korean American Bar Association of Southern California has parents who own a dry cleaning establishment in South Central Los Angeles. His mother was stabbed in the face two weeks ago and his father was assaulted.

Over and over again I hear these kinds of stories. The Korean American community gets information that the mainstream press does not. So, if you in law enforcement have community relations officers, you need to use them to cultivate information sources to gauge the temperature of the Korean American community.

We have been doing the best we can to work with the LAPD. We are driving through the high-risk areas of our city, South Central in particular, identifying by address those stores that remain standing and dropping off what we call a "community network tool," which has the telephone numbers of all the local emergency assistance agencies. It also has several community organizations and agency numbers for non-emergency questions and inquiries or requests for assistance.

We are organizing our own volunteer pool, which can be sent out to help people with food and transportation if they need to get out. And we are urging people to contact folks in the neighborhood and exchange phone numbers, so that if it comes to a point where it is time to leave, they will have a person with whom they can have some communication about how things are at their business location.

We are having to be creative. And I am asking you, as the leadership in your law enforcement agencies, to be creative too. We all suffer from having too few resources.

In Los Angeles, the ratio of law enforcement officers to population is dismal. As a consequence, we have to be creative about how we use the resources we have. The old model of law enforcement, which talked about random, direct patrolling, retrospective investigations, and rapid response activity, is out-modeled. It is not going to work in the cities of the future. There is not enough money to maintain that kind of strategy.

In my community I am doing the best that I can to connect people to our agencies. Your part in this will be to get some data about the changing nature of your community, the direction it is going, and then try to be visionary. You are in a position of being able to do that. The community, whether they say it or not, expects that of you.

In closing, I would say that despite all of the tragedy and the pain, I remain hopeful. It is not a hope that comes out of being an idealist or refusing to see the challenges ahead. It is a hope based on the fact that I have met some incredible people who have made very clear to me that they are not leaving the picture. They have committed themselves to making a society that works for everybody, a society based on principles that we can all relate to, no matter what color, religion, age, sex—dignity, equality, opportunity, and the right to be respected in the pursuit of those principles.
EFFECTIVE POLICE RELATIONS WITH THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY

Mario Moreno
Regional Counsel, Mexican-American Defense & Educational Fund, Washington, D.C.

I am from Texas, and although I have been here in Washington for 10 years, there is still some Texas in me. And while I was listening to the other rather impressive speakers, I remembered a story about these two cows that were out in the middle of a pasture chewing their cud. A milk truck raced down the country road, followed by a trail of smoke. The side of the truck said “Milk Pasteurized, Homogenized, Vitamin A, D Added.” One cow turns to the other and says, “Makes you feel a bit inadequate, doesn’t it?”

That is the feeling that I had while I was listening to these speakers. I am a Latino. Some people call us Hispanics, or a multitude of other different names. We come from different countries in this hemisphere.

I am part of an ethnic group that is one of the largest and youngest in the United States, and the fastest growing. By the year 2010, demographers tell us, we will be the largest minority in the country. We are mainly concentrated in the Southwest and in the West, but are very rapidly migrating to other parts of the United States. Cities and regions are coming to grips with the baggage that we carry as we go.

As an Hispanic, I have a large group of brethren that are limited English-proficient. In fact, that holds true for my family. My parents still speak just a little bit of English, though they have been in the United States for quite some time.

There are segments within my community—recent immigrants from Central and South American countries—who have a deep suspicion of government and authority, who know that, in the old countries, a knock on the door by the government is something very serious, and who know that you get in a lot of trouble and sometimes you get killed as a result.

So they come to this country and they have to acculturate and assimilate into a system where the government has a different role than it did in the countries from which they came.

In my community, there are many families of mixed documentation status. Some of them are undocumented, some of them are documented, but all may live in the same household. In fact, in the urban areas there are often two or three families living in the same apartment or house with different documentation statuses. This poses yet another problem for law enforcement officials.

And there are other cultural idiosyncrasies we bring, although the language barrier is one of the central problems law enforcement officials face. The Mount Pleasant riots in Washington, D.C., were primarily triggered by the inability of the officer involved in the incident to effectively communicate with the person that she was trying to bring under control.

We have to understand that law enforcement is brought in, whether in Mount Pleasant or Los Angeles, to deal with a symptom of a much deeper problem.

The problem that exhibits this symptom of civil unrest is something law enforcement cannot do anything about—lack of housing, lack of educational opportunities, lack of jobs, lack of access to the political system. It is a powder keg. Incidents like the Mount Pleasant riot, where one individual is wounded, not killed, by a police officer can thus cause many nights of unrest.

After the riot, the District of Columbia had to come to grips with the fact that it was ill-prepared to deal with such a crisis. It did not have any communication with the community; it did not know who the leaders were within the Hispanic community; it did not know whom to contact, with whom to deal, with whom to negotiate with. It tried to handle the crisis with force alone, and, as we know, the situation got quite out of hand.

As Latinos and Hispanics, what we ask of law enforcement is basically that which other people take for granted. In many cases, it seems that the civil and constitutional rights of individuals expire right at the borders of our neighborhood. We are not afforded those constitutional rights that we, as citizens of the United States, should have. There is a lack of respect, which, I believe, is one of the major problems.

The other problem is that, in many cases, we do not have any place to go within the system. In many cities there is not a credible structure where one can take complaints, with the hope of getting some sort of redress. Either the complaint falls into a black hole, the person is discouraged from bringing it, or there is such a delay that any resolution seems only distantly related to the complaint.

Another problem my community faces is the distrust for government and authority that they have brought with them from their native countries, as I mentioned earlier. In some instances, they are reluctant to go to the government with any sort of complaint; even if they do go, limited English-proficiency may preclude officials from
understand what they are saying.

I did not speak English when I got to the first grade. I was monolingual, Spanish-speaking. We were divided up in class and put into two separate rows of seats: the Spanish-speaking group sat on one side, everyone else on the other. After the teacher explained to everybody else what the assignment was, she turned to us and she talked louder and slower, but it did not make any difference because we did not know what she was saying. It was very difficult to get engaged in an educational system that did not lend itself to your needs.

I have a nine-year-old child that lives with me in Mount Pleasant. So I am speaking not only from the perspective of the Hispanic and Latino community, and as a civil rights advocate, but also as a parent. What I do not want to happen in the aftermath of the Mount Pleasant incident is for law enforcement officials to come into my neighborhood and enforce laws differently than they do in other parts of the city, for fear of starting another riot. That is not the answer.

The answer is not the isolation of our communities. The answer is to restructure the law enforcement mechanism in such a way as to accommodate the particular problems we have—one being language. Law enforcement officers can either take Spanish, which would help you in travels in this hemisphere, or you can hire minority Spanish-speaking officers to work within your department. Diversity within a system adds to its credibility. As an Hispanic, seeing Hispanic officers in my neighborhood adds to the credibility of that system for me. I think it would also improve community relations within the police department and in the neighborhoods that it patrols.

Such departmental additions are tough, given budget constraints. I know the federal government has cut the monies it allots to states and localities, so many are looking toward increasing taxes in order to provide these innovative programs that may not be needed in other parts of the country. That said, we are talking about the constitutional rights of individuals. If someone is a U.S. citizen, but cannot speak English well enough to communicate with people, this country has an obligation to protect that person's constitutional rights by enforcing the law in a language that he or she understands.

AN AFRICAN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES

Wade Henderson

Director, Washington Bureau, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

I have been asked to provide what was characterized as "an African American perspective on crime and criminal justice issues." I am not entirely certain I am the most appropriate person to provide that assessment, though I do indeed represent the NAACP, which is the oldest and largest civil rights organization in the nation. We at the NAACP recognize that many in the African American community hold a wide variety of views on the criminal justice debate, and I will attempt to offer only those that reflect the positions of the association.

One of the founding members of the NAACP, the great sociologist Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, wrote a book in 1904 entitled "The Souls of Black Folk," in which he coined a phrase that has turned into one of the defining issues of the NAACP in the 84 years of its existence. He said that the issue of race would be the "color line" issue of the 20th century. And, as we look back at our history, we see that on the question of law enforcement in particular, race has been a very significant factor. Perhaps this fact helps explain African American attitudes toward law enforcement, which have been marked historically by a kind of ambivalence.

On one hand, African Americans, like all other Americans, want the kind of meaningful and fair law enforcement and protection from crime that every other citizen wants. And yet, because of race, there is a pervasive fear in the African American community that encounters, even casual encounters, with representatives of the law enforcement community can lead to other incidents—sometimes violence, sometimes death. This fear distorts the willingness of persons in our community to avail themselves of the protection they want.

No one can deny that police officers have a tough job, and those of us in the African American community are well aware of that fact. When you need a police officer, when you want a police officer, you are pleased to see them show up,
regardless of color and in spite of any fear that you may have that the incident could in fact lead to something else.

Nonetheless, that general attitude of fear and that history of violent experience has continued to affect the way our community perceives the law enforcement community.

The discussion here has focused indirectly on the recent disturbances in Los Angeles, and I was therefore reminded about how incidents with individual police officers have over the past three decades triggered many of the social disturbances that we have characterized as riots in this country. This is an issue of great importance, and one with which this conference is trying to grapple.

At the same time, there is a sense in the African American community that crime is becoming a national dilemma, not just an isolated racial issue. Because of this, we at the NAACP believe it is critically important for the civil rights community to begin addressing in a very serious way the growing and disproportionate number of African Americans who are victimized by crime, as well as the high incidence of African Americans, particularly young African American males, who are ensnared in the criminal justice system.

For some time now, the NAACP has recognized that it needs to move well beyond a mere recitation of socioeconomic data on the disparities between blacks and other groups with respect to their involvement in the criminal justice system. We must actually begin in an affirmative way to emphasize changes in policy and in legislation that address some of the most pressing issues faced by our community and by the country as a whole.

This is part of what we believe to be an affirmative, comprehensive agenda on law enforcement and criminal justice issues that takes into account some of the historical realities that continue to shape how our community responds to the problem of crime. But this agenda also establishes points of common interest where we, through our organization, hope to work more closely with those in the law enforcement community.

I would now like to outline several of those issues, in an attempt to establish a dialogue.

Of first and foremost concern to me personally and to the association as a whole is concern about handgun-related violence. In Washington, D.C., alone, we have seen some 450 more-or-less innocent civilians victimized by gun-related violence over the last three years.

Recently, Conchita Campfield, a 15-year-old African American honor student living in Prince George's County, Maryland, went to a party—an innocent social activity for a teenage girl. At the party, a fight broke out between two young men and, obeying the instructions of her parents, Conchita immediately left to telephone her father so that he could come and pick her up.

Unfortunately, the fight that started inside spilled out into the street, and as Conchita was on her way to the phone she was struck by a bullet and killed. The young man who fired the shot was a 20-year-old African American boy who did not know her. This is just one incident.

We now have in Mount Pleasant incidents involving drive-by shootings, in which some six innocent individuals already have been shot, one killed, for no apparent reason. Apparently, the person perpetrating these crimes does not know his victims. He is simply driving by, finding an isolated pedestrian, pulling out a shotgun, and shooting the individual from the car—for no reason.

When we begin to look at the devastation handgun violence is wreaking not just on the African American community but more broadly around the country, it becomes, as far as we are concerned, one of the top civil rights and health-related priorities of the African American community. In that respect, our association has announced its vigorous support for the enactment of the Brady handgun bill and other related legislation, such as the recently enacted bill in Virginia, the one-gun-a-month purchase bill.

We recognize that both these bills will make only a very small dent in the problems of gun-related violence, but we also recognize that unless we start the debate today, and unless we break the control of the National Rifle Association over the debate on gun-related violence, we will not make any progress at all.

We are also concerned, as I mentioned in my introductory remarks, about the problems of police-related violence. The NAACP, in conjunction with the Criminal Justice Institute at Harvard Law School and the Monroe Trotter Institute at the University of Massachusetts, recently completed a fairly substantial study of police abuse cases and problems in six cities around the country. The study was conducted through a series of public hearings that the NAACP held over the summer of 1992, after the Rodney King incident, in an attempt to begin documenting in very specific ways the kinds of problems our community experiences in encounters with the law enforcement community.

For us, it is very important that we begin documenting these cases. But beyond that, we believe we must now begin taking steps to help local police departments strengthen a commitment to equal enforcement of existing law and to respect of the constitutional rights of all citizens within their jurisdiction.

We do not assume, by the way, that law enforcement
officers do not have a respect for those constitutional rights and protections. In fact, we believe quite the contrary; we know that the vast majority of law enforcement officers do indeed have a very significant respect for the rights and privileges of individuals within their jurisdiction—but that notwithstanding, there still is a need for significant change.

We have found, first and foremost, that by seeking to broaden diversity within these departments—by encouraging more departments to hire African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and women—that you indeed bring perspectives that were previously missing and in turn help to sensitize these departments to the responsibilities they now face.

Mario Moreno talked about the language barriers that were a significant part of the disturbances in the Mount Pleasant community last year. One way of addressing that issue, obviously, is to hire people who speak the language, or to encourage officers to obtain those language skills.

But we also need people who come from the communities they police. For that reason, we join with you in supporting principles of community-based policing, because we understand how important it can be in providing—given the limited resources that all police departments today labor under—the kind of broad-based support and coverage we need.

And we also believe that law enforcement officers must have adequate training, to go along with affirmative action hiring. As part of that effort, we are attempting through our legislative program to encourage Congress to enact programs that help provide the kind of resources that local police departments need to carry out their jobs. We support funding for community-based policing. We also support initiatives to find new alternatives to incarceration for many of the young men and women who are now being ensnared in the criminal justice system—some of them having committed first-time offenses, or relatively minor offenses, and who are then subsequently disabled as they attempt to go out and pursue careers.

We recognize that the problems that frequently beset the law enforcement community and its relationship with local communities go well beyond issues of law enforcement. When we start looking at the depth of problems that exist in Los Angeles, for example, the complexity of that situation goes far beyond Rodney King.

For example, one looks at Los Angeles and discovers that this is a city that is polarized economically and financially at a level perhaps beyond other cities. One finds that banks in Los Angeles have in fact restricted access to mortgage money and to money used to establish new businesses. One also finds that this is a community that has lost, within the last two years, almost 100,000 jobs previously associated with manufacturing in Los Angeles. We are dealing with a city that has a chronic, systemic, economic problem.

Nonetheless, it is the law enforcement community that helped trigger the Rodney King incident—and so it becomes the first institution that must be examined in this larger context.

My last point is the following: We, as an association and as an African American community, recognize an affirmative obligation to become much more directly involved in issues of law enforcement and policing at the local level. We know that each of our ethnic communities has a unique character, and that in order to effectively offer solutions to many of the problems we share in common, we have to work in conjunction with law enforcement. When we are at odds, because of the kinds of tension and history of abuse that exist, it creates a problem for both of us.

As part of a civil rights organization, I recognize that if people are not safe in their homes, if they are not free from the kind of gun-related violence that is too pervasive throughout our country, we cannot pursue a progressive civil rights agenda effectively. I cannot seriously begin to construct life options for people who are basically afraid to live in their own communities. We know we have got to find some solutions.

At the same time, however, law enforcement has a responsibility to work with us in addressing systemic problems so pervasive that they have distorted the relationship between us. That is to say, when there are officers who routinely violate existing laws, or who do not respect the rights of individuals under their charge, they have to be rooted out. You have got to change systems and police departments that engage in a pattern and practice of abuse. When we have an inadequate statutory mechanism to bring charges against police officers that commit crimes against the citizenry, it has to be changed.

We are looking to you to support that kind of fair play. You are looking to us to make certain that you get the resources you need to carry out your job—and that you are given the training and the political support you need at the local level to do it effectively. We are prepared to support you on that.

But, in return, we are asking you to live up to your responsibilities as police officers. Together we can begin to forge a new relationship, based on a recognition that our interests are tied together, and that we must work together to find new approaches to these old problems.
THE POLICE ROLE IN REMOVING ROADBLOCKS TO MINORITY ECONOMIC PROGRESS

Arthur Fletcher
Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights; Professor of Business Administration and Director, International Institute for Corporate Social Policy, University of Denver

I teach at the University of Denver's Business School, in addition to being Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. I got the job as a result of a commencement address I made with reference to the role of the business community in helping to deal with the economic and social problems of depressed neighborhoods.

When I got through my address, the Chancellor said, "It sounds to me like you should not be in the School of Social Work. You should not be in the School of Education. You should be in the Business School, trying to help today's and tomorrow's business leaders understand the connection between sound economics and secure neighborhoods." So I got the job.

I do not think economic development in what I call "Third World" neighborhoods is the silver bullet by itself, but it will go a long way toward stabilizing them. Because this is my orientation, we are having a meeting with the Denver banks, to discuss the creation of community development banks.

But I am also asking the Denver police department to join the coalition and provide needed information in order to convince the banks that they do indeed have a role to play. At this meeting, we will show some statistics of what happened to Los Angeles's economy for a given period after the uprising in 1960 and after this last one. Our job is to convince the banks that there are profits to be made in those neighborhoods.

One of the things that I kept hearing when I was in Watts this last time was a perception that Koreans could borrow money to go into business in depressed neighborhoods, whereas blacks in Los Angeles could not get those loans.

I also often heard in response that the Korean family network causes them to be a good risk—meaning you can make loans to them, they will hire family, the business will succeed. Since I teach business, I understood what they were talking about.

But I also had to remind these speakers that some of the oldest businesses in the black community were family businesses that had been passed down from one generation to the next for years.

In any event, what I am trying to do with this particular model in Denver is preventive in nature. I am trying to get the police department and its leadership to sit down with the top policy makers at Denver banks and listen to what the community has to say and what the police can contribute. I want to show them the following: "When folk own the assets in their neighborhood, here is a profile of that neighborhood. When they do not, here is another one." Let them see the numbers for themselves.

In the minds of some people, the particular neighborhood I use as a model is "depressed." Well, it turns out that not only is it not depressed, but of the 17,000 who live there and own their homes, they owe less on their mortgages than anywhere else. Their incomes were two-family incomes. Lo and behold, it was a depressed neighborhood only in the figment of somebody's imagination.

But then we took a look to see who owned the businesses there, and lo and behold, most of the businesses were not owned by people who live there. The dollar turned over one time and was gone.

The point that I wanted to make with the banks was that these are the kinds of neighborhoods we could prevent from going down the drain—these are the kinds of neighborhoods that are not causing the police any problem.

What is interesting is that this is a predominantly black neighborhood, one that causes the police no problem whatsoever—but it could if we do not pay attention. What I am trying to do, then, is get the police departments across the country into the equation, to become part of a preventative solution, as opposed to being called on to put out the fire.

One of the nice things about being chairman of the Civil Rights Commission is that you can get the Federal Reserve Board and the governors to listen to you, so there is a possibility that we might get some action on this program.
THE FEDERAL PRESENCE IN THE L.A. RIOTS: AN OVERVIEW

Oliver Revell
Special Agent in Charge, Dallas Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

On the morning of May 1, 1992, in Dallas, I received a telephone call from Attorney General William Barr. The Attorney General told me that the situation in Los Angeles was not going well, that the governor was putting pressure on the president to send in federal forces. The President was reluctant, but wanted to provide as much assistance as possible to law enforcement in Los Angeles. Consequently, the attorney general was assembling a team of federal law enforcement officers to go to Los Angeles to directly support state and local law enforcement in returning order to the community. The attorney general directed me to go to Los Angeles and take charge of this task force, and to work directly with Sheriff Sherman Block, Chief Daryl Gates, and other law enforcement in the area.

In Los Angeles, police were essentially outgunned and outmanned, and withdrew from the riot area. Where they tried to engage the crowd, they were overwhelmed. Very quickly, arson and looting broke out in several areas of the city. Arson was a very big problem, and the support of fire and emergency services became a critical issue.

In the Los Angeles basin area, there are in excess of 100,000 gang members. It became evident early on that the gangs were very much involved in the riots. They had targeted liquor stores, sporting goods stores, gun stores, and banks, and did so with a pretty well-organized structure. The gang members were also involved in a lot of the gratuitous violence—attacks upon individuals without any provocation. The gangs did not start the riots, but they took advantage of them, without question.

People saw the looting on television and came down to take part in it. The looters ran across the entire socio-economic spectrum; there were suburban housewives, students, people from within the community and people from outside.

After places were looted, they were burned. Cars that were stopped on the streets were overturned and burned, closing many of the streets and avenues. And, of course, there was the human toll that went with this.

Unlike Los Angeles' previous riots, in which a 50-square-block area in Watts took almost all of the damage, the 1992 riot area included South Central Los Angeles, the downtown area, Westwood, Koreatown, the Long Beach area, the San Fernando Valley, and Beverly Hills. Interestingly, in South Central, one block would be totally devastated and blocks surrounding it would not be damaged whatsoever. Sometimes one business would be hit and others in the area would be left alone.

Banks were hit very heavily. All the banks in the area were essentially burned down. Most were looted. They did not get into the vaults, but they got everything out of the cash drawers.

When the attorney general decided to send in federal law enforcement, a communication was sent to the various federal agencies and to all FBI field offices, saying "The President, by a proclamation of May 1st, 1992, has declared by virtue of Chapter 15, Title 10, United States Code, that all persons engaged in acts of violence and disorder with regard to this matter are commanded to desist therefrom and to disperse peacefully." "Commensurate with this proclamation, the President has ordered the following: units and members of the Armed Forces of the United States and federal law enforcement officers will be used to suppress the violence described in the proclamation and to restore law and order in and about the city and county of Los Angeles and other districts of California.

"Section 2: The Secretary of Defense is authorized to use such of the armed forces as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Section 1. To that end, he is authorized to call into the active military service of the United States units or members of the National Guard".

This became a very key issue. Once the federal military moved in—not federal law enforcement but the military forces—and a state of emergency was declared, the National Guard was nationalized under federal service, and a serving major general of the United States Army, Major General Warren Cobalt, became the overall military
commander. He had a brigade of Marines, a brigade of the 7th Infantry from Fort Ord, and all the mobilized National Guard units—about 12,000 of the National Guard personnel were in the Los Angeles area.

The President's statement continued: "...as authorized by law to serve in active duty status for an indefinite period and until relieved subject to the discretion of the Secretary of the Defense." I added, however, that: "In carrying out the provisions of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall observe such law enforcement policies as the Attorney General may determine."

"Section 3: Until such time as the Armed Forces shall have been withdrawn pursuant to Section 4 of this order, the Attorney General is further authorized to coordinate the activities of all federal agencies assisting in the suppression of violence and in the administration of justice in and about the city and county of Los Angeles and other districts of California, and to coordinate the activities of all subject agencies with those of state and local agencies so engaged."

Essentially, the attorney general was made the crisis manager for the federal government—to interact with all other agencies of the federal government, including the secretary of defense, and with the authorities of the state, primarily the attorney general but also the mayor and whichever other authorities were actively involved. Although the secretary of defense maintained direct control of the military, it was under the direction and supervision of the U.S. attorney general.

"Section 4: The Secretary of Defense is authorized to determine when federal military forces shall be withdrawn from the disturbance area and when National Guard units and members called into active military service of the United States in accordance with Section 2 of this order shall be released from active service." That became a bone of contention, which I will discuss later.

"Such determination shall be made in the light of the Attorney General's recommendation as to the ability of state and local authorities to resume full responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the affected area."

"The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General are authorized to delegate to subordinate officials of their respective departments the authority conferred upon them by this order." This occurred; the secretary of defense made General Cobalt his on-scene commander. General Cobalt reported directly through the chief of staff of the Army to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the secretary. I was appointed to represent the law enforcement for the attorney general. Assistant Attorney General Bob Muller was there to represent the attorney general on policy and legal issues. I had operational control; he handled the policy and legal issues.

"Section 6: Nothing contained in this order shall confer any substantive or procedural right," etc. It continued, "By order of the Attorney General, William D. Barr, the FBI has been designated the lead agency in directing the combined federal law enforcement effort to include the federalized military troops and other civilian federal law enforcement agencies. SAC Revell has been designated overall commander of operations."

The order then designates the FBI units involved: a hostage rescue team, a counter-terrorist team that trains full-time when not deployed at Quantico, and 14 division SWAT teams. I had a total of 400 FBI tactical personnel.

Essentially, this is what we had when we got to Los Angeles. We had the executive order from the President, and we had directions from the attorney general to put together a federal task force and use it to directly support state and local authorities. We also found that there is a provision under California law stipulating that any chief law enforcement officer can request assistance from any authority and thereby convey upon that entity or that person the full status of a law enforcement officer.

We were not sure we really needed this, because there are some applicable federal statutes, but we received this status anyway. Ron Frankel, who was the chief of operations for the LAPD, gave me a summons of assistance, and so from the time our officers hit the streets, which was Friday night at 10:00 p.m., they were California peace officers as well as federal agents. This was done primarily for civil liability purposes.

You hear a lot about turf issues, factionalism, difficulties between the different agencies. Let me give you an idea of what we were dealing with in Los Angeles. There was Daryl Gates, the chief of police in Los Angeles; Sherman Block, the sheriff of Los Angeles; the INS district director; the regional director for the Bureau of Prisons, Dan Conroy; the deputy associate director of law enforcement for ATF; the chief special agent from Border Patrol; the agent in charge of the U.S. Customs Service; Wayne Smith of the U.S. Marshals Service; Major General Marvin Cobalt; General Ted Hopgood of the U.S. Marine Corps; Major General Dan Hernandez of the California National Guard; and Bob Muller, Assistant Attorney General, Justice Department. Then there was my staff: Bill Gavin, who became the deputy special agent in charge for the operation; Charlie Parsons, the agent in charge of the FBI in Los Angeles, who became the overall event coordinator; Jim Ahern, who heads our office in Phoenix; Bill Ball, who heads our office in Knoxville; Dick Swine, who heads our office in El Paso.
On Friday night, to get people on the streets, we made some critical decisions. One of the first was that each agency was going to maintain command-and-control communications with their own personnel. We were not going to try to integrate a federal task force; it never would have worked. We were going to try and operate the task force as a conglomerate of agencies with specific tasks. When an agency, through the joint command center, accepted a task, it was up to them to provide the personnel and the logistical support and to maintain their own rules of engagement.

Each agency head told me what resources were available for the task force and then accepted tasks as they were developed in coordination with the other agencies. It was up to them to carry out those tasks and report back the results. That was the only way we could put this together, have it work, and maintain the type of discipline necessary. And it worked superbly well.

The personnel I described earlier came within 24 hours, though I had 1,700 federal agents before we were through. We deployed 700 Friday night and Saturday and we then gradually continued our deployment of all 1,700. We teamed up with LAPD and LASO officers in high-risk areas and went on active patrol. We protected sensitive and high-risk locations by stationing our personnel in those locations. We escorted fire and rescue vehicles, and provided a backup for any tactical team that was needed for barricading, sniper incidents, or arrests.

We accepted those tasks through Monday morning, at which time a decision was made by the sheriff and the police chief that federal law enforcement assistance, other than the tactical assistance, was no longer required. We withdrew the federal agents and stood them down, ready for recall.

At that time, we set up a task force to carry out necessary follow-up actions. During the entire situation, each agency carried on its own duties and responsibilities. ATF responded to arson and gun thefts, INS responded to illegal alien situations, the FBI worked with the LAPD on gangs and other types of federal offenses. The Bureau of Prisons was transporting prisoners.

Pursuant to a decision that those who had used the riots to engage in the violation of others' civil rights and violent crimes should be subject to vigorous law enforcement, a joint task force was set up to function in the aftermath of the riot. In fact, it continues today to identify, locate, and prosecute those individuals who committed serious crimes during the course of the riots. In effect, we went from direct support for riot suppression to direct investigation of riot-related crimes.

The only debate on military deployment was over (1) whether or not military should be deployed in small increments—one soldier, two soldiers, a small group of soldiers—or at the company level, and (2) whether they should be involved in direct law enforcement activities as opposed to the suppression of civil disorder. General Cobalt took the position that once the riots were over it was the military's responsibility to maintain a presence and a reactive capability, but not to enforce non-riot-related criminal law enforcement activities—searches, seizures, arrests, barricade situations, sniper situations.

Sheriff Block did not agree, because he had been able to use the National Guard to augment his forces, which is what he wanted to do with the federal military. It was our position that this was not why the President had sent the military. Local law enforcement is trained to make arrests, conduct searches, and use minimum force to carry out their mission, rather than the military, which is generally trained to use maximum force to accomplish its mission. Further, it is not trained in law enforcement. That is the crux of a debate that still goes on about the use of federal forces versus National Guard versus federal law enforcement.

There are a number of federal statutes that specifically relate to civil disturbances: rebellion insurrection, sedition conspiracy, conspiracy against the rights of others, civil disorders. One statute, Title 18, Section 231, addresses the subject of gangs and the use of a firearm, explosive, or incendiary device in a civil disorder. That was directly on point in a number of situations in Los Angeles. There were also churches that were desecrated and damaged, and there is a federal statute that provides punishment for that, presenting another basis for federal jurisdiction.

Interference with commerce by threats or violence we obviously saw. Reginald Denny was involved in interstate commerce; he was driving through the area, his truck was essentially hijacked, and he was severely beaten. That is just one example of the interference with commerce. Essentially, every time someone took on a store, a gas station, or any other business engaged in interstate commerce, the federal law could be applied.

So there was ample basis for the federal government to provide assistance. An important part of this, however, was that we did not go into Los Angeles and tell the chief of police, the sheriff, and the mayor, “We're here, you go home, this is now our ball game.” Our objective was to provide support and assistance to the police. They remained responsible overall for the suppression of the riot and, of course, for the law enforcement response to the riot. We provided additional resources, logistics, and trained personnel to augment all the ongoing law enforcement activities, and we provided law enforcement and legal advice to the military forces regarding their role and proper utilization.
am going to focus on ATF's specific role during the riots and what we learned from that experience. On April 30, our field office in Los Angeles provided the Los Angeles Police Department and Sheriff's Department with a list of all federal firearms licensees and their addresses. Our personnel in Los Angeles were instructed to make contact with the city's Emergency Operations Center to determine how best the ATF could assist.

The next day, 50 agents were activated and instructed to assist local law enforcement agencies with patrol capabilities and to team up with patrol officers. We assigned one ATF agent at the FBI command center to work with them full-time. Seven of our Special Response Teams (SRT), equivalent to what you know as SWAT teams, were placed on alert for possible activation. Our Los Angeles agents were instructed to follow up on any relevant leads relating to the riots that involved violations within our jurisdiction. Our Los Angeles group retrieved a large quantity of firearms that had been abandoned in a local federal firearms licensee business, and we also secured about a hundred M-16 rifles that had been left at a warehouse.

On the fourth day, May 2, our SRT teams were activated to protect fire personnel and fire department equipment responding to the various emergency calls around the city. We had a 50-agent crime suppression unit that was paired up with the police in Inglewood in Los Angeles to maintain security around the various post offices that were threatened.

On the fifth day, May 3, that same 50-agent unit assisted the LAPD riot-suppression officers in providing security for the transfer of several million dollars that were located in some of these banks in the riot areas. Various SRT teams were involved in the successful execution of search warrants in an attempt to recover looted firearms. On that fifth day they recovered looted firearms, some stolen items, and some stolen explosives. It took three of our SRT teams on that day to execute those search warrants.

On the sixth day, we asked local radio stations to broadcast news of the ATF 1-800-GUNS hotline, and request citizens to report any information they had on guns stolen during the riots. Several ATF agents were assigned to work with the Los Angeles Fire Department and the police department's criminal conspiracy section, to render assistance in several fire fatality investigations.

On the seventh day, May 5, three of our SRT teams were still activated; they executed two more search warrants, recovering some more stolen firearms.

On the eighth day, our arson explosive group in Los Angeles began to develop strategies necessary to investigate arson fires. We brought in 15 certified fire investigators from various field offices around the country to help out.

On the ninth and tenth days we continued to execute search warrants and recover numerous stolen firearms. During the Los Angeles riot, there were 32 federal firearms licensees that were either looted, burned, or both. There were more than 4,690 firearms stolen from these dealers during that time. About 3,900 of those firearms were taken from eight of the 32 dealers; 100 were taken from one dealer, Western Surplus.

During the riots, we recovered only 58 firearms out of that total, but since then a few more than 200 firearms have been recovered.

In the aftermath of the riot, we re-evaluated our civil disturbance response plan and refined it by prioritizing the use of our resources. In addition to the national plan we had in existence at the time, we directed all our field divisions to develop specific plans that would address five priorities as they applied to their geographic area of responsibility.

The number one priority is the protection of ATF personnel and resources, meaning mainly our non-law enforcement personnel. We also need to make sure that we have alternative office space if existing office space becomes threatened.

Our number two priority is denying criminals access to firearms and explosives. We now make it a policy to provide computer printouts of all firearms and explosives licensees to local police departments in the larger cities. We are also asking federal firearms licensees to be cooperative with the police departments and allow police departments to learn what types of firearms these licensees are selling. We are asking that the police and federal firearms licensees work together to make sure that licensees notify the police of any large purchase of firearms by individuals when there is a potential for civil disorder.

Priority three concerns explosives and arson response capabilities. Upon the request of state and local law enforcement in a civil disturbance area, we will make
available our arson and explosives investigative resources. If that which is required is beyond the capabilities of the state and local agencies, or if their resources are exhausted, we will gladly provide certified fire investigators, arson dogs, and our national response teams. We will also be available to provide explosive enforcement officers and appropriate equipment on any explosive incidents that may occur.

Priority four addresses the support role of our special response team. Although the responsibility of these teams is normally the execution of ATF high-risk search-and-arrest warrants during riot situations, we will also make them available to any other law enforcement agency that may have non-ATF search-and-arrest warrants.

Finally, priority five concerns the use of ATF agents on mobile patrol. Because riots and civil disturbances frequently cross jurisdictional lines, and law enforcement agencies are required to cooperate with each other, we will provide, if necessary ATF agents to pair up with patrol officers to assist them in carrying out patrol duties. We are trying right now to work up inter-agency agreements with some of the larger departments to provide for this.

In sum, as a result of the Los Angeles riots, many law enforcement agencies have re-evaluated their contingency plans. We certainly did, and found some areas in which we felt we could improve. As a result, we are going to be able to improve the response of ATF and enhance the operation during times of crisis as well.

THE I.N.S. AND THE BORDER PATROL RESPONSE TO THE L.A. RIOTS

Gil Kleinknecht
Associate Commissioner, Enforcement, Immigration and Naturalization Service

My current position is associate commissioner for enforcement for the U.S. Immigration Service. On a day-to-day basis I attempt to give leadership to the U.S. Border Patrol of some 4,000 to 5,000 men and women—about 1,800 special agents, 1,600 detention/deportation officers, and hundreds of other support people. I have only done this for two-and-a-half years. The reason I point this out is that I spent the previous 25 years serving as a police chief. From 1965 to 1973 I was the chief in Huntington, West Virginia. During the riots of the 1960's and 1970's, I learned a lot by trial and error. Then, from 1973 to 1991, I served as St. Louis County superintendent of the police. There I spent most Saturday mornings in front of numerous abortion clinics and medical facilities, dealing with the pro-life, pro-choice, and various groups that wanted to be arrested. Unfortunately, it was our job to accommodate them.

When I was sent to Los Angeles under the leadership of the attorney general and Mr. Oliver Revell, I naturally had apprehensions. I wondered whether as a federal officer, my approach to this problem was going to be the same or different. In retrospect, I believe that my prior experience enabled me to provide some direction and leadership to the Border Patrol activities. We were able to muster 400 Border Patrol agents, men and women, within 24 hours of the attorney general's decision to have federal agents in Los Angeles. This first group were on site, downtown, fully equipped and fully uniformed, with all the paraphernalia and automobiles to do whatever job that the local police, the FBI, or others wanted us to do.

Our staff mostly came from the San Diego sector, El Centro, Livermore, and Yuma. In addition to the Border Patrol agents, we brought in seven horse teams, which ultimately were not that effective. And we brought in three helicopters to give air assistance.

I have dealt with men and women, particularly young law enforcement officers, for 25 years. The worst thing you can have them do is nothing, and since I had 400 Border Patrol agents in one hotel with no specific assignment, I realized that I had to find something for them to do or I would have another problem—in the hotel. So I called up Buck Revell and said, "You've got to give me an assign-
ment or I'm going to have two problems." Fortunately we were out on the street in a few more hours and my hotel problems dissipated.

In addition to the Border Patrol, we were fortunate to have a large number of special agents in Los Angeles who were also assigned to the project. Their primary role was to deal with the Los Angeles County Jail and the processing of individuals arrested for non-immigration offenses who were later found out to be illegal aliens, or lacked proper documentation.

We at the Border Patrol had three missions. The first was to provide street patrols to two divisions. The bulk of our agents were assigned to the South Central Division and the rest of them were assigned to Grand Park.

The second was to provide strategic-site security. Many of the agents were assigned to local neighborhood retail stores that were still in operation and able to deliver service to the community. Other agents were used to secure buildings that had been burned out but still contained merchandise. We also provided security to certain pieces of federal property throughout the area.

The third mission was to provide back-up support to the LAPD for crowd control. They welcomed the support of the Border Patrol or anyone else who was there and able to help them; they had their hands full.

Most of the tough work took place on the first day. After that, things leveled off. As a result of three days of rioting, most of it during the first day, there were 140 arrests made by the Border Patrol—20 of those felony arrests, and 100 of them misdemeanor arrests, ranging from possession of narcotics to curfew violations. Contrary to press stories, only 20 arrests were made of undocumented aliens, and their undocumented status came to light only after they have been arrested by the local police for other offenses.

In addition to the arrests, our agents were involved in more than 2,200 incidents not resulting in arrests, the bulk of which were curfew violations in which violators were allowed to go home, a practical consideration under the circumstances.

My ATF colleague mentioned the firearms. During its arrests, the Border Patrol recovered some 62 firearms, 60 handguns, and 60 knives.

Of course we experienced some problems. Like everyone else, we had trouble with communications. We were on one frequency and the local police were on another frequency, so it took us a few hours to trade portable radios and be able to communicate. Initially, we did not have a specific mission, but it came quickly and within eight hours we were out assisting the local police. Also, we had not worked out arrangements as to where the agents were going to stay, who was going to feed them, etc., but we managed.

What about the future? If the attorney general and the President made a decision to provide assistance from federal agents, how could the Immigration Service be of
The Border Patrol is the only uniformed law enforcement agency in the federal government. When they come, they are wearing a uniform most citizens recognize, they come with their own marked patrol vehicles, they come with all the paraphernalia we would expect a law enforcement officer to have. They are very well trained, as well as all large city police departments are. They are trained in the use of force, deadly and non-violent. They are trained in civil rights and all the other areas in which a well-rounded police officer should be. But especially, they are able to work as a team because they work as a team every day. They will not split up and go in their own direction and do their own thing; they will do what the sergeant tells them. They are well-disciplined, they will take orders, they understand the chain of command.

Unfortunately for the interior of the United States, the bulk of the Border Patrol agents are in Southern California and along the southern border. So if a disturbance occurs in the interior, in St. Louis for example, I would not be able to generate large numbers of officers in 24 hours. It would probably take a little longer, perhaps 48 hours, to take care of transportation and other needs that would get a large contingency into the interior.

Second, we can provide language skills. All Border Patrol detention and deportation officers, as well as special agents, have Spanish as a second language. They are very fluent, and in those communities with a high concentration of Spanish-speaking residents they can be of valuable assistance in the interrogation and processing of those arrested. In addition to Spanish, we have special agents who are fluent in many other languages, and we can have them on-site within a reasonable length of time.

The third thing we can do for you, due to our experience with Cubans, Haitians, and others, is set up and operate a detention facility, whether it is on a permanent site or in tents.

The fourth asset, which is little known, is that the Immigration Service has the authority and ability to deport aliens. Aliens can be deported out of the United States quickly—not quickly enough, but within a reasonable length of time—and all we need is the information to start the process.

Any alien can be deported, but there are two important causes that are relevant here. They can be deported (1) if they are convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or (2) if they are convicted of an aggravated felony. What are some kinds of moral turpitude? Obviously, for the purpose of the federal statutes, any crime against a family is classified as moral turpitude. Any crime against the government of the United States is a crime involving moral turpitude. The only catch—and it is a small one—is that this crime and conviction had to take place within five years of when the alien first entered the United States—so we have a five-year statute of limitations for crimes involving moral turpitude.

An aggravated felony, such as murder, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, money laundering, violent crimes, or any attempt to commit these crimes, can be used as grounds for deportation. Here, there is no statute of limitations. If at any time during their residency in the United States they are convicted of such an offense, they can be deported to their native countries. And if they come back in, that is a felony too, and then they can serve many years at the expense of the government and at the pleasure of the Bureau of Prisons.

The point is that all of these offenses occur during the course of a civil disturbance. If you look at the arrest docket, you would see the bulk of the offenders are charged with felony assault, concealed weapons, interfering with a law enforcement officer, obstructing justice, larceny, burglary, malicious destruction of property, and interfering with the trade or commerce of an individual. All of these are deportable offenses.

An important thing to remember is that if an alien is arrested for that offense and the prosecutor lets him plead guilty to something else, it is not a conviction for a deportable offense. For example, you will see instances in which someone is arrested for destruction of property, a deportable offense, but they plead guilty to curfew violation and, therefore, are not deportable.

So it is important that those deportation charges are followed through to conviction. And it is also important that the Immigration Service be notified early and through the appropriate district. We can then begin deportation procedures right at conviction, so that the process will be completed; and when they finish their sentence in the state prison they can be deported immediately. Although deportation takes time, it is ultimately effective. Last year, INS deported 37,000 aliens, 17,000 of whom were criminal aliens.

In sum, we can be of help to the local police in providing trained, experienced, uniformed law enforcement officers if the President so decides. We can provide personnel with language skills not necessarily available in your community. Lastly, and probably most importantly, we can begin and complete deportation for individuals convicted of the right crime, even while they are serving their prison sentence.
THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE: A COOPERATING AGENCY DURING CIVIL DISORDERS

J. Douglas Wiggs
U.S. Marshals Service

Each federal agency brings something a little different to a situation like we had in Los Angeles. I want to describe what the U.S. Marshals Service brings. But before I get to that, I would like to make a distinction between civil disorders and civil disobedience. We in the Marshals Service face both from time to time.

When we talk about civil disorders we are talking about turbulent situations, usually riot-type situations like Los Angeles, ones in which confusion abounds, where there is fighting among individuals and wholesale destruction of property. Civil disobedience, on the other hand, is a much broader term, in which we are not only talking about riot situations in civil disobedience, but also about more peaceful protests.

I would like to point out that last year, during the riots in Los Angeles, the Marshals Service was faced not only with our responsibilities there, but we were also called to help protect the Department of Justice in the nation's capital, two distinctly different situations. We had an out-and-out riot in Los Angeles, and we had peaceful protests here in Washington. We had to be prepared for both extremes.

The history of the Marshals Service goes way back. We were involved in our first encounter in 1794, in the Whiskey Rebellion, which occurred in what is now the middle district of Pennsylvania. The Marshals Service was in quite a tough spot and we ended up having to call in what would have been the National Guard at the time, but was then called the militia. A hundred years later, we were called to Illinois to help keep the railway lines open during the Pullman strike.

In this century, of course, we have been involved in things that range from escorting young black students to school during the civil rights reform era to protecting the Pentagon from destruction by Vietnam War protesters. In 1972, we removed from Alcatraz trespassing American Indians who were involved in the American Indian Movement. A year later, we, along with our colleagues in the FBI, faced those same Indians at Wounded Knee. We were involved in a 73-day siege there that left one of our deputies wounded.

For the purposes of this discussion, however, I would like to focus on more recent events. How does the Marshals Service get involved? Usually, either the President or the Attorney General will issue an order that brings us in. This can be because the situation is too large for a state or local authority to handle. A natural disaster like Hurricane Hugo, for instance, left citizens without any law enforcement. We were asked to provide a police presence. Generally, we are called in because we have the broadest law enforcement authority. Our particular authority is defined in Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code. But I also like to think that we have proven ourselves over the last 200 years.

For a disturbance like the one in Los Angeles, planning is the key element. I would like to describe an incident that took place in the early 1970's involving some squatters, again in Pennsylvania. These squatters had come down from the Woodstock festival. They were of the flower child era and had decided they were going to settle on some land that had been condemned for a Corps of Engineers project.

Well, even though they were flower children they had set up prostitution rings, they were making moonshine, and they were extorting money from the local citizens by setting up their own road toll booth. The area they were in was a very isolated part of the Pocono Mountains. There was one road in and one road out, so you had to pass through their toll booth. Several attempts were made by local law enforcement and by the U.S. Marshals Service to serve legal process on these people and have them removed. All attempts failed. Eventually, one of our U.S. Marshals was assaulted while attempting to serve some legal process.

The federal judge overseeing the case finally ordered the U.S. Marshals Service to step in and bodily remove the squatters. Because we were physically removing citizens, a few of whom were pregnant women, we were especially cautious. We sent in a couple of our special operations deputies. They surveyed the area for two weeks, and set up a plan that included evacuation of the squatters, rules of engagement, use of any chemical agents if necessary, a medical response, and coordination of the bulldozing of the squatter camps by the Corps of Engineers. The latter was very important; had we not bulldozed these buildings, the squatters would have just moved back in as soon as they made their bail.

We assembled 60 of our Special Operations Group (SOG) deputies at a nearby hotel. For three days they rehearsed and were briefed on the situation. The operation itself was brief—only 45 minutes—a signature of all
good planning. There were approximately 100 squatters and they were all removed. No one was injured. As a matter of fact, we were able to deliver a baby during the action. And the buildings were bulldozed after the squatters were safely removed.

We have already alluded to one of the Marshals Service capabilities—the Special Operations Group. It is similar to a SWAT unit and is comprised of approximately 170 deputies spread throughout the United States. They are made up of six-man teams, and they were deployed to Los Angeles last year.

SOG teams helped in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. We also assisted the Department of Defense in Panama, including taking immediate custody of General Noriega and returning him to the United States, along with the Drug Enforcement Administration. We have protected U.S. courthouses in San Francisco and Los Angeles during the anti-war demonstrations, a service we also provided during the Los Angeles riots last year.

We also provided security for the federal merchant management agencies, temporary banks, and were a police presence in the tent cities the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) controlled in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew last year.

There are two other vital components of the U.S. Marshals Service civil disorder response program: (1) our special operations tactical center; and (2) our air operations division.

The tactical center is located in Louisiana and provides our SOG unit with the facility to train and stage its personnel in preparation for operational missions. The tactical center's main facility is a 37,000 square-foot building that houses our operations center, our medical operations, a warehouse for all our equipment, rooms to train and to repair our equipment, etc. The tactical center also includes two large parcels of land, one that is set up in an urban environment and the other in a rural environment for training purposes. We have four firearms ranges and a driver's training area.

Our air operations division is located in Oklahoma City; it has a fleet of aircraft including two Boeing 727's and smaller executive jets. We can airlift our equipment and our personnel anywhere in the United States within 24 hours. During the Los Angeles riot, we flew 350 people into the area within 24 hours. We not only flew our own people, but representatives of the Bureau of Prisons, the FBI, and the Park Police—about 128 agents from other agencies. In Waco, Texas, when the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms asked us to respond to the incident in progress at the Branch Davidian compound, we put our people on the ground there within four hours.

In closing, I would like to emphasize the importance of cooperation. None of these situations, especially when you have disorders of the magnitude of that in Los Angeles, can be handled by a single agency. We believe we are a cooperating agency. We like to help other agencies on the state and local level, and our federal colleagues, as well.
During the Los Angeles riots, each federal agency maintained its own command center, but we had a joint command center set up in the FBI office and we were also using facilities that had been designed for the coordination of the Olympic games in 1984. The military and the National Guard set up a command center at an Army base south of Los Angeles.

On a 24-hour-a-day basis we exchanged liaison officers with them as well as with the sheriff's department and the police department. Through the sharing of command centers and communication centers, we were able to coordinate tasks and get response and intelligence.

We did not share the same frequencies or equipment but we did use secure faxes. We used cellular phones. We used secure radio, particularly the FM bands, and whenever we were going out with the police we used their communications, with our communications available to report back on an agency-specific basis. It worked very well. Surprisingly, we had very little difficulty in carrying out the tasks and keeping the process flowing.

The provision of intelligence from our own sources was a key role of the federal agencies. We have no prevention responsibility other than for federal crimes. But through informants, sources of information, and cooperative citizens who may call us, we can provide intelligence.

We, along with other federal agencies, did provide intelligence on gang intentions to the LAPD and the LASO. We knew the gangs intended to use the outcome of the trial, if it went wrong, to instigate acts of both violence and looting, and that intelligence had been passed to the police department and was in their possession at the time that the riots occurred.

We did not determine any of our assignments. They came from the police command center and the sheriff's office. We assumed as our responsibility the protection of federal facilities and carrying out of federal laws, but we did not assume the responsibility for anything that we were not asked to do; we did not want to be working at cross-purposes.

We did let other agencies know what we had available. For instance, I told Chief Gates and Sheriff Block that we had a substantial capability to transport and detain prisoners. We had the Marshals Service, we had the Bureau of Prisons, and we had INS, all of whom have specific expertise in handling prisoners.

They chose not to take advantage, and later came back and said that one of the shortages they had was in the ability to handle prisoners. There was obviously a disconnect there. We were prepared to handle a large number of prisoners, both transporting them and arranging for temporary custody on the behalf of the state and local authorities.
WORKING TO IMPROVE COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Mary Ann Wycoff
Project Director, Police Foundation

We all know that our concerns in the police community revolve around what happened after the Rodney King decision. However, I would like to propose to you that a concern of equal importance is what did not happen last year after the Rodney King decision.

If you are like me, you sat next to the television hour after hour, waiting for reports of other cities that were going to explode behind Los Angeles, wondering if yours was going to be one of them. There were a few, but by and large I think most of us were quite surprised and very relieved at what did not happen after Los Angeles exploded.

I am not in the slightest going to make the prediction that those communities that did not experience disorder then, will not next week, or sometime down the road. We all know better than to do that. But I do believe that there have been changes in policing that will decrease the odds of those explosions in the future. We have heard that riots and civil disturbances have been with us from the beginning of time and will occur again, and I believe that too.

We have also heard that in the aftermath of each of these, a major report has been written, and that time and again those reports sound much alike in terms of the problems they identify and the things they say need to be corrected. And changes are occurring.

A great many police departments today are working very hard to change their relationships with the community. More than that—and this is at the heart of community policing—they are working hard to change the very nature of the communities they police, to create the spirit of community where it may not exist. The departments that have been invited to make presentations have been involved in a variety of research projects with the Police Foundation.

Let me reiterate what I think is a very critical point about this forthcoming discussion. These departments have not been invited here because we believe they will not be a hot spot in the future. We have not asked any of them to put themselves in the position of saying: “We have done such a great job here that we know that it is not going to happen to us.” We know better than that. They are here because we know they are making very deliberate efforts to decrease the odds of disturbances happening in the future.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAMS IN BALTIMORE

Edward Woods
Commissioner of Police, Baltimore City Police Department

You may have heard of a lot of activity going on in Baltimore recently, with the President visiting and demonstrators at baseball’s opening day. And yet, we only had two incidents. We had one arrest for scalping tickets; the other incident was, unfortunately, a heart attack. But it was a day of joy in the city, and it reflected our strong sense of community.

Civil disorder is sometimes referred to as a riot by individuals acting together in response to some perceived wrong. The actions can take various forms, from peaceful demonstrations to arson and murder. In many cases, these individuals do not represent the community as a whole, and the response of the community to the action of these individuals often determines whether the violence escalates or is controlled.

Community participation in and tolerance of violent acts reflect the community’s opinion of the police. Respect for the department can lessen the duration and seriousness of acts committed. In short, if the community believes the department would fairly handle complaints and take corrective action when its members violate rules and regulations, the people will support police efforts.

The Baltimore Police Department has a long-term positive relationship with the Baltimore community. However, this has not always been the case. This relationship took years to develop, and it was not without setbacks. One must keep in mind that community respect is not just given, but earned. The Baltimore Police Department has in place a number of policies, procedures, and programs that have facilitated the earning of the community’s respect. For ease of presentation, these will be characterized as “internal” or “external” to the organization.

In the internal area, we have a centralized internal investigation division. This is where any citizen with a complaint or allegation of excessive force or discourtesy can receive an unbiased investigation of that particular incident.

In Baltimore, all uses of force must be reported. Failure to report is in itself a violation. This lets our people know that we do not tolerate excessive use of force—that it can be used only when necessary. Officers
know that report filing is a part of their duty, and that they must report the incident because later there may be allegations.

All allegations of misconduct must be reported to the Internal Investigation Division within four hours. This is a must for anyone receiving this information from a citizen. He or she produces a written report. Later, the Internal Investigation Division will follow up with the citizen.

All complaints, even minor violations, are assigned a control number and are investigated by our command, who must then reach a finding of sustained, non-sustained, unfounded, or exonerated. The use-of-force policy is very strict, and guidelines are enforced. Again, when we receive a use-of-force report by any of our officers, the commander must see the investigation through to completion.

