When crimes occur—when a ghetto teenager is shot to death in a gang war, when an elderly woman is mugged for her social security check, when a nurse is raped in a hospital parking lot, when one driver is punched by another in a dispute over a parking place, when a black family’s new home is vandalized—society’s attention is naturally focused on the victims and their material losses. Their wounds, bruises, lost property, and inconvenience can be seen, touched, and counted. These are the concrete signs of criminal victimization.

Behind the immediate, concrete losses of crime victims, however, is a different, more abstract crime problem—that of fear. For victims, fear is often the largest and most enduring legacy of their victimization. The raped nurse will feel vulnerable long after her cuts and bruises heal. The harassed black family suffers far more from the fear of neighborhood hostility than the inconvenience of repairing their property.

For the rest of us—the not-recently, or not-yet victimized—fear becomes a contagious agent spreading the injuriousness of criminal victimization. The gang member’s death makes parents despair of their children’s future. The mugging of the elderly woman teaches elderly residents to fear the streets and the teenagers who roam them. The fight over the parking place confirms the general fear of strangers. The harassment of the black family makes other minorities reluctant to claim their rights. In these ways, fear extends the damage of criminal victimization.

Of course, fear is not totally unproductive. It prompts caution among citizens and thereby reduces criminal opportunities. Too, it motivates citizens to shoulder some of the burdens of crime control by buying locks and dogs, thereby adding to general deterrence. And fear kindles enthusiasm for publicly supported crime control measures. Thus, reasonable fears, channeled in constructive directions, prepare society to deal with crime. It is only when fear is unreasonable, or generates
Looking at race, class, and residence variables, blacks are more afraid of crime than whites, the poor more afraid than the middle class or wealthy, and inner-city dwellers more afraid than suburbanites. Indeed, while the current national trend may show a decline in fear, anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend has not yet reached America’s ghettos. There, fear has become a condition of life. Claude Brown describes Harlem’s problem in 1985:

In any Harlem building, . . . every door has at least three locks on it. Nobody opens a door without first finding out who’s there. In the early evening, . . . you see people . . . lingering outside nice apartment houses, peering in the lobbies. They seem to be casing the joint. They are actually trying to figure out who is in the lobby of their building. “Is this someone waiting to mug me? Should I risk going in, or should I wait for someone else to come?”

If you live in Harlem, USA, you don’t park your automobile two blocks from your apartment house because that gives potential muggers an opportunity to get a fix on you. You’d better find a parking space by “The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime” released in 1980. Two-fifths of Americans surveyed reported that they were “highly fearful” they would become victims of violent crime. Similar results were reported by the Harris poll of 1975, which found that 55 percent of all adults said they felt “uneasy” walking their own streets. The Gallup poll of 1977 found that about 45 percent of the population (61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men) were afraid to walk alone at night. An eight-city victimization survey published in 1977 found that 45 percent of all respondents limited their activities because of fear of crime. A statewide study in Michigan reported that 66 percent of respondents avoided certain places because of fear of crime. Interviews with a random sample of Texans in 1978 found that more than half said that they feared becoming a serious crime victim within a year.

Second, fear of crime increased from the late 1960’s to the mid-1970’s, then began decreasing during the mid-1970’s. According to the 1968 Gallup poll, 44 percent of the women and 16 percent of the men said that they were afraid to walk alone at night. In 1977, when a similar question was asked, 61 percent of the women and 28 percent of the men reported they were afraid to walk alone at night—an increase of 17 percent for women and 12 percent for men. In 1975, a Harris poll found that 55 percent of all adults felt “uneasy” walking their own streets. In 1985, this number had fallen to 32 percent—a significant decline.

Third, fear is not evenly distributed across the population. Predictably, those who feel themselves most vulnerable are also the most fearful. Looking at the distribution of fear across age and sex categories, the greatest levels of fear are reported by elderly women. The next most frightened group seems to be all other women. The least afraid are young men.

The causes of fear

In the past, fear was viewed as primarily caused by criminal victimization. Hence, the principal strategy for controlling crime was reducing criminal victimization. More recently, we have learned that while fear of crime is associated with criminal victimization, the relationship is less close than originally assumed.
The association between victimization and fear is seen most closely in the aggregate patterns across time and space. Those who live in areas with high crime rates are more afraid and take more preventive action than people living in areas where the risk of victimization is lower. The trends in levels of fear seem to mirror (perhaps with a lag) trends in levels of crime.

