Many American police departments feel themselves to be slowly drowning in a rising tide of serious crime and calls for service. Over the last decade, department workloads have risen steadily while their resources have stayed constant or often declined. Police executives generally have responded by striving to enhance the efficiency of police operations and focus police resources on only the more serious calls. Computer-aided dispatching and other information systems have been employed to make the most of the patrol force, and many departments no longer respond at all to nuisance calls or provide services like escorts and house checks that the public once took for granted. Nonetheless, police in many cities find themselves more and more pressed, a problem recently greatly exacerbated—even in smaller communities—by unprecedented increases in drugs and violence.

It is thus understandable that many departments find calls for community policing unrealistic. As most police—and most mayors—understand the concept, community policing means taking on difficult new responsibilities, like fighting fear and solving community problems, using fresh tactics like foot patrol and community organizing. What room could there possibly be to do new jobs when the department can scarcely do the old ones?

Mayor Bud Clark of Portland, Oregon, was a community policing enthusiast when he took office in 1985, but he saw no place for the new strategy in what both he and the police agreed was a short-handed, overworked department. “Community-oriented policing means less relying on heavyhanded law enforcement and more getting at root causes,” said Chuck Duffy, a Clark aide. “But we recognized the fact that you can’t do it well unless you have an adequate level of police officers, because you’ve got to do the community outreach stuff with police on top of your base of patrol officers, and we were having trouble with our base.”

Such sentiments are often, and understandably, expressed by police and municipal officials. They are the sum of four widely
held beliefs about contemporary policing (until recently, nearly universally held). One is that the public demand for police services, particularly for 911 rapid-response services, is largely out of police control. The second is that departmental resources are, in the main, already deployed to best advantage, efficiently and effectively. The third is that community policing (like other new policing strategies such as problem-oriented policing) is a discretionary add-on to the core job of policing. Because it is seen as “soft,” aimed more at community and public relations than at crime control, it is often delayed and resisted when crime and workloads are on the rise. (In other words, the real job of policing is traditional enforcement, and departments should not be distracted from that mission.) The fourth belief is that police resources, meaning police department budgets, are largely static, particularly in the current climate of fiscal constraint. The largest gains a department can hope to make, on this line of thinking, are still small—an improvement in patrol deployment here, a few extra positions there. It is no surprise that the police find large increases in calls for service, or striking new challenges like the crack epidemic and waves of youth violence, very difficult to meet.

Increasingly, however, there is reason to believe that none of these four beliefs is true. The concrete experience of numerous innovative police departments—including Portland, which found ways to move into community policing despite resource constraints—is proving otherwise. The police can, in fact, manage public demand and expectations for police services. They can deploy their current resources in new and improved ways. They can use community and problem-solving policing strategies to achieve ambitious crime-control objectives. And they can find and win new resources, budgetary and otherwise, to help them do their various jobs. These are fundamental, not marginal, gains; they hold out the hope of major advances in the struggle to fight crime and improve the quality of life in troubled cities. This paper will take each of these arguments in turn, then turn to a discussion of their combined significance for the future of policing.

**Call management and differential response**

No challenge is more immediate, no job more demanding, in many police departments than the crushing burden of answering the public’s calls for service. Individual officers in busy cities feel the weight on every shift. “If you drive out there and make yourself available for calls, you wouldn’t be available one minute that night for anything else,” says Los Angeles Police Department patrol officer Joe Ciancanelli. “There wouldn’t be a dull moment, no time for anything.” Patrol forces have, over the last 10 years, increasingly been restricted to answering the tolling of the 911 bell. Fewer and fewer people and less and less time are available for foot patrol, problem solving, crime prevention, or any other important tasks a chief might want the force to perform.

That concern is heightened by a growing sense that for the vast majority of calls for service, rapid response is not—contrary to several generations of police belief and expectations—an appropriate or effective crime-fighting tool. Most dispatched calls—50 to 90 percent, in most jurisdictions—are not about crime. In only a small percentage of those that are about crime—less than 5 percent of all dispatched calls, in most cities—does the officer have a chance to intervene or make an arrest. Nobody doubts that for that crucial 5 percent, the response should be immediate and authoritative. But in the other 95 percent, the scene is cold and the officer can do little more than take a report and soothe the victim. “Most of the time,” says Ernest Curtsinger, chief of the St. Petersburg, Florida, Police Department, “irrespective of the call, you get there and the bad guy is gone and the real emergency situation is over.” The high hopes once pinned on rapid response and 911 systems have turned, in many police quarters, to a profound concern about their insatiable appetite for resources. “We’ve created,” says one chief, “a monster.”

