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To Albert J. Reiss, Jr.
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Foreword

It is difficult today to imagine a time when criminologists or criminal justice policy makers did not recognize the importance of social organization in understanding crime and the criminal justice system. But this was indeed the case before Albert J. Reiss, Jr. began his pathbreaking work in sociology, criminology, and criminal justice research more than four decades ago. Back then, with few exceptions, criminologists took a unidimensional approach, viewing crime as a series of isolated events, focusing solely on the offender and the offense, with scant attention to the broader social context in which crime is committed. What practitioners might learn from research was accordingly limited. It is no wonder that the response to crime was based on a similar approach, with little thought to the complex web of factors essential to consider in crafting prevention and other crime control strategies.

Today, thanks to Al Reiss’s pioneering work, policy makers as well as criminologists use this fundamental concept—social organization—as a standard analytical tool. What we at the National Institute of Justice refer to as “understanding the nexus” of crime and other social variables has become a major objective in research and practice. Analyses of the social, organizational, and even the physical environment of crime and the justice system response are now the rule rather than the exception. The same perspective animates policy making and practice. This type of analysis has caused the bar to be raised, with research becoming more complex (and difficult), but with the payoff well worth the effort—richly textured, finely nuanced results, more inspired conclusions.
There is space here to cite only a few of the ways AI introduced and investigated the study of crime and justice in their social context. He was among the first scholars to plead for shifting the emphasis from studying offenders and their crimes in isolation, toward a perspective that includes the networks of relationships binding offenders one to another. What he termed "co-offending" is a construct that has helped clarify what happens when people act in concert to commit crime. He introduced new ways of thinking about crime control, demonstrating that the way the police go about the job of reducing crime is itself a function of how they are organized and of (ever-changing) external factors. He used a similar organizational focus to alert researchers to why the data they trust so implicitly may not be as reliable and valid as they would like to think. Data are generated by organizations shaped by forces that affect the quality of the information produced. Drawing again on his grounding in sociology, AI gave criminologists a valuable field research tool, "systematic social observation," used for the study of policing. More recently, he was a major force in shaping the design of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, a long-term study of how community, family structure, ethnicity, gender, and a host of other variables influence the origins of criminal behavior. He called the investigators' attention to the dynamic nature of communities and of the consequent need to track change over time, and he created a new set of measures for the processes that put people at risk for crime. These and other products of AI Reiss's fertile imagination continue to have incalculable heuristic effects.

It is no exaggeration to say that innovations like problem-oriented policing, community-based approaches to crime prevention, the analysis of "hot spots," crime mapping, and more...
recent constructs like "collective efficacy," which sees the informal social control mechanisms of neighborhoods as potent forces for preventing crime, have gained currency in large part because of Al Reiss’s groundwork. A large part of NIJ’s portfolio is a testament to his influence on criminal justice research.

In partial payment of the debt the field owes to this singular individual, editors Elin Waring and David Weisburd have prepared this festschrift. It is the outgrowth of NIJ’s interest in bringing together a group of leading scholars who, as Al Reiss’s intellectual progeny, share his view that understanding social organization must be at the heart of research and practice. Their studies--the proof of paternity--use his road maps as points of departure from which to launch and extend their own explorations and to chart new territory: in situational crime prevention, strategies for building research into the structure of police departments, the implications of community policing for police organization, the utility of “social disorganization” as an explanatory factor, the parallels between co-offending groups and licit groups, the viability of a single-cause theory of crime, the validity of “neighborhood” as an explanatory factor when neighborhoods change...and more.

The editors and authors of this volume, and NIJ, its sponsor, offer this tribute to Al Reiss with a string attached. The proviso is that he will continue—for many years to come—to bring to our discipline the acutely perceptive insights that have already shaped generations of scholars and contributed to a fuller and more accurate picture of crime and justice in America.
Introduction

Crimes are often viewed as atomistic events which, committed by individuals and in specific places, can be fully understood through the analysis of event-level information and ecological correlates. Although the location of criminals in families, schools, peer groups and places is widely acknowledged, they too are often ultimately treated as isolates with an appended collection of contextual characteristics. Responses to crime, whether in the form of interventions to prevent crime, to decrease the risk of criminality, to deter or rehabilitate offenders or to improve the measurement of crime are often similarly treated as isolated undertakings. This view of crime as a problem of individuals, rather than organizations or social networks, has informed much of our thinking about crime, criminality and the criminal justice system.

Increasingly, however, criminologists have begun to recognize the importance of taking into account the connections that bind criminals, societal agents of social control, and the community more generally. This idea, which we define more broadly as the social organization of crime, has been a central focus of the distinguished criminologist, Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (see Vaughn, this volume). More than any other observer of the world of crime and justice, Albert Reiss has led us to recognize how the idea of social organization must lead us to broader changes in how we understand crime problems, as well as how institutions of social control respond to them. This volume is dedicated to Professor Reiss. It draws from those of us who have learned
from him to explore the problem of social organization and crime in the broad based tradition of
his work.

The work in this volume may be seen as informing three major themes in the construction
of the problem of the social organization of crime. The first, may be defined simply as the social
organization of crime itself. It is well-known that many-- and for some types of crime, most--
crimes (Reiss, 1988:123-126) involve multiple offenders. Indeed, even some crimes which at
first appearances seem to be acts of lone individuals often involve larger structures, ranging from
markets for stolen goods (e.g. Klockars, 1974) to the existence of a formal organization in which
a crime takes place (Weisburd et al. 1991; Cressey 1973). Yet the nature of these structures has
rarely been explored (Finckenauer and Waring 1996, for exceptions see Mars, 1982, Waring,
1993, and Shover, 1973). The correlates of the organization of criminal acts into networks,
hierarchies and markets (Powell, 1990) with specific structural characteristics remain relatively
unstudied and undertheorized (for exceptions see e.g. Cressey, 1972 and McIntosh, 1975).