Yet, the groups that are most fearful are not necessarily those with the highest victimization rates; indeed, the order is exactly reversed. Elderly women, who are most afraid, are the least frequently victimized. Young men, who are least afraid, are most often victimized. Even more surprisingly, past victimization has only a small impact on levels of fear; people who have heard about others’ victimizations are almost as fearful as those who have actually been victimized. And when citizens are asked about the things that frighten them, there is little talk about “real crimes” such as robbery, rape, and murder. More often there is talk about other signs of physical decay and social disorganization such as “junk and trash in vacant lots, boarded-up buildings, stripped and abandoned cars, bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, street prostitution, panhandling, public drinking, verbal harassment of women, open gambling and drug use, and other incivilities.”

In accounting for levels of fear in communities, Wesley Skogan divides the contributing causes into five broad categories: (1) actual criminal victimization; (2) second-hand information about criminal victimization distributed through social networks; (3) physical deterioration and social disorder; (4) the characteristics of the built environment (i.e., the physical composition of the housing stock); and (5) group conflict. He finds the strongest effects on fear arising from physical deterioration, social disorder, and group conflict. The impact of the built environment is hard to detect once one has subtracted the effects of other variables influencing levels of fear. A review article by Charles Murray also found little evidence of a separate effect of the built environment on fear. The only exception to this general conclusion is evidence indicating that improved street lighting can sometimes produce significant fear reductions.

The important implication of these research results is that fear might be attacked by strategies other than those that directly reduce criminal victimization. Fear might be reduced even without changes in levels of victimization by using the communications within social networks to provide accurate information about risks of criminal victimization and advice about constructive responses to the risk of crime; by eliminating the external signs of physical decay and social disorder; and by more effectively regulating group conflict between young and old, whites and minority groups, rich and poor. The more intriguing possibility, however, is that if fear could be rationalized and constructively channeled, not only would fear and its adverse consequences be ameliorated, but also real levels of victimization reduced. In this sense, the conventional understanding of this problem would be reversed: instead of controlling victimization to control fear, we would manage fear to reduce victimization. To understand this possibility, we must explore the consequences of fear—not only as ends in themselves, but also as means for helping society deal with crime.

The economic and societal consequences of fear: costs and benefits

Fear is a more or less rational response to crime. It produces social consequences through two different mechanisms. First, people are uncomfortable emotionally. Instead of luxuriating in the peace and safety of their homes, they feel vulnerable and isolated. Instead of enjoying the camaraderie of trips to school, grocery stores, and work, they feel anxious and afraid. Since these are less happy conditions than feeling secure, fear produces an immediate loss in personal well-being.

Second, fear motivates people to invest time and money in defensive measures to reduce their vulnerability. They stay indoors more than they would wish, avoid certain places, buy extra locks, and ask for special protection to make bank deposits. Since this time, effort, and money could presumably be spent on other things that make people happier, such expenditures must also be counted as personal costs which, in turn, become social costs as they are aggregated.

These are far from trivial issues. The fact that two-fifths of the population is afraid and that the Nation continues to nominate crime as one of its greatest concerns means that society is living less securely and happily than is desirable. And if 45 percent of the population restricts its daily behavior to minimize vulnerability, and the Nation spends more than $20 billion on private security protection, then private expenditures on reducing fear constitute a significant component of the national economy. All this is in addition to the $40 billion that society spends publicly on crime control efforts. In short, fear of crime claims a noticeable share of the Nation’s welfare and resources.

Fear has a further effect. Individual responses to fear aggregate in a way that erodes the overall quality of community life and, paradoxically, the overall capacity of society to deal with crime. This occurs when the defensive reactions of individuals essentially compromise community life, or when they exacerbate the disparities between rich and poor by relying too much on private rather than public security.

