



Perspectives on Policing



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The Strategic Management of Police Resources

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Many American police departments feel themselves to be slowly drowning in a rising tide of serious crime and calls for service. Over the last decade, department workloads have risen steadily while their resources have stayed constant or often declined.¹ Police executives generally have responded by striving to enhance the efficiency of police operations and focus police resources on only the more serious calls. Computer-aided dispatching and other information systems have been employed to make the most of the patrol force, and many departments no longer respond at all to nuisance calls or provide services like escorts and house checks that the public once took for granted. Nonetheless, police in many cities find themselves more and more pressed, a problem recently greatly exacerbated—even in smaller communities—by unprecedented increases in drugs and violence.

It is thus understandable that many departments find calls for community policing unrealistic. As most police—and most mayors—understand the concept, community policing means taking on difficult new responsibilities, like fighting fear and solving community problems, using fresh tactics like foot patrol and community organizing. What room could there possibly be to do new jobs when the department can scarcely do the old ones?

Mayor Bud Clark of Portland, Oregon, was a community policing enthusiast when he took office in 1985, but he saw no place for the new strategy in what both he and the police agreed was a short-handed, overworked department. "Community-oriented policing means less relying on heavyhanded law enforcement and more getting at root causes," said Chuck Duffy, a Clark aide. "But we recognized the fact that you can't do it well unless you have an adequate level of police officers, because you've got to do the community outreach stuff with police on top of your base of patrol officers, and we were having trouble with our base."

Such sentiments are often, and understandably, expressed by police and municipal officials. They are the sum of four widely

Community policing represents a new future for American law enforcement, changing the way our Nation's police respond to the communities they serve. This report, one in a series entitled *Perspectives on Policing*, is based on discussions held in the Executive Session on Policing sponsored by NIJ at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The Executive Session on Policing has been developed as part of the Kennedy School's Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management and is funded by the National Institute of Justice and private sources that include the Charles Stewart Mott and Guggenheim Foundations. The success of the police mission now and in the years ahead is the common goal of those who have participated in the Executive Session. Helping to achieve that goal is the purpose of these reports.

The Executive Session on Policing has brought together police chiefs, mayors, scholars, and many others in periodic meetings to focus on modern strategies that produce better results. The rapid growth of these strategies shows the willingness of American police executives to test new approaches to crime, disorder, drugs, and fear in their communities.

We hope that these publications will challenge police executives and local officials to reexamine their approach to law enforcement, just as those who participated in the Executive Session have done.

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held beliefs about contemporary policing (until recently, nearly universally held). One is that the public demand for police services, particularly for 911 rapid-response services, is largely out of police control. The second is that departmental resources are, in the main, already deployed to best advantage, efficiently and effectively. The third is that community policing (like other new policing strategies such as problem-oriented policing) is a discretionary add-on to the core job of policing. Because it is seen as “soft,” aimed more at community and public relations than at crime control, it is often delayed and resisted when crime and workloads are on the rise. (In other words, the real job of policing is traditional enforcement, and departments should not be distracted from that mission.) The fourth belief is that police resources, meaning police department budgets, are largely static, particularly in the current climate of fiscal constraint. The largest gains a department can hope to make, on this line of thinking, are still small—an improvement in patrol deployment here, a few extra positions there. It is no surprise that the police find large increases in calls for service, or striking new challenges like the crack epidemic and waves of youth violence, very difficult to meet.

Increasingly, however, there is reason to believe that none of these four beliefs is true. The concrete experience of numerous innovative police departments—including Portland, which found ways to move into community policing despite resource constraints—is proving otherwise. The police can, in fact, manage public demand and expectations for police services. They can deploy their current resources in new and improved ways. They can use community and problem-solving policing strategies to achieve ambitious crime-control objectives. And they can find and win new resources, budgetary and otherwise, to help them do their various jobs. These are fundamental, not marginal, gains; they hold out the hope of major advances in the struggle to fight crime and improve the quality of life in troubled cities. This paper will take each of these arguments in turn, then turn to a discussion of their combined significance for the future of policing.

Call management and differential response

No challenge is more immediate, no job more demanding, in many police departments than the crushing burden of answering the public’s calls for service. Individual officers in busy cities feel the weight on every shift. “If you drive out there and make yourself available for calls, you wouldn’t be available one minute that night for anything else,” says Los Angeles Police Department patrol officer Joe Ciancanelli. “There wouldn’t be a dull moment, no time for anything.” Patrol forces have, over the last 10 years, increasingly been restricted to answering the tolling of the 911 bell. Fewer and fewer people and less and less time are available for foot patrol, problem solving, crime prevention, or any other important tasks a chief might want the force to perform.

