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ACQUISITIONS

Debating the Evolution of American Policing

*An edited transcript to accompany
"The Evolving Strategy of Policing"*

Edited by Francis X. Hartmann

Editor's note: The following is an edited transcript reflecting strongly held opinions by members of the Kennedy School's Executive Session on Policing about "The Evolving Strategy of Policing," a companion piece to this transcript in the Perspectives on Policing series. Excerpts from "The Evolving Strategy of Policing" are included to clarify parts of the discussion; they appear in large, indented type such as that following this note.

We have found it useful to divide the history of policing into three different eras. These eras are distinguished from one another by the apparent dominance of a particular strategy of policing. The political era, so named because of the close ties between police and politics, dated from the introduction of police into municipalities during the 1840's, continued through the Progressive period, and ended during the early 1900's. The reform era developed in reaction to the political. It took hold during the 1930's, thrived during the 1950's and 1960's, began to erode during the late 1970's. The reform era now seems to be giving way to an era emphasizing community problem solving.

By dividing policing into these three eras dominated by a particular strategy of policing, we do not mean to imply that there were clear boundaries between the eras. Nor do we mean

This is one in a series of reports originally developed with some of the leading figures in American policing during their periodic meetings at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. The reports are published so that Americans interested in the improvement and the future of policing can share in the information and perspectives that were part of extensive debates at the School's Executive Session on Policing.

The police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and others invited to the meetings have focused on the use and promise of such strategies as community-based and problem-oriented policing. The testing and adoption of these strategies by some police agencies signal important changes in the way American policing now does business. What these changes mean for the welfare of citizens and the fulfillment of the police mission in the next decades has been at the heart of the Kennedy School meetings and this series of papers.

We hope that through these publications police officials and other policymakers who affect the course of policing will debate and challenge their beliefs just as those of us in the Executive Session have done.

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that in those eras everyone policed in the same way. Obviously, the real history is far more complex than that. Nonetheless, we believe that there is a certain professional ethos that defines standards of competence, professionalism, and excellence in policing; that at any given time, one set of concepts is more powerful, more widely shared, and better understood than others; and that this ethos changes over time.

Mark Moore: This paper analyzes stages in the evolution of the concept of policing. It is both an analytic framework and a historical analysis. When we last presented the paper, people had difficulty with the distinction between the community policing of the future and the political policing that we imagine as a relic of the past.

Jim Wilson described the central challenge of community policing as protecting the gains that resulted from professionalism, and the separation of the police from political influence without expanding the distance between the police and the community.

Kenneth Newman: As a police chief who sat on top of policing in London, I think it leaves out very important dimensions of policing—for example, the way in which policing problems have evolved over the last two decades, particularly in relation to terrorism and organized crime. It seems to me that we are ignoring a whole superstructure of crime which is at the base of policing. We are talking about fundamentals, but are virtually ignoring many of the evolutionary factors about policing.

I am not sure the paper catches the full weight of the “sea change” that is taking place. If you are looking for a rubric for the change, it is something like the “mobilization of the citizenry in their own defense.” It is receiving expression in the whole range of activities like neighborhood watch and business watch. I have no doubt the whole concept has extended in America as it is extending in Europe, that you are getting areas of functional surveillance like cab watch, where you harness the eyes and ears of the cab trade to the purposes of crime prevention.

You have hospital watch; you have programs like crime stoppers, where you mobilize the business community to support policing. Now, this has a very deep political significance, too, because in England these neighborhood watch groupings, although they began as local units, are aggregating to regional and national units. You now have the formation, I believe with the sponsorship of the Home

Secretary, of a national crime prevention organization which will actively encourage these aggregations of citizens’ mobilization.

Now, that is a very important, evolutionary “sea change” that is not captured in what we are saying here about policing.

Mark Moore: Chips Stewart has often articulated that there is a frontier of policing that demands regional consolidation or the creation of specialized capability to take on more serious kinds of problems.

Kenneth Newman: Now, about terrorism and organized crime. You must deal with those matters because there is an intimate relationship between the superstructure of organized crime and what happens in communities.