All discharges of firearms must be reported to our Education and Training Division, plus the police commissioner. If the discharge results in injury to a citizen or officer, the Homicide unit conducts an investigation. Each incident of this nature is considered serious by us, and warrants some type of report. We will then follow up on that report with various interventions, including retraining the individual officer, or if the finding is very negative, taking action to address questions of liability.

In recruit training, use-of-force is covered in depth and each year is part of in-service training. In cultural awareness training, the officers are educated in the differences in communication, body language, and other cultural behavior traits. This is something we took very seriously back in 1990 when we realized that many of our people might need extra training in dealing with the multitude of ethnic groups in our city.

We have a growing Korean community, for example. In the past 12 years we have had a large influx of Koreans who have bought mom-and-pop grocery stores. We knew that communication problems would be an obstacle to the melding of this ethnic group into the community, so we went to extra lengths to set up meetings with the various community leaders. We also hired a Korean liaison who could get to know the community and bridge the language gap in times of trouble.

In terms of monitoring use-of-force incidents, the command must review each incident, and if an officer has three or more uses of force within one year, the command must refer that officer to the chief physician for evaluation. This applies also to some of our people who might have a propensity to use actions that are against our policy. It behooves us as commanders to pick out these individuals, even though they might be involved in three unsustained incidents.

We also have volunteer peer counseling groups. These volunteer officers, who have been involved in the use of deadly force or serious injury, meet with members who have prior use-of-force experience. They discuss alternative methods to use of force. All communication in this group is confidential.

We initiated this program in the middle of last year, when we found about 35 officers who might fit this mold and who might benefit from a pro-active approach. We used outstanding officers who have gone through the same thing, and we sit them down in a three-on-three setting. Three were “good guys” and three were so-called “bad guys.”

At the first meeting, the bad guys were really going after their counterparts, a reflection of their lack of knowledge about proper police procedure. But in the next group, a positive attitude did emerge. We are confident that this will help them in the future; they now see how they could have handled situations differently.

When we have a major shooting or some type of officer-involved trauma, we again have a team of officers who might have gone through this same experience to help the officer with any problems we might be overlooking. The officer sits down with this group, opens up, and deals with the incident in order to find out if there are any major problems we might need to address as an agency or that the officers might need to look at as individuals.

Police officers need to be matched to their community so that citizens can identify with the enforcers of law. We are constantly trying to recruit individuals from the community. At this time, for instance, we have eight Korean Americans in the agency. As a matter of fact, we were able to promote one about three months ago. In terms of our organization, we have a policing philosophy—not a program—that features a “flattening” of the organization. At one time in our department we had a deputy commissioner, and under him a colonel chief of patrol, and under him a lieutenant colonel in charge of three districts. Since we had nine districts, we had three sets of this type of organization.

But in communicating with the field forces, I discovered a need to cut out some of those levels. We have discontinued the lieutenant colonel and the colonel levels. Now I have a deputy commissioner who oversees the nine districts, which makes it easier for my directives to go right into the district. In the external area, there is the Complaint Evaluation Board. In many cities there are citizen review boards, but in Baltimore we have the
investigative ability to handle all cases that come before us—from excessive force to discourtesy cases. Our Complaint Evaluation Board consists of a person from the state attorney’s office, a member of my office, a member of Legal Aid, one from the Civil Rights Commission, and also a member of the city solicitor’s office.

This board does not have subpoena power, but it does have the ability to send the case back to me to be reinvestigated. We have not had any major problems with this process, though in the last two years we have been hearing from some of our citizens who feel that we need a civilian review board. Instead, the mayor has asked for, and I concur with, a system in which anyone can review our investigations. Also, the mayor has proposed that any two citizens could be added to the Complaint Evaluation Board in order to review the investigation.

We have also hired a public affairs director in the last year. I hired a young man for this job who has been involved in the news media, a very outstanding young man, who has had long exposure to the city and who is looked upon as a star by many of the citizens.

We have also been opening up the department to outside people. For example, we have started a Citizens’ Police Academy, a program that has taken off like wildfire. I personally sign a certificate given to the many citizens who attend this Citizens’ Police Academy. Each of the nine districts has its own police academy. The academy gives citizens an overview of the department, and lets them know what they can do to help the department.

When people have a better understanding of what we are doing, it prevents problems. It is important for us to show that ours is not a closed shop.

STEMMING THE EROSION OF PUBLIC OPINION IN PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MARYLAND

David Mitchell
Chief, Prince George’s County Police Department

In Prince George’s County, we are right next to Washington, D.C. We are quite large at 486 square miles. We are one of 23 counties in the State of Maryland. We were established in 1696, so we have been around a while.

I police a population of about three-quarters of a million people. I have about 1,700 people under my command. My county is divided into six police districts, plus a Special Operations Division. We have a Criminal Investigations Division as well, to handle major crime. To give you an idea of some of the challenges we face, last year we handled about 430,000 calls for service. We made about 15,000 criminal arrests. We handled about 46,000 part-one offenses, and I currently have an operating budget of about $75 million. We are labor-intensive, so most of it goes to salaries and capital items, such as cruisers, that we unavoidably have to purchase.

We do not have a large training budget. In fact, given the downturn in the economy, my department’s outside training budget for 1,700 people next year is about $5,000.

There has been much change in Prince George’s County. First of all, we have gone from 85,000 people to three quarters of a million since 1931. That is more than in seven states. We have also changed in terms of our nature. We used to be viewed as a bedroom community of Washington, D.C. Today, we are viewed as a metropolis, even though we are a county.

We have also changed a lot in terms of our demographics. Imagine going from about 15 percent African American 20 years ago to 51 percent African American today. Like most governments that experience demographic shifts like that, we did not have a long-term plan in place. While we are very proud today of our rich cultural life, we are still making up for those years when we did not recruit from our local employment base.

We are no stranger to controversy in Prince George’s County. We are no stranger to screaming headlines about the use of excessive force. Quite frankly, from the tail-end of the 1970’s up through the 1980’s, we did have allegations of excessive force lodged against us. Part of what led to this was our relationship with our community. There was a void of trust. Folks did not trust that if they made a
One of the things we did was to develop a mission statement. We got together over a two-day period with the leadership of our unions and our command staff, and came up with a mission statement, that simply says: “To work in partnership with the citizens of Prince George’s County toward providing a safe environment and enhancing the quality of life.” I think that is something new in policing—not just to provide a safe environment, but to enhance the quality of life.

Just as the absence of war is not peace, the absence of crime does not necessarily mean we have a community or a neighborhood that is healthy. We have to work in partnership with the citizens of Prince George’s County toward providing a safe environment and enhancing a quality of life consistent with the values of our community. We police to the values of our community.

Obviously, in order to police to the values of our community, we have to get out and know our community, and our community has to know us. It is up to us to go out and say, “What is it that you would like to see from the police department?” And in turn, we must deliver.

One of the programs we started was a Chief’s Advisory Council. In each of my six precincts, I have district citizens’ advisory councils in which I have leaders from each patrol beat come together once a month to meet with the district commander and discuss local issues, changes in policy, suggestions for recommendations. One of the things we are doing now is looking at our fast-chase policy. I have also drawn in one citizen representing each of the six precincts, along with the president of the NAACP, folks from the Asian Pacific community, the Latin American community, and others. We meet together quarterly to talk about the police department, the progress we are making, and to hear feedback in terms of the values of our community.

We have diversity and cultural awareness training. Why do we need this? I have an area that has about 30,000 Latin Americans representing 27 different countries, which means 27 different cultures with 27 different
viewpoints about the police department. In fact, I have
new arrivals every day, and they are coming from places
where the police are the military and are not to be trusted.

I know and my officers know, for instance, when we
get a loud radio or loud party complaint, that it is perfectly
culturally correct in a Latin American community to
socialize at night with the radio on. But we have a diverse
community and some folks have to work in the morning
and do not necessarily like the noise.

In order to gain the compliance we are looking for, we
do the work beforehand, through cultural awareness
training.

We have also found that, of the excessive force
complaints we receive in my department, the most
common are those originating with a traffic stop.

What is it about traffic stops? Well, we have a
Citizens' Police Academy. The participants actually go
out under controlled circumstances and make a traffic
stop. They find out what it is like to stop someone, engage
in dialogue, and write a ticket. This effort has met with
overwhelming success. We have had members of the press
go through it, as well as leadership in our community.

We have also established the position of citizens' services manager in my office. Years ago, when a citizen
called, they would get pointed around. They would get
transferred, only to hear, "Well, you really want to talk to
so and so." Then they would get cut off, and then they
would get mad. So now I have a citizens' services manager, who, with great patience and great communication
skills, handles complaints.

And we do not tell the citizen to call someone else.
We get back to them, I hope, with a solution.

As mandated by the State of Maryland, we also have
advanced officer training. As our officers recycle through
the academy, they learn the updates to criminal law,
traffic law, etc. And I have the chair of my Chief's
Advisory Council there to speak to each class about the
community side of the mission statement and what it
means.

I am sure most of you have special events where you
go into neighborhoods and do those nontraditional things
that do not necessarily relate to law enforcement but do
relate to friendship, partnership, and the improvement of
the quality of life in our communities. We try to take part
in all the community days to which we are invited; and to
those that we are not invited to, we try to make sure we
receive an invitation.

We videotape some of the children at these events
and give the tape to the parents. We will also have
McGraff there.

Those are good ways to form partnerships, to get to
know one another so the folks can put a face on the police
department and the police can put a face on our commu-

nity as well.

It is also not unusual to have a prayer breakfast at
police headquarters, where I invite members of the clergy
from all walks of life to come in and talk about ways we
can form partnerships.

We also have a command college with a civil service
system where our officers study, take multiple choice tests,
and go through oral interviews. We created the college
for all newly promoted sergeants and lieutenants, to
provide them with tools for the modern manager.

Our planning division is focusing on where we expect
the police department to be in the 21st century. Too
often, departments are on a four-year political cycle in
terms of planning— and a one- to two-year vision
definitely is not enough, as we look out and ask what is
possible, what is probable, and what we would prefer to see
happen.

We too have found the value of community-oriented
policing. It began several years ago with a grant from the
National Institute of Justice, and is called Innovative
Neighborhood-Oriented Policing, or INOP. It gives us an
opportunity to be much more than just guardians of law
and order. We can be community problem-solvers. We
can be community outreach specialists. We do this
through master and mini-planning committees with
representatives from environmental resources, the health
department, fire department, public works, the state
attorney's office, the Apartment Owners and Builders
Association, in addition to key business owners from the
community.

We started out with eight original sites, and I am
proud to say that after two years we have 44 separate
satellite offices up and running in Prince George's County.
My long-range plan calls for 101 police officers dedicated
to community-oriented policing by 1995.

Of course, we are in competition for that precious
dollar. I am competing with fire departments and I am
competing with boards of education. I can tell you from
Budgeting 101, when you talk increases, talk programs.
Do not say: "I just need more police." I am very fortunate
to have a supportive county executive who believes in
community policing and approved the plan to get up to
101 community police officers by 1995.

In the 44 separate offices we now have, our police
officers have signs out front that say "Prince George's
County Police, Community Policing Project." Some are
in churches, as a matter of fact, and there I do not pay one
Our approach is to solve the problem the first time. One of the examples of that is called CMAST or the County Multi-Agency Services Team. It was conceived from California's SMART Team, or the Special Multi-Agency Response Team. Members of the CMAST in Prince George's County include the police department, the Department of Environmental Resources, the state attorney's office or Office of Law, the fire department, public works, transportation, central services, Housing and Urban Development, Child and Adult Protective Services, the sheriff's department, and our health department.

We look at some of the long-standing problems we have had in our community, and we develop ways to solve them so that we can move on. Through CMAST and community policing, not only have we gained an improved image for the Prince George's County Police Department, but we have seen violent crime in community policing areas reduced by up to 40 percent. We have also seen an improvement in terms of the quality of life. We see playgrounds now where we once saw drug dealers.

We also see improvements in the way police officers feel about coming to work; we see improvements in morale. Overall, it has been a great partnership in Prince George's County.

What I have to have and what I want in Prince George's County is a community that is proud of the police department. You cannot have 1,700 employees and not make a mistake along the way. What I want is the community's trust and the opportunity to look into what happened, get back to my community, take appropriate action, and move on from there. We are all that much better for it, or that much prouder for it, and that much more successful for it as well.

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN MADISON, WISCONSIN

Noble Wray
Sergeant, City of Madison Police Department

I would like to begin by talking about some of the characteristics of civil disorder. There are some subtle differences and distinctions in civil disorder, and the reason I want to spend a little time discussing this is that Madison has a long rich, history in dealing with civil disorder.

Many of you may remember the late 1960's. Being a university town, we dealt with a lot of anti-war protests, and we are probably one of two or three other cities in the nation that had a lot of protests and demonstrations during the Gulf War. We are also currently experiencing many right-to-life demonstrations.

Those types of civil disorders are generally energized by social or political issues, and they are usually, but not always, single-issue-oriented, which usually results in planned marches, demonstrations, and boycotts. We in Madison have evolved an operating philosophy to deal with civil disorder, and in doing so we learned some things that were really important.

A long time ago, we learned to establish some form of communication between the police and crowds. For example, if a situation called for it, perhaps the officer should not wear a helmet; perhaps he or she should talk to people during demonstrations, break that barrier, negotiate a win/win situation, and not become a negative focus.

What I mean by negotiating a win/win situation is that most of the people who demonstrate are not focusing on the police department, they are petitioning the government. They have certain issues that they want to deal with. We understand that. In fact, it has gotten to a comical point with most of our demonstrators. We sit down with them and we say, "Where would you like to be arrested? Where do you want the media to be when you are arrested?" And, "How exactly would you like to be arrested?" Now, the key here is for the police department not to become the focus. The police department is creating a situation or an environment for people to achieve their objectives without us becoming the focus.

We have a method for handling crowds and demonstrations, and we type these things up and hand them out to the crowd. Some of the statements include the following:
"Our objective is to protect constitutional rights, the rights to assemble, petition the government, and engage in free speech.

"We are impartial and remain neutral regardless of the issue.

"We maintain open dialogue with citizens and news media, before, during, and after demonstrations.

"We monitor demonstrations and marches to protect individual rights and ensure public safety.

"We balance the right to demonstrate with the rights of the community at large; we use restraint on the use of force.

"We protect people first, property second."

And finally, I think what is more important is this: "We, as peace officers, pursue continuous improvement in our method."

Of course, there are serious distinctions between this type of civil disorder and what took place last spring in Los Angeles. And the distinction would be this: How is it fueled?

Los Angeles was energized by more chronic conditions, which relates to the people involved. For example, when the right-to-life demonstrators protest, they come in on buses, they demonstrate and then they leave. On the other hand, I would characterize what happened in Los Angeles as "Classic Urban Civil Disorder Syndrome." This type of civil disorder generally erupts from living conditions such as racial intolerance, poverty, lack of job opportunity, crime, and drugs, etc. And the affected group usually spells government P-O-L-I-C-E. To go into even more detail about this classic urban civil disorder syndrome, there are several basic dynamics that exist, number one being the belief that there is a disparity in treatment. What I mean is that there is a perception that severe inadequacies exist in certain areas of the social structure. This includes minority groups that believe that their rights have been neglected or violated, non-minority groups that perceive that minorities have received social benefits at their expense, or hate groups that press for their superiority over other groups.

I used the word "perceive" deliberately. Perception is illusive, and the only way you can deal with perception is to open up dialogue. You have to have communication.

The other community dynamic in this chronic civil disorder syndrome is a lack of confidence in redress. It is really critical to have a complaint process where people can deal with these issues.

The last and probably most vivid in our minds is the triggering incident. A triggering incident is a tension-heightening event that catalyzes discontent and turns into civil disorder. From a citizen's perspective, this means "us against them"—"them" meaning police or government, and "us" meaning those who feel they are likely to be mistreated. When we have a triggering incident, an arrest, an officer-involved shooting, we set this dynamic in motion.

Many have an image of Madison as being a university town that does not have any problems, and in part, that is correct. We usually make the top ten in the nation as the best place to live. It is a university town. Our general population has two percent unemployment. It is a very professional town. We have all of those things that lead to a stable community.

But just like any community, we have two cities. We have two cities within the city, one of which contains scattered-site public housing, displaced in 13 different areas of the city. Those areas are disproportionately African American, and have 70 percent unemployment. We have crime, drugs, you name it—anything you would find in a large city.

It was when I was a community policing officer seven years ago that I realized we could have an impact on preventing unmanageable civil disorder in these areas. There is such a thing as manageable civil disorder, and it helps when we deal with citizen-identified problems rather than police-identified problems.

For example, when I was working out there, I identified a problem by looking at the statistics to determine where I was having the most incidents. The number one incident at the time involved kids at a large apartment complex ripping out stereos and other equipment from...
cars in order to get money to purchase drugs or alcohol. I dealt with it, and I had some success. But at every neighborhood meeting I went to, no one brought that up as an issue. Did I solve the problem? No. I solved the crime-related problem, but I did not solve the citizens’ problem.

And as you know, we are in a competitive business. We have to view citizens as customers, because they are the ones that measure our level of service. At the time, their number one problem, which I was able to identify through neighborhood meetings and surveys, was disruption caused by teenagers and small children going through the apartment building. So I had to deal with that, because the residents with the concerns are the ones measuring the service I am providing.

Another objective is to engage in broad problem-solving—and not just respond to incidents. This approach demands looking for non-traditional methods to deal with traditional problems. I also needed to be concerned about quality of life and not just fighting crime. This does not mean that you do not deal with those traditional law enforcement issues, because your credibility depends on it. And it does not mean that you are expected to solve all the problems. But many times you will find yourself out there as a catalyst for positive change.

Today in Madison we have 13 neighborhood sites, with neighborhood officers assigned to them on a full-time basis. This is imperative in terms of getting to know the people you serve. Their hours should not be structured, something I have always advocated. You should be looking for prime time, when you can get maximum impact.

Some people would argue that you are supposed to be on duty from 6:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. That is generally the peak period when crime occurs. But that is not the only reason you are out there. You are also looking for maximum visibility. Some people say, “Oh, we are not social workers, we are crime fighters.” But if you work upstream you can solve some of the problems downstream. And being a social worker on a micro-level, meaning, for example, referring a family to the correct social service so they can move forward, is part of the job of being a community policing officer.

And, of course, we are going to have to work more and more with other agencies. We have to figure out a better way of working smarter, not harder.

How does all this relate to civil disorder? If you are out there beforehand, you know who the people are. They know who you are. Communication is so critical.

I would like to emphasize this point with a story.

When I first went out there, as I walked the streets, I saw a couple of teenagers coming toward me, then take off running. I could not figure out what was going on. Finally I caught up with them, and said, “Why are you running?” Well, they said they were used to running from police officers, and they just reacted to me based upon how they had been treated in the past. The perception was that I was going to do something to them. That is why it was so critical for me to open up lines of communication.

Finally, I will say this: The idea of the connection between civil disorder and poverty seems to surprise a lot of people—most recently in Los Angeles. I was amazed, listening to the media and to the reaction of many residents in Los Angeles. That is an old issue. So old that Frederick Douglass talked about it more than 100 years ago:

“Where justice is denied, where poverty is in force, where ignorance prevails, and where one class is made to feel that society is organized in a conspiracy to oppress, rob, and degrade them, neither persons nor property will be safe.”

And those same issues remain today—before and after crack cocaine.
COMMUNITY-BASED PROBLEM-SOLVING IN GREENVILLE, SOUTH CAROLINA

Charles Barnett
Major, Greenville County Sheriff's Department

Greenville, South Carolina, has 265 sworn officers and a total of just over 400 full-time and part-time personnel. In area, the land is about 789 square miles; county-wide the population is 330,000. Last year we dispatched about 131,000 calls. During that time, we managed to have a record clearance level of 63.5 percent of all reported crimes, which we thought was fairly significant. And the reason why we think it is significant is that our manpower level is just over 1 per 1,000, and in the suburban law enforcement areas, you usually get around 2.4 or 2.5 per thousand. Actually we should have a department of over 500 officers, instead of 265.

One of the factors to which we attribute our success is our deep involvement with the community in problem-solving—not just responding to criminal events, but simply going out there and being a part of the day-to-day life of that community. That is why we feel we have a greater potential to avoid large-scale civil disorders in our community—because people in minority communities and the other communities throughout the county do not see us as an outside occupying force; they see us as part of the fabric of that community.

We do not just get involved in criminal events; we get involved in citizens' problems on a day-to-day basis. And we would certainly like to thank all the agencies that have gone before us and served as the experimental seed beds in accepting grants and in developing some of the ideas that we have adopted, because we adopted all these things without any federal grant money. We felt that if the ideas were good, they could be implemented without any additional dollars and, in fact, we are implementing or community-oriented law enforcement throughout the organization.

We have been frozen in our manpower levels for the past three years now, but it does not take additional manpower to do this. We work closely with apartment managers and with property managers in subsidized housing areas, which we identify as higher call-volume areas. We send a team of officers in to try to identify those people involved in questionable activity. We will either set them up for counseling or we will work with the property managers to get them evicted.

If the problem is in subsidized housing, sometimes we have found that property managers have been co-opted by the drug dealers who live and ply their trade inside the apartments. In that case, we simply go a few steps higher, to the property owners, and tell them we have a problem with their property manager and that, before we file any formal complaints that might interfere with some of their federal reimbursements, we would certainly like to give them an opportunity to work with us. Many times when you talk about people's pocketbooks, it gets their attention.

Faith in our agency is critical. People certainly are not going to have faith in you and your agency if they feel there is any instance of abuse going on that is being covered up. So we also have a vigorous internal affairs program, and we publish the results in an annual report that is distributed to the public every year.

As a part of the working community, we see things every day that many other county agencies do not see. We are in a good position to report it and request that action be taken in order to correct it. We have developed a county-wide service referral form. Officers fill out the report, state what the problem is and which county agency it should be referred to. It is given to a staff deputy in the Uniform Patrol Division, who then logs it in on his computer and sends it to the appropriate agency. He then provides a five-day follow-up, calling to make sure, number one, that the agency received it and, number two, what it is going to do about it.

We found out that some of the county agencies were not used to responding the way we felt we should respond. In fact, sometimes it was like sending information into a great black hole somewhere. Service requests went in, but you never heard anything back. So we found out we had to be aggressive in follow-up if this was to work. The people would not have faith in what we were doing if they never saw results from it. Moreover, the officers themselves were not going to have faith in you unless they saw some results.

One of the things we also did was to get away from counting beans. We did away with the Officer's Daily Work Report. Some of our sergeants almost had heart attacks when we did that. They said, "My God, how are we going to evaluate our officers?"

But when we pulled the daily report out, we established a higher benchmark for the sergeants and said: "You are going to evaluate the officer based on the quality of life in the community to which he or she is assigned." That goes for all patrol officers now. They are evaluated on how they interact with people and how they respond to disorder in the community, not just crime but any signs of disorder.

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At one point we had a very large, open drug market for crack cocaine. It was the largest in the state of South Carolina. We went in and identified some pretty decent people in the community, long-time residents, who still owned their own homes there. We started telling them that we were going to come in and assist them. We did not tell them exactly what we were going to do, but the day we started we really drove a wedge between the market and the consumer. We really disrupted that market with a lot of aggressive, good, strong law enforcement.

On the other hand, the officers were also working with the people who lived there, so when they came through they were waved right on in. It worked so well that people were parking their cars and coming back out to the officers on the traffic stops and shaking their hands, saying, “Thank you for being here. We want you to stay.” In fact, now we have people coming from all sorts of communities asking for officers to be assigned to their communities in order to help them with certain problems.

Another project we undertook was community clean up, because we felt people could not take pride in where they lived if it was a mess. We started out with three environmental crimes investigators, and we assigned four or five vehicles.

In terms of the investigative effort, we try to prosecute people whenever we can find the responsible party. I am sure a lot of counties have trouble with the dumping of shingles and tires. As landfill restrictions get tighter and tighter, this stuff ends up all over the place, on the ends of little dirt roads. So we started posting these areas.

What we were very concerned about, though, is that many of these illegal sites were near residential areas that had gone downhill. People were just dumping there, even industrial waste. The children in the area were put at risk with this material. Now we have some very tight environmental restrictions dealing with uncovered loads, and we are working to clean up the county.

We also have a large Mack roll-back truck with 40-yard boxes that we can set up in a community whenever we are doing community clean-ups. The arrangement gives us enough room to pick up large amounts of heavy trash.

We are not doing things that take away from law enforcement; we are doing things that complement law enforcement, helping that community become cleaner. They are also part of the clean-up day. Everything that we do is in conjunction with the community.

As an example of the program’s effectiveness, during the month of March we moved about 230,000 pounds of trash into primitive landfills from various areas across the county. In one community, we are doing some redevelopment, so we scheduled one of these clean-up days and we moved 70,000 pounds of trash out—in one weekend’s worth of work.

So there are a number of things that can be done that are not considered traditional but which can enhance the overall mission. Too many times in law enforcement we say we are not social workers, but we are—whether we like it or not, because we deal with people.
Before I give an idea of how our particular areas of Las Vegas were affected last year, I need to say first that the state is rather sparsely populated. The northern part of the state is the Reno area and the southern part is Las Vegas. About 800,000 people live in Clark County—that does not count the tourists that come through on any given weekend or holiday. We have about 1,100 commissioned people, and about 450 of them are primarily committed to patrol.

The region of Las Vegas where we had problems last year is a geographical area of about 12 square miles, containing primarily low-income and federally-subsidized housing projects. We had problems with both Hispanic and black gang members.

We have spent a tremendous amount of time training our people in conventional tactics to deal with civil unrest. We have experienced several different types of civil unrest in Las Vegas over the last ten years, but it has primarily consisted of labor strikes on the strip area and downtown.

Nonetheless, I need to underscore our lack of preparedness. We were not prepared for the rapid increase in violent behavior, not only toward citizens in the community but also toward the police. We were caught rather flat-footed, even after we had seen what was occurring in Los Angeles.

After Los Angeles erupted it took almost 24 hours for it to affect us. On April 30, 1992, in the latter part of the afternoon, a large group of primarily black gang members rallied in a specific area of West Las Vegas. West Las Vegas is a rather confined area, and has a large criminal element. About 250 people gathered; half of them were able to mobilize and get into vehicles. They also had quite a few weapons of all different types: Molotov cocktails, rocks, bottles, and so on. They then started a rapid movement toward our downtown area, which was about two-and-a-half miles from where they originated.

We had people in the area who saw what was happening, and who made an assessment that these individuals would have to be dealt with. Using conventional tactics, we formed a small skirmish line of about 40 officers and strategically placed it in an area where it could attempt to turn back the group, at the intersection of Main Street and Bonanza. We positioned ourselves there and were able to turn the crowd around. It took us about 20 to 25 minutes. We were shot at and had officers injured from the flying debris.

We were able to turn the group back to the area from which they came. But we then sat back and thought, “Okay, we were successful; we stopped them from getting into our downtown gambling district.” We made a critical error, however, in that we did not make a significant number of arrests. In fact, I do not think we made more than 10 or 12. We were not prepared to do so; we did not have the people in place.

We moved the group back into the West Las Vegas area and attempted to splinter and deplete it. That took about 14 hours, until about 4:00 in the morning.

In the meantime, they burned most of the business community that is located in that area of town, and we had one officer shot in the arm. One citizen was killed in an arson. Looters burned the store down, and the individual was unable to get out.

That was our first night, which we affectionately call Fright Night 1. Then we stood back and started to look at some of the ways in which we could be better prepared. And good thing, because within three-and-a-half days, we had to deal with it again. If you recall, many of the gang sets—the Bloods, the Crips and their offshoots—were under a so-called truce. So we allowed this criminal element to gather up under their truce. That was another major mistake; 99 percent of them were active gang members.

Sunday night, May 2nd, we experienced a large gathering at one of our housing projects, about 500 people. We went in, gave a dispersal order, and probably half the crowd dispersed within 12 to 15 minutes. We still utilized the conventional tactic of a skirmish line, but we were now prepared to make arrests. The minute we started to form our skirmish line we were shot at again—this time at very close range. People were firing from inside the crowd. Most of the rounds were hitting high, but it obviously had a devastating effect on those officers on the front line.

We split the skirmish line at that point, and we deployed two 10-man SWAT units in a B-100, which is basically an armored personnel carrier. We had one of the teams inside of that vehicle and one team on the ground to cover. We went inside the group itself and we used less-than-lethal munitions: sting-arounds, which are like a bean bag round shot from a shotgun; wooden baton rounds; and rubber baton rounds, which are shot at the ground level and then skip up at the waist level. Those were very effective in dispersal of the crowd.
However, we failed again that night to do what we neglected the first night, and that was to make the arrests. We dispersed the crowd, which went in many different directions. We did not consider an approach in which we could have moved the crowd into our arresting units. We did, in fact, disperse the crowd. No officers were hit, and no citizens required hospitalization.

Our third major incident came five days later, on the following Friday. No burning took place this time, but some looting did occur. Again, there was a group of about 50 people in a park. It started out as a picnic under the so-called truce, but at that time the truce was starting to deteriorate quite a bit, and more gang-on-gang violence began to occur.

They gathered at about 2:00 in the afternoon. We had police presence in and around the area, but at about 8:30 that night the scene turned from a picnic-type environment to a very hostile one. Shots rang out from within the group. This time, instead of doing a skirmish line, we set our people up in a position and brought in our SWAT unit. Again, we used the peacekeeper and a B-100, which we were able to get from the Department of Energy’s nearby test site. We went in and dispersed the crowd, but this time we also set up a position that enabled us to make a significant number of arrests.

That was the last major incident we experienced in Las Vegas. It ran over a 12-day period—three major incidents that made national news. But I assure you, we had trouble through about May 25th. Our officers dispatched in the area were regularly shot at. If an arrest was to be made, 40 to 50 individuals would surround our officers and throw things at them, which obviously created some serious problems for policing the community.

We learned a lot of things. I think we had a lot of problems to begin with because we were not reaching out to the people who lived in the area. After the incidents, we started walking foot patrol and talking with the residents, who were basically imprisoned in their own homes. Most of the low-income housing project facilities do not have phones, and these residents were basically at war with the gangs. Many of them would simply say to us, “You know, it is really nice that you guys are trying to do something. However, you are just visiting. We live here.”

It really opened our eyes to what we could do to prevent future incidents like this. Our patrol force is relatively young, about three-and-a-half to four years on the force, due to our rapid growth. And they were not prepared to deal with that type of environment. They were taking the violence projected at the police very personally. Some experienced stress-related problems after those events.

Since that time we have established Tenant/Council committees, regular foot patrols, and a peace committee group, that is, residents from the affected area that are out right now trying to do things that will prevent similar situations from developing in the future.

The tactics we deployed were very aggressive, but please do not confuse “aggressive” with “use of force.” Since that time we have adapted the mobile field force concept, which is a rather aggressive approach to dealing with civil disturbances. We have also cleaned and polished our mass-arrest procedures, because we saw other agencies in the Western United States—San Francisco, for example—make about 2,000 arrests within an hour-and-a-half when their problems started. I do not think we have the people to be able to make arrests on that scale, but that would have been a big help to us. If we had made those arrests on the initial night, I do not think we would have chased the problem for 10 to 12 days afterward.

We used less-than-lethal munitions during the major incidents. The SWAT people were deployed strictly as perimeter and arrest teams, and we did not receive one complaint through our Internal Affairs Bureau.

Since that time, however, our gangs have grown significantly. Right now, this affected area has approximately 25,000 residents, and there are about 7,000 active gang members who are creating some significant problems for the people that live and work in and around that area.

That said, we have gotten closer to the community, and we have identified some shortcomings on our part and have begun to relate to the people that reside there. The problems they are experiencing were somewhat different from what we expected. We started working with them and we have made some great strides.

Nevertheless, should future disturbances occur, we are preparing by practicing with live gas. We have incorporated two different types. We have an access-denial chemical agent for prevention of looting, which we can deploy inside a business. It is flameless. It allows us to arrest people that are driven out, and denies access for a period of time.

We also use an outside chemical agent which is very, very hot. We have trained 888 people in the last seven weeks to deal with the chemical agent—when to use it, when not to, what type of criteria, what needs to be considered as far as weather conditions. On our leather gear we carry Capstun at 5 percent. In addition, we use a device we call a Magnum, which can fire a stream of 5 percent capsicum about 18 to 20 feet. We also have a Devastator, which is a large fire extinguisher that shoots...
an incapacitating mist of 10 percent capsicum about 35 to 40 feet; this is carried by tactical units.

We found that in those large crowds, when we can identify the people with the weapons and can get to them fast, our problems are more quickly resolved. I should note that when we talk about use of force in our training, whether it is nonlethal, less-than-lethal, or use of a chemical agent, none of it is to exceed our department use-of-force policy.

At the beginning of the post-LA verdict disturbance, we had decided to handle 500 arrests, we would have been able to accommodate such numbers. But what we failed to do was to take our detention personnel; arrest is basically their specialty. We left them out of our plan.

We also had a few other things we had to consider. In many cases, we went into these housing projects and we gave the dispersal order. Because a lot of the people lived there, however, we were discouraged from deploying a chemical agent which would have affected a lot of innocent people.

We experienced no significant injuries in the use of less-than-lethal. One individual tried to throw a Molotov at one of the peacekeepers and was hit in the elbow with a sting-around; the elbow was broken. That was the most serious injury we had. It does whack you, it does bruise you, and the rubber baton rounds will knock you down, but there were no serious injuries—resulting in less-than-lethal force.

The access-denial chemical was something we learned about from agencies in Florida and Los Angeles. After Los Angeles experienced what it did, their officers approached business owners about deploying a chemical agent in their stores. We have done the same thing, and have told our business owners that if we deploy chemical agent for access-denial, in many cases their perishable goods would be tainted. As for clothing, it would have to go through some kind of decontamination process. Not one owner has said that he would prefer not to do it.

Again, there has to be some training provided, because anything that says “less than lethal” can be lethal if it is abused. A lot of people think that if one works, then two or three will be better. But that is not the case; you get a desired effect with one, and that is where you stop.

We had a few businesses that were totally looted and then burned to the ground. If we had deployed chemical agent for access-denial, I do not believe they would have been burned to the ground, and we could have made a significant number of arrests.

When we were able to apprehend looters, we did. But the problem was that we had 200 people inside a shopping center, and a 45-man platoon responding to that problem; it is very difficult to amass the numbers of arrests that would have been required to resolve the situation. You do more chasing than arresting.

If we had made the arrests the very first time, I really believe that would have resolved many of our problems. If anything, it would have removed the agitation that was starting to boil over. But we just were not prepared to do it. The first night, we ended up chasing that group of people for about 12 hours, when in fact if we could have taken 150 out of the original 250, I do not believe we would have seen the type of problems that we had for the remainder of that evening. And it is possible we could have saved some buildings. We could have saved the one person that died inside the building, as well as kept one of our officers from being shot.

In the final analysis, we were not fully prepared. We did know that we were going to experience something, due to the heavy influence that Los Angeles gangs have on our gangs. We continually interact with very mobile gang members from Los Angeles who come to Las Vegas and stay for two, three, four weeks at a time. Whether they are running drugs, guns, or whatever, they are there, and they are there constantly. And we were prepared to deal with civil unrest, because we saw it occurring in Los Angeles, so we were already starting to beef up police presence on the streets. But we were not prepared for the rapid escalation of the violent behavior we experienced from the start. It was almost instantaneous.

And, as I mentioned, most of our officers, being young, were not prepared to stand in a skirmish line with rounds whizzing above their heads. At that point they did not know what to do. We had first-level supervisors saying “hold your position,” which in a conventional tactic is very appropriate—but you can obviously appreciate some of the responses they got.

As to inter-agency coordination, we in Las Vegas have a unique situation as far as mutual aid agreements. We are the largest law enforcement agency in the state, larger than the state police. The Nevada Highway Patrol, by the way, was there right away to lend assistance. We also have a small area called North Las Vegas with 126 officers total. They had a lot of problems there, and we ended up spending most of our time in their jurisdiction. And we had absolutely no mutual aid problems.

As for any future problems, we have all already prepared plans that correspond with those of the other agencies, and there has been an on-going dialogue established so that we can try to foresee emerging problems. ●
ATLANTA IN THE AFTERMATH OF L.A.

Julius Derico
Deputy Chief of Police, Field Operations Division, Atlanta Police Department

The Atlanta Police Department consists of approximately 1,600 sworn officers, serving a city of about 53 square miles. We have approximately 450,000 residents, and, being the convention center that we are, we attract many more on any given day.

On April 30, 1992, the city was hosting a conference of the National Black Police Association. I had gone there that morning, and we had talked about the Rodney King situation. The day went along, and we went to City Hall that night for a reception. The verdict came out in the afternoon, around five o'clock.

The mayor was at the reception. He had heard the verdict, and those of you who know Mayor Maynard Jackson know he is generally outspoken. But, ironically, on this evening, as he addressed the group, he expressed amazement at the verdict; he disagreed with it just like a lot of us did. But he did not go to the extremes that some chief executives did—Tom Bradley, for instance, who made several inflammatory statements about the verdict over and over and over again on TV.

Once the verdict came in, we began to have our people pay more attention to our city's hot spots, as we call them areas with low-income housing, for example. The evening went along rather quietly.

The 11:00 p.m. news in Atlanta carried what was going on in Los Angeles between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. It was being repeatedly shown on television. In Atlanta, however, everything was being reported as quiet within the city.

So I went to bed. But at about 12:30 a.m. the phone started jumping off the hook. We had a situation involving approximately 150 young people. They did not come from any of our 43 housing projects—it was still just as quiet there as when I went home that night. But we have seven black colleges in the Atlanta University Complex, which is a mile from downtown, and that is where they had come from.

Immediately I thought: We have done a pretty good job dealing with the major community, but we have done a very lousy job dealing with these students. Who the hell do you call at 12:30 at night to deal with these students?

And the answer was, "I do not know."

We responded to trouble at the State Capitol. We have in our department a captain who is on the evening shift and on the morning shift, who we refer to as our "night commander." This is the person who generally takes control of any after-hours situation. It was he who pulled resources from the various precinct areas and brought them to the Capitol until everything was basically under control.

During the trip to the Capitol, there were minor incidents. Some rocks had been thrown and a couple of windows had been broken. And, once they arrived at the State Capitol, one young man tried to break into the Capitol building. He was quickly put in a paddy wagon. Basically, we sealed the area off. Since the State Capitol is state property, the Georgia State Patrol and the Georgia Bureau of Investigations were notified and also responded to the situation.

We spent about two hours there that night, talking with the young people, negotiating, listening to them and trying to find out exactly what was going on. What was scariest was that as you went from pocket to pocket of young people, you found that nobody was in charge. Everybody was running around in their own groups doing their own thing, which was going to make it much more difficult to reach any kind of resolution.

After we had talked to them for a period of time, the only thing they could agree upon is that they wanted the person who was arrested. After discussions with everybody involved, we decided that we would release him, although we would not allow him to go back with them. We physically carried him back to his campus and, basically, the students went on back to their schools that night.

It was then that we began the plan. We started canceling off-days and calling in additional people, because we figured that the next day there would probably be another kind of situation developing.

And sure enough, the next day at approximately 1:00 p.m. another group gathered at the Atlanta University complex, intent on marching to the State Capitol again. We were under-prepared to stop it at that point, based on the resources we had present. So we opted for the lesser of two evils and tried to control it and escort it to the State Capitol. Initially we did well, but as the group moved along it became a magnet for everything in sight. We saw people coming out of abandoned houses and every place else, jumping into the group, which then started to pick up the pace. By now we knew we were going to have some problems with this group, because we could not slow it down, stop it, or control it.
So we called in resources from our other patrol unit and put them on stand-by in the downtown area. We also alerted the state patrol to stand by. When they got to the Capitol, a car was overturned by a group of people, and immediately a splinter group took off toward our underground Atlanta area, one of our major business developments.

They spread through downtown. Unfortunately, this was about 3:30 in the afternoon, and high school kids were getting out of school. They began to join the activity, so it took us approximately three hours to round this group up. We wanted to do it before dark, so we called in all the resources the state had. We made approximately 250 arrests that day, and we got everything pretty much under control.

Then we immediately went to our strategy sessions. This time we met with the mayor, and we had some people from the governor's office there. We all agreed it was in our best interest to call for an evening curfew from 11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. the following morning. After a long, long discussion with the mayor, who is very political, very liberal, very open-minded, very open-hearted, we convinced him that it would not be in his best interests or the best interests of the city that we let these people come back downtown the next day. Reluctantly, he agreed.

Our plans were that the next day we would put in a blocking force of Atlanta Police officers and buses supported by officers from the state and other areas. The city is such that you have a main thoroughfare that borders the campus area, and then there are several artery streets going downtown. We put our people in place at 7:00 in the morning so that no one could cross this line.

Kids began to move around on campus. We had a lot of public officials as well as private citizens on campus the next day talking to kids, trying to diffuse the situation, trying to get them to stay within the campus boundaries. There was a group of radicals, however, who began to move around the campus area toward downtown.

We immediately took our people off the buses, leaving all the state people, the reinforcement people, on the buses. We put our own people on the street for the initial confrontation. And as the youths began to move downtown, we pulled from the reinforcements, just to show them: this is what we have, and this is not where you are going today. They began to move back toward the campus, and as they moved back they started moving rather rapidly. We lost control over the group, and they went past the area on campus they should have gotten to.

We decided then that this is where we were going to draw the line, and we got the reinforcements off the buses.

We gave an order for the group to disperse. Some of them did, but some started throwing rocks and bottles from behind a housing development. The irony of it is that this entire campus complex is adjacent to a public housing project, but not one person from the housing project was involved in the bottle or rock-throwing.

We again began to make mass arrests, so they began to retreat to the campus. We took our lines to the street adjacent to the campus, and we ringed the entire campus. Again, we had rocks and bottles coming out at us, most being thrown from one particular dormitory. Liquid acid of some sort was also coming from the building, so we made the decision to use tear gas.

Tear gas was fired, and the campus police basically sealed off that dormitory. Then some students from one of the adjoining schools, Morehouse College, began to throw bottles and bricks. What we had developing was a unique situation in that, within an eight-block area, those students were the only ones there. We were basically on the perimeter, though we had 37 officers injured that day.

We had two helicopters in the area, one belonging to the state and one of our own. My chief had gotten back into town that morning, and he was flying in one of the helicopters. From this observation point, he decided that rather than run the risk of the officers trying to get in to disperse the crowd again, we would use the tear gas and the Oleoresin Capsicum gas that was on the helicopter. It was dropped, very delicately, right into the middle of an intersection. Then the helicopters hovered over it to keep all of the gas and fumes right down on top of them. After about 30 minutes, everything was over. They were out of the streets; they were gone.

We mistakenly decided to withdraw from the area immediately adjacent to the campus. As we withdrew approximately four blocks, we failed to take notice of a Korean grocery store and liquor store within that area. As we retreated, some of the students went off campus into the liquor store and the grocery store was looted and, to an extent, burned.

The incident hit me hard, because the Korean grocer had called 911 several times. They were in the store; they were trapped. They had climbed onto the roof of the store, and thank goodness they had a long phone cord to call us. Finally we got to them and got them out. That was the most critical event we had to deal with toward the end, and ultimately we were accused of not paying attention to the needs of this particular group.

After that incident, we immediately went in with street sweepers, and every bit of the debris was gone before midnight. From that point forward we had absolutely no
problem with civil unrest.

But we did have some problems with personnel. Most of our officers either attended schools in the Atlanta University complex or had kids in school at Atlanta University centers—African American officers in particular. And we had some mixed emotions among fathers who had students there.

But these were some of the things that came to our attention after the fact. We did not have any kind of rebellion or anything, but these are the kinds of things you never think about when you start grabbing people and assigning them to X, Y, and Z. You do not look at those kinds of internal dynamics that may play a direct role in the lives of the persons you are dealing with on a routine basis.

We also learned to start meeting with the college presidents and the student body. We now have a liaison group. The mayor has set up an Office of Youth Affairs that deals with the students on a regular basis. The mayor, the chief, and I went to many, many meetings on the various college campuses. We were abused, criticized, talked about. But we went out and met it head-on. The mayor did not let it fester or linger, and he set up the groups that are now working with his office on a routine basis.

In Atlanta, as in other major cities, the biggest problem we had was that the general population did not know what to do. The only thing they had to rely on was television or radio newscasters. On the first day, our business community would have been totally lost except that we had a radio network over which our private security companies downtown could both monitor and transmit.

We did not utilize this set-up to its full capacity; in some cases we had businesses making decisions to close down and put people out in the streets where we did not want them. So I think you need to look very hard at trying to set up a mechanism for controlling people — either when they are let go or when they are kept in the buildings. I think we all agree that they are safer in the buildings, particularly on the second or third floor, than they would be in the street.

In the aftermath, our City Council was very generous. We were able to purchase helmets and shields and guns and bomb containment devices. And we fully equipped our helicopters with the kind of searchlights we need. It is unfortunate, but sometimes it takes this kind of wake-up call for the city fathers to become active.

In general, the city of Atlanta had an experience for which we were not really prepared, even though we had our plans in place. We had a coordination arrangement set up with the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), though we did not really activate it, practice it, or do the kinds of dry runs we should have.

Since that time, we have formalized our EOC operation. Further, we are now in the process of creating, with the assistance of our emergency management agency, an automated call-up system, where we will be able to put all the numbers in a particular precinct on a floppy disk and put them into a computer. We have telephone access, so we can record a message and send it out to them. This will give us the opportunity to practice call-ups of personnel.

As for coordination with the university police, when the disorder started that night, they were the first to call. Apparently there was some kind of gathering on campus that ended around 11:30 p.m.; when the university police saw what was happening, they called right away.

We also now have in Atlanta what we call our Citizen Advisory Councils. Each police commander has picked reputable people in his or her precinct who are leaders in the community. And we have called them together and asked them to be our eyes and ears in the streets. But we also want them to be the ones that get the word out to their community groups if we do have a problem.

What that now means for us is that we must make sure that we have a mechanism in place in each precinct to make contact with these people if a situation arises. If not, we are going to lose them, and they are very anxious to work with us.
CIVIL DISORDER IN DADE COUNTY: RESPONSES TO THE MCDUFFIE AND LOZANO INCIDENTS

Jimmy Brown
Chief, Sheriff Services Division, Metro-Dade Police Department

In May 1980, in the City of Tampa, an all-white jury found a group of our officers innocent in the killing of Arthur McDuffie. Within two hours, Dade County had the worst civil disorder in this country in 30 years.

As a result of the violence that ensued, 18 people died. There was over $144 million worth of property damage. Then, in 1989, I was the commander of Northside station right in the heart of Liberty City. One of our officers decided he would make a traffic stop. He shot a young man on a motorcycle, and the rest is history. That was the Lozano incident, which happened on Martin Luther King’s birthday.

After that, a “spontaneous” incident in which a police officer shot a minority member, we arrested 256 people. No lives were lost as a result. We did not use any gas; we have not used gas in a long time. All of our mobile field forces are equipped with gas, but only a supervisor can give the command, and when we issue gas to a supervisor it is by serial number, so we know who uses it.

Our use-of-force policy does not waiver. It is the same during a civil and disturbances or any other disturbance.

I have referred to the spontaneous incident, which I consider the Lozano incident to have been. Additionally, there is what I call a “planned incident.” For example, if you have a trial that has received a lot of publicity, in which a minority member has been killed or injured, as we had in 1980, there are some things you can do that will determine whether or not you are going to have problems.

For the spontaneous incident, a plan is essential. When I was commander of the Northside station in the heart of Liberty City, we had our own civil disturbance plan. Why? Because we know that if all hell is going to break loose, it is going to start in Liberty City.

Not only do we have a plan, but we call our watch commanders “platoon commanders.” Each lieutenant has a cellular phone in his car. He has a mobile command post kit, and he can set up a field command post instantly.

You must also have a rapid response, and this is why we use the peer enforcement concept. You also have to contain the incident so that innocent people will not come into the area. That is essential.

For example, during the Lozano incident, the City of Miami experienced rocks and bottles and shots fired before we did. My entire platoon in the Northside station then immediately set up a perimeter around the affected area. We also called in the adjacent Metro Dade Police District, one to the south end of the district and one to the north.

We get the chance to rehearse quite a bit, so we get good at this, and the district was covered. Afterwards, we only took priority calls. We got down to real business, so our area was covered.

What we also learned from 1980 was that we need to know the mutual aid potential. We need to know who is on our side. I knew from four years in Liberty City, for example, that when we got ready to shut down the Hialeah Police Department on our west side, it would take one phone call, and they would shut down and set a perimeter around the west area. And even when we had Lozano, even during the spontaneous incident, I knew I was going to get some cars from Miami Beach.

A type of non-spontaneous incident can come when you have a change of venue. For a planned incident, like a trial, you need to start planning, and you need to develop an incident-specific plan. In retrospect, this is one of the serious shortcomings of Los Angeles. They did not have an incident-specific plan. They had a tactical operation. It was pretty; it was fixed. But who in the hell had time to read all that stuff?

Number 1, the plan should be simple; it should supplement your mobilization plan. The basic contents of such a plan are these: First, we anticipate that there is going to be violence. We do not apologize for it, we plan for it. Secondly, we want to prevent it if we can. And that means developing your intelligence.

I am not talking about the typical intelligence units that would shut down as they did in Los Angeles. Intelligence means understanding that there are some factors you can look at months before the trial. How many shop fire calls are you getting? When you start to get an inordinate number of those, that is an indicator.

Also, when you start to get a lot of assaults on your police officers, it is an indicator of unrest. How many times have we had incidents involving rocks? It is an indicator of unrest. When I was in Northside, it was every night. They threw rocks and bottles every night, except when it was raining or cold. Those are the kinds of things you start to look for.

We have one place in the department where all the intelligence comes in, including newspaper clippings. Initially, the intelligence unit prepares a written report.
that goes to all the command staff and affected agencies once a month. During the month prior to the trial or the incident, the report is published every two weeks, so that everybody knows what is going on.

Community dialogue is also important. This is why you need to have a relationship with the community before trouble. What we have learned is that we need to know where the key people are. Since 1982, we have put a team police unit right in the housing project. They work two shifts, so they know the residents, they know the bad guys, and they have a relationship with the community.

Deployment is critical. What we did prior to the Lozano trial is have actual rosters of everybody we anticipated would be working department-wide, because you are always going to have somebody who is sick or on leave and you need to make accommodations.

One of the other things we did was to sit down with 200 business people in my district. Why? Because during a violent incident you have a lot of people who believe in using their Uzis when push comes to shove, and we did not want to be caught in the crossfire. So we met with them and told them exactly what we were going to do.

Another aspect of deployment is that we used detectives to identify critical locations—the places where explosives are stored, power facilities, etc. Moreover, you can't wait until trouble starts to assign specific people to fire stations. One of the problems we had in 1980 was that people did not know who was in charge. So what we did during Lozano was setup six live phone lines in my office; that is where I would entertain high-ranking people. They can make their calls, they can have coffee, they can have a doughnut, but my conference room was the command post. Now, for the real big-wigs, the mayors, we had a command office 30 miles away.

One of the things we also learned is to use the field force concept—40 to 60 officers all responding together, just like the National Guard. Give them a mission to get to a site. When you have about 25 police cars with all of their lights on, let them go in. We practice this at least twice a year. People who work together, practice it together. They are not strangers, they know each other, and respond as a team.

We went to the mobile field force concept because we have learned from today's urban disturbances that the skirmish lines often do not work; you need to have an alternative. Maybe the mobile field force is not for you, but it is something that you should consider.

One of the main things we have learned is what to do when police officers get trapped. That is one of the things we practice—how to go in and rescue officers who are down, and also how to go in and get innocent citizens out when they have wandered into the area unknowingly. As Los Angeles did in 1992, we had real problems with this in 1980. If they had gone in and taken Florence and Normandy before all those people got hurt, I am certain that there would have been a different outcome.

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EMERGENCY PLANNING: DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE BLUEPRINT

Jon J. Wehmeyer
Supervisory Special Agent, Training Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Our topic, “Emergency Planning,” is crucial to the successful response and resolution of any crisis situation. In the FBI, we talk in more generic terms—“crisis management” as opposed to “civil unrest management.”

At the National Academy, we run nearly a thousand police officers through the program each year. Of those thousand officers, approximately 200 of them are involved in our 15-hour crisis management elective. In that program, common complaints about the planning process come from the participating police officers. Here are a few:

- Many managers do not take the time to get involved in emergency planning;
- There are too many fires to put out on a daily basis;
- The managers cannot devote enough time to the planning process; and
- Plans are not reviewed or updated.

The suggested solution is to designate one person to coordinate and monitor the planning process. Our field offices usually appoint a SWAT team leader or another coordinator to handle that responsibility, and it is supposed to be his or her responsibility to exercise the plan on at least a semiannual basis, and then make the appropriate modifications. This is what is supposed to happen. Yet the complaint is that this does not occur frequently enough.

