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**Paving the Way for Project Safe Neighborhoods:  
SACSI in 10 U.S. Cities**

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## Paving the Way for Project Safe Neighborhoods: SACSI in 10 U.S. Cities

This report is based on a longer research report, "Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) in 10 U.S. Cities: The Building Blocks for Project Safe Neighborhoods," by Jan Roehl, Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Sandra K. Costello, James R. Coldren, Jr., Amie M. Schuck, Laura Kunard, and David R. Forde, October 2005. Available online at [www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212866.pdf](http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/grants/212866.pdf).

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## ABOUT THIS REPORT

In the early 1990s, the Boston Police Department partnered with Harvard University researchers to analyze the problems of juvenile homicide and gun crimes and to work together to implement appropriate intervention strategies. This collaboration, called Operation Ceasefire, was considered successful—the youth homicide rate dropped from an average of 40 deaths annually to the low teens.

To see if Boston's approach could be replicated in other cities, the Department of Justice launched the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI). This report presents the main findings of a national assessment of the SACSI approach in 10 cities.

The SACSI strategies in each city were developed by multi-agency, multidisciplinary core groups led by United States Attorneys' Offices.

Nine of the ten SACSI sites targeted homicide, youth violence, or firearms violence. Memphis was the exception, where the SACSI partnership focused on reducing rape and sexual assault.

### What did the researchers find?

The study found that the SACSI approach, when implemented effectively, is associated with reductions in targeted violent crimes, sometimes by as much as 50 percent. Successful elements of the SACSI approach include the leadership provided by U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the integration of research into the planning and intervention strategies, collaborative strategic planning, and implementation of a range of intervention strategies.

### What were the study's limitations?

Because the SACSI program did not involve random assignment or perfectly matched controls for the target areas, it is not possible to say definitely that SACSI alone was responsible for the reductions in crime or whether it was SACSI in combination with other anticrime efforts (or other factors altogether). Cities of similar size across the United States experienced decreases in violent crime in the late 1990s, but the decreases were significantly greater in the SACSI cities.

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## Paving the Way for Project Safe Neighborhoods SACSI in 10 U.S. Cities

### About the Authors

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SACSI was a multipronged effort in 10 cities that aimed to bring together some of the best practices known to date for reducing and preventing violent crime, adapting the process used in Boston's Operation Ceasefire project: multiagency collaboration, integration of research into program planning and implementation, and strategic problem solving, all under the leadership of the U.S. Attorney's Office.<sup>1</sup> In Boston, a multiagency planning group developed coordinated problem-solving strategies using detailed information about severe juvenile homicide and gun-related crime problems supplied by a research partner and law enforcement officers. Boston's signature strategy called for convening offender notification (or "lever pulling")<sup>2</sup> meetings with high-risk offenders. These were designed to deter juvenile crime through a combination of warnings of swift and sure enforcement and prosecution for any violence and the provision of social and

vocational services. The strategy seemed to be a solid success. But it was Boston's collaborative, data-driven, problem-solving *process* that SACSI sought to emulate, not its central intervention strategy (see "Defining Characteristics of the SACSI Problem-Solving Model," p. 2). The SACSI approach had much in common with prior collaborative problem-solving efforts, but the integration of a local research partner into the core planning group set it apart from its predecessors (other than Boston) (see "How the Research Was Conducted," p. 4).

### The SACSI sites

Ten cities were selected as SACSI sites. The five Phase I sites—Indianapolis, Memphis, New Haven, Portland (Oregon), and Winston-Salem—were funded in 1998. The five Phase II sites—Albuquerque, Atlanta, Detroit, Rochester (New York), and St. Louis—were funded in 2000.<sup>3</sup> The 10

## DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SACSI PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL

- U.S. Attorneys lead each local project.
- Full-time project coordinators manage day-to-day activities.
- Multiagency, multidisciplinary core groups plan and oversee problem-solving strategies.
- Local researchers are included in core groups and are integrally involved in problem identification and analysis, strategic planning, and assessment.
- “Street knowledge” helps participants analyze chronic crime problems, offender groups, and hot spots.
- A strategic plan guides enforcement, suppression, intervention, and prevention strategies.
- Working groups implement strategies.
- Evaluation data and assessment activities provide ongoing feedback to the core group for program improvement as needed.