In some of those communities you find that condominiums are owned by organized crime, as are shopping parades. You can find a substantial part of the economic infrastructure is dominated by organized crime. We have to spell out how the organization for community policing interacts with the different kind of organization, the more highly centralized organization, that you need for dealing with those matters.

Michael Smith: When Sir Kenneth was speaking, I was thinking about a paper that Zach Tumin presented¹ to this group. In that paper, he reached for a way of lodging the authority, and to some extent the strategy, of law enforcement in ideas of “community” that were different from the political forces at play at a given moment in a given locale.

It struck me, when Sir Kenneth was talking, that organized crime and terrorism are indeed properly encompassed within the community policing idea because it is the restoration, maintenance, and nurturing of the institutions that are important to community life, which is law enforcement’s function. Described that way, “community” lends both authority to what is done and strategic content to the way in which it is to be done.

It does not suggest that patrol officers in beats ought to be handling the terrorism function. To that extent this paper may be misleading. But the idea of community goes well beyond the idea of the beat officer or the idea that community organizing can lend authority to the police. One might argue that it is the vision of community life, held by the larger society, that lends authority to the community policing idea.

1. Zachary Tumin, “Managing Relations with the Community,” Working Paper #86-05-06, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, November 1986.

In retrospect, the reform strategy was impressive. It successfully integrated its strategic elements into a coherent paradigm that was internally consistent and logically appealing. Narrowing police functions to crime fighting made sense. If police could concentrate their efforts on prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals, it followed that they could be more effective than if they dissipated their efforts on other problems. The model of police as impartial, professional law enforcers was attractive because it minimized the discretionary excesses which developed during the political era. Preventive patrol and rapid response to calls for service were intuitively appealing tactics, as well as means to both control officers and shape and control citizen demands for service. Further, the strategy provided a comprehensive, yet simple, vision of policing around which police leaders could rally. The metaphor of the thin blue line reinforced their need to create isolated independence and autonomy in terms that were acceptable to the public. The patrol car became the symbol of policing during the 1930's and 1940's; when equipped with a radio, it was at the limits of technology. It represented mobility, power, conspicuous presence, control of officers, and professional distance from citizens.

Patrick Murphy: It troubles me that on the very first page, it says: One, political; two, reform; and three, community. I do not think there was a reform era in policing, except for California, where they were and still are so far ahead. During the era that is labeled reform, there were a lot of other things happening. Vollmer, Wilson, and Parker's effect on American policing was a major happening.

You cannot talk about American policing without talking about J. Edgar Hoover and his enormous contributions. I attended the FBI National Academy in 1957, and for the first time in my career, I had the opportunity to spend 12 weeks with people from other police departments. The exchange of knowledge that went on was so eye-opening to me, after 10 or 12 years in the greatest police department in the world, that it was almost shocking to find out about how advanced some departments were.

If we are talking about the history of policing in the United States, we have to talk about Federal assistance. We have to talk about the crime commissions.

Edwin Meese III: I think the paper is good, but perhaps a shade grandiose. Suggesting that we have "a whole new era" to be compared with the reform era is too grand an approach. It is only one component of the whole picture.

I like the term "strategic policing" because we have been talking about the deployment of field forces. However, a very important aspect that Ken has repeatedly mentioned is the idea of analysis and intelligence as explaining how you use these people and how you use the information that they get.

We have not talked very much about how to support these deployed field forces in the community, with specialist services that are going to focus on homicide, citywide burglary rings, car theft rings, and organized crime and terrorism. We have neglected to talk about these except when we said, "If we do not have the other resources of the department readily available to those people in the community, the citizens are not going to be happy."

If we talked about community-involved policing as a part of a new era of policing, rather than being the total denomination, many of the concerns raised here would disappear. Everybody would realize that this is a very important contribution which, along with other things happening in the police field, marks a new era of strategic policing in which people are thinking about what they are doing.

Herman Goldstein: There should be some additional acknowledgment of these other concerns. Having deliberated for several years, we are now in a position in which papers that reflect the views of some members can be issued. I certainly do not agree with everything in this paper, but I assume that there will be a caption that will say that not everyone buys into this. While it reflects the benefits of these deliberations, it is the work of the authors and not the total product of this group's work.