The officers attending this seminar often note that agencies failing to perform this all-important step face significant civil liabilities. One excuse for not getting enough planning is that when you put something on paper you have liability problems. It is not true.

Eight or ten years ago, when we developed our hostage rescue team, we had the same kind of situation and were faced with the same issue: How do we put down on paper what these people are going to do? Should we do it? Should we not? We decided that it was in our best interest to write it down. If we go to court, are put on the stand, are asked what our standard operating procedures are, we could then respond with a well-thought-through plan laid out on paper.

However, there is a caveat to this, which is that if you are going to violate an SOP or any part of your planning process, recognize it, articulate it, and then act accordingly. Because every situation is different, we cannot be held to what is on paper. So, as long as we recognize that we are violating our procedures and act accordingly, we cannot be faulted from a liability standpoint.

I would now like to focus on how to formulate the plan. We use the “what-if” theory to pick out potential crisis situations: What if this happens? How are we going to respond to it? You cannot identify all potential crisis situations, but you certainly can highlight those that you, through the mission of your organization, could reasonably expect to encounter. Then we prioritize them. How important are they? Are we more concerned about someone taking over the Washington Monument or are we more concerned about a terrorist attack on Congress?

Then we must ask what we are going to do about it. Are we going to be pro-active or reactive? As I noted earlier, as far as the National Academy students were concerned, we have not been pro-active enough. We do try to get out in front of the situation rather than letting the situation dictate how we operate.

Basically, you want to determine what is expected of your organization: What are your capabilities and limitations? Try to make provisions to acquire what and who you need. Do not wait for the incident to occur before you start thinking about what you should do, what kind of equipment you need, or what people you need. Form the team, determine your command-and-control requirements, and start gathering intelligence on what you believe may be your high-priority threats.

You have to start developing a strategy on how to handle crises. In Washington, D.C., we have a specific scenario we are concerned about, relating to Capitol Hill. But there are generic plans that you can tailor-make to fit any situation. Test the plan and communicate it to all the members of the crisis management team.

Then you must evaluate your plan. Just having a plan on paper is not enough. Too many plans sit in a cabinet somewhere and gather dust.

Next, training is extremely important. We have individual training, team training, component training—for the negotiators, the SWAT people, the technical and intelligence folks—and then we have system training, which must be tested on a routine basis.

In our organization, we test at least once a year with a major command-post exercise and field training exercises. We bring everybody out, but you can conduct a command-post exercise without rolling out all the troops.
We have looked at some of the basics of putting a plan together, and now we want to talk about how to respond once the incident occurs, and about how to implement the plan.

When we get the word that a situation has occurred, the first responders are extremely crucial. And chances are that in most cases those first responders are going to be police officers on the street. We need to determine in advance what their roles and responsibilities should be.

First, we want them to identify the subjects involved, whether or not there are any hostages, and what weapons may be used by the subjects. These are things that must be reported back as soon as possible.

Then we want to talk to witnesses and identify staging areas. How do we get in there? What resources do we have on scene? Where is the command post location? And we must also prepare for the crunch of people that are on the way.

For us, the first responders are state and local law enforcement. In most situations, our agents are not going to be on the scene first. So next we want to assemble the crisis management team. This draws on component training—intelligence and operations—which I mentioned earlier. The tactical coordinator and negotiations coordinator work very closely together, as well as the technical and surveillance personnel.

Unfortunately, some of these people in some organizations are wearing more than one hat. We try to break out individuals who can deal with a protracted situation in which the shifts operate 12 hours on, 12 hours off. Once everybody gets tired and goes home, somebody needs to be capable of continuing the operation.

The glue that binds this system together is intelligence information. Without identifying prepared channels of information, your system is not going to work. In a situation like Waco, we used an information flow that worked something like this:

Every component coordinator fills out a form when he or she gets information they think is critical to the operation. This form is then given to all the coordinators, who check it off and develop their own overview, adding any information they think could be lead material. Then the material goes directly to the intelligence coordinator, who puts a number on it and makes copies. We have found that it is critical in these cases to have a copy machine, make multiple copies, and send the information simultaneously to all the different components.

If there is a lead to be developed, the operations coordinator should assign that lead and see that it is entered and tracked on a computer system. In this manner, at the end of the day the on-scene commander can get a printout as to what has been done—he can do a word search if he has got a name or any other identifier, and pull out all the information he needs. That was a real savior for us in Waco. If you put butcher block paper on the walls in a situation like that, it will not do you any good. You are going to lose the information. The same thing can happen with a computer. It is one thing to enter information, but you also have to be able to get it out on a moment's notice.

While the first responder does his or her job, the crisis management team must isolate the threat, put the perimeters together, and set up the command post. If you are the on-scene commander or you are in charge of one of these situations, you must go out and look at it. You cannot address a situation like this from the command post. Take the time to get out on the street. Fly over it, walk around it, do whatever you have to do, but make sure you get out there and look at it.

Next comes the mission analysis. What is the mission? Why are we here? What are we going to do? Sometimes these questions do not get answered early enough.

We are going to generate courses of action, and we need to come up with a few suitable, realistic options. The on-scene commander is going to review these options and then decide on the best course of action. Then we issue a warning order, which is a short statement of the situation, the mission, the basic instructions, and the specific instructions.

We are now at the point where we can further develop the plans and then get back to the on-scene commander. He or she will approve and modify the detailed plan. Once that is done, the operations order is issued.

In this way, you will catch a lot of details that may have fallen between the cracks without this kind of system. Once the order is issued, we will have rehearsals, get ready to go, do what we have to do, and then supervise implementation of the plan.

And that is it. It is quick and dirty—what the military would probably call a rapid planning process, and it is a process that you can go through step-by-step when a crisis situation occurs. If you have a simple outline like this to follow, it will be of great assistance to you in getting things done quickly and effectively.
DETROIT'S PRO-ACTIVE APPROACH TO POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

James Jackson
Commander, Training and Support Division, Detroit Police Department

As a 25-year veteran of the Detroit Police Department, I have had the opportunity to observe a myriad of changes in the law enforcement community. When I joined the department in 1968, our city, like many others, was still recovering from the civil disturbances of 1967. Since that time, there have been sporadic instances of civil disruption throughout the country, but Detroit has remained a relatively peaceful city with no serious civil disorder problems.

The major reason, we believe, is that from day one of his administration, Mayor Coleman Young set the tone. He indicated he would not tolerate brutality. We attribute the absence of the kind of civil strife we have seen in a number of cities—Los Angeles most recently—to a number of key steps that the mayor, the police department, and key city officials have initiated over the years with the full organizational support and cooperation of our citizens.

While it is impossible to accurately predict the reaction of the community during stressful encounters with law enforcement officers, it is possible to take a pro-active approach to mitigate circumstances that may create public resentment against police officers. Indeed, our history of success in Detroit is reflected in the fact that, following the disturbances in Los Angeles, we were asked to send a representative to Los Angeles to work with the Police Foundation in assessing the police response to disorder there.

Our department has continually and aggressively sought citizen participation in police functions, and the support, cooperation, and enthusiasm of our citizens has been a catalyst for what we believe to be our success.

As many of you are aware, in November of 1992 our department experienced a situation in some ways similar to the Rodney King incident that occurred in California. A young black man died as a result of police contact, apparently beaten to death, near a crack house. Most of the officers at the scene were white, with the exception of one black supervisor, who arrived later.

The two officers who initiated the contact both had some history of complaints of abusive behavior lodged against them, which up to that time had been largely unsubstantiated. Many citizens in the community, based on rumors, were enraged. Fortunately for us, this incident had a different outcome than the King incident, and we attribute that difference to the many steps that we have taken in the Detroit community over many years.

Our Detroit police chief, Stanley Knox, following consultation with the mayor, acted swiftly, decisively, and forcefully to reassure the public that the complete interests of justice would be served in this matter, regardless of where the blame fell. He moved promptly to insure that our investigative machinery worked quickly, thoroughly, and evenhandedly in order to bring this about.

Within twenty-four hours of the incident, Chief Knox suspended all five officers involved.

In a series of news conferences, all within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, both he and the mayor provided fresh information as developments unfolded. The intent was to keep the public informed, to discourage rumors, and to provide ongoing reassurances that the Detroit Police Department was doing everything possible to see that justice would be done.

Within a matter of seventy-two hours, four criminal charges were brought. There are three pending, and trials are expected within the month. There were no outcries within the city.

Of course, this response was based on a posture adopted 20 years before. Since taking office in 1974, Mayor Young and the Department have pursued a vigorous policy of affirmative action. Over the past twenty years, we have recruited from our community, and trained and promoted a very diverse work force.

Our progress in this area has been so significant that today, fully qualified minorities and women are now represented in all ranks. That goes from the chief executive down to police officers on the beat.

Our standards have not been lowered, as has sometimes been charged in other places. We feel that we have raised standards.

Several years ago, a producer for “48 Hours” came to Detroit and I had the pleasure of briefly working with him. He remarked that in every office in our department, from the chief’s office to investigations, he saw black faces, he saw female faces.

All Detroit police officers are required to live in the city. As a result, we believe that our officers are viewed as a part of the community, and no longer viewed as mercenaries. The significant changes responsible for our current status can best be understood against the historical backdrop of our city and its relationship with its police in...
the many years prior to 1967.

Based on a long and grievous history of poor police-community relations and police abuses, many minorities felt—rightly felt—that too many police were insensitive to their feelings, their cultural mores, their constitutional rights. There was a widely held view that a largely white police force emphasized enforcing the law in minority neighborhoods, but protecting citizens in other neighborhoods.

And indeed, discrimination in both hiring and work assignments did exist, from segregating police cars to discouraging black officers from enforcing the law in white neighborhoods.

In 1967, when Detroit, along with many other American cities, erupted in flames and civil disorder, the picture was not much better. Even though police-community relations had gotten worse, there was no fair, serious affirmative action hiring process.

In 1973, Mr. Young ran against the department. The commissioner of police ran against him. Mr. Young’s platform was solely the elimination of racism and brutality in the department. In 1974, the population of our city was 50 percent black, and our police department was approximately 17 percent black. There had been some progress, but many in the black community saw a white army of occupation.

The Kerner Commission report held that there would always be tension between police and black citizens, not only in Detroit but in any urban setting, until meaningful progress was made in making police departments truly representative of the people they served. Detroit’s 1967 rebellion raised serious concerns among the citizens. I say “rebellion,” because it was not a riot in the classic sense. Most acts of violence were aimed at property, looting. There were no officers killed by looters. Most fatalities resulted from National Guard and police actions.

Police-community tensions, a causative factor in the 1967 civil disturbances, were exacerbated after a series of fatal shootings that occurred in the early 1970’s. We had a decoy operation that killed twenty people in two years. None of those folks had guns. The program was called STRESS. It stood for Stop the Robberies and Enjoy Safe Streets. Nineteen of the 20 people killed were black.

After he was elected, Mayor Young eliminated the program immediately and began an affirmative action program in the department.

What resulted was a complete reversal in police-community relations, and Detroit soon led the nation in crime reduction. Not satisfied with fulfilling that particular campaign plank, we began work toward a goal that took 20 years to achieve—a racial and sexually balanced selection of qualified people to manage the police department and virtually every city department.

Today, more than half of the members of the police department are minorities. More than 21 percent of our force is comprised of females, the largest number proportionately in the country. Detroit leads the nation in appointing female police supervisors and executives. Our administration has long held the belief that female officers would be very positive in terms of police-community relations.

Beyond making the police department more accessible to its citizens and increasing the ranks of minorities, we believe the department improved the quality of police hires overall. We eventually changed both the reality and the perceptions of many, many Detroiters, convincing them that we really wanted to change the police department.

It was not an easy task. There was much legal wrangling and protracted court battles. As a matter of fact, within the last two weeks, we finally settled our last affirmative action case initiated in the mid-1970’s.

We now feel that our community programs touch literally every citizen in the community. We have a crime prevention program that touches virtually every block in our community. There have been more than 5,000 blocks organized in the last five years.

Our police officers have reached out to 6,000 students through our Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program. Drug-free schools began three years ago this month. The program is active in 66 schools as of today. We have reached over 200,000 children in our crime prevention programs. We have an active law enforcement Explorers program. We even have musical groups out in the community. You might have seen our Blue Pigs on national television.

We have a unified block parent program. And we have a program that we consider unique: we work actively with every city utility. Printed on the sides of utility trucks is the phrase, “Eyes and Ears for the Police.” The utility people have communications equipment, and the kids know that they can count on them to contact the police if there is a need. We call them Safe Houses on Wheels.

Our chief holds a wide array of community crime prevention meetings. We encourage citizens in each precinct to attend regularly. The chief also has a citywide crime prevention meeting in which citizens are also invited to participate. He has as well a Crime Prevention Advisory Committee.
We have a citizen complaint process that is totally 
open. It accounts for the large number of investigations 
and lawsuits we have. All the lawyers have to do is follow 
our lead, because we really investigate every complaint—
even telephone complaints. Citizens can be anonymous; 
we do thorough investigations. Our complaints are high, 
but we accept literally everything.

We have a Junior Police Cadet Program with twenty-
four hundred kids in twelve public high schools, an 
average of about 150 kids in each school. They do crime 
prevention projects. They control the area. They work at 
football games. They are highly identifiable. It is more 
popular than the ROTC, and many of those kids have 
become police officers in our city. Also, we have our 
Police Athletic League, and, of course, our Summer Youth 
Program.

We have a very active reserve program. We have 
trained several thousand people and currently have about 
2,000 active reservists. They are citizens who are attorneys, 
doctors, and lawyers; they are people who work in our department of sanitation, they are people from 
throughout the community, employed folks, unemployed 
folks. They wear uniforms. They are clearly identified as 
reserve. They work throughout the community. They do 
volunteer time. And we have gotten tens of thousands of 
hours from these folks every year. They feel that they are 
an active part of our department.

We have mini-stations which we established in 1976. 
There are 50 mini-stations throughout the city, staffed by 
officers and located in housing projects, senior citizen 
dwellings, etc. Citizens really use them, not only to work 
with the officers in what we consider to be true community policing activity, but they use our mini-stations for 
meetings, community gatherings, and so forth.

We also use citizens band radios. Many of you have 
read about the fires set every Devil’s Night, just before 
Halloween. Well, the last two or three Devil’s Nights, we 
have had fewer fires than we have on ordinary nights, 
largely because we had 35,000 citizen volunteers on the 
street working for us. Every community group was 
mobilized, included 9,000 volunteer city employees. It was 
a huge educational process, and we managed to defeat 
what had become a serious problem.

Our recruitment program’s focus is on honest, 
hardworking, dedicated men and women willing to fulfill a 
vital need in what we consider to be a vital community. 
We have been nationally recognized for leadership—I 
think, and providing equality of opportunity—true 
equality of opportunity—in hiring and promotional 
policies.

In order to maintain our exemplary public image and 
good community relations, we expect our officers to be 
 extremely professional, extremely courteous, and ex-
tremely dedicated. We hold them to exacting standards. 
We also feel that we do an excellent job in training. We have a comprehensive, sensitivity-oriented, 
entry-level training process. Every officer, including the 
deputy chief and the chief, does some training. But every 
police officer is mandated to do annual in-service training. 
That includes comprehensive blocks on technical matters, 
as well as on community sensitivity issues. Every police 
officer in our department is going through cultural 
diversity training, training on the prevention of sexual 
harassment, training on community needs and community 
sensitivity.

In short, I think that we have developed in 
Detroit since the 1970’s. We think it is a lesson for the 
nation—a truly representative police department.
BIG CITY PROBLEMS IN MIDDLETOWN AMERICA: LANSING, MICHIGAN

Lynne Martinez  
County Commissioner, Ingham County, Michigan

I have been a commissioner in Lansing, Michigan, since 1985, on a board that serves a county of about 280,000 people. Lansing is the state capital. We have Michigan State University there, and I like to think that I live in a middle-size town in Middle America.

I first ran for the Board of Commissioners because the neighborhood where I live is a mixed community — with diverse needs. I do not live around any very rich people. I live around poor people and middle-class people, and I noticed that many families were struggling just to get by, to be able to give their kids the things that they needed, and have day care.

And I know that country government does a great deal to try and assist with human services, so I ran for and was elected to the Board of Commissioners in an attempt to protect and enhance those services. The very first thing I noticed was that every couple of months, something would happen and a little bit of money would get taken out of a human service program and get put in some court program, or law enforcement program, or something like that; it kept getting harder and harder to maintain those dollars spent on public health, mental health, child care, the things that I think help keep people from ending up in our jail, in our courts.

So I decided that it was time to learn more about this whole criminal justice system and about what other places were doing to prevent crime and prevent the things that lead to crime.

I joined committees of the Michigan Association of Counties and the National Association of Counties (NACO) and for about the last seven years have been promoting prevention efforts. I think that sometimes we wander around in this world talking to a few people who are our peers, who we think have the same ideas as we do about what we need to do, and where we need to go as communities and as a society. I know there are big groups of educators who talk about the needs for early intervention. And I know other groups of people in criminal justice planning that talk about the need for early interventions and prevention. And it is really refreshing to hear that there actually is consciousness of and interest in things that we can do as communities, things that police can help with to rebuild our communities and take care of our kids. I am just frustrated, time after time after time, how society fails to take care of those children.

In any case, while learning about the criminal justice system, I watched the State of Michigan embark on what I think was the biggest prison expansion system in history. We tripled our prison capacity. For awhile, we were opening one prison a week, and during all of that time, what happened was that the crime rate stayed stable, our streets did not get safer, and money was taken from elementary education, from higher education, from public health, from mental health, and put into the corrections budget.

Between 1979 and 1993, the corrections budget in the State of Michigan grew from less than $100 million to a billion dollars. It is a billion dollar industry, and has grown 900 percent in fifteen years. But it has not made a difference.

Then, in 1988, Michigan passed a Community Corrections Act, and I was appointed by the Governor of Michigan to serve on the Community Corrections Board for the state; we started implementing programs at the community level, instead of sending so many people to prison. We now have 79 of our 83 counties participating with the state in developing local programs that would offer intermediate sanctions for people who need something more than probation, but less than incarceration.

We are about three years into the programs, and the verdict is not in yet, but we think it is starting to have some impact and are very encouraged.

I told you already that I live in a middle-sized town in Middle America, but one thing I know is that kids who live in my town are going through the same things that kids in Detroit are going through and that kids in Los Angeles are going through.

My newspaper is filled every week with articles about young people who are taking guns and knives to school, young people who are being assaulted because they are wearing the jacket that somebody else wants. The police officers are going into those schools. They tell the kids that just because one person had a gun in school does not mean that they have to bring guns to school. Because, of course, the thing that happens with young people is that, as soon as they hear somebody has a gun, they feel like they have to have one too.

People have guns, and it is frightening to me to think that we are in such a volatile situation in some of our cities and some of our neighborhoods. If we do not continue to handle things very carefully, continue to try to work to bring better understanding to our communities,
During 1992, NACO worked with United States Senator Kohl to develop a new Title V to the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act. That new title embodies much of the strategy that we had developed the year before. Title V was approved in the reauthorization of the act, and what we are working on right now is to get Congress to appropriate the $30 million it has authorized for prevention efforts.

Those of you who have worked in this city know there is a big difference between the words "authorized" and "appropriated." Part of the pitch that I would make today, therefore, is that if any of you have Senators whom you feel you can talk to, ask them for full funding for the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act; we would certainly appreciate that support.

What we are trying to do is to encourage the development of planning boards at the local level to bring together the boys and girls clubs, the police departments and county departments, the churches, and other people trying to have an impact in the neighborhood, and provide some seed money for doing a little more of the work they are doing, and for working together to do more of what needs to be done.

The police officer's role has been changing over the last decades, and you are involved now in things that never used to be issues for police. I am very impressed with what is going on in many of the departments that we have been watching. We have talked about Neighborhood Watch, DARE, community policing, PAL's, and I guess the thing that is noticeable is that more and more police officers are now in a position of having to be political activists and community reformers.

We also have to be concerned with the legislative process—to get the things done we know must be done. We need to work more at the grass roots level with the people in our community to effect the rebuilding of our communities.

It is risky, I know, but I think the efforts that have been made are paying off. Moreover, I think that the public reception of the work you have done is good, and I want to thank you for the work you are doing, and encourage you to keep on doing more of it. The National Association of Counties stands ready to help in any way that we can.
PREVENTION STRATEGIES AMONG GANG MEMBERS

David Fattah
House of Omoja, Philadelphia

My mind is back in a time tunnel.
In 1980, I was sitting in a similar situation. As strange as it might seem, this was about a riot. This was in Miami. And it was about a court case where some white policemen had been acquitted of killing a black insurance person. Here we go again. It seems like all I have done is gone to sleep in 1980, wake up, and look at what is still here. Did we solve it yet?

What I would like to do first is talk about perceptions. I am a firm believer in perception. I think many of the problems we have are about perceptions. Perceptions can be real or imaginary, but the outcome of the reaction to a perception can be dangerously real.

Now, with that in mind, in 1990, we brought some member of the Crips and the Bloods to Philadelphia. See, we did not have enough trouble. We had to go get them. And I was crazy enough to have them living in my house. So if I act a little strange, just bear with me. If I seem a little slow, sometimes not quite as quick as I would like to be, I have been through a lot.

But we learned a lot from that experience.

Now, with that in mind, there are two brief video-tapes that I would like to examine. The first one is about the Portland, Oregon, experience, where Crips and Bloods from California organized the gang in Portland. As some of you probably know, there has been a marked migration of Californians to Portland, Oregon, a fact which has had serious impact on the value of the land, and also on some social conditions there, one being the advent of gang warfare.

The second thing I would like for you to consider is the type of people we are talking about. I want to show you what some of these young men are thinking. These are the people who will probably be on the front line if there is to be a riot — the people that are probably going to be the ones to kick it off, to stay the longest, that will be the hardest to stop.

I think it is important that you, as law enforcement folks and people of good will, to get an insight into their thinking. How are they thinking now? Where are there heads at? A few excerpts from the videotape may help us to being to answer these questions:

VOICE [ON VIDEOTAPE]: This week, Portland officials will be looking into another solution, one that has proven successful in the city of Philadelphia. Jim spent most of last week in that East Coast city, and joins us now with a look at the House of OMOJA. Jim?

VOICE: Tracey, OMOJA is a Swahili word for unity, and unity is the key to what they do at the House of OMOJA. These days, the kids you find there are more likely to be suspected of auto theft or assault, but in the late 1960's or early 1970's, the House of OMOJA took in dangerous gang members and, in many cases, turned them around.

Sister Falaka Fattah and her husband, David, bring to Portland more than a typical cross-country traveler. They bring with them proof that a city's gang problem can be controlled. They bring the experience of working with dangerous gang members, and getting them to change their ways.

The Fattahs did that work, in West Philadelphia, beginning in the late 1960's. Their work began not so much by choice, but necessity, when Sister Fattah discovered one of her sons was heavily involved in gangs.

She did what most mothers would do. She asked her son to come home. But then she did what few mothers would do. She told her son he could bring his gang friends with him. That is how the House of OMOJA began.

SISTER FATTAH: What we said to them was, “Look. We will make the commitment to you to try and keep you alive and to try to keep you out of jail, okay?” In terms of what rules they would live by once they came here, we told them that they would help to establish the rules, and they did. And these are the same rules we live by today.

VOICE: Today, the House of OMOJA includes nearly an entire street of freshly painted row houses. There is space here for between twenty and thirty kids who take classes in math, history, and computers. They are told how to write resumes and apply for jobs, and at the end of the day, they do not go home, because this is their home.

The House of OMOJA became successful not by destroying gangs, but by replacing them. The Fattahs realized over twenty years ago that kids were getting from gangs what they were not getting at home—a sense of belonging. The gangs had become family.

The Fattahs knew that teaching math and providing job skills would not be enough. They would have to become families for those kids...

VOICE OF OMOJA RESIDENT: Her message was different. Her message was common sense. Why were we fighting? Well, we were fighting because of turf, turf being
city blocks.

Did we own those blocks? Not at all. We never owned those blocks. Not at all.

VOICE: Curtis Jones joined a gang at twelve, entered the House of OMOJA at fifteen, and at seventeen was on his way to college. Today, he runs the city agency in charge of developing minority businesses.

MR. JONES: She had the ability, unlike most gang workers and social workers, to have the trust and confidence of the active participants in gangs, and that is vital.

VOICE: The Fattahs have been brought to Portland to determine if a House of OMOJA could be successful here, and many questions need to be addressed . . .

VOICE: The Fattahs will do two things here in Portland. They will talk with kids at risk of joining gangs, and they will talk with the various government officials and tell them what they have learned about the Portland gang situation. Discussion will also begin on finding the money to pay for a House of OMOJA here in Portland. A supporter of the project says it will take about $300,000 to get the program off the ground.

VOICE: The Fattahs offer education and job skills to kids. Their method: making the kids feel like family so they will not pursue family ties through gangs . . .

The Fattahs will meet with kids in schools and kids in trouble. They will also meet with community leaders, politicians, and business people, because Portland cannot just want a House of OMOJA, it has to find the money to pay for it.

Nearly everyone has acknowledged that Portland has a gang problem. This week, we begin learning if Portland feels House of OMOJA is a solution to that problem.

MR. FATTAH: The good news is that Portland now does have a House of OMOJA. It is two years old and has been relatively successful in dealing with the young people who have been there; and we feel very good about that.

For our purposes, I want to focus on the type of individual with which we are dealing. You have got to understand that the people who will most likely start a riot, or be in one, or lead one, are not getting up and going to work the next morning, whether there is a riot or not. Some of them are not going to school. They have a tendency to occasionally drop in, and more likely, to drop out.

With this in mind, we want to make some recommendations. Today, this week particularly, is a most appropriate time to stop and analyze our progress as it relates to our attitudes toward and treatment of one another. The nation has the opportunity to review events twenty-five years after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the close of the Second Meridian following the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, the year after one of the most devastating disturbances in modern American history—the Los Angeles riot.

Despite the monumental significance of the former, it is the latter that has brought this most distinguished body together for the conference on civil disorder. Civil disorder, most will agree, is a manifestation of racial relations in this society at a given point in time. Once civil disorder begins to occur, the total breakdown of racial relations is tragically obvious. It is imperative, therefore, to examine these relationships periodically, enabling us to take corrective action while the situation is still under control.

According to a New York Times-CBS poll published in April of 1993, the outlook is grim. Fifty-two percent of African-Americans believe that race relations in the United States are the same or worse than they were in 1968. Forty-five percent thought things had improved. Fifty-four percent of the whites thought things were better. Sixty-six percent of African-Americans and 55 percent of the whites felt that race relations were generally bad.

The poll, which was taken between March 28th and the 31st, had a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percent for white and 6 percent for African-Americans.

If we were to collect all the statistics, events, misdeeds, perceptions, injustice, oppression, irrationality, violence, in one word that triggers, fuels, and perpetuates civil disorder, that word would be "disrespect." Police must begin by respecting the black community and African-Americans who dwell there if we are to prevent civil disorder.

Now, we have a list of recommendations here, and I will read you some. But at the core of everything that has been said and done, the main thing is disrespect.

A lot of young people use those words. They say, "You dissed me." If one of them ever says that to you, do not hang around. Do not call anybody. Get out of the way. Because those are words that cause tragedy, death, and bloodshed within the black community itself, internally—all stemming from young people trying to resolve the issue of manhood, because all too often, manhood has been defined by external forces, whether it is Hollywood, whether it is something somebody said, whether it is a member of the opposite sex. It is very seldom defined in terms of a person's value systems and the ability to keep their word, and keep their promises.

One of the things that was crucial in terms of trying to deal with gangs was to sit down, put the issue on the table,
discuss it frankly, open and honestly, and resolve it. But, in order for this to happen, everybody has to be honest. In other words, if I said to you, “We are getting ready to have a meeting to discuss a disturbance, a gang fight, a potential riot, or whatever kind of confusion is on the horizon, and I want to speak to three of you that have influence and are sincere,” and you agree to do this, and you send one guy named Craze, I might not really take this thing seriously. Because if Craze is coming, it is going to be difficult to negotiate. Because Craze is not about negotiation. Craze is about being crazy and fighting. That is how he got his name.

A similar principle can be applied to our approach to community policing. Community policing can be very successful. But you have to use the proper personnel. So much of this hinges on people understanding the elements involved in these human dramas.

For instance, our first community patrol was composed of young people under a program funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. They patrolled, checked on businesses, made sure they were secure, and protected them. We found something that gang guys were good at—being security guards.

When the police began their community policing the first time in our neighborhood, however, they sent in two people who were not in a good mood. It was hot. It was a summer day. And they were walking down the street basically trying to get people to move, get off the corner, go in the house, do this and do that.

You have to be careful who you send, and how people perceive these situations. When these two officers came down the street doing and saying things, nobody knew why. In this kind of situation, clear communication is vital. It is critical. In other words, if somebody comes up to an arresting officer and says, “What’s going on?” you have to be able to decide, “Is this a good citizen, like old Dave Fattah? Or is that Craze trying to start some trouble.” Because you do not respond to both people the same way. If you respond in a negative manner to a person in the community who folks see as a good guy, one who people look up to, you have indeed thrown the first match. You have put that person in a situation that makes it difficult for them to help you.

If you respond to Craze on Craze’s level, you have thrown the second match, because now you have moved out of character and put yourself in a confrontational situation that you cannot win. Why? Because Craze will say anything to please the crowd. He is a crowd pleaser, and he is crazy. That is why they call him Craze.

So all too often, rather than speaking with a person on the scene who is intelligent and concerned, we find ourselves distracted, arguing with someone on the sideline who may need to go downtown.

I work with all communities, and this report I have covers all communities. But the community I know the most about, believe it or not, is the one that is the African-American community.

Now, many people labor under some very negative perception about the police and the police station. There are some people who see the police as the standing army, and the police station as its fortress: they are under occupation. Have you ever heard anybody say that?

This report was put together after the Miami riot. There were very similar situations in Philadelphia, and very similar reactions.

We made sure everybody on the City Council had a copy of the report. We made sure the mayor had one, made sure the police commissioner had one, made sure everybody we felt would need it would have it.

Well, apparently, nobody read it. Because thirty days later, there was a riot. There was civil disorder. And it started over crime. A young man stole a car. He was being chased by police in a patrol car. He got out and ran down the street. The policeman, huffing and puffing after him, got mad, pulled his gun out, shot the boy in the back.

Boom. You are gone.

What happens next?

Unfortunately, the mayor was out of town, so the managing director had to handle it. The reason I know how people feel about the police department is because that first night, young people in the area ran up to the police station and threw bottles, rocks, sticks, and bats at the police station. You notice I said the first night. The second time around can get rougher.

So my wife got together with other women in the neighborhood, locked arms, and literally surrounded the police station in the middle of all this rock throwing so that those young people would stop attacking that police station. Now, that is one way you stop this kind of nonsense. It is also very dangerous; you put everything you are about on the line.

Meanwhile, me and the fellas were out in the street talking to the other groups, breaking them down. They started to mass and we kept breaking them down, and breaking them down, and breaking them down, to where we could get them off the street. It was on our word that they went home, because we promised them that the managing director would find a solution, and if we did not go for it, we would let them know, and we would not be back to bother them any more—if they would go home.
And this is what happened. They found the police officer. He went to trial, although there was no conviction. However, out of that confusion, those young men, former gang leaders, some guys just getting out of the penitentiary, came forth and took a leadership position and turned the situation around.

We built upon that. We made them a security force. We showed them how to write grants. We enabled them to establish their own community organization so that they could constantly be there to take care of their own needs.

Now, we would like people to stop viewing the police and the police station from that negative viewpoint. That must cease. And the best way to get that done is for the police to provide other services.

If the only reason you ever go to the police station is bad news, it leaves a lasting impression.

People need to be able to go to the police for help in getting jobs. The probation department needs to be put in the police station. Some aspects of the educational system need to be in the police station. The police station must be seen as more than a refuge for law enforcement. It must become part of the social process.

On occasion, after a horrendous crime has occurred in the community, I've seen the police pass out leaflets to guys on the corner, who in turn help. Why can't we pass out a leaflet to tell them to get a job? Show them where a job is?

Because the police are in the neighborhood twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, they have more interaction with the youths standing on that corner than anybody else in the community. No matter who is standing on that corner, they are in somebody's police sector, patrolled at least once or twice in an eight-hour period. That is the system.

Now, why can't the police on one of those cruises begin to identify who is who, and reach out to these youth in some way?

The John Wayne perception of law enforcement must cease. The police have to understand they are also a role model. And when you jump out of that car, 90 percent of the time the reaction that you get is the action that you bring.

"This is my corner? Is it? Let's find out."

Now we have a confrontation. My manhood is being challenged. You are talking about my corner. You see?

You might move them off the corner, but there will be resentment. Instead, you could just say, "I would appreciate if you would move on down the street. You are disturbing Mr. Jones; he is trying to sleep. Okay?"

When you don't communicate, people are going to think the worst. You may know certain officers, or police stations, that kids respect. Maybe they do not love them, but they will respect them. You do not have to get out of your car. They know you are coming. They get off the corner.

But more riots in the last five years have been caused by traffic incidents than shootings or hitting people in the head. Even in cities where excessive force is a problem, trouble is usually caused after someone is in police custody or after some confusion about a traffic incident. Does that make sense? Sure. Why? Because first of all, when you stop a person, you have your lights burning. You see, black folks are hyper-tense. You have your lights flashing, beeping, and black people are nervous because we have to live with all this violence and craziness. So we might not always be thinking as quick as you would want us to.

So here you go again. You get in a hassle. "Well, why
They need something to do. This was being said when I was a teenager, and that is a long time ago.

There are a couple of other things I want to tell you, some of which I am sure you are already familiar with. Because I know that you are out there every day. First, I am going to read you a letter that was written to our conference in 1980. It is entitled, “The State of the City.” The city was Los Angeles.

The letter said: “The tensions in our urban centers have risen to a dangerous level, and the government, traditional social agencies, and civil rights organizations seem incapable of seeing the magnitude of the problem. According to our neighborhood leaders, the situation is potentially more dangerous than in the worst days of the 1960’s. Many of the people in these troubled areas, particularly the young, are losing hope.”

The letter, written by the Director of Say Yes, a youth service organization in Los Angeles, went on to describe the volatile situation in that city: “We are talking about 30,000 gang members, 300 gangs armed with guns now, not rocks. There is more homicide now than in the last three or four summers—not sixteen to eighteen years of age and up, but eight on up. The youngsters no longer go from the shoulder with their fist, they go from their fingers with a gun.”

The letter writer noted how he worked with twenty-five gangs channeling activities into youthful outlets. That was 1980. Today I thought I heard somebody say here that they saw the recent trouble coming. Now, how long are we going to look at it coming before we go to meet it? That is the question.

I do not want you getting excited and jumping up and down and running me out of town, but some of this you need to hear; it gets right to the heart of what we have been talking about today.

I hate to admit it here, but the violence in Los Angeles, as ugly as it was, as unwanted as it was, created two very strange reactions that helped some of us who work every day with these kids.

One was, “I don’t agree with it, but it was somewhat justifiable; I can kind of understand it.” How come people are saying these things? Because it shows the level of perception and understanding about conditions out there.

The other one was related to money. For years and years, we have gone to the government and said, “Look. We need money. We need jobs for these young people. They need something to do.” This was being said when I was a teenager, and that is a long time ago.

It took Los Angeles being turned upside down, inside out. The reaction to that was, “Well, here’s what we’re going to do. We want to double the pot.” Then they doubled the pot again. It is now one billion dollars.

But as we sit here, people on the Hill are arguing whether or not we want to cut the Summer Jobs program. Do you understand that? If you cannot promise a person a summer job, how can you promise them a year-round job? You follow what I am saying?

But the bad part is that it took those gang guys who we say are crazy to make a difference. They were listened to before us, we who have degrees and went to school and tried to do what we are told. “Hey, we ain’t got no money, man. We ain’t got no money.”

Money came out of everywhere. So much money came to Philly, we could not believe it.

Here is one recommendation you need to think about. Special groups of grass-roots people, local government, business leaders, and police should be formed to monitor tensions in critical areas. They should examine policies as they are formed, before they are implemented, in order to identify potential problems.

The police would play an active role with key leaders in the neighborhood, establishing policy together. So no one is isolated.

Working with people in business becomes more critical in multi-ethnic cities like Los Angeles, where businesses are increasingly owned by people from different cultures, and, more and more, the consumer role is being played by members of the African-American community. It is going to require a more delicate balance, and you need to get all these people together.

We also recommend that curfews be employed only during extreme situations. Carelessly imposed, curfews can exacerbate problems by punishing and frustrating the innocent. Some people may need to come out to retrieve their children. An older child watching a little sister may need to take her home.

Sometimes it is good to put up police-and-citizen checkpoints to make sure you know where everybody is in a neighborhood. It is important that you know everything in your police district. You should know who is the town drunk, who is on welfare, who is on Medicaid, who is taking the medicine. It is better to have people who can provide this information than to have a tragic situation where Joe gets shot because somebody did not know that the man was hyper.

You need to know when schools are getting out early and when they are opening late. You need to know the general characteristics of your neighborhood and be able
to get people to come with you when you want to check something out.

You need clearly identified helpers.

This can help you avoid doing something that works against you, like going into a crowd after Crazy with your gun on, without a back-up, where somebody takes your gun. You should have the crowd on your side if they see that you are talking about preserving the neighborhood.

STRATEGIES FOR SECURING PREVENTION FUNDING: A PANEL DISCUSSION

James Jackson

I think that police chiefs and other police officials, as well as police officers on the street, are great power brokers. We have a great deal of influence in our communities, and we can do a lot. We do need a tremendous amount of money to make the kinds of changes that need to be made, but the very first thing that we should do is to take a serious look at ourselves and make some decisions about what we can do in our community.

Many police personnel around the country talk about community policing; perhaps they already have a project here and a project there. But getting the involvement of the total police department in that community is something else. Some citizens are angry at the symbol of authority that they see, namely the police department. We can do something about that. We can be in touch with our community and work with it. We can alter our attitudes. We can try to understand the cultures in the community. Instead of passing by that Baptist church once again, we can go visit the church and begin to understand the folks who go there.

I think that politically there are no more important groups than police officers. We have political power, but I do not think that we know what we want. Do we want bullets, or do we want things to work in the community? Maybe a little bit of both is necessary.

David Fattah

There should be more community input at all levels of police selection and training. Police recruits should be better trained to work in the problem areas identified by crime statistics. There should be incentives, promotions, and recognition for activities that prevent violence and establish good community relations.

Lynne Martinez

As a county commissioner, I know a little bit about what encourages people to spend money. There are basically two things that direct budgets in government. One is crisis; the other is public opinion. If you can get a coalition of important people singing from the same page, you will be surprised at what you can do.

I get discouraged because teachers, mental health workers, and police all will talk about a problem from their separate corners. But if you started getting some of those people together at the same table, you would be amazed at
what could be accomplished.

We did it with community corrections. Various people in the county were saying that people were going to jail who did not belong there. But until we made them all sit down around the table and talk about it, they could not tell us which ones.

Keeping the legislature or the county board of commissioners informed as you are developing an agenda can go a long way toward getting a program funded.

You can convince policy people occasionally to fund prevention if you show them that it costs $200 to $400 a day to lock people up. You do not have to keep many people out of an institution for six months before you can amass the money it takes to run some prevention programs.

I think there is somebody in the White House now who knows how to spell "children." I think this is a good time for people to actually try to agree on an agenda to take to the White House. I think that there is a better opportunity with the current administration than I have seen for a long time.

People across the country listen to law enforcement. I am a politician. Anybody who is running for public office is hearing a message from taxpayers about crime. The people who are in the greatest position to set the agenda about crime are law enforcement people.

If law enforcement officers have finally decided that intervention and prevention are the keys to their jobs, then they are in the position to be able to get public policy makers to move forward on an intervention and prevention strategy. We politicians listen to the voters. When you tell us that you do not have the resources to help the public, we are the first ones that give you every single thing you want. Ask for the right thing, and use the power that you have.

James Jackson

The police department has a role to play in addressing social problems. We have had some success, for example, with training police officers to make referrals to social service agencies and to follow up on that process.

Police are only a part of a much larger system, but police play a very, very important role. Our folks are the first to see child abuse. Our folks are the first to go into homes. Our folks respond to the crises that occur within families.

Very often, unfortunately, there are not enough services to go around. Sometimes people are not put in touch with the services they need because there is no mechanism for it. The police can play a vital role in providing a link.

Sometimes, police officers who are in constant contact with the public do things that are offensive to the community. Many police officers are not really aware of it. Most police officers think that they are doing a good job, and they are. Most police officers are decent human beings. But they have to be taught that cultural differences are extremely significant and that misunderstandings can cause offense unintentionally.

You try to make police officers understand that they could wind up like some in Milwaukee or Los Angeles or Detroit. If you look closely at the police officers who are standing in front of judges in those cities, you may notice that they do not understand why they are there. Nor do their colleagues understand why they are there. In many instances, cultural differences contributed to why they are there—lack of sensitivity to communities they do not understand and do not know how to work with.

We try to make in-service police officers understand how those folks got there. We show them that if they approach the community in a very positive way—really getting into that community and working with it—their chances of going before the bar of justice are nil. We think our approach is working.

David Fattah

A lot of times, the police do need to reprimand and correct. People do not know how to act. But a lot of the need for sensitivity comes into play in interactions with people. For instance, we used to invite the police to come in and talk to young people at the House of OMOJA.

The police asked why they encountered so much hostility. One guy said, "Every time I turn around, you got your hands on me, you have got to touch me, you are pushing me around, you are cursing at me."

As the dialogue continued, each began to see what he was doing to make the situation more unpleasant.
inner city communities suffer from a lack of adequate health care and a high percentage of people afflicted with diseases that should be preventable or treatable. If lack of illness, a sense of well being, and access to comprehensive, affordable care are criteria for being considered healthy, then it is obvious that residents of inner city communities, by and large, are not healthy. Much of preventive health care is based on the perspective that the health of individuals is, or should be, important to themselves and their communities. Yet in low-income neighborhoods the system frequently does not support the access and prevention that might result in the improved health of citizens.

Low-income people rarely have the opportunity to establish a primary care relationship with health providers. Studies in communities such as New York City show that the poorer the community, the less likely it is that its physicians will be connected with the standard health care system, will have admitting privileges at hospitals, or will have met the accreditation criteria set by area hospitals. Most hospitals in these low-income areas receive lower reimbursements for services and therefore have much higher staff-to-patient ratios than is the norm in U.S. hospitals.

Low-income inner city communities have very high incidences of the primary causes of death in the United States: diseases related to poor nutrition and obesity, such as heart disease and its sequelae; hypertension; strokes; cancer; diabetes; kidney disease; substance abuse; and infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and childhood illnesses.

Law enforcement agencies are affected by inner city health problems in various ways. Police enforce our society's punitive, nonmedical approach to substance abuse. The total amount of money spent in enforcement dwarfs that which is devoted to the prevention and treatment. Communities are being devastated by the concomitants of substance abuse: erosion of the family structure, increased violence and crime, the spread of HIV, incarceration, and lost productivity. It is unrealistic to expect law enforcement agencies to protect the rest of society from encroachment by these problems.

The rise in the incidence of HIV and tuberculosis is presenting new occupational hazards for law enforcement officers. Many of the individuals with whom law enforcement officers come into contact are at high risk for HIV disease. Too few programs have been instituted to educate law enforcement officers about how to adequately protect themselves from contact with body fluids during arrests and at crime scenes, or how to deal with inmates who are sick, or how to protect themselves against infectious tuberculosis, which spreads easily in prisons and holding centers. Yet major cities on the eastern seaboard have noted a rise in the number of law enforcement personnel with active cases of tuberculosis as well as those exhibiting positive reactions to tuberculin skin tests.
YESTERDAY WON'T WORK FOR TODAY: UPDATING CHICAGO’S EMERGENCY PLANS

Dick Wedgbury
Commander, Chicago Police Department

Twenty-five years ago I was taking an entrance examination to become a police officer for the Chicago Police Department. The examination took place at Wells High School, which is located on Chicago's West Side, and from that vantage point we could still see the smoke rising along Madison Street from the aftermath of the Martin Luther King, Jr. riots.

In light of some of the comments that have been made at this conference, in light of some of the comments and the observations made by the National Commission on Criminal Justice as far back as 1968, and in the more recent comments of Judge Webster’s Commission, I am reminded of the old Yogi Berra line, “It is deja vu all over again.”

When I address groups within a department of police, I find out that a 25-year veteran is somewhat of a rarity. I imagine that at this conference it is not quite so rare, that some of us have been around since the late-1960’s and can relate to some of the experiences and problems that we have recently had.

But I would also suggest that in some current situations we are tempted to dust off plans we developed in the late 1960’s. That is a temptation, but it is also extremely simplistic.

I appreciated the earlier comments by Judge Webster, when he painted a picture of police officers in Los Angeles with their tactical manuals on the hood of their squad cars, thumbing through them, trying to find out what their specific responsibilities were in the case of a major occurrence. Some of them found out that, first and foremost, their major responsibility was to survive the day.

In Chicago, we are coming to the realization that what worked in the 1960’s may not work today. For this reason, we are entering into different types of mutual assistance agreements—primarily with the Illinois State Police and with the Cook County Sheriff, who can provide substantial resources to supplement whatever we might have at hand.

I would also like to respond to comments that were made earlier regarding some of the precipitating events that led to major disturbances in the past. In Chicago, the precipitating events over the last several years have not involved police action per se, but were precipitated by the success of our sports teams.

I can recall a personal experience in 1984, when the Cubs clinched the National League East title. That day, a situation at a sports bar and grill rapidly got out of hand, and we had to handle it with the existing resources at our disposal.

We had planned for and anticipated some sort of celebration, some exuberance in the vicinity of Rush and Division Street. What we were not prepared for was the nature of the demonstrations that occurred at various locations throughout the City of Chicago. This lack of preparedness prompted us to look at our approach to problems, and we found that much of what we were doing harkened back to the 1960’s.

For example, one of our plans required that we call up all on-duty resources, which we discovered was a somewhat cumbersome way to approach things. In fact, a lot of the approaches developed in the sixties did not necessarily address the problems, particularly the smaller-scale problems, that we were more likely to encounter. As a result, we are now relying more and more on other approaches.

Each district now has tactical teams, which generally consist of a sergeant and eight police officers who are generally assigned to mission-oriented patrol activities and who are available for instant recall; theoretically, we could pull up as many as 25 district tactical teams with a sergeant and eight men and devote them to a specific place.

In addition, when the tactical teams are not available—they start at 10:00 in the morning and go to 2:00 in the morning—we have had to identify specific on-duty resources. Again, these consist of sergeants and eight men from each particular district—incident-control teams that can be called up on a moment’s notice.

All our directives are specifically laid out. Whenever there is a major disturbance, for instance, it is relayed to our communications center. When the field officer at the scene indicates that there is a need for additional manpower, we start setting priorities and pulling in resources immediately.

Our recent experience with the Bulls championship celebration, which for all practical purposes resulted in a major civil disturbance on our West and South sides, taxed our resources to the limit with regard to on-duty resources. Because of this, we began looking outside for additional resources from the Illinois State Police and the Cook County Sheriff’s Department.

I also looked at some of the criticisms that have been
leveled against the Los Angeles Police Department. Even though they had a plethora of resources, one of the things that became very clear to them was that there did not seem to be any coordination plan in effect. No one knew the proper role that these other agencies would be playing during a major civil disturbance.

With any disturbance you must recognize that there are going to be a lot of problems. You are going to have problems processing arrestees, for example, and you will need to coordinate these efforts.

More importantly, and this has been pointed out again in the Los Angeles study, you must recognize what you are trying to accomplish in the early stages of the event. And you must also recognize that it is probably going to change. For example, when the Los Angeles disturbance began at a particular location, we would suggest that the proper police response at that time may have been to make arrests at the scene.

What happened in Los Angeles was that with the passage of time, the crowd started to grow larger and uglier, and the priority changed from arrest to containment. The officers failed to recognize, however, that after containment they should have gotten back into an arrest posture as quickly as possible.

If you are going to rely on mutual assistance agreements with outside agencies, one of the things that you are going to have to establish is what their mission is going to be when they arrive. There are going to be a lot of significant demands in terms of manpower. What are your priorities going to be? Are you going to be protecting your downtown business district or are you going to be concerned with containment and trying to localize the source of the problem?

I think there have been some disturbing trends, not only in Chicago, in that most of these disturbances are not finding themselves neatly confined to a specific geographic area. For example, in our experience with the Bulls 1992 victory celebration, we had a significant problem on our West Side, which is where we expected to have some problems, based on past history and known hostility between Korean and Arab merchants there. Intelligence told us it was probably going to happen in and around that area. There were, however, other locations throughout the city where we did not anticipate trouble.

Another problem we had at that time was that our city fathers were totally ignorant of what was going on in the city. In addition to having the Bulls' final game in Chicago, it also happened to be the weekend of the Puerto Rican festival, which had been another occasion for major civil disturbances in the past. Additionally, there was a Blues Fest in downtown Chicago, and a Gold Coast Art Show. All of these events required significant police resources. Needless to say, we found ourselves somewhat strapped.

Fortunately, we have a large police force, and we were able to extend shifts and come up with a significant number of police officers. But on that fateful weekend we had not anticipated that when the Bulls won the players would come out at the end of the game and start to parade around. The result was an instant crowd, and it required our police officers to remain at the site of the Chicago stadium for a significant period of time, which restricted our ability to send them elsewhere.

This year, I know the senior command staff is lighting candles and going to church on Sunday hoping that the Bulls lose in the first round.

In any event, we will survive. But I suggest that if you have not done so already, your plans should clearly specify the roles and responsibilities of outside agencies.

The Los Angeles experience shows that outside agencies are important in terms of securing buildings and providing fire escort. Those are the types of situations where you need help but will not necessarily be involved in the arrest and processing of a large number of prisoners. The Cook County Sheriff's Department, for example, has indicated that if necessary it can provide security for the courts—since most of the courts are located in police facilities.

Building security for major police facilities and for the courts could also provide security at the same time for the large number of arrestees that we anticipate arriving in the different lockup facilities during a civil disturbance.

In listening to the number of arrests that had been made at the different events throughout the 1960's, I was shocked to hear that there were only 200 or 300 arrests made over a period of four or five days of major civil unrest. In contrast, on the first day of the Bulls Fest we made over 1,000 arrests in a 12-hour period, which placed a significant strain on our resources in terms of processing mass arrests.

Of course, expediting the processing of prisoners allows them to get back to the community and cause problems again.

Any comprehensive emergency planning should take advantage of the new technologies available. I used to be in charge of 911 in the City of Chicago, and I know that there are some rather exciting things happening technologically with communications systems.

Many of these innovations are based on military technology. Some of the things the military can do right-
now with communications are absolutely astounding. Geosynchronous satellites, for example, may seem fanciful; they do, however, have some implications with regard to civil unrest. One geosynchronous satellite can replace or eliminate the need for a significant number of repeater satellites and stations that you may have throughout the city to maintain radio communications, and which may require manpower protection in time of civil unrest.

You should also be looking at alternatives to voice radio communications. It was our experience during the Bulls fiasco, or "celebration," that we had a record number of calls to 911 on that day. We had 30,000 calls in a particular period of time, and those were just the calls that got through.

We know that in a crisis the 911 system is going to be taxed to the limit. So, for a variety of reasons, you are going to have to look for some other viable alternative to radio communication, not the least of which is that your voice communication system, for the most part, is not secure. Anybody can go into a Radio Shack right now and purchase for about $10 a device that can monitor police radio communications.

There are several viable, very inexpensive alternatives to voice radio communication. The cellular phone is probably one of the most inexpensive and readily available. We have had success in terms of establishing private communication links between the control center or chief and the field commander. Two-way communications between your logistical support personnel and your command posts can also be set up via a cellular phone. Further, I would advise you not to put a cellular phone number in your published orders; the media has access to it. And we already know that the media monitor our radio communications.

You are going to find out that the communications business is going to be very, very willing to provide you with more than adequate resources when it comes to cellular phones. In our case, there were a significant number of cellular phones provided to us pro bono.

Another aspect of cellular phone technology is called "trunking." Several jurisdictions have experimented with trunking systems. In essence, this system uses cellular phone technology, but does not need a wide number of frequencies. In fact, different jurisdictions can share the same frequency.

Many agencies are doing a lot of exciting things with trunking. For example, they are using their system to hook up the fire department, police department, the airport, and any jurisdiction that might be of service in an emergency. Minneapolis-St. Paul is experimenting with a trunking system across a number of jurisdictions, so that approximately 70 square miles in the metro area can be covered, using a very limited number of radio frequencies. As agencies are called in from the outside, you can literally dial them up on a computer and patch them into your frequency, allowing you to hear what they are hearing and vice versa. The technology is there, but it is going to cost money.