A second area of concern is the social organization of the context of crime. Crime does
not consist of an isolated act involving a simple interchange between offender(s) and victim(s).
Rather, it occurs in the context of multidimensional social organization, including family,
neighborhood, place, formal organization and situation, all of which can be understood as
providing essential long-term and immediate elements in the unfolding of specific criminal
events and, then, to the immediate and long-term consequences of such events (Reiss and Tonry,
1986; Reiss and Tonry, 1993; Clarke, 1992).
For example, the potentially contrasting unofficial response to a theft between strangers may be quite different from a similar theft in which one neighbor victimizes another. This itself would likely be influenced by the pre-existing characteristics of the social organization of the neighborhood including the strength of its adult and child networks (McGaley, 1986).

The social organization of the organized responses to crime, form another important area of inquiry. A variety of formal organizations, including a variety of government agencies, community organizations, advocacy groups, and non-profit and for-profit service providers are assigned the task of controlling, measuring and responding to crime, criminals and crime victims. How these organizations separately and collectively define and provide society's reactions to these categories is a separate and influential dimension of social organization (Sherman 1992: 106-109). To what extent do these organizations share interests and, conversely, how much competition is there between them? What are their institutional characteristics? How do they influence the definitions of crime and important crime? What environmental factors--including regulation and dependency on other organizations for funding, clients, research access and other resources--influence the operation of these organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)?

To what extent do criminal justice organizations constitute an organizational field or set or organizational fields with distinctive characteristics, typologies and cultures (Aldrich, 1979)? Analysis of the ways in which all of these factors influence the response to crime by these organizations at the street level requires a social organization perspective.
Although these three areas of focus appear to represent distinct research problems, in fact, they are themselves intricately connected one to another. For example, the nature of the organizational response to crime may have an impact on the way in which future crimes are organized. The neighborhood which provides the context for the commission of predatory crime by late adolescents may also provide a supply of potential co-offenders who have known each other since their early school days and a church with a basketball program which lessens the likelihood that those potential co-offenders will become participants in a criminal event. The incapacitation of the central actor in a deviant network by a juvenile court may have an important impact on the nature of that network in the future (Reiss, 1980). The organization of the context of offending may influence the nature and extent of law enforcement responses to crime (Smith, 1986).

Discussion of the social organization of crime can be found in many different areas of criminology. However, to date there have been very few attempts to bring together the different themes we have raised within a single scholarly work. Such an opportunity was provided to us by the National Institute of Justice. We are most grateful to Jeremy Travis, the Director of the Institute, for his interest in the problem of the social organization of crime and his willingness to have the Institute support a meeting and book examining the topic. The papers in this volume represent a beginning dialog which we hope will be continued. It is a dialog covering the themes outlined above, both in their specific dimensions and in the context of their complex interactions. This is an approach that is very much in the tradition of Albert J. Reiss, Jr., to whom this volume is dedicated.

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References


Chapter 1

Clarifying Organizational Actors: The Contributions of Albert J. Reiss, Jr. to the Sociology of Deviance and Social Control

Diane Vaughan

A casual perusal of the many publications of Albert Reiss suggest a scholar of catholic interest and taste. This contention is, of course, true, but looking more analytically and deeply into the content of his intellectual interests shows that to draw the quick conclusion of diversity obscures a pattern that appears in much of his research and theory. A lot of his scholarly attention, developed during his graduate education and expanded upon throughout his career, was and is devoted to social organization. This focus has materialized in a stream of work in the Sociology of Deviance and Social Control dedicated to clarifying organizational actors. For his students and others who have worked closely with him on this topic over the years, this comes as no surprise, but for many academics this aspect of his career is not well known, a fact attributable to publication of a definitive conceptual article in a journal that soon after went out of print, key ideas surfacing in government reports, and their elaboration appearing as chapters in books. My purpose in this brief excursus is to trace the trajectory and development of his ideas about organizational actors, thus constructing a sociology of knowledge in addition to clarifying his contributions. My method was a content analysis of relevant publications and papers listed on Reiss's curriculum vita, a personal interview, and a review of the literature on organizational deviance and control for citations as an indicator of the dissemination of Reiss's ideas. I have chosen to trace the organizational deviance and social control trajectory of his work for this
paper, but someone else might trace the trajectory of his interest in social organization in another
direction entirely. It is evident in his work on community studies, urban sociology, delinquency,
education, career criminals, sentencing, co-offending, and violence.

A Grounding in Social Organization

Reiss was and is, first and foremost, a sociologist. His role in clarifying organizational
actors in the Sociology of Deviance and Social Control must be seen as work consistent with a
fundamental focus on social organization that originated during his graduate education. Reiss
received his graduate degree from the University of Chicago in 1949. The core of the research
and theorizing of the department at that time was social organization. Reiss took courses with
Ogburn and Wirth, and taught with Lloyd Warner, all of whom had a strong organizational
perspective. Whyte was at Chicago during this period writing up his thesis fieldwork (later to
become Street Corner Society), in which he observed that the "slum" was organized, challenging
prevailing assumptions at the time about the social disorganization of the inner city. The
departmental focus on social organization also permeated the work of faculty who studied
deviance and social control. Sutherland's theory of differential association stressed the
importance of differential social organization; Shaw and McKay's ecological theory explored the
social organization of crime in the city (paradoxically, at the same time that they posed a theory
of social disorganization to explain it); Alinsky was involved with the practical question of how
one organizes communities.