At the same time, many police executives despair of winning public acceptance for any other way of delivering police services, even approaches like problem solving that might actually improve conditions and cut down on the volume of calls coming into departments. Rapid response, in this view, is a promise that the police have made to the public and that cannot be broken, regardless of its operational shortcomings. “People expect us to come when they call; that’s an absolute,” says one chief. “Believing anything else is a pipe dream.”

Other executives, though, are looking for new ways both to handle calls and to reshape public expectations. Their goal is generally to preserve, and even enhance, their departments’ ability to respond immediately to true emergencies while finding more efficient, and perhaps more effective, ways to respond to less urgent calls without disappointing the public in the process. Evidence is accumulating that it can be done.

Much of the work being done in this area builds on one core idea: that the public will not insist on immediate responses to nonemergency calls, if it is properly prepared for what to expect instead. As long ago as 1976, research showed that public satisfaction with police handling of calls was less influenced by the speed of response than it was by the difference between anticipated and actual response times. The public’s expectations, in other words, seemed to be central to their sense of how well the police were performing. Could those expectations be deliberately reshaped?

In the early 1980’s, the National Institute of Justice designed its Differential Police Response experiments to find out. The DPR research tested public reaction to a range of alternative response strategies for nonemergency calls—walk-in and mail-in report-
ing, telephone report units, officer response delayed by up to half an hour, officer response by appointment, and the like—in Garden Grove, California; Greensboro, North Carolina; and Toledo, Ohio. Dispatchers were carefully trained in how to rank calls and, when appropriate, inform callers about the new responses. Administrative mechanisms were developed in each department to make sure that what dispatchers promised—for instance, to have an officer arrive to take a report at a particular time—was actually delivered.

The results were striking. More than 90 percent of callers in all three cities who received the alternative responses were satisfied with them (with the exception of the write-in option, which proved less popular). Nearly half of all calls could have been so handled (not that many were, because of the experiments’ designs). Even with the limited proportion of alternative responses permitted in the experiments, patrol workload was reduced by as much as one-fifth. Instituting and staffing the

"Their goal is . . . finding more efficient . . . ways to respond to less urgent calls without disappointing the public . . ."

alternatives turned out to be fairly straightforward and inexpensive; in Toledo, for instance, 4 report-takers in a headquarters telephone unit were worth 10 in the field. Many of the alternatives were, and more could have been, staffed by civilians. The speed and quality of rapid response to priority calls was unaffected. Overall, the NIJ report concluded, “Police departments can achieve a sizable reduction in the number of non-emergency calls for service handled by immediate mobile dispatch, without sacrificing citizen satisfaction.” Contemporary reports from the field bore them out. Some departments were able to take as much as 45 percent of their reports over the phone.

While that view has gained some currency in policing in recent years, it has generally done so against the grain of police wishes and preferences. Conditions may have made it impossible to answer every call with a dispatched officer, and differential response strategies (particularly telephone reporting units) are no longer as rare as they once were, but there is often a lingering sense that they represent an unfortunate backing away from the ideals of policing. Nor, in most departments, have call management and differential response had much effect on the nature and role of the patrol force. Street officers may be less burdened as a result, but the basic job of patrol and response remains largely as before.

This is beginning to change. Police executives are increasingly undertaking call management and differential response as part of a purposeful shift to new community and problem-solving policing strategies, and with the express intent of substantially reshaping patrol (and often other) operations. Chief Darrel Stephens, for instance, relied heavily on a relatively traditional telephone report-taking unit to make room in the Newport News department to do problem-solving policing, which proved successful against a wide variety of crime and order problems. In St. Petersburg, Florida, call management allowed the department to shift significant resources into community policing while simultaneously cutting response times to high-priority calls by more than 20 percent.