Granted, what I have just described is somewhat of a technological fix and it might be beyond the capability of some of your jurisdictions, at least in the short term. Nonetheless, you should really be considering it right now. What are you going to be doing when these outside agencies start coming in? That very problem—the lack of shared frequencies—was noted in the City in Crisis report.
I will talk about two models of civil disturbance plans. But before I do, I would like to talk a little bit about some of the trends we have been seeing in civil disturbances since 1988.

When you look at civil disturbances, you really have two generations of riots, the first being the 1960's and the second beginning in 1988. The one exception was Miami in 1980.

In the new variety of civil disorder, we find a lot more gunfire, and a lot more random violence. And yet, of interest to police officers is the fact that there tend to be fewer of them getting killed or seriously injured in this new generation, though more people who are not even remotely connected with the source of the civil disorder are. Another very interesting trend is that the newest variety of riots tend to be a lot more organized than the previous ones.

How do we know that they are more organized? We have done some surveys of police departments that have dealt with civil disorder since 1988, and essentially asked respondents to look back at what was going on in their environment immediately before the riot started, and determine if there was anything that was telling them that they were about to have a civil disturbance.

In fact, every respondent said yes. Many said that in the days and hours before civil disorder started, thefts of trucks and vans shot off the charts, indicating that people were actually thinking about and acknowledging that there was going to be a riot and that they were going to need something to haul the loot that they were going to get.

Gasoline sales into containers other than vehicles also shot up. Places that redeem glass bottles saw redemption of rocks and bottles. We certainly saw a lot of this in Miami.

All of this tells us that this is more organized and less spontaneous than it has been in the past. The most recent generation of riots also tend to be longer in duration, and we are finding that people involved in the civil disturbance are traveling out of inner-city areas more, as evidenced by disturbances in Beverly Hills, San Francisco, and other cities. This has a major impact on civil disorder planning, so that you now need to start thinking more in a jurisdiction-wide framework than strictly focusing on the inner city.

We are also seeing in this new generation civil disorder taking place in conjunction with events not necessarily associated with inner city community tension—sporting events, for example. And in Miami most recently, we saw disorder in conjunction with Hurricane Andrew. When the hurricane was over, we had a lot of looting that can only be defined as civil disorder.

Additionally, we are discovering an element of society that really thrives on civil disturbance. They would like anarchy, would like the police not to be in control at any given time.

Fortunately, they cannot create that situation under most circumstances. However, when there is an issue looming, such as a high-profile trial like Rodney King's, or the Miami trial of police officer William Lozano, community tension tends to rise. When this occurs, the criminal element I was just discussing will seize the opportunity to try and create chaos by attacking motorists, setting fires, pushing dumpsters out in the street. And, if they are capable of creating enough chaos to occupy the police in the area, they create looting and general mayhem opportunities for a much larger group that can be labelled the "have-nots" of society. These people may be black, Hispanic, or anything else, and when there is enough chaos created and the police are preoccupied, this group will jump on the bandwagon. And when it does, the situation really gets out of control, resulting in what we had in Miami in 1980, and in Los Angeles in 1992.

Therefore, the premise of planning is that if the police can intervene quickly in an effective, organized manner before the larger group joins in, we can be effective in shutting it down.

This plan has worked very well for us in Miami. But we learned the lesson only after 1980. In 1980, we were neither prepared nor able to move effectively and quickly enough. Since 1980, we have had several smaller civil disturbances that we have been able to control.

Given this backdrop, I would like to talk about two specific models of civil disturbance planning. All civil disturbance plans must incorporate two separate scenarios. The first scenario is the unanticipated civil disturbance in
which a routine public operation or some other catalyst incident ignites a neighborhood. The key to dealing with unanticipated civil disturbances is rapid mobilization.

The problem with many police civil disorder plans is that they fail to take off from routine operations. These plans need to be able to take you from routine operations to the time the police department is able to get all extra resources in to implement the full plan—to mobilize, call people in from home, pull people from adjoining jurisdictions or precincts. It is during that period of time when a lot of people die, and when a lot of plans fall short.

In Metro-Dade, if an event starts to get beyond the control of the officers on the scene, they will immediately pull all available on-duty resources into that problem district—whether they are detectives or crime prevention units, a crime suppression team or community services officers. We will throw everything in. The key to this type of plan is to be aggressive, but not abusive. We certainly do not want to create a new incident by overreacting.

The second type of plan must address the anticipated civil disturbance. This requires an entirely different kind of planning: contingency planning. In South Florida, we had several cases in which a shooting or some other event initially occurred, and then six months to a year later there was a trial. In these cases, you can anticipate potential problems because of the high profile of the initial event. Now, the whole community is watching it. Newspapers are heavily reporting on it. That requires contingency planning.

Given these generalizations of the type of planning, I would now like to talk about some specific models.

First, the basic civil disturbance plan for the unanticipated events that can happen in any jurisdiction. Let’s face it, the problems that lead to civil disorder—joblessness, poverty, injustice, inequity—exist in all major metropolitan areas in the country. So everyone really needs a plan that can take you from routine operations into mobilization in an organized way.

Our plan at Metro-Dade first provides for mobilization of personnel. One of the important aspects of this is to recognize when you cannot contain it with your own police officers and your own agency. However, when you start bringing in outside people from adjoining areas, who tend to have different enforcement policies, munitions, and communications, things can really get out of control if you do not have a process for assigning those people duties.

Another important issue is containment. Among those who study these kinds of tactics, there has always been a debate about whether or not to perimeterize, that is, contain the incident in the affected area. At Metro-Dade we feel we have an obligation to prevent additional victims from entering the area.

The next step in the plan is securing critical facilities and services. We certainly need to secure government facilities. We also need to secure fire department escorts. Fire departments will, as they did in Miami in 1980 and Los Angeles in 1992, refuse to go into an area. They will say, “I am paid to rescue people and to fight fires. I am not paid to take bullets and I’m not going in unless you send policemen with me.” So police departments need to prepare for the inevitability.

Another consideration is whether or not to protect businesses. What we have opted to do is not necessarily protect all commercial establishments to the exclusion of people, but to protect certain types of businesses, such as those that have a stock of firearms—your pawn shops and firearms dealers, for instance. If you do not protect these establishments, the police department is going to be facing those guns on the street in the following hours.

What outside agencies will help us secure these areas? One is the National Guard. I know that in Florida—and from what I understand this is pretty universal—the National Guard prefers to be a force multiplier. The Guard prefers not to come in and confront angry crowds and looters. Rather, it prefers to be deployed so as to free up officers who normally work with that population.

Suitable Guard assignments therefore would be escorting fire department vehicles, guarding gun ships, guarding government facilities, holding perimeters, and other such activities.

One of the problems we had in Miami in 1980 is that officers from outside the area, some from rural jurisdictions, came in without any connection to the community, and there were some nasty attitudes and indiscriminate throwing of tear gas. They knew that when it was over they were going back to their communities and would not be accountable. Again, you can prevent this by giving outside help the support assignments, while giving people from the police or other primary agency the front-line assignments.

Another important element of this plan is clarification of enforcement policy. When the chaos of civil disorder starts, it is very frightening to police officers, who are very accustomed to being in control of their surroundings. And with the fear comes a lot of confusion. We saw it at Metro-Dade in the City of Miami and in Los Angeles as well. Officers need to be clear about enforcement policy. Is our enforcement policy to shoot looters or to try to
Their function is to be out there to observe and report accidents. Unless the commander is given an accurate update of how many fires, shootings, rock and bottle incidents there are, how many shootings, how many rock and bottle incidents, etc.

The reconnaissance people do not take any action unless there is an absolute life and death emergency. Their function is to be out there to observe and report accurately. We use cellular phones and have the reconnaissance team call in on the three-quarters of the hour. The information is then combined and analyzed at the command post.

The second type of plan is the contingency plan. If you know that a specific event is affecting a specific community, you can anticipate problems, make many more assumptions, and prepare more than you can with a basic civil disorder plan. Our contingency plans include four basic elements—information management, community dialogue, deployment, and coordination of logistics.

Information management is an important one, because it tends to give us an indication of what the level of tension is in the community. In any inner-city community, in any major metropolitan area, certain events occur at a given rate, events like assaults against police officers, interracial assaults, hate crimes, shots fired.

If you can gauge those events, measure them, and begin to chart what that rate is, when you start seeing deviations you know that something unusual is going on. We call this monitoring indicators of unrest. If there is a rise in the number of police officers being assaulted, the number of interracial assaults, hate crimes, and indicators of unrest, you can anticipate possible disturbances.

By community dialogue, I merely mean dealing with and communicating with the community, rather than being an alien, occupying force. Departments should identify all kinds of community groups, be they church or civic groups, and designate police officers within the department to start meeting with them when a potentially precipitating event occurs. Update them on what is going on. Set up a liaison. Listen to what they are saying.

Along these same lines, it is important to set up rumor control hotlines. False rumors really cause a lot of problems. We advertise the phone numbers on television and have found that not only do we get people calling to find out whether a rumor is true or not, we also get a lot of intelligence unintentionally. People will call up and say that there is a large group hanging out in a certain area getting gas cans together, and they are planning to go here or go there. The hotline is not set up for intelligence, it should be noted, but you get a lot of it anyway.

Deployment incorporates the mobile field force concept. We form officers into large groups we call mobile field forces and position them in areas that are likely to be affected by civil disorder.

As regards the establishment of command posts, it is always better to establish them before a problem occurs rather than doing it under fire.

A manpower pool should also be established early.
Every police department has a lot of sworn personnel on detective or administrative assignments. If you do not account for them before the problem starts, it is going to be very hard not only to find out who and where they are, but to get them assigned.

Coordination and logistics simply mean maintaining current contact information for all the other agencies involved, as well as for businesses and agencies in critical areas, such as the Korean business district in Los Angeles. It is very important for the police department to know that, if we have some form of civil disorder, there are certain businesses in their jurisdiction that have guns. That way, we do not wind up shooting a business owner, or someone protecting a business. If we could have officers surveying businesses beforehand, we would know who will be guarding their business.

Finally, the department should set up contacts with vendors who will provide supplies and equipment during or before a disturbance.

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EMERGENCY PLANNING IN LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY: ADAPTING TO CHANGE

Deputy Chief Phillip Turner
Deputy Chief, City of Louisville Police Department

The greatest lesson I have learned in my present assignment is to listen to people. When I was first assigned as deputy chief, we were involved in a community policing project, one of eight sites around the country. One of the tasks was to go into a number of different neighborhoods and find out what was happening there. My role was to keep my mouth shut and listen. And that was very difficult for me. As a police officer I was trained to tell people what to do.

But I learned very quickly the importance of listening. I learned that folks were interested in safe neighborhoods and quiet streets for their kids to play on. They wanted to get rid of the boom boxes, the loud noise, the drunks on the street.

I was ready to respond to major assaults, murders, drug trafficking, robbery, rape, and burglary. But I was missing some of the key concerns of the community.

The Louisville, Kentucky, metro area is about a million people, while the city of Louisville is just under 300,000. We have 670 sworn officers in Louisville, not 12,000 or 25,000, as some others here have.

Though ours is a relatively small city, the mechanics of our civil disturbance plan are very similar to Chicago's and Metro-Dade's. So, instead of reiterating what has already been said, I would rather take a different approach and tell you where Louisville has been, where we are right now, and where we are going.

Like a lot of other towns, in the late 1960's we experienced severe civil disorder. I was not in the department then, but I lived in the community and I witnessed it as a resident.

The next major civil unrest we experienced was in 1975. I was with the police department then and the unrest was over school desegregation. This was a very troubled time for Louisville.

Since then, other than natural disasters, sporting events in particular have for some reason inflamed citizens and prompted them to overreact. Notorious trials have also sparked disorder. Last year, we had a wild series of crimes. One of them involved four young black males, three of whom were juveniles, who went through our city and seriously assaulted a number of elderly people.
This upset our community.

But because of our experiences back in the late 1960s, and then again during the desegregation of the school system in 1975, our administrators had kept formal civil disorder plans within the division, and had made sure they were updated. The last major revision we had was in 1990; the revised material ranges from prevention to deescalation of disorder stemming from a major event or natural disaster.

We also focused on training, from the entry level through in-service training for specialized units. Our purpose, as always, in the Louisville division of police, first and foremost, is crime prevention. We are responsible for crime prevention and for the maintenance of order. That is our mission, day in and day out.

I am very proud of the fact that in Louisville we have had police planners well before many major departments did. For years, we had a number of different units in the division that were charged with the responsibility of planning. But it was not until last year that we created a formal planning unit. We have had time data units and intelligence units that helped us plan for specific events, but we never had a formal planning unit. Now we do and I think it is significant.

If you think you do not have the time or resources for the planning purpose, think again. You will pay now, or you will pay later. Regrettably, later is very expensive and often involves human life.

We also have a crime commission in Louisville. In the late sixties and early seventies, crime commissions were very popular and were federally funded throughout the country. Regrettably, as the funds died, so did the agencies. That did not occur in Louisville. We have maintained a crime commission for a number of years, a commission that acts as a planning agency in support of our public safety office.

While we are the major police department in Jefferson County, there are a number of small towns within our county that we incorporate in our planning. We have mutual aid agreements with all of these smaller communities in the event of a major disorder. It is clearly laid out in our civil disturbance plan what they will do for us and what we will do for them, so there is no confusion. Most of us are efficient about running our own agencies, but when we network with other agencies, we frequently fall short.

In this respect our moderate size is an advantage. Because we are small, I know all the chiefs in the county, and they know me. I know the planning people and I know the corrections staff. I know them when I see them and I know them by their first name.

With the benefit of all this planning, law enforcement can respond most admirably to an incident, but that is not the whole story. If the rest of the criminal justice system and the social service system are not included in the equation, failure is the result.

We need to support the support systems. We need to support corrections. We need to support additional judges. You need to support them. How are you going to get the judges in if you do not have a court room and you do not have a clerical staff for them? That is how deep you need to go.

Our particular plan calls for an update every year, but that is not often enough. It needs to be updated every six months on a formal basis, and perhaps more often than that, depending on conditions in the community.

Throughout, in addition to training, we must focus on the commanding officer responsibility. We try not to charge our police officers with making decisions that should be supervised. We also offer guidance to our supervisors depending on the level of decision required.

As I said, we are proud of our plan. But it is like a blueprint for the house you are building. There are going to be changes, and you need to adapt your plan to changing conditions in the environment.

I will close by remarking on something that has already been much discussed: community or problem-solving policing. It is a theme that is quite popular around the country. We in Louisville have been involved with it for about three years now. We eased into it at first, to see what would work. We did some experiments. And right now, we have a philosophy of management being applied throughout our department, one which attempts to integrate police and governmental in-services with other service providers in the city. The ultimate goal is to help people solve their problems.

Community policing goes hand-in-hand with the willingness to listen and to respond by helping residents and the community solve problems, rather than merely going out and making a bunch of arrests. Police departments can serve as the catalyst to bring a community together, and create a safe, secure environment. ●
RESPONSE PLANNING AND SOCIAL PLANNING IN NEW JERSEY

Robert J. Del Tufo
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey; former Commissioner, New Jersey State Commission of Investigations

Responding to civil disorder does not imply an ad hoc approach to unrest. It really means planning and preparation and preparation and preparation. An effective response means advance planning to deal with logistical and other concerns well in advance of a problem.

I think this approach takes us toward something we have tried recently to do in New Jersey, which is to streamline law enforcement by bringing prosecutors and police, sheriffs and others to the table to define their roles in law enforcement so as to avoid overlapping responsibilities. We want to try to individualize the approach on a county-by-county basis, though this also brings people together and enables advance collective planning.

The Los Angeles report on the 1992 civil disorder seemed to suggest a lack of planning from a city-wide and country-wide standpoint, and the absence of significant training in trying to deal with civil disorders, though I think we have seen a change since then.

In addition to planning for a law enforcement response to some type of untold event, it is also very important that there be another kind of planning. For want of a better phrase, let me call it "people planning," that is, trying to deal with the community's problems up front so as to smooth the waters before anything occurs. In effect, fix it now or it is going to be much more expensive to fix later.

As law enforcement officers, we have to focus on those kinds of things and deal with a myriad of problems, ranging from more focus on juveniles, for example, to just trying to bring people together and make the society a bit more cohesive and serene.

The things we have been trying to do in New Jersey are not at all unique, but I want to mention a couple of them because they might be instructive. For example, in trying to bring people together, start a dialogue, and have a smoother working society, we have emphasized sensitivity to bias and prejudice to a large extent.

We have tried to combine a vigorous policy of prosecutorial enforcement against those who would commit biased types of crimes with some type of preventive mechanism. In every county we have human relations commissions under the aegis of the county prosecutor trying to bring people of different ethnicities and religions to the table to talk to each other.

For instance, we have curricula in schools for kids to try to teach them tolerance and not to display these terrible feelings of hate and prejudice. This is important, since kids commit most of these biased types of incidents.

We even created an Office of Bias Crime and Community Relations to coordinate all these particular activities. The effort has had some very positive results, I think, by keeping the lid on potentially explosive confrontations between the police and the minority community.

We have also combined this with some type of cultural diversity training for police officers, and last year created what we called a Use of Force Task Force that brought together minorities, the ACLU, police officers, prosecutors, sheriffs, and others to talk about this delicate issue, which led to several major innovations.

One was the creation of a set procedures for investigating serious confrontations between the police and the community. It is a way to instill confidence in the public that these matters will be pursued diligently, impartially, and straightforwardly.

We also realized that we needed to create a mechanism for the receipt and handling of citizen complaints about police officer conduct, something that is very
important for the police officer and very important for the community. Up to that point, most departments in New Jersey did not have a mechanism for accepting citizen complaints, let alone investigating them through an internal affairs officer.

And lastly, though we had a weed and seed program in New Jersey, I also allocated almost $5 million of Federal block grant drug money to police/community partnerships in an attempt to deal with the drug problem in urban centers around the state. The thrust of this effort is more community policing, more interaction between police officers and citizens in a very supportive way, and an improved relationship that gets people, the community, more involved in trying to chart their own fate and their own course of conduct.

In the last analysis, we are really only going to succeed in this society if we get people mobilized and involved and interested and caring about each other and loving each other and working together to get a job done.

A resident of one of these community policing areas said, "We may need help, but we are not helpless." That is the whole thrust of where we have to go as a society, in advance of civil disorders. We must bring people together and get them interested in their own fate.

In sum, from a pragmatic standpoint, we need a law enforcement response plan. But we also need some broader social planning and positive interaction between government and our citizenship in order to prevent these things from happening in the first place.

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**THE NECESSITY OF A WRITTEN CIVIL DISORDER PLAN: THE NEW YORK APPROACH**

**Raymond Kelly**
Commissioner, New York City Police Department

If you look at reports on civil disorders—*City in Crisis*, for instance, the excellent report done by Judge Webster and Hubert Williams, or *Nights of Fire*, the one prepared concerning the incidents of disorder in Los Vegas, or the report put together by the major city chiefs that the FBI issued last year—four constant themes come through: the need for quick and decisive action; the need for unity of command; the need for training; and the need for a clearly articulated plan.

Why do you need a written plan to address civil disorder? Simply because when a civil disorder happens, you do not have the time to think about it. You need something that you are familiar with, and that you can take off the shelf to use as a ready reference. But it cannot be something that has been on the shelf for years and years.

I believe the plan must be specifically addressed to civil disorder, not just to emergency response. It must specifically address the issue of what a department does in the event of a riotous situation.

The plan must be current. It must be something that is examined at least twice a year. In New York City, we have 75 precincts. They are under an umbrella of 19 divisions, and they are in seven borough commands. We are a large and complex organization. Each one of those entities has a disorder control plan—and I can tell you that until recently, we were not looking at those plans.

Simply put, information changes and must be updated. The personnel and equipment you have available, the mobilization points, radio frequencies, and a whole host of other issues can change.

The plan has to be simple, in simple language, and it has to tell everyone what they are expected to do, particularly at the onset of a civil disorder. I am a police officer. Where do I respond? What type of equipment do I have to have?

A useful format is the old military model. Those of you in the military might remember the acronym SMEAC—situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and communication and coordination. I think it serves us well in the New York City police department.
And, of course, you have to exercise your plan. Again, quite frankly, up until recently we were not exercising our plans, but we are now. We have major mobilization drills every month in which we bring together our task forces, other uniformed personnel, and some detectives, as well.

There are five geographical boroughs in New York City, but we have seven organizational borough commands, and it is within these that we mobilize our uniformed task forces. Each one of our boroughs has a uniformed task force of about 100 to 120 officers, and we have a total of about 800 officers in our task forces. We bring as many of those as we can to one location each month, to practice disorder control.

We use our plainclothes officers, what we call “anti-crime officers,” to act as demonstrators or rioters, and then our uniformed officers practice making arrests.

In New York we have designated a deputy chief to act as the disorder control coordinator to inspect our disorder control plans and to help both myself and Chief Scott, the chief of the department, know what the condition of the equipment is, as well as what the disorder control plans in all of our 75 precincts and borough commands are. So far, this has proven very helpful. I do not know if other agencies can afford to do this, but at least for a short period of time it might be very beneficial to designate someone full time to give you a report as to where your organization stands on readiness for disorder control.

Preparedness comes with a cost. There is an opportunity cost. If you are going to train, you are taking those people off patrol or out of their other important functions. But it is a cost well worth paying.

For example, we expect the military to train. We have had a strategic air command for 40 years, and we accept the concept that they practice. We accept the concept that it costs money to have them practice. Yet in policing, oftentimes, the conventional wisdom is that we have got to get out there and do real police work. Yet training is critical in the disorder control business.

There is perhaps a new appreciation for the costs of training and preparedness in the aftermath of Los Angeles riots. We can already see how difficult it will be for Los Angeles to bounce back.

In New York City we understand the cost of disorder. In 1977 we had a blackout in the Northeastern quadrant of the county, and buildings and stores were looted. Those buildings are still standing, but the stores, the businesses, have never reopened. The cost was tremendous. It is much cheaper to prepare for disorder than pay for it after it happens.

Let me just cite some weaknesses that we have encountered through the years in dealing with the disorders in New York City. As I say, most of them we learned about the hard way. Some of them we corrected through better planning, some of them through training, and some of them we are addressing now.

For instance, years ago, in the seventies, if we had a major mobilization in which officers had to come in from their homes; we would have them report to the closest police facility. Nobody really thought about it too much. Then we realized that there was no equipment there. There was no transportation for them. It may seem like a simple adjustment, but we adjusted our disorder control plan so that people report to their own commands, they go where they work, where they have their equipment, where there are supervisors. And we package them in teams of eight or ten officers with the supervisor and take them with transportation to the mobilization point.

Another problem that we encountered, and we encountered it just recently in Washington Heights, is that when you have looting you have a lot of broken glass. Broken glass and pieces of debris in the street cause flat tires. We had an inordinate number of flat tires on our radio cars.

What is the solution? We now have a logistics package that we put together for disorder. That includes tires on rims and mechanics to change flat tires.

In Tompkin Square Park in 1988, officers responded directly to the scene of a disorder. There was a demonstration over the closing of Tompkin Square Park. The demonstrators came out in the street, officers became involved in a tussle, and they called for an assist officer, a 10-13, as we call it.

Officers from surrounding areas responded directly to the scene. They responded on their own, without supervision. As a result, some of them came and went as they pleased. We did not know who was there, and by the way, we had about 100 civilian complaints that generated from that incident. Our response was to embark on a massive disorder control training program for the entire department, and it requires all officers to first report to their individual commands.

Again, where officers are linked up with supervisors, they are briefed at a mobilization point and then taken en masse to the scene. If you practice this you can do it relatively quickly. In this manner you have the psychological impact of having large numbers of officers arriving at a scene together, which also discourages independent action on the part of officers.

We also found that we did not have clearly identified mobilization points. We now have our precinct com-
manders identify several mobilization points in each of their precincts, in addition to routes and information as to how to arrive at those mobilization points.

We also had problems in several demonstrations and disorders with low-flying helicopters. For instance, in an attempt to use our helicopters as a tactical weapon to go down and move a crowd, all we succeeded in doing was to create an attraction and bring more people to the scene.

Helicopters are extremely valuable in disorder situations, and we want them on the scene, but we want them either to be at an altitude where they are unobtrusive or can observe traffic routes and roving bands while remaining at a distance from the central scene.

We actually had a helicopter fired upon last year. It received two rounds in the tail. This is another argument for remaining at a high altitude.

In Crown Heights, 1991, our problem was lack of mobility — or, rather, you might say that the mobility of the rioters was our problem. Traditionally in New York City we have been able to muster large numbers of police officers at the scene of a disorder; we now have about 28,000 officers, and will be going up to 31,000 officers shortly. But in the case of Crown Heights, we did not provide sufficient mobility for those officers to move as the situation changed. We had groups of young people running from block to block, street to street. We had started off policing it as a demonstration, having lots of officers on foot, and therefore did not have sufficient mobility. We later moved in vehicles, vans, horses, motorcycles, but not until the third day. Now, every one of our disorder control plans provides for a sufficient amount of mobility.

Another problem we had was that police vehicles were being targeted by rioters, since in a disorder situation officers have the tendency to arrive at the scene and park their vehicles anywhere. It is a terrible sight to see a police vehicle burn, to see it on television.

What we have done is to establish clearly delineated points where vehicles will be parked. One of the concepts is to establish a route perpendicular to the disorder area that will allow us to amass equipment. It will be, in essence, a show of force. You put your radio cars, fire equipment, and ambulances in a secured area, and then are able to escort those vehicles along this perpendicular route into the disorder area. It is critical that you keep your vehicles together and do not let them stray.

In the aftermath of Crown Heights, we had a problem with officer burnout. We had some officers who were out for 20 hours or more, and that is simply too long. From the very beginning, you must think of civil disorder response as a port and starboard concept. You have to make certain that you have sufficient personnel to address the problem early on, but also sufficient personnel to come in 12 hours later. That is what we do in New York. In the event of a disorder, we will go to 12-hour tours. But in order to do this you have to plan. You have to have sufficient managers available to manage the situation for the succeeding 12-hour period. You need places where officers can rest.

There are some generic problems that occur throughout the country. For example, we know that television has the ability to spread disorders instantly. In Watts, it took several days to spread the riots to other areas, whereas now, in our global village, it takes just a matter of minutes or hours.

I think it is important that one of the first things people see on television is large numbers of well-disciplined police officers. That is a photo opportunity that we cannot miss. We want to use the media to show that we are in control.

Again, regarding the mobility of the rioters, every agency has to look at the possibility of young people being particularly mobile and running. You must have a sufficient number of vehicles. And you also have to envision a perimeter concept, closing off an area where you keep potential victims out and where you keep the rioters confined.

Consistency in planning is important. I mentioned our own disorder control plans. A lot of those plans were different. Some of the precinct plans looked nothing like the others. We are now in the process of making them uniform.
It is also important to have personnel who do the same functions at disorders, with an assigned personnel officer or logistics officer, for instance. We are now in the process of clearly identifying people at our temporary headquarters by their function. When you walk in, you know that this is a personnel officer. He will have an arm band on that identifies him as such. Or this is the logistics person that you see if you need radios, if you need information about fuel.

Again, we have seven task forces in the City of New York that we mobilize once a month. We are planning to equip them with shorter shields. We found that the larger shields they had, 4-foot shields, were simply too cumbersome. We have found that 3-foot shields are much easier to carry and to run with.

Lack of training, of course, is always an issue. The solution for the New York City police department was to institute an ongoing disorder control training program. Right now we have accelerated it somewhat, training 200 officers a day. After the summer, we will probably be training fewer officers, but it will remain an ongoing program.

There is also an understandable lack of experience on the part of commanders. Disorders do not happen with great frequency, thank God. What we have started to establish are command post exercises, something that the military does all the time. We also have table-top exercises, or one-on-one situations. Information is given to captains and above who then have to react to certain situations. We also are looking to develop a similar program for supervisors. We will have a mobile training team of sorts, that will go from one borough to the other conducting command post exercises.

What all this requires is a return to the fundamentals. This is not rocket science. These are things that we all know but have perhaps put on the back burner in recent years.

I am a strong proponent of community policing. My predecessor, Lee Brown, did a magnificent job in putting community policing in place, and certainly his predecessor, Benjamin Ward, did an outstanding job in laying the foundation. Moving away from the classic military model in policing is a good thing, but there are a lot of things that we can learn from the military as far as disorder control training is concerned.

For example, there are the famous von Klausewitz principles, which are still applicable today. When you think about planning for a disorder, you need to think of: (1) mass, the concept of bringing large numbers of officers together to a critical point; and (2) mobility, the concept of being able to move. You need a clearly stated objective for your officers. You need unity of command, particularly those agencies that will need support from other jurisdictions. Somebody has got to be in charge of surprise, of keeping the plan secure—keeping your immediate locations and your equipment, secure.

Another of these military principles involves economy of force; that is, you should not over-police an event if you can avoid it. Yes, you want to have a show of force, but you do not want to do it in such a fashion that it in itself becomes an inciting incident.

You also have to think in terms of taking the offensive—to be aggressive in the best sense of the word. I do not think we can lay back any more and have property damaged or have persons placed in jeopardy. We have to be more decisive and more aggressive in our initial moves.

Though this is clearly the responsibility of government, we are the people that the citizens rely on to restore order in this very delicate society of ours. It is simply something that has to be done, and we are the ones that have to do it. And we are the ones that have to practice it. And indeed, the very delicate balance of our society depends on our skill at quickly, aggressively, and fairly addressing civil disorders.
EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED

Charles Meeks
Executive Director, National Sheriffs’ Association

Most law enforcement is basically made up of rural areas, smaller communities, with areas of responsibility that run from agricultural to light industry. Most of them have a chief of police, a sheriff, and maybe, as a source of additional support, someone from a federal agency within their bailiwick. How many of us expect to run into civil disorder on the magnitude that we see in Los Angeles and New York City? Many of us are saying to ourselves, “Thank God it is in those areas. I hope I never have to face something like that.” But civil disorder does sometimes hit within the sheriff’s office and city police in small, urban America and rural America. And it is with this in mind that I will present my remarks.

What happens if you have a large industrial base and, say, 9,000 employees go out on strike? And all of a sudden management brings in strike-breakers, and we have civil disorder we are not prepared to handle.

What about the new trend we have seen over the last few years of violent confrontations in front of abortion clinics? No longer do we have the peaceful demonstrators who lay down and are carried away. Now we have violent confrontations, including murder and burnings. So we have to look at all aspects of civil disorder. We not only have to look at the problems we have within our cities, but at the problems that can affect any small town in our nation today.

These problems will come to you in many forms. And then you will have to face the fact that you are not prepared. The chief did not talk to the mayor. The sheriff did not talk to the chief. We never talked to the superintendent of the state police. We never talked to the prosecutor. And all of a sudden we have to work together. We may not even like each other, and many times that is really true.

If we do not overcome this we are going to find ourselves on the bad end of publicity. And then, as a sheriff or a chief, you know what happens: Somebody gets replaced.

In many large metropolitan areas, the sheriff may only have civil process and is not a big player within the criminal justice system. But out of 3,900 sheriffs in the United States, most of them have complete responsibility for crime and law enforcement within their bailiwick, and they are team players. They have to be, because in most of those places they operate the jail.

Now, you can be a chief and have a civil disorder, and no place to put your prisoners. Just like in Los Angeles County today. Jails, as you know, are over-crowded. Prisons are over crowded. Where are you going to detain the people you have arrested? Have there been proper allowances made for this? Has the sheriff made proper allowances for this? How are you going to feed them? How are you going to get them to court? How are you going to get them through medical? How are you going to get them on intake forms? How are you going to process them? How are you going to transport them? How are you going to assign attorneys? How are you going to work with the visitors who are going to come to visit their sons and daughters who have been arrested and incarcerated? How is that plan put together?

First, it is important that the chief, the sheriff, and the state police superintendent, along with the prosecutor and even a trial judge, as well as some individuals within the community, form a task force that covers any turf problems there might be. If there are, try to solve them, and then divide up the responsibilities.

Who will speak for a particular agency, and who for the entire operation? Will it be the chief of police or the commissioner? Will it be the sheriff? Will it be the prosecutor or the attorney general, or will it be the U.S. attorney? Who is going to issue the news releases? The officers and the rank and file out there in those situations should be able to say, “I know who is going to be the official spokesman,” so that only accurate information is flowing back into the community.

Who is going to operate the hotline and the tipline and the rumor control line? Who is going to take care of those communications lines, and who will feed the information into them? All of these things have to be thought out.

Many times, we do not do that. I have been there, and I have seen it.

When it comes down to it, we in law enforcement are the ones in the front row, and we are the ones that act as
the lightening rods—and take the lightening hits. Everything comes down to us. The politicians can sit back and talk. But we have to be trained and ready to go.

That said, there is one element that I would like to focus on in closing, and that is the burnout factor. We need to take a look at those officers and the stress that they are under.

In Desert Storm, the military was in conflict for 100 hours, and it had support services for their people for post-traumatic syndrome. Our officers are on the streets day after day, week after week, month after month, and we do not have that. We have to be able to tend to the needs of our officers also. That should be part of the planning.

RENEWING CONFIDENCE, REBUILDING VALUES IN THE L.A.P.D.

Stanley Sheinbaum
Member of the Board of Police Commissioners, Los Angeles; Publisher, New Perspective Quarterly

Willie Williams
Chief of Police, City of Los Angeles

Mr. Sheinbaum was asked by Chief Willie Williams to deliver his remarks in the chief's absence. What follows is an introduction by Mr. Sheinbaum, his presentation of Chief Williams' remarks and Mr. Sheinbaum's concluding remarks.

Listening to the inventory of what is being done, especially in New York, and having been very close to what went on in Los Angeles in April of 1991, it is as though I am looking at the opposite side of a coin. In Los Angeles we learned fast what went wrong and why, especially with the help of Judge William Webster and Hubert Williams. And what is being done in New York seems in keeping with our findings. Of course, the basic principles pertain in both places. I feel honored to be saying these words for Willie Williams; in the past year in working with him, I have become very conscious of the man’s competence.

Chief Williams begins his remarks by underscoring civil disorder as the topic of the day. We in Los Angeles have been called to make preparations to respond to this challenge. Before getting to specifics, however, it is important to examine our efforts to rebuild and restore confidence in the LAPD. The LAPD’s reputation was damaged. The morale was damaged because the rank and file felt they were disparaged, when a lot of what went wrong was not their problem. The equipment was not there, the command staff was not functioning well, some of the command level people were not talking to others, the chief and the mayor were not talking to each other, and on and on.

It was not the hit that the members of the department should have taken; that is one thing that is absolutely clear. But you try and tell them that. They are still suffering from it; it is a very serious problem.

Remarks of Chief Willie Williams, as presented by Stanley Sheinbaum

Clearly, to be successful, police work must be community based and dependent upon mutual respect, communi-
cation, and a true partnership with a community.

Our first step was to make a concerted effort to meet with all strata of the community, church groups, educators, students, homeowners, chambers of commerce, gang members, hillside residents, and block clubs.

At the local police station or area level, we are forming community councils and advisory groups. Currently, a group of captains have joined my senior lead officers and are developing guidelines for those community groups. While the captains will clearly remain responsible for the performance of their people, the community will have a role in the development of joint planning, decision-making, and even expectations.

Community empowerment produces community confidence and shared responsibilities. Community evaluation of police services is being sought. Councils are being advised of the disposition of personal complaints within the constraints of the personnel laws. The complaint system was archaic and had not functioned well. And over time the community had become bitter about the nature of what happened to the complaints.

The role of the senior lead officers is expanding and changing in the evolution to problem-oriented policing and problem-solving. Training to reinforce the early efforts supported by the Police Executive Research Forum and the San Diego Police Department is slated for the near future.

At the executive level, we have developed community forums, with representatives of the Asian, black, and Hispanic communities. These forums provide open discussion on policy, training, and enforcement issues, as well as on community concerns.

Our second step is to emphasize a return to basic patrol service. We are currently evaluating the number of patrol cars we have, and we may be revising the number to establish neighborhood or business community bonds.

We are also attempting to establish some stability in beat assignments so that officers can improve their bond with the community they serve. The goal is to establish neighborhood identification and "ownership" by all officers assigned to the neighborhood business district foot beat, not just the senior lead officers.

We are examining our basic deployment blocks. Basic car areas constitute our beats. Los Angeles is very spread out. It is 100 miles long, and almost as wide. We would like to approximate the geographic communities that we serve through our basic car areas, although our resources are limited. New York, for instance, has a force of 27,000 sworn officers; we have 7,600 for what I believe is a larger geographical area.

Foot patrol work is much more difficult to implement. The personnel demands of foot patrol work are almost impossible for us to meet under the present budgetary problems. We lose about 30 officers a month, and have had only one Academy class since I became chief, again because of budgetary problems.

We have also had to take a critical look at the many special units that the LAPD had developed over time. As the Webster report pointed out, too many people had moved off the street and into headquarters. The rank-and-file knew that promotions went to officers in the specialized units rather than to officers on the beat. That was a very serious handicap. On the other hand, some of the most effective individual efforts in the department came from these special units. However, because we needed both to cut costs and to get back to basic patrol service, we trimmed and in some cases eliminated special units. It was unfortunate, but necessary.

The third step, the strategic plan for management, is to establish a clear direction for current efforts and, more importantly, for the future. We are looking at our core values and the department's commitment to excellence of service, and we are conducting an examination of the
department's culture.

By the fall of 1993, we will have had input both from outside and within the department. The values that emerge from this process will be adopted and published in our mission statement. There is good news here. There is a focus on high quality, and we are blessed with well-educated, value-driven people who are committed to bringing about this kind of change.

We are placing a new emphasis on leadership training for all levels of command: executives, captains, midmanagers, and supervisors. We are fortunate to have received offers of assistance from West Point and local colleges and universities. The goal in Los Angeles is ultimately to establish a 5-year strategic plan.

To tie these three steps together, there is the National Institute of Justice Partnership for Community Policing grant. In October 1992, I initiated the change process and applied for assistance from the federal government. Recently, the National Institute of Justice approved $600,000 in grant funds to the department to address three of our most important challenges:

1.) Rebuilding our patrol force and rejuvenating the basic car plan.
2.) Developing a strategic plan in order to develop goals and strategies for the future.
3.) Rebuilding public confidence in the police department through the development of police community councils for all geographic areas.

The Partnerships for Community Policing grant has enabled the LAPD to obtain the services of Jack Green from Temple University. He is helping us coordinate the various phases of the process and examine the values and culture of the organization. The goal is a true partnership with the community. There is much for us to accomplish.

Thus concludes Willie Williams' remarks. Stanley Sheinbaum continues.

We have just had a $300 million bond issue passed by the City Council to cover supplies, vehicles, and logistics. It took some fighting to get it, but equipment shortages are being addressed. Finally, there are now less-than-lethal weapons being supplied: rubber batons, 37 mm rounds, rubber grenades, and pepper gas.

The effort toward civil disorder preparedness is very important. There is a sense that the country must focus on this. The use of force is a critical issue. It is difficult to draw objective, clear, guidelines for use of force, to define what is excessive and what is not. But the public is confused and ultimately loses confidence in the department.
FIELD OPERATIONS ARE OFTEN CARRIED OUT IN LESS THAN IDEAL CONDITIONS. DECISIVE ACTIONS ON THE PART OF THE FIRST SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ON THE SCENE OF AN UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE ARE A MUST. TIME IS THE ENEMY. THE SUPERVISOR, WHOEVER THAT MIGHT BE, MUST BE MENTALLY PREPARED. THE FIRST SERIES OF DECISIONS SETS THE TONE FOR THE OUTCOME.

COMMAND SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED ON THE SCENE. SUPERVISORS NEED TO ASSESS THE SITUATION WITH THEIR OWN EYES AND RESPOND QUICKLY WITH SUFFICIENT FORCES. IN THIS AREA, IT IS BETTER TO HAVE MORE MANPOWER THAN NEEDED. ASSESS AND EVALUATE THE SITUATION, DETERMINE THE MAGNITUDE, THE COMPLEXITY, AND THE SEVERITY OF THE OCCURRENCE.

ESTABLISHING A FIELD COMMAND POST REQUIRES DELEGATING RESPONSIBILITY. REMEMBER, YOU CANNOT DO EVERYTHING YOURSELF. IN MANAGEMENT 101, THEY TELL YOU THAT YOU HAVE TO DELEGATE. YOU CANNOT DELEGATE AUTHORITY. BUT YOU CAN DELEGATE RESPONSIBILITY. QUICK AND DECISIVE ACTIONS CAN ALTER THE COURSE OF AN INCIDENT. THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE POLICE DEPARTMENT'S FIELD RESPONSE TO A CRITICAL INCIDENT ASSUMES COMMAND; ASSESSES THE SITUATION; ESTABLISHES THE COMMAND POST; ESTABLISHES OBJECTIVES; DETERMINES STRATEGY; ENSURES THAT INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND PLANNING FUNCTIONS ARE ACCOMPLISHED; APPROVES THE ORDERING AND RELEASE OF RESOURCES; AND COORDINATES WITH OTHER AGENCIES.

JUST A YEAR AGO, ON APRIL 13, 1992, MATT RODRIGUEZ BECAME THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CHICAGO POLICE. ON THAT DAY, HE CALLED ME AND SAID, "I THINK I GOT THE SUPERINTENDENT'S JOB. THE MAYOR JUST CALLED ME AND HE WANTS ME IN HIS OFFICE AT 9:00 A.M." WELL, LITTLE DID MATT KNOW THAT WE HAD THE START OF A DOWNTOWN FLOOD THAT ALMOST TURNED INTO A DISASTER. THE MAYOR TOOK HIM TO A PRESS CONFERENCE AND HE SAID TO ALL THE REPORTERS PRESENT, "I WANT TO INTRODUCE THE NEW SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, MATT RODRIGUEZ. WE HAVE TO LEAVE NOW, WE'VE GOT A CRISIS ON OUR HANDS."

LATER THAT EVENING, WE EVACUATED NEARLY TWO MILES OF CHICAGO'S LOOP. IT WAS MATT'S COMMAND. HE WAS THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE AND HE WAS THROWN INTO IT. AND LET ME TELL YOU, HE TOOK THE BULL BY THE HORN. HE DID NOT SEE HIS OFFICE AT 11TH AND STATE FOR TWO WEEKS.

THE FLOOD HAD STARTED ON A MONDAY. ON TUESDAY, THE CITY OF CHICAGO TOOK A BUILDING THAT IT OWNED WITHIN A BLOCK FROM WHERE THE WATER WAS SEEPING INTO THE TUNNELS, AND THEY SET UP A COMMAND CENTER. THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, FIRE DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT, EVERY DEPARTMENT HEAD ESTABLISHED AN OFFICE IN THAT BUILDING; IT WAS LIKE A MINI CITY HALL. SO THERE WAS NO PICKING UP THE PHONE AND HEARING, "WELL, HE'S IN A MEETING." YOU JUST WALKED ACROSS THE HALL. EVERYBODY WAS THERE. WE WERE THERE FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO AND A HALF WEEKS. IT IS SO IMPORTANT WHEN EVERYBODY WORKS TOGETHER, PULLS TOGETHER, WHETHER IT BE A FLOOD OR A CIVIL DISORDER.

WHEN IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY, THE FIELD COMMANDER MUST RECOGNIZE THAT POLICE RESPONSE MUST CHANGE AS CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES CHANGE. YOU HAVE TO BE ABLE TO CONTAIN THE EVENT IMMEDIATELY, CONTROL AVENUES OF APPROACH, DIVERT TRAFFIC, ASSEMBLE SUFFICIENT MANPOWER AND RESOURCES TO CONTROL AND SUPPRESS THE INCIDENT QUICKLY, PROMPTLY ARREST LAWBREAKERS, AND ARRANGE FOR THEIR TRANSPORT FROM THE SCENE. YOU INSTITUTE PERIMETER CONTROL, SURROUND THE PROBLEM AREA, AND ASSURE COMMITTED UNITS THAT THEY HAVE A MISSION.

YOU ALSO HAVE TO MAINTAIN A RESERVE FORCE. REPLACE INITIAL RESPONDING PERSONNEL WITH RESERVE MANPOWER; YOU CANNOT LEAVE THEM OUT THERE TOO LONG. AND THAT IS WHERE THERE IS MORE OF A DANGER OF COMPLAINTS OF EXCESSIVE FORCE. THE STRESS FACTOR COMES INTO PLAY. YOU HAVE TO NOT ONLY MAINTAIN THE POSITIONS YOU HOLD AT THE SITE OF THE DISTURBANCE, BUT YOU HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE REST OF THE CITY. YOU HAVE TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND TO CALLS FOR SERVICE AS WELL.

I WOULD LIKE TO TURN TO THE SUBJECT OF EXCESSIVE FORCE, A CHARGE THAT WAS MADE AGAINST A POLICE COMMANDER AND TWO DETECTIVES OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT. THOSE OFFICERS HAVE JUST FILED SUIT AGAINST THE CITY OF CHICAGO, THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE POLICE BOARD, SUPERINTENDENT RODRIGUEZ AND MYSELF, BECAUSE OF OUR POSITIONS. SO WHILE I WILL SPEAK ON THIS SUBJECT, I HAVE TO LIMIT WHAT I SAY BECAUSE OF THE PENDING LITIGATION. THE EVENTS IN THIS CASE DATE BACK TO 1982 WHEN A LIEUTENANT AND TWO DETECTIVES ARRESTED TWO BROTHERS FOR THE MURDER OF TWO POLICE OFFICERS. THEY WERE FOUND GUILTY AND BOTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT.

IN 1984, A COMPLAINT WAS REGISTERED AGAINST THE THREE OFFICERS, CHARGING THEM WITH BRUTALITY AND TORTURE. THE COMMUNITY FOCUSED ITS ATTENTION ON THE CASE, WHICH WAS INVESTIGATED BY OUR OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, OR OPS, RUN BY A CIVILIAN WITH ALL CIVILIAN INVESTIGATORS. IT TOOK QUITE A WHILE FOR THEM TO INVESTIGATE THE CHARGES. THE LONGER IT TOOK, THE MORE INCENSED THE COMMUNITY GOT.

EVENTUALLY, OPS CAME BACK WITH A "NOT SUSTAINED," MEANING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS COULD NEITHER BE PROVED NOR DISPROVED. THAT WAS NOT SATISFACTORY TO THE CITIZENS OF...
Chicago. We had some small demonstrations — not large demonstrations, not big disorders, but the people let the city government and the police department know how they felt.

So in 1989 or 1990, under heavy pressure, LeRoy Martin, then the superintendent, reopened the case. The civilian Police Board held hearings. We usually handle all the Police Board cases right in our headquarters building at 11th and State, on the sixth floor, the office adjacent to mine. But so many people showed an interest in coming that we did not know where to hold it. Ultimately, the federal government gave us the ceremonial courtroom in the Federal Building at 219 South Dearborn. All we had to do was secure the courtroom itself; the rest was done by the General Services Administration and the Marshals Service.

I testified at the Police Board hearing, and every day for about a month that courtroom was packed; there were many more who wanted to get in and could not. So each day that the hearing was in session we had to worry about violence erupting. Some of the witness testimony was so explicit that people would come out of the courtroom and be frustrated and mad at the police.

It took approximately fifteen months for the Police Board to make its decision. They had mounds and mounds of testimony that they had to go through, and you have to remember that the board's members volunteer their time. Four of them are lawyers; they were not about to give up their law practice during the day and sit and read all this testimony; that is why it took fifteen months. Every month when the Police Board met, we had a roomful of people and the first question that was asked was, "What about the Burge case? What are you doing about it?" For the next two or three days we had to be prepared in case there were civil disruptions.

Finally, the president of the Police Board telephoned the superintendent and said, "We're going to announce our decision tomorrow morning at 11:00 o'clock." The superintendent whistled me down to his office. "Well," he said, "the Burge decision, whatever it is, is going to come down tomorrow. So you better make some preparations." So we did. We secured the building and we had a reserve force in the central district locker room.

Now, as I said, the Police Board room is adjacent to my office; I kept looking at my watch as it got closer to the appointed hour, but there was nobody there. I went down to the superintendent's office and asked, "Do you know something I don't? There's nobody up there." He had no other news.

Unbeknownst to us, the president of the Police Board figured he would be more secure in his law office on the 21st floor of some building. He told the press at 10:00 o'clock that morning, but he never told us. So we had all these resources assembled at the Central Headquarters Building, while they were holding their meeting in the middle of the Loop. People found out about it, however, and they sat down in the law office and they would not move. We had a few minor scuffles up there because the law firm's president or the chairman of the board, even though he had given permission to hold the meeting there, became angry at the disruption; he wanted everybody that was sitting, barring the entrance to his office, locked up.

Once again, they said they would hold a press conference at 11:00 a.m. Then they changed it to one o'clock, at which time they changed it to three. Three o'clock came and they changed the time to five o'clock. When they finally announced their decision, we were still on standby. You can never relinquish your standby. You have to keep everybody in place because you never know what is going to happen.

The Police Board decided to fire the commander, and give the two detectives the fifteen months and seven days they already served without pay. It was that decision which last week prompted the three to file suit in Federal Court, asking that the commander be reinstated and allocated his back pay, and that the two detectives receive their back pay and have their rank of detective restored.

While we had prepared for trouble in this case, fortunately the disorder was minimal. What we are experiencing now, however, is this new phenomenon of victory celebration. The success of the Chicago Bulls in the National Basketball Association championships have resulted in two disturbances. In last year's Bulls victory celebration, we arrested 1,000 people in 12 hours for looting and burning; two police officers were shot. When the Dallas Cowboys won the Super Bowl, they had a victory celebration eight days later, with the same kind of violence as we had. It does not have to stem from a police officer doing something wrong; it could be anything. As to preventing something that could very quickly have become a big problem, just a few weeks ago, an Arab grocer in a small shopping mall on the West Side was shot by a young black man. And within moments, all the store owners were up in arms and were out demonstrating. They started throwing rocks and bricks at the cars and at people. Our TAC teams, a sergeant and eight men, were mobilized within a half hour or 45 minutes and within an hour and a half it was all over. We contained it right there, made a few arrests, and everybody went back to their businesses.
NEWARK'S TARGET TEAM
RESPONSE TO AUTO THEFT

William R. Celeste
Director, Newark Police Department

Newark is a city of approximately 351,000 residents. It has a police force of approximately 1,100 police officers. Newark had a large civil disturbance in 1967, which most of you know about. The National Guard was brought in; 23 people were killed, including one police officer and one firefighter. It lasted a long time, during which much of the city was burned down and a lot of looting occurred. As a result, many businesses left Newark.

But the city has since come back. Newark has not had a major disturbance in twenty years. The city just announced plans for a $250 million cultural center in Newark. Many low and moderate income housing units have been built. Newark is now called “The Renaissance City.” Nonetheless, Newark has some problems.

The major crime problem in Newark is auto theft. We lead the nation in auto theft per capita. Last year, we had almost 14,000 autos stolen in Newark—784 less than in the prior year, so we are making progress. But we have a phenomenon in Newark that is unique to the city. We call it “donuts.” Donuts is where young men steal cars, especially cars with front-wheel drive, turn the wheel as far to the right or as far to the left as they can, hold it there, and then push the gas pedal down to the floor. The car spins in a circle and makes the loudest racket you ever want to hear. Usually, the car is wrecked. We have had kids as young as nine years old doing these donuts.

Donuts are still a popular activity among the young men, but now they have taken the sport one step further; now they go after the police officer who arrives at the scene. They try to intimidate and sometimes assault the police officer. The donuts situation got so bad that we became reluctant to send a police officer to the scene, even though people were calling up, complaining about these kids. That is what the kids wanted people to do. I will tell you why in a moment.

We had to issue an order that prevented police officers in Newark from pursuit of a stolen car. It caused a lot of controversy, especially with law enforcement officials from outside Newark who wanted to chase cars into Newark. We hoped they would appreciate our position on the no-chase policy, but some of them did not and chased in anyway. They felt like we were stopping them from doing their job.

My feeling on the subject was that too many people were getting killed during police pursuits of stolen cars—particularly when we had arrested over 2,000 people for stealing cars and not nine went to jail. I just thought it was crazy for police officers to put their lives and the public's lives in danger by chasing these cars.

But as I said, before these kids have graduated from donuts. Now they do the donuts until they see a police car; then they come out of the spin and head right for the police car, which either has to move out of the way or get hit. They also go after walking police officers, go right up on the sidewalk after them. If they are in front of a police car, they will shift into reverse to hit the front of the police car so the airbags will go off and the car will be immobilized. Then they take off. In short, they try to intimidate the police officer.

Police officers have become discouraged. We have had reports of police officers throwing rocks at the cars because they cannot shoot the kids for stealing cars. So some police officers have thrown rocks, trying to break the windshield of the car, trying to immobilize the car that way. We had one situation in which a young man was reported doing donuts. There were police officers in the park above him and as they came down the hill to make an arrest, the young man got out of the car, shots were fired, the young man ran, and the police left the scene.