That concern is heightened by a growing sense that for the vast majority of calls for service, rapid response is not—contrary to several generations of police belief and expectations—an appropriate or effective crime-fighting tool. Most dispatched calls—

50 to 90 percent, in most jurisdictions—are not about crime. In only a small percentage of those that are about crime—less than 5 percent of all dispatched calls, in most cities—does the officer have a chance to intervene or make an arrest.² Nobody doubts that for that crucial 5 percent, the response should be immediate and authoritative. But in the other 95 percent, the scene is cold and the officer can do little more than take a report and soothe the victim. “Most of the time,” says Ernest Curtsinger, chief of the St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department, “irrespective of the call, you get there and the bad guy is gone and the real emergency situation is over.” The high hopes once pinned on rapid response and 911 systems have turned, in many police quarters, to a profound concern about their insatiable appetite for resources. “We have created,” says one chief, “a monster.”

At the same time, many police executives despair of winning public acceptance for any other way of delivering police services, even approaches like problem solving that might actually improve conditions and cut down on the volume of calls coming

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into departments. Rapid response, in this view, is a promise that the police have made to the public and that cannot be broken, regardless of its operational shortcomings. “People expect us to come when they call; that’s an absolute,” says one chief. “Believing anything else is a pipe dream.”

Other executives, though, are looking for new ways both to handle calls and to reshape public expectations. Their goal is generally to preserve, and even enhance, their departments’ ability to respond immediately to true emergencies while finding more efficient, and perhaps more effective, ways to respond to less urgent calls without disappointing the public in the process. Evidence is accumulating that it can be done.

Much of the work being done in this area builds on one core idea: that the public will not insist on immediate responses to nonemergency calls, if it is properly prepared for what to expect instead. As long ago as 1976, research showed that public satisfaction with police handling of calls was less influenced by the speed of response than it was by the difference between anticipated and actual response times.³ The public’s expectations, in other words, seemed to be central to their sense of how well the police were performing. Could those expectations be deliberately reshaped?

In the early 1980’s, the National Institute of Justice designed its Differential Police Response experiments to find out. The DPR research tested public reaction to a range of alternative response strategies for nonemergency calls—walk-in and mail-in report-

ing, telephone report units, officer response delayed by up to half an hour, officer response by appointment, and the like—in Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio. Dispatchers were carefully trained in how to rank calls and, when appropriate, inform callers about the new responses. Administrative mechanisms were developed in each department to make sure that what dispatchers promised—for instance, to have an officer arrive to take a report at a particular time—was actually delivered.

The results were striking. More than 90 percent of callers in all three cities who received the alternative responses were satisfied with them (with the exception of the write-in option, which proved less popular).⁴ Nearly half of all calls could have been so handled (not that many were, because of the experiments' designs).⁵ Even with the limited proportion of alternative responses permitted in the experiments, patrol workload was reduced by as much as one-fifth.⁶ Instituting and staffing the

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alternatives turned out to be fairly straightforward and inexpensive; in Toledo, for instance, 4 report-takers in a headquarters telephone unit were worth 10 in the field. Many of the alternatives were, and more could have been, staffed by civilians. The speed and quality of rapid response to priority calls was unaffected. Overall, the NIJ report concluded, “Police departments can achieve a sizable reduction in the number of non-emergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch, without sacrificing citizen satisfaction.”⁷ Contemporary reports from the field bore them out. Some departments were able to take as much as 45 percent of their reports over the phone.⁸

While that view has gained some currency in policing in recent years, it has generally done so against the grain of police wishes and preferences. Conditions may have made it impossible to answer every call with a dispatched officer, and differential response strategies (particularly telephone reporting units) are no longer as rare as they once were, but there is often a lingering sense that they represent an unfortunate backing away from the ideals of policing. Nor, in most departments, have call management and differential response had much effect on the nature and role of the patrol force. Street officers may be less burdened as a result, but the basic job of patrol and response remains largely as before.