The results were striking. More than 90 percent of callers in all three cities who received the alternative responses were satisfied with them (with the exception of the write-in option, which proved less popular). Nearly half of all calls could have been so handled (not that many were, because of the experiments’ designs). Even with the limited proportion of alternative responses permitted in the experiments, patrol workload was reduced by as much as one-fifth. Instituting and staffing the

There is reason to believe that problem solving can reduce calls for service. Addresses and areas that generate repeat calls for service are easily identified by police from departmental information, and efforts to address these repeat calls often feature in departments’ problem-solving efforts. In one now-classic example, a sergeant in the Philadelphia Police Department solved a noise problem caused by a jukebox bar and cut calls for service that had been coming in at a rate of a thousand a year down to zero. In Florida, Tampa’s QUAD program against street drug dealing appears to have cut citywide calls for service considerably. And, while they generally lack firm proof, officers and supervisors involved in problem solving are invariably convinced that their work lowers their departments’ call loads. Difficult though the job may be, making room in departments for proactive, problem-solving policing appears likely to pay substantial returns.

The new strategies’ overall emphasis on such things as devolution of police authority, beat integrity, and street-level problem solving is beginning to give rise to new models of call management. One of the most interesting comes from the Houston Police Department, which—as part of its neighborhood-oriented policing philosophy—has planned a high-tech decentralization of call management. Priority one and two calls would still be dispatched from headquarters. Other calls, though, would be patched through via in-car video display terminals to shift sergeants, who would be expected to manage both their officers, via radio, and the callers, via cellular phone. The sergeants’ job would be to provide the best mix of police response for their areas, balancing the need to work on community and problem-solving projects against the need to respond to individual callers—and, where necessary, to explain and justify their decisions to the public. The result, if the scheme works, will be call
management and police services custom-tailored precinct by
precinct, and even shift by shift, to Houston’s varied and ever-
changing needs.

Two additional important points should be made about com-
community policing and call management. First, community policing
itself seems to perform a call management function. Calls in the
pioneering Flint, Michigan, foot patrol districts, for instance,
dropped 43 percent over the course of that department’s formal
experiment. Some of the decline was attributable to problem
solving, but much of it was due to residents in the districts pass-
ing minor complaints directly to the foot officers rather than
making formal calls for service. The foot officers then handled
them as and when they wished. This was a far more efficient
scheme than dispatching officers to every such call, and a much
more popular one than refusing service for calls that failed to
merit a formal dispatch, or promising a rapid response that in
fact took hours to materialize.

Second, community policing makes formal call management
schemes easier to sell to the public. When call management is
used solely to relieve the workload on traditional patrol opera-
tions, the public is asked to give up something tangible and
immediate—a response—in exchange for an efficiency gain that
is usually perceived to benefit only the department. With com-
community policing, the public arguably gets something—more
responsive, more effective policing—for its sacrifice. As the
Newport News, Reno, and other departments can attest, the
public often finds this a welcome trade.

Reorganizing to make the most
of departmental resources

Just as departments can reexamine their service preferences and
obligations, they can reexamine their allocation and utilization
of personnel. The first step is often simply to take a fresh look,

"New strategies, new allocations of re-
sources, and new lines of authority
give the new [policing] a much better
chance to succeed."

with basic principles of good management in mind, at how a
department does business. Police agencies, like all organiza-
tions, have a tendency to get set in their ways, and a manage-
ment review, performed internally or by consultants, can often
uncover significant room for improvement. For example, the
Rivlin Commission on Budget and Financial Priorities of the
District of Columbia examined the Washington, D.C., Police
Department in 1990. The Commission discovered that the de-
partment, though an extreme case, had the highest overtime
expenses in the country, due chiefly to rigid work rules and
hugely inefficient arrangements for the booking and charging of
arrestees; the lowest proportion of civilian employees among 13
major departments; no capacity for crime and workload analy-
sis, and therefore none for efficient personnel allocation; and
actual assignment practices that bore little relation to formal
ones (500 assignments to patrol existed only on paper, while the
Youth Division had more than twice its authorized strength).16
While few departments may be in such dire straits, many could
benefit from a similar examination.