Reiss's graduate interest in social organization strengthened over time and solidified. His
work at the University of Michigan, from 1961-1970, marked a turning point. Previous to
Michigan, Reiss's Chicago background manifested itself in an ecological point of view. At
Michigan, three events crystallized his thinking in a different direction. First, Reiss co-taught with Ed Swanson, Swanson presenting the social psychological approach and Reiss the social organization perspective. Playing off the other perspective, Reiss expanded his knowledge and crystallized his understanding of social organization. Second, he became Director of the Center for Research on Social Organization. Third, he affiliated with the Michigan School of Law, which added law to the other strands of his thinking, so he came to view his interests as "deviance, social control, and law." Embodying this crystallization and solidification of interests and understanding was the publication of "The Social Organization of Legal Contacts," written with Leon Mayhew (1969).

The result of these three changes showed up in his own classes, as he started thinking and theorizing about organizational deviance and control, and the course of his intellectual journey was set.

Establishing the Beginning Conceptual Apparatus

During his years at Michigan, Reiss served as President of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society (now the Midwestern Sociological Society). His Presidential Address was titled "The Study of Deviant Behavior: Where the Action Is." Later published in The Ohio Valley Sociologist (1966), the article lays out the beginning conceptual apparatus that Reiss would use and refine as the basis for his theorizing and research in the coming years. Conceptually innovative and strong theoretically, the article attracted little notice, laying dormant for years. In part, its invisibility was because it appeared in The Ohio Valley Sociologist, a small circulation journal that soon went out of print. Also, its publication occurred at a time when interest in research and theory on White-Collar Crime (as everyone was calling it then, following the...
Sutherland legacy) had waned. The article appeared during a hiatus: scholars who had done research and theorizing during the Classic Period of "white-collar crime" research had moved on to other interests, and Watergate, which triggered a renewed and sustained research program in the 70s, had not yet occurred (Vaughan 1981). Ermann and Lundman resurrected Reiss's "The Study of Deviant Behavior" by reprinting it in a edited collection Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society (1978a), that was widely adopted for classroom use. By that time, however, many sociologists had independently arrived at the position that the organizational perspective (and the literature on organization theory) was a useful tool for understanding the deviance and social control of organizations, and were writing and publishing using that perspective. In essence, Reiss's Presidential Address/article was a groundbreaking article that never broke the ground it should have.

What is noteworthy about it is that, first, Reiss was thinking about organizational deviance and control as early as 1966 and, second, although a mere twelve pages in length, the Presidential Address was conceptually rich, identifying a number of topics that he would be engaged with in the future. Borrowing his title from Goffman's "Where the Action Is," Reiss emphasized that deviance was a question for which the complete answer could not be found in either the individual motivation to be deviant nor in the cultural and social structure. The answer, he argued, was in social organization. He wrote,

"The Action rather is in the study of social organization - the organizational matrix that encompasses the deviant behavior of persons and the deviant behavior of organizations. A more general theory can encompass both. Indeed, the theory of organizations is easily adapted to the study of organizational deviance. Perhaps the time has come to remake the scene as well as make
Reiss built his argument by noting that the Mertonian paradigm had appropriately shifted attention away from individual pathology toward institutional forces. Because of Merton, Reiss wrote, "The action began to lie in a "...systematic approach to the analysis of social and cultural sources of deviant behavior (Merton 1938: 672, cited in Reiss 1966: 1). In the 60s, however, Reiss noted that the work of Goffman, Cohen, and Becker had shifted the scene of The Action to the level of interaction (1966: 2). He pointed out that the emphasis in both the Mertonian and interactionist eras was on the person. Reiss drew attention to the deviance that characterizes aggregates, organized groups, and formal organizations. The foundation for his approach has been laid by the scholars who did research and theorizing about organizational and occupational deviance in 40s and 50s, the Classic Period of "white-collar crime" research and theorizing.  

Reiss's contribution was not only to bring the socially organized aspects of the phenomenon back in, but to make explicit the link between social organization, in a theoretically generalizable way, for a new audience. He laid out the conceptual terrain as follows:

1. Reiss stressed the linkage between individual action and social organization, asserting:
   - no individual deviance exists that does not involve social interaction and organization;
   - much individual deviance is intricately linked to organized systems and organizations that also are defined as deviant; when organizations are defined as deviant, often all members are classified as deviant also

2. He suggested the possibility of a general theory of deviance concerned not only with the behavior of persons but of organizations.

3. He observed that complex organizations create distinctive problems for social control
for two reasons. First, their own deviance is enabled because massive evasion of social control is possible. Second, they are ready targets of deviance: for example, check forgery, malicious destruction of property, embezzlement.

This short Ohio Valley Sociologist article demonstrates the broad parameters of his conceptualization in 1966. Having set an intellectual agenda, his subsequent work explored more deeply the issues that he raised.

Refinement of Conceptual Interests

Reiss refined these conceptual interests by exploring three topics: organizations as violators, organizations as victims, and the regulation of organizational deviance. His chief contribution on the former two was to introduce, as sensitizing concepts, organizations as both violators and victims. However, he made no major intellectual commitment to either topic. His major intellectual investment was - and is - in the social control of organizational deviance. We will consider each of the three in turn.

Organizations as Violators:

In 1980, Reiss, together with Albert Biderman, published Data Sources on White-Collar Law Breaking. The primary purpose of this research was to explore existing sources of data and make recommendations about a general system of indicators for white-collar violations of law to the National Institute of Justice. The Reiss-Biderman report is permeated with conceptual insights that show Reiss's social organization perspective. This influence is visible to even the casual reader, as it appears in chapter heads and subheads: for example, "Statistics as an Organizational Complex;" "Statistical and Bureaucratic Organization;" "Organizational Barriers to the Collection and Classification of Information for its Statistical Processing;" "Social
Organization and Conceptualizing, Classifying, and Counting Law Violations." Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Reiss-Biderman project was the identification of many existing sources of data at a time when many sociologists were stating that extensive research on (so-called) white-collar crime was impossible because corporations were powerful, making data unattainable. But in addition to its applied dimension and the identification of data sources, Reiss and Biderman developed the following conceptual definition for use in government data collection efforts:

White-collar violations are those violations of law to which penalties are attached and that involve the use of a violator's position of significant power, influence, or trust in the legitimate economic or political institutional order to the purpose of illegal gain, or to commit an illegal act for personal or organizational gain (1980: xxvii).

Many scholars have grappled with the conceptual definition of the phenomenon both before and after the above, the most recent being a 1996 conference organized expressly for the purpose of creating a definition (Helmkamp et al. 1996). Consensus was achieved at the 1966 meeting, but no consensus has been achieved in the scholarly community at large. What is significant about the Reiss-Biderman definition is that it shifts government attention to the organizational locus of the problem, thereby setting up a recommendation that government data be collected on both individuals and organizations as violators. Both the title of the monograph and the focus on "white-collar violations" seem oddly wrong, however, given Reiss's background in social organization and the argument of The Ohio Valley Sociologist article. An interesting comment appears in the monograph's preface that suggests the NIJ and enforcement/practitioner audience for the monograph was influential. They wrote "... (the term, white-collar violations)
reflects express and latent ideas about violations that are already important to law and to action...we considered but rejected the idea of using another term more nicely in accord with the denotative meanings of our definition than is the term "white-collar," which is archaic sartorially as well as theoretically... (but) we find that "white-collar crime" has so strong a position in the common vocabulary, and now even in a statute, as well, that it would be idle to seek to replace it (Reiss and Biderman 1980: xxix)."

Organizations as Victims

Reiss was thinking about the vulnerability of organizations to victimization by crime and deviance long before others. His earliest publication on the subject was a government report that appeared in the late 60s, the result of a survey of crime against small businesses that he helped design and execute (1969). Reiss and Biderman later discussed organizations as victims in the 1980 Data Sources on White-Collar Law Breaking. Suggesting that enforcement agencies collect data on organizations as victims, Reiss and Biderman argued for classification of data by level of social organization (Reiss and Biderman 1980: 410). Further, they considered the variation in victim and violator combinations that could occur, stressing the relationship between victim and violator rather than following the more usual data collection method of defining them as isolated statuses in an event. This early work of Reiss's on organizations as victims was not incorporated into the work of other scholars, no doubt because it appeared in these two government publications. By 1983-1985, when Reiss began incorporating these ideas in publications in scholarly journals and chapters in scholarly books (see citations at note 18), others had independently discovered the topic and had begun to publish theory and research about organizations as victims.³
Regulating Organizations

Reiss's major intellectual investment has been and remains in the development of social control models. Several publications, all acknowledged classics that were published close to 1966 publication date of "The Study of Deviant Behavior," demonstrate his pre-existing and abiding concern with social control (Reiss 1971, 1967, 1974). Important as they are in their own right, they also played a role in what would eventually materialize as a general conceptual schema for the regulation of organizations - offenders whose offenses seldom were processed in the criminal justice system. The parameters of that conceptual schema were first set out in Data Sources on White-Collar Lawbreaking. In it, Reiss and Biderman made the observation that underlying statistical reporting systems are general models - usually unrecognized, but if recognized and the statistical reporting capabilities of these models developed, would lead to enhanced usefulness of the statistics. Then they identified three social control models:

1. Mobilization of Law Enforcement: The Proactive and Reactive Models

Drawing upon Reiss's research in The Police and the Public, Reiss and Biderman stated that organizations come to know law violations by both internal and external intelligence capabilities related to internal and external environments. They examine these "mobilization strategies" (proactive and reactive) in relation to internal and external environments.

2. Deterrence Model of Law Enforcement

They identified but did not explicate the model, noting instead the failure of agencies to collect data so that a systematic study of deterrent effects of sanctions could be done.

3. Compliance Model of Law Enforcement

They identified but did not explicate the model, observing that the structure of compliance
information systems have consequences for gathering information about compliance. Within a few years of the publication of Data Sources, Reiss published several articles and chapters, one following immediately after the other between 1983-1985, that developed the compliance and deterrence models in conceptual detail (Reiss 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1985). In these conceptually rich articles, Reiss

1) Elaborates his previous ideas of organizations as both violators and victims, the victim discussion appearing for the first time in scholarly publications.

2) Addresses the expansion of legal regulation into organizational life

3) Elaborates on previous ideas about the social control of organizational life as problematic

4) Articulates in detail the characteristics of and distinctions between compliance and deterrence models by constructing Ideal Types of manipulation (leverage for social control) that represent both models (incentives vs. threats; voluntarism vs. coercion; prevention of violations vs. punishment after the fact), noting most systems of social control mix these models.

In the 90s, Reiss began applying his social organization perspective and deterrence and compliance models to the world economic system. For an international audience, he is considering problems of international and multinational problems of deviance and social control (Reiss 1993). In "Crime and Justice in a Changing World", Reiss's Presidential Address, 11th International Congress on Criminology of the International Society of Criminology, August 27, 1993 in Budapest, Hungary, he raised tough questions. Can we regulate as before, leaning on the principle of sovereign states regulating business enterprises engaged in transnational markets,
when polities and their sovereignty, economies and their markets, and technologies and their organization are rapidly changing? In addition to the new difficulties of regulating business, social control must deal with crimes by sovereign states themselves. The situation is complicated by transnational crime - harms that transcend national boundaries (e.g., genocide; sale and use of nuclear technology; trafficking in arms; environmental crime) -- and the absence of effective international organizational means for regulating.

How is it possible, Reiss asked, to create a system to prevent, detect, and sanction violations or regulate compliance with law? Uncharacteristically pessimistic, he noted the pre-existing absence of moral consensus as well as the erosion of sovereign powers' ability to regulate business. Are states willing to give up sovereign national interests to some larger organizational identity with law-making and regulating powers? Reiss observed that one obvious option, shifting from national regulatory powers to supra regulatory agencies, is likely to be strenuously resisted because in a global economy private information is necessary to business; state secrets become even more important to the individual state.

Conclusion

Clarifying organizational actors in the Sociology of Deviance and Social Control is one stream of research and theorizing in a career that has covered many substantive topics. Although some of the key pieces of his published work on this topic are scattered in difficult to locate sources, those ideas have been influential nonetheless. Reiss has passed them on through the oral tradition: participation in seminars, professional meetings, and teaching. A dedicated teacher who writes extensive comments on student papers, the influence of his life-long emphasis on social organization can be found in the work of his students, each of whom has built upon what they
learned from him in different and innovative ways: e.g., Sherman 1978; Shapiro 1981; Weisburd et al. 1991; Waring (forthcoming), to name only a few. In addition to passing on the importance of social organization by the oral tradition, this perspective has informed his work on the applied side. He has taken many positions of responsibility in organizations (including Chair of each Department in which he has taught - serving in some more than once - and as President of several professional organizations). Not only has he applied his social organization perspective to government-sponsored research that shaped policy, that perspective has also informed his input on Scientific Panels and Advisory Groups (the list covers three pages of his vita).

Considering the totality of his work, it is probable that he has been most often linked, both nationally and internationally, with Criminology. Criminology seems to be defined by sociologists in other disciplinary specialties as marginal to mainstream sociology because of its applied side. This seems odd, since many other disciplinary specialties in Sociology also have an applied side, but apparently Criminology is marginalized by a stereotype about criminal justice concerns that conjure up fingerprint experts rather than theorists. Yet Reiss's work has been rooted in mainstream sociology - the fundamentals of social organization - since graduate school. This has remained true whether he is working the applied side of the street, which he has done often, or the theoretical side, which he also has done often. First and foremost a sociologist, he has always worked both sides of the street from the center, not the margins.

References


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Notes

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By independent discovery, I mean that the author's work does not cite Reiss's 1966 article (although not citing it does not necessarily mean the author did not know about it. Further clouding the issue, citing it may indicate that the author began the work independently using an organizational perspective, then later discovered Reiss's article as appropriate by (for example) reading it in the Ermann and Lundman volume). Lundman himself, a Minnesota PhD teaching as an Assistant Professor at Ohio State when I was a graduate student there, first had specialized in both Complex Organizations and Deviance and Social Control as a graduate student, combined them in his research, then uncovered the 1966 Ohio Valley Sociologist as he was writing his 1978 Sociological Quarterly article with M. David Ermann.

Listed chronologically (although the work obviously was begun before the dates indicate it was presented publicly), the independent discovery of the importance of replacing a "white-collar" perspective with an organizational perspective was as follows: Meier 1975; Stone 1975; Cohen 1977; Denzin 1977; Ermann and Lundman 1978; Schrager and Short 1978; Gross 1978; Shover 1978; Needleman and Needleman, 1979; Vaughan 1979 (published as Vaughan 1983); Gross 1980; Vaughan 1980; Finney and Lesieur 1982; Kramer, 1982.

Many of the sociologists working on the problem during this era emphasized aspects of social organization (see Vaughan 1981; 1999).

Most of this work was done at the Disaster Research Center (DRC), then at Ohio State University, where E. L. Quarantelli and Russell R. Dynes directed a team of organizational sociologists to study natural disasters. DRC had two research streams: the response of organizations to disasters and organizations as victims when disasters occurred. (See e.g., R.R. Dynes and E. L. Quarantelli 1974; Vaughan, 1980, which was written while I was a graduate student).
student at Ohio State). Also prior to the 80s, research was being done on the victimization of organizations, but it was not done by sociologists, nor was it done with a focus on the organizational aspects of it (See, e.g., Lange and Bowers 1979).
Chapter 2

Patterns of Juvenile Delinquency and Co-offending

Joan McCord and Kevin P. Conway

Co-offending is endemic to delinquency (e.g., see Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Sarnecki 1986; Shaw 1930; Shaw and McKay 1969; Short and Strodtbeck 1965; Sutherland and Cressey 1974; Suttles 1968). Yet the study of co-offending and its implications for theory and practice have a short history, a history to which Albert J. Reiss, Jr. made seminal contributions. In 1980, he introduced the term "co-offenders" in his carefully reasoned criticism of the assumption that incarceration of offenders necessarily reduces the number of criminal events. Reiss wrote that group offending throws off models of incapacitation. Putting an offender in prison, he noted, may actually increase the number of crimes committed—if it leads to added recruiting or to increased rates of offending alone. In 1986, extending his consideration of co-offending, Reiss commented about the implications of group offending for potential intervention policies. He suggested that group affiliation is fundamental to understanding criminal careers. Participation in group offending, he pointed out, could have critical effects on "onset, persistence, and desistance from offending" (Reiss 1986: 122).