This is beginning to change. Police executives are increasingly undertaking call management and differential response as part

of a purposeful shift to new community and problem-solving policing strategies, and with the express intent of substantially reshaping patrol (and often other) operations.⁹ Chief Darrel Stephens, for instance, relied heavily on a relatively traditional telephone report-taking unit to make room in the Newport News department to do problem-solving policing, which proved successful against a wide variety of crime and order problems.¹⁰ In St. Petersburg, Florida, call management allowed the department to shift significant resources into community policing while simultaneously cutting response times to high-priority calls by more than 20 percent.¹¹

The Reno, Nevada, Police Department, a recent convert to community policing, splits its patrol force on a day-to-day basis between special projects and mobile response. Call management is handled through the headquarters dispatching center, which presents callers with a wide variety of service options for non-emergency calls. Where an officer's presence is appropriate or insisted upon, the dispatcher keeps callers apprised of when one should be available. Because mobile response is now handled by perhaps half as many officers as in the pre-community policing department, getting a car to a low-priority scene often takes several hours. But with careful departmental attention to explaining why, citizen satisfaction—tracked by formal polling—has remained high.¹²

There is reason to believe that problem solving can reduce calls for service. Addresses and areas that generate repeat calls for service are easily identified by police from departmental information, and efforts to address these repeat calls often feature in departments' problem-solving efforts. In one now-classic example, a sergeant in the Philadelphia Police Department solved a noise problem caused by a jukebox bar and cut calls for service that had been coming in at a rate of a thousand a year down to zero.¹³ In Florida, Tampa's QUAD program against street drug dealing appears to have cut citywide calls for service considerably.¹⁴ And, while they generally lack firm proof, officers and supervisors involved in problem solving are invariably convinced that their work lowers their departments' call loads. Difficult though the job may be, making room in departments for proactive, problem-solving policing appears likely to pay substantial returns.

The new strategies' overall emphasis on such things as devolution of police authority, beat integrity, and street-level problem solving is beginning to give rise to new models of call management. One of the most interesting comes from the Houston Police Department, which—as part of its neighborhood-oriented policing philosophy—has planned a high-tech decentralization of call management. Priority one and two calls would still be dispatched from headquarters. Other calls, though, would be patched through via in-car video display terminals to shift sergeants, who would be expected to manage both their officers, via radio, and the callers, via cellular phone. The sergeants' job would be to provide the best mix of police response for their areas, balancing the need to work on community and problem-solving projects against the need to respond to individual callers—and, where necessary, to explain and justify their decisions to the public.¹⁵ The result, if the scheme works, will be call

management and police services custom-tailored precinct by precinct, and even shift by shift, to Houston's varied and ever-changing needs.

Two additional important points should be made about community policing and call management. First, community policing itself seems to perform a call management function. Calls in the pioneering Flint, Michigan, foot patrol districts, for instance, dropped 43 percent over the course of that department's formal experiment. Some of the decline was attributable to problem solving, but much of it was due to residents in the districts passing minor complaints directly to the foot officers rather than making formal calls for service. The foot officers then handled them as and when they wished. This was a far more efficient scheme than dispatching officers to every such call, and a much more popular one than refusing service for calls that failed to merit a formal dispatch, or promising a rapid response that in fact took hours to materialize.

Second, community policing makes formal call management schemes easier to sell to the public. When call management is used solely to relieve the workload on traditional patrol operations, the public is asked to give up something tangible and immediate—a response—in exchange for an efficiency gain that is usually perceived to benefit only the department. With community policing, the public arguably gets something—more responsive, more effective policing—for its sacrifice. As the Newport News, Reno, and other departments can attest, the public often finds this a welcome trade.

Reorganizing to make the most of departmental resources

Just as departments can reexamine their service preferences and obligations, they can reexamine their allocation and utilization of personnel. The first step is often simply to take a fresh look,

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with basic principles of good management in mind, at how a department does business. Police agencies, like all organizations, have a tendency to get set in their ways, and a management review, performed internally or by consultants, can often uncover significant room for improvement. For example, the Rivlin Commission on Budget and Financial Priorities of the District of Columbia examined the Washington, D.C., Police Department in 1990. The Commission discovered that the department, though an extreme case, had the highest overtime

expenses in the country, due chiefly to rigid work rules and hugely inefficient arrangements for the booking and charging of arrestees; the lowest proportion of civilian employees among 13 major departments; no capacity for crime and workload analysis, and therefore none for efficient personnel allocation; and actual assignment practices that bore little relation to formal ones (500 assignments to patrol existed only on paper, while the Youth Division had more than twice its authorized strength).¹⁶ While few departments may be in such dire straits, many could benefit from a similar examination.