Beyond such fundamental attention to rationalization and effi-
ciency, policing is increasingly seeing moves toward a major,
sometimes radical, strategic redistribution and reprogramming
of departmental resources. One of the most visible is shifting
people—and authority—out of headquarters and specialist units
back to field commands. When Sir Kenneth Newman took over
the London Metropolitan Police Department in 1982, he both
"desquadded," returning 10 percent of all headquarters squads
and 1,200 additional headquarters posts to the field, and "flat-
tened" the rank structure, entirely eliminating a senior rank that
stood between Scotland Yard and its territorial commands. John
Avery, commissioner in New South Wales, Australia, shifted
much of his detective force to the field and put it under the
authority of patrol commanders. Lee Brown put nearly 500
officers back on patrol when he took over in Houston, and be-
gan a similar but even more ambitious program in New York.17
The Reno department effectively eliminated all supervisory
ranks between chief and area captain. Such moves are in part
efforts to ease the burden of call response and other field activi-
ties. More fundamentally, however, they are intended to pro-
mote decentralization, precinct- and street-level problem
solving, and responsiveness to the community.

In most departments, headquarters functions have long been
valued more highly than precinct functions, and the work of
detectives and other specialists more highly than that of patrol.
Generations of police chiefs have found creating special squads
an attractive response to new problems. It can be done fast; the
new unit, consistent with traditional police concern for central-
ized command and control, can be easily monitored and supervi-
sed from headquarters; and the department has something
concrete to point to, demonstrating it has taken the problem
seriously. Unfortunately, such units, once established, are diffi-
cult to disband and tend to monopolize responsibility for the
problem. In this way, they limit opportunities for police officers
to learn how to handle such problems, and drain strength and
creativity from geographic commands and more general func-
tions like patrol.

Many departments now are trying to reverse that tendency by
enhancing the authority and discretion of geographic com-
mands. In New South Wales, for instance, detectives probably
do not do any more detecting than they did before the shift.
However, they worked before according to headquarters’ inter-
est in major cases and clearance rates, while now they are
guided in part by geographic commands’ assessments of the
problems and community needs they face. The same is true with
shifts of narcotics, juvenile, vice, and other specialists into
geographic lines (though care must be taken to preserve the
department’s capacity to act against highly mobile crime). Not only are more personnel in the field, but the department’s overall capacity also is deployed for maximum problem-solving and community-service effectiveness.

This is, in a way, a new version of the very promising but generally short-lived team policing experiments of the 1970’s. Those programs often failed because the demands of rapid response and headquarters expectations ran counter to teams’ interest in local problem solving. New strategies, new allocations of resources, and new lines of authority give the new teams a much better chance to succeed.

Less tangible but no less important than these changes, in many innovative departments, is a major development in the philosophy of police administration. Police departments have long been governed by a paramilitary command-and-control approach that puts a premium on close supervision and the prevention of corruption and operational error. The traditional emphasis on discipline and propriety is laudable, but many modern police executives have come to believe that the paramilitary approach won that ground at the cost of organizational flexibility, responsiveness, and innovation. They are actively seeking ways to gain those qualities without at the same time opening the door to police misbehavior.

Beginning to emerge is a managerial and organizational style that looks more toward the best in private-sector and professional organizations than toward policing’s own heritage. Modern police executives, no less than the CEO’s of innovative high-tech firms, directors of teaching hospitals, or senior partners in architecture firms, are coming to believe that one of their main jobs is forging departments that are tied closely to their clients and in which junior and senior officers alike have the freedom and support to contribute as fully as they are able. This new environment, combined with schemes like call management, resource shifts like enhancing the strength and authority of patrol, and ideas like problem solving, can create significant new police capacities. Traditional policing, with its enforced focus on individual calls for service, gives patrol officers little choice but to handle each incident quickly and with little attention to underlying causes.

The new strategies, by letting officers look at patterns and clusters of calls and complaints, create within the department the capacity to investigate and intervene in situations that previously would have been handled far more superficially. Houston’s Neighborhood Oriented Policing created institutional ground so fertile that one tactical squad sergeant was able to craft a scheme for putting a major open-air drug bazaar out of business, win community and departmental support for it, and see it through not only the elimination of the drug problem but through the area’s commercial redevelopment—all by reprogramming precinct resources and putting them to new use. Such individual successes, if they can be made the rule rather than the exception in policing, would represent not just more efficient, but substantially more effective, use of police resources.