SACSI cities are diverse in size, region of the country, and severity of crime (see exhibit 1). As a group, however, they represent America’s midsized cities where, by and large, the twin scourges of drug trafficking and violent crime came later than they did to the larger coastal cities such as New York and Los Angeles.

## Evidence of SACSI’s effectiveness

Using crime data from target neighborhoods reported to local police before and after the SACSI periods and city-wide figures for comparison, Phase I researchers in each site reported dramatic decreases in their target crimes, discussed below. (See exhibits 2 and 3, pp. 5 and 6, for illustrations of the drops in homicides and in violent crimes in general in the sites during the SACSI periods.)

**Exhibit 1. SACSI Sites: Population, Crime Rate, Partnership Composition and Size, Target Crimes**

| SACSI Sites  | 2000 Census data |      | Violent crimes/1000 in the year SACSI started | Composition of core group         | Size of core group | Target crimes                           |
|--|------------------|------|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------|---|
|  | Population       | Rank |   |                                   |                    |   |
| <b>Phase I Sites</b>   |                  |      |   |                                   |                    |   |
| Indianapolis   | 781,870          | 12   | 11.35   | LE/CJ*                            | 28                 | Homicide, firearms violence             |
| Memphis  | 650,100          | 18   | 14.99   | Broad-based                       | 27                 | Rape, sexual assault                    |
| New Haven (see Note)   | 123,626          | 175  | 16.84   | LE/CJ*                            | 27                 | Firearms violence                       |
| Portland   | 529,121          | 28   | 13.72   | Broad-based                       | 25                 | Violent crime among 15- to 24-year-olds |
| Winston-Salem  | 185,776          | 107  | 12.52   | Broad-based                       | 21                 | Violent crime among youth under 18      |
| <b>Phase II Sites</b>  |                  |      |   |                                   |                    |   |
| Albuquerque  | 448,607          | 35   | 11.45   | LE/CJ*                            | 15                 | Homicide, firearms violence             |
| Atlanta  | 416,474          | 39   | 27.81   | LE/CJ + ER*                       | 15                 | Homicide, firearms violence             |
| Detroit  | 951,270          | 10   | 23.24   | LE/CJ*                            | 10                 | Firearms violence and violations        |
| Rochester  | 219,773          | 79   | 7.43  | Broad-based                       | 8                  | Youth and firearms violence             |
| St. Louis  | 348,189          | 49   | 22.79   | Broad-based                       | 27                 | Homicide, firearms violence             |
| <b>Average violent crimes/1000 for U.S. cities over 100,000 population</b> |                  |      | 1998: 6.91<br>2000: 6.20                      | <b>Average size of core group</b> | 20                 |   |

\* LE/CJ=Law enforcement/criminal justice; ER=Emergency room.

**Note:** New Haven became broader based over time with the addition of a full-service offender reentry organization. As the program became broader based, it also became smaller, with 10 members by the second wave of the partnership survey.

**Data sources:** Population—U.S. Census Bureau, Summary File 1 (SF 1) and Summary File 3 (SF 3); U.S. rank—*County and City Data Book*, 2000 ed., revised March 16, 2004; Violent crime rates—FBI Uniform Crime Reports.

- *Indianapolis*: 53 percent decrease in gun assaults in target neighborhood versus 19 percent decrease city-wide; 32 percent reduction in homicide citywide during the year after interventions in the target neighborhood.
  - *Memphis*: 49 percent decrease in forcible rape city-wide after the introduction of SACSI.
  - *New Haven*: 32 percent decrease in violent gun crimes and 45 percent decrease in calls for service for “shots fired” citywide after the introduction of SACSI.
  - *Portland*: 42 percent decrease in homicide and 25 percent decrease in other violent crimes city-wide after the introduction of SACSI.
  - *Winston-Salem*: 58 percent decrease in juvenile robberies and 19 percent decrease in juvenile incidents in target neighborhoods after the introduction of SACSI.
- The impact of the lever-pulling approaches was mixed. Three of four sites found that offenders had indeed “heard the message”