Beyond such fundamental attention to rationalization and efficiency, policing is increasingly seeing moves toward a major, sometimes radical, strategic redistribution and reprogramming of departmental resources. One of the most visible is shifting people—and authority—out of headquarters and specialist units back to field commands. When Sir Kenneth Newman took over the London Metropolitan Police Department in 1982, he both “desquadded,” returning 10 percent of all headquarters squads and 1,200 additional headquarters posts to the field, and “flattened” the rank structure, entirely eliminating a senior rank that stood between Scotland Yard and its territorial commands. John Avery, commissioner in New South Wales, Australia, shifted much of his detective force to the field and put it under the authority of patrol commanders. Lee Brown put nearly 500 officers back on patrol when he took over in Houston, and began a similar but even more ambitious program in New York.¹⁷ The Reno department effectively eliminated all supervisory ranks between chief and area captain. Such moves are in part efforts to ease the burden of call response and other field activities. More fundamentally, however, they are intended to promote decentralization, precinct- and street-level problem solving, and responsiveness to the community.

In most departments, headquarters functions have long been valued more highly than precinct functions, and the work of detectives and other specialists more highly than that of patrol. Generations of police chiefs have found creating special squads an attractive response to new problems. It can be done fast; the new unit, consistent with traditional police concern for centralized command and control, can be easily monitored and supervised from headquarters; and the department has something concrete to point to, demonstrating it has taken the problem seriously. Unfortunately, such units, once established, are difficult to disband and tend to monopolize responsibility for the problem. In this way, they limit opportunities for police officers to learn how to handle such problems, and drain strength and creativity from geographic commands and more general functions like patrol.

Many departments now are trying to reverse that tendency by enhancing the authority and discretion of geographic commands. In New South Wales, for instance, detectives probably do not do any more detecting than they did before the shift. However, they worked before according to headquarters' interest in major cases and clearance rates, while now they are guided in part by geographic commands' assessments of the problems and community needs they face. The same is true with shifts of narcotics, juvenile, vice, and other specialists into geographic lines (though care must be taken to preserve the

department's capacity to act against highly mobile crime). Not only are more personnel in the field, but the department's overall capacity also is deployed for maximum problem-solving and community-service effectiveness.

This is, in a way, a new version of the very promising but generally short-lived team policing experiments of the 1970's.¹⁸ Those programs often failed because the demands of rapid response and headquarters expectations ran counter to teams' interest in local problem solving. New strategies, new allocations of resources, and new lines of authority give the new teams a much better chance to succeed.

Less tangible but no less important than these changes, in many innovative departments, is a major development in the philosophy of police administration. Police departments have long been governed by a paramilitary command-and-control approach that puts a premium on close supervision and the prevention of corruption and operational error. The traditional emphasis on discipline and propriety is laudable, but many modern police executives have come to believe that the paramilitary approach won that ground at the cost of organizational flexibility, responsiveness, and innovation. They are actively seeking ways to gain those qualities without at the same time opening the door to police misbehavior.

Beginning to emerge is a managerial and organizational style that looks more toward the best in private-sector and professional organizations than toward policing's own heritage. Modern police executives, no less than the CEO's of innovative high-tech firms, directors of teaching hospitals, or senior partners in architecture firms, are coming to believe that one of their main jobs is forging departments that are tied closely to their clients and in which junior and senior officers alike have the freedom and support to contribute as fully as they are able.¹⁹ This new environment, combined with schemes like call management, resource shifts like enhancing the strength and authority of patrol, and ideas like problem solving, can create significant new police capacities. Traditional policing, with its enforced focus on individual calls for service, gives patrol officers little choice but to handle each incident quickly and with little attention to underlying causes.

The new strategies, by letting officers look at patterns and clusters of calls and complaints, create within the department the capacity to investigate and intervene in situations that previously would have been handled far more superficially. Houston's Neighborhood Oriented Policing created institutional ground so fertile that one tactical squad sergeant was able to craft a scheme for putting a major open-air drug bazaar out of business, win community and departmental support for it, and see it through not only the elimination of the drug problem but through the area's commercial redevelopment—all by reprogramming precinct resources and putting them to new use.²⁰ Such individual successes, if they can be made the rule rather than the exception in policing, would represent not just more efficient, but substantially more effective, use of police resources.²¹

Doing more successful work

It increasingly appears that such stories could become policing's norm. In fact, the outlines of a very promising progression now are visible. The beginning came in the 1970's with programs like team policing, the Los Angeles Police Department's Senior Lead Officers, and Flint's foot patrol program, aimed at cultivating officers' contact with the community through innovative use of a relatively small proportion of the force.²² These programs often showed considerable operational promise, but they also showed insightful police executives that

“The creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative that community policing demands cannot easily be combined with the paramilitary hierarchy . . .”

bottom-up, community-focused policing was not easily commensurable with the claims and procedures of a predominantly response-oriented department. Over the course of the next decade came a host of attempts to shift departments wholesale into a new community-policing style, most notably in America by Lee Brown in Houston, but in different ways in a number of other departments as well. This was a time of striking, but frustratingly partial, results. Success stories like Link Valley in Houston; the Community Mobilization Project in Los Angeles; problem-solving policing in Newport News, Virginia; and many others seemed to herald the ability of police to prevent crime and solve problems in league with public and municipal allies. Generally, however, they remained isolated tales, both in the effect they had on cities and in the proportion of police effort they represented even in the most dedicated and experimental departments.²³

A third phase now appears to be beginning, in which departments more or less familiar with community-policing ideas apply them wholesale to policing cities, or to solving major citywide problems. This is happening first, predictably enough, in smaller cities whose forces can shift more readily to the new style. In some of these places, community policing is beginning to deliver on its promise of making a dent in serious crime. In Reno, Nevada, the police credit the new style with ending overt public drug dealing in the city and driving off the Los Angeles-based gangs that were establishing a beachhead in town. In Gainesville, Florida, a problem-solving approach cut convenience-store robberies by 65 percent. Tampa police, whose city was being overrun by crack and crack-related violence, organized a citywide problem-solving and community-

policing approach that eliminated street dealing almost entirely and brought overall crime levels down to pre-crack levels. Reported crime was down 12.4 percent in 1989; in some hot spots reported crime was down more than 20 percent.²⁴ All of these gains were made without additional resources (at least initially, a point we will return to), simply by employing smarter and more effective policing. One can hope that more cities will soon be able to tell similar stories.

If it is true that new policing strategies can make such striking improvements in police performance, then the most crucial resource management decision facing police executives is a new and extremely fundamental one: how to craft their departments in these new shapes, and how to manage the transition from here to there. Facing this task squarely is essential if the new strategies are to succeed. The new strategies are not programmatic add-ons to a police department's traditional organization and functions. Community organizing and problem solving represent a fundamentally different approach to doing the job of policing than do rapid response and retrospective investigation. They represent, in fact, an approach that is in many important ways incompatible with traditional police organization and tactics.

Making patrol officers responsible for problem solving, for example, means granting them a degree of operational discretion and giving them time to think and work that are not easily combined with a centralized dispatching operation devoted to minimizing response time to calls for service. Developing a departmental capacity to respond in a comprehensive fashion to community concerns—be they narcotics, guns, or the homeless—cannot easily be combined with a structure of detectives and other specialist squads operating largely autonomously from patrol and other geographic commands. The creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative that community policing demands cannot easily be combined with the paramilitary hierarchy and often draconian management style common to traditional departments. The list goes on and on; points of conflict are many and severe.

There is, here, both bad news and good news. The bad news is that the job of shifting a department, especially a large department, into the new strategies is a large and probably long one. The good news is that making that transition—not finding new resources—is the fundamental challenge facing a police executive interested in the strategies' potential. *How much money?* and *How many people?* while clearly still critical are no longer the central resource questions. The fundamental questions are *Money for what?* and *People for what?* As Houston, Newport News, Reno, and other departments are demonstrating, high workloads and limited resources are not necessarily insurmountable obstacles to moving successfully into community and problem-solving policing. The new ideas, to a considerable degree, open up to reconsideration all departments' traditional resource allocations. Just what can then be done with them the profession is only beginning to discover.

New resources

This is not to say that most police departments would not find more money and other resources very welcome, particularly as they move from traditional policing to more community-oriented, problem-solving policing. During that difficult transition, departments are in some ways in the worst of both worlds: they must invest in the reorganization, training, and technology the new strategy demands, and suffer the dislocations and inef-

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ficiencies of change without yet realizing many of the new strategy's promised gains. With most departments stretched to their limits already, additional resources would be useful. Fortunately, much is possible on this front. The experience of many departments shows that even cities in serious fiscal trouble often can find ways to offer their police significant new support.

One approach is for departments to raise, or cause to be raised, nontax revenues. A National Institute of Justice report on supplementing police budgets found the most promising avenues to be donation programs and asset forfeiture.²⁵ Businesses in Oakland, California, for instance, concerned that declining police budgets would threaten the planned revitalization of the city's commercial areas, raised more than \$750,000 for the Oakland Police Department.²⁶ The Miami Police Department netted \$5.5 million over 3 years from seizing and auctioning property used in criminal enterprises.²⁷ Cash assets seized through drug and money-laundering enforcement have proved important in many jurisdictions. In addition, many departments have experimented with user fees (for instance, for answering private burglar alarms), fees-for-services (for instance, for extra patrol in malls), and in-kind contributions (for instance, management training).

Such efforts can be significant, but they also raise important management and equity issues. Private funding, both of a general nature and for particular details, can create questions of improper access to and control over a public service. Aggressive asset seizure programs can create questions of public authority being deployed for narrow institutional interests. Many departments have managed to avoid any cast of impropriety, but

in each instance careful attention to actual and apparent conflicts is essential.

Some special relationships with the private sector, as in programs in which police managers attend corporate training programs, are by their nature much more benign. They can also be extremely important, particularly in departments working to reshape their administrative structures and cultures. Kevin Tucker, who took over the Philadelphia Police Department after the disastrous MOVE bombing, made this kind of management training a key part of his strategy to move the department toward more flexible, community-oriented policing.²⁸ The alliance not only built the kind of capacity in the department that Tucker wanted, it enlisted the cachet of private-sector management ideas in the service of his controversial reforms.

The new policing strategies create fresh and important opportunities for bringing outside resources to bear on police problems. Community and problem-solving police departments have shown, over and over again, that they can draw heavily on help from outside the department to handle what traditional police departments would have considered entirely police business. This is welcome news. It seems more and more apparent that the police alone cannot solve many crime and order problems, but that in partnership with others who have resources of their own to offer—time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment, and more—perhaps they can. It has become, therefore, the aim, on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds, for innovative police departments to invest a good deal of effort in enlisting the aid of others, and to tackle problems by allying police resources and strengths with those of others.

Police give up something when they enter into such partnerships: their claim that responsibility for public safety is theirs and theirs alone. But they gain more than they lose. When public safety becomes a joint police, community, and municipal responsibility, others have to chip in as well. The resulting

“... even new strategies of policing that prove effective in traditional terms will not necessarily mean less work for the police ...”

contributions can be of major importance. When the Houston Police Department, together with a coalition of community organizations, tackled the Link Valley drug market, local people cleaned up the area (a daylong effort by hundreds of volunteers and a large number of corporations), donated technical help with deed and title searches, and made sure that city departments delivered on their obligations to bring property owners into code compliance. When Tampa's police took on the city's

crack dealers, they needed—and received—the active help of citizens in identifying, monitoring, and tracking street dealers, and of city departments in cleaning up street-dealing sites, taking down abandoned buildings, and closing down businesses fronting for traffickers.

These cooperative relationships are not always easy. The police and other parties do not always have the same agenda, or agree on the merit and propriety of particular ends and means. Police should be sensitive to the possibility, or the perception, that they are demanding too much in the way of public resources, or doing so in a way that slights other departments' procedures and priorities.²⁹ But the proven power of partnerships between the police and the public, and the police and other government agencies, means that, with the new strategies, police effectiveness becomes not just a matter of their own resources and operational capacity, but their ability to design solutions that capture the support and active aid of others. That ability has only begun to be developed, even in the most innovative departments.

Finally, the new approaches to policing change the nature of the political dialog about police resources. With the traditional strategy, the political question was basically whether a city wanted to buy more policing: more patrol, more investigation, quicker response. In today's climate, where municipal fiscal crisis and near-crisis are the norm, more of the same can be hard to justify. The new strategies, in important contrast, foster a debate over what kind of policing cities want. Do citizens want foot patrol officers in their neighborhoods? Do they want fear reduction? Do they want a department that both answers emergency calls promptly and has time for attending to neighborhood nuisances? The public is skeptical that simply hiring more people to do traditional police work is worth doing. But hiring more people to do different things is another matter entirely.