Doing more successful work

It increasingly appears that such stories could become policing’s norm. In fact, the outlines of a very promising progression now are visible. The beginning came in the 1970’s with programs like team policing, the Los Angeles Police Department’s Senior Lead Officers, and Flint’s foot patrol program, aimed at cultivating officers’ contact with the community through innovative use of a relatively small proportion of the force. These programs often showed considerable operational promise, but they also showed insightful police executives that...
policing approach that eliminated street dealing almost entirely and brought overall crime levels down to pre-crack levels. Reported crime was down 12.4 percent in 1989; in some hot spots reported crime was down more than 20 percent. All of these gains were made without additional resources (at least initially, a point we will return to), simply by employing smarter and more effective policing. One can hope that more cities will soon be able to tell similar stories.

If it is true that new policing strategies can make such striking improvements in police performance, then the most crucial resource management decision facing police executives is a new and extremely fundamental one: how to craft their departments in these new shapes, and how to manage the transition from here to there. Facing this task squarely is essential if the new strategies are to succeed. The new strategies are not programmatic add-ons to a police department’s traditional organization and functions. Community organizing and problem solving represent a fundamentally different approach to doing the job of policing than do rapid response and retrospective investigation. They represent, in fact, an approach that is in many important ways incompatible with traditional police organization and tactics.

Making patrol officers responsible for problem solving, for example, means granting them a degree of operational discretion and giving them time to think and work that are not easily combined with a centralized dispatching operation devoted to minimizing response time to calls for service. Developing a departmental capacity to respond in a comprehensive fashion to community concerns—be they narcotics, guns, or the homeless—cannot easily be combined with a structure of detectives and other specialist squads operating largely autonomously from patrol and other geographic commands. The creativity, flexibility, and individual initiative that community policing demands cannot easily be combined with the paramilitary hierarchy and often draconian management style common to traditional departments. The list goes on and on; points of conflict are many and severe.

There is, here, both bad news and good news. The bad news is that the job of shifting a department, especially a large department, into the new strategies is a large and probably long one. The good news is that making that transition—not finding new resources—is the fundamental challenge facing a police executive interested in the strategies’ potential. How much money? and How many people? while clearly still critical are no longer the central resource questions. The fundamental questions are Money for what? and People for what? As Houston, Newport News, Reno, and other departments are demonstrating, high workloads and limited resources are not necessarily insurmountable obstacles to moving successfully into community and problem-solving policing. The new ideas, to a considerable degree, open up to reconsideration all departments’ traditional resource allocations. Just what can then be done with them the profession is only beginning to discover.

New resources
This is not to say that most police departments would not find more money and other resources very welcome, particularly as they move from traditional policing to more community-oriented, problem-solving policing. During that difficult transition, departments are in some ways in the worst of both worlds: they must invest in the reorganization, training, and technology the new strategy demands, and suffer the dislocations and inefficiencies of change without yet realizing many of the new strategy’s promised gains. With most departments stretched to their limits already, additional resources would be useful. Fortunately, much is possible on this front. The experience of many departments shows that even cities in serious fiscal trouble often can find ways to offer their police significant new support.

One approach is for departments to raise, or cause to be raised, nontax revenues. A National Institute of Justice report on supplementing police budgets found the most promising avenues to be donation programs and asset forfeiture. Businesses in Oakland, California, for instance, concerned that declining police budgets would threaten the planned revitalization of the city’s commercial areas, raised more than $750,000 for the Oakland Police Department. The Miami Police Department, for instance, for extra patrol in malls, and in-kind contributions (for instance, management training).

Such efforts can be significant, but they also raise important management and equity issues. Private funding, both of a general nature and for particular details, can create questions of improper access to and control over a public service. Aggressive asset seizure programs can create questions of public authority being deployed for narrow institutional interests. Many departments have managed to avoid any cast of impropriety, but...
in each instance careful attention to actual and apparent conflicts is essential.