## HOW THE RESEARCH WAS CONDUCTED

The National Evaluation of SACSI, conducted by the University of Illinois at Chicago, was a cross-site comparison of the 10 sites. Researchers documented and assessed partnership formation and dynamics, strategic planning, problem-solving activities, the integration of research into the site strategies and activities, program longevity, and program impact based on local reports and FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data. The central methods were:


- Two to five personal visits to each site.
- Interviews with 367 SACSI partners regarding processes and activities.
- Two surveys of partnership members regarding interactions, progress, satisfaction, key activities, and effectiveness.
- Observation and recording of meetings and activities onsite by local research assistants.
- Attendance at cluster meetings.
- Review of project materials, reports, etc.
- Analysis of UCR data from SACSI and comparison cities.



about new violence bringing swift and certain law enforcement action. Yet, in those same sites, there was no difference in the recidivism rates of lever-pulling attendees and those of comparison groups of offenders. Researchers in Indianapolis found a general deterrent effect due to offenders' awareness of increased police stops, probation

sweeps, and the like, rather than their awareness of SACSI "offender notification" meetings and messages. In pre- and post-SACSI community surveys, researchers in New Haven found residents had a decreased fear of crime, increased satisfaction with the quality of life, and a heightened awareness that illegal gun carriers would be targeted.

**Exhibit 2. Homicide Rates, 1990–2003**



\*Based on a 3-year moving average

### Keys to success


The SACSI program featured several central structural components that appeared to be linked to success. Chief among them were:

- The leadership provided by the U.S. Attorneys' Offices.
- The formation of a core multiagency partnership of decisionmakers, as well as working groups to carry out program strategies.

- The integration of research into problem selection, analysis, strategic planning, and assessment.
- The implementation of complementary strategies directed at both suppressing and preventing violent crime.

These key components varied in form and structure from site to site, responding to local conditions and forces.

**Exhibit 3. Violent Crime Rates, 1990–2003**



**Leadership of the U.S.**

**Attorneys' Offices.** The leadership of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices was a key factor in implementation success. Each U.S. Attorney's Office, through the U.S. Attorney or the First Assistant U.S. Attorney, was able to bring key decisionmakers to the table. U.S. Attorneys were generally quite active in partnership building and development, and their involvement was key to sustaining good working relationships among local, State, and Federal law enforcement officials and prosecutors.

In a survey conducted with the agency partners involved in the programs, respondents gave high marks to the involvement of their U.S. Attorneys, second only to the full-time project coordinators. The project coordinators (usually Assistant U.S. Attorneys) were often cited as leaders of the Phase I core groups, credited with seeing that strategies were carried out and that all partnership members followed through. They were especially helpful in working with non-law-enforcement members on prevention and intervention activities.

**Core and working groups.**

Each of the SACSI sites successfully formed and maintained a core multiagency partnership responsible for strategic planning, reviewing research results, and coordinating intervention strategies. Half of the SACSI sites' core groups consisted entirely of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives, while the other half were more broad based, encompassing social service agencies, other city agencies, nonprofits, schools, the faith community, and others. The majority of the sites also had non-law-enforcement partners who worked extensively on SACSI activities (developing a public education campaign or conducting street outreach, for example) but were not included in the core group.

The sites with the largest decreases in target crimes—including Portland, Memphis, and Winston-Salem—were more apt to have broad-based core groups (see exhibit 1, p. 3). In Indianapolis, where target crimes were also dramatically reduced, the core group consisted entirely of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives, but the working

groups also had strong support from faith-based and social service partners.

Core groups appeared to function without substantial difficulty, suggesting that no one model was more effective than others. Throughout the SACSI program, the satisfaction, interest, and motivation of members remained high for all groups.

All sites formed working groups charged with carrying out the daily work needed to implement the intervention strategies. Except for Memphis, all the sites had a working group composed of law enforcement and criminal justice representatives who concentrated on enforcement, and half of them had a second (or third) working group focused on outreach and prevention.