Hoover wanted the FBI to represent a new force for law and order, and saw that such an organization could capture a permanent constituency that wanted an agency to take a stand against lawlessness, immorality, and crime. By raising eligibility standards and changing patterns of recruitment and training, Hoover gave the FBI agents stature as upstanding moral crusaders. By committing the organization to attacks on crimes such as kidnapping, bank robbery, and espionage—crimes that attracted wide

publicity and required technical sophistication, doggedness, and a national jurisdiction to solve—Hoover established the organization's reputation for professional competence and power. By establishing tight central control over his agents, limiting their use of controversial investigation procedures (such as undercover operations), and keeping them out of narcotics enforcement, Hoover was also able to maintain an unparalleled record of integrity. That, too, fitted the image of a dogged, incorruptible crime-fighting organization. Finally, lest anyone fail to notice the important developments within the Bureau, Hoover developed impressive public relations programs that presented the FBI and its agents in the most favorable light. (For those of us who remember the 1940's, for example, one of the most popular radio phrases was, "The FBI in peace and war"—the introductory line in a radio program that portrayed a vigilant FBI protecting us from foreign enemies as well as villains on the "10 Most Wanted" list, another Hoover/FBI invention.)

Struggling as they were with reputations for corruption, brutality, unfairness, and downright incompetence, municipal police reformers found Hoover's path a compelling one.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: The myth has grown up that J. Edgar Hoover in particular, and the Bureau in general, sought to limit itself to simple crimes in order to gain positive publicity. That myth is inaccurate. The Bureau of Investigation was founded in 1908 with 32 people, so that the Attorney General would not have to use Secret Service agents. Congress had prohibited the Attorney General from using Secret Service agents to conduct investigations for the Justice Department. Its jurisdiction was essentially the Mann Act, prostitution, and various crimes that the Attorney General designated. When Hoover came in, in 1924, as a young attorney, the FBI had grown to about 200 people and was primarily conducting investigations for which no other entity had a particular responsibility. Very rapidly, as laws were passed, and the Interstate Acts were among the first, the Dyer Act and so forth, they were given to the Bureau.

I have done quite a bit of research in Bureau files and archives, and I do not know that any Federal offense was ever declined or shunted off to another agency, with one

exception. Back in the sixties, Hoover was asked if he wanted to take on the Bureau of Narcotics. He indicated that the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics should not be combined because drug offenses are crimes of a very different type and require a single dedicated agency. That was in an era when we did not have the mixture of drugs throughout criminal activity. And second, he did not want the corrupting influence of drugs on FBI agents. That is how this myth has grown up.

The role of the National FBI Academy as a force within American policing has been raised by Pat Murphy. The Academy brought police together for the first time, allowed them to exchange ideas, and created the awareness that experimentation was taking place in various departments. The Academy made it appropriate for law enforcement officers to pursue academic review of their activities and established that law enforcement could learn from the example of other organizations.

The IACP (International Association of Chiefs of Police) made a very important contribution in centralizing certain police services, such as the identification process, which became the Identification Division of the FBI, the National Laboratory, and so forth. And UCR (*Uniform Crime Reports*) is another contribution, of course.

If you are going to talk about the evolution of law enforcement in the United States, these themes are very important to the overall progress.

James "Chips" Stewart: I want to compliment George because he captured the essence of the issues in one of his other articles better than anybody else has. However, I think that this particular paper is flawed in the way it characterizes policing.

Lee Brown handed out a pamphlet about his new police substation. In it, a paragraph says, "What has happened here is not a revolution but an evolution that will change policing and the management involved in providing that policing." That captures more of what we are doing than George Kelling's statement of community policing does.

One theme of the evolution in policing might be the use of force and the law. The political era's concept of force could characterize police as 800-pound gorillas who sit where they want to sit. Political era police are the law and they manage through intimidation, selective use of force, and harassment.