Some special relationships with the private sector, as in programs in which police managers attend corporate training programs, are by their nature much more benign. They can also be extremely important, particularly in departments working to reshape their administrative structures and cultures. Kevin Tucker, who took over the Philadelphia Police Department after the disastrous MOVE bombing, made this kind of management training a key part of his strategy to move the department toward more flexible, community-oriented policing.28 The alliance not only built the kind of capacity in the department that Tucker wanted, it enlisted the cachet of private-sector management ideas in the service of his controversial reforms.

The new policing strategies create fresh and important opportunities for bringing outside resources to bear on police problems. Community and problem-solving police departments have shown, over and over again, that they can draw heavily on help from outside the department to handle what traditional police departments would have considered entirely police business. This is welcome news. It seems more and more apparent that the police alone cannot solve many crime and order problems, but that in partnership with others who have resources of their own to offer—time, money, expertise, ideas, energy, equipment, and more—perhaps they can. It has become, therefore, the aim, on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds, for innovative police departments to invest a good deal of effort in enlisting the aid of others, and to tackle problems by alloying police resources and strengths with those of others.

Police give up something when they enter into such partnerships: their claim that responsibility for public safety is theirs and theirs alone. But they gain more than they lose. When public safety becomes a joint police, community, and municipal responsibility, others have to chip in as well. The resulting

...even new strategies of policing that prove effective in traditional terms will not necessarily mean less work for the police...
Conclusion

Policing, then, need not feel that its ability to manage its business and explore innovative strategies is hamstrung by today’s admittedly punishing workload. Departments can, experience shows, manage their call burdens; they can deploy their resources in new and more productive ways; they can pursue promising new approaches to policing; and they can, at least sometimes, win substantial new resources, both financial and otherwise. It is not yet clear which techniques, and which combinations of techniques, are most effective, though certain tendencies and directions appear to be evident. It is clear, though, that police departments can explore these areas even where call loads are heaviest; that, indeed, exploring them is probably an essential step toward addressing those calls, and the crime and disorder that lie behind them.

A warning is in order here regarding expectations and criteria of success. The new strategies carry no guarantee that they will be accompanied by reductions in calls for service, reported crime, or overall police workload. They may well lead to a rise in calls and reported crime, especially in troubled and demoralized parts of cities, as residents come to believe that the police can and will help with their problems. This is no bad thing, but it does mean that departments (and elected officials and newspapers) that look for an automatic reduction in crime statistics and officers’ workload can be disappointed and misled when the reduction fails to materialize. Officers’ workload likewise may well rise, or at least not fall, since the community organizing, service delivery, and problem solving that the new strategies require all take time. The hope is that, in the long run, they will improve conditions sufficiently that both demands for service and overall workload will start to decline. Even that cut in workload can be swallowed up, however, if departments take on new responsibilities such as fighting fear (as with COPE in Baltimore County) or coordinating the delivery of municipal services (as community police officers in Los Angeles, Houston, and many other departments tend to do).

This basic fact—that even new strategies of policing that prove effective in traditional terms will not necessarily mean less work for the police—has a major implication for police executives. Policing success will not relieve chiefs of their responsibilities for managing department resources to best effect, and may in fact add to and complicate them. The new strategies, with their wider range of tactics, new menus of possible responsibilities, and new roles for officers and managers, will require more, not less, in the way of strategic management and hard choices about resource allocation.

---

David M. Kennedy is a Research Fellow in the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Editor of this series is Susan Michaelson, Assistant Director of the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

Opinions or points of view expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or of Harvard University.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

Notes

1. For an account of this pressure in one large urban department, particularly its impact on proactive and community work, see David M. Kennedy, “Neighborhood Policing in Los Angeles,” John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16–87–717.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1987.


4. DPR Field Test, note above, p. 17.

5. DPR Field Test, p. 16.


7. DPR Field Test, p. 16.


11. Chief Ernest Curtsinger, St. Petersburg Police Department, personal communication.

12. Captain Jim Weston, Reno Police Department, personal communication.


14. The exact impact is hard to figure, inasmuch as Tampa went to a 911 system for the first time late in 1988, just before QUAD was begun. Although it is impossible to ascribe the change with certainty to QUAD, after calls had been rising for years, they fell from 606,755 to 549,402 between 1989 and 1990. Against regional and statewide trends, Tampa’s crime rate, index crimes per 100,000, and drug-related homicides also fell during the same period. See David M. Kennedy, “Closing the Market: Controlling the Drug Trade in Tampa, Florida,” Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice, forthcoming (1992).