A few minutes later, we received a call reporting that a young man had been shot in the same area. Some of the same police officers answered the call but they never admitted they had been on the scene before, that they had fired their weapons, and that they had left the scene without reporting the incident. As the investigation proceeded, it was found that the young man was hit with a .45 automatic. That is not a police gun, but one of the police officers has been indicted and charged with using that gun to shoot this young man. The incident led to demonstrations in Newark and calls for police review boards.

We have another case in which a van was taken from its owner. The next day, the van was spotted by the police and chased. Shots were fired and three people in the van wound up dead, including a pregnant 16-year-old. That, too, created considerable controversy, particularly when no gun was found inside the van. You can imagine the frustration of Newark police officers who want to do their jobs and go home to their families like everybody else, but who are subject to being attacked with these vehicles.

So we had to try to educate the community on what was going on, why we chose finally not to chase these cars.
We had to educate the police officers as well, teach them about community policing, tell them why it was not necessary for them to chase stolen cars. In one week last year in Newark, for instance, we had ten officers out injured and four police cars totally wrecked. You can imagine the cost. So we had to figure out different ways of approaching the problem.

The prosecutors from Essex County and Union County had formed a task force made up of police officers from all the different towns within the two counties. Newark had two officers in that task force. The task force attempts to arrest young men for stealing cars. But in Newark, I felt like a new approach was needed. Indeed, something had to be done, in light of the growing number of citizens saying, "We demand that you do something about these stolen cars; we demand that you do something different because what you’re doing evidently is not working."

We formed what we called the TARGET Team. The TARGET Team stands for Tactical Auto Recovery Group And Enforcement. The TARGET Team was made up of 24 police officers—hand-picked by me—including a captain to run the unit, two sergeants, ten detectives, and eleven police officers. There are three components to the program: an enforcement component, a business component, and an education/community participation component.

To start any unit like this, of course, takes money. And our police budget, like many of yours, is limited. We thus went to local businesses to raise funds. We went to insurance companies, telephone companies, even small businesses, and we asked them to form a partnership and help us put together a unit to control the auto theft problem in Newark. The response was gratifying. Over $300,000 in equipment was donated. The insurance companies were particularly generous because they were losing the most. The equipment included ten vehicles of all makes: Jaguars, Mercedes, Jeeps, etc. We were also given cameras, paint guns, and telephones.

This is how the TARGET Team works. The first thing we do is set up a camera in the TARGET Team vehicle. We then go out there undercover. You are able to get close enough to get a picture of the suspects. The unit records as well the time, the date, and the license plate of the vehicle. So we just identify them and get a warrant and we do not have to chase them. If we are close enough, can get some back up, and affect an arrest with no trouble, then we will do it.

We also employ a paint gun and shoot a paint ball at the car. This makes a blotch on the vehicle, which identifies it to police and citizens as a stolen vehicle or one being used in the commission of a crime.

We also have telephones, donated by the telephone company, installed in these TARGET Team cars. Officers can communicate with each other without fear of being monitored by a scanner.

As we speak, the TARGET Team has been in operation just three months, and so far they have made over 200 arrests, although not all the arrests were for stolen autos and carjackings. We arrested two bank robbers, for instance. Our police officers were sitting in a team car right outside the bank at a traffic light. Two guys were going into a bank, pulling down ski masks as they went. They did not even pay attention to the two officers, who, looking at the calendar and realizing it was not Halloween, said, "Something must be going on. These guys are going into the bank." They called for help and the two bank robbers were arrested.

The third component of the TARGET Team—the education and community participation part—is very important. We have set up a ten-week course in the schools; it works a lot like DARE, but it focuses on stolen autos and carjackings rather than drugs. We show pictures of kids who have died as a result of stealing cars. The community distributes tee-shirts, bumper stickers, and placards saying, "Don’t steal cars, TARGET TEAM." The TARGET Team will also go out to community-based organizations to talk about the program. We are trying hard to combat negative attitudes held by community residents. We in Newark have developed what we call the community police mini-mobile precinct—a truck or a precinct on wheels. We do not think the stationary or storefront mini-precincts work as well as the mobile precinct. While we have one now and have ordered four more, we plan to put a mobile precinct into each and every precinct in Newark. The mobile precinct will go wherever the district commander thinks there might be a problem. If there is a problem on Broad Street, the van will be sent to Broad Street. The police officers in that van are all trained in community policing. They get out, they organize the community, they get rid of the problem, they try to stabilize the community. We have great hopes for our community policing efforts. And already we are coming to depend on working with the community to stop civil disorder.

When the Rodney King verdict came down, one of the first things we did was bring community leaders to police headquarters. We talked to them. They manned phones for us. Others went to police stations and addressed our officers, informed them about the community,
told them that they were with them and that they
supported them. We put together a special unit of about
25 trained community service police officers. Rather than
bring in a unit trained to squash any particular problem
right away, we try to do it another way. They talk to the
kids who know most of these officers because they are
either in DARE or they are in PAL. This helps stop
problems before they start.

At Broad and Market, we had over 1500 kids ready to
go at it when the verdict was announced. We sent 25
officers, but had a reserve team ready to go in if this tactic
failed. Fortunately, the community service officers did not
fail. They did make arrests but were able to do so without
unduly antagonizing the other kids.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR
CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN THE
NATION'S CAPITAL

Thomas Carroll
Deputy Chief Commander, Special Operations, Metropolitan
(D.C.) Police Department

When they asked me to come here and talk
about explosive situations, I said, “Well, I’ll
take a look at my calendar and see what we
have coming up.” I did not have to look too far because
yesterday we had a visit from President Mubarak of Egypt.
There was an extremely high threat level on him, so we
and the Secret Service had our work cut out for us.
Mubarak left yesterday afternoon and today one of the
Secret Service agents called me and said, “Whew, thanks a
lot.” We worked closely with the Service to get President
Mubarak out of town safely. Fortunately, it was a successful
mission.

One of our problems in Washington, of course, is that
we receive many visits from heads of state. If something is
going on somewhere in the world, it usually affects local
law enforcement. When the government launched
Operation Desert Storm, we felt the impact. Demonstrators
spontaneously gathered in front of the White House
and tried to take over the street there. Sporting events
can also cause problems here. If you have a championship
event in your city, you should be planning to respond to it.
Such foresight has saved us a couple of times.

When the Redskins last won the NFL championship,
and we had a spontaneous victory celebration in
Georgetown—one of our central gathering places—we
had prepared for it. We had people there and on duty,
ready to go that evening, and had no difficulty at all. We
were very fortunate.

Soon, we will have to be ready for the opening of the
Holocaust Museum. Heads of state will be coming in for
that, and possibly demonstrators or others who have
concerns about the museum or its message. We also will
have to be ready for a large gay pride demonstration
scheduled to take place in about two weeks. The organiz-
ers estimate there will be a million people here. I do not
know if they will get a million people, but it will be at
least several hundred thousand. That too could be an
explosive situation, particularly in view of various militant
organizations within the gay community. There is one
group called Queer Nation, another group called Act Up.
Some of the things they support are reasonable, but their
methods of demonstrating are militant and thus could be
cause for difficulty. But while we expect a large group, I do not anticipate any problems. In the past we have handled large demonstrations like that without much difficulty.

We also have a heavyweight championship boxing match coming up on May 22 here at RFK Stadium. I think that has a potential for some problems. We have World Cup Soccer, the Super Bowl of soccer, that will be coming here and carries the potential for trouble.

We have several Grateful Dead concerts this year. If you have never had the Grateful Dead in your town, it's quite an experience. They have their own followers. Their concerts are always a sellout. It is kind of a happening thing for some of the folks from the old days as well as some new followers. Experience indicates reason for caution and contingency planning for such events.

One recent situation in which we did have some problems occurred in D.C.'s Mount Pleasant area. You may have heard that term while you have been here. Mount Pleasant is predominantly a Latino community, with a heavy concentration of El Salvadorans. One summer Sunday afternoon when we had minimum staff on the streets, a female police officer was involved in an incident with an El Salvadoran man who was drinking in the park. She approached, along with another officer. The subject at this point drew a knife, the officer fired at the man, wounding him. Residents of the area began to gather as rumors began to circulate that the officers had shot a handcuffed individual. With that, we had our first riotous situation up in Mt. Pleasant. We had no indication in the past that this could be a trouble spot, but it turned into a major situation that lasted for two days. We arrested 245 people. There were 29 police officers injured. There were about 40 businesses that were destroyed, some burned, windows broken, and we had several police vehicles that were badly damaged.

As you will find in most major civil unrests, the second day is usually the worst day. That has been our experience. And I think that is true of the civil disorder in the 1960's. We were able to bring the Mt. Pleasant situation under control on the second day and we have not had any large-scale problems since then.

We have a special operations division, and within it a training branch. Our training branch has about twelve people who provide about 40 hours of riot control training, as well as special weapons training, to members of our special operations division and our civil disturbance unit. Our civil disturbance unit includes approximately 1,000 patrol officers, all of whom receive this special training. They do normal tours of duty, but we bring them back and provide quarterly training. They receive updates in use of special weapons, tear gas and crowd control tactics.

When one of these explosive situations develops, whether it is something that we can plan for or something spontaneous, we will rely on these people. The system has worked pretty well for us throughout the years. We used them in the Mount Pleasant situation. We activated all of our civil disturbance units and moved them up there. In fact, we will use them for many different things. We may use them for a presidential detail, for instance. We mobilize them quite often; it is a real benefit to us, that they get used to mobilization as well. They get used to responding to a particular location. We also try to use their own supervisors. We ask for a sergeant to come with 10 officers, so that they are deployed together.

We have them carry their individual equipment at all times. We issue a riot baton, gas mask, and a helmet; we expect them to bring that with them. Specialized munitions and items of that nature we issue once they come out.

We now have a total of approximately 4,500 officers on our force, of which a bit less than a quarter are specially trained civil disturbance officers. When we call in a group of officers for special detail, that releases them from their regular patrol duty. Our daily breakdown of deployment identifies the number of civil disturbance officers in each patrol district, the number that are working, whether they are foot patrol, scout car or scooter, or whatever. We consider this breakdown before we mobilize.

As to the city's response to the Rodney King verdict, one of the things we did was to hold our on-duty special operations division people beyond the day shift. We had our three to eleven o'clock shift on the street. We mobilized civil disturbance unit officers who were working and placed them in strategic locations around the city, including the Justice Department, which had become a target of demonstrators.

In addition to that, we started getting information that Georgetown—a shopping area frequented by a lot of the young folks—was going to be one of the areas to be hit. We deployed our special operations division and civil disturbance unit people over there. We did in fact get large crowds on the street, but as soon as the first window was broken we moved immediately, shut the area down, and did not have any other incidents. It broke the back of the disturbance right then.
THE DOMESTIC MISSION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: AN OVERVIEW

Lieutenant General John B. Conaway
Chief, National Guard Bureau

The National Guard is America's community based national defense force. We are in our 357th year of operation. We are not only in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, but also in Article II. We are in the Bill of Rights and many other laws of the land, including the Posse Comitatus Act. Our name changed informally in 1824 from Militia to National Guard, and then formally in the early 1900's.

Upon request of the governors, our job is to support law enforcement and other agencies that respond to community calamities and restore domestic tranquility. We are organized federally as the National Guard of the United States, and receive 90 percent of our funds from the federal government. Much of that funding ensures that we are able to be deployed whenever and wherever we are needed.

We do have upwards of 10 percent in state funding because of our role. We are unique in that respect. All other Defense Department forces are 100 percent federally funded. Only the Guard can be called up by the 53 governors to respond to man-made or natural disaster. We use federal equipment, and are paid by the state. We then may be reimbursed by federal dollars, as we were in Los Angeles, 75 percent versus 25 percent. In Florida, President Bush made a decision that our costs would be 100 percent federally reimbursable, so the state was reimbursed for what they paid.

I would like now to discuss the Posse Comitatus Act, passed in the 1800's, to keep the military and law enforcement separate. At the time, the law did not apply to the Navy and the Marines. The provisions of the act do apply now but only through directive and Department of Defense policy.

Who in uniform, military uniform, does the act not apply to? In a qualified way, it is the two guards, the National Guard and the Coast Guard. It does not apply when we are in our state status, called to active duty by the governor. It does not apply when we are called up in Federal Title XXXII status and Title XXXII is controlled by the governor. But when we operate under U.S. Code Title X status, the Posse Comitatus Act does apply to us.

At 9:00 on Friday night after the President's speech on the Los Angeles riots, we went under U.S. Code Title X, which put us into federal status. All of a sudden, General Delk and General Danny Hernandez were no longer working for Governor Wilson. At the snap of the finger, they were working for President Bush. And we are capable of serving two masters.

The Army National Guard has 4,400 units in 3,200 locations, and literally covers the entire United States, as well as the District of Columbia, the Territory of the Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and halfway around the world in Guam. The National Guard of Guam has been kept extremely busy recently during and after seven straight typhoons that hit the island territory almost on a weekly basis. There are also 154 facilities of the Air National Guard scattered around the United States.

To understand the role of the National Guard, it is useful to make a distinction between it and the active forces under control of the Defense Department. The active forces lead during overseas operations, whether it is a war or a humanitarian effort such as in Somalia. The Guard is deployed for humanitarian missions and other peacetime engagements overseas, but follows the active forces and then leaves before the actives do. We liken it to the tip of the spear.

In these situations, the active forces are first to go in and last to come out; in domestic missions, on the other hand, the National Guard represents the tip of the spear, first in, last out.

We were in Los Angeles within 15 hours after we were called, from a cold start. You know, it kind of shows that the battle you win is the battle you win before the battle has begun. That says it all. Within 15 hours of the call, our soldiers from communities around California were on the streets, equipped.

Yes, there were a few glitches getting there. We basically need 24 hours to marshal active forces and equipment before the Guard can leave the tarmac of the base where they are located. When you take that into context, the National Guard did a superb job. We had a presence in Los Angeles until the end of June; the active force of 2,500 was there for about seven or eight days.

The number of call-ups of the National Guard can
serve as a kind of barometer of civil unrest. There were far more call-ups in the late 1960's and 1970's than now. In 1970, there were nearly 100 civil disturbance call-ups, that is, the number of times the National Guard was called out by governors to quell civil disturbances. The trend picked up a little bit in 1992, in which we had about four or five civil disturbance call-ups after dropping to two in 1991.

So we do not know whether we are on what some say is a 25-year cycle. If we are—and law enforcement probably knows this better than we do—then obviously the decade of the nineties is one in which we should work closely together.

The number of state call-ups, of course, is much greater than the number of civil disturbance call-ups. We average almost a call-up a day. In 1992, we had over 30,000 troops out on the streets in over 300 call-ups. The real measure, however, of how busy we were is the number of days those troops were out; in 1992 there were several hundred thousand person-days devoted to civil disturbance control.

The year before, more than 44,000 were called up, but there were not nearly as many person-days involved because of the shorter average duration of the emergencies.

There were 90 state emergency missions in 1992 due to natural disasters—the biggest category. Other emergencies involved the provision of shelters and water hauls. The transportation services we provide help law enforcement, the Marshals, and other agencies. Our armories are being used more and more by governors as shelters for disaster victims or the homeless.

Our counterdrug operations in fiscal 1992 exceeded one million person-days, illustrating again the versatility of the Guard. On a recent day, we had 4,000 troops called up by the governors for man-made or natural disasters. We had 4,000 National Guard men and women involved in counterdrug support to various law enforcement agencies; we had 4,000 overseas on humanitarian and active duty missions.

Almost two-thirds of our manpower in counterdrugs and two-thirds of the dollars appropriated to us by Congress under governors' state plans is used to support Border Patrol, the DEA, and local police and sheriffs departments in drug interdiction activities. A growing percentage (now 37) is in marijuana surveillance and eradication.

The Guard assisted law enforcement in arrests some 20,000 times in 1992, up from 6,000 in 1991. The drugs involved were estimated to have a street value of $69 billion.

We are also very proud of our Star Base program at Selfridge Air National Guard Base, highlighted on Peter Jennings' ABC News the other night. In this program, the National Guard brings inner-city youth to Selfridge one day a week. The Kellogg Foundation has helped us with this.

The kids work on computers, they get in our flight simulators, they learn how to build various types of aerodynamically-designed aircraft and things of that nature. Youngsters that previously had zero interest in science and were flunking their courses in school leave us with renewed interest in science and in school. A lot of the youngsters came from leads we got from law enforcement officers in the Detroit area who wanted to help.

To sum up, the domestic mission of the National Guard includes military support, community support, disaster assistance, role model programs, family support, and employment. One final word of advice: To strengthen your relationship with the Guard, it is critical to know the adjutant general of your state. The adjutant general is in the governor's cabinet. He builds the governor's state plan for drug demand reduction. He builds the plan for youth programs. He builds state program Med-Ready USA. What is Med-Ready USA? The National Guard is the only agency in the Department of Defense now authorized to start up new programs in states and communities to assist medically underserved areas. That, too, falls under a governor's state plan. The point is that virtually everything we do falls under a governor's state plan that is put together by the adjutant general. I cannot overemphasize the importance of that role and your familiarity with it.●
THE NATIONAL GUARD IN LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

Major General Robert F. Ensslín
President, National Guard Association of the United States

The National Guard is a unique organization. In some respects, it reminds me of the three blind men who each feel a different part of an elephant, and then try to describe what kind of creature it is that they have felt. Obviously, each describes a different animal. In many respects there are also three distinctly different perceptions of the National Guard.

From the federal perspective, the National Guard is seen only as a military force, structured, organized, equipped, and trained to fight a war. From the state perspective, it is seen as an organized force available to the governor in response to natural disaster or civil disturbance. From the local perspective, it is usually seen as the town armory, whose members volunteer at the local school, are involved in drug interdiction activities, or sponsor Boy Scout or Explorer troops among other civic endeavors.

In the recent past, we have seen the National Guard manifest all three of these perceptions. The Guard was called to federal duty for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Governors Pete Wilson and Lawton Chiles called their respective state National Guards to duty in response to the Los Angeles riots and Hurricane Andrew. Not receiving the same headlines nor the same notoriety, thousands of Guard members are involved in drug interdiction and demand reduction, and work everyday with inner-city youth. The plus to us as American taxpayers is that we have paid just once for an organized force that can respond to federal, state, and local emergencies.

These past couple of years, the National Guard Association has been directing its efforts toward slowing the proposed cuts to the National Guard's force structure allowance and end-strength. Force structure allowance has always been based on a federal perspective of what is militarily required for the National Guard to be able to fight to defend the country. We believe consideration must also be given to maintaining sufficient end-strength to meet local emergencies.

Let me give you a specific example. During the Los Angeles riots, over 10,000 Guard members were mobilized to help restore order. If proposed cuts had occurred, California would have had only 7,000 Army Guard members available. That would have had a severe impact on how civil authorities and law enforcement personnel could have dealt with that situation. If these cuts were to occur, it would affect how other law enforcement agencies planned for contingencies.

We have prevented the proposed Draconian cuts, although the slope is still downward. We have been able to accomplish this because of our support in the Congress. This support comes in part because of the Constitutional and legal basis for the National Guard. The Constitution prescribes a national defense capability that is composed of the smallest necessary standing active forces, reinforced by a strong, capable, and trained militia. Subsequent statutory and case law have installed the National Guard as the primary Federal Reserve and the first line of defense.

Our national experiences with the use of active military to replace civil authority have ranged from the English Army in pre-revolutionary days to reconstruction days in the South. The Posse Comitatus Act put legal limits on the use of military forces in a federal status, limits that are not applicable to the use of state militias within the respective states.

The National Guard does not have the limits on it that are placed on the active forces. Thus, it is available to assist in many additional scenarios, and it does so successfully. Its success comes because it is a citizen-based army, one that knows the community from which it comes; additionally, it has a unique ability to develop partnerships, in great part because it is simultaneously a state and federal organization.

A prime example of the Guard's usage is its participation in the war against illegal drugs, especially in the drug interdiction effort. Thousands of Guard members work with not only local law enforcement agencies, but with state and federal agencies and all levels of law enforcement. One measure of its effectiveness is the amount of drugs seized. General Conaway gave you the 1992 figures, and that was up from fiscal 1991 when about $20 billion in illegal drugs and related material were seized as a result of Guard assistance.

At the time I retired in Florida, the Florida Guard, in their search of cargo with U.S. Customs, had recovered more federal currency that the budget allocated for the effort. That has got to be cost-effective.

Let me spend just a few minutes talking about some personal observations of what kind of support the National Guard brings to local authorities. I was a task force commander during the Mariel boat lift. It was almost as if the flood gates had opened. Thousands upon thousands of people were pouring into South Florida, and although
many organizations were involved and many others were trying to help, the reaction to the boat lift was not coordinated.

In response, the Florida National Guard was activated, and it was interesting to observe what occurred. First, and almost matter-of-factly, the operations people came in and set up an operations center. Maps were pinned up, a status board established. The communications people came in and set up the necessary equipment to talk to the outside world. The logistics people worried about housing and food. The operations people assessed the situation, and began to develop plans for how best to deal with it—even as they were dealing with it. The command group established coordination with as many agencies as possible, and started making the collective decisions. The public affairs people began working with the media. Was there a specific plan on the books for the Mariel boat lift? The answer is no, but because of the Guard’s training, planning capabilities, and constant practice, what we did in response to the Mariel boat lift was almost automatic.

The framework of that response is standard, regardless of what the situation is. The training our people go through ensures that they can execute that response as quickly as humanly possible. Because we come from the same communities, our response is sensitive to the needs of the civilian authorities for whom we work. If you have not yet had an opportunity to work with your local National Guard unit, I would encourage you to meet with them and involve them in your contingency planning. It will pay dividends in the future.

THE NATIONAL GUARD AND THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

Major General (Ret.) James Delk

 Former Deputy Adjutant General, California National Guard

You have heard a lot about the 1992 riots in Los Angeles. I want to provide a little more paint for the picture, so that you can understand some of the problems we faced and why we did what we did in responding to them.

Los Angeles County is big, and it is almost all concrete. There is very little green space in that huge county—eighty-three incorporated cities, 67 of them with their own police jurisdictions. The rest of the territory, of course, is picked up by the sheriff. Almost nothing happens in Los Angeles City that does not have an impact on the little cities and towns surrounding it as well as on the unincorporated areas.

A lot of comparisons have been made then and now between what happened in Watts years ago and what happened in Los Angeles in 1992; I have got to tell you that there were many more differences than there were similarities. Watts could be measured in square blocks. We had to cover 900 square miles in 1992.

As for the timing of responses to the disturbance, all of our experience up until Los Angeles 1992 told us that people riot at night. So the LAPD timed its Metro Squad—a SWAT team, if you will—to be ready to go at 6:00 p.m. the first night. They were too late. So they said, “Well, next day, let’s have them ready to go at 4:00 p.m.” They thought they were being smart. Well, hell, it never stopped. The riots continued day and night. And we were obviously in trouble before we even got started.

And then there’s the element of ethnicity. Watts was a black/white riot. You just did not think about other ethnic groups. We did not know what the bad guy looked like in this riot. Most of the arrests were Hispanic or Latino, and a great many of them were aliens, and a great many of them were illegal aliens.

In regards to duration, Watts was brought under control in five days. This one was effectively under control in 36 hours. That is what the police will tell you, and I would agree with that. A lot still happened, but it was under general control in 36 hours.

While there were gangs in 1965, there were not nearly as many, and they were much more benign. There is no way you can describe the gangs now in Los Angeles as benign. There are over 100,000 gang members, and
they are all heavily armed, with Kalishnikovs and Uzis and Mac 10’s, which they would wave at us as they went by. It was not that way in 1965. Now, as we all know, it is dangerous as hell out there. Of course, we all wore flack vests and bullet-proof vests, but some of the gangs have them, too.

One of the biggest differences between Watts and 1992 riots was the fire discipline. Watts was a free-fire zone for the police officers and the soldiers. If we had a sniper fire from a rooftop, we took the top of the roof off. If they shot at us behind a cinder block wall, we cut down the cinder block wall with a machine gun. It was not that way in 1992, and I will tell you why.

We killed some innocent people in Watts, and we did not want that to happen again. Our soldiers fired 22 rounds in Los Angeles in 1992, and I know where every bullet went. And that is a hell of a difference, and a very important point that I want to make. And I think all of us now think that way. When you call for us, you are going to get disciplined soldiers.

Now, there is something important for you to know, and it was brought out in the Webster Report. It was an embarrassment, and it should never have happened: There was nobody in charge when we started. No sooner was I on the ground than they wanted soldiers. I understood that. And as soon as they were ready to go, I sent them. But I did not send them because they were ready for them. I sent them because I trusted and knew the cops I was talking to.

You never send out soldiers if you do not have a command and control system in place. So the first thing we had to do was get together and agree what should happen.

At 2:00 p.m. the second day—that is 23 hours after the verdict—we arranged to sit down and determine who was going to do what and who was going to be in charge.

There was a gathering at 14:00 hours was Sheriff Block, Chief Gates, Maury Hannigan, the Chief of the Highway Patrol, and I — together nearly a full day after the outbreak began and certainly after soldiers were out there.

Chief Gates said, “I’ve got to have some guy protecting fire engines.” He looked at Maury Hannigan across the way and asked if the Highway Patrolman would take care of that. They did that and also escorted ambulances. Then the chief looked at me and asked if we would do everything else. I said yes.

Next we had to decide who was going to run all this. Well, it had to be the sheriff. The undersheriff said so, and it was agreed upon. The County Emergency Operations Center was thus set up.

We did another thing that I think was very important. Our liaison officer, Colonel Zisk, had the authority to make decisions on the spot. He never called me once to ask permission. When the police and the sheriff determined what was most important, they turned to him and said we need it. He would pick up the phone, talk to General Hernandez, say this is what we need, and they would roll. The liaison officer was not a messenger or a messenger boy; he was a man with great authority.

And as a consequence of many, many things, we accepted virtually 100 percent of every mission they asked of us. I did not care what it was; we did it. We are trained from the time we are pups that if a cop asks us to do something, we do it. But that changed when we were federalized.

From that point on, 15 of 167 missions were approved. Many thought that was due to the Posse Comitatus Act. The Act generally says we do not want federal troops mucking around in civilian law enforcement because of some bad things that happened during and after the Civil War. But there is an exception, Chapter 15, and that is what the President used. That provision is designed to permit the federal troops to enforce the law if the situation seems beyond control of state and local forces.

Since the President invoked Chapter 15, federal troops had the authority to enforce the law. The President gave the directive to go in there and restore law and order. But since law and order had already been restored, federal troops were not able to perform nearly the number of missions that we had done before being federalized. I will tell you, law enforcement found that extremely frustrating, and with good reason. But during the worst of it, we sent the guys out.

I want to discuss a few things you need to think about. One is communications. Our troops cannot talk to the police on our radio or vice versa. That calls for liaison officers. It also may call for purchasing some radios, because normally you already have your own communications problems and do not have enough radios to loan them to us. We found that the gangs had better communications than we did. As we walked through the streets, we heard the Bearcat scanners monitoring the police.

The police also need night vision devices. The night belonged to the gangs until we got there. After that, the night belonged to us. We put our guys in church steeples with night vision devices and they provided intelligence for people in the street making arrests.

“Don’t screw with the Ninja Turtles.” People on the street started talking that way after we were forced to shoot a felon who tested us too far. Even with only 22 rounds shot, word quickly got around—that is, we do not shoot
that often, but when we do, we hit what we want to hit. It was better than I expected, frankly.

As for squad cars, the only difference between the Guard and the police in that respect is that when we send our military police out they have a hatch in the top where they can mount a machine gun or an automatic grenade launcher. We did not use them, obviously, but the capability is there. Our military police are valuable to the police because that segment of the Guard attracts a lot of people who are police officers and security guards in civilian life. It is a situation of importance at senior levels as well. Pete Gravat, chief of the staff of the division and very important in running our soldiers, is a retired police officer, watch commander, LAPD, holding the Medal of Valor, their highest award for heroism. They know that; we know that. These kind of relationships obviously are important to cooperative ventures.

We put our people out two by two because law enforcement wanted them out that way. We trusted you, and when one of these small teams asked for help, you made sure that they got help instantly. But I would tell you, the minute we were federalized, that came to a screeching halt. They would not put anybody out there smaller than a platoon; it made a big difference.

The two-person teams were valuable not only because we covered a lot of territory, but because we took the streets back from the gangs, and because the people that lived there found us approachable. They would come out and talk to our soldiers, men and women, where they would not come out and talk with platoons.

Guardsmen are seen differently than cops. Where there is an existing adversarial relationship between police and citizens, and there certainly was in the County of Los Angeles, the simple fact that soldiers showed up diffused the situation. Almost always, the bad guys would take off and the good people would come to us. Of course, if a suspect was Salvadoran, it was just the opposite. They are scared to death of the military. If we detained one, we had to quickly get him into the hands of a police officer. Only then would they finally relax.

Finally, I would like to say we learned much through our experience in Los Angeles. We now have over 11,000 California Guardsman who are experienced in civil defense, whose skills have been honed in the fires and furies of those riots of 1992. But you also have a lot of soldiers who, if they did not have an appreciation for the dangers and the decisions you in law enforcement have to make every day, they certainly do now. And I will tell you, every California Guardsman, and certainly I, salute you people.

THE SECURITY ROLE OF THE FLORIDA NATIONAL GUARD DURING OPERATION ANDREW

 Brigadier General Richard G. Capps
 Assistant Adjutant General, Florida Army National Guard

Back on the 24th of August, 1992, Hurricane Andrew, a Category 4 storm with winds in excess of 170 miles per hour, struck the South Miami area, causing the most costly and significant natural disaster in the history of the United States. The Florida National Guard was the first outside relief agency on the scene—the beginning of the longest and the largest state active duty deployment in the history of the Florida National Guard, and the second largest in the nation.

I am here today to talk with you about the Florida National Guard, our organization, and our law enforcement security role during Operation Andrew. At the height of the Florida National Guard involvement in Operation Andrew, more than 6,400 of our more than 13,000 Guard members would be activated to support our mission in south Dade County. Hurricane Andrew slammed into South Florida at 5:05 a.m., August 24, 1992, damaging more than 1,100 square miles as it traveled.
across the peninsula and into the Gulf of Mexico. The eye of Hurricane Andrew made landfall near the city of Homestead, and that was the area hardest hit.

The Florida National Guard was well prepared and quickly on the scene, with over 500 Miami area Guardsmen who rode out the storm in the armory. By 7:10 a.m. on Monday morning, as the eye of Hurricane Andrew crossed south Dade County, more than 1,400 Florida Guardsmen had been activated and positioned in the armory. By 10:30 a.m., as Andrew passed, these soldiers would be deployed on the streets, working their security role missions. Had these initial security troops not arrived in the affected areas until later on the 24th, the looting situation would probably have gone seriously out of control.

To the contrary, through the combined efforts of the various law enforcement agencies and the Guard, looting and general lawlessness were held to a minimum throughout these critical early stages.

From the Cutler Ridge area, south along U.S. 1 through Homestead to Florida City, we were providing security in an area of total devastation. There was no electricity, no telephones, no water, no traffic lights, and very few street signs. After the sun went down it was very much like a Mad Max movie, indescribable.

Our security missions primarily fell into three categories: roving patrols, fixed site security, and traffic control. All were armed with M-16 rifles and ammunition and worked under the direction and coordination of local law enforcement. The roving patrols were conducted primarily at night and involved the use of our Humvee vehicles equipped with search lights. Fixed-site security involved Guardsmen providing access and crowd control at disaster assistance centers throughout the South Dade Area. We also provided security at polling places, temporary bank trailers, and, perhaps the most difficult of all, food stamp centers. We also manned checkpoints at key intersections along U.S. 1 during the hours of curfew. Traffic control was the security mission we were able to hand off to the active forces immediately after their arrival on August 28th. That was one mission federal forces could perform under the Posse Comitatus Act. The law prohibits the use of armed federal forces to enforce local law without presidential declaration. In other words, of the more than 26,000 federal and Guard troops sent to the South Dade area to support the Andrew relief efforts, only the 6,400 Florida National Guard soldiers were allowed, by law, to carry loaded weapons and follow the proper rules of engagement to use force if necessary.

During the early stages of the Andrew relief effort there was much conversation among the local media and civilian leaders concerning the appropriateness of federalizing the Guard. Had the Florida Guard been federalized during this mission, the first thing our soldiers would have been ordered to do would be to unload their weapons and turn in their ammunition. This would have been a catastrophic event for local law enforcement. In retrospect, all concerned have recognized the value of allowing the Florida Guard to serve a unique role as a state militia, answering to the governor and augmenting local law enforcement. General Gordon R. Sullivan, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, said in a recent article that the decision to leave the National Guard under state control during Operation Andrew was a wise one and should be repeated under similar circumstances in the future.

In summary, I would like to say to you that our primary mission from day one through the 18th of December, the last day of Operation Andrew, was security. The National Guard is a force uniquely equipped by law and trained for this type of mission. Fixed-site security, roving patrols, and traffic control security missions in a civil disaster area require the same soldierly skills and tactics as these units would use in their federal wartime missions.
COMMUNITY POLICING IN
WASHINGTON, D.C.: FROM
PHILOSOPHY TO INSTITUTION

Fred Thomas
Chief of Police, Washington, D.C.; former Executive
Director, Metropolitan Police Boys and Girls Club

When I retired in 1985, I thought at the time that I was through with law enforcement. I wanted to fulfill a different role, working with kids. I worked with an organization—the Metropolitan Police Boys and Girls Club—that served kids between the ages of six and 18, about 12,000 boys and girls, mostly inner city kids, most of whom are from public housing. I found it very rewarding and I learned a lot from the kids. They are a sort of mirror to the future.

When I was away from law enforcement, I did not spend a lot of time reading about different philosophies and programs and fads in law enforcement. But when I decided to come back to law enforcement, because I had been away for seven years, I started doing a lot of reading; I read a lot of things from the Police Foundation and literature from NIJ. The concept that kept coming back was this whole idea of problem-oriented policing, community policing, or community empowered policing. And as I read more about it, I thought it sounded good.

But all the writers kept referring to community policing as a philosophy and not a program. Conceptually I had some problem with it. I wondered how you could operationalize it and make it meaningful.

When I returned as head of the Washington, D.C., police department, I started looking at the department’s involvement in community empowered policing. I wanted to see what kind of program we were involved with and to what extent the staff within the department understood it, as well as how the community was receiving that.

I asked all of my senior staff inspectors, deputy chiefs, assistant chiefs—about 40 people—to prepare a 30 to 45 minute presentation on their organization and to tell me anything that they wanted me to know about what they were doing. I gave no other instructions beyond that, other than to assure them that they could use any staff that they wanted and any visual support.

I then told them I would videotape their presentations, and that made them a little nervous. They wanted to know why we really wanted to do that. The purpose, I told them, was to make it possible for me at some point to go back and review the presentations and to get a handle on what the department was doing, how well these folks presented the materials, how well they knew their organization, and what they thought about community empowered policing.

I did that with all of the senior staff, and then I interviewed 52 captains. I asked each of the captains to prepare a list of ten critical concerns about the department, and I quickly rank-ordered those and spent about four hours discussing that. Then I did something similar with the lieutenants; there are 160 of them in two sections.

After talking with all of those folks and talking to the leadership of the bargaining unit for the police department, I quickly discerned that community policing meant something different to almost every person that I spoke with—that some had a good grasp of what it represented within the department, some did not, and some were just absolutely confused.

And then I learned from talking to citizens that the citizens were very confused. Some citizens felt that community policing meant having a foot patrolman—that they would have a foot patrolman out there and they would have the same footman all the time providing services to them. So as I looked at the evidence, I thought to myself that they did not quite understand what we are doing, and while we had a lot of literature that supported community policing as a philosophy and a style, we did not quite understand it as an organization.

Then I looked at how well this philosophy has been implemented. The department started out, as I understand it, with two pilot projects in two separate police districts. We have seven police districts in all. Apparently it was working fairly well, but then a move came about to implement community policing citywide. I think we did that just so that we could say that we had it. And the officers did not understand. They were very confused. The citizens are still confused about it and we really do not know where we are headed with it. I am being candid with you. The facts speak for themselves.

If we are going to really have community policing we must first sell it to ourselves and fully understand it and not view it as a fad. I fully subscribe to the philosophy of community policing, but in my department, before we can fully implement community policing, we must first revamp and reorganize the infrastructure of the police department. There is no way that we can support community policing without doing that. I am referring to deployment and to equipment that we need to deliver police services. We need better cars. We need radios for our folks. We need better training for our officers.
One thing we can do is to continue the efforts of the last couple of years of incrementally putting the programs in place where we have the necessary structure and order to provide a level of police services to the community that will make the community feel safer and will allow the community to participate through citizen patrols and clean-up projects.

We must involve the entire community. We have a very diverse community in our city. We have a large gay/lesbian community, a large Latino community, a large African American community. We must look at ways we can get these communities to work together.

Washington attracts large numbers of persons who wish to exercise their constitutional rights by making public statements and demonstrating. Over the years, we have become very adept at handling demonstrations, going all the way back to the Vietnam era. I think we have done a really good job of establishing processes and procedures for doing that; today, we can handle 500,000 people without any major incident at all.

But where we as an organization start to fall short was made evident by what happened two years ago in our Mt. Pleasant area, where a large Hispanic community resides. We failed to keep in mind the need to interact with the community. The Latino community started out as a very small community and then rapidly exploded in numbers. We in the department did not know how to handle that. We did not have bilingual officers. We had not really gotten out into the neighborhood to build a bond between the police and the community.

I think this is similar to what happened to this city in 1968, when the city failed to address the needs of the African American community. As a result of that, when things blew up, we attracted a lot of attention. And the same thing happened in Mt. Pleasant. The incident started over a young officer who was attempting to arrest a person who was drinking in public. The suspect pulled a knife on the officer. The officer ended up shooting the suspect. The rumors just started to fly, and that really created an explosive situation. No lives were lost, but there was some personal injury and a lot of property damage.

It clearly pointed out to the police that we were not prepared for that situation. We had not attempted to have any outreach programs within the community. Even now we have our interaction only with those people in the community who really want to be involved. They are already organizing community groups. They have the orange hat patrol and those kinds of things. But for those residents within our community who are recalcitrant or who are not a part of the mainstream, we still have not found a way to get out and reach them and make them a part of this great philosophy of community policing. We still do not have that real outreach and we have a powder keg in those communities, in public housing as well as in the Latino community. We have to look at ways in which to really get out and have that outreach. Community policing, I think, is a vehicle for doing that, a good vehicle, but it takes more than going in and just organizing people.

In the Latino community there is a great deal of distrust between the community and the police. I think some of that is based on cultural bias; some folks from places like El Salvador carry with them a distrust of the police from their countries of origin. They come here and that continues. In the department we have not been able to break down those biases. There is a lot of tension between the African American community and the Latino community, because the Latino community is expanding greatly and in some areas is displacing some of the African Americans. What we have to do in this department is to use the community empowered policing, have outreach, hire additional bilingual officers to work in the community, look at ways in which we can get community activists to be a part of the process to help us defuse things, and set up ways in which we can reach the dominant media within that community, that is, the Latino newspapers and the radio stations. That way, when we have rumors of police misconduct we can quickly get a better word out.

There is a Latino task force that I have been working with. We meet monthly to discuss issues of mutual concern, to share information. I think this is one way of conducting community empowered policing—probably not in the traditional sense that you are experimenting with in your communities, but I think in the Latino community that is the way we need to proceed. Eventually, the effort will evolve into something that is much larger, and that will give us a good relationship with the community.

Similar things can be said of people who live in public housing. They are displaced, they are isolated, and they are not very organized—and in some cases they greatly resent police. I think it is incumbent upon the police in this case to get into those communities, to help organize, to help break down those barriers of distrust and develop a bond. I think by doing that we can then fully start to implement community policing. In order to do that we must rebuild our infrastructure. We must have the equipment necessary to deliver the services. We must
have a way in which we can handle some of the calls for service in a fashion other than dispatching a mobile unit. In our case we receive 1.6 million calls for service; if we do not have a way of handling those calls in a different fashion, there is no way that we will ever have blocks of time for officers and beat cars to respond and interact with the community and help do real problem solving. I think that by doing these things and just reassessing what we are doing, we will in fact eventually have a good solid community policing program that will start to bring the entire community of Washington together.

COMMUNITY POLICING, DISTRESSED PUBLIC HOUSING, AND SERVICE DELIVERY

William Matthews
Director, Community Police and Criminal Justice Administration, ICMA; former Chief, Baltimore City Housing Authority Police Force.

We are just now beginning to develop the means of looking closely at what community policing really means and what it really can accomplish. Although there are countless cities across the country, there are probably only a dozen or so major cities that are attempting to implement community policing, and by that I mean institutionalize it. In large measure, community policing, or the institutionalization of community policing, in major agencies is still on the rise.

But before I discuss community policing, I want to tell you about a few people who live 30 miles from here in a city that I had the pleasure of serving for about six years.

I would like to take a moment to introduce to you Rebecca Coleman, who, after being raped and watching her companion killed, took her own life. And I would also like to introduce to you little Mary Jane West. Mary was barely five years old when she was admitted to Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore after being shot by the gun that killed her mother. I also would like to introduce Julia Wright, who says she is tired of encountering drug dealers with armed weapons, Mac 10’s, Uzis, and AK-47’s in the lobby of her seventeen-story building.

I introduce these people because over the last six years they are the first to tell you that they feel that they have been conveniently forgotten by both housing police and municipal police. So I think it is a duty that wherever I go I talk about them, because, after all, those are the folks that we are supposed to serve, and those are the folks that we are really talking about when we talk about implementing community policing.

Distressed public housing is the focus of my remarks. For the most part, their apartments are clean and decent and affordable, and they love and protect their children as we love and protect our own. So what I am about to say about distressed public housing I am not directing at the vast majority of folks who live in public housing—and incidentally the majority of public housing residents are not black but white. There are so many stereotypes about public housing.

Distressed public housing is just that, severely dis-
tressed. And there we find victims and victimizers who are frequently related by a family bond, as statistics tell us. As difficult as it is to hear grim statistics, imagine how difficult it is to live them a lifetime, how difficult it is to go home to experience these statistics that we run through our lips so freely and sometimes so cavalierly.

Here are some statistics: I am a black man, and African Americans, particularly black males, are four times as likely to be robbed and twice as likely to be assaulted. Black females are four times as likely to be raped. Blacks are twice as likely to be victims of burglary, and a staggering eleven times as likely to be victims of murder than any other single group.

Homicide in distressed public housing is the leading killer of black males between the ages of 14 and 34. And this is a sober statistic. And black on black crime stems from a lot of things. We are used to saying—and it is fashionable to say—that it is drug related. But black on black crime, and specifically black on black homicide, has many many causes. There are great frustrations to everyday life in distressed public housing areas: low income, physical deterioration, dependency, racial and ethnic concentrations, broken homes, working mothers, overcrowded and substandard housing, mixed land use, high population density, high rates of tuberculosis, cancer, HIV infection, and infant mortality.

Black on black crime and violence is a barometer, a hallmark of the frustration that the people find in the community. All of these factors, not just drugs, come together to form a unique kind of experience within an individual, where an individual turns aggressive. Usually this aggression is not turned against strangers, as in the Los Angeles experience, but inward toward family and friends, as a spur-of-the-moment kind of thing among acquaintances. And out of this sense of utter powerlessness and jealousy, many times they acquiesce to killing a friend or a relative, and usually with a handgun. This is a reality reinforced by the sale of a handgun in this country every 13 seconds. This is the environment that we are talking about sending our young officers into to implement community-oriented policing.

Now the question is, why have we not focused on public housing before? Why is it that we are getting to it just today? We all know that is where many of our problems, especially in our cities, come from.

The Council on Large Public Housing Authorities keeps statistics that indicate that since 1975 the budgets for public housing security really have not increased, even though the problem of crime in public housing has increased over the last 10 or 15 years. Every police officer knows where distressed public housing is located; so that is not a reason why we do not go there. It is very simple. If you ask a police officer, he will tell you where the action is. But according to many residents it is where violence rules the streets and police seldom patrol. That is their definition of distressed public housing.

The Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, which was established last year, attempted to define "distressed public housing" in a report. They said it is where social and physical and environmental conditions have deteriorated to a degree that renders the housing dangerous to the health, safety, and welfare of residents. These conditions in and of themselves represent fertile ground for the next civil disorder.

You do not have to go to a public housing development to be touched by this problem, because it is going to come to you. Over the last ten years folks in public housing have been leaving the concentrated developments and venturing into the wider neighborhoods. Programs such as Section 8 and now Scattered Sites ensure that you will find public housing just about anywhere. As a matter of fact, most people living out there in the community do not know or probably do not have any way of knowing that maybe the house right down the street is owned by a public housing authority or is federally subsidized in some way. But I am also here to tell you that the problems associated with public housing go along with the individuals that live there. This is not a concentrated problem anymore.

Now what is the appropriate action? Public housing residents will tell you what they want. They say they want the streets clear. They say they want the hallways cleared of drug dealers and automatic weapons. They say they want to be able to get into their elevators. They say they want to be able to walk their streets. That is what they will tell you. But they will also tell you that they do not want to be occupied. That is one of the great dilemmas we are facing as we try to implement this philosophy of community policing.

I am going to issue a slight warning—and it is peculiar to issue a warning to your colleagues. There are some things that community policing is, and there are some things that community policing is not. Sometimes in an effort to define what something really is, it is helpful to touch upon what it is not. Community policing is not a containment program. It cannot be used to keep problems isolated in one area. It is not an intelligence program; its primary objective should not be to cultivate informants. It is not an appeasement program; it must not be used to placate residents or housing authority staff. It is not a...
catch-all program. A police department's Officer Friendly, or Police Girls and Boys Club, or public relations unit cannot and should not be renamed to fit under the community policing banner.

Community policing is not a code name for returning to the foot patrols or the so-called good old days. And frequently you hear community policing defined as a return to the good old days, when neighborhood foot officers knew everybody, talked to everybody, knew everybody's personal and political business. But to blacks and other minorities the so-called good old days bring back memories of police brutality and other forms of violence against citizens.

Community policing is a service delivery philosophy that, once implemented, changes the traditional role of policing the community. It introduces the police officer as a change agent, as a social service program facility. It broadens the police function.

But more importantly than that, it is a philosophy that transforms an agency from being input managed to being outcome oriented. An agency is input managed when people sit before you articulating their workload: we handled 30,000 cases this year.

We have outcome management—and that is really what community policing is trying to get to—when we start to try to evaluate the results of what we do. How many lives did we save? How much property did we protect? What were the results of our efforts? That is when we are going to understand what community policing really is all about.

Now here is another warning. Police departments should guard against initiating traditional police sweeps in distressed public housing under the guise of community policing. Although community policing can provide the foundation for all sorts of police strategies, it is not a tactic. It is a philosophy.

Now I know that there are those who are going to say, "Well, how can you implement community policing in a distressed public housing area where there is a lot of crime unless you take the community back?" Well, what I am offering to you is that community policing is most effective, and specifically police sweeps are most effective, after community policing strategies have been initiated, not before. In other words, community policing is not the weed part of seed. It is the glue that brings the community and local government together, the police being the vanguard.

We all know that in distressed public housing all over the country we have been long on weed whenever there is enforcement and short on seed, and I would imagine that in many of your jurisdictions the situation is the same; long on the sword, short on treatment.

Community revitalization often does not occur after the sweep. It is far easier to move the drugs from one building to another, from one block to another, from one neighborhood to another, and even from one city to another, than it is to develop the infrastructure necessary to assist the community and hold out and defend the territory once you have recaptured it. That is why we have so much interest in community policing, as a different kind of program.

In most distressed public housing areas the public housing authority is under great stress. In many instances they are close to bankrupt. Now here is our dilemma. We introduce community police officers into a situation, and we say to them, "Be problem-solvers," yet the resources that they are going to need, mostly through the housing authority, are not going to be there. That is a dilemma. Before we go into distressed public housing, making promises, we have to negotiate our role with the housing authority. We have to know very specifically what the budget is, what their capabilities are, and what their plans for revitalization and rehabilitation of their properties will be for the next five years. If we are to be successful, we have to develop the political savvy to be able to go to the mayor or the city manager to help facilitate that kind of dialogue between the police department and the housing authority.

I would like to read you a quote from Jacqueline Massey, who is president of the Valley Green Resident Council here in Washington, D.C. She says:

"People don't even listen to people in public housing when they cry out. We have a community with service providers that don't even listen to us. They give us needs according to their way or the way they've been trained, not the way we ask or we present ourselves."

Even in the worst public housing there are those with a light in the window, and the beauty of community policing is that it enables us to put our officers out there with commitment and training. We do not want to send in our worst officers. We want to put the good officers out there who have the wisdom and the commitment to find the lights in the window, and to help that light shine in other windows until maybe we get a chain reaction going. That is the commitment. That is the beauty and the promise of community policing.

In Baltimore there was a public housing development, a high rise community, that was the most notorious in the city. People there burnt our police cars, shot at them regularly. They shot at the post office. It was hell here on...
earth. But we did something special. We put together teams of police officers, social workers, community organizers, and educators, who worked together under the authority of the police, and we sent them out for about a nine-month period of time. We did not send in the troops. We sent in a resource team with instructions to organize the community, to find the resident leadership, to find the lights in the window—and to negotiate their way around the drug dealers as the residents have to.

The team's activities paved the way for the sweeps, and they paved the way for the evictions, and they paved the way for the other traditional kinds of activities that took place. And we were able to do this during the period of rioting in Los Angeles, because the community was prepared.

Here is another warning. People want success repeated. And they do not consider the fact that it may have taken thirteen, fourteen, fifteen months to accomplish. They want success tomorrow and so they send out personnel with a mission to achieve the same goals—but this time in 60 days. Community policing is not short-term; it is long-term. That is one of the lessons that ICMA is trying to emphasize to mayors and city managers nationwide. This is not a short-term, politically expedient philosophy. This is a long-term commitment to folks. All that people want is a decent place to live.

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**IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY POLICE**

DeForrest W. Taylor  
Chief, New York City Housing Authority Police Department;  
former Chief of Personnel, New York City Police Department

There are three police departments in New York City. The largest, naturally, is the New York City Police Department. The transit police is next in size, and the New York City Housing Authority Police, of which I am chief, is the smallest.

The ethnic breakdown of the residents of the public housing is as follows: 55 percent black, 29 percent Hispanic, 9 percent white, and 7 percent others.

We have several police-community relations programs in effect in the department. We have some other programs that, while having law enforcement as their primary function, do have a very positive police-community relations effect.

In May of 1991, we started a law enforcement scouting program for young men and women from the ages of about 14 to 20 who are interested in a career in law enforcement. They work with the police officers in the public service areas. We call our station houses—they are not precincts there—public service areas. The young people are in and out of these station houses. They have been on trips with the officers, and right now we have nine posts with about 150 scouts. Each is headed by adult resident leadership; my police officers are not spending all their time being scout masters.

Another program we started in October 1991 is an auxiliary police program, modeled after the New York City Auxiliary Police Program. Participants are mainly public housing residents who patrol the grounds in uniform under the supervision of housing and police coordinators. To date we have about 98 fully trained volunteers.

A third program about which I am very enthusiastic is the Police Cadet Program, which we established in June 1992. We currently employ 47 college students, males and females, who are actively pursuing either a two-year or a four-year degree. They are screened. They take a medical test and a psychological test. Upon passing a civil service exam for police officers and completing their degree requirements, they enter the Police Academy as housing police officers. So we spent all last summer training them. On weekends and other times when they are not in school they work with our cops in the community. They wear a
uniform that we have created for them so that people know that they are police cadets.

Twenty-four of them live in public housing. That is what I am most proud of. They can be examples to kids growing up in public housing who can say to themselves, “Hey, they’re only 21 years old and I’m 16. I can do that. I can make that transition.” The cadets are very articulate. Without knowing them, I make them get up and speak at meetings and they do well each time. They make it look as if I were a genius for picking them; everything you want them to say they say, without any prompting. We are going to bring in 50 more cadets this June.

Two other programs that I would like to mention in this context are our Bicycle Patrol Program and Operation Safe Home. Early in 1992, after hearing about the success of bicycle patrols in combating drug sales in the Los Angeles housing developments, I decided to investigate whether or not we should do that in New York City. So I sent two members of my department to a police bicycle convention in Las Vegas. Afterwards, they visited the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, which apparently patrols the housing developments in Los Angeles. They also visited Seattle, Washington, which has a very large bike patrol, to learn everything they could about bike patrol. At the same time, I sent out a memo to members of the department telling them that I was interested in forming a bicycle patrol and asking for their comments and suggestions. We were surprised at the number of people that responded and the enthusiasm that started to build up.

We received about 120 applicants for the 38 bike patrol positions. We showed applicants a video that we picked up out on the West Coast. Then we conducted background investigations. We looked at any past records of citizen complaints and their attendance record. We were not as interested in the number of arrests they had made.

The officers that we selected then went through a medical exam. We tested for flexibility and strength and made them pedal for 20 minutes on a stationary bike to see if they could do it.

You would be surprised at the number of young people that could not pass that kind of exam. Some of them went on to do some training on their own in order to get into condition. The interest was great and the enthusiasm was great.

Those who were selected went through a rigorous one-month training program on safety, physical fitness, and bicycle maintenance. The safety portion concentrated on riding techniques and how to prevent accidents. Their training also included vehicle stops, how to apprehend suspects, and how to perform internal vertical patrol of housing developments. Each day they had to complete a 15-mile endurance ride.

The bike patrol operates all year long. When we started it, I wondered if we should stop it in the second week in January, if it would be too cold to ride the bikes in winter. I told my officers, “I am going to let you just tell me when it’s too cold to ride.” The only time they did not ride this past year was when there was rain or snow on the ground, when the traction was poor.

The bicycle patrol officers do not wear a standard uniform. In the summer, they wear a light blue knitted polo shirt and dark blue knitted shorts. They wear bicycle helmets with the word “Police” on the front as well as a cloth patch that says “Housing Police.”

When they respond to calls in high rise buildings or when they are doing an internal patrol, they do not leave the bikes outside. We were concerned about bikes being stolen. The officers carry the bikes into the development.

Now the bike patrol often works with plainclothes anti-crime units. The anti-crime units are spotters for drug sales. They identify dealers for the bike patrol officers, who can then move swiftly to arrest them.

Using the bicycles has several other advantages. On them, officers can approach criminals quickly, silently, without drawing attention to themselves because they can ride on the sidewalk, in and out of the development. The criminal element is looking for a car or looking for a police officer walking. Another advantage is that bike patrols cover more territory in less time than our foot patrols. They can cover three and four developments during the course of a tour.

During 1992, the bike patrols made 68 felony arrests and 205 misdemeanor arrests. They assisted other units in apprehending 499 drug offenders. They seized almost 3,000 vials of crack, 414 decks of heroin, and 18 firearms. In February of this year we added five more units. Now, all of the developments have them. We now have about 72 officers on bike patrol, probably the largest contingent in the country.

While it is primarily a crime-fighting operation, they reach out to the community by creating a basis for dialogue. This is facilitated by the fact that they do not wear regular police uniforms. And kids know about bikes. Everybody rides a bike, so a kid feels very comfortable in walking up to this guy or woman who is in shorts and talking about the bike. Whenever officers go to a community function, the kids first go to the bike cops because they just feel that they can. The officers are even able to give kids tips on bicycle safety.
The residents of Housing Authority developments talk a lot about my bike cops. They seem to feel more secure when they see the bikes. The bikes can be seen a number of times during the course of the evening, so they look as if they are always there. The drug dealers hate them.

I think part of the reason for the success of this program is that there is a very high esprit de corps among the officers. They think that they are an elite unit. They have been welcomed by the community with open arms because the artificial barriers that existed before were torn down. And they themselves just feel as one with the community. The community thinks they are doing a great job. Not one of my bicycle officers has been the subject of a civilian complaint since the program was started, and I feel very good about that.

In January of 1991, we began another interesting program: Operation Safe Home. It is the police component of a federally funded drug elimination program, and it was set up in a community policing textbook setting. The management of the Housing Authority, tenant leaders, and the police sat down together as equals and devised a program. Everybody had input, even about where we were going to start and how we were going to do it.

The police portion of the $40 million came to about $14 million. With that we were to hire 78 additional police officers and 9 sergeants. Operation Safe Home officers are employed in the nine different Public Housing Authority developments around the city.

We assign officers to a development and that development could contain 30 or more separate buildings. The officers will patrol three buildings at a time, conducting extensive vertical patrol in uniform. They will interact with the tenants, they will make arrests, and do whatever is needed to try to clean up conditions in that building.

At the same time, management is supposed to come in and improve the maintenance of the building: cleaning, repairing, removing graffiti, improving lighting, making sure that the lobby doors and rear doors have locks. Thus, buildings do not look like the kind of places where crime can be committed. The Housing Authority also sends over a tenant patrol division, which—with the police—enlists tenants into a tenant patrol.

The three entities all have their jobs to do—the police and the community and the authority. If they do their jobs the right way, the program works. Robberies in those developments that we have worked in have decreased by almost 8 percent, homicide by 31 percent.

They have just added a new wrinkle to the program in the Bronx. It is called a Model Building Gain Sharing Program. The Housing Authority estimates they spend over $16 million a year repairing broken locks and windows, removing graffiti, and attending to other forms of vandalism. Therefore, they said to the tenants, “We will work with you to reduce the vandalism in your building. Whatever savings are realized from your efforts, we will take half of them. We will give you that half to use as you deem best. Do you want to landscape your area? Do you want to set up your lobbies differently?”

This program is a new program, so there has not been a chance to evaluate it. But it could have very good results, because the tenants now see that they can have some control over part of their lives.
ENCOURAGING INNOVATION IN COMMUNITY POLICING IN PHILADELPHIA

Richard Neal
Police Commissioner, City of Philadelphia

In Philadelphia, upon the outcome of the first Rodney King trial, we were extremely successful in quieting our community; we encountered no problems whatsoever. Largely, this experience in Philadelphia is due to community policing.

I would like to give you a perspective of where Philadelphia began and what we have now evolved to with community policing. About seven years ago, we were basically following the traditional concept of policing. And we were experiencing in our city some of the same things as in many other cities around the country: violence, unrest, and mistrust from the community.

We had unfortunately gone through the difficult issues precipitated by MOVE—and I am sure that many of you are familiar with the group MOVE and some of Philadelphia's experiences in connection with that group. There had also been traditional sweeps through various communities, which had helped mistrust to fester.

The newly appointed police commissioner at that time decided that community policing was the way to go to resolve some of those festering problems and to bring back a level of communications, a level of understanding, and a level of acceptance between police and community. As a result of that, we embarked upon the implementation of the community policing philosophy.

When we started out in community policing, it was basically a top-down philosophy; we realized that what we had been doing in the past was certainly not helping us attain the level of safety that we were interested in seeing for our city. The thinking behind the top-down approach was that if we got the commanders to buy into community policing, it would then roll downhill, and as it rolled downhill people at the lower levels of the organization would buy into it and get on board.

We realized very early on that in community policing, the chief has to be prepared to give up some management prerogatives, particularly since you want your people to be innovative. You want your people to be responsive. It cannot be a situation where all of the direction will come from the field, up the chain of command, and then go back down the chain of command. The people beneath you have to have a clear understanding and a clear sense that what you want them to do is be of service to that community.

I frequently say to officers, “When you look at your area of assignment, you are in essence a part of that community.” When you consider that the second greatest amount of time that an officer spends anywhere is in his or her area of assignment, then certainly the officers have to view themselves as part of that community. The problems that exist in those communities have an impact on an officer working there. They affect the way that officer’s eight-hour shift goes. They affect the workload of that particular officer. It cannot be a situation of “them against us.”

Community policing does not totally eliminate traditional policing. Many times, people view community policing totally from a social perspective and say that it is too expensive and will eradicate traditional policy. You have to blend traditional policing and community policing so that they work hand in hand.

In terms of expense, it is to our best advantage not to respond to Ms. Jones’s house for disturbance calls 20 times a month. Isn’t it better to refer Ms. Jones where she can get the kinds of services that she needs to eradicate the problem? We can direct those resources to an area in which they can be better utilized.

We have communicated this philosophy to our command structure. When I was a district captain some years ago, there was no written material on community policing available. Community policing means many things to many people. If you provide too much written structure and procedure, you deprive the command and others involved of the opportunity to experiment, the opportunity to reach out to the community and develop a true partnership. When I say “a true partnership,” I mean that we are all stakeholders in the respective community—stakeholders from a residential perspective and from a police perspective.

We encourage our officers to be innovative. We take the best of the programs that our subordinate people have developed and find ways in which we can utilize those programs across the entire department.

You will find that the community will be responsive as long as they see that you are sincerely interested in bringing resolution to the problems that exist in their areas. When I was a district commander, we held monthly workshops to give community members an opportunity to bring their concerns to their respective captains. At every monthly workshop for one area there was an elderly lady that used to stand up and talk about a
crack house in her block, and the fact that this crack house operated 24 hours a day. She wanted to know what the police department could do about it. One of the things that I had done from a traditional perspective is that I had assigned personnel to investigate and make arrests on a regular basis. Every time we made an arrest, two days later the place was back in business again. But following a community policing philosophy, I realized that I had the ability to do what was necessary to address that problem and deal with the quality-of-life issues that existed in that community. I decided that it would become a test of wills between myself and the drug dealer. And based upon that test of wills, I parked a police car in front of the drug house and said that the car was going to remain there 24 hours a day until that drug dealer decided that he could no longer operate at that location. After about a week or ten days, the drug dealer closed up and moved away.

Obviously, this is not the solution for every situation, but it is a solution from a community policing perspective, because we realized that we are there to have an impact on quality-of-life issues. We removed ourselves from the traditional mode of doing things and developed new strategies. As a result of that, we have won over not only that lady but that community to the view that the police department sincerely cares and sincerely has an interest in bringing solutions to their problems.

In community policing, you have to make sure that all of the officers buy into the process. You should not have a situation where you have identified certain specialized officers and those are the only people who address issues of concern in those communities.

We have many programs. We are involved in victim assistance, where we meet on a regular basis with victims of crimes to help guide them through the criminal justice system. By virtue of this kind of program more people will feel comfortable in coming forward and identifying perpetrators of crime—and we will be able to get those people off the street. It is a winning situation for both sides. The community wins because it has a better understanding of criminal justice and because they know that they can be safe and secure after identifying criminals. The police, in turn, gain an advantage because they are better able to free that community from criminals.

We have to look at community policing from a holistic perspective. Many issues have an impact on the quality of life. Some community policing activities are social in nature, to a certain extent, but they also address the problems that are driving the issue of crime in that community. So although the police department may not be the agency that is ultimately responsible for addressing a problem, the police department needs to have some influence and provide some direction about the problem in order to help diminish crime.

Along these lines, we are engaged in a number of youth activities. Certainly we are not a community-based recreation center. But I am the president of the Police Athletic League. Through PAL we talk to young people about how they can accomplish anything in life that they choose to, and how they can be anything they want in life. An officer operating a PAL center may have an impact on a thousand young people. As a role model, that one officer may be deterring 20 or 30 crimes that those young people might otherwise have engaged in had they not had the opportunity to participate in the PAL center.

The benefits of community policing have to be communicated down the chain of command. You will find that some of your subordinates will not initially buy into community policing because they do not see the rewards. If you show them how it makes their day better, or how it influences what they do on day-to-day patrol, they will buy in and certainly they will acknowledge those kinds of benefits.

In Philly, we have an abandoned vehicle program. Why are police interested in the issue of abandoned vehicles? Well, abandoned vehicles force the issues of blight and decay and crime in the community. By having officers remove abandoned vehicles from a community, we help instill a sense of pride. We are better able then to stabilize and organize that community into groups that will help the police by providing information about who is responsible for those crimes. It is another way of building a bridge of partnership.

Openness is an issue in most police departments. Many people view the department as a closed society, as a society of “them against us,” as a society of people who come into a community on an eight-hour basis, show no sensitivity, and then leave after the shift is over. By operating with a community policing perspective, we show that we are not just there for that eight-hour period—it is not them against us—and we do bring sensitivity and concern to the problems that exist there.

One of the best ways to bridge the gap between the police and the community is to provide the vehicle for friendly interaction, so that the police can see the community from a different perspective—not as people who are lawless and must be arrested. And the community can see the officers not as people who ride around in a patrol car, whose only concern is for an opportunity to
issue a ticket or make an arrest. This way, we see both
groups are human, and we both are sensitive to the issues
that exist.

Because in Philadelphia we have operated by a
community policing philosophy, and have shown open-
ess and sensitivity to the community, the city remained
quiet when the Rodney King verdict was announced. We
utilized those friendships and those partnerships that had
been forged with the community. We sent our command-
ers out into the community to talk to the different groups.
We sent the community groups out to talk to other people
in the community, to say that Philadelphia wanted to be
quiet, that Philadelphia would not be caught up in any
kind of civil disorder. They said that certainly we could
all feel appalled at what had occurred in Los Angeles, but
that this would not translate into any kind of civil
disorder. I am very pleased to say that it did not.

And yet we always have to be prepared. Even given
our best efforts, there may be some breakdown somewhere
along the line that may manifest itself in some type of civil
disorder—though the last time Philadelphia experienced
any major civil disorder was back in the 1960’s, when
many other cities around the country were having the
same kind of experience.

However, I think that Los Angeles has been an eye
opener to all of our agencies. We know that there has to
be a level of preparation in the event that this type of
situation occurs, and that we must continue efforts to
ensure that we are being responsive to quality-of-life issues
that exist in the communities. The police department
cannot be what we were years ago, a closed society, a
society that assumed that we had all of the answers and
never sought input from the community.

It is extremely pleasing today to see that we have
evolved into an organization that is prepared to sit down
at the table with the community and discuss issues one-
on-one, and is prepared to implement the suggestions that
are provided by the community. In fact, we sit down
together on a regular basis. Since being appointed police
commissioner, I have taken my entire command staff away
from behind the desk—and I am talking about the highest
levels of the police departments, the deputy commissioners
and the chief inspectors—and have taken them out into
the communities, so that they can hear first hand what the
problems are, what the solutions are that the community is
looking for, and how we as partners can sit down and help
enhance and develop these solutions. The response that
we are getting is tremendous. We are very pleased with
the results, and it is something that we are going to
continue to do.
WHAT CAN MAYORS DO TO AMELIORATE POLICE-COMMUNITY TENSIONS?

Rose Ochi
Director, Criminal Justice Planning Office, City of Los Angeles

I have been a director for the City Criminal Justice Planning Office for some 18 years. During the dark days of disorder last April I could hardly recognize the city where I was born and where I have been working. The King incident was truly a defining moment for us all—for the city, the country, and particularly those of us who are involved in the administration of justice. Following the verdict, the violence and the looting and the destruction that stormed through Los Angeles scarred the national psyche with the most ominous image of urban unrest since the Watts riots of the 1960’s.

From the beating to the verdict, to the mayhem it precipitated, and to the failure to control its devastating path, the King incident represented a major setback for law enforcement. The tragic King case was appalling to everyone of decency. The acquittals of the four police officers shocked people’s conscience, including the mayor and the President. Police officials’ reactions were no different. Many of them were painfully mindful that their cities could similarly explode. Unfortunately, from this and other recent incidents it is evident that civil riots are a part of the American landscape.

Without question, the King beating thrust the issue of police use of excessive force and civil disorder on the front burner for our system of government and particularly law enforcement. The visions of brutal blows and of rioters rampaging sent waves of after-shocks prompting condemnation and calls for reform nationally. This forced all departments to take a hard look at their policies and practices.

The first step in any reform is to honestly evaluate what lessons we have learned, and next to ask what can we do better to prevent civil disorders, to ensure preparedness, and to improve response.

I would like to raise a semantic consideration. In Los Angeles today, whether it is in the press or among candidates for mayor or in conversations throughout the city, we hear people having some problems with saying the “R” word. Certain groups are referring to the civil disorder as a riot, whereas others are referring to it as a rebellion. And still others are just stumbling around looking for a politically correct word to characterize the event. Some use the terms “occurrence,” “insurrection,” “uprising,” “unrest.” The euphemism most often used is “civil disturbance.” It is intended as a more sensitive way of describing what was in essence a race riot. If we are going to make any real progress in talking about the race question, we are going to need to approach it more honestly and openly. I think that juggling different labels can only lead to misunderstanding, miscommunication, and distrust that further inflate racial tensions and form inter-group conflicts. We must find ways to talk frankly about these issues. It is imperative that we begin to knock down the walls that divide us. Instead of polarizing into separate parts, we should pull together as one America.

As a nation we must consider whether we can afford to continue ignoring the deep social ills that plague our cities. The King aftermath made us realize that longer and longer freeways, higher and higher walls, and even the thin blue line will not be able to protect us from this reality.

Law enforcement executives, who are the first to admit that getting more police alone is not the answer, must join mayors in calling for attention to the plight of inner cities.

Now I would like to turn to the issue of civil disorders. We need to begin a discussion of the issue of civil disorders by dealing with one assumption. Civil disorders, unlike earthquakes and hurricanes, are not natural disasters; that is obvious. However, when we deal with the question, we treat it as if it were an inevitability. You know those T-shirts and those signs that say, “Shit Happens.” Civil disorders do not just happen. I think that it would be foolhardy for us to address it in this way. That kind of approach would doom us from the start. So we must talk about prevention.

I think the mayor can provide leadership to reduce the probability of civil disorders. I think the best way to handle a riot is to avoid it. And this is grounded in the understanding that long-standing anger and frustrations caused by a lack of housing and jobs set the stage for civil disorders. The Kerner Commission’s far-reaching report is just as compelling today. While many positive changes have occurred in policing, for the underclass the situation has worsened. As desperate as these conditions are, however, I think we need to keep in mind that in recent years we have not had a hunger- or job-related disorder in this country. Rather, civil disorders arise from combined cumulative rage. Following the jury verdict in the King case, crowds gathered and became violent. In this and in other civil disorders an individual event was singled out.
for triggering the violence. The social, economic, and political problems laid the foundation.

The second ingredient for a riot is a long-standing tension between ethnic minority communities and the police. One rioter noted that racial tensions are rising, and that the problems of drug and violence in our cities threaten to spiral out of control. He suggested that these signs point to what could be called a runaway social greenhouse effect. We have technical means to measure the levels of dangerous environmental toxins. How well are we in touch with the rage factor in our communities? Can we take the temperature of hostility?

I think if police want to get a reading on racial tensions they need to employ many community policing methods in identifying and measuring indicators of strife—for example, establishing ties and maintaining them with all community groups. They can help to serve as barometers of community temperament, opinions, and attitudes, and act as a two-way vehicle for information exchange.

Mayors can do much to ameliorate police-community tensions. Foremost is having a police chief who understands that lawfulness begins with him or her. Our new police chief has signaled to every sector of our city his mission for a professional and responsive department. He has, in the short time that he has been chief, made much progress in implementing the recommendations of the Christopher Commission, which was established by the mayor in the wake of the King riot. Paramount among the recommendations is converting from a largely traditional policing philosophy to a community-oriented strategy in dealing with the problems of excessive force, racism, and prejudice.

The third ingredient, what I will call a last straw factor, usually centers around a police incident involving a minority. No single factor exceeds police use of excessive or deadly force in fostering the distrust and anger that can become a flash point for a riot. It is the principal source of friction between law enforcement and the ethnic minority community.

Minority communities believe that they bear the brunt of these police abuses, and this appears to be borne out by experience. Statistics from the Community Relation Service of the U.S. Department of Justice paint a telling tale of minority communities across the United States where certain officers under the color of law have taken upon themselves the characteristics of the lawless. The problem is exacerbated by the failure of the justice system to enforce sanctions against police abuse.

In the 1980's violations under the color of law went up, but investigations and prosecutions went down compared to the 1960's. In the 1990's the actual collusion of the justice and the political system in shielding police lawlessness should be totally unthinkable. I think we are confident that the new administration has a real commitment to the enforcement of sanctions against civil rights violations. Mayors and police chiefs should not react to citizens' outcries for reform by circling the wagons. Instead, the mayor and the chief need to rid police departments of misconduct or surely we will continue to see violent civil disorders.

Beyond the problem of excessive force, minorities complain that they regularly are humiliated by verbally abusive police who use overly aggressive tactics. We held a series of town hall meetings in Los Angeles. We heard from a stream of witnesses who testified before the Webster Commission. Far too many minorities from all strata have their own stories to tell about a negative police encounter. Mayors and police commissions are ultimately responsible for providing an avenue for citizens' complaints and for oversight of police misconduct. In this way, prevention of civil disturbances can better be assured.

Another key to prevention is a police force that lives up to a reputation for being even-handed in enforcement practices. We took a recent survey of the LAPD and it revealed some very bigoted and discriminatory attitudes. This, of course, can no longer be condoned. In particular in cities like Los Angeles with significant ethnic differences, we need to promote tolerance and inclusion.

Civil disorders may come about in spite of law enforcement agencies' best efforts to promote positive police-citizen relations and police professionalism. Matters entirely out of the direct control of the police can com-
bine to set the stage for such an eventuality.

The city of Los Angeles, after some 30 years of relative calm, was caught woefully unprepared. The city leaders and the LAPD alike seem to have been caught by surprise as lawlessness escalated following the verdict. Their initial response was marked by slow reaction and confusion. There was a total lack of coordination within the department itself, with other city agencies, and with the other emergency management structures at the regional, state, and federal level. The hesitancy of the response to the initial incidents allowed the violence, looting, and destruction to take hold and grow. It became clear that the department did not have a specific plan for dealing with potential unrest following the King verdict.

In California we are very earthquake conscious. The city has a state-of-the-art emergency plan. However, notwithstanding the massive volumes we have on our emergency operation master plan and manual, and the LAPD's technical manuals, we did not have a specific plan to handle large-scale disturbances. Many jurisdictions likewise have emergency plans, but not a specific plan for civil disorders. Prior to the verdict, the mayor had been assured repeatedly that such plans were ready and in place. What he needed to do was take the "I am from Missouri" approach and demand to see them.

Because of the failures in planning at every level of the emergency response, a complete overhaul of the city's and the department's planning for responding to any future outbreak of civil disorder has taken place. Now this civil disturbance plan must be kept current with a periodic review in updating. Both the city's and the department's civil disturbance plan must provide for integrated training and for testing and evaluation.

In addition to the planning and training, any preparation entails reviewing all applicable ordinances and laws, ensuring clear understanding by all. Under the local ordinance the mayor is empowered to declare the existence of a local emergency whenever the mayor finds that there has been an occurrence that, by reason of its magnitude, is or is likely to be beyond the control of the normal capacities of city government. The mayor or his designee, in conjunction with the department commander, makes this determination.

It is advisable to have on hand a boilerplate of a proclamation declaring a local emergency. When the mayor makes a declaration, it activates immediately the city's emergency operation organization, whereupon the mayor becomes a director and is given direct supervisory control over all of the organization's operations and personnel, including the Emergency Operation Board. As director, the mayor is granted extraordinarily broad powers to promulgate and enforce rules, regulations, and orders for the purpose of protecting life and property. Orders may involve the imposing of curfew. It is a good idea to examine beforehand all curfew laws and to make sure that they can withstand legal challenges. It is also good for the jurisdiction's mass arrest policy and plans to provide the logistical support that will be needed.

In many cities of the United States, it is important that there be plans for handling the homeless if curfew is declared; temporary shelters will need to be provided. Other orders might include banning the sale of ammunition and gasoline; closing schools and commercial establishments; restricting access to designated areas; and enjoining the conduct of public events. It would be wise to have all necessary legal documents for restraining orders and injunctions handy; that is not something you want to have to get at the midnight hour.

Only the mayor has the authority to order a general release of city employees in the event of a disaster. A policy should be promulgated and disseminated to all employees so that they understand their responsibilities. When a disaster occurs, citizens look to the city for leadership and assistance in mitigating the effects. Therefore, it is the policy of our city that all employees work normal working hours and make themselves available for disaster relief, whether they are involved in public safety responsibilities or not.

In Los Angeles, due to the failure to adequately prepare a specific plan, many leaders and rank-and-file employees were mentally unready to mount a response. The failure of individual commanders to react quickly to the initial incidents permitted events to get out of control and to mushroom. One of the things that local jurisdictions need to do beyond planning is to have desktop exercises. It is an expensive endeavor but it should be in place. The decision-making apparatus went catatonic during our crisis.

About 6:45 p.m., an LAPD division commander broadcast a citywide tactical alert. Just after 8:00 p.m. the LAPD was put on emergency mobilization, and at 8:45 the mayor declared a local state of emergency. Shortly thereafter, he requested that the governor mobilize 2,000 National Guard troops.

On the evening of April 29th, when it was determined that outside assistance would be needed by the city, police commanders did not call upon the police resources of neighboring jurisdictions, most readily available under the state mutual aid plan. Instead, the LAPD bypassed local mutual aid entirely and urged the mayor directly to request
of the governor that the California National Guard be deployed, knowing fully that such a deployment could and did take some 17 hours or more to mobilize.

When they finally did arrive, there was some temporary confusion as to whether the National Guard was to function under the direction of the police department or the sheriff. From top to bottom within the city and within agencies, at all levels of the emergency infrastructure, people must understand proper channels of communication and the chain of command.

As to when to request mutual aid, the city’s emergency operation plan provides that mutual aid will be requested through established channels. The city will reasonably exhaust its own resources before calling for outside assistance. Our tactical manual provides that when requesting mutual aid, the department commander under the direction of the mayor shall direct the request to the operational law enforcement coordinator. For our area that is the sheriff. That is not what took place. Whether a department’s resources are reasonably committed shall be determined by the department commander with the concurrence of the sheriff. That did not take place.

The test is that the department resources shall be reasonably committed prior to the initiation of a request for mutual aid. A reasonable commitment may be dependent on many factors, including the nature, the gravity, and the projected escalation of the emergency.

During this assessment, when the emergency of a magnitude certain to require mutual aid appears imminent, continuous intelligence on the actual and projected situation should be forwarded to the coordinator and jurisdictions likely to respond to mutual aid. Information should be shared continually.

When does a jurisdiction request the National Guard? To arrive at the judgment that local resources have been overwhelmed, first we must have committed all the city’s field forces and must determine that the county and regional mutual aid resources have been exhausted. This does not mean practically that they are totally spent, but rather that they are committed and being utilized. Mutual aid should be requested early in an incident rather than after local resources are overwhelmed.

We need to plan how to coordinate the effective use of outside mutual aid resources, the National Guard, and the federal troops. Problems arose when the President ordered federal troops. There was confusion as to the proper role of the military despite written declaration by the President regarding the Posse Comitatus Act, prohibiting the military from engaging in any law enforcement functions. When the National Guard was placed under the federal command, they were subject to federal restrictions, which severely limited their roles to what was deemed military versus law enforcement. Moreover, another layer of bureaucracy was added to decide these matters, so when LAPD called on National Guard or federal troops to lend assistance in arresting or moving prisoners, we had to deal with this chain of decision-making.

There are some other things that mayors can do, but for now I just want to close by saying that the mayor and the sheriff and the police chief and the chairman of the supervisors have met with the media and have urged them to balance social responsibility with their first amendment rights. We fear that they have almost marketed disorder, setting it up so that you would almost be disappointed if a disturbance did not occur.

We are ready should a disturbance arise in the future. We have learned a lot from the lesson of 1992.
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR IN COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Nolan E. Jones
Director, Justice and Public Safety, National Governors' Association

When I came to the National Governors' Association in 1978, one of my first duties was to look at the whole issue of emergency management. At that time it was new. One of the first things we did was to lobby then-President Carter to create the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The other thing that we did was to look at how the states were organized to deal with emergencies of all types, and we brought out many publications on how to bring together agencies.

One of the things that we talked about that got started around that time, in 1978, was the creation of departments of public safety within state governments. Governors began to put several types of state bureaucracies within these departments, maybe the state police or the National Guard.

Another thing that we did was to provide technical assistance to different states to help them put together plans to deal with all types of emergencies. We described emergencies as those things that happened out of the ordinary, and assumed that they can be planned for even if they do happen out of the ordinary. One of the things that we have seen is that if you develop a plan, you certainly have to exercise that plan. We continuously say that plans and books that simply sit on shelves are no good — and will never effect the desired ends.

In helping the states, we came up with a concept of what we call comprehensive emergency management. The Federal Emergency Management Agency later started calling that same process integrated emergency management.

The four phases of comprehensive emergency management are mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Emergencies can be fires, nuclear hazards, nuclear bombs, and riots. In mitigation, we worked with certain scenarios. Mitigation referred to predictions that could be made about a category of event so that its probability could be minimized.

We have used this process, and the state directors of emergency use the same process when they are working around nuclear power plants. They have plans to prepare them to respond to a disaster around the plant and to recover from it, as well as to mitigate the process. They follow four-phase mechanisms that can be applied to any kind of disastrous situation while varying the procedure for the particular kind of disaster.

Both governors and mayors have symbolic powers. Every governor in this country has a different degree of power. In fact, in one state whose governor is viewed by the public as being one of the most powerful in the United States, the governor only has one-fifth of the power that he is assumed to wield. He cannot even decide the budget, cannot decide which way things are going; in many instances he is only one-fifth of a panel of people who have equal power. Yet that governor is thought of as powerful. The symbolic power of the governor in emergency and other situations has to be clearly understood.

But, most of the states now, as I said earlier, have emergency laws that give the governor certain emergency powers to react during disasters. First of all, the governor has the power to make the declaration. Every two years or so we have put forward a little booklet that is entitled A Governor's Guide to Emergency Management. We hold a workshop for all new governors every two years. We tell them that the first and major appointment they will make is their director of emergency management.

We tell them this because the response to a disaster can politically make or break you. We know of mayors who have gone down because of how they dealt with disasters. Those who handle disasters quite well have made good political points.

One of the first things we do in our worksheet is to give governors a sample of how you issue a declaratory order. We say, "First of all, your disaster guy makes the survey and immediately comes back and tells you what is happening; you then set up the declaration. This is boilerplate language. All you have to do is take out the governor's name that we have there and put your name on it. Sign it and put the state's seal on it and it becomes the governor's order. Then you can use the powers that you have." The order describes the nature of the emergency, why it occurred in the state, and the authority that the governor is using under state law in making this declaration.

The governor does not have to make a declaration for the powers and the forces of governmental structures to operate. The governor's director of emergency management can be and should be working with local emergency services in dealing with the process. All emergencies are local, similar to what former Speaker of the House Thomas "Tip" O'Neill once said about politics: all politics
are local. The governors know that. Everyone in state politics knows that. The state directors immediately start working with the affected localities in making an assessment of what is going on and of how the process is coming along.

Notice that the main people that the government has to depend upon are two individuals. The first, of course, is the governor's director of emergency management, and the second is the governor's adjutant general. In about 20 states, the adjutant general's office is where the emergency management director can be found. Others have the emergency management director either reporting to the secretariat, often the Secretary of Public Safety, or directly to the governor, as is the case in about four or five states.

How does the governor appoint these two important individuals? In a recent workshop, we asked governors how the selection is made. One governor said, "It's difficult, but you almost want a person who can walk on water." What he means was that the individual has to be able to command the structure. That person is the person in charge. Once the declaration is made, the person appointed by the governor becomes the commander in charge of the whole process and reports directly to the governor throughout the emergency.

What powers does the governor have then, besides placing the state emergency director in charge? He can also use the state emergency director in any small disaster. I recall one some years ago in a state where they were having problems with weekly prison breaks. The governor declared a minor state of emergency and called in an emergency director. He told the emergency management director that he was to work with the National Guard, that he was in charge, and that he wanted to see no more prison breaks. That was about three years ago, and from that time on they have not had another prison escape.

The governor, of course, can mobilize the National Guard. The governor has the power to require evacuations—not ask for them, require them. This is what Governor Lawton Childs did in South Florida during Hurricane Andrew. Some people did not want to move so he sent the police and the National Guard out to move them. The governor has that power.

The governor has the power in many instances to declare a type of martial law, commandeering public property for certain purposes. The governor can also suspend certain statutes.

Whom can the governor call on? Of course the governor has at his disposal the National Guard. He has the state police. He has state workers—for example, from the Department of Human Services. He can command prisoners. In many instances, especially in California, prisoners have been used for fighting forest fires. Prisoners have been used for making sandbags for levees.

There has been always some confusion over the role of the National Guard. We held a symposium on the Posse Comitatus Act about six years ago, especially about the use of the National Guard in drug interdictions. We published a booklet that explained that the Guard is under the governor's control unless the Guard is federalized. Then, the President takes over under that section of the U.S. code that gives him control over all federal military structures.

I think that in many instances the governor should rely more on the Guard. I am old enough to have been around during the riots of 1967-1968, and, in fact, I was on several panels at that time looking at the aftermath of those riots. One of the problems with the Guard at that time was that the Guard, like the police, was comprised primarily of white males and there was very little respect for it within the black community.

That has graciously changed a lot. It was interesting to me that a couple of years ago Lieutenant General John B. Conaway received a high honor from the NAACP because of his efforts at making sure that the Guard looks like the American people. It is important that people understand that the National Guard is composed of men and women who have come from our communities. That is the same composition that we began seeing even earlier in the police.

I live here in Washington and I go to an inner city church. Several members are police officers. The children learn to respect them because they know who they are. They know they are friends. When they see them, they recognize them not only as the authority of the police but as the person who teaches my Sunday school class. We now see the same in the Guard.

When should the governor or the mayor go to the scene? We have had focus groups of governors to trade information about disaster response. The last one we had was two years ago after Hurricane Hugo. In most instances, we think the governor should go to the scene, except during prison riots or civil disturbances when the governor should remain at a command center. In most natural disasters, the governor should be on the scene. He should be seen walking around, feeling the hurt, looking at the destruction of the houses. He should get on a helicopter and look over the scene and he should talk to people. This is important because of the symbolic power of the governor and the mayor. The people like to know that the officials they have put their trust in are feeling their
hurt, feeling their needs.

A governor should communicate with other public officials. He should let the mayor know what assistance is available, for example, the Guard or the state police. He should ask the mayor what he needs. Of course, this information should come to the state director of emergency management from the local director of emergency management.

Before a governor says anything, he needs to get the facts. Until then, he should simply say that he is looking into the issue.

The next major thing that the governor and the mayor have to do is to control rumors. Lack of rumor control can itself cause a disaster. Most of the governors that we talked to said that they set up 800 numbers as rumor control numbers. The state directors take charge of that.

It is imperative that a governor tell the truth. He should not try to snow the press; they will find out anyway. He should not equivocate on issues; that can be very dangerous. A governor should issue periodic updates about the situation and review the political significance of known facts. One governor reminded us to make sure that the scientists give us good information. Harry Truman once said that he wished he had a one-handed economist. You cannot tell the public, “On the one hand it might be good, but on the other hand it might not be good.” They have got to know what is going on specifically. You are the leader and they look for you to tell them.

Finally, it is important for the governor or the mayor to make a symbolic appearance after the recovery. After the bombing of the World Trade Center, Governor Mario Cuomo went there and opened up his office. That symbolic act said the World Trade Center was a safe place.

THE PRESSURES OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES UPON CITY HALL

Patrick Murphy
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have been with the United States Conference of Mayors for the past few years, attempting to advise mayors about their police problems. I never knew before the Rodney King beating that there were so many mayors interested in civilian complaint review boards. But that has been the question ever since then. The mayors explain to me that the pressure they are getting at City Hall, in the neighborhoods, and in the news media about the issue of police misconduct overwhelms them.

The United States Conference of Mayors is the national organization for mayors of cities over 30,000 in population. There are about a thousand cities in the country with over 30,000 people. There is another organization, the National League of Cities, that embraces all mayors, city council members, and management professionals from cities. The Conference of Mayors is a much smaller organization, for what we refer to as the principal cities. The role of the mayor varies, depending upon whether you have the strong mayor form of government, a commission form of government, council manager form, or even some other forms. But the mayor usually is the chief executive of the city. He or she is elected by the people.

Even as the job description for governor varies very much from state to state, so does it vary for mayors from city to city. Some of them can be very powerful. For example, police chiefs may serve at their pleasure. They can be removed at any time the mayor wishes. The mayor does not have that power in the city manager form of government. The manager may have that authority, and in some cities the council or the commission has that authority. And of course the situation in Los Angeles, as Judge Webster pointed out, was that the police chief, going back about 50 years since the city reformed its charter, in effect has life tenure. Now, if you are going to give a police chief life tenure, you should have a good selection process.

The mayor ordinarily will have authority over all departments. Because the mayor has been elected, the people look to the mayor to exercise that authority. He or she is responsible for the performance of all departments, and of course the principal department involved in
Disorder prevention and disorder control is the police department.

I must say that most mayors come to their positions not well prepared to oversee police departments. Overseeing a police department is not simple. Police administration is very complex. Some of the authorities on public administration, for example, have written that the administration of a police department—especially a large department—is as complex a problem as they are ever asked to address.

Managers do not come very well prepared either, though usually better prepared than mayors, unless the mayor has been in government as a council member, for instance. We occasionally get a mayor who has been a police chief. That mayor knows a little more about the issues. But even chiefs themselves are not in agreement about many aspects of police administration. Therefore, one difficulty that the mayor has is trying to understand how well prepared the police department is.

I think that a mayor and his staff have a clear responsibility to prevent civil disorders. Prevention should be the first order of business, and as part of that prevention, planning. A clear responsibility should be fixed within every police department—even if it is a city of only 30,000 people—for seeing to it that the department is actively training, preparing, planning, and will be ready when a disturbance arises. In the typical department, it might be the chief of operations or, in a larger department, the chief of the special operations division or emergency services. It could even be a chief or director of planning. Prepare for the worst; hope for the best.

As part of that planning and training, there should be desktop exercises. I believe there should even be an occasional dry run, even very quietly, without any news attention, or an all out dry run, where you ask the governor, the National Guard Bureau, and everybody in city government to go through an exercise some afternoon, so they have a little bit of a feel for it.

I was public safety director in Washington, D.C. in 1968 when we had the riot. Thank God for the National Guard, the 82nd Airborne, and the other people who came to our rescue. It was a pretty big riot. If you go over to 14th Street or 17th Street to this day, you will see the remains of that riot. Yet there were only ten deaths. Only two of those were police-related deaths, and they were clearly justifiable.

Therefore, plan and train and be as prepared as you can be. Coordination is necessary first among all of the agencies of city government, then coordination in the mutual aid plan, with other police departments, with the National Guard, with the military. Information and intelligence I think are very important. Information is the lifeblood of police work. Good police officers get information, and there has to be a system in place for passing that information up the line.

During the riot era in the mid- and late 1960's, police departments were doing a lot of those things, but of course they were very sensitive to the issue. There was a lot of training going on. Even mayors and police chiefs were brought to Washington for training.

All of these things are important, and even in a quiet time like now I think they should be paid attention to. I would like to think that the federal government would feel a continuing responsibility. If I were the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I might charge the head of the National Guard Bureau or some other general with seeing to it that the country was ready for any serious disorder.

The mayor should stay in touch with police departments—state police, local police—so that we can all have a little more confidence when emergencies occur, sometimes without much warning, that they will be addressed effectively.

We are in a different period right now than from the earlier riot era. Then, we were coming out of a long civil rights revolution when there were many demonstrations and some violence. We are in the post-civil-rights-revolution era now, I think. I am not saying for a moment that we have achieved racial justice, but it is a different time. There were frequent, large protest demonstrations in the 1960's and there was civil disobedience, to which police responded by making many arrests. For the first time, a lot of housing, employment, and schooling was being integrated. The police, for the most part, did an outstanding job during that period all across the country. In 1954, when the Brown v. Board of Education decision was issued, there were few black police officers. We are past those first phases of integration.

One of the things in which the police can take a lot of pride is that in racial terms the police are almost representative nationally—almost, not quite. How many institutions can say that? The military can say it, but not many more. Formerly, there were very few black police chiefs. We have a lot of black police chiefs now.

Mayors who have appointed black police chiefs in cities that may be only 15 percent black in their general population have said to me, “Look, I have eight department heads. I have ten department heads. To the black community which one is the most important? The police department. That is why I appointed a black chief.”
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

Marty Tapscott
Chief of Police, City of Richmond; former Chief of Police, Flint, Michigan

Richmond, where I have been chief of police since 1989, is about 100 miles south of Washington, straight down I-95. It is a city of about 203,000 residents, 55 percent of whom are African-American. About 42 percent are white. The remainder are Hispanics, Asians, and others. Predominantly, however, it is a black-white city.

When I first became chief, Richmond was operating primarily under what is commonly called a paramilitary style of policing, a hierarchal command structure with directions and policies moving from top to bottom. We decided that we were going to the community policing approach and we went to the trouble of defining it for Richmond. As you know, the definition of community policing may vary from city to city. Some people have a tendency to call it a program, other people call it a philosophy. We do call it a philosophy in the City of Richmond, and that philosophy is described as a partnership or close working relationship between the police and the citizens that they serve—both people who live in the community and the business folks who work there.

Before this evolved very far, we had to train and educate our own police officers about the philosophy and what it meant. And we did that throughout the department and citywide. We were not going to pick out one neighborhood or demonstration program. We believe that it should be a philosophy shared by all police officers and citizens, including civilians within the department.

After orienting the police department, we then went to the community to talk about our policing philosophy and what it means in terms of their relationship to the department. And in each instance, in my opinion, the meetings necessitated an attitude change in police officers, other police department employees, and the citizens in terms of understanding each other’s roles, understanding what the relationship should be, and how it could best serve the community if we worked together in a partnership.

There was some resistance within the department at first, because they looked upon community policing solely as a social program. When you start talking about...
families, social values and needs, health needs, educational needs, all of which figure in the community policing equation, it sounds like a so-called "soft" approach to policing. So we had to emphasize very early that community policing is not a soft approach, that one of its primary purposes is crime reduction and a subsequent improvement in the quality of life for those who live in these communities.

Once we explained that we must, as the weed-and-seed program indicates, weed out the criminals as well as seed in social, health, and educational programs, officers rapidly started coming around to the community policing philosophy. We are not all the way there. I do not think every police officer in the department is sold on community policing, but I think the vast majority are. Everyone in the community is not sold on it either, but I think the vast majority of the community is.

We also found it necessary to reorganize our department. We were top heavy in terms of upper level ranks, so we reduced those; we had four majors, now we are down to three. We are reducing the number of captains and the number of lieutenants as well. Those positions are not being lost in terms of the number of people that we are authorized to have. Those positions are either translating into increases in the number of patrol officers on the street or, in some instances, increases at the sergeant's level in order to staff programs such as quality control. We have almost completed the process of organizational flattening except for the lieutenants.

We also recognized the need for officers to be assigned to the same beat at the same time of day in order to establish continuity between the police officer and the community that is being served. We included the officers in the process and designed a work schedule—a fixed schedule. Our officers do not rotate tours any more. The same officers are supposed to work the same beat at the same time of day, and to organize their communities.

Part of our philosophy, of course, is to trust in the police officer. If we are going to ask them to problem-solve, if we are going to ask them to go out and relate to the community, then they have to become a very important part of how you organize, how you structure, how you design programs. As an example, let me say I was originally not a fan of bicycles. But a couple of officers felt that they could handle burglars and street robbers better if they were on bicycles. When they recommended it and gave me their reasoning, I immediately approved it. And it has been one of the most successful programs we have had in the City of Richmond. As a result, we are gradually building up our bicycle patrols, a problem-solving idea that came not from me, but from the police officer.

Our drug-free block program, a program requiring tremendous participation from the community, is another idea that did not come from the chief's office. It did not come from the operating chiefs' offices. It came from the officers and staff responsible for street-level sales of narcotics. To be instituted, the program requires 80 percent of the adults on a given block, and 60 percent of the juveniles, to make a contractual agreement with us to rid their community of drug activity on that block.

So far, the drug-free block programs have been very successful in weeding out the criminal and maintaining an improved environment. The community, of course, plays a very important part in the maintenance of a drug-free block; the police officer cannot stay there 24 hours-a-day. So the officers have pagers and the community knows their pager number. In some cases, they have cellular phones available. The community can thus call them directly to let them know what is going on in their block.

We have been called back to those blocks any number of times. We have had incidents where citizens would describe drug dealers or where drugs are being hidden or held. And they did so without ever revealing themselves to the dealer, as you know, fear plays a major role in the level of community participation, and the telephone system is one means of getting citizens to make reports without fear of retribution.

We are still in the process of training our police officers. We have to provide more definitive problemsolving training. We are going to be focusing on beat "profiling," that is, identifying what is on your beat, who lives on your beat, and what problems exist on your beat. That will be computerized so that we can look at a particular beat, discern what is happening there and who is involved in the problems, without having to interview dozens of people. All we have to do is turn on the computer.

The other thing we are doing is reorganizing our beat structure according to neighborhoods, rather than according to street boundaries. That is difficult to do, but for the most part we have done it.

We are also trying to control our 911 calls. We do not want to be incident-driven, so we installed a communications system designed to take more reports by telephone, more delay calls, and to be forthright in telling citizens about how soon we can get there. I believe it is wrong to tell citizens that you can respond to their calls if you cannot guarantee it; and on many occasions you cannot. Rather than mislead citizens, we are trying to convince the community that if we can reduce the number of calls
patrol units have to take, then perhaps we could be more responsive in emergency situations.

If citizens insist we answer every call, regardless of its seriousness, delays in response are inevitable. We have to convince them to reduce the number of calls the patrol units are handling—either take it by phone or give it to the beat officer when he or she comes back in service. We can actually respond better to service needs by reducing 911 call response.

We have given our crime analysis unit a boost as well; it is now being computerized and I think we will be better able to examine crime patterns and criminal behavior. It is designed to be a practical tool to fight crime, not merely a place to compile statistics.

We have also decentralized—nothing new in policing, but it was new in Richmond. We took detectives out of headquarters and put a squad in each of the three precincts. A detective, who will remain anonymous, was quoted in the Richmond paper, saying that decentralized detectives was the worst idea he'd heard since he has been there, the worst idea in the history of the police department. They nonetheless got out of the precincts and started working with patrol officers, and patrol officers started working with them, hand to hand. Each detective became responsible for a neighborhood or a beat in his particular precinct. The information flow between officers and detectives has thus improved substantially. After a time, everyone grew to love the system.

It was nothing new. We did this all the time in Washington, D.C.—precinct detectives, everybody had precinct detectives—but it was "the worst idea" in history. Now I could not get them back to headquarters if I tried.

It is important to mention to you that one of the first things we did was to draft a value statement, but we did not do it in isolation. We brought in a cross-section of the community—religious leaders, people from housing, business, the city council, other government agencies, and we sat down over a three- or four-month period. It took us that long to put our value statement together.

We did this because we wanted our value statement to be consistent with the values of the community. And I think we came out with a very good one. All officers are issued a wallet-sized value statement to carry with them.

We are also including the community in an evaluation of the expectations of community policing. We ask them what they expect the results of that method to be. We talk in such terms as fear reduction, the quality of life, etc.

We are getting away from numbers. We do not believe in placing too much weight on numbers and statistics, other than in describing reduction in crime. We go straight to the citizen and ask questions: How do you feel about your neighborhood? How do you feel about the police officer in your neighborhood? How do you feel about service delivery?

I would strongly suggest to you that community policing become a department-wide philosophy, and that it not be confined to police officers you may designate as community police officers. When I was in Flint, Michigan, I had 64 officers dedicated to neighborhood foot patrol. The program was widely written about, glorious, glowing reports about how well that program worked. But I am telling you there was a split in that police department between the foot patrol officers and the motorized patrol officers, because the foot patrol officers had the philosophy, the motorized patrol officers did not. The foot patrol officers did not respond to calls for service, they worked the neighborhoods exclusively. The other patrol officers were upset because they could not get assistance from these other officers. When I tried to integrate them, all hell broke loose. But eventually it worked out.

Ultimately, we in Richmond like to think of community policing as part of a larger system—community-oriented government. If other government agencies are not involved and cooperating, community-oriented policing will not work. If we tell the community we are going to clean your street on Saturday, the street must be cleaned on Saturday. If we say an abandoned car will be towed in three days, that car must be picked up in three days. Sanitation, transportation, and other agencies have to participate.

One final note: I think we are enjoying so much success in Richmond because the police officers, the sergeants, and the lieutenants are intimately involved in building the program. They are the problem-solvers; they are the program makers; they produce the ideas, they run it. They have a feeling of ownership. Regardless of what the chief thinks, they are going to see that it works.
A TRUE POLICE-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP IN SAN DIEGO

Norm Stamper
Executive Assistant Chief, San Diego Police Department

San Diego sits at the Mexico-United States border. It is a city of 1.2 million people. It is the sixth largest city in the country now. It is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural community. In fact, by the year 2000, people of color will constitute over half the population of my city. San Diego is a 400-square-mile city, so we do sprawl somewhat. But we do have economically depressed inner city areas that both generate and suffer from social, political, and economic problems, as is true of many other big cities.

It is interesting, however, that despite the fact that San Diego is just over 100 miles away from the City of Los Angeles, in the spring of last year our city did not explode. Part of that could be attributed to demographics, part of that could be attributed to luck, but I believe that a large part of it has to do with steps that had been taken prior to that time. To understand what did not happen, I think it is important to understand some things that did happen in San Diego.

To be fair about it, of course, there have been civil disorders in San Diego throughout the history of the San Diego Police Department, which was first organized in 1889. For example, shortly after the turn of the century there were some vicious attacks by police officers against the IWW, also known as the "Wobblies" in San Diego. We had our skirmishes in the 1960's. I joined the police department in 1966 and spent a good part of the first three years working on 12-hour shifts, staging, going through mob and riot control formations, and occasionally confronting people in the community under less than desirable circumstances. So clearly in the past San Diego has had problems.

In trying to understand why we did not have problems in 1992, it may be useful to consider an incident that took place in 1984. Most police departments have had a similar incident. There is always a twist; there is always a variation. Every one is unique, but there is something that tends to unite every police department, and that is one chapter, or more, in the history of that organization that we would just as soon forget.

For us, it happened on March 31, 1984. A young San Diego police officer, with one cover unit carrying a civilian ride-along, stopped a young African American man suspected of gang activity. He was not, however, a gang member. In fact, he was in the company of several of his friends, driving on a Sunday afternoon down the road when a police officer decided to stop him. The struggle that ensued left one police officer dead, and the police officer who made the stop, wounded, crippled for life. The young man, in making his escape, shot the civilian ride-along and then stole the police car and drove over the body of the wounded police officer.

He went to trial on murder charges and assorted other charges, not once but twice. He was acquitted.

That incident raising, as it did, allegations of racism and brutality and patterns of discriminatory police practices on the part of San Diego police officers was, you might imagine, very troubling for us, a wrenching emotional experience for many within the department and in the community. The defense was self-defense, accompanied by allegations of racial slurs. The jury believed that the police officer was beating this young man to death.

We spent probably two or three years, and that may be a conservative estimate, licking our wounds and generally trying to recover from the incident itself, but more particularly, from the press coverage that surrounded the highly-publicized, quite sensational trials. At the end of that period—when we had circled the wagons and become very defensive, almost institutionally defensive—we began a process of restoring public confidence and organizational pride. That was a very deliberate, conscious effort. It included a significant community outreach activity, efforts to improve relations with the media, and, most important of all, efforts to convince our police officers, through a pretty substantial commitment to education and training, that their responsibilities included treating everyone with dignity and respect.

We can now fast forward to the 1990's. Along the way, we embraced the principles of neighborhood or community policing. In fact, I have to pay tribute to Tony Pate. He and I and several others were involved in a round of discussions back in the early 1970's. The San Diego Police Department received a grant from the Police Foundation in 1973. It was called the Community Profile Development Project Grant. We began community profiling, establishing beat profiles in our northern division on a pilot project basis. In 1975, we went citywide with what was then called community-oriented policing. The expectation was that police officers would engage in problem-solving and that they would develop partnerships with the community they served. A lot of the language being used today was already helping to shape attitudes and feelings and opinions in San Diego.
back in the mid-1970's.

A lot of people consider that experience to be a failure. As its principal architect, I do not. I do believe, however, that rather than dying on the vine, the program or the philosophy rather lay dormant for a considerable period of time, only to be resurrected in the mid-1980's. By the early 1990's, in concert with the effort that was underway to improve public confidence and police officers' feelings about their own organization, we had in fact embraced the concept, the philosophy, and the elements of neighborhood policing.

That did include problem solving. It did include establishing a true partnership with the community. Of course, that is a phrase that really cries out for definition, to be taken out of the abstract and put into concrete terms, so that police officers and community people can all understand what it means. It means something like a 50-50 relationship with the community we are serving, one in which we no longer go to community meetings, for example, and make unilateral proclamations about what we are going to do or not do.

We spent a lot of time with our police officers in education and training programs. Then—I think it is safe to say—we made a quantum leap forward with the arrival of a new city manager, who came up through the ranks in the City of San Diego. His name is Jack McGrory, he is very different from any city manager I have ever met or heard of. He is an activist. As a white, able-bodied, native-born straight male, he is remarkably sensitive to issues of diversity, is very concerned about women's issues, about people of color, about the disabled, about gays and lesbians. He is a very, very inclusive individual and he made it very clear to everybody in his city that all within his purview and under his direction as city manager would embrace these principles of diversity. And so all of that was in place when "it" happened.

"It," of course, is what Edgar Shine would call that "catalytic marker event," the Rodney King incident. When it happened in March of 1991, I was asked by a reporter outside the headquarters building, "What'd you think of that?" and I said, "It's the most brutal and cowardly act I have ever seen in over a quarter of a century in police work." Our police chief said something very similar. We both said the same things to our police officers and to the community in a variety of settings.

When that criminal act took place in Los Angeles in March of 1991, it was bad. It was very bad. But it was compounded by the miscarriage of justice that occurred in Simi Valley in the spring of last year. These are personal opinions. And I expressed these personal opinions, even editorializing in our in-house newspaper, raising the question, "What are we going to tell our kids about what they have seen over and over on television?"