In the reform era, there is a reaction to this personal and arbitrary use of force. The police become very defensive about their use of force; they use the rule of law as authority for their actions. They did not use the rule of law during the political era at all. In fact, they very rarely appealed to the courts when policing the community.

The reform era saw a tremendous movement of the courts into the arena of policing. The courts' impact on reform policing has been enormous and it is neglected in this paper. The law authorized police actions and courts reviewed them in the context of the law, not the community nor politicians. This influence ought to be included.

The civil rights and antiwar demonstrations can be seen as an extension of the reform movement. They are an effort to extend legalistic control over the police. The police and their use of force had to be authorized by the rule of law, not politics.

Now we are moving into what George characterizes as the community era. I would describe it as problem oriented. Ed Meese articulates it as strategic policing as does Sir Kenneth, I believe. I look at it as an era when police took a proactive approach to their work, in terms of seeking out problems in the community so that they can have impact on them.

The reform era, I believe, directed police to rely exclusively on the criminal justice system and to operate within a narrow, legalistic frame of reference. This coincided with an explosion in crime that overloaded and overburdened the criminal justice system.

The police believed they could not do much because they were not empowered by law and the courts to do it. The public began to say "no, we want more from our police," and the demands of the public forced us out of this legalistic envelope.

Community or strategic policing relies not just on the law to solve crime problems, but on a spectrum of solutions, some of which lie in the criminal justice system. Other solutions are in the community, the private sector, volunteers, and a whole host of resources beyond the justice system.

Another thread that goes through this evolution in policing is the use of discretion, who controls it, and how it is informed.

These themes—discretion, the use of force, and the law—are better ways to approach the description of this evolution. They capture what the group really has in mind and address a number of the areas of concern that have been brought up. In continuing to use the term "community policing," we unnecessarily narrow the evolution that we all perceive is taking place.

I agree with Sir Kenneth that there has been a sea change in public attitudes and the police are part of that change. I think the paper falls short of reflecting that change accurately.

Mark Moore: These are very articulate criticisms. Let me say why we keep talking about this phrase "community policing."

Let us imagine, for a moment, that there are two different fronts on which new investments in policing are likely to be made. One lies in the direction of more thoughtful, more information-guided, more active attacks on particular crime problems. Some are local crime problems like robbery and burglary, and some turn out to be much bigger problems for which additional resources need to be brought to bear. These would include organized crime, terrorism, and sophisticated frauds.

That is one frontier. In many respects it is a continuation of an increasingly thoughtful, professionalized, forensic, tactical-minded police department.

The other front is the developing theme of how to strike up a relationship with the community so that we can enlist their aid, focus on the problems that turn out to be important, and figure out a way to be accountable in a world in which the story about being accountable for the full and fair application of the law is no longer a plausible story. And we want the freedom to deploy a variety of remedies in addition to the simple application of the law and we want to be able to talk to somebody about whether we are doing that satisfactorily.

The first strand is captured by notions of strategic and problem-solving policing. The second strand is captured by the concept of community policing.

We all know that when you try to move an organization, only a certain amount of energy can go into new investments and the construction of new capabilities. My judgment is that the problem solving—strategic thing will take care of itself because it is much more of a natural development in policing. If you are going to make a difference, you ought to describe a strategy that challenges the police in the areas in which they are least likely to make investments in repositioning themselves. That is this far more problematic area of fashioning a relationship with the community.

Given the opportunities for improvements and advancement along both fronts, that would be the argument why one front might be described in a slightly exaggerated way compared with the other. The other front is going to take care of itself. The one that you want to talk about is the hard one.

The paper is not a whole description of what is going on, it is naming the most problematic thing that needs to be worked out.

Allen Andrews: Then the paper needs to say that, and I hope that it would not be exaggerated, but emphasized.

I have several concerns about the history. "The thin blue line," to my recollection, arose in the sixties, as crime almost

exploded about our ears and, to be perfectly frank, you academics were at war with us as to whether there was a real crime increase. The police felt that they were standing alone, talking about a crime increase that everybody said was not happening. And then, of course, we had disorder to boot, unprecedented in the careers of most of us in service at that time.