The combination of core and working groups appeared to be effective for planning and implementation. Working groups shouldered the majority of day-to-day responsibilities. Law enforcement working groups were particularly active and effective. Adult probation agencies, historically marginalized in law enforcement strategies, played central roles in

both enforcement and prevention activities.

**The importance of prior partnerships.** The SACSI projects were built on the foundations of prior collaborative efforts in each city. Prior relationships among partnership members, in both core and working groups, helped SACSI get going quickly. Most of the sites had a history of key law enforcement and criminal justice agencies working together on crime, drug, and gang problems. Some of these prior efforts simply segued into SACSI when that funding became available. Prior working relationships with and among non-law-enforcement agencies were less common, but helpful as well. Cities that had developed a culture of conducting business via interagency partnerships found the SACSI approach easy to adopt.

**Use and value of research.** Unique to the SACSI projects were the *type of researcher-practitioner relationships* formed and the *nature of the research activities* undertaken. The local researchers were primarily professors from local universities with long-established ties with the criminal justice representatives in the core groups. The

researchers became full partners, participating in strategic planning, development, and assessment (i.e., action research). They collected and analyzed traditional and atypical data in contextual ways to aid in fleshing out the target problem and designing and implementing intervention strategies. The local researchers also served as in-house evaluators, providing feedback on strategy implementation and conducting impact analyses to assess effectiveness. Partnership members felt the integration of research into the planning and implementation of the SACSI initiative was successful and useful.

The SACSI model envisioned that the selection of the target crimes would be part of the research-driven process, but this only occurred in Memphis and, to a lesser extent, New Haven and Rochester. The other cities' target crimes were selected prior to SACSI funding, because of unprecedented local homicide rates combined with public outcry and, in Phase II sites, because of the Federal emphasis on gun violence.

Local researchers analyzed the target problems through

traditional methods, including examining incident, arrest, and probation records; crime mapping; analyses of victim and suspect characteristics and their relationships; and multiyear trend studies. One of the most successful problem analysis tools in half of the SACSI sites was the use of homicide and crime incident reviews, a joint product of researchers and practitioners. Street-level information from diverse sources (e.g., gang outreach workers and probation officers) and across agencies was vital to strategic planning.

Several sites developed lists of chronic and high-risk offenders based on arrest and probation records, and targeted these offenders with heightened enforcement, supervision, and intervention. Local researchers in some sites also interviewed target offenders and added specific questions to Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM)<sup>4</sup> interviews to gather information on firearms use and attitudes and to assess intervention messages and strategies. Although such interviews were time consuming and difficult to conduct, they generated some of the most useful research findings for fine-tuning interventions.

**Intervention strategies.** The SACSI partnerships developed and implemented an impressive number of intervention strategies. They ranged from prevention to arrest and prosecution, and from the traditional to the innovative. Partnership members reported their perceived effectiveness in solving the target problems as moderate, averaging 1.3 on a scale of 0 to 2.

*Enforcement strategies.* Each of the SACSI sites implemented both enforcement and prevention strategies, yet all sites, particularly at the start, emphasized enforcement and prosecution. Many of the initial strategies were enforcement oriented—targeting hotspots and repeat offenders, crackdowns, sweeps, saturation patrols, serving warrants, and making unannounced visits to probationers. The SACSI sites were most skilled at implementing enforcement and suppression strategies, and law enforcement, prosecution, and probation agencies committed a high level of resources to these strategies (see “Innovative Arrest, Enforcement, and Suppression Strategies”).

All of the sites adopted some version of Boston’s Ceasefire approach based on deterrence theory (which states that people will not take an action if they believe they will be caught and punished for it). Sites varied in the number of offender notification or lever-pulling meetings held and the emphasis placed on those meetings. Indianapolis, for example, held dozens of meetings, ultimately meeting with several hundred chronic offenders, but Portland only held a couple of meetings and worked extensively with about 40 people. There were also variations across and within sites in the extent to which “swift and certain” action was taken following violent incidents (i.e., the extent to which levers actually were pulled). Geographic enforcement—where a violent crime would be followed by sweeps and warrant serving in the area where the crime took place—was more common than targeted crackdowns on associates of the suspects.