There are numerous examples that the public is more willing to pay for a new kind of policing than it is for the old. In 1982, the citizens of financially strapped Flint, Michigan, voted a \$3.5 million tax increase specifically to continue the city's innovative foot patrol program (previously grant-funded), a move it repeated twice subsequently.³⁰ The Reno department shifted to community policing in the explicit hope that it would lead to increased public support. A 1987 study had revealed that 6 of 10 residents thought the police were doing a bad job, and the city had twice voted down a tax override to increase the police budget. Late in 1987, the department switched to community policing, which proved so popular that less than 6 months later Reno voted for a 40 percent increase in police strength. By the first half of 1989, public satisfaction had increased to nearly 90 percent.³¹ Baltimore County, Maryland, and Portland, Oregon, both experienced similar, if less dramatic, increases in tax revenues after undertaking community policing. Portland won its extra money after going through two chiefs in less than 2 years, in considerable part due to intragovernmental feuding over funds. “Their answer to everything was just ‘more,’” a Portland official said of one of the fired chiefs' maneuverings.³² When a new chief proposed a strategy that was not just more, but different, the city proved more than willing.

Conclusion

Policing, then, need not feel that its ability to manage its business and explore innovative strategies is hamstrung by today's admittedly punishing workload. Departments can, experience shows, manage their call burdens; they can deploy their resources in new and more productive ways; they can pursue promising new approaches to policing; and they can, at least sometimes, win substantial new resources, both financial and otherwise. It is not yet clear which techniques, and which combinations of techniques, are most effective, though certain ten-

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dencies and directions appear to be evident. It is clear, though, that police departments can explore these areas even where call loads are heaviest; that, indeed, exploring them is probably an essential step toward addressing those calls, and the crime and disorder that lie behind them.

A warning is in order here regarding expectations and criteria of success. The new strategies carry no guarantee that they will be accompanied by reductions in calls for service, reported crime, or overall police workload. They may well lead to a rise in calls and reported crime, especially in troubled and demoralized parts of cities, as residents come to believe that the police can and will help with their problems. This is no bad thing, but it does mean that departments (and elected officials and newspapers) that look for an automatic reduction in crime statistics and officers' workload can be disappointed and misled when the reduction fails to materialize. Officers' workload likewise may well

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rise, or at least not fall, since the community organizing, service delivery, and problem solving that the new strategies require all take time. The hope is that, in the long run, they will improve conditions sufficiently that both demands for service and overall workload will start to decline. Even that cut in workload can be swallowed up, however, if departments take on new responsibilities such as fighting fear (as with COPE in Baltimore County) or coordinating the delivery of municipal services (as community police officers in Los Angeles, Houston, and many other departments tend to do).

This basic fact—that even new strategies of policing that prove effective in traditional terms will not necessarily mean less work for the police—has a major implication for police executives. Policing success will not relieve chiefs of their responsibilities for managing department resources to best effect, and may in fact add to and complicate them. The new strategies, with their wider range of tactics, new menus of possible responsibilities, and new roles for officers and managers, will require more, not less, in the way of strategic management and hard choices about resource allocation.

Notes

1. For an account of this pressure in one large urban department, particularly its impact on proactive and community work, see David M. Kennedy, "Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-87-717.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1987.
2. For a nice summary of this research, see John E. Eck and William Spelman, *Problem Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News*. Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1987: 13-14.
3. Tony Pate et al., *Police Response Time: Its Determinants and Effects*. Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1986; Stephen L. Percy, "Response Time and Citizen Evaluation of Police," *Journal of Police Science and Administration* 8, 1 (March 1980): 75-86; and James M. Tien et al., *An Alternative Approach in Police Patrol: The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Public System Evaluation, Inc., 1977, all cited in J. Thomas McEwen et al., *Evaluation of the Differential Police Response Field Test*. Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, 1986: 42.
4. *DPR Field Test*, note above, p. 17.
5. *DPR Field Test*, p. 16.
6. *DPR Field Test*, p. 101.
7. *DPR Field Test*, p. 16.
8. Thomas J. Sweeney, "Managing Time—the Scarce Resource," *Law Enforcement News*, January 11, 1982.
9. For three recent discussions of community and problem-solving policing, see Commissioner Lee P. Brown, *Policing New York City in the 1990's: The Strategy for Community Policing*. New York, New York City Police Department, January 1991; Herman Goldstein, *Problem-Oriented Policing*. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990; and Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, *Beyond 911: A New Era for Policing*. New York, Basic Books, 1990.