I have a concern about the statement “the community need for rapid response to calls sometimes is largely the consequence of police selling the service.” I do not recall it that way and I have been mixing with police chiefs for nearly 30 years. The fact is that you have had an evolution here.

Learning from Hoover, police reformers vigorously set out to sell their brand of urban policing. They, too, performed on radio talk shows, consulted with media representatives about how to present police, engaged in public relations campaigns, and in other ways presented an image of police as crimefighters. In a sense, they began with an organizational capacity—anticrime police tactics—and intensively promoted it.

Allen Andrews: The advent of the motor car permitted police to get to some places with the speed that they could not before. As the motor car developed, it became inevitable that the public wanted more response, asked for it, and police responded. It just makes common sense. There are a lot of incidents occurring; you are expected to get there. The impact of the Depression arrived in American cities and on police. There was not a reform movement demand for efficiency to abolish foot patrol—these things developed because of money pressures. Police chiefs went down fighting over the issue of abolishing and retracting foot patrol. In 1954, New York City had Operation Twenty-Five, a major experiment to demonstrate that foot patrol was still valuable and that cutting back foot patrol was a costly mistake in results, although it saved money.

Yet the paper portrays the reform police chief calling foot patrol “an outmoded, expensive frill.” Ultimately it got that way, and I have said it myself. But, by then, it was an issue of reversing the tide.

Daryl Gates: Well, I have to agree with Allen. Those of us who are older read this and find it just does not fit the history. For example, our response time has always been

poor principally because we have a very small police department and an awful lot of area to cover and we found that there are many other things that need to be done besides answering calls. We try very hard to answer emergency calls quickly, but it is difficult.

I have a hard time fitting the history of policing, as I know it, to the pattern that I see in this paper. The eras carved out in the paper are not precise at all. For example, in 1969 we began the basic car plan. In 1970 we were fully implementing the basic car plan—that was community-oriented policing. The neighborhood watch—we were meeting with the people. In the early 1970’s the entire operation went to team policing. Three thousand people were involved in team policing—detectives, traffic, everything that we did. In 1973, we decentralized our department.

Also, when we talk about these reform areas, we talk about ridding the police of political control. If anyone here believes today that political influence does not prevail in major cities in this country, you are deluding yourselves.

Chiefs today are unfortunately deeply tied to politics and politicians. It’s a very sad commentary on local policing. How do chiefs refer to their mayor? “My mayor.” “Is your mayor going to win this election? Yes, I think she is going to win; yes, I think he is going to win.” And if they do not, that is the last time we see that commissioner or that chief. Gone, because of political whim, not his or her performance as a chief. So, if you do not think politics are tied into policing today, you are being very, very foolish.

George Kelling: Let me respond: little has been said that I disagree with. Allen and I would interpret some things differently. Because I look at it from the outside, I interpret the role of the FBI differently from Buck Revell and maybe Ed Meese.

What we are talking about is a model. To the extent that a model is adhered to or not is of less concern than the extent to which it is a model which the profession identifies with and presents as its ideology. Of course, there are wide variations. Certainly, the reform era did not get politics out of policing.

Yet, we all believe that it is heresy to say that politics should influence the decisions of police and the allocation of personnel, or anything else. But we all know that happens.

What I tried to examine was the development of a set of myths that dominate the profession and against which the profession measures itself, the central beliefs of the occupation.

You may not have had 911, but did have rapid response to calls for service; 911 has come to symbolize that. The paper is an attempt to characterize stages of history by the ideology which dominated.

Edwin Meese III: I think that you are trying to reduce this to an academic definition which is not helpful for either the public or for the people working in the field. Some of us are concerned that these definitions are too rigidly compartmentalized.

You suggested that it is “heresy” to say that politics guides police decisions. Well, it is not heresy, because in our discussions we are substituting new political forces—the community and the people in the community—for the old political forces, which at one time were the mayor or the party leaders. More recently, after reform, the political influences are the people in police work themselves. Mayors and others still have a great deal to say, but the police professionals have a firmer grasp of implementation. This is an evolution of understanding rather than strictly compartmentalized periods.