Several sites implemented general deterrence strategies using media campaigns and public awareness materials to get out messages of “zero tolerance plus assistance.” In most cases, these citywide

## INNOVATIVE ARREST, ENFORCEMENT, AND SUPPRESSION STRATEGIES

**Offender notification meetings** are modeled on Boston's Operation Ceasefire offender notification meetings and based on deterrence theory. They are also called "lever pulling" meetings. The prosecuting attorney's team meets with high-risk people and informs them that any violence judged to be within their control will be swiftly and surely sanctioned by law enforcement and prosecution. At the same time, the team offers assistance in obtaining jobs, education, and other services.

**Homicide and incident reviews** occur when key agency representatives and street workers meet to review and share information on recent homicides or other incidents of violence. "Grand homicide reviews" typically kick off the process, with representatives from many agencies reviewing homicides committed over a long time period (years in some cases).

**"Worst of the worst" offender lists** are compiled from arrest or probation records or by "nominations" from probation and parole officers. The lists of known chronic offenders are used to focus enforcement, prosecution, and supervision efforts.

strategies and high-visibility enforcement were well implemented. St. Louis's core group partnered with a communications agency to develop a public awareness campaign that focused on the years of Federal prison time possible if a felon carries a gun. Using segmented marketing strategies, more than 10,000 posters were distributed in the target area and radio spots were aired on stations popular with the target group.

*Prosecution and probation strategies.* Prosecution

strategies focused on fire-arms crimes were central to the SACSI project. The major gun prosecution model was Project Exile, in Richmond, Virginia, viewed by practitioners as an "unqualified success" in removing violent criminals from the streets and changing attitudes about illegal gun possession among criminals and criminal justice system representatives alike (see "Innovative Prosecution, Court, Probation, and Parole Strategies," p. 12).<sup>5</sup>

A key component of prosecution efforts under SACSI was

the unprecedented cooperation between Federal prosecutors and their State and local counterparts. They reviewed cases together to determine in which system the case would be tried and shared information and resources. New Haven's TimeZup project was typical. Every gun-related crime was reviewed by the U.S. Attorney's Office; local prosecutors; and local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. The goal was to achieve longer incarcerations, persuade defendants in State courts to plead guilty and to plead guilty earlier in the

process, and get the word out about the longer Federal sentences, thus creating a deterrent effect on gun crimes.

Probation officers were recognized as critical central partners in the SACSI approach, working the continuum from enforcement to prevention. Often paired with police officers, they were key players in lever-pulling, Nightlight, and Project Re-Entry strategies (see "Innovative Prosecution, Court, Probation, and Parole Strategies"); participated in the development of "most violent offender" lists; and were primary resources for referrals to jobs, job training, and other assistance.

### INNOVATIVE PROSECUTION, COURT, PROBATION, AND PAROLE STRATEGIES

**Project Exile:** Named after the gun crime reduction project that originated in Richmond, Virginia, in which a criminal caught with a gun forfeited his right to remain in the community. Although Virginia's Project Exile was multifaceted, its cornerstones were immediate Federal prosecution, stiff Federal prison sentences, and "exile" to Federal prison.

**Nightlight:** Named after Boston's Nightlight project, this effort put probation and police officers on teams that conducted home visits to juveniles on probation and patrolled neighborhood streets to see if these youths were in compliance with curfew and other probation conditions.

**Project Re-Entry:** This growing national program assists new parolees in reentering their communities and in adhering to parole conditions. Probation officers (and others) begin working with prisoners in the months prior to their release to prepare them for their return to the community. Again, warnings about swift and sure response to criminal behavior are given hand in hand with social and employment services.



Portland was one of the earliest cities to launch a Project Re-Entry program, in 1999. Lever-pulling meetings were scheduled with soon-to-be-released gang members while they were still in prison to establish a release plan, and a visit was made to each prisoner's family. A home visit was made immediately after release by a team of probation officers, police officers, and outreach workers, each emphasizing different aspects of the release plan, expectations, and requirements. Over time, most of the work fell to the probation officers. A limited outcome evaluation conducted by the local SACSI research team suggested this reentry program reduced the reoccurrence of serious offenses in the paroled group.