15. Chief Elizabeth Watson, Houston Police Department, personal communication.


17. Commissioner Lee P. Brown, New York City Police Department, personal communication.


21. For more examples from probably the toughest policing environment of all, New York City, see “CPOP: Community Policing in Practice,” New York, Vera Institute of Justice, October 1988. This paper is included in the excellent James E. McElroy et al., CPOP: The Research—An Evaluative Study of the New York City Community Patrol Officer Program. New York, Vera Institute of Justice, 1990.


23. On Link Valley, see “Fighting the Drug Trade in Link Valley,” n. 20 above. On Houston and other innovative departments, see Beyond 911, n. 9. On Newport News, see Problem Solving, n. 2.

24. See n. 14 above.


26. Strategies for Police Budget, note above.

27. Strategies for Police Budget: 3.


29. For an account of how one local government dealt with these tensions, see David M. Kennedy, “Fighting Fear in Baltimore County,” John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Study C16–90–938.0, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1990: 16–17.


The 1990–91 Executive Session on Policing convened the following distinguished panel of leaders in the field of policing:

Camille Cates Barnett, Ph.D.
City Manager
Austin, Texas

Cornelius Behan, Chief
Baltimore County Police Department
Baltimore County, Maryland

Lawrence Binkley, Former Chief
Long Beach Police Department
Long Beach, California

Robert C. Bobb
City Manager
Richmond, Virginia

William Bratton, Superintendent-in-Chief
Boston Police Department
Boston, Massachusetts

Alvin Brooks, President
The Ad Hoc Group Against Crime
Kansas City, Missouri

Lee P. Brown, Former Commissioner
New York City Police Department
New York, New York

Former Chief, Houston Police Department
Houston, Texas

Charles B. DeWitt, Director
National Institute of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Daryl F. Gates, Former Chief of Police
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California

Herman Goldstein, Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law
University of Wisconsin Law School
Madison, Wisconsin

Daniel P. Guido, Commissioner (Retired)
Suffolk County Police Department
Suffolk County, New York

Francis X. Hartmann, Executive Director and Senior Research Fellow
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

George L. Kelling, Professor
College of Criminal Justice, Northeastern University
Boston, Massachusetts, and
Research Fellow, Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Robert B. Kliesmet, President
International Union of Police Associations, AFL-CIO
Alexandria, Virginia

Richard C. Larson, Professor and Codirector
Operations Research Center
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

George Latimer, Dean
Hamline University School of Law
Saint Paul, Minnesota

Former Mayor, Saint Paul, Minnesota

Alex Longoria, Chief
McAllen Police Department
McAllen, Texas

Edwin Meese III, Distinguished Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
Washington, D.C.

Former Attorney General of the United States

Mark H. Moore, Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Professor of Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Patrick V. Murphy, Director
Police Policy Board
U.S. Conference of Mayors
Washington, D.C.

Ronald J. Ostrow, Reporter
Los Angeles Times
Washington, D.C.

Oliver B. Revelle, Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Dallas, Texas

Former Associate Deputy Director—Investigations
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.

Michael E. Smith, President
Vera Institute of Justice
New York, New York

Robert L. Smith
Public Safety Administrator
Tampa, Florida

Malcolm K. Sparrow, Lecturer in Public Policy
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Darrel Stephens, Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum
Washington, D.C.

James K. Stewart, Principal
Justice Systems Technology
Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.
Bethesda, Maryland

Former Director, National Institute of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Robert Trojanowicz, Professor and Director
National Center for Community Policing
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

Mack M. Vines
St. Petersburg, Florida

Robert Wasserman, Research Fellow
Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Elizabeth M. Watson, Chief of Police
Austin Police Department
Austin, Texas

Former Chief, Houston Police Department
Houston, Texas

Gerald L. Williams, Director
Administrative Officers Management Program
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, North Carolina

Former Chief, Aurora Police Department
Aurora, Colorado

Hubert Williams, President
Police Foundation
Washington, D.C.

Willie L. Williams, Chief of Police
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, California

Former Commissioner, Philadelphia Police Department
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania