In the Netherlands, just as in many other western European countries, there has been a growth in the number of local security networks for about the last ten to fifteen years. The police, local governments and citizens are the main participants of these networks. In this paper two main questions are dealt with. What is the position of these participants in the local security networks? To what extent are the intended contributions of these participants to the networks realised? One of the main results of this study is that the envisioned participation of the police, the local government and citizens in the Netherlands' security networks is only realised to a limited extent. Their participation encounters serious problems and contradictions.

INTRODUCTION

In many western European countries the systems of policing and crime control have changed fundamentally over roughly the last ten to fifteen years. One of the core elements of these changes is that the prevention and control of crime and insecurity are no longer regarded as the sole responsibility of the police. Other agencies, both public and private, are seen as being responsible for these tasks. As a result, especially at the local level, there has been a growth in the number of multi-agency networks in which the police, local government, (groups of) citizens and other public and private organisations are the partners.

Several circumstances have contributed to this shift from 'government' to 'governance' (Newman 2001; Pierre 2000) in the control of crime, disorder and insecurity. In many western European countries the level of crime today is much higher than it was during the 1950s or '60s. In these 'high crime societies' (Garland 2000), crime and insecurity have become major concerns to large numbers of citizens (although the fear of crime and insecurity also reflect more general, often vague feelings of uneasiness and lack of control that many citizens seem to experience in contemporary society) (Bauman 1999). Citizens expect or even demand that the state (and especially the police) will provide a solution for the problems of crime and insecurity. This has contributed to the fact that crime and insecurity became major issues on the political agenda in many western European countries in the 1990s and early 2000s. As a consequence, the police and criminal justice institutions are confronted with rising demands and expectations. However, their resources are often inadequate to meet these rising demands, with the consequence that the once taken-for-granted authority and legitimacy of the police and criminal justice are eroding in many western European countries (Reiner 1992).

The governments and police organisations created several strategies in reaction to this combination of rising demands and eroding legitimacy. During the 1990s there was a shift towards a harsher and more punitive policy in many western European countries, with a stress on more police, more prisons and severe sanctions. Under the influence of the New Public Management, all kinds of managerial measures were introduced to promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the police and criminal justice agencies, such as measures of performance management (Loveday, 1999; Martin 2003). One of the most important reactions consisted of what Garland (1996) called a strategy of
responsibilisation. With this strategy the government tries to promote the active involvement of other actors and agencies in the prevention and control of crime and insecurity. Tasks that were formerly the monopoly of the police and criminal justice agencies are now presented as the moral duty of other agencies and citizens. Both moral and financial arguments are given to motivate this new distribution of responsibilities.

This development seems to fit in with a more general change in many western countries in which a great number of tasks of the welfare state are privatised or transferred to non-state agencies. According to many authors, in fact this is so much not a process of ‘hiving off’ former governmental activities, but the creation of a new role for the government, one that places it at a greater distance (Rose and Miller 1992), more a role of ‘steering’ than ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). This new role implies the co-ordination, activation and regulation of the networks and activities of many partners, both private and public.

This shift to a governance of crime and insecurity is accompanied by a new discourse with three concepts at its core: ‘community’, ‘prevention’ and ‘partnerships’ (Crawford 1997). Community here is not only understood as the location of problems and intervention. In this view the community should also be created and mobilised to attack the problems of crime and insecurity (Rose, 1999). The stress on community, prevention and partnerships resulted in a great number of security networks (Newburn 2001) and a great degree of multi-agency co-operation, especially at the local level.

This paper deals with local security networks in the Netherlands, where the responsibilisation strategy has been a central element of the changes in policing and the control of crime since the early 1990s. Partnerships and multi-agency networks here, as in many other western countries, are elements of three interrelated developments. First, partnerships and shared responsibilities are central to the notion of community policing, which became a dominant paradigm of Netherlands’ policing in the 1990s. Secondly, in the early 1990s the Netherlands’ government created a so-called Local Safety Policy, one premise of which is that safety should not be the task of the police alone, but a shared responsibility of many agencies and actors. In this view the police are still responsible for the control of safety in the public space. The local government is seen as being responsible for the co-ordination of the local safety policy, including the activation of other partners. A third relevant development in this context is the rise of all sorts of non-state, privatised policing. In a couple of years there will probably be as many people working in the commercial security sector in the Netherlands as there are (regular) police officers – a situation that has already been attained in some other western countries (Van Dijk and De Waard 2000; Johnston 2000). The rapid growth of private policing is partly the result of the increasing demand for safety. Partly, too, it is the consequence of the new policy regarding the police’s ‘core business’ and of the concomitant appeal to the citizens’ own responsibilities.

In this paper I concentrate on the position of the main participants in the local security networks: the police, the local government and (groups) of citizens (including entrepreneurs, many in small businesses). Two main questions are dealt with in respect of each of these participants. What is their position in the local security networks? To what extent are the intended contributions of these participants to the networks realised?

In this paper the positions of the partners in local security networks is analysed on the basis of a model of co-operation between actors in local implementation networks, described elsewhere in more detail (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven 2004). According to
In this model the co-operation between actors is seen as depending on both external and internal factors. Among the external factors are the institutional relations between the policy sectors involved and the policies and policy traditions in the relevant fields. Among the relevant network-internal factors are: the (resource) dependencies between the participating actors (including the stock of resources upon which each participant may rely (Pfeffer and Salancik 1977; Benson 1975), the extent to which the actors share their views and beliefs with regard to safety problems and networks (among other things), the strategies used by the actors in their mutual relations, and the ways their interdependent activities are co-ordinated.

This paper is based upon a recent study of local security networks in the Netherlands (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven 2004). Eight of these networks have been studied in detail. The data presented here are based on interviews with the participants in these networks (such as police officers, public prosecutors, local government officials, citizens and workers from many public and private organisations participating in the local security networks) and on a study of available documents.

In this paper I first describe local security networks in the Netherlands and the co-operation between the partners in practice (Section 2). I then deal with the three main partners mentioned (Sections 3–5). Some of the main problems and contradictions in the policy on local security networks will be dealt with briefly in the concluding remarks.

LOCAL SECURITY NETWORKS

The first local security networks in the Netherlands were introduced in the late 1980s. Most Dutch cities and communities have had many such local networks since the mid-1990s. They focus on a wide range of safety problems, as for instance those in an industrial area, a neighbourhood, a recreational area with a concentration of bars and pubs or a large school. Other networks focus on problems of disorder and nuisance resulting from the use of and trade in drugs, the problems of soccer hooliganism or a group of youth causing trouble, like crime and feelings of insecurity in their neighbourhood.

Most local security networks are the result of a bottom-up initiative. People living in a neighbourhood, teachers at a school, a group of shopkeepers or a community police officer observe some serious problems of crime, disorder or insecurity in their immediate environment. In their view, previous strategies did not work and a new strategy, based on co-operation between several agencies, is urgently needed. In many cases some informal leader, often with charismatic qualities and relevant social capital, will take the initiative to set up the network. Often a local community police officer plays this activating and stimulating role. For the network to become established, it is necessary that after a time the initiative receives the support of a broader coalition of partners.

At first many local security networks encounter a lot of problems. In the beginning there are often only vague notions about the goals of the network, its envisioned activities and relations between the partners. In many cases the co-operation between the partners is initially hampered by distrust and sceptical attitudes among the partners. The feelings of distrust may be overcome only after a while, when the partners become personally acquainted with each other and the first concrete results of the network are realised.
The organisation and number of participants vary widely among the local security networks. One of the networks studied had only four participants: a school, a community police officer, an official from the public prosecutor’s office and an organisation responsible for the implementation of alternative, extra-judicial sanctions for youngsters. In other cases some thirty or forty participants may be involved in the security network. Which organisations participate in the network depends on the network’s goals, its envisioned activities and the history of its origin. The police were among the participants in all networks studied. Local government and citizens or (small) entrepreneurs were involved in most networks. Other participants may be schools, organisations for social work, youth work, probation services or a real-estate agency. As a rule partners frequently meet to exchange information, make decisions, and implement and evaluate joint activities.

The local networks studied are mainly oriented to concrete and specific problems of crime, disorder or insecurity. Nevertheless, their formal goals may be rather broad, like ‘the promotion of the quality of the area’ or the realisation of ‘a city centre with an attractive climate to live, to stay, to set up a business and to invest money.’ The emphasis on such broad goals may be seen as a way to eliminate potential resistance to a network that concentrates on crime and may be primarily associated with the police or criminal justice agencies. These broad and often rather vague goals may give room for the participation of actors and agencies with widely differing views and interests.

Most local security networks use several methods of intervention, or what Johnston and Shearing (2003: 28-9) call ‘technologies’. Some of these methods are more bound to the traditional work of the police; others belong to the domain and competencies of the local government or non-criminal justice agencies. These methods may be used in all kinds of combinations. Eight methods used in the local security networks may be distinguished: formal and informal surveillance; repression, sanctions and alternative sanctions; administrative prevention and the enforcement of civil and administrative law as an alternative to criminal law enforcement; measures to influence the social and economic infrastructure; preventive measures to change the physical situation; educational and social work activities; recreational activities; and the promotion of social cohesion, seen as a way to foster the so-called self reliant behaviour of citizens.

Most of the local security networks are based on both formal and informal modes of co-operation. The main original agreements between the partners are often formally laid down in some document or treaty. However, as other studies have also found (Blagg, et al. 1988; Pearson, et al. 1992; Crawford 1997), informal relations are often much more important in understanding the relations and co-operation between the partners. To a large extent the local security networks are based on mutual trust, informal agreements and personal acquaintance. This ‘informalisation’ may be seen as a strategy to avoid the restrictions of formal rules and create some room to avoid (potential) contradictions between the partners involved (see also Terpstra 2004). This informality, however, may create some unintended consequences. For reasons of goal-orientation and effectiveness, partners may decide to exchange information informally, even if this is against the formal rules relating to the protection of individual citizens’ privacy. The weight of informal considerations may in the long term make the local security networks rather vulnerable: if one of the participants gets another job, the continuation of the network may be in danger. The informality may cause roles and competencies of the partners to become blurred or even intermingled. This is especially striking because these networks may have important consequences for public values and may intervene in individual lives. One of the consequences may be that the democratic accountability and control of the local security networks may be difficult to
achieve. It may also seriously hamper the legitimacy of the police and the local government's local safety policy.

THE POLICE: BETWEEN RESPONSIBILISATION AND RETREAT

In general the police in the Netherlands today have a positive attitude to co-operation with citizens and other agencies and to participation in local security networks. Mostly they are aware that an adequate (re)action to many safety problems requires the expertise, knowledge and skills of other actors and agencies, besides those of the police. It is seen as impossible for the police to meet all the needs and demands laid upon them. In the last decade or so a new, partly moral, orthodoxy has been established in many of the Netherlands' police organisations, which states that a new distribution of responsibilities is needed in the prevention and control of crime, disorder and insecurity: other actors and agencies should accept their responsibilities and no longer abdicate their tasks to the police.

Many of the local security networks were to a large degree the result of initiatives taken by the police. Especially in the initial phase the network often depends on the enthusiasm and dedication of the local community police officer.

Nevertheless, the role of the police in the initial phase of the network may be rather ambivalent. Many of the networks were not only the result of initiatives by the police, but also motivated by the view of some of the partners that the police did not pay enough attention to their problems and were insufficiently accessible to the citizens, shopkeepers or teachers in case trouble should occur. At first the police often were somewhat hesitant about joining the network. Both the culture gap between the participating organisations and the ways police officers perceived some of their partners (like the youth workers or the local administration) contributed to this ambivalence. The police may also fear a loss of autonomy or dependence on other agencies by participating in a network, a feeling which may also hinder the co-operation later on.

The activities of the police officers in the local security networks are often rather heterogeneous. Some of them have to do with the network itself, like maintaining relations with partners, frequent meetings with them, managing the partners, the exchange of information with other agencies and acting as the link between the partners and other units of the police force. The police also undertake more concrete activities, such as surveillance in the public space (in some cases in close co-operation with other actors, like citizens or private police organisations), the creation of more or less formal reactions to crime, disorder and other problems (alone or with other agencies).

Police participation in the local security networks is to a great extent based on the assumption that the police on their own are not able to create an adequate answer to many of the problems of crime or insecurity. According to this view, other actors and agencies should be convinced of the need to co-operate and to accept their own responsibilities in the prevention and control of crime and insecurity.

The envisioned new distribution of responsibilities, however, implies that other actors and agencies should adjust their expectations about the police. Actually, the need for a ‘management of expectations’ (Crawford 1997: 176) is one of the main arguments for the police to join local security networks. Although responsibilisation and the management of expectations are closely connected with each other, there is also a tension between these two police strategies. On the one hand, the police co-operate closely with other actors and agencies. On the other hand, however, the police tried to retreat...
from the network after a while in half of the networks studied, in most cases without formally terminating their membership. In this way the initial comprehensive, initiating and stimulating role of the police is gradually replaced by a more limited role according to which the police only have a secondary task in the local security network. This strategy of retreat is partly a consequence of a lack of time and other resources available to the police. In part, too, it is the result of the aim of concentrating the police on so-called core-business tasks, which are said to have a 'more measurable output' and to fit more with 'real police work' than participation in local security networks. The strategy of responsibilisation is hard to reconcile, both with the recent pressure to accept new managerial criteria and with the new stress on a more punitive policy in the Netherlands.

This somewhat ambivalent position of the police in local security networks has several consequences. Some of the local networks seem to evolve to a new model, according to which the partners still co-operate, but with a strict separation between their tasks. In other cases, however, partners in the network fear that the withdrawal by the police may undermine the basis of the network. Initially the police often had a stimulating and co-ordinating role in the network. Many participants wonder if the withdrawal by the police will not result in gaps that no other agency will be able to fill.

In regard to the individual police officer who participates in the local security network, the participants generally have a favourable judgement of the police contribution to the network. The community police officer's dedication, motivation and goal-oriented attitude are praised. About the rest of the police force, however, the partners are remarkably less positive. In the view of many participants the police force management displays only a limited involvement. According to the partners, it is often hard to make agreements with other units or departments of the police organisation. Many participants fear the consequences of the police withdrawal, both for the continuation of the network and for its effectiveness.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CO-ORDINATION OF LOCAL SECURITY NETWORKS

In the Netherlands the local governments have the formal responsibility to co-ordinate the Local Safety Policy. The local security networks are one, highly visible element of this local policy. The security networks often depend on resources – like manpower, information or formal competencies – which only the local governments have at their disposal.

Still, however, other partners often criticize the contribution of the local governments to the security networks. In many cases the local government is described as the 'weakest' participant in the network. Several factors contribute to this remarkable discrepancy between the envisioned leading and co-ordinating role of the local government and its modest implementation in reality. In many cases several departments of the local administration are involved with the local security network. Each of these departments has its own expertise, information, resources or relations on which the network more or less depends. In many cases there is a lack of co-ordination between these departments, or they may even be in competition or conflict. In some cases it appeared that the departments of the local administration, although participating in one and the same local security network, were not aware of each other's decisions or activities and tried to abdicate their responsibilities to each other. In other cases the departments of the local administration have different views on the security problems, their causes, the preferred measures or the needed distribution of responsibilities. Many par-
Participants in the local security networks complain about bureaucratic inertia, irresolution or other perverse effects of bureaucracy in local government. These problems may be reinforced if local authorities do not have a clear vision on local security problems and local safety policy or if they do not give a high priority to local safety issues.

The municipal department which is primarily responsible for the local safety policy often has a rather weak position within the local administration. Often this department was established only recently. Its general task consists of the formation and implementation of a neighbourhood policy. This department often still has to establish its own domain in relation with the other, older, more centralised departments within the local administration, while it is still highly dependent on the other departments. One of the reasons for this is that there is generally only a limited budget for safety policy within the local governments. The result of this complex of factors is that in the view of partners in the local security networks measures by the local government are often implemented incompletely, too late, or not at all.

The uneasiness and incomprehension among the partners with regard to the local government’s lack of goal-orientation and effectiveness may also be linked to a difference in perspectives between representatives of the local administrative bureaucracy and other participants. Citizens, entrepreneurs and community police officers in particular have a pragmatic, goal-oriented attitude and are primarily oriented to direct, tangible, visible results. On the other hand, however, officials working in local government have a more bureaucratic-legalistic attitude. They often pay more attention to formal procedures or to the need to gain political support for proposed measures. One of the results of this gap in perspectives is a difference in time horizon. What to local administrators may look as if they are following a taken-for-granted procedure may in their partners’ views appear as a lack of involvement and understanding of serious security problems, as a wait-and-see attitude or even simple red tape.

According to most of the partners the formal responsibility of the local government to co-ordinate the local safety policy should also imply the co-ordination of local security networks. However, most of these networks are not (or only to a limited extent) co-ordinated by the local government. Several factors mean that the local government often fails to meet this expectation. First, the department of the local administration that is responsible for the local safety policy is often not able to achieve any co-ordination of local networks because of its internal marginal position and lack of competencies and resources. Secondly, local security networks are predominantly implementation networks (O’Toole, Hanf and Hupe 1997). Municipal officials, however, are often mainly oriented to the formation of policy and are only marginally interested in day-to-day policy implementation. The practical problems associated with implementation do not fit in with their ambitions. For this reason they often try to withdraw from the responsibility of co-ordinating local security networks.

This co-ordination failure on the part of local government may have several effects. Although many participants expect the local government to co-ordinate the local security network, in fact it may be unclear who actually takes on this responsibility. In some cases the co-ordination may be fragmented among several of the participants or may be abdicated, being passed on from one to another. In fact, there is often a continuous, partly hidden struggle going on about who should co-ordinate the local security network. Until a couple of years ago in many cases the community police officer decided to fill the gap left by the local government by taking the responsibility for co-ordinating the network. However, the increasing emphasis on the need to focus on ‘core business’ tasks often forces police officers to abandon this informal co-ordination role. What remains is often the question of who will do this co-ordination now.
PARTICIPATION BY CITIZENS

The involvement of citizens or (small) entrepreneurs in local security networks is highly differentiated, sometimes even within one network. Four types of involvement by citizens or entrepreneurs may be distinguished. The first two of these types of involvement are primarily forms of ‘talking’; the last two are more based on specific activities or on ‘doing’ some activity to intervene in safety problems. Both ‘talking’ and ‘doing’ may be either more limited, or more extended (see figure I).

Figure I: Four types of involvement by citizens or (small) entrepreneurs in local security networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>limitation</th>
<th>limited</th>
<th>extended</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘talking’</td>
<td>Exchange of information (I)</td>
<td>Citizens as advisors or participants in decision-making (II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘doing’</td>
<td>Promotion of self-reliant behaviour (III)</td>
<td>Safety activities under citizens’ control (IV)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The first type of citizen involvement is mainly based on the exchange of information between the partners in the local security network. According to this model, citizen participation may be promoted by local government to bridge the gap with the citizens and to acquire a greater legitimacy among them. This type of citizen involvement may also be promoted by the police because of the need to get more information from citizens and to have a closer relation with them (or as police officers in the Netherlands call it, ‘knowing and being known’).

The second type of citizen involvement is not limited to the exchange of information, but also intends to give a ‘voice’ to citizens in the formation of police and/or local government policy. As a rule, however, despite the rhetoric of the participatory state, the actual influence of citizens is quite small. Citizens see this especially as a consequence of a lack of responsiveness of the local administration.

The third type of involvement is mainly based on the notion of self-reliant behaviour. Citizens are asked to participate in the network to intervene actively in local safety problems or to create a solution for problems of crime and disorder, for example in their neighbourhood. Sometimes they are expected to do this on their own, but in most cases in collaboration with others, like the police. In this view the prevention of crime and disorder is closely associated with the promotion of social cohesion and informal control.

In most cases the involvement of citizens is the result of the initiative of others, like the community police officer. The fourth type of involvement is the only type that is the result of citizens’ or entrepreneurs’ own initiatives. Main activities of the network are here implemented by citizens or entrepreneurs more or less on their own or paid by them. For instance, a private policing organisation is paid by a group of businesses to make frequent patrols through the streets of their industrial area.

The participation of citizens or entrepreneurs in local security networks may create several tensions, some of which may be the result of conflicting expectations about their role in the network. In one of the networks studied citizens wanted to have a clear voice in the decisions of the local government (according to type II). However, municipal officials perceived citizens as only giving information (which is more an involvement of type I). The community police officer wanted citizens not only to be just ‘talking’, but to ‘do something’ and contribute actively to solutions to the problems of crime in their neighbourhood (type III).
Other participants are often somewhat ambivalent about the contribution of citizens to the local security network. Although they are convinced that citizens might have an important contribution, in practice this is often seen as somewhat disappointing and of only limited value. In the views of many of their co-participants, citizens in the local security networks are often only interested in their own situation and are not able to take a more detached view of the problems concerned. According to their partners, citizens often lack the needed expertise and see their participation in the local safety platform mainly as a frequent and pleasant social meeting with others, like their neighbours. This reflects a clash in perspectives between citizens, for whom participation in the local network is often mainly a social phenomenon valued in itself, and representatives of formal organisation who have a more instrumental, utilitarian view of local security networks.

Although citizens are valued by their partners as participants in the local safety networks, in many cases they are also seen as 'troublesome', as being 'unrepresentative' of the community or as the 'loudmouths', who only create problems, a phenomenon also found in other studies (Terpstra 2004; Skogan 1998). Several strategies are used by other participants, like the community police officer or officials of the local administration, to avoid the problems which they feel may be created by the presence of citizens. In some cases citizens are (partly) excluded from information or decision-making in the local security network, even if this makes the network more complex and less transparent.

As a rule only a small number of citizens or entrepreneurs participate in the local security network. In most cases the participants may not be seen as representative of their community: the young, members of ethnic minorities or the low-skilled are often poorly represented (see also Benyon and Edwards 1999; Crawford 1997 and 2002; Pearson et al 1992; Skogan 1998). This may be the result of both selection and self-selection.

Citizens or entrepreneurs who participate in a local security network may get into a difficult position because different groups of citizens and/or entrepreneurs in their community may have opposed interests or views.

One of the local security networks studied is focused on an area containing both houses and a lot of bars and dance halls. Especially in the weekends thousands of mainly young people come to this area, making it overcrowded until at least four o'clock in the morning. Residents living here complain about the noise, the loud music, and other side-effects, like litter, broken glasses, vandalism, burglary and violence as a result of the consumption of alcohol and drugs. Many of the owners of the bars understand these complaints and try to a certain extent to decrease the noise and annoyance. But they see this problem as fundamentally unresolvable. They think that the local government should not have given permission to build new houses in this area. Some of the residents decided to take the local government to court to get them to do something about the noise produced by music in the bars. Other citizens who participate in the local security network do not appreciate this. They think it is wiser to try to get an agreement by negotiations, but also feel this is an unjustified criticism of their own role as representatives of the neighbourhood.

In many cases a significant number of the citizens and/or entrepreneurs do not participate in the local security networks. Nevertheless, they often also benefit from the preventive measures instituted by the network or from the contributions to safety made by others. Entrepreneurs who participate (and sometimes pay for the measures taken by
the network) often disapprove of what they call the 'free-riding' of the others. As long as the participation in local security networks is voluntary, it is almost impossible for citizens and/or entrepreneurs themselves to find an adequate answer to this problem of non-participation. In some cases entrepreneurs expect the local government to solve this problem by forcing non-participating entrepreneurs in their area to become members of an association which is responsible for the so-called 'facility management' of the area. This association should, among other things, be concerned with prevention and control of safety problems. The local government may force business firms in the area to become a member of the association and to contribute towards its costs: if they do not contribute, the local government will refuse to grant them a permit to locate their firm in the area concerned.

In some of the networks citizen participation is seen as a way to promote self-reliant behaviour. Participating citizens and entrepreneurs are expected to informally control other citizens and if needed to try to influence their behaviour. In practice it proves to be very difficult to realise this ideal of active citizens as informal agents of social control. Fear of threats and reprisals makes citizens abandon an attempt to correct other people, such as a group of boys hanging around in the neighbourhood. In some cases people think that it is actually the duty of the police or the local government to take care of the local safety problems. Self-reliant behaviour may also be restrained because it is not clear to citizens what exactly is expected of them or do not know how they should try to control and correct other people.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The policy of responsibilisation and the shift from 'government' to 'governance' in the prevention and control of crime, disorder and insecurity should be seen as endeavours to create an answer to the lack of effectiveness and the eroding legitimacy of the police and criminal justice agencies in many of the western European countries today (Garland 1996; Crawford 1997). However, the local security networks create a wide range of new problems with serious consequences for their effectiveness and legitimacy. The envisioned participation by the police, local government and citizens in Netherlands' local security networks is achieved only to a limited extent. This participation encounters serious problems and contradictions. A range of factors is relevant here, like the resource dependencies between the participants (and the resulting uneven distribution of influence in the network), the conflicting perspectives between them, contradictory expectations about their proper role, the lack of congruence between the notion of local co-operation and the policy or policy traditions in several of the relevant policy fields. The strategy of responsibilisation is hard to reconcile with the current stress on a more punitive policy and with the increasing dominance of managerial demands that the police organisations face. One of the main contradictions is that the police try on the one hand to co-operate with other agencies in local security networks, but on the other hand they are forced to concentrate on their 'core business' tasks and to retreat from active participation in the networks. This may result in a new distance between the police and local society (which is hard to reconcile with the envisioned community style of policing) and in the refusal of the police to go on taking care of the co-ordination of local security networks. Both the police and other participants expect that the local government will replace the police as the co-ordinator of local security networks. This paper clearly indicates that local governments often fail to meet this expectation, the result being that the task of co-ordination becomes an object of struggle among the participants involved, is fragmented among several agencies, or is abdicated and passed from one to the other.

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One of the main problems of local security networks has to do with the participation of citizens (or small entrepreneurs). In many cases it is hard to realise the planned involvement of citizens in local security networks. One of the problems is that the expectations of citizens' participations are both high and divergent. The differences in perspectives between citizens and representatives of formal organisations often gain insufficient attention. Participation of citizens is hampered by a range of problems, like the conflicting interests between different groups of citizens, the problems of a limited representation of the participating citizens or their lack of resources and information. Each of the types of citizen involvement in local safety policy distinguished earlier seems to have its own impediments. Each type of citizen participation requires that the police and local government are closely involved in local security networks. These networks depend on resources and competencies that only the police and/or local government have. Self-reliant behaviour of citizens will often only be possible if it receives sufficient, tangible support from the police. Citizens and entrepreneurs on their own are not equipped to find adequate solutions for problems of non-participation and free-rider behaviour. Moreover, important individual and social values are involved in safety policy and security networks. The promotion of safety for one category of people may have unintended consequences for another group. Safety policy, even if it is partly in private hands, is fundamentally concerned with a public good. A close involvement of the police and (local) government is needed. Responsibility should not be equated with a retreat, by either the police or the local government.

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ENDNOTE

1 Paper to be presented at the Fifth International Criminal Justice Conference Policing in Central and Eastern Europe, Dilemmas of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 23-25, 2004. Thanks to Roderik Kouwenhoven for his willingness to be a peer reviewer.

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