Skogan has described in detail the mechanisms that erode community life:

Fear ... can work in conjunction with other factors to stimulate more rapid neighborhood decline. Together, the spread of fear and other local problems provide a form of positive feedback that can further increase levels of crime. These feedback processes include (1) physical and psychological withdrawal from community life; (2) a weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime and disorder; (3) a decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of
the neighborhood; (4) deteriorating business conditions; (5) the importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance; and (6) further dramatic changes in the composition of the population. At the end lies a stage characterized by demographic collapse.25

Even if fear does not destroy neighborhood life, it can damage it by prompting responses which protect some citizens at the expense of others, thereby leading to greater social disparities between rich and poor, resourceful and dependent, well-organized and anomic communities. For example, when individuals retreat behind closed doors and shuttered windows, they make their own homes safer. But they make the streets more dangerous, for there are fewer people watching and intervening on the streets. Or, when individuals invest in burglar alarms or private security guards rather than spending more on public police forces, they may make themselves safer, but leave others worse off because crime is deflected onto others.

Similarly, neighborhood patrols can make residents feel safe. But they may threaten and injure other law-abiding citizens who want to use the public thoroughfares. Private security guards sometimes bring guns and violence to situations that would otherwise be more peaceably settled. Private efforts may transform our cities from communities now linked to one another through transportation, commerce, and recreation, to collections of isolated armed camps, shocking not only for their apparent indifference to one another, but also ultimately for their failure to control crime and reduce fear. In fact, such constant reminders of potential threats may actually increase fear.

Whether fear produces these results or not depends a great deal on how citizens respond to their fears. If they adopt defensive, individualistic solutions, then the risks of neighborhood collapse and injustice are increased. If they adopt constructive, community-based responses, then the community will be strengthened not only in terms of its ability to defend itself, but also as an image of civilized society. Societies built on communal crime control efforts have more order, justice, and freedom than those based on individualistic responses. Indeed, it is for these reasons that social control and the administration of justice became public rather than private functions.

Police strategies for reducing fear

If it is true that fear is a problem in its own right, then it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of police strategies not only in terms of their capacity to control crime, but also in terms of their capacity to reduce fear. And if fear is affected by more factors than just criminal victimization, then there might be some special police strategies other than controlling victimization that could be effective in controlling the fear of crime.

Over the last 30 years, the dominant police strategy has emphasized three operational components: motorized patrol, rapid response to calls for service, and retrospective investigation of crimes.26 The principal aim has been to solve crimes and capture criminals rather than reduce fear. The assumption has been that if victimization could be reduced, fear would decrease as well. Insofar as fear was considered a separate problem, police strategists assumed that motorized patrol and rapid response would provide a reassuring police omnipresence.27

To the extent that the police thought about managing citizens’ individual responses to crime, they visualized a relationship in which citizens detected crime and mobilized the police to deal with it—not one in which the citizens played an important crime control role. The police advised shopkeepers and citizens about self-defense. They created 911 telephone systems to insure that citizens could reach them easily. And they encouraged citizens to mark their property to aid the police in recovering stolen property. But their primary objective was to make themselves society’s principal response to crime. Everything else was seen as auxiliary.

As near monopolists in supplying enhanced security and crime control, police managers and union leaders were ambivalent about the issue of fear. On the one hand, as those responsible for security, they felt some obligation to enhance security and reduce fear. That was by far the predominant view. On the other hand, if citizens were afraid of crime and the police were the solution, the police department would benefit in the fight for scarce municipal funds. This fact has tempted some police executives and some unions to emphasize the risks of crime.28

The strategy that emphasized motorized patrol, rapid response, and retrospective investigation of crimes was not designed to reduce fear other than by a reduction in crime. Indeed, insofar as the principal objective of this strategy was to reduce crime, and insofar as citizens were viewed as operational auxiliaries of the police, the police could increase citizens’ vigilance by warning of the risks of crime. Nevertheless, to the extent that reduced fear was considered an important objective, it was assumed that the presence and availability of police through motorized patrols and response to calls would achieve that objective.

The anticipated effects of this strategy on levels of fear have not materialized. There have been some occasions, of course, when effective police action against a serial murderer or rapist has reassured a terrorized community. Under ordinary circumstances, however, success of the police in calming fears has been hard to show. The Kansas City experiment showed that citizens were unaware of the level of patrol that occurred in their area. Consequently, they were neither reassured by increased patrolling nor frightened by reduced levels of patrol.29 Subsequent work on response times revealed that fast responses did not necessarily reassure victims. Before victims even called the police, they often sought assistance and comfort from friends or relatives. Once they called, their satisfaction was related more to their expectations of when the police would arrive than to actual response time. Response time alone was not a significant
factor in citizen satisfaction. Thus, the dominant strategy of policing has not performed particularly well in reducing or channeling citizens' fears.

In contrast to the Kansas City study of motorized patrol, two field experiments have now shown that citizens are aware of increases or decreases in levels of foot patrol, and that increased foot patrol reduces citizens’ fears. After reviewing surveys of citizens’ assessments of crime problems in neighborhoods that had enhanced, constant, or reduced levels of foot patrol, the authors of The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment concluded:

... persons living in areas where foot patrol was created perceived a notable decrease in the severity of crime-related problems. And:

Consistently, residents in beats where foot patrol was added see the severity of crime problems diminishing in their neighborhoods at levels greater than the other two [kinds of] areas.

Similarly, a foot patrol experiment in Flint, Michigan, found the following:

Almost 70 percent of the citizens interviewed during the final year of the study felt safer because of the Foot Patrol Program. Moreover, many qualified their response by saying that they felt especially safe when the foot patrol officer was well known and highly visible. Whether foot patrol can work in less dense cities, and whether it is worth the cost, remain arguable questions. But the experimental evidence clearly supports the hypothesis that fear is reduced among citizens exposed to foot patrol.

Even more significantly, complex experiments in Newark and Houston with a varied mix of fear reduction programs showed that at least some programs could successfully reduce citizens’ fears. In Houston, the principal program elements included:

1. a police community newsletter designed to give accurate crime information to citizens;
2. a community organizing response team designed to build a community organization in an area where none had existed;
3. a citizen contact program that kept the same officer patrolling in a particular area of the city and directed him to make individual contacts with citizens in the area;
4. a program directing officers to re-contact victims of crime in the days following their victimization to reassure them of the police presence; and
5. establishing a police community contact center staffed by two patrol officers, a civilian coordinator, and three police aids, within which a school program aimed at reducing truancy and a park program designed to reduce vandalism and increase use of a local park were discussed, designed, and operated.

In Newark, some program elements were similar, but some were unique. Newark’s programs included the following:

1. a police community newsletter;
2. a coordinated community policing program that included a directed police citizen contact program, a neighborhood community police center, neighborhood cleanup activities, and intensified law enforcement and order maintenance;
3. a program to reduce the signs of crime that included: a) a directed patrol task force committed to foot patrol, radar checks on busy roads, bus checks to enforce city ordinances on buses, and enforcement of disorderly conduct laws; and b) a neighborhood cleanup effort that used police auspices to pressure city service agencies to clean up neighborhoods, and to establish a community work program for juveniles that made their labor available for cleanup details.

Evaluations of these different program elements revealed that programs “designed to increase the quantity and improve the quality of contacts between citizens and police” were generally successful in reducing citizens’ fears. This meant that the Houston Citizen Contact Patrol, the Houston Community Organizing Response Team, the Houston Police Community Station, and the Newark Coordinated Community Policing Program were all successful in reducing fear.

Other approaches which encouraged close contact, such as newsletters, the victim re-contact program, and the signs-of-crime program, did not produce clear evidence of fear reduction in these experiments. The reasons that these programs did not work, however, may have been specific to the particular situations rather than inherent in the programs themselves. The victim re-contact program ran into severe operating problems in transmitting information about victimization from the reporting officers to the beat patrol officers responsible for the re-contacts. As a result, the contacts came far too long after the victimization. Newsletters might be valuable if they were published and distributed in the context of ongoing conversations with the community about crime problems. And efforts to eliminate the signs of crime through order maintenance and neighborhood cleanup might succeed if the programs were aimed at problems identified by the community. So, the initial failures of these particular program elements need not condemn them forever.

The one clear implication of both the foot patrol and fear reduction experiments is that closer contact between citizens and police officers reduces fear. As James Q. Wilson concludes in his foreword to the summary report of the fear reduction experiment:

In Houston, ... opening a neighborhood police station, contacting the citizens about their problems, and stimulating the formation of neighborhood organizations where none had existed can help reduce the fear of crime and even reduce the actual level of victimization.