Francis X. “Frank” Hartmann: George, what do you hear in this conversation?

George Latimer: I hear two levels of criticism. One concerns the historical accuracy of the facts. The more fatal criticism is related to the model itself, that it is not as encompassing as the current challenges. And I hear the mixing of words, for different purposes. Daryl Gates describes politics of a kind which will always play a role. Ed Meese has introduced the notion of a different kind of politics, a good kind of politics, if you will. Not that a minority cannot threaten you with violations of people’s rights, but it is different from the “ward heeling” system. That is what Ed is saying.

James “Chips” Stewart: During the sixties, seventies, and eighties, the police have been aligned with the crime victims, while academia, the courts, and the press have seemed more concerned with defendants’ rights. In the eighties, however, the courts and the press are talking about a new partnership with the victims movement. This is where the police have been all along.

New legislation talks about greater penalties and the rights of both the accused and the innocent are promoted. Our efforts to work on DNA, our efforts to work on better forensics, to improve the police delivery of service, are all part of this very important change in police and community. That has not been mentioned in the paper. The characteristics that you have identified miss important characterizations of what was going on in the past.

Daniel Whitehurst: What I hear is the same thing that happens when a politician is being labeled either liberal or conservative. They always resist the label. There is resistance to being pigeonholed.

The purpose of the paper is to put today’s policing in a box. A model has to be created, which everyone will resist, yet it is a helpful and useful methodology.

I agree with the gist of the paper and buy into the idea of several different eras and yet see that you can find things today that still reflect the political or reform era. There are no neat, carefully drawn lines. But, maybe I do not resist the labeling because I am not the one being labeled.

George Kelling: Let me say that Pat Murphy and Chips Stewart are absolutely right that when I evaluate the changes, I have not included a section on the legal changes, like Miranda. That should be added, because you are right about that.

Mark Moore: The other thing that I keep hearing is that we missed the civil rights movement.

George Kelling: Yes. I believe that several things need redoing: the section on environment is wrong. When I am talking about environment I emphasize the level of intimacy between police and citizens. The concept of environment generally also includes an organization’s relationship to technological, social, demographic, and cultural changes and the occupation’s response to it.

Allen Andrews: If the history could be elaborated, as George has already indicated, that is well on the way to satisfying my principal concern. In terms of Sir Kenneth’s concerns, I think the fact we are zeroing in on the role of the uniformed police officer and the basic police function in the neighborhood needs to be acknowledged.

George Kelling: Well, in England, Sir Kenneth has responsibilities for organized crime and for terrorism, which is much less of a condition here.

Oliver “Buck” Revell: Perhaps the empirical data do not support the conceptualization itself, on the community era response and results. That is as troubling as what I see as inaccuracies in the history which may or may not have a significant impact on the model itself. I do not believe, when we talk about the quality of life and citizen satisfaction, that foot patrol and problem solving and team policing have been demonstrated as successful by the empirical data.

Robert Kliesmet: I came on the police department in 1955, when cops beat confessions out of people. I stood outside

while hired guns in the department who were deft at beating the truth out of people got it.

I saw Miranda come and I saw police executives go screaming out of the era of beating confessions out saying that we are going to continue doing what we have always done. Yet, in fact, there was a drastic change in the way police dealt with the community.

I then went through the 1960's, the war, LEAA, and I saw all kinds of new concepts coming into being, team policing being one of them. It was a damn good idea, but the chiefs did not buy it, because academics proposed it. I see the labor relations era of the 1970's differently than you do. We won some major court cases in terms of the rights of police officers. This made them more satisfied and, hopefully, they performed their duties better.

Now, I read a paper that delves into history, and I think it is accurate. I believe that the reform era is not gone; we are still in the reform era. However, I do believe that politics overrides, and that anything that we do here will ultimately come down to the political issue.

I have talked to Daryl Gates at length. He has a good system but that is Los Angeles, California. I can go to Burbank, which is in Los Angeles County, or Redondo Beach, or Sacramento, and they do not have a similar situation.

I travel the whole country talking to police officers who talk about joining our union, or who belong to our union. They are nowhere near where you are. How do we get them to this plateau? Is this group going to put them there?

Nothing is going to happen unless we actively talk about what we intend to do 2, 3, 5 years down the road. History does not mean a damn thing to the cop on the street. He will have to suffer until we implement the real solution to job satisfaction.

Patrick Murphy: The great heroes of policing in the United States are the cops who have to put up with the terrible management and the terrible organization. How can you expect to have decent organization and management when a Philadelphia captain will not spend a day going up the road 90 miles to see what happens in New York, or down to Baltimore, or to Washington? They are all closed institutions. Middle management is the big problem.

You cannot grapple with the problem of American policing at all if you do not start with the fact that we have 17,000 police departments. We have a nonsystem of local policing, but out there among those 17,000 police departments are

some gems of departments, and we have had outstanding chiefs. Unfortunately, chiefs come along and bring about reform or upgrading, and that is lost when they leave.

George Kelling: This paper was my attempt, on the basis of a lot of experience in many police departments, to get way back from the occupation and take a very long view, through binoculars. I suspect that when you do that, you see it differently from somebody who worked inside the field for a long period of time. This long view identifies what I consider to be the central tendencies of the occupation.

Now, in the paper, I deliberately put them in very stark terms. It is intended as a polemic. It is meant to raise issues for discussion.

There was always movement toward community, toward problem solving, that did not fit with the general direction of the organization. Police officers were always problem solving. The Kansas City experiment was a problem-solving exercise by Bob Wasserman. A group decided that the main problem was teenagers around schools. Then came the reaction, "We have to keep doing preventive patrol; we cannot concentrate on that problem because if we depart from preventive patrol the community might be torn apart by the bad people of the community." The rhetoric and the organization did not change.

Why are we making this transition now, and making it faster and with more ease than one would expect? Because there are people with weight now in the organization who have always thought in terms of community and addressing problems. And now, as we go through an evolution or a revolution or whatever, the organization is utilizing these capacities and making them part of the central tendencies of the organization.

Mark Moore: So the fraction of problem-solving or community-oriented things that were sanctioned as opposed to done illicitly is gradually changing.

George Latimer: The model is just crude enough to be perfect for a mayor and for a police chief. It is very helpful from a political standpoint, but that is just one use. I am prepared to simplify, because I am comfortable with it and the voters understand it.

It really does not matter whether the reform era ever ended. What does matter is that, conceptually, it is quite different to approach policing this way than the way we would in the hierarchical operation of a department. Most of the country, and this group of people, believe we ought to move away from the traditional hierarchical management system of operating police.

The rest of our deliberations are about how to connect it up with the community.

Daryl Gates: George [Kelling], when you started to describe what you were doing here as stepping back, from a viewpoint outside the police profession, and looking at the profession with binoculars, that put this paper in a different perspective. But the paper should say that in a preamble. Then the paper begins to make more sense to me. It is not history as such.

I have been sitting with major city chiefs for 19 years and have noted how policing in America is different from city to city. While there are great similarities, there is also a great deal of dissimilarity, even in community-oriented policing or community-based policing. The most interesting aspect of attending a major city chiefs' meeting is listening to the great diversity as expressed by each chief, yet noting how similar some of the problems are.

George Kelling: The existence of a unifying strategy does not mean that there were not regional and other variations among police departments during the reform era. Yet a model developed, and the model shaped how police thought about the business they were in and the kind of organizations police departments ought to be.

Oliver "Buck" Revell: A small elite did, but most police did not.

George Kelling: I think Buck is wrong, and I think Daryl is wrong about this, too. The characteristics of policing during the forties, fifties, and sixties are important issues for this group.

Hubert Williams: I liked the paper. The question in part is one of comprehensiveness. Outside of a few questions related to accuracy, the issues that are raised go largely to comprehensiveness. I have watched police for over 25 years, in departments and in pursuit of degrees in policing and criminal justice.

I see policing primarily as a reaction to the conditions that exist in our society at various times. America was once a very segregated society. A separate set of laws was enforced on the black community, the only significant minority. That has changed. We now have communities with a number of minorities, many of them at each other's throats.