Questioning the focus on identification and early incapacitation of high-rate offenders, Reiss (1980, 1986, 1988) demonstrated the inadequacy of computations regarding a relation between individual crime rates and rates for crime events. Reiss noted that the proportion of crimes accounted for by high-rate offenders is exaggerated if the high-rate offenders commit a large proportion of their crimes in groups. On the other hand, the proportion of crimes accounted for by high-rate offenders is underestimated if they commit most of their crimes alone.
At least since early in the twentieth century, when Goring (1913) reported criminal statistics for England, being young at the time of first arrest has been linked with habitual or frequent recidivism. Similar linkages have been found, for example, in a sample of discharged juvenile offenders (Glueck and Glueck 1945), among a general cohort of males born around 1928 in congested areas of Cambridge and Somerville Massachusetts (McCord 1981), among a cohort born in 1945 in Philadelphia (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1972), and for a London cohort born around 1953 (Farrington 1983; Nagin and Land 1993).

Juveniles tend to commit their crimes with others. For example, Shaw and McKay (1969) found that 81.8 percent of the juveniles brought to court in Cook County during 1928 committed the offenses for which they were brought to court as members of groups. In reviewing such evidence in 1988, Reiss reported that co-offending tends to decrease with the age of offenders. Such variation could, of course, have a dramatic impact on estimates of the relation between age and crime events. A systematic positive correlation between age of offending and amount of co-offending would reduce the number of crimes that should be attributed to young offenders as measured against calculations based on participation rates.

The tendency for younger offenders to commit their crimes in groups gives an inflated estimate of the number of crimes for which they are responsible if a separate crime is counted for each member of a co-offending group. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation reports and self-report studies use individual participants as though each report of a crime indicates a different event.

To address some of the questions regarding how age is related to co-offending, Reiss and Farrington (1991) analyzed criminal records from London. Their sample was garnered from a
prospective longitudinal study of 411 8-year-old boys who were living in a particular working class area in 1961-62. Criminal records of these subjects and their co-offenders were collected when they were 32. Reiss and Farrington discovered that individuals with long criminal histories tended to move from group to solo offending, although the probability that an offense would be a co-offense remained relatively constant through the first eight offenses. They remarked on the fact that both recidivism and co-offending declined with increasing age at first offense. Whereas 34 percent of the juvenile delinquents who were first arrested between the ages of ten and thirteen, only 20 percent of those first arrested between the ages of fourteen and sixteen offended with others.

Co-offending delinquents tend to commit crimes at higher rates than do solo offenders (Hindelang 1976; Reiss and Farrington 1991). Further, the British longitudinal data indicated that age at first official offense interacts with effects of co-offending on subsequent offending (Reiss and Farrington 1991). Among those under fourteen, offense rates were higher for boys whose first offense had been committed with others. On the other hand, among the boys first convicted between ages fourteen and sixteen, offense rates were somewhat lower for boys whose first offense had been committed with others.

To show the implications of the distribution of co-offending for the age-crime distribution, Reiss and Farrington (1991) computed alternative age-crime curves. When computed for offenders, crime among the London cohort appears to peak around the age of seventeen. When computed for offenses, the peak appeared around age twenty. In short, the data considered by Reiss and Farrington point to a confounding between age effects and co-offending effects.
The age-crime curve for offenders has given rise to age-based typologies of offenders. Terrie Moffitt (1993, 1994) proposed an explanation for both the age curve of criminality and the persistence of antisocial behavior by positing that there are two groups of adolescent delinquents. The first consists in youths who have been antisocial since early childhood and will probably continue to be so as adults. Moffitt believes they have neuropsychological deficits that predispose them to criminality and account for persistence in antisocial behavior. The second group is composed of youths who have a short period of criminality as a consequence of an adolescent gap between biological maturity and social immaturity combined with exposure to opportunities to learn delinquent behavior. This group accounts for the sharp rise in participation in crime late in adolescence. Their delinquencies are prompted by perceived rewards from delinquency, including separation from intrusive adults and rejection of roles assigned to them as immature adolescents. Moffitt suggested that the late starting delinquents sought the rewards they perceived as accompanying misbehavior and learned to misbehave by mimicking those whose criminality had been persistent.

Moffitt tagged the first group "life-course persistent" criminals and the second, "adolescent-limited." Although Moffitt's theory suggests that peer influences have greatest impact on adolescent-limited delinquents (Bartusch, Lynam, Moffitt, and Silva 1997), Moffitt does not directly consider the possibility that co-offending might affect the developmental trajectory of crime.

Like Moffitt, Gerald Patterson developed an etiological theory that focuses on differentiating early onset delinquents from late onset delinquents (Patterson 1995; Patterson, Capaldi, and Bank 1991; Patterson and Yoerger 1993, 1997). Patterson emphasizes family
socialization practices and association with deviant peers as having strong influences on early onset for delinquency. He hypothesized that "the more antisocial the child, the earlier he or she will become a member of a deviant peer group" and that "young antisocial children form the core of the deviant peer group" (Patterson and Yoerger 1997: 152).