*Prevention strategies.*

Community- and service-oriented prevention strategies were more prevalent and robust in sites with broad-based representation in the core group and one or more strong non-law-enforcement partners. Prevention strategies were provided by probation officers, social service agencies, coalitions of churches, other faith-based organizations, and community organizations. The list of prevention and intervention

services provided through SACSI is long, and includes job training, job placement, substance abuse treatment, tutoring, GED assistance, mentoring, family-based services, afterschool activities, tattoo removal, driver's license replacement, and a school-based rape prevention program in Memphis (see "Innovative Prevention Strategies," p. 14).

Winston-Salem's SACSI project was the most heavily involved in prevention and intervention, with several new initiatives launched in addition to more typical prevention activities (e.g., mentoring for youth, family-based services, job skills training and placement, and afterschool activities). Teams comprising a police officer, court counselor or probation officer, minister, community representative, and street-level workers provided coordinated services to high-risk individuals after lever-pulling meetings in a new program dubbed Operation Reach. Atlanta and St. Louis created promising innovative emergency-room-based projects designed both to gather useful information on gunshot victims and victims of other violent crime and to reach out to victims and families when they are most vulnerable.

## INNOVATIVE PREVENTION STRATEGIES

**ER trauma intervention:** St. Louis and Atlanta developed emergency-room-based programs to gather information (for research and prosecution) and to provide police and social service interventions at a critical moment when the victim, family, and friends are available and attentive.

**Faith-based coalitions:** Several sites developed coalitions of churches patterned after Boston's TenPoint Coalition. Church leaders and organizations provided prevention and intervention services, especially mentoring, street outreach, and job assistance.

## Expansion of SACSI into PSN

All 10 SACSI projects have successfully “morphed” into Project Safe Neighborhoods<sup>6</sup> (PSN) sites, with firearms crimes the main target and rigorous gun crime prosecution a signature activity among other enforcement, supervision, and prevention strategies. Multiagency task forces continue to head PSN efforts, and local research partners remain integral to the program. The central SACSI concepts of U.S. Attorney leadership, multiagency partnerships, data-driven strategies, and local research partners continue in these 10 SACSI sites under PSN's umbrella. PSN programs in all 94 Federal districts employ the SACSI model.

## Challenges to success

The impact findings support the hypothesis that comprehensive partnership approaches to public safety can be effective. Process data shed light on what worked well and where difficulties were encountered.

Most people who served in SACSI partnerships said their teams did not encounter major problems—the reported problems were most apt to be insufficient funding or staffing. Group cooperation and agreement over goals were high, although tensions among subgroups with different philosophies such as police and probation officers, law enforcement and community representatives, probation officers and social workers, and researchers and criminal justice representatives were apparent at times.

Different organizational cultures and methods among researchers and practitioners led to some friction. Practitioners generally wanted information that they could act on immediately, while researchers needed time to collect, clean, analyze, and interpret data. Further, issues of subject protection and confidentiality had to be resolved.

In general, the Phase II sites enjoyed smaller successes than the Phase I sites. The Phase II sites included three of the highest crime cities in the United States (Atlanta, Detroit, and St. Louis), and several of these sites targeted areas of those cities with high levels of concentrated poverty that offer more obstacles than others. Although these conditions typically hinder the effectiveness of most interventions, St. Louis experienced sizable reductions in target crimes. Phase II sites also differed from Phase I sites in that they did not have full-time project coordinators. Phase I partnership members felt full-time project coordination was a critical factor in successful implementation.

No Federal funds were provided for interventions, and

the in-kind contributions of the sites were enormous. Most sites, particularly those with heavy law enforcement representation on their core groups, began with and emphasized enforcement and suppression strategies. Prevention activities in most sites were meager and implemented late in the SACSI programs. Non-law-enforcement teams had more difficulties carrying out their responsibilities, and lack of resources was a central contributing factor to those difficulties.