In Newark, many of the same steps—including opening a storefront police office and directing the police to make con-
The success of these police tactics in reducing fear, along with the observation that fear is a separate and important problem, suggests a new area in which police can make a substantial contribution to the quality of life in the Nation's cities. However, it seems likely that programs like those tried in Flint, Newark, and Houston will not be tried elsewhere unless mayors and police administrators begin to take fear seriously as a separate problem. Such programs are expensive and take patrol resources and managerial attention away from the traditional functions of patrol and retrospective investigation of crimes. Unless their effects are valued, they will disappear as expensive luxuries.

On the other hand, mayors and police executives could view fear as a problem in its own right and as something that inhibits rather than aids effective crime control by forcing people off the streets and narrowing their sense of control and responsibility. If that were the case, not only would these special tactics become important, but the overall strategy of the department might change. That idea has led to wider and more sustained attacks on fear in Baltimore County and Newport News.

In Baltimore County, a substantial portion of the police department was committed to the Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) unit—a program designed to improve the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and the police and to work on problems of concern to citizens. A major objective was to reduce fear. The effort succeeded. Measured levels of fear dropped an average of 10 percent for the various projects during a 6 month period. In Newport News, the entire department shifted to a style of policing that emphasized problem-solving over traditional reactive methods. This approach, like COPE, took citizens' fears and concerns seriously, as well as serious crime and calls for service.

These examples illustrate the security-enhancing potential of problem-solving and community approaches to policing. By incorporating fear reduction as an important objective of policing, by changing the activities of the police to include more frequent, more sustained contacts with citizens, and by consultation and joint planning, police departments seem to be able not only to reduce fear, but to transform it into something that helps to build strong social institutions. That is the promise of these approaches.

**Conclusion**

Fear of crime is an important problem in its own right. Although levels of fear are related to levels of criminal victimization, fear is influenced by other factors, such as a general sense of vulnerability, signs of physical and social decay, and inter-group conflict. Consequently, there is both a reason for fear and an opportunity to work directly on that fear, rather than indirectly through attempts to reduce criminal victimization.

The current police strategy, which relies on motorized patrol, rapid responses to calls for service, and retrospective investigations of crime, seems to produce little reassurance to frightened citizens, except in unusual circumstances when the police arrest a violent offender in the middle of a crime spree. Moreover, a focus on controlling crime rather than increasing security (analogous to the medical profession's focus on curing disease rather than promoting health) leads the police to miss opportunities to take steps that would reduce fear independently of reducing crime. Consequently, the current strategy of policing does not result in reduced fear. Nor does it leave much room for fear reduction programs in the police department.

This is unfortunate, because some fear reduction programs have succeeded in reducing citizens' fears. Two field experiments showed that foot patrol can reduce fear and promote security. Programs which enhance the quantity and quality of police contacts with citizens through neighborhood police stations and through required regular contacts between citizens and police have been successful in reducing fear in Houston and Newark.

The success of these particular programs points to the potential of a more general change in the strategy of policing that (1) would make fear reduction an important objective and (2) would concentrate on improving the quantity and quality of contacts between citizens and police at all levels of the department. The success of these approaches has been demonstrated in Baltimore County and Newport News.

Based on this discussion, it is apparent that a shift in strategy would probably be successful in reducing fear, and that that would be an important accomplishment. What is more speculative (but quite plausible) is that community policing would also be successful in channeling the remaining fear along constructive rather than destructive paths. Criminal victimization would be reduced, and the overall quality of community life enhanced beyond the mere reduction in fear.
Notes


18. Ibid., p. 212.


20. Ibid., p. 222.


22. William C. Cunningham and Todd Taylor, The Hallcrest


27. O. W. Wilson, Distribution of Police Patrol Forces (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1941).

28. For an example of the use of fear to build support for the police, see the discussion of the “fear city” campaign in The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment (Washington, D.C.: Police Foundation, 1981), pp. 120–21.

29. Kelling et al., Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment.


31. The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, p. 72.

32. Ibid., p. 123.


34. Antony Pate et al., Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark, pp. 7–10.

35. Ibid., pp. 10–18.

36. Ibid., p. 35.

37. James Q. Wilson, in Pate et al., Reducing Fear of Crime in Houston and Newark, p. ii.


39. Ibid., p. 20.


The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

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