Several patterns of offending could produce what appears as age-related decreases in co-offending. For example, most very young delinquents might commit their crimes with others and then desist. Those early delinquents who persist in committing crimes might not change their behavior, but rather, be among the minority of young offenders who committed their crimes alone. Because data have been collected from individuals, asking them whether they committed crimes alone or with others, the age-related pattern might be produced by an age-related reduction in the size of co-offending groups. Larger co-offending groups would inflate reported co-offending without reflecting a greater number of crimes. An alternative possibility is that young delinquents commit most of their crimes with others, but as they mature, those who continue to commit crimes increasingly do so alone. This transition may or may not be a consequence of group processes. Delinquents might learn from their co-offenders techniques for misbehaving that they would not otherwise have learned.

Several studies have shown that gang membership contributes to high rates of criminal activities (e.g., Battin, et al. 1998; Esbensen, Huizinga, and Weiner 1993; Huff 1998; Thornberry 1998; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, and Chard-wierschem 1993). These and other studies (e.g., Pfeiffer 1998) also suggest that gangs facilitate violence. The heightened criminality and violence of gang members seems not to be reducible to selection. That is, although gang members, prior to joining a gang, tend to be more active criminals than their non-joining, even delinquent, peers
during periods of gang participation, they themselves are more active and more frequently violent than before or after being members of gangs. The literature on gang participation, however, does not go much beyond suggesting that there is a process that facilitates antisocial, often violent, behavior. Norms and pressure to conform to deviant values have been suggested as mechanisms. How and why these are effective has received little attention.

Research by Thomas J. Dishion and his colleagues point to reinforcement processes for understanding why deviance increases when misbehaving youngsters get together. Delinquent and nondelinquent boys brought a friend to the laboratory. Conversations were videotaped and coded to show positive and neutral responses by the partner. Among the delinquent pairs, misbehavior received approving responses contrasting with the nondelinquent dyads, who ignored talk about deviance (Dishion, Spracklen, Andrews, and Patterson 1996). In addition, reinforcement of deviant talk was associated with violence, even after statistically controlling the boys’ histories of antisocial behavior and parental use of harsh, inconsistent and coercive discipline (Dishion, Eddy, Haas, Li, and Spracklen 1997).

A modification of Dishion's interpretation of why talk among delinquents encourages delinquency, one with broader implications for understanding the impact of others on a person's behavior, is that the feedback contributes structure to how a person reasons about the world. This latter interpretation, one based on Construct Theory (McCord 1997), suggests that co-offending provides grounds for delinquents to see criminal behavior as appropriate in a wide variety of circumstances. The role of co-offenders, at least for young children, would be that they promote potentiating reasons for a form of action that is delinquent. The contribution of group processing, according to this theory, is different from that of enhancing the probability of finding
accomplices, though group processes may lead delinquents to seek accomplices for further actions.

Studies of co-offending only incidentally have considered age at first offending. Neither gang studies nor typological studies that consider early- and late-starters as having different types of personality have focussed on the role of co-offending in production of crime. Therefore, in the present analysis, we consider the age of first crime to create a typology (following Moffitt and Patterson) in the light of questions about co-offending raised in the work by Reiss. To do this, we use longitudinal data from Philadelphia to focus on co-offending in relation to age at first arrest.

The sample

Subjects for the study consisted in a random sample of 400 offenders drawn from police tapes listing the 60,821 crimes committed in Philadelphia during 1987. Because we wanted to compare solo offending with co-offending, half the sample was drawn from a list of offenses the police had recorded as being solo offenses; the other half, from a list of co-offenses.

To avoid defining late-starting juvenile delinquency as not-early-starting (which can mask the source of differences) we divided the sample into three categories of age at first crime. Early starters were offenders whose first offense occurred before their thirteenth birthdays. Late starters were offenders whose first offense occurred after achieving the age of sixteen. The modal offenders (about one third of the sample) were black males whose first offense occurred when they were between thirteen and fifteen years of age.

Offenses and Co-offenses

This analysis is based on court incidents, that is, on offenses for which a docket number assigned by a police officer had been recorded in the juvenile court files. When more than one
charge was made for a particular incident, we coded the most serious one. The offenders averaged 4.6 crime incidents, with a range of 1 to 24. They averaged 3.5 Index crimes, with a range of 0 to 24. These included an average of 1.4 violent crimes, with a range of 0 to 11.

We tracked complete juvenile histories. The four hundred identified offenders were listed for 1843 crime incidents, for a mean of 4.6 incidents per offender. The records included twenty incidents for which two of the randomly selected offenders had been listed. Six pairs committed one offense together, four pairs committed two offenses together, and two pairs committed three offenses together. The number of offenders for these double-counted incidents ranged from two to six, with a mode of three.

In over 95 percent of the incidents, some information about the number of offenders was available. When a range was given, we estimated conservatively, taking the lower number. When "group" was mentioned with an unspecified number of offenders, we coded the number as 3. We were unable to code the number of offenders for 91 crime events, including 26 thefts, 19 robberies, 9 vehicular thefts, and a smattering of other crimes. On average, each of the 1752 crime incidents with information about the number of co-offenders involved 2.2 offenders, with a range of 1 to 30. Among these, 725 were solo offenses. The 1027 incidents that were co-offenses included a mean of 3.0 offenders.