## Conclusion

The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative has demonstrated the value of U.S. Attorney leadership, multiagency partnerships, data-driven strategies, and the general deterrent effects of intense suppression activities. Other successful program elements include the use of homicide and incident reviews for problem analysis, the key involvement of probation officers, and successful firearms prosecutions. As for Project Safe Neighborhoods, it is currently being funded and has expanded to focus on gang violence in addition to gun crimes.

## Notes

1. See Kennedy, David, "Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention," *Valparaiso University Law Review* 31 (2) (1997): 449–484; Rosenbaum, Dennis (ed.), *The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1994; Goldstein, Herman, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990; Travis, Jeremy, keynote address at the National Conference on Community Policing—What Works: Research and Practice, Washington, DC, 1998; and Roehl, Janice A., Robert Huitt, Mary Ann Wycoff, Anthony Pate, Donald Rebovich, and Ken Coyle, *National Process Evaluation of Operation Weed and Seed*, Research in Brief, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, October 1996. NCJRS, NCJ 161624.

2. The term "lever pulling" meetings derived from the assurance given by high-level representatives (such as the Assistant U.S. Attorney, ATF special agent in charge, homicide commander, FBI, etc.) that if violence occurred, the representatives would "pull all the levers" available to them (meaning they would prosecute gun crimes to the full extent of applicable State or Federal law, press for reincarceration for those with probation or parole violations, serve outstanding warrants, etc.).

3. Full reports are available through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) for most of the SACSJ sites:

■ **Albuquerque:** Steele, Paul D., Lisa Broidy, Jerry Daday, Nell Damon, Kristine Denman, Kerry Edwards, Colin Olson, Teresa Schellhamer, Lisa Ortiz, Vanessa Salazar, and Salim Khouyami, "Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative in Albuquerque: Project Activities and Research Results," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 2001–IJ–CX–K001, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2005. NCJRS, NCJ 220486.

■ **Atlanta:** Kellerman, Arthur L., "Project Safe Neighborhoods—Atlanta: Final Report," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 2000–IJ–CX–K014, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2007. NCJRS, NCJ 222232.

■ **Detroit:** Bynum, Timothy S., and John D. McCluskey, "Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSJ): Detroit, Michigan," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 2001–IJ–CX–K006, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2005. NCJRS, NCJ 220487.

■ **Indianapolis:** McGarrell, Edmund F., and Steven Chermak, "Strategic Approaches to Reducing Firearms Violence: Final Report on the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 99–IJ–CX–K002, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2003. NCJRS, NCJ 203976.

- **New Haven:** Hartstone, Eliot, and Dorinda M. Richetelli, "Final Assessment of the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative in New Haven," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 99-IJ-CX-K001, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2003. NCJRS, NCJ 208859.
  - **Portland:** Kapsch, Stefan J., Lyman Louis, and Kathryn Oleson, "The Dynamics of Deterrence: Youth Gun Violence in Portland," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 99-IJ-CX-0025, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2003. NCJRS, NCJ 203969.
  - **Rochester:** Klofas, John M., Christopher Delaney, and Tisha Smith, "Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) in Rochester, NY," final report for National Institute of Justice, grant number 2001-IJ-CX-K009, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2005. NCJRS, NCJ 220488.
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4. The Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program collected data about drug use, drug and alcohol dependency and treatment, and drug market participation among recently booked arrestees in 40 communities around the United States. The data and research findings that were derived from ADAM are used by policymakers and practitioners to make decisions concerning the problems of drugs and crime. More information is available at [www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/adam/welcome.html](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/adam/welcome.html).
  5. Comey, Jim, and Stephen Miller, "Project Exile," *United States Attorneys' Bulletin* 50 (1) (January 2002): 11–16.
  6. Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a nationwide program that aims to reduce gun crime by networking existing local programs that target gun crime and providing them with additional tools and funding. PSN funding is used to hire new Federal and State prosecutors, support investigators, provide training, distribute gun lock safety kits, deter juvenile gun crime, and develop and promote community outreach efforts as well as to support other gun violence reduction strategies. More information is available online at [www.psn.gov](http://www.psn.gov).



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