So we in our city talked about it a great deal. And the response in San Diego in the spring of last year was, in my opinion, a creative one. The mayor, the manager, the police chief, the elected official for the prominently African American community, all got together and went into the community immediately. I took the in-house operational responsibilities. We opened up our ERC (Emergency Resource Center) immediately, and the chief made a statement that went out not only to the police officers but to the community, and the statement was, "We are shocked by these verdicts. I am expressing my personal opinion. My police officers may see it the same way or they may see it differently. That is their right. However they see it, they are entitled to express their opinions. Every citizen in the City of San Diego is entitled to say how he or she feels about those verdicts.

And, furthermore, if people want to take to the streets to express their emotions, their feelings, as American citizens they are entitled. As their police department, we are responsible for seeing to it that they are allowed to express those feelings safely. And we will not pick nits, we will not quibble over parade permits, we won't get technical or detailed. We understand the feeling in our community."

And as a result of that, I am convinced the community knew that the police department was playing it straight and was recognizing the need for and the value of people expressing themselves. We had three incidents.

When I said the mayor and the police chief and the city manager and the city council members went out, they went out at all hours of the day and night and stayed awake basically for three days, as many of us did. They were on the streets. We were in-house.

We also created a hotline. It started with a call from the city manager to me, saying, "Can you put three phones in a community meeting room?" We set aside a room in the headquarters building, a room about 40 feet by 60 feet.

The three phones grew to 16, the room filled with volunteers, people who were encouraged to just come in and, with fact sheets in front of them, answer people's phone calls. We got calls from people who were scared, had heard rumors to the effect that the city was on fire—false rumors. We had calls from people who wanted to give us intelligence, give us information about people contemplating crimes, and we had calls from people who wanted to simply use us, if you will, as a phone-in show, just expressing their opinions, and we took thousands of calls in the days following that verdict in Simi Valley.
As I said, we had three incidents. I think each of the three is important. One of them was very important. Two police officers sitting in a car doing paper work in a darkened area took a rifle slug to the car. The shot narrowly missed the head of the driver.

We had another incident in which about 50 students from the University of California at San Diego took to Interstate 5; we closed the freeway down for about 15 or 20 minutes, let them say a few things, and then escorted them peacefully off the freeway, reopening the road to rush hour traffic.

The third incident was a burglary. You can put that in quotes. There were eight suspects. They broke into a stereo store. We were ready for them. We moved in with several two-officer units and made eight arrests, charged eight people, recovered VCR's, televisions, stereos, and assorted equipment that they had taken to their vehicles. And I think it is important to point out that we were ready for them because one of those anonymous callers on the hotline basically said, "I got a bunch of friends who are about to do something real stupid." So we are really pleased with the way we handled it as a city this last time.

We have tremendous grassroots support for neighborhood policing and community policing. Our model does use some officers who are freed to do the kinds of comprehensive efforts that are necessary to fully attack a neighborhood or community problem. Our strategy is to create through rotation an entire patrol division versed in problem-solving. Our officers work the community team for eight months and then they rotate back to patrol.

We have also committed ourselves to massive community organization and mobilization, under the premise that the police alone cannot possibly do anything about the fear that permeates so many of our communities—people scared to death, keeping their kids in the home, sometimes seven days a week, 24 hours a day. We are really committed, however, to interrupting that cycle of violence and fear.

As an illustration, we had some street muggings in our Hill Crest-North Park area. There is a large concentration of gay and lesbian people in Hill Crest and North Park. Assaults had attacked quite a few with baseball bats, PVC pipes, knives, and so forth, and there were also a number of straights who were attacked there. Together, gay and straight, residents and business people came to us and said, "We really want to start a citizens' patrol."

A reaction that would have been common just two or three years prior would be, "Are you crazy? We don't think so. Vigilantism. You're going to get over-zealous, violating the constitutional rights of other citizens, and furthermore, you don't want to put yourself in harm's way. These people are, after all, pretty violent. They're hurting people." Then, on December 15, 1991, a 17-year-old kid, who happened to be going to a coffeehouse at night, was attacked, beaten, and ultimately stabbed to death. The citizens' patrol was launched with our full support and enthusiasm. Two-hundred people took to the streets, driving their own cars, and operating cellular phones donated by a local phone company with police department intervention. Today, the patrol has about 100 people. The total dipped to about 75 after they knocked the hell out of crime, reclaimed their neighborhood, took back their streets, did all those things that make people feel some sense of control. They did it not just with our blessings but our full support.

Today, we are ready for whatever happens in Los Angeles. We do not believe that anything of any consequence is going to happen in our city. That can be painted as a very naive statement or a confident statement. I would not characterize it as either. I think it is important for people in leadership positions to say that we do not expect problems. We are ready for problems, but we do not expect them. When leaders say, "The sky is falling, the sky is falling," the chances that the sky will fall are dramatically increased. So I think it is critical that in this business we do not do that.

So we are ready, and I think we have even more imaginative and creative plans, operationally, strategically, and politically, this time around. But we do sit, in every inner city in this country, on that pile of dry wood and smoldering embers about which Secretary Cisneros spoke recently.

To summarize, I think we have to learn from our history and we have to recognize that some of the things we do, with the best of intentions, produce precisely the opposite of the desired results. Getting angry, getting defensive, getting emotional in the mid-1980's produced in our own town greater problems with our community and greater problems with the media. To get smug and self-righteous about it just does not work. It is important that our leaders stake out a place in the future that is inspired, that is principled, and that is a good place to be; and to share that vision, certainly as Marty Tapscott has done, to share that vision broadly, to listen to people, to see other people's vision, most notably those of your own police officers, because they are the ones ultimately who are going to carry out these new philosophies.

I think it is time for a revolution. If that word is too strong, you might try "reform." If that word is too strong, try "organizational improvement." I am going to stick to
my guns and say that I think it is time for a revolution in police work. I think that the organizational structure, the paramilitary, bureaucratic, top-down, steeply hierarchical arrangements of our organizations, are an anachronism—and I am trying to be kind. I think they have outlived their usefulness. The bureaucratic mindset is death today. It is absolute death. The complexity, the seriousness, the sensitivity, the dangers, the pressures that are associated with big city police work just cry out for people with imagination and creativity, people who will partner with people that do not look like them, do not talk like them, do not sound like them, but who have in their hearts the same goals—and that is safer streets and more satisfying police work. We need to flatten our bureaucracies, and I do not mean just thinning ranks. I mean flattening. We have cut deputy chiefs and commanders out of the picture in San Diego.

We need to empower people. I know it is fashionable, but it really needs to be said. Participative management in the 1990's has become a moral imperative. We know, from all the research that has been done, all the courses, all the studies that we have done, that empowerment is critical to health, that is, the emotional and physical health of human beings. To deny people access to a decision-making process when that decision is going to affect them, perhaps even profoundly, is morally reprehensible. We need to understand the value and the necessity of empowering people throughout our organizations. And finally I would say we need also to honor and respect the opposition.

The ideas that we are sharing represent a radical departure, represent difference and change, and that is always unsettling. Some say, “You can please the community or you can please the cops, but you can’t please both.” That kind of thinking has turned out to be a big mistake.

PREVENTION OF DISORDER THROUGH PROBLEM-SOLVING POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY

Austin Mulyran
Inspector, New York City Police Department

What I would like to do is to give a broad overview of what we are doing in the 72nd precinct in New York City. But since I believe that police work, like politics, is local, on the street, I want to talk about three police officers in various parts of the city and how they responded to conditions on their beat.

The community policing effort began in New York City in 1984. It started in the 72nd precinct with one sergeant, ten police officers, and one civilian clerk. We wanted to see if we could, with a limited number of police officers, start addressing conditions affecting the quality of life in the city. The program in the 72nd command was a tremendous success. The program was highly publicized. There was a ground swell throughout the city; everybody wanted a community policing program. By 1988, every precinct in New York City had a community policing program.

At the present time, we have 2,455 police officers on 1,308 beats that cover every part of New York City, and who are involved in community policing on a full-time basis. They are supervised by 239 sergeants. Problem-solving community policing is the guiding operational philosophy of the New York City Police Department. All of us are involved in it. It does not matter if you are a police officer, a chief, or a detective; all of our different operational units have a role in community policing.

While all this is well and good, you may be saying to yourself, “What does this have to do with disorder control, which is the theme of this conference.” I believe the best way to deal with disorder is to try to prevent it from occurring. It has been our experience that all communities yearn for order—from the poorest community to the richest in the city. They want a sense that they have some control over events that are happening on their block or in their neighborhood. If they have a problem, they want to know that someone will listen to them, work with them, and try to solve the problem. People need to feel that it is their community, that they have a stake in it, and they will fight to preserve and improve it. Community self-defense is one of the primary goals of a problem-solving community policing approach, and I say problem-
solving because you cannot have community policing unless it is based on problem-solving. It is one of the reasons that a substantial portion of the community policing training we give is devoted to community organizing. Although there were literally thousands of community-based organizations in place even before we began our efforts, in the last two years our community policing office has created 611 additional organizations.

At this point, I would like to outline a few success stories that illustrate how our community beat officers responded to a number of problems that had a potential for destabilizing neighborhoods. If the neighborhood is destabilized, the potential for disorder goes up a tremendous degree.

David Thomas is a beat officer in the 30th precinct on the West Side of Manhattan. I would like to tell you a little bit about the 30th precinct. When people visualize New York City, this is the kind of neighborhood they see. It consists chiefly of apartment houses. It is compact and very crowded. About 61,000 people live in that precinct. Its racial composition is about 50 percent Hispanic, 46 percent black, 3 percent white, and about 1 percent other.

During the summer of 1992, a quality-of-life condition arose at a park at 137th Street and Broadway. People were loitering to obtain or use drugs, engage in street gambling, and peddle. To address this condition, the officer developed an enforcement strategy in coordination with the local community board. In New York City, there are local community boards, each having a district manager who is responsible for acting as an ombudsman to make sure that services are delivered at the local level. Officer Thomas worked with the community board, the Merchants Association of Broadway, and the Hamilton Heights Association, an association of people who live in the area, to alleviate the problem.

The officer's efforts stabilized the conditions in the park and brought local residents back into the park. Once you take back a park or a public area, you have got to get the people in the neighborhood to use the park. If it is used by the local residents, you will keep out others who want to destabilize the park.

The same officer was confronted that fall with a problem of disorderly young people and the homeless at a local public school. Working closely with the school principal, the officer employed problem-solving techniques and developed a strategy involving frequent visits to the school, dispersal of large groups, and, when necessary, arrest of those destabilizing influences in and around the school. Then he pursued his strategy diligently.

In 1992, this officer made 96 arrests. Fifty-two of these arrests were felonies. The reason I am talking about this officer is because some critiques of community policing claim that it is soft on crime. That is certainly not true in New York City. In 1992, on a citywide basis, community police officers effected more than 33,000 arrests, almost 9,000 for felonies. So this policing style is certainly not soft on crime. In my personal experience, the best beat officer is a good street cop who is respected by both his peers—you do not want to have the cops working radio cars and beat officers fighting with each other—and by the community.

Although many of the conditions that beat officers confront in New York City involve serious violations of law, arrest is, of course, only one of the strategies employed. Pete Givney is a beat officer in the 43rd precinct in the Bronx. I am familiar with this precinct because I was in command of it for two-and-a-half years. I am familiar with the area. I am familiar with this officer. He is a very quiet, thoughtful type of officer.

This precinct has 170,000 residents, about 11 percent white, about 31 percent black, and about 54 percent Hispanic. The area this officer patrols is a middle-class Hispanic neighborhood of one and two-family houses. Over the years, a condition had developed at the end of Soundview Avenue, the main street running through the neighborhood, where it meets Clausen Point Park. It involved persons parking their cars in the middle of the dead-end street and using the area to loiter, drink, repair cars, and play loud music till all hours of the night.

Officer Givney worked closely with the two local home owners groups, the Clausen Point Association and the Shorehaven Association, to develop an appropriate strategy to resolve the problem. As I said, this is a condition that had existed for years. When I was there, it was there. We used to employ conventional tactics. We would go down every Friday night and arrest and summons everybody in the area. But there was little long-term impact.

Officer Givney approached it differently. He worked closely with the Department of the Parks and, with the aid of local elected officials, succeeded in having the area closed off to cars and designated a play street, while still allowing access to pedestrians. Officer Givney's efforts resulted in the elimination of the activities that were making life miserable for the residents of the area. He did not have to make one arrest in this area, but the situation was cleared up.

Another condition that Police Officer Givney was able to solve involved a serious auto dumping problem at
the end of Betts Avenue, where it meets Pugsley Creek. This particular area fronts on Long Island Sound. Working with the same homeowner's group and the Department of Parks, the officer was able to get sixty abandoned and stripped cars removed from the area. A physical barrier was then installed at the access road and no further dumping of autos has occurred. This is a classic example of the quiet revolution that often occurs when the police and the community work hand in hand at problem-solving, community stabilization activities.

It has been my experience that when an officer is working with the community to develop a strategy, the officer's personality and the personality of the group almost dictate what the strategy is going to be. This officer would not be comfortable going down and taking an enforcement approach in the area. He thought about it. He developed a strategy. Then he solved the problem.

The number one problem that beat officers in New York City confront involves the sale and use of drugs. Nothing frightens a community more. Leslie Catalano is a beat officer in the 103rd precinct in Jamaica, Queens. The 103rd precinct has about 94,000 people. It is about 59 percent black, 24 percent Hispanic, 7 percent white, and about 8 percent Asian. Right now, Chinese is the third most popular language in New York City, after English and Spanish. We have a tremendous influx of Asians into the city.

At the monthly meeting of the Jamaica (Queens) Narcotics Task Force, a community group, Officer Catalano became aware of a serious problem in an apartment complex. This particular complex was privately owned. It consisted of four very large buildings, arranged in a horseshoe shape around a courtyard. The complaints ran from loitering in the building to drug sales. After visiting the complex, Officer Catalano observed that physical security in the buildings ranged from poor to nonexistent. Prospective tenants were reluctant to move into the complex due to its reputation. At that point, there were 200 vacant apartments in the complex.

The first step that the officer took was to organize a community meeting at the complex. At the meeting, he distributed anonymous suspected-drug-activity forms so that he could start to develop intelligence on the drug activity in the complex. It has been our experience that one of the most valuable components of a community policing approach is that once the community begins to trust an officer, they start to talk to him. They will tell him things that they will not tell anybody else. They will give him very detailed information on criminal activity in the neighborhood because, number one, they believe he will keep it confidential and, number two, he will start to do something about it.

Officer Catalano then conducted a security survey of the complex. Part of our community police officer training is crime prevention training. Our officers learn how to conduct a survey of a complex and make recommendations on security. After he completed the building survey, Officer Catalano worked closely with the complex manager to implement the suggested security recommendations. Officer Catalano then elicited the assistance of two officers assigned to the radio car to patrol the area on the 4:00 to 12:00 p.m. shift. This proved very, very important. It is not uncommon to get that split between officers who are assigned to answer 911 calls and officers who are engaged in community policing. This officer personally overcame this problem. His sergeant did not have to do it. He approached these officers on a cop-to-cop basis. They agreed to increase their patrols in the area when they were not responding to 911 calls. The radio car officers did this in a highly visible manner.

Based on his own observations and information from residents, Officer Catalano was able to identify points of drug sales in the complex. Actually, it was a little more than that. He discovered that the building manager's secretary's nephew was a drug dealer and that the secretary was giving her nephew access to some of the apartments in the complex.

Working with the building management and the Queens District Attorney's office he was able to get the occupants of the targeted apartment evicted. As these events were unfolding, the officer continued to maintain a highly visible presence in the area. As a result of Officer Catalano's efforts, this complex no longer generates quality-of-life or drug-sale complaints. There is no longer a perception that drug sales or loitering are tolerated in the area, thus no loiterers. And vacancies in the complex, once 200 apartments, has sunk to just four empty apartments.

After I worked on this presentation, I called one of the lieutenants in this command to see if things were still as good as they were. "They're too good," he said. "Because now they are starting to complain about some of the improvements that the manager made in security that are limiting people entering and leaving the building."

What all this illustrates is that if a problem comes to your attention, as the captain or the chief, it is probably late in the game. You may in fact have almost lost the game. If things had gone a little further and say there were 300 apartments empty in that complex, it would have taken a massive effort to take it back. But one officer,
spending about four or five months and working mainly his own resources, in addition to the assistance given by patrol car officers, was able to solve this problem. Nobody knows an area as well as the officer assigned to that beat. If he can intervene early in the game, before the situation becomes so outrageous that everybody knows about it, your chances of success are heightened tremendously.

A little personal story: When I first became a precinct commander in the Bronx in the 43rd precinct, I began by looking at who did what. When I saw there was a police officer assigned to Evergreen Avenue. I asked, “How come we have a cop over there?”

“Well, we have a building out of control,” someone explained. It was a city-owned property with about 80 apartments. When they opened the building, they moved about 20 families in from a welfare hotel. They completely destabilized the building. There were about five independent drug-selling operations at any one time in that building. Walk in there any time and you might find a hundred people in the hallway. The situation got so bad that the city gave the building over to a private real estate firm with the option to buy the building with the city’s money after a year.

We worked closely with that real estate company, probably invested hundreds of arrests in the building, invested thousands of hours to take that building back. While this was going on, one of my beat officers came in to see me and said, “You know, Cap, there’s a building opening on 174th Street that’s just like the building on Evergreen Avenue.”

I said, “What are you going to do about it, Joe?”

He said, “I’m going to go in and organize the building when the first tenant moves into that building. They’re going to know that we’re not going to stand for anything in the building.” So he did. Same type of scenario. They were going to move about 15 or 20 families into city-owned property out of a welfare hotel. The officer organized the building from day one. And nothing ever happened in that building. Nothing. It was just another building on the block. So you have to intervene early. And the only way you can intervene early is if the cop who is working that area sees something that is a potential problem and intervenes before it gets to the level of the captain or the chief.

COMMUNITY POLICING AND
COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT IN
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND

William Kelly
Major, Field Support Services Division, Baltimore County Police Department

Let me begin by giving you a thumbnail sketch of Baltimore County, Maryland. Baltimore County is 692 square miles. We surround Baltimore City on three sides; the Chesapeake Bay and the Harbor are the fourth side of Baltimore City. Our population is approximately 700,000. If our forecasting is correct, we will surpass Baltimore City in population in the next eighteen months. There are no incorporated towns or local police agencies in Baltimore County. If you call 911, you will get the Baltimore County Police Department. The Maryland State Police is generally responsible for interstate highway patrol. Our department has nine precincts, each precinct commanded by a captain.

As has been said, community policing needs to be more than a specialized unit. We realized that management has the responsibility of bringing the philosophy of community policing to the rank and file officers. We have to push it down to the street and let the street officers have the responsibility and the authority to go ahead and solve problems.

Just as important is the need for community empowerment. That involves a range of activities, from solving big problems and coordinating police and government agencies to development of community organizations. Unfortunately, the police officers who work the community policing projects are the only ones who receive accolades. It is just as important for the community leaders involved in those projects to receive the same accolades. They and the officers should be together when they receive their certificates of recognition from the government or the news media.

We need to break the image of the officer as a uniform without a face behind it. We need to have each officer identify with the community and the community identify with the officer. We need the officers to get involved with residents, to know the official leaders, to know the informal neighborhood leaders, and know the troublemakers, which is just as important. We need to have these officers monitor the racial and ethnic tensions and have them roll their sleeves up and become involved in mediation and conflict resolution, get them involved in
rumor control, and be concerned with the general wellness of the community.

I would like to take a few minutes to give you some examples of some projects that were really conceived by management, but which people in the street took and ran themselves. To preface this illustration, let me say that we do have foot patrol officers and we have asked that motor officers try to take an hour of their time per day to do what we call "stop, walk, and talk" in the communities. In real life, if they do 15 or 20 minutes daily, we are very, very pleased.

Now, we have a neighborhood in Baltimore County that is a 100 percent African American community. It is on a peninsula, not too far from the Bethlehem Steel factory. The community was very strongly blue collar. The majority of workers were employed by Bethlehem Steel. Obviously, in bad economic times, the socio-economic problems in that community increased.

One of our young officers, a patrolman named Chuck Hart, was on his 15 or 20 minute stop, walk, and talk. He had walked about three blocks from his police car on a cold November day when it began to rain. Reverting back to training that says a good officer should never get wet, cold, or hungry, he made a beeline to the community library.

So he walked to the library, did his normal "How you doing?" types of things and walked around. Noticing that it was still raining very hard outside, he walked back to the children's section of the library just as a librarian made ready to read a story to a half dozen kids from the neighborhood. Officer Hart figures he will sit in the back and take in the story. Well, the librarian was a little bit smarter than he was because she called him up front and asked him to read the story to the kids. He did the 15-minute story, talked to the kids, and played what I will call "Officer Friendly." Then he left.

The next day and the day after, the librarian received so many phone calls—"When's Officer Chuck coming back to read to the kids again?"—that every Wednesday from 3:30 to 4:00 for the next four years, except when he was on vacation, Officer Chuck was at the library reading. Moreover, because the kids were so young, their older brothers and sisters had to take them to the library. The parents came occasionally. Some of the grandparents and seniors in the neighborhood came just to be there and be part of the "in" thing of listening to Officer Chuck read.

It was no big deal—15 minutes. But Officer Hart had done one of the best informal community relations programs in town. He had the young kids, he had the teenagers, he had the parents, and he had the senior citizens. Eventually, Officer Chuck wanted to go into a specialized unit and transfer to the canine unit. Just before he left, the library held an award ceremony for Officer Chuck. The next day he and the kids from the community were featured on the front page of the Baltimore Sun newspaper—publicity a police department cannot buy, all for a small commitment of time.

Here is another example of a program that began at the command level, but was carried out exceptionally well. To try to tap into the strength of churches in the black community, we asked each of our precinct commanders to go out and meet pastors in the various churches and to begin a dialogue with them. We wanted to know what needs they had and whether we were addressing them.

Some of the precinct commanders did just basically that and no more. Others, with a little more initiative and gumption, turned these initial encounters into once-a-month meetings with the entire group of pastors. One of the precinct commanders was invited to attend services at the church. And so an Irish-Catholic white precinct commander walked into a black Baptist church one Sunday morning with his wife and two children. They took seats in the back of the church, but within a few minutes an usher walked up to them and asked them to come sit in the front row with the pastor and his wife and kids.

As the service closed, the pastor, still at the pulpit, asked the congregation to stop at the back of the church and meet the captain and his family. It took them an hour to leave because everybody who left made sure they stopped, shook the precinct commander's hand, and got to speak a few words with him. Well, the precinct commander not only went to church there occasionally, but contributed to other church-sponsored events, such as the church bazaar. Very small things, perhaps, but when you put them all together, you are in a position where the precinct commander now has a very strong following and very strong connections within an entire community.

Another example has to do with the Korean community. Much to our surprise, a recent census reported that Baltimore County has the second highest population of Koreans in the Baltimore-Washington corridor, second only to Washington, D.C. We do not have a large contingency of Asian grocery stores or Asian-owned stores, however. Upon closer examination, we found that most of the Koreans had their businesses in Baltimore City and fled to the suburbs in the evening to live. We were experiencing a large number of street robberies as they got out of their cars to walk to their house with their receipts and the money from the day's business in their pocket.
We were also experiencing some very serious problems in investigation, because we did not understand the Korean culture and they did not understand our culture.

So we got involved with the Korean business people, and spoke to them about crime prevention, gave them brochures, and asked the community business leaders to translate them into Korean. We now publish a small article every month in the Korean newspaper that addresses a range of police-resident issues, for instance, "How do I as a Korean respond to a police officer during a traffic stop when the officer asks for my license and registration? What can I expect? What happens if I sign the ticket? What happens if I do not sign the ticket?" These may be very basic things. But because of those basic things, we have improved our relationship with the Korean community.

Shift work has, of course, become a key issue in community policing. Baltimore County has been involved in community policing for over a decade. Only in the last two or three months, however, have we changed our shifts to reflect community policing principles. We used to rotate our shifts every seven days. If you look at it in real time, you worked five days, you changed shifts, you did not come back to the same location until the end of the month. If you figure on a couple of training days or an extra leave day here and there, you really only worked six days a month in the community. Further, I define that community by location and time, because I think the community you serve on the daylight shift, even though geographically the same as the community you serve on the 3:00 to 11:00 shift and the midnight shift, is not really the same community. The nuances and the particulars of that community change totally between 7:00 in the morning and 4:00 in the morning.

In view of this, we have formed a permanent midnight shift, and the daylight and 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. officers rotate every two weeks. Ideally, we would like to go permanent on all three shifts. The overtime costs related to court appearances, however, are prohibitive, so we try to find the best alternative. Officers on the 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. shift can thus go to court on the daylight side of it.

Another key element in our policing plan is crisis liaison. Each of our precinct commanders has the phone numbers and addresses of community leaders and have established liaisons with a number of them, especially in the minority communities. If we have a situation of crisis proportion, for instance, a police pursuit in which the subject is killed in a motor crash or a police-involved shooting, that night the precinct commander, once he gets the facts, will reach out and notify community leaders to provide them with those facts. It does several things. Number one, it helps to squelch a lot of the rumors. Number two, it ensures that the community leaders have the correct information, and that we have established a dialogue with them. Number three, it gives us a leg up on the media. If the community leaders believe everything they hear in the media, they may get an incomplete or inaccurate account of the event.

We have had a situation where we had an officer involved in shooting a black home owner in a suspected breaking and entering; it turned out to be an accidental shooting. The contacts we had helped us tremendously. It was an accidental shooting, it was the only way to explain it. Although the shooting was very unfortunate, we received positive feedback for our efforts. Our track record of giving information and admitting when we have made a mistake helped us very much.

Another program we have instituted is operation CODE, which stands for Community Oriented Drug Enforcement. It is basically a weed and seed operation, but we give a good deal of responsibility to the shift commanders. We ask them to identify the problems. We ask the precinct patrol supervisors, the sergeants, to formulate a plan, to utilize department resources, and do everything from undercover narcotics to removing abandoned autos and bringing in the sanitation department and other government agencies. We use the lowest rank of supervision, the precinct patrol officer and the precinct supervisor to work on that.

Sometimes an officer can figure out a way to cut through bureaucratic red tape when others have failed. Some neighbors, for instance, wanted a stop sign at a certain intersection. Traffic engineers went two or three times to examine what was a two-way stop intersection, but they refused to make it a four-way stop. The neighbors persisted and we called the traffic engineer, who replied, "Listen, we hear you, we've done the survey, and we're not doing it, period."

Well, one of four officers took matters into his own hands. We have a form that you fill out when a stop sign or a parking sign gets knocked down because of an accident. The officer filled out two forms. Each said, "A stop sign is missing from this street." So a year of negotiation with traffic engineering was overcome by getting them to replace two stop signs that never existed. And that solved the community problem.

Community policing is a powerful strategy for police to employ to reduce the likelihood of violence and increase the level of stability in the county.
PREPARING FOR CIVIL DISORDER

Dean DeJong
Major, Miami Police Department; Director, Emergency and Civil Disorder Planning and Training

I appreciate the opportunity that the Police Foundation has given me today to spend just a little bit of time with you talking about some of the procedures that police organizations throughout the United States should examine as they prepare for the very real possibility of civil disturbance.

I am here because the Miami Police Department at one time or another has screwed it up just about any way that is humanly possible. But fortunately we have learned from those mistakes. We can also say, unfortunately, that we have had some practical experience in this matter of civil disorder.

What happened in Los Angeles in April 1992 does not happen in Miami anymore. After Los Angeles, there was civil disorder in Las Vegas, Seattle, Atlanta, and other places. Guess what happened to the phone in my office shortly after? It rang off the hook, because a lot of organizations said, "Hey, maybe this is something we have to start thinking about."

I would like briefly to cover some of the very basic steps that we think are important to organizations starting the process of getting ready for civil disorder. I am using Miami as an example, but I think that the general concepts are applicable whether you are from the New York City Police Department, which can put 28,000 cops on the street at any given moment, or you are from a small town where you have 40 or 50 police officers or maybe even less. A 40- or 50-police officer job to the New York City Police Department is small potatoes. What might require ten police officers in some of your organizations is a major incident. There are some elements that are common to all of us and steps that all of us need to take to get ready for civil disorders.

There are certain general principles about which there is some basic agreement. One, you have to plan ahead. Two, you have to have some kind of written plan. And three, you have to practice that plan through training. These fundamentals are applicable across the board to most organizations.

If you have not seen the ABC report Anatomy of a Riot, write ABC News and ask for it. It is perhaps the best police training tape I have ever seen. It analyzes the Los Angeles civil disorder and it shows a variety of things that went wrong and why they went wrong.

We often show the ABC report and then we read this series of problems and recommendations:

- Problem: A lack of immediate direction in the response to the rioting was observed.
  Recommendation: Establish and maintain a complete disaster management plan. This is very important. Furthermore, it is essential that a person be designated to update all such disaster plans on a continuing basis.
- Problem: Poor lines of communication between city, county, National Guard, and other agencies with experience.
  Recommendation: Carry out an immediate exchange of liaison officers between emergency operations centers and maintain individual contact with the National Guard on an ongoing basis.
- Problem: Roll call disorder was experienced.
  Recommendation: Have pre-planned assignment sheets, personnel assignments, and a written plan detailing these.
- Problem: Department members reported to work in a variety of uniforms and with a variety of pieces of equipment.
  Recommendation: Before emergencies arise, create riot kits that include coveralls, riot batons, and helmets.
- Problem: The content of after-action reports from individual commanders was insufficient.
  Recommendation: Develop a format for these reports. These problems and recommendations are taken from the 1980 City of Miami Police Department After-Action Report of the Miami Riot, not from an analysis of Los Angeles. The point is that things do not change, that the kinds of things that have caused problems for police organizations in the past are similar to the current ones and need, therefore, to be examined and need to be systematically dealt with.

It is unwise to make blanket statements about most things. But in Miami we have sketched out some of the major elements that are present in full-blown civil disorder. While every instance is a little different, all seem to follow a certain sequence of events.

First there is a trigger event of some kind. It could be a police shooting, a trial, an arrest, a traffic accident. The incident prompts a community to gather for one reason or another.

As a second step, small groups begin to engage in serious acts of violence. Is there anyone here who has not seen pictures of Reginald Denny, the truck driver at the intersection of Florence and Normandy in Los Angeles? That is the reality of the modern riot. Watts and Detroit...
and other cities experienced severe riots in the late 1960's, but they were different from what has happened in major incidents since 1980. The difference in more recent riots is that a focused attack on people occurs from the very onset of the riot. In Watts in the 1960's there were 40 or 50 people killed, but the first acts of violence occurred later and the casualties were really basically individuals who were killed as a result of riot activity. In Miami in 1980, 20 minutes after the first rock flew, there were five people killed who were simply driving through the area when their cars were attacked. That requires a difference in strategies and thinking.

What follows usually is sporadic looting and arson. These are the work of the same general group of people. The people who start riots are not decent people who live in the area, work every day, want the same things you and I do, and try to raise their children in that environment. The people that start these things, in my opinion, are thugs and criminals who are looking for the opportunity. That is what you need to think about from the start. You have this group that is going to shoot you anyway, that is very violent. They take advantage of the situation they have created for sporadic looting and fighting. The longer this is allowed to go on, the more likely that ordinary people will start to join in.

The Miami riot of 1980 started on a Saturday evening. When a group of people came out of a church service on Sunday evening, they walked across the street and looted a store. Now these are not people who normally steal, and interestingly enough, the vast majority of the merchandise that was taken from that store was returned two or three days later because the people asked themselves, “What did I do?” What happens in a disorder is that a carnival-like atmosphere develops, and looting by more and more people starts to take over. That is exactly what you saw in Los Angeles.

The disorder in Los Angeles went on for three to four hours before it spread to different areas of the city. When disorders are allowed to go on, they feed on themselves and grow. Very rapidly the police organizations become overwhelmed and their ability to deal with the situation is lost. Think about it: On an ordinary busy day, we have to deal with 10 to 15 incidents. In a situation of disorder we will be faced with 50 to 100, and we will not have the ability to respond quickly. The problem builds.

Generally we see disorders cease in three to four days. One reason for this is the large influx of police resources and Guard resources that come into the area. An equally important part of it, however, is that people just get tired. When there is nothing left to loot and nothing left to burn, the disorder almost dies by itself.

Now, is every riot like this? No, but the ones where there has been big trouble—lots of looting and major incidents—seem to follow this pattern.

Based on this pattern, there are some very important lessons that we can derive. The first lesson has to do with time. Time is vital to us. Resources have to be gathered as soon as possible so that we can concentrate on suppressing violent activity and stopping the thing before it grows.

Second but equally important—and really almost opposed to the issue of time—is the need to go in with sufficient resources to respond to the problem. I can get four cops together in a very short time, but if I go into an area with only four cops, we are probably going to create more problems than we are going to solve. The collection of sufficient resources is critical, but obviously while you are trying to collect a lot of resources, the enemy, time, is working against you.

This brings us to our third lesson, the need for goals. You have to have a prioritized set of goals for managing a civil disorder. If you would, you have to have an organizational philosophy on the management of civil disorder.

Fourth, you have to develop specialized tactics. Riots are something totally different from ordinary police work. In ordinary police work, our cops handle the varied situations that they encounter in a fairly independent manner. There is a sergeant they occasionally go talk to, but for the most part they are given a lot of discretion. In the case of riot response, you sometimes hear police departments referred to as paramilitary organizations. A riot is probably the one situation where they damn well ought to be.
Fifth, you have to develop a plan of action. When you have identified the elements of civil disorder and police response, you have to address in detail the issues that they raise. How do we get the resources there? What are the roles of officers? What are their responsibilities during an emergency? These questions require detailed answers.

Sixth, you have to train officers based on that plan, those tactics, those goals.

And seventh, critique and update everything on a regular basis. Training can assist with this critique, as can meetings and notetaking. I discover things we have forgotten. I take notes on what I need to address when I get back to my department. It is important also to critique and update the response to an event as it occurs.

These are the principal lessons that we have learned and the major issues that you need to be concerned about. How then do we put them into operation? Where do we start? We start with what I call a pre-planning process. This initial step in the planning process is something that every police organization can do. What it requires is the time of an individual. It does not require millions of dollars. It is, however, the essential first step in determining what you are going to do and how you are going to do it when it comes to the issue of civil disorder management.

One of the first things to look at in this process is what I call “civil disorder demographics.” Every police department has some idea of where a civil disorder is most like to happen in its city. Is it unusual, for instance, for a cop to get a rock or a bottle thrown at him or her in an area? No! Then a disorder may occur there. Part of that pre-planning process is to identify those areas and the ways in and out of them.

In the pre-planning stage, you figure out where you are going to need to block the streets, what kind of resources you are going to need, where a barricade would be appropriate. You figure out which is going to be the first corner you block and which is going to be the last. You go into the neighborhood. You find out where the alleys are. Do not assume that everybody knows where the alleys are, because you can have a guy from another part of your police department riding into that neighborhood without knowing where he is going. You provide street maps. You look at where ambuses are likely.

You should also consider where your targets, or hot spots, are. We have identified the location of pawn shops, certain gasoline stations, certain stores. There is a store in our town called the Edison Furniture Store. The owner of Edison Furniture should just open the damn doors and invite everybody in just before the riot starts, because it is guaranteed that people are going to go in there. Because we have identified these places, we know we need to station troops there to deal with any problems.

You also have to look at the modus operandi of the bad guys in these situations. Do they throw rocks and bottles or do they shoot guns? That can make a difference in your tactics, your strategies, and your equipment.

You have to look at equipment issues. In the Miami Police Department Property Unit, we have a section that is devoted to civil disorder equipment. What we have created is something called “field force kits.” Inside the kits is a variety of items that you need in dealing with civil disorders: different kinds of paperwork, smoke grenades. We also supply officers with five-gallon canisters containing 24 continuous-dispersion CS tear gas grenades.

We begin the process of making people accountable right at the very beginning. We put a sealing device on the can. The seal guarantees that somebody has checked it and nobody has tampered with it. When that seal is broken, I, as a “top brass, high falutin’ guy,” am going to have to investigate. The seal gives the police officer accountability and also protects him and the field force leader.

There is an envelope taped to the flip side of the can. Inside that envelope are extra pins for the tear gas grenades. Now why do you think we came up with that? At one time or another we have said, “All right, let’s get ready to deploy gas,” and somebody has thrown the pin and then we have said, “Oh, changed our mind, don’t need to throw it.” All of a sudden the guy who threw the pin becomes very unpopular with his comrades. In the middle of a very large-scale rock-and-bottle incident, they have to play “let’s find a pin down here on the ground somewhere.” Part of the pre-planning process is thinking about these little things and learning from mistakes.

We put on a stand all the equipment that we will need for a field force that is forming. When the time comes, we push the stand onto a pickup truck, drive it out to the site, and we have the equipment that we need where we need it. We keep boxes stocked with wing-nuts—the little thumb-nuts that you use to screw on helmet shields. Notice during training how many of your guys grab the helmet, put it on, and it turns out that the face shield is not attached securely. In the middle of a riot, when you are looking for thumb-nuts, you are going to have a hard time finding them. We include wing-nuts in the field force kit because we noticed through training that their absence was a common problem. That is preparation.

At one time, the department spent a billion dollars for dog kennels that no canine handler in the world would put his or her dog in. So the kennels sat. But we found a
use for them. We loaded shields in them. We could put a lot more shields in. But we put in exactly the number of shields needed to equip one field force. This way, you do not have the property clerk, while the city is burning down, going, "One, two—was that two or three?" It is a little thing that cuts time.

You also have to talk about procedures. Who does what? When does he or she do it? How does he or she do it? How are things handled? Who is responsible for what? All of these questions have to be answered in the plan.

Command and control issues are extremely important. Within the Miami Police Department we use the following structure. Decisions about civil disorder response are made at two levels: a strategic level and a tactical or operational, down-on-the-ground level. Strategic decisions—including definition of the rules of engagement, where the resources should go, what priority should be assigned to needs—are made at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) levels. Let's say you are a commander in the Miami Police Department and you are on the corner of NW Third Avenue and Twentieth Street and rocks and bottles are falling all around you. Where should the resources go? "Where? Right here, right now, anything you got, send it to me." But what you, the commander on that corner, may not know about is that cops are pinned down by gunfire somewhere else. That is why we need to pull strategic decisions away from the street and place them in the hands of someone who can make the determination based on what is happening throughout the city or throughout the emergency situation.

Tactical decisions (how you actually accomplish the mission) are best left to the street. The EOC should not deal with them. I cannot, as an example, tell my field force leader, "Go west on Twentieth Street and Third Avenue and take the looters out," because what I may not know is that looters have just stolen a tank and it would be a very bad thing for the cops to go zipping up the street. Within your command and control plan, you need to identify well who is in charge of decision-making—not necessarily by name but by rank.

If you are a chief of police, let me tell you who should not be boss: it should not be you. And why should it not be you? Because the bottom line is that you are going to be doing so many different things that you are not going to be able to sit in a room and have full knowledge of what is happening. I guarantee you that the mayor is going to call, the city manager is going to call, you are going to have to go here, you are going to have to go there. You need to identify an individual who is going to make decisions and who is going to be willing to stand by those decisions. It may be your assistant chief; it may be a major. In our department it is a major, because even the assistant chief gets so tied up in doing other things that he cannot be there at all times. Now that does not mean that the chief of police, or even an assistant chief, ultimately cannot overrule a major, but it has worked out in our organization pretty much to the point where, in situations of disorder, the major runs the EOC on his own, with, of course, a lot of input.

Our Emergency Operations Center is on the fourth floor of the Police Building right across the hall from Communications. We have cut the door in half. That is meant to convey the message, "Stay out. It is okay to look, but we do not want you here unless you belong here." In the middle of a full-blown crisis, there is so much noise and so much confusion that if you have hangers-on at the EOC, you are going to get into trouble.

For the last five years, Miami has been mobilized an average of three times a year. Yet the room where the EOC is set up is only 20 feet by 25 feet. There is a reason for that. The bigger the room, the more people will want to go in. Our Emergency Operations Center is staffed by the EOC commander, his executive officer, and the first call recorder. If you are a commander trying to run an incident, you want that recorder there to take down your decisions. I have sat in that chair, and, believe me, I would rather stand on my record than on what somebody thought I said or did not say. The recorder is critical to you.

When we have a civil disorder, we seal an area, a primary area, and then take over control of that entire area from the Emergency Operations Center. In other words, any call for service, any complaint, any situation is filtered directly from Communications into the EOC so that there is no possibility that a police officer on a regular call for service will drift into that area and get involved in a situation that he may not be familiar with.

In the EOC, we have a dispatcher. We have a police officer whose duties are (1) to record the specific incidents on the police channels—events that could be unfolding all over the place at the same time—and (2) to key the EOC commander into specific incidents that he needs to be aware of, like shots fired, ambushes, or officers or citizens down.

A fire officer also sits in the EOC next to a computerized dispatch terminal. All fire units—whether rescue or regular fire—that are dispatched into the affected areas are dispatched from there. The fire officer hears what the commander hears and sees what the commander sees. It is essential, if you are going to take care of your fire person-
nel during a disturbance, that you have that fire officer in your Emergency Operations Center.

We have a book we call our EOC Bible. The title of the book should really be *Everything You Wanted to Know About a Riot But Were Afraid to Ask*. In it, we have phone contacts, plans, strategies, call-up lists. It is essentially a picture of the dispatch position.

In the EOC we have computer-generated status maps. You do not need a computerized map. All you need is a magnetic board, a map, and different stickers that can be used to keep track of what is going on in a particular area. We use a series of symbols. One is for fires; one is for shots fired; another is for looters. As calls come in, that information is posted on the map. The map thus gives you an idea of the activity that is going on right then. When you are about to send a police officer or a squad to a particular area and you have somebody glancing at that map and saying, “Wait a second, Major, there have been three shots fired at that corner already tonight,” the light bulb starts to go off in your head and you can make some decisions. Are you going to remember that at the intersection of Twelfth and Thirty-third they have shot at cops three times? No, you are not. It is probably going to be one of several incidents that will have started to blend. This map gives you immediate information.

The map is important for another reason. When the disturbance is over, you can go back and take a look at that map and you can record where your fires were, where your major looting incidents were, where your cops were shot at, and where they were not. The next time a disturbance breaks out, you at least have a historical record to guide you.

This system need not cost $25 million. If you have a map of your city, a magnetic board, and a guy who can draw little dollar signs, you have the start-up of something that might keep a cop alive.

On our status board, we keep track of what our resources are, where they are assigned, who is in the field forces, and who are the commanders. This, too, is not expensive, but it works.

In the old days, we had television sets in the EOC. This was not a brilliant strategy, because the televisions created more noise and dragged more people in. We moved those televisions out. The point is to keep the noise and the confusion in the EOC down to a minimum.

We do have a person in the department specifically assigned to watch TV during a riot. When Reginald Denny was getting beaten in Los Angeles, people knew about it in Hong Kong, but they did not know about it in the command post of the Los Angeles Police Department.

Sometimes a mom-and-pop grocery store will be looted by 30 people while a big department store is getting looted by 300 people. If the mom-and-pop store is the one that makes it to television, you may decide to dispatch a field force to control these 30 rioters. Why? You can use the television coverage to send a message: we are out there, we are putting people in jail, and we are not going to play with this. You need to consider television coverage when devising a strategy. You need to consider television broadcast monitoring as part of your strategy. You need to know what everybody else knows.

One important part of command and control is manpower allocation issues. Most plans assume that a riot will be over in four days. That is good, but most plans also call for changing shifts right around 6:00 or 7:00 a.m. This means that officers are changing again at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m., just when that sucker is really going, really cranking. You have to think about that. Generally, we conduct our shift change at 4:00 a.m. We do that for a couple of reasons. Generally, at 4:00 a.m. things are fairly quiet, certainly quieter than at 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. Traffic is also lighter at 4:00 than at 7:00 a.m., so our cops can get to work more easily.

As part of thinking about your manpower allocation, you have to take an inventory of what officers you have, where you have them, and what times they are there. And you have to compare that list with your needs and how they can be met.

When you have figured out your manpower needs, should you always plan down to the very last person? No, I guarantee you that if you do a first call-up and you get 60 to 65 percent, you are doing very well. You have to estimate your resources on that basis.

You, as a department, also have to consider what you are going to do when 600 cops arrive at your door at the same time. How are you going to handle it? One of the criticisms one hears about the Los Angeles response is that 200 or 300 police officers were sitting around doing nothing. You have to plan for the deployment of your personnel ahead of time.

In our department we issue athletic wristbands in different colors. The officers with a particular color are then part of a team: the red team, the blue team. It builds esprit de corps. The wristbands also work another way. Cops will do everything in the world they can to get lost. The s in sergeant does not stand for “Superman”; it stands for “shepherd.” By checking the wristband, we know what a cop’s assignment is. Those cops that do not have it on have to report back to the desk.

One important area requiring pre-planning is mutual
aid. You have to know ahead of time which other agencies are going to help you and which ones cannot. You also have to know ahead of time what kinds of assignments you are going to give them or they are going to give you.

If Dade County calls the city because there is something happening in the county and asks us to come in, we do. We would cover their perimeters. We do not want to go into the county and fight their war. They will do the same for us, which is more likely. Unless we are in a situation where we are totally overwhelmed—at which point we might actually bring in field forces—we fight the battle in our town and they cover our perimeters, and vice versa. But you have to establish that beforehand.

In 1980, every cop in the world, it seemed, ended up in the City of Miami and in Dade County, flattening people's tires and messing with them in general, and we had no idea who they were. They were all over the place. They were free-lancing, it was a mess, and it hurt us. Outsiders did not have to deal with the problems after the smoke had cleared; we did.

It takes an act by the governor to activate the National Guard. However, I polish my National Guard commander's Humvee every day because I want him to know who Dean DeJong is. That way when I tell him that we are sending a request for National Guard assistance to the liaison from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the National Guard commander can begin to prepare. He is not going to put the troops on the street just because I call, but he is going to get the process started because he and I have a one-on-one relationship and he knows that when I say something, it is for real. My Florida Department of Law Enforcement liaison, who is the conduit for obtaining the Guard or other state resources, also has a very shiny car. When I need him, there cannot be a lot of fooling around.

Every day men and women of the Miami Police Department, and police departments in communities around the country, handle incidents that have the potential to grow into civil disorder, but because of officers' skills, the incidents do not develop beyond this initial stage. In the Miami Police Department, we have a philosophy that we implement when a crisis has developed and the officers on the scene arrive at the conclusion that the problem is beyond their ability to control it with the resources that they have immediately on hand. We refer to this philosophy as "the four c's."

The first c of our philosophy is containment of perimeter. Now we do not put this into effect every time a bottle flies. We would have to put a constant perimeter around the city if we did it on that basis. Rather, this goes into effect when control has been lost and it is time to get the troops in and get business taken care of. This means that we put a perimeter up around an area and close it to incoming and outgoing movement.

Why do we close an area? So that the disorder does not spread and so that we do not have a Reginald Denny on our local TV. Recent riots in the United States have started with focused violence against people coming into the area when they do not belong there. When we set up a perimeter, we prevent that, or at least we lessen the chance. A perimeter keeps innocents out, and equally important, keeps the disorderly from getting out. After a time, if things are allowed to continue, more and more people will go look. And over time, if you do not get it stopped by putting that perimeter up, it makes the situation more difficult to control.

The second c is communication. By communication I mean not just radios; I mean talking to each other, talking to the people out in the field, finding out what is going on, and then talking to the command center. Officers have to report on what they need and what issues or questions are arising. You need to know certain important things about a situation. What is going on? What are the reasons for the activity? What are people fighting about? Why are they angry at the police—or are they angry at us at all? All of this information has to be communicated and the communication has to flow two ways.

The third c, coordination, means taking the information you receive through the communications process and beginning to turn it into the means of action. You turn your information into field forces, SWAT teams, and logistics. The processes of communication and coordination should continue throughout the entire disturbance.

During the last phase, or fourth c, which is control, we actually go in and we deal with the problem. That includes putting people in jail, making arrests, doing what we need to do.

Ours is not a philosophy of "seal the area off, stand by, and watch it happen." Ours is a philosophy of "seal it off, start talking about what you need, getting what you need, and moving in there as quickly as you can but with reasonable force."

We had an incident in December 1990 in Wynwood, a Puerto Rican community in Miami. We goofed. We were not ready for it. Some cops had been acquitted in the beating death of a drug dealer named Leonardo Mercado. All of a sudden, we had a civil disorder. Because Hispanics had never rioted in the past, we thought they never would. We got that wrong, but we got
the organizational philosophy right. I was the Central District commander then. We sealed the area. It took us about an hour and a half to get resources together and we went in and dealt with the problem. Now, in that time we had two buildings burned and we had two stores looted. But no citizen was injured, and no police officer was injured. Our approach worked well and it worked as it was supposed to.

Afterwards, a very competent lieutenant asked me, “Did I make a mistake in asking for help?”

I asked him, “How many people were there?”

“About 300 on the street?”

“How many cops did you have?”

“About 12.”

“Okay, if you had gone in with your 12 cops and people had all run away and nothing had happened, you would have been a great hero, right?”

“Yeah, maybe.”

“What if those 300 people had surrounded you and your 12 cops? How would you have gotten out?”

“Any way I could.”

“You're darn right, any way you could.”

And what would probably have been the net result? People would have gotten shot—police officers or citizens. And then would that lieutenant have been a hero? No, not really. The lieutenant followed departmental philosophy, and it worked.

We received some criticism. The Miami Herald said we waited too long to go in. I guarantee you that if we had shot four people trying to get our troops out of the scene of disorder, we would have gotten a lot more criticism and it would have been justified.

The philosophy works, but it is essential that the organization commit itself to it. Field force is an important component of civil disorder response. Our field force consists of:

- a lieutenant, who is the leader;
- seven sergeants, one serving as the executive; and
- 46 officers per squad—seven serving per squad, two with the field force leader, and two with the arrest wagon.

The structure of the field force builds in command, control, and supervision. Its strength is in the packaging.

Something else that a field force with this configuration does for you is that it gives you the ability to move a large number of police officers as a group into a given situation. Believe it or not, 50 cops in 14 cars with the lights and emergency equipment on create one hell of an impression. Through psychological impact they can easily rout 200 or 300 people.

The six-squad configuration of the field force also provides you with flexibility. You can send individual squads to deal with separate, isolated incidents, but the overall control of the field force leader is maintained.

In the Miami and Metro-Dade Police Departments, as well as in many others, the field force leader has far more discretion than he or she would as a lieutenant on the street. The uses of a field force are basically limited by the imagination of the person in charge of it.

We have developed different kinds of tactics. We play a game called “Throw Rocks at the Cops.” In it, we take two squads and send them up the street and let them get caught in a hail of rocks and bottles. Then we send a squad around one way and a squad around the other way and the group boogies. The cops get out of the car. The “rock throwers” run, but they run into cops coming in from the rear and from their flanks. Therefore somebody goes to jail. Does everybody go to jail? No, but somebody goes; that is the message that we want to put forward.

We try to make our training exercises as realistic as possible. We do not want to sustain serious injuries, but we hit on shields and we throw coconuts, tin cans, or water balloons, to simulate conditions in which officers might have to operate. You can sanitise training to the point where it is worthless. You do a greater disservice to your people when you do not train them realistically and then throw them out into the middle of the kind of craziness that makes up a riot; your police will not be prepared to be there.

The training for civil disorder response needs to be carried out at different levels. You have to train the troops, the supervisors, and the top brass. You need to run tabletop exercises. You need to identify who can function in an EOC environment and who cannot. Some commanders may be extraordinarily competent at performing
certain functions—running training, for instance—but they may have no idea in the world about how to deal with disorder. It is incumbent on the chief to identify those people ahead of time so that he knows that when he places someone in the EOC, that person is going to be able to do the job.

You also have to train the troops. If your department is new at this, you might consider training in the field force concept. Tell your officers what it is about, explain command and control, the supervisor’s responsibility, and the movement of field forces. Actually practice out on the street, moving through traffic.

I recommend that you always practice line formation. Now, in a full-blown riot, when they are shooting at you, you are not going to take 40 cops and march them up the street in a line—not unless you are really stupid and you want to get your police officers killed. But part of what you accomplish in line formation practice is that you build discipline and the ability to move together and work together.

In many situations—such as abortion clinic demonstrations—the line formation is very useful, so it is important that you train. Other line formation issues you can train in include hostile-crowd-versus-passive-crowd reenactments, use of chemical agents, and donning and doffing of gas masks under different kinds of situations.

Another possibility you need to prepare for is urban guerrilla warfare—for example, sniper situations. What do you do, for instance, if you are in a line and somebody shoots at you? Sometimes people who have been trained time and time again in 1960’s line formation think that you maintain the discipline of the formation. The hell you do. You duck; you go find a tree or a car. That is what we train our troops to do. When you are getting shot at, it is not the right time to march up the street.

Part of guerrilla warfare preparation is training in vehicle rescue. One of the critical elements is going to be the ability to move in quickly and take a person or a group of people out of a dangerous circumstance. While our SWAT teams are our primary element for doing that, every police officer in the Miami Police Department is trained to deal with that kind of situation.

We train our officers in arrest policy. We do not train them to catch everybody. We train them to catch somebody. We teach techniques such as encirclement and sending in a decoy and then moving other people around.

We train two field forces to operate together. That sounds simple, but try to do it sometime if you have not practiced it. You will have two people who want to be the boss while many cops are trying to engage in a concent-
MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY IN CIVIL DISORDERS

Bill Baker
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When all things are working well, a law enforcement press office is well prepared ahead of time, well briefed, and capable of having sufficient resources to deal with press inquiries. But the mention of civil disorder implies a certain chaos, and to those who are on the outside, I would imagine, a disorganization; as we in law enforcement know, however, when we are prepared, that is not the truth. In fact, the press offices for law enforcement agencies have come far in the past years in being prepared to respond to the media. I would like to draw upon several incidents in the recent past to demonstrate that when things work well, the public is informed and the different entities involved may each do their job without too much overlap and without too much tension. But problems are always there.

I look first to the bombing of the New York World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. And I look to the ten full-blown press conferences that were held subsequent to great forensic work—and breaks in the case that were often bizarre.

Three full-time, media-trained agents for the FBI responded to over 1,000 media inquiries in the first several weeks following that tragic bombing. Certainly the incident fits under the umbrella of civil disorder. Fifty thousand workers were displaced, a half dozen killed, hundreds more injured. A major symbol of the United States was successfully attacked. By any definition, the bombing of the World Trade Center was civil disorder. As David Johnston, reporter for the New York Times, told me, there was a great uneasiness in New York City and in fact in the whole country. A lot of questions were asked: what level of terrorism would we see following this?

I think that to a great extent it was the ability of law enforcement, in particular the calming appearances before the press of Commissioner Raymond Kelly and FBI Assistant Director Jim Foxx that succeeded in assuaging the concerns of this country. But the case illustrates that when you have a well trained and well informed press office in your own law enforcement agencies—and when those press officers have direct access to the very top, to the commissioner and to the assistant director—then you do not get out different versions of the same story. You tend to be prompt and responsive to the media.

Besides law enforcement and the press corps, another entity that is very powerful and very necessary is the court system. The federal judge trying the World Trade Center bombing case imposed a gag order on April 4. In effect what the court system was telling the press corps and law enforcement was that enough was enough, that from then on the crime was the province of the courts. These are some of the tensions that can arise and that agencies must be able to handle.

In Waco, Texas, just two days after the New York bombing, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms raided the Branch Davidian compound and a long siege ensued. In this case, all access into the compound had not been cut off and David French, a reporter for CNN, in what I believe would be considered by many to be a major scoop, was able to get inside the compound and talk for one hour with cult leader David Koresh. Koresh was able to lay out his demands during this lengthy interview. However, from the law enforcement perspective, our primary concern was the release of individuals about whose status we were uncertain. Were they willing or unwilling members of the siege? The interview was a negative for us, because we were unable to ask for anything in return. In other words, the negotiations that go on between the principal negotiator and the principal subject in a major incident are paramount. And here, because of technology and because of aggressive reporting, CNN was able to get in there and lay out for the entire world the thoughts of David Koresh unchallenged.

Technology—often a great asset to us in law enforcement and in the press—can present problems, as again illustrated in Waco. In this instance, media outlets were able to use night vision equipment, which enabled them for a short time to depict at night the deployment of law enforcement as they sealed the compound. We negotiated with the media to stop this type of coverage. The media's reasonable response to this request illustrates that regardless of the tremendous power of First Amendment freedom
of the press, when law enforcement can make a logical request of the media, it is considered and often accepted. It also shows the importance of having good, well trained press officers and of having the law enforcement leadership at the incident communicating directly with the press corps.

Los Angeles in 1992 was a different situation. Technology was driving the way the news was being broadcast, with helicopters overhead feeding the nation with continuous live coverage. Certainly it is the kind of situation that makes for raw drama. The public becomes, in essence, a player along with everyone else. The end is not known. There are certain responsibilities, I am sure, that come with this ability to lay out a crime while it is being enacted. It further raises questions about the right of law enforcement to have access to evidence versus the right of the press to withhold evidence in a criminal case.

If you contrast this raw live coverage with the well prepared questions that were asked at a recent summit meeting between Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, you can appreciate the difference in problems the media have to face. When they are live they are very much like the beat officer, and my concern is that we are going to see footage that is sometimes too dramatic, sometimes too violent. There is a certain responsibility that comes with this capability, and we must address it.

THE POLICE, THE PRESS, AND THE LACK OF PERSONAL CONTACT

Jack Nelson
Washington Bureau Chief, Los Angeles Times

All of my adult life I have been a journalist and I have worked with police. Practically all of my contacts with police have been friendly and cooperative. But not all of them. I used to cover George Wallace when he was running for president. He had a lot of hard-eyed state troopers with him. I stopped at a roadside cafe one time and Wallace’s bodyguard introduced me to a table of state troopers. He said, “This is Jack Nelson of the Los Angeles Times.” A trooper looked at me and said, “Well, let me tell you one damn thing. There ain’t but three people can walk on water: George Wallace, Bear Bryant, and Jesus Christ, in that order. And don’t you forget it.”

Much to the state troopers’ delight, of course, Wallace used to work the crowd up against us. He used to point me out in the audience because I was originally from Talladega, Alabama, and he would say, “There he is, there at the Los Angeles Times, out there where they give blood to the Viet Cong and fly the Viet Cong flag.” He said, “Look at him. I made him get his hair cut.”

I had a flat-top haircut in those days, and I said, “Governor, how come you always tell people you made me get a haircut? As long as you’ve known me I’ve had a flat-top haircut.”

He said, “Let’s put it this way. About half of what you write about me is so and about half of what I say about you is so.”

I used to quote Wallace in that vernacular. I always used apostrophes, because it is how Southerners talk, white and black: gettin’, goin’, keepin’. One day the bodyguard came up to me and he said, “Boy, the governor’s gettin’ damn sick and tired of you always quotin’ him usin’ them ‘postrophes.”

Seriously, though, I think a major problem in our covering of civil disorders is the lack of personal contact that the police and the press have. I do not think either group fully understands the problems and needs of the other, and while I do not bring any recent experience of covering disorders into this discussion, I did cover the disorders in the South in the late 1960’s during the civil rights revolution. But I think that part of the problem with the coverage of disorders then was the same as it is now. The media covers disorders the same way as any
other big police story. Who got shot and where? Where were the fires? Where were the accidents? We never really went into the underlying social problems. We do not do a lot better today. We do not report them in real context: how and why did these disorders erupt? And when we talk about the role of the media, we can state the obvious because what we are really talking about is what happens when you have a boiling over of racism and race relations.

And as a native Southerner who has lived in the South and worked in the South and spent some time studying and living in the North, and who has represented a newspaper on the West Coast and Washington, D.C., for almost a quarter of a century, I know that racism knows no boundaries.

We are all part of the establishment, and I think sometimes we all tend to forget it. The establishment includes law enforcement, the judiciary, the other branches of government, organized labor, and business. I think that we have to be honest about the fact that throughout the establishment we do face a problem of institutional racism. And this legacy of poverty and desperation breeds crime and terrible conditions in the inner cities, and a lot of people will look at it and say, well, those were not the root causes of riots that broke out in Los Angeles and other cities, but I think that most people looking at the situation will agree that they were.

Listen to what was said by Arthur Fletcher, the prominent black Republican appointed by President Bush to head the Civil Rights Commission. He said that those riots sprang from a cancer of racism that has been eating away at the nation's moral fiber and infecting practically every major institution in government, education, health, and the judicial system, the cornerstone of our democracy. And you do not need statistics to know the disparity in sentences handed out to blacks in connection with the same crimes committed by whites, or you do not need statistics for other disparities in the judicial system. And while none of it justifies mob violence—those who take the law into their own hands must be brought to justice—we all agree with Arthur Fletcher that justice must be even-handed and that all forms of lawlessness must be condemned with equal vigor and passion.

Now I have discussed with the Los Angeles editors the problems that we encountered in covering the riots last year. And the biggest problems really came the first night. We had no information. There was total chaos there. The police had gone to the scene, and had withdrawn and were in holding places. They were not responding to 911 calls. It was very bad. Across the street from the Los Angeles Times, a coffee shop was on fire and being looted. Rioters and looters were attacking the Los Angeles Times building. They fired through the publisher's office. A police station was two blocks away, and yet we could not get a policeman or a fireman to the scene.

It was utter chaos. It was every man for himself. Reporters got their information from television and helicopters. Bill Baker mentioned about the helicopters there. We would see where the helicopters were hovering and we would dispatch reporters to the scene. Basically, we were flying blind the first night. And even into the second day, we were not getting too much police cooperation. So what were reporters spending their time doing? Well, they were looking into the police department—what had gone wrong with the police department, who was in charge, if anybody.

Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block told the Los Angeles Times that if you look at the Reginald Denny beating case, you can see that police made the arrest there on the basis of evidence from photographers and other journalists. Reporters are therefore likely to be targeted. I know that in the South in the 1960's many times police officers who were on the scene would cover up their badges in order not to be identified. Now reporters in Los Angeles are thinking about finding ways to not be identified as journalists so they will not be attacked.

While awaiting the outcome of the federal trial of LAPD officers accused of violating Rodney King's civil rights, Police Chief Willie Williams did something extraordinary: he had a public briefing on his plan for quelling civil disturbances that might break out. Some people thought that this was not necessarily a good idea. I thought it was probably an excellent idea.

Tremendous paranoia remained in Los Angeles. Throughout the city, people were arming themselves. There was a lot of concern that, should it come again, disorder would spill over into various areas of the city. And I think that reporters can find themselves, during their next riot, between the devil and the deep blue sea. Policemen distrust them on one side because of the Rodney King case. Gang members or rioters will zero in
on them because of the Denny case. There is even greater distrust between police and the media because we showed over and over the Rodney King beating film.

That case aside, I think that police do have their job to do, and police think the press interferes with it many times. I think sometimes what they do not consider is that the press has its job and it requires cooperation too. The relations have been especially poisonous between the police in Los Angeles and the press. On the surface Chief Williams is open with the press, but prior to any possible disturbances he has given us little more cooperation really than Chief Gates. One thing that I think is needed in advance of any disturbances is for the police to sit down and talk with the press, and I do not mean just the chief or the top officers. I mean a real exchange between reporters on the street and policemen who may be on the street.

You know the same thing happened with the military. We have had this same kind of distrust between the media and the military in this country, and we have had repeated conversations here in Washington among reporters and military information people about how to cover the next military operation. In Grenada, we were shut out for two days from covering the situation. When the press is shut out nobody is served. The police or armed forces are not served, the press is not served, and certainly the public is not served in shutting out coverage of either military operations or police actions. Now, in Grenada, I can tell you for certain that the American people sometimes got better information out of Radio Havana than they got out of our own government because of that blackout. The record will show that. It is extremely important for there to be some sort of open communications.

Most of the national television coverage of Los Angeles was fairly restrained, but our people found the local television coverage appalling. It was alarmist. It upset everybody. At least a dozen helicopters were hovering that first night. Their presence helped create a wartime atmosphere. The helicopters belonged not to the police, but to the local media outlets. One helicopter reporter for a radio station actually reported the story before it happened, telling reporters he had not seen any fires yet. Los Angeles radio host Tom Snyder said that was like saying, “We have got the cameras on. You can start any time now.”

It was easy to discern the point of view of the anchors most of the time. The rioters were threatening to encroach on the West Side. The rioters belonged in the black areas, the Hispanic areas, or Koreatown, but they would be encroaching if they went to the white side. The panic in the anchors’ voices was obvious. There was a lot of editorializing about thugs and hooligans on the streets, when some of the people they were editorializing about were just trying to get back to their homes. Again, there was institutional racism. A whole class and race assumption went along with the news coverage. Many journalists themselves found that disturbing. Nothing was said about tensions or previous police incidents or poverty or the high unemployment rate or the hopelessness. A lot of the sensational coverage went over very well with the audience. The average viewer saw fires, gunfire, beatings, speeding cars, the usual television entertainment—except that it was real.

We not only lacked racial and gender diversity in the press, we also lacked class diversity. Many of our reporters today are very well off; they do not relate to the anger or the blind rage of the people in the street. There were a lot of people there who were stealing diapers and baby food and other stuff they needed. Our journalists reported on a widespread sense that the poor minorities did not expect the law to be fair because there was no law and order for them, and so they figured, as our editors saw it, that they did not have much to lose. Most journalists today, I think, do not relate to that.

We frequently question what the police do and we write things that reflect adversely on the police department. I know that we do not do our job very well much of the time, particularly in covering disorders like this. The press and the police have very difficult jobs. There ought to be more contact between the police and the press, and it ought not to be just at the level of editors and police chiefs, but it ought to be at the level of street reporter and street police.
REDUCING CONFLICT AND TENSION BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE MEDIA

Ed Turner
Executive Vice-President, Cable News Network (CNN)

The head of research at the Emory Hospital Laboratories in Atlanta called me the other day. He wanted to know why CNN had not done a story on the substitution of journalists for rats in their laboratory. And I said, “Well, I did not know anything about that. Tell me, why are you using journalists instead of rats?”

And the head researcher said, “Well, of course there are more journalists than rats. And second, you can get attached to a rat. And third, there are even some things a rat will not do.”

We are in the position here of trying to determine what it is a journalist will and will not do in what is a natural tension and conflict between two elements in our society: law enforcement, trying to carry out the law, and the press, representing the public’s right to know. The conflict and the tension are inevitable, but they can be reduced. They are manageable in most instances most of the time.

Churchill was one of my heroes, along with General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Churchill for about a decade attempted, as a political leader of England, to woo Mussolini so that when the inevitable start of World War II came, Italy would remain on the side of the allies, as it had done in World War I. However, Mussolini was persuaded by Hitler to join the Axis nations. And Churchill, who had been criticized at Whitehall, among his own cabinet, for attempting to secure the support of an Italian army that had engaged in questionable campaigns in North Africa, was awakened in the middle of the night by one of his aides with the news that Mussolini had just announced that Italy was going to go with Hitler. And Churchill, ever the great philosopher and rationalizer, said, “Well, it seems only fair. They were on our side last time.” So I think that you ought to be careful if the journalists are on your side.

Anybody can be a journalist. There are no national licensing boards. There is no test you take. And therefore at the scene of a crime or a disorder or a parade or a demonstration there are lots of folks that are going to show up that can become journalists because they say they are, and there is nothing to be done about all of that in this free country in which we live, thank God. It may seem to you, as it does to me, that nearly every other soul that you see marching along the streets has his or her own videotape camera. Videotaping is going to grow. The Hi-8 camera, and the sons and daughters of the Hi-8, will become the format of the future.

If you think that there are enough rat journalists today, you ain’t seen nothing yet, because as television technology advances over the next year or two permit compression, the local television system may well be carrying 500 channels. You will see an enormous proliferation of information-related organizations—news agencies, institutions, networks, and ad hoc groups—and it will get even less tidy.

As technology improves or changes, depending on your point of view, it will be easier and easier to broadcast live, not just from a helicopter, but from various locales around a march, a demonstration, a riot. The portable uplinks will truly become portable. Right now a link requires an awful lot of gear to be portable, and it is a bit like putting a handle on an elephant and saying it is portable. But the miniaturization is going to continue. So you are going to have more people claiming to be journalists, you are going to have more outlets because of the compression system that will permit the creation of more channels, and you are going to have the technology permitting the equipment to be there and at a rather inexpensive rate.

It is very commonplace for the national networks to use Hi-8’s. They cost about $1,000 a pop, as opposed to $80,000 for the big cameras. As the Soviet Union was coming apart, CNN gave away Hi-8’s to people who were lunatic enough to want to go back into their countries,

![Image of a person]
particularly the Baltics, tape the disorders, and then smuggle the tape back to Moscow so we could put it on the air. We gave out dozens of these cameras to very brave men and women who wanted to show what the Soviet Army was doing to their people, in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Georgia. We had this occur during the Gulf War too, when we would give these little cameras to people who would tape the atrocities being carried out by the armies of Iraq.

Tomorrow, there is going to be more of every kind of coverage; it is not going to go away. The question we need to ask ourselves is, how do you deal with what we have today and what is coming tomorrow?

My first coverage of civil disorder was the integration of schools in Little Rock; I was very much a cub reporter then in the late 1950's. Since then I have covered events all across the South, including the enrollment of James Meredith at Ole Miss and the killing of Medgar Evers in Jackson, Mississippi. And from there I have gone to Beirut and Northern Ireland, the burning of cities across America in the 1960's and the trashings of America by the antiwar demonstrators for what seemed to me like an interminable time. More recently I am able to stand at a distance and assign people to do the coverage because I am getting too old to duck under cars or enjoy smelling tear gas, but I have had my share of it. I have been shot at in anger and I have seen men and women killed. Maybe I am not as experienced as some of you here, but I have heard it thunder a couple of times and I know what we are talking about is deadly serious. It is people's lives at risk. It is order in our society at risk. It is not a game. It is not something to be done for ratings. It is not something to be done so that you get a bead on the competition. It is not something that you look at as a child's way of snubbing the authorities, the establishment, mom and dad. And yet all of that is at play.

In my 35 years of experience in doing this, most journalists really do want to be fair. In spite of what your own observation may be, these men and women really are serious about their jobs. You have the lunatics and the maniacs in journalism just as you do in law enforcement. We all have our problem people, but most of them most of the time, I think, at the scene of a story want to be fair and reasonable.

It has been my observation that law enforcement gets in trouble not at the end but at the very beginning of a story. That is when journalists need all the help and information they can get. We will put out the information, but we need to have it coming in. Therefore, a "no comment" is really a killer for the law enforcement side.

A no comment does you, your town, your force a great disservice and it is unnecessary. Tell what you can. You have an obligation to tell the citizens of the community that the center is not falling apart, all is not lost. That authoritative information has to come from the top, because it is in those opening hours that usually the game is lost. Over a period of time, the press will do a pretty responsible job of looking at the underlying causes of tension within the community: the unfavorable treatment, the blacks who have been left out of the process, the police force that needs more money for better training or better equipment. Those stories can be told by you and about you, but you have to have mutual trust before the riots start. There is no simple, easy, magic formula. It takes time and it demands that each side have respect, not necessarily a liking, for one another.

There are no memos that can be written to make all this easier. In your town, when there is a civil disturbance, that is a major story. It is going to be covered, because it is news. You cannot stop us, nor would you want to. The worst thing you can have is a riot that is not covered and all that is out there is rumors. It becomes far worse than anything that you could possibly dream of with overcoverage. Overcoverage is better than undercVERAGE anytime. Grenada is a brilliant example. We had to report what Radio Moscow and Radio Havana were claiming because our own people down there would not tell us what was happening. That is outrageous.

The public has a right to know. It is, after all, their money. If we are going to be in a civil disturbance, if we are going to be in a war, the public has to know about it. It is their right to know how good and how bad it is. They need to know the troubles you face. Reporting is not all to your disadvantage. But regardless of that, reporting is part of the open society we live in. The public has the right to know and we are going to tell them. And with your help we will tell the story more fairly.
MEDIA ACCESS AND POLICE REPRESENTATION: A PANEL DISCUSSION

Bill Baker

I would caution that as law enforcement leaders you should differentiate between inviting the media along on raids during a civil disorder and the access the media will have apart from such invitations. The practice of inviting the press corps to accompany officers armed with a search warrant is becoming ever more popular. It opens up an avenue for criticism later on, and it can also expose you to civil liability. The access that the media have through their helicopters and their reporters on the street is different.

My colleagues may of course differ with that, but I have seen too many examples and too many legal decisions now. And so if you are considering that or your department currently has a policy of extending such invitations, I suggest that you check with your legal adviser and look at the possible ramifications.

Jack Nelson

One of the things we never wanted to be considered was an arm of the law enforcement. If we are, we cannot do our job as well and I think that going on these raids sometimes has that danger in it.

Ed Turner

That kind of picture story is briefly sensational but really does not add much to public understanding. You have 30 or 40 seconds of people hollering and breaking into somebody’s house—and that a serious and responsible news organization can live without. It is, I suppose, nice occasionally to have just for a change of pace, but it is not essential to a legitimate coverage of a news story.

Jack Nelson

To respond to a question from the floor about disciplining journalists who report false information, do you remember the recent case of USA Today running a photograph of what they said were gang members in Los Angeles? Well it turned out that it was a totally phony photo. The two people involved in it were disciplined—suspended without pay.

As far as ethics in a disorder goes, we sometimes receive information that someone has not acted properly, but it is very difficult to pin down. If anybody in a police department has complaints about reporters, you should not hesitate to tell the reporters’ editors about it. If we had a complaint about being pushed around by a policeman, we would not hesitate to call the police chief.

The following exchange followed a police chief’s question of how a police organization might persuade the press to cover points of view other than extreme ones that may not represent an entire community.

John Locks

Gentlemen, if I could ask a question. My name is John Locks. I am the Chief of Police in Minneapolis. When a story breaks, I could not agree more that the head of the agency, namely myself, has to be on Front Street, and accountable and give information quickly. But it is the other side of the coin that continually bothers me, when the print and electronic media go to their “community” source, and to be very candid, it is usually the loud mouth who has good ten second sound bites. Often, that person does not represent us, the rank and file community.

The reporters, print and electronic, say, well then give us names of people that you think represent the community, or they go to other organizations. But these people’s comments never see the light of day in most of the controversial stories. Reporters keep going back to the well and get—again, I’m characterizing—the loud mouths. Then I spend a lot of my time countering wild allegations that will prove in the long run not to have any merit. How do we get the media to go to others than the ones that just like to spout off?

Ed Turner

When you seek a point of view, what you need as an editor is somebody who is articulate, informed, can make his point with a bit of energy, and is not laconic. It is the responsibility of the news organizations and of the community itself to seek out alternatives points of view. If they are not doing that, and it has come down to three talking heads representing a city, then that is just sloppy journalism.

I am sorry that a lot of your time is spent responding to it, but I would guess you are a pretty good spokesman, and better doing that than letting it go unanswered, and that is what you have in a free society.

Jack Nelson

I think I know exactly what you are talking about. You are talking about the people who say that “we are going to tear this town apart,” and use very inflammatory language. That is a problem for us, because our reporters capture that sort of language and unfortunately it is what
Let me begin by sharing with you my perspective on what we can look forward to in the future of law enforcement. In doing so, it is important for us to understand what is happening on the streets of our cities from the perspective of the officers who are out there each day. Today, police officers patrol the streets of America's cities with more fear, despair, doubt, and loneliness than ever before. Police are fearful of the violence brought about by the proliferation of handguns, and a new willingness on the part of their owners to use them, even if against police officers.

They fear a gun, knowing from both experience and folklore that gang members and drug dealers would not hesitate to shoot them. They patrol the streets knowing that there is an ever-increasing cultural acceptance of violence as a means of resolving disputes. Police are in despair because each day they are called upon to manage the human debris of social and institutional collapse.

Now, this collapse includes the failure of primary and secondary schools in too many of the nation's cities. It includes the collapse of affordable housing and access to health care for poor people, including the absence of residential care and treatment for the mentally ill.

Society's ultimate safety net, the family, has also been damaged in many places with more and more American households headed by single mothers living in poverty. Police officers know how thin and how inadequate their response to these problems is. They see the evidence of the weight of these problems and the anger of the people they fear. So they keep their collective finger in the dike where our society fails to deal effectively with urban decay.

Police doubt because the problems they face are more complex, more demanding than ever before, and they act with less confidence that their response is the solution. Police deal with emotionally disturbed people who, until recently, would have lived in state-run hospitals. Police deal with vagrants without the benefits of vagrancy laws. Police deal with people made homeless by drug and alcohol addiction and too few places to refer them for shelter or treatment or a job. Police deal with angry, violent teens, who very often have no hope of breaking out of the cycle of poverty that surrounds them. Police respond to racially and ethnically charged disputes with little or no control over the factors that give rise to the bias, resentment, and fear. As a result, many police officers struggle to maintain a sense of justice, to act fairly and compassionately.

And finally, the police feel alone and abandoned. They feel they are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. They respond to public pressure to make the streets safer, but they are not given the resources to get the job done properly. They see a failing criminal justice system where those arrested are back on the streets in record time. There is great pressure from their organizations never to make mistakes, and officers fear that they would not be supported if they were to make an honest error, not to mention serious mistakes.

Consequently, many police officers see the world they work in as more dangerous and less supportive than ever before. They see their job as stressful; they feel unappreciated even by those they serve. Little wonder they ask: Is it worth it?

Being left alone to battle in a hostile environment, police often turn inward for support. They develop the most closed occupational subculture outside of the military. They work together, they also socialize together. They are isolated from the public such that many officers' sense of trust extends no further than their cruiser or the back-up unit. They worry about their families, and they feel that if they do not support each other, who will.

If the police continue the turn inward, then everything gets worse. They become more fearful, more despairing, more doubting, and alone. Clearly, there is a
need to institute a major change in American policing that will break down those factors perpetuating a "we" versus "they" attitude in the minds of too many police officers. This can best be accomplished, I submit this morning, by a style of policing that we call community policing, a philosophy that fosters a closer relationship between the police officers and the law-abiding people they serve.

This is important because we know that in neighborhoods where the police and people feel connected to one another, there is less fear, there is less crime. When the officer and the citizens know each other, there is less apprehension; hence the police are less likely to overreact, and the community is less likely to be hostile toward the officers.

Contrast that attitude to that which prevails in communities where the police are alienated from the people, where the police often view everyone as the enemy and where some of the people in the community see the police as the oppressor. Yet it is in these very neighborhoods where community policing must take hold. These are the communities suffering from a disproportionate impact of crime, drugs, and violence. These are the communities where those who most need police services are fearful of speaking out. Many residents and business people in these communities have lost confidence in our system. They are no less supportive of the police than other communities, but they are disconnected from the social compact.

Community policing offers us a connection by giving groups of police officers and supervisors permanent responsibility for every neighborhood in the city. The officers get to know the community and the residents. Officers can come to know and understand cultural diversity. Residents and business people can come to trust the police and take a stand with the police against crime and violence. For this to happen, there must be some organizational change. Police departments must be willing to establish permanent beat and shift assignments. Police forces should more closely mirror the racial and ethnic composition of the cities they serve. Officers must have access to the knowledge, the technology, and the skills required to police a complex society.

Perhaps most importantly, police officers must come to view the communities they serve, to view the people there as partners in a coalition to build safer and more secure neighborhoods. Police in American cities need the support of the public more than ever: the good, law-abiding, hard-working people who live in our center cities need the police. Community policing is the way to build new partnerships against crime, drugs, hopelessness, and urban disorder. I see community policing as a model for a new national urban policy, and this is particularly important when we understand that the prospect for additional funding and resources for personnel in police agencies is not that promising.

Community policing calls for mobilizing existing resources and skills differently than has been the case in the past. It recognizes that the solution to problems besetting our cities reside at the neighborhood level, not in the mayor's office, not in the governor's mansion, not in the White House. The essence of community policing, as I see it, rests in two easily understood premises.

First, to make progress in solving the urban crisis, we must reduce the problems to ones of manageable scale by organizing programs on a neighborhood, not a citywide basis.

Second, a neighborhood-based program must mobilize a broad, cross-disciplinary, cross-professional network of community leaders, professionals, civil servants, academics, and local citizens to develop a coherent sense of community within each specific neighborhood. Programs and initiatives must involve the community in their formulation and implementation.

Community policing recognizes that when major urban areas are dealt with as a whole, problems become overwhelming, complex, and unsolvable. As I see it, the only solution that generates a sense of hope and future potential, whether it be in an urban, suburban, or rural environment, is providing individuals a sense that they reside in a vital, thriving, caring, and supportive community in which they can raise children safely, work productively, and have a healthy life.

Community policing is predicated on these basic assumptions. It focuses on the issue of community-building skills. When the urban problem is reduced in scale and community building progresses and the processes are set in motion, I am convinced that we can make a difference. Those cities in America that had the smallest number of disturbances after the Rodney King verdict, for example, were those communities where community policing was either in the development stage or had been developed. Police officers worked with the community to bring about calm, even in the midst of despair and anger.

It worked because individuals knew each other, had been working together, had been in contact with each other, had been talking to each other, knew each other by name. People were no longer strangers; they became colleagues pursuing a common goal in a community in which they had an immediate stake in the outcome. Even
in a city as large as New York, the strategy worked. So let me close by saying that, although I view community policing as the future policing of America, there is a danger that if urban conditions continue to worsen in cities across America, there will be a mounting pressure to abandon the concept and use the police as temporary occupying forces to put down disturbances. Certainly, overwhelming police numbers are sometimes required to ensure peace; but more often they are not. An effective, community-oriented police presence is a deterrent to neighborhood violence in the first place. We should make the police officers permanent, highly visible fixtures in the neighborhood, known personally to the people who live and work there.

To revert to a "us" versus "them" mentality will only make things worse both for the community residents and the police. I can assure you that in the end the community police officers permanently assigned to a neighborhood are a better deterrent to unrest than a SWAT team waiting in the wings. The ultimate deterrent to crime and unrest involves addressing some of their underlying causes. It is a role beyond the police, but at least community policing invites everyone else into the process. Community policing recognizes something that can-do organizations like the police sometimes will not readily admit. It acknowledges that the people most affected by crime may be the best people to help us attack the problems and find the solutions.

THE NEXT GENERATION, THE FUTURE OF POLICING, AND THE POLICE CORPS

Adam Walinsky
Chairman, Police Corps; Attorney, Firm of Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Hellman, New York City; former Chairman, New York Commission of Investigations.

We are meeting here, of course, to discuss civil disorder. That was the assignment I was given. Most of the time the term "civil disorder" is used to mean rioting, looting, and mob violence. And in modern America, they are taken to mean racial riot and violence, particularly riot and violence committed by people whose skin is dark. And for the press, of course, the words mean Los Angeles last year and whether there is going to be another outbreak next week.

Yet civil disorder, disorder, the absence of order, the intrusion of violent happenstance or angry damage into the settled course of life, this is, in fact the constant, regular, understood condition of large parts of our great cities. Disorder, the collapse of urban civility, the inability of governing institutions to protect property, to assure the stability of commerce, to safeguard life itself, is the most obvious reason why Cleveland, Baltimore, Washington, Detroit, St. Louis, and dozens of other cities have lost a third or more of their population in little more than a decade.

Most clearly and most dangerously, disorder has become a way of life for millions of American citizens. Now, nobody in this room needs instruction from me on the manner in which the black poor and to a lesser extent the poor of other minorities are living in large parts of the country today. No one here needs to be told about the conditions in which a generation of children, another generation of children is growing. The danger, indeed, it seems to me is not that we do not know it, but that we know it so well that we come almost to accept it as a fact of life—not anything we like, not anything that makes us comfortable, but rather as a condition that, though we may ameliorate it, we do not really have a hope to change.

So it seems to me that the first and the most important point for any meeting such as this, and for any of us with the responsibilities we have, is to understand that none of this is inevitable, none of this is some ineradicable Cain's curse in our history, and there is none of it that cannot be changed.
Now, as I look out at this room, I see many young men and women who look as if they came to this work in the 1970's, perhaps some a few years earlier, like myself, and some even a little later. And it may be difficult, particularly for the youngest people in the country, to understand, to comprehend that what we see around us, this social chaos, is really a phenomenon that is very recent. It is a phenomenon of our time. It is unfortunately a product for which our generation has to accept the responsibility and the understanding that this has happened on our watch.

All of this is very sensitive to discuss. We all have friends and colleagues across the table racial divisions in this country. We do not want to give offense and we should not, but we have to face reality. We have to talk about our lives together. We have to work together to fix it. So I want to start now, and in order to be sure that everybody understands that this is a mutual effort, what I am going to start with is a quotation from John Lewis of Georgia:

Now, as most of you know, John Lewis was a 19-year-old college student when he led the first sit-ins at segregated lunch counters in the South. He was the first of the freedom riders when the freedom buses were burned and their riders were beaten. He has probably been subjected to as many incidents of vicious racist abuse as any person in our history. He is one of our greatest civil rights leaders. Now he sits in the Congress. He represents the Fifth District of Georgia, which, of course, includes the five points, and he is the immediate past chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus.

Now, here is what he says: "All across the nation black communities are under an assault of crime and violence that is without precedent in our history. Under this savage assault, it is not too much to say that the low-income black community is disintegrating and violence and crime are the order of the day." He points out that the facts of the tragedy are well-known to all.

And then he says, "Look, these are not the normal patterns of life. This is not our history. This is not how we overcame centuries of oppression and brutality. We did that like everybody does in this country, with mutual support and decency and love. So how did we get to this position?"

And he answers: "Listen, the causes of the deterioration, the roots of our present crisis are many." And indeed they are. "But surely," he says, "the most immediate and the most powerful is the fact of the violence itself.

Increasingly, over the last 30 years, crime and violence have been allowed to run virtually unchecked through poor black communities. This widening gyre of destruction first stripped communities of businesses and jobs. It broke down housing. It made schools places of fear where a quarter of the students might carry weapons for self-defense, and where learning was always a casualty."

The he reminds us, "For as life became more dangerous, so it became progressively difficult to raise children in the settled peace that they require. And more and more the most conspicuous model of success was the racketeer, the pimp, and the insidious drug dealer. More and more children deprived of reasonable nurture were sucked into the vortex to become, in their turn, the abusers, the destroyers of the children who came after them."

But, says Lewis, "It is not only poverty that has caused crime. In a very real sense, it is crime that has caused poverty and is the most powerful cause of poverty today."

Now, no one who has been where so many in this room have been, no one who has been to the Henry Horner houses in Chicago, at least before Vince Layne started to work, or to the Red Hook houses in Brooklyn where nobody is working, or to any number of other places in this country where people are living outside the law and outside the protections of the Constitution, nobody, it seems to me, who has seen that could challenge what John Lewis has said.

So I asked a historian once, "Was there a time, a period in European history to which we could look for a similar kind of social breakdown and disintegration?"

He answered unhesitatingly. He said, "Of course. It was during the 30 Years War." And if you think of it for a minute, a 30 years war, a kind of a 30 years war, has been raging unnoticed and ignored through too many communities in this country, and unchecked. And the casualties
of that and the products are what we live with now. They are also the omen for our future.

Now, let us look at our future which is the present as it works forward. I suggest to you a visual aid. Write down four numbers: 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1995. Now, in 1965 Daniel Patrick Moynihan, now the senator from New York, warned of the growing proportion of black children who were being born to single mothers. And he said, “Whether in the wild Irish slums of the 19th century, or in the ghettos of the 20th, a society which allows large numbers of children to be brought up without fathers and to be raised by single women will find itself with terrible social disorder and difficulty.”

He was excoriated as a racist and the subject was dropped for 20 years. The rate of illegitimacy that year—and this is the number that you have to put down under 1965—is 26 percent. Nobody paid attention. Everybody took a walk. And whatever attention was being paid to these areas, whatever fitful efforts we had made in the 1960’s were largely abandoned. So it took just over a decade.

You go to 1976 now and the illegitimacy rate was 50 percent. Half of all these kids were born to single mothers. Nine more years of chaos. Now, under 1985 you put down 67 percent. So we are talking about a third of these kids, a third of them only, growing up with two parents. Ten percent of even the youngest children were being raised without a mother or a father. In the house, raised by collateral relatives, by grandparents, or in foster homes.

So there is the first step on our time chart. Now, here is the second: Draw a line that starts in 1965 and takes a kid born in 1965 to when he becomes 15 years old in 1980. Now, there is not anybody involved with law enforcement in this room who does not know that 1980 and 1981 were the worst years we had ever seen for criminal violence in the country. And the parade was being led by the forgotten teenagers and young men of the ghetto. But the kids that we were so worried about in 1981, they were still members of a group of whom three-quarters had at least had something, three-quarters of them had had the advantage of having two parents—at least when they started out. It was not until 1991—draw the line now from 1976, fifteen years later—that at least half had been raised by single mothers.

Now for the future. Start in 1985 and work forward. Think of the kids born in 1985. Think of these kids, one in twelve raised without a mother or a father, eight in 12 with a single parent. These are the children of the crack plague; these are the children of whom unprecedented numbers were subjected to terrible child abuse. These are kids who grew up in the incredible chaos that we allowed to govern inner-city neighborhoods in the 1980’s and 1990’s. These are the kids who have seen death all around them, who have seen people shot in their schools, on their streets, in their houses. These are the kids who have grown up under the rule of the gun.

These are children you know. Every police chief and every police officer in America knows who they are, knows that these are kids who think that they will never live to reach the age of 25. These are kids who learn that only the strong and the ruthless survive. These are kids, some of whom seem to have learned to kill without remorse, to kill for a drug territory or for an insult, for a look, for a bump on the shoulder, or just to do it. Why not?

Some of these are kids whose lust for other people’s property is accompanied by indifference to life and the future that terrifies the law-abiding. And, as we know, these are kids who have been raised in the midst of ceaseless media violence, an incitement to every depravity, movies that feature two hours of solid killing in every new and more imaginative method. The television programs that tell them that every kid has to have a $200 pair of sneakers every week or he is nothing. The music that exhorts people who listen to it to brutalize Koreans, rob store owners, kill the police.

By the way, I notice that Ice-T has a new record out. Another corporation has financed it, and this one says, “The kids are hot. They want police shot.” These are the lessons, of course, being taught to millions of kids as we meet here, that have been taught to the millions who are going to reach physical maturity during the rest of this century. These are our products.

These are our children, too. Though they are the sources of our difficulty, they are also what we have to work with for the rest of our time. It is, I believe, supremely necessary to understand that all of this can be changed. This is just what President Kennedy meant when he said that our problems are made by men and therefore they can be solved by men. We have dug ourselves into this pit, and we are capable of digging ourselves out of it. When I say “we,” I mean that it is up to those of us who are concerned with and care about law enforcement to help determine the future of our country.

Now, I know and you know that there is only so much cops can do, or jails or laws can do. If it is true, as John Lewis tells us, that the violence itself has become its own most important cause, that violence is breeding more violence, crime has itself become a major cause of
Clinton's commitment to increase police nationwide by 100,000, an increase of 20 percent that will make community policing possible around the country, and proportionately greater in many of the most troubled cities. While I know there has been concern in the past as to the ability of localities to pay for these federally educated officers while they are serving, I think I can tell you with confidence that when the bill is reintroduced in this Congress, with the support of the administration and the Senate and House leadership across the board, it will include very substantial funds to help the localities hire these young people.

Moreover, I do believe that the new national focus on increasing and bringing police forces up to a reasonable strength will cause many local officials to make very different spending priority decisions than they have made in the past. I do not think that two more years will go by without seeing very substantial increases in police manpower in Baltimore and in Los Angeles, for instance. I see the newly elected mayor of St. Louis has pledged the same, much like the increases for which Lee Brown led the way in New York.

Second, the police corps represents a turn to a higher ideal of police and the work they do. The police corps essentially says and is intended to say that police work, the work of civil order, of civil peace, of assuring the protections of the Constitution to all of our people, is so important that we have to try and attract to it our very best young people and give them the best education they can get before they begin the work.

Moreover, we know through surveys taken by the Department of Justice that the police corps is especially attractive to the kids we know we have to get—the very best and brightest kids out of the minority communities—45 percent of whom said in a survey that they would sign up for this program, the real affirmative action.

Third, and I think very important, the police corps can, as it must, lead to the end of the police as the isolated bureaucracy that Lee Brown warned us about—the bureaucracy that is too often neither trusted nor even understood by the citizenry it polices and protects or by the government officials who direct its actions.

Our problems obviously are not just problems of law enforcement. We do not have a law enforcement problem, we have a long-standing political and constitutional problem. Our crime problem, as we call it, or our law enforcement problem, embodies the same problems that this country has had for 300 years. They are not going to be solved by just handing them over to some bureaucracy, not the police bureaucracy, not the school bureaucracy, or anyone else. These are problems in which all we have to take a hand, for which we all have to accept the responsibility of working together. The solutions must involve our citizens. This has to be work that citizens enjoy.

When we fought wars in this country, when we had
national crises that involved the survival of the country, we did not just hand it over to five professionals; we said this is work in which we are all going to join. And in the same way, I believe, the work of justice here requires the direct participation of a broad spectrum of American citizens right across the board.

The question has to strike you when you watch Congress debate or you watch appellate judges. How many ever served as police? There are two members of the House of Representatives who ever served as police. There is one senator who put in some time, and he is perhaps the only one who ever did. No former police officers, to my knowledge, sit as judges of the appellate courts that make the rules by which you live. In New York on Tuesday, our highest court upheld an award of $4.3 million to a mugger, to a felon, who was crippled when a police officer shot him as he was mugging a 79-year-old man in the subway.

So we now have commitments from the deans of some of the leading law schools in this country that they would give preference in admissions to young people who had served their time in the police corps. In this way, we could, over time, hope to send into the very citadels of the legal establishment and ultimately into appellate courts around the country people who knew what it was to go up an alley, to break down a door, to live with the fear of automatic weapons fire, to know what it was to deal with emotionally disturbed people on the street—for the first time, perhaps to have real experience and understanding of the police in the highest councils of government and the judiciary.

It is when all of these changes are taken together that the true aim of the police corps appears. It is the same goal held by the people who have worked to advance policing all these years. I think about Lee Brown; I think about Hubert Williams; I think about Pat Fittsimons, and other people you know in law enforcement, Neal Behan, and Joe McNamara, Willie Woods, Willie Williams, Eddie Woods, Ed Davis, Ruben Greenberg, and so many others who have led the country to confront finally the violence, the crime, the horror of life as it is lived by so many of our fellow citizens.

The police corps is not a magic cure, it is not the whole program. It is not all that has to be done in law enforcement. But what we want to do is to enlist the best young people in this country of every stripe. We want to hand them over to people like Lee Brown and the other chiefs who have been so much a part of this and forge an indissoluble blue bond in a shared enterprise and a commitment to bring order and freedom and peace and
THE NEED FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLICING

William Tafoya
Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation

The issue of who we have on the front lines is critically important. I could not agree more with the sentiment that has been expressed these last several days. The theme, the underlying theme, in this conference is that there is a desperate need to change the way America has been policed. There is also a resistance here to maintaining the status quo of policing in America. I think it took great courage for Hubert Williams and the Police Foundation to sponsor this conference, to bring this issue to the light of day, to express the view that if we continue to do what we have done in the past, we are only going to repeat the mistakes of the past.

I think it is important that you understand that community policing, problem-oriented policing, is not something to be Velcroed to the same brown belt of the police for them to continue doing what they have done in the past. I have heard time and time again, including here in the last several days, that this is nothing new, that it is no different, and that it adds to the already incredible amount of work the police have to do. Those folks just do not get it. They do not understand that while sending officers out on the streets of America is important—how they act, what they do—is vitally important.

The police have to change the philosophy underpinning their interaction with the public. Let me tell you an anecdote relayed to me just a few weeks ago by a California Highway Patrol commander. He told me of a time in the 1960's when he drove through the riot-torn streets of Los Angeles. "We saw little kids playing in the street," he said, "And as we looked over at them they smiled and waved at us. In the midst of the devastation." He said he talked to the kids. They talked about things like basketball and who their favorite team was in 1965.

In 1992, now a commander in the California Highway Patrol checking on his troops in the devastation of Los Angeles in April of 1992, he drove through the streets and saw little children playing in the streets. That memory from 1965 came back to him, and he smiled and waved at the kids. What he got in return from those little kids was a cold, hard stare and an obscene gesture. Ladies and gentlemen, we have got to change the way we police in America. We have got to change the philosophy. We have got to select people not on the basis of their gender or ethnicity, not on the basis of the breadth of their shoulders or how tall they are. We have got to select people for what they have between their eyebrows and the top of their head, for the ability to solve problems, not simply to push people aside and say, "Don't do that or I'll come back again." We cannot possibly police America that way.

We have got to embrace community policing because by being in the neighborhoods, by learning what is bothering people, how they hurt, what hurts them, by facilitating the delivery of services they need, the non-police services, we will have built trust that may give us enough notice about problems brewing and help prevent widespread devastation.

If we continue to police America in the old way, no matter how many police officers we add, we will be viewed as an army of occupation.

Let me remind you of Aristotle's words. Aristotle said that virtue was doing the right thing for the right reason at the right time. And he said that the sum of all virtue is justice. Justice is what each of us who carries a badge has sworn an allegiance to uphold and provide for all in America. I ask you to remember that as you leave here and go back to your communities. I encourage you to have the courage to understand that doing the same that we have been doing will not make America a safer, saner society.

[Image of a person]
WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? WHAT DO WE DO NEXT?

Hubert Williams
President, Police Foundation

In her introductory epigraph to Derek Bell's *Faces at the Bottom of the Well*, Maya Angelou wrote:

"In these bloody days and frightful nights when an urban warrior can find no face more despicable than his own, no ammunition more deadly than self-hate and no target more deserving of his true aim than his brother, we must wonder how we came so late and lonely to this place. With these words she constructs a vivid image of a time bomb ticking away in our inner cities.

On the opening day of our conference, David Ginsburg reflected back to his experiences as the executive director of the Kerner Commission 25 years ago. He reminded us that the history of our republic reflects a great racial divide. Winston Churchill once said: "We mold our buildings and then our buildings mold us." We are not able to quantify the degree to which hundreds of years of slavery, segregation, and racism have affected our attitudes and our behavior, but we are certain that problems persist and continue to shape our reality.

Despite all of the great advances that we have made in our society today, the plight of the poor and the minority citizens is most grievous, for they have slid back. Americans must wonder how problems that have so long persisted could continue to deteriorate. The seeds must be searched for in past decades.

These complex problems that we face are the setting in which police officers perform their duty. What is it about our backgrounds, skills, or experiences that prepares us to deal with problems of this dimension? We have seen now through the last decade or so a shift in the inner cities from the problem of race based on an African American cultural heritage and experience to something more expansive, that includes other ethnic groups with different cultures, different values, different perspectives.

The words of Rodney King still ring out: “Can we all get along?” We have to find ways to interact more effectively across the cultural divide. Not only we as law enforcement officers, but other leaders in our communities as well, have to figure out the new role for policing in America.

Lee Brown set the tone today when he said that we have to come closer to the people that we serve. We need to understand their values, their perspectives, their concerns, and we need to learn to understand this seething hostility that we see in the eyes of young people living in the inner city, young people who feel left out and put upon and leaderless. You can detect these feelings in their music, particularly the rap music—sometimes in Ice-T’s lyrics. We feel fear and concern because we, as law enforcement officers, should not be the targets for all of this animosity.

We must find a better way to do our jobs, a way that is consistent with our values and consistent with the democratic principles that undergird the republic. We must place at the fore the issues of race and ethnicity. We, as law enforcement officers, are closest to the people. There is no institution in our society closer to the people than the police who provide services 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

We must finally get these problems behind us, and that, to me, means that we must reach out in different ways as individuals and as organizations.

We began this conference by looking at what we know. Police need to learn more about civil disorder. We need to learn what style of policing would be most effective in reducing behavior that will act as a trigger for civil disorder.

We know that race is a hot trigger. It is the button that politicians push when they want to stop us from thinking, when they want us to bond even when we do not have anything in common except for something as superficial as the color of our skin.

The other button is the question of force. The Kerner Commission found that almost every instance of civil disorder in the mid-1960’s had been preceded by an incident or a rumor of police use of force. How much force is enough? And how much is too much?

We need to study these issues. We need to know about the history of civil disorder in this country. We need to learn from those experiences and to let these lessons shape our style of policing so that we are not part of the fuse that sets off the time bomb.

The Police Foundation is establishing a National Center for the Study of Police and Civil Disorder. This center will focus on democratic styles of policing. It will use the best ideas in our profession to improve incrementally our method of doing business as law enforcement officers. It will draw on the talent within our community. It will welcome interns and fellows. It will be a clearinghouse of information for anyone wanting to know about civil disorders.

One of the problems that we have in law enforcement is that we create the expertise but not necessarily the ability to exercise good judgment and make tough
decisions under pressure. How do we deal with problems when there are conflicts and no right answers? What lessons can we learn from the experiences in Los Angeles, New York, Crown Heights, Las Vegas, Newark, or other cities? This information could help to guide our profession and enable us to do a better job, but too often it gets lost in the dust of a report that has been put on a shelf, as we move on to deal with other emergencies and other demands imposed on us. We need to remain constantly focused because civil disorder is the most devastating and costly problem that can befall our communities.

In 1967, I was a rookie sergeant in Newark, New Jersey. By a freak set of circumstances, the police director froze all people in their current positions at their current levels—so I was an acting lieutenant behind the desk, running one of the precincts that experienced civil disorder. I still remember the fear, the violence, and the hatred. I still remember the racial tensions and polarization within the department. Black officers were afraid to go home at night. They had guns stuck in their faces by the National Guard. They slept in the precincts. The experience tore the police department asunder along racial lines.

What are the lessons that we have learned and how will those lessons be incorporated in our training and in the way we do our jobs? We hope to create a center that will capture from the experiences of every city that has had a civil disorder the dynamics and the challenges. Then we want to use this information to create a training tool using integrated video technology that will put law enforcement officers in a setting where they can live the incident and be forced to make decisions under pressure similar to that experienced by officers in the field.

To that end, we have now collected at the Police Foundation all of the reports from Los Angeles except for those deemed confidential. We have a commitment from the City of Los Angeles that the Police Foundation will have access to all information. Scholars will be able to come and study the questions raised by civil disorders of the past so that we can improve our styles of policing, enhance our profession, and ensure our commitment to democratic values, so that our society will no longer be like a time bomb ready to blow itself apart.

From 1967 to 1985, when I left the City of Newark, New Jersey, where I was the police director, to come to Washington to become president of the Police Foundation, Newark lost more businesses than it gained. Nineteen-eighty-five was the first year that Newark gained more businesses than it lost. This case is not unique. The scars of civil disorder can be found in every city. No city during my lifetime has come back to its pre-civil disorder state. It is critical that we take preventive measures.

I was deeply touched by Attorney General Janet Reno's remarks today. She spoke of the separateness of the disciplines. We, as law enforcement officers, are locked into a law enforcement environment. Barriers divide us from the sociologists, the medical professionals, the educators. These walls keep us from coming up with solutions that require our collective talents and wisdom. We engage in turf protection and often turf warfare. The team approach is a great idea. It is so refreshing to have someone in the Attorney General's post who is from a large city and who understands the problems that cities must confront. I am delighted that our attorney general has expressed a commitment to a new path that we must all follow if we are to come to grips with the terrible problems that afflict towns and cities across this nation.
Gayle Fisher-Stewart  
*Deputy Director for Technology and Technical Assistance and Director, The National Center for the Study of Police and Civil Disorder, Police Foundation.*

To say that I am excited about the creation of the National Center for the Study of Police and Civil Disorder is an understatement. As I thought about the center's development, I was reminded of the mythical phoenix, a very large and powerful bird who, when its life span had come to an end, would burn itself upon a funeral pyre, and out of the ashes would rise another phoenix. Its ability to rejuvenate itself from the ashes gives us hope.

Somehow, out of the ashes of Los Angeles, we are raising this National Center for the Study of Police and Civil Disorder. It is really needed. There may be agencies that say, "Well, I'll never have civil disorder, my department's too small, my city's too small." But being prepared to help your neighboring jurisdiction would be desirable. That was one of the problems that we found in Los Angeles, that there was not that network.

All through this conference we have heard about the issue of race and how it has an impact on law enforcement, and that sometimes there is a spark for civil disorder. At times, I have felt that my brothers and sisters in policing were getting a bum rap, because we do not always start civil disorder. But even when we do, you have to ask: what is it about policing and police officers that creates a situation where civil disorder can occur? I have yet to hear anybody join a police department and state, "I really want to violate someone's civil rights. I really want to be the one who sets the spark to burn this city down."

In addition to looking at the institutionalized racism and sexism that does exist within law enforcement—because law enforcement is a microcosm of society at large—we need to look at the culture of law enforcement and what it does to us. You have to remember that there are still people in law enforcement who have risen up the rank structure who are still part of a culture that turns people into near robots who do not see the community as people. We need to ask what it is about the culture that creates a situation where people become the spark that can ignite civil disorder.

We also need to broaden our definition of civil disorder. There are two types of civil disorders or riots. There are expressive riots such as in Los Angeles. There are also instrumental riots where the police are called in to contain, control, or suppress a violent confrontation, such as now we are seeing with the abortion issue. The police did not spark anything. We are just called in to control others' actions.

Under a broadened concept of civil disorder, we must ask whether the planning, the resources, the leadership, and the mindsets are the same for expressive civil disorder, which we may or may not spark, and for instrumental civil disorder, which we do not spark. These questions and many others will be answered by the Center.