10. *Problem Solving*, n. 2 above: 40.
11. Chief Ernest Curtsinger, St. Petersburg Police Department, personal communication.
12. Captain Jim Weston, Reno Police Department, personal communication.
13. *Problem-Oriented Policing*, n. 9 above: 81.
14. The exact impact is hard to figure, inasmuch as Tampa went to a 911 system for the first time late in 1988, just before QUAD was begun. Although it is impossible to ascribe the change with certainty to QUAD, after calls had been rising for years, they fell from 606,755 to 549,402 between 1989 and 1990. Against regional and statewide trends, Tampa's crime rate, index crimes per 100,000, and drug-related homicides also fell during the same period. See David M. Kennedy, "Closing the Market: Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida," Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, forthcoming (1992).
15. Chief Elizabeth Watson, Houston Police Department, personal communication.
16. James J. Fyfe and Patrick V. Murphy, "D.C. Police: Trim the Fat," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1990, p. A21. See also "Financing the Nation's Capital: The Report of the Commission on Budget and Financial Priorities of the District of Columbia," Washington, D.C., November 1990.
17. Commissioner Lee P. Brown, New York City Police Department, personal communication.
18. See, for instance, Lawrence Sherman et al., *Team Policing: Seven Case Studies*. Washington, D.C., Police Foundation, 1973.
19. See, for instance, David C. Couper and Sabine H. Lobitz, *Quality Policing: The Madison Experience*. Washington, D.C., Police Executive Research Forum, 1991, and *Policing New York City in the 1990's*, n. 9 above: 66-72.
20. David M. Kennedy, "Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-90-935.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1990.
21. For more examples from probably the toughest policing environment of all, New York City, see "CPOP: Community Policing in Practice," New York, Vera Institute of Justice, October 1988. This paper is included in the excellent James E. McElroy et al., *CPOP: The Research—An Evaluative Study of the New York City Community Patrol Officer Program*. New York, Vera Institute of Justice, 1990.
22. On team policing, see *Team Policing*, n. 18 above. On Los Angeles' senior lead officers, see "Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles," n. 1. On the Flint foot patrol experiment, see Robert Trojanowicz, *An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan*. East Lansing, Michigan State University, 1982.
23. On Link Valley, see "*Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley*," n. 20 above. On Houston and other innovative departments, see *Beyond 911*, n. 9. On Newport News, see *Problem Solving*, n. 2.
24. See n. 14 above.
25. Lindsey D. Stellwagen and Kimberly A. Wylie, *Strategies for Supplementing the Police Budget*. Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, May 1985: 2.
26. *Strategies for Police Budget*, note above.
27. *Strategies for Police Budget*: 3.
28. *Beyond 911*, n. 9 above: 81.
29. For an account of how one local government dealt with these tensions, see David M. Kennedy, "Fighting Fear in Baltimore County," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16-90-938.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1990: 16-17.
30. Edwin Meese III and Bob Carrico, "Taking Back the Streets: Police Methods That Work," *Policy Review*, Fall 1990: 24.
31. Jim Weston, "Community Oriented Policing: An Approach to Traffic Management," Unpublished paper, November 8, 1990, p. 2.
32. David M. Kennedy, "Patrol Allocation in Portland, Oregon (Part B): PCAM in the City," John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C15-88-819.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1988: 5. "PCAM" stands for "Patrol Car Allocation Model."

The Executive Session on Policing, like other Executive Sessions at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is designed to encourage a new form of dialog between high-level practitioners and scholars, with a view to redefining and proposing solutions for substantive policy issues. Practitioners rather than academicians are given majority representation in the group. The meetings of the Session are conducted as loosely structured seminars or policy debates.

Since it began in 1985, the Executive Session on Policing has met 12 times; some of the members changed in 1990. During the 3-day meetings, the participants energetically discussed the facts and values that have guided, and should guide, policing.

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Baltimore County, Maryland

Lawrence Binkley, Former Chief
Long Beach Police Department
Long Beach, California

Robert C. Bobb
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Former Chief, New York City Transit Police Department
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New York City Police Department
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