We had, in 1967, a presidential commission on law enforcement, which was followed by the Kerner Commission Report. Both reported on the differences within our society.

The civil rights movement brought about an empowerment, it brought about greater democratization. It brought about a significant change in American life, both in terms of perceptions, and in terms of the acceptance by the minority community of what police and government do. Today there are minority chiefs in many of the major cities.

Unless we include the effect that the civil rights movement had on policing, we are not really dealing with the various movements that have changed policing. Before the riots occurred in this country, the salaries of police and the attention given to police by government officials was negligible. They just did not care about cops. The riots came, and suddenly everybody realized that the police are the ones that protect us out there. The police became important. Then, LEAA came about and there was a tremendous infusion of money into the system.

Patrick Murphy: The police were changed from the villains to the critical role of making this thing happen. The thin blue line of law and order is related to race.

Richard Larson: We have focused on a number of issues primarily because this is an advocacy piece. If I were to write such a piece, it would differ markedly from the current one on such issues as costs and feasibility of implementing these kinds of procedures in today's "tax cap" environments and the role of technology, to name two.

James "Chips" Stewart: My criticism from the beginning is that the community era is not distinguishable from the political era in this conceptualization. Decentralization is present in both, both have intimate relationships with community, both have foot patrol, both have political satisfaction, citizen satisfaction, both have law, both have politics.

Our discussions have reflected the evolution of police accountability and the paper should do that as well. Police accountability in the political era simply maintained the status quo. As Hubert indicated, accountability in the reform era was different. It evolved because police were not providing the sort of justice expected by society. When that happens, other institutions, such as the courts, will intrude on police discretion and hold the police accountable to new standards.

We are now moving out of the reform or legalistic era of accountability and trying to push to a new level of accountability responsive to the broader community. That is what is forcing this issue, a concern with crime and fear that merges

the victims movement, the civil rights movement, and the larger interests of the society. We have talked about how we integrate the notion of accountability with responsiveness to the community. The word “community” can be used as a code word for special interests.

We have taken that community idea and homogenized it and we think that we have a new community out there, not a community of special interests but the community of many interests concerned about crime and disorder.

George Latimer: Buck, you made the point that a correlation between community satisfaction and community policing has not been demonstrated by the evidence. In the so-called reform era, was community satisfaction considered a primary good and objective?

Oliver “Buck” Revell: Yes, but I have trouble with the concept of reform movement because as a participant observer of 25 years, I have probably dealt with four or five hundred police departments. August Vollmer, O.W. Wilson, and Bill Parker were not even known to the majority of these police departments. They had no concept of a reform movement. Most of them had heard of Hoover but they had not read him.

The things that really led to reform are Miranda, Mapp versus Ohio, the civil rights movement, bringing police into the modern era.

In response to your question, though, my point was that I do not think empirical data have proven that community satisfaction and quality of life are in fact improved by the models presented. I hope that we can find a model, because the police and the community need to be integrated on a much more specific and supportive basis.

George Kelling: Buck, you are thinking about the current era. I am talking about the reform that occurred at the beginning of the century. It was an extension of the progressive reform movement, professional management . . .

Oliver “Buck” Revell: Scientific management, machine theory was working its way into police ideology.

George Kelling: Yes, but that is not the 1960’s. The 1960’s begins the shattering, the unraveling of that.

Hubert Williams: We should take a look at the history and write further on this. I will take some responsibility for that. Pat Murphy and I have had the same perspectives on these issues, so Pat and I can write one together.

Mark Moore: We do not want to proclaim an answer; we want to have a conversation. George and I both feel this very strongly—that papers should reflect the deliberations of the group and genuinely emerge from the group, sometimes in opposition, sometimes in concert with the group. That is our publishing philosophy. The audience that we are trying to find is an audience of people who might be having this conversation at the FBI National Academy, at the PERF (Police Executive Research Forum) Executive Program, at the U.S. Conference of Mayors, at the New Mayors Meetings at the Kennedy School, and in discussions between mayors and police chiefs.

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