**Age and Co-offending**

The proportion of co-offences varied in relation to the age at first offense. Those who committed their first offenses prior to their thirteenth birthdays were unlikely to have committed all their crimes alone. Less than five percent committed no crimes with accomplices whereas twenty percent committed all their crimes with others. Offenders who committed their first
crimes when they were sixteen or seventeen, on the other hand, were almost as likely to have committed all their crimes alone (30%) as all their crimes with someone else (37%). Those in the modal category, having a first offense between the ages of 13 and 15, were about half as likely to commit all crimes alone (15%) as to commit them all with someone else (29%). A majority of the offenders committed some crimes alone and some with others.

The data show quite clearly that co-offending is inversely related to age at first offense. Approximately two-thirds of the 224 offenses committed prior to age 13 had been committed with others. In contrast, only a little over half of the offenses committed by offenders who first committed a crime at age sixteen or seventeen had been committed with others. In addition, about forty percent of the crimes committed by offenders who began their criminal careers early committed crimes with at least two accomplices. Only 26% of the crimes committed by offenders who began their criminal careers late committed them with at least two accomplices.

In keeping with studies of other populations, recidivism was inversely related to age at first offense in this Philadelphia cohort. The individual recidivism rates inflate crime rates, however, to the extent that they represent offenses committed by more than one person. Those who committed crimes prior to age 13 committed 3.43 times as many crimes as those 16 or 17 years old when they committed a first offense. Yet when the size of offending groups is taken into account, their criminality ratio is 3.00 to 1, a 14% reduction in crime ratio.

The three groups, of course, had different lengths of time during which they had committed crimes as juveniles. Individual crime rates were computed for both solo offenses and co-offenses. These were computed on the assumption that a juvenile who committed a crime would remain a delinquent until the age of 18. That is, the number of years of exposure and the
age at first crime varied inversely. Whatever bias this computation introduced affected solo and co-offending rates similarly. Individual co-offending rates were higher than solo rates regardless of the age at first offense (Table 1A).

Table 1 about here

Computed in terms of individual offending rates, these data suggest that the high recidivism rates of those who are particularly young when they begin offending are due, in part, to the duration of their criminal activities as well as to the fact that so many of their crimes are with accomplices. They do not indicate that early starters commit offenses with greater rapidity than do offenders who start when older.

Individual crime rates -- at least as measured through official records -- appear to decline with experience. In terms of annual rates, those who started committing crimes under the age of thirteen were not more active than those who started later. Among the offenders who began offending prior to the age of thirteen, eight-four percent offended between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, and seventy-nine percent offended at ages sixteen or seventeen. Among the offenders who began offending between the ages of thirteen and fifteen, three-quarters reoffended at ages sixteen or seventeen. Even the active criminals seem to have reduced their rates of crime (Table 1B).

Individual crime rates for offenders who began to offend prior to age thirteen, at ages thirteen through fifteen, and at ages sixteen or seventeen are remarkably similar during the early years of offending. Whether the subsequent reduction in crime rates should be attributed to reduced criminality, to increased ability to escape detection, or to some other cause is a matter that cannot be settled by the data available.
The size of offender groups ranged from one (for solo offenders) to thirty. To make analyses manageable, offenders were divided into three groups based on their co-offending: Those who committed less than a quarter of their offenses with someone else; those who committed between a quarter and seventy-four percent of their offenses with someone else; and those who committed at least three-quarters of their offenses with another person.

Two patterns emerged. First, the probability of solo offending increased as a function of increasing age at first offense. Second, the mix of co-offending with solo offending in relatively balanced proportions declined with age at first offense. There was no trend relating age at first crime to committing crimes largely with others. Both among those under 13 at first and among those over thirteen, about forty percent committed at least three quarters of their crimes with others.

The division of offenders by their proclivity to co-offend revealed a consistent pattern. For each age at first offense, those who mixed solo with co-offending committed crimes at slightly higher rates than those whose crimes were almost exclusively with others or almost exclusively alone.

The analyses reported above pertain to all types of offenses. It is important to add, however, that co-offending had an impact on the more serious street crimes as well. Age at first offense was inversely related to the frequency of Index crimes, controlling for participation in co-offenses. Yet regardless of age at first offense, offenders whose crimes included accomplices, especially those who committed about equal numbers of crimes alone and with others, committed more Index crimes than did offenders who committed relatively few crimes with others.

Both age at first crime and co-offender type (independently and sequentially) predicted
number of Index crimes committed by individuals. Within each category of co-offending type, those who first offended under age thirteen committed the most Index crimes. Further, within each category of age at first offense, those whose crimes were least likely to be co-offenses committed the fewest Index crimes. Thus, co-offending appears to increase the likelihood of persistent criminality, particularly among those whose criminality began prior to age thirteen.

Similarly, both age at first crime and co-offending type were related to the number of violent crimes (aggravated assault, attempted murder, rape, robbery) for which the offenders were arraigned in juvenile court. Offenders who first offended before the age of thirteen committed a larger number of violent crimes if they were co-offenders (Table 1C).

Effects of co-offending on violence were significant independent of the effects of age at first crime. Early starters who committed most of their crimes alone were not particularly prone to committing violent crimes. On the other hand, co-offending early starters were considerably more likely to commit violent crimes than were late starters, especially those who committed most of their crimes alone. The vast majority of early starters commit many of their crimes with others. Therefore, the impact of age and that of co-offending tend to be confounded.

Summary and Discussion

The analyses of offending in this randomly selected cohort of offenders active in an urban center during 1987 suggests that co-offending is a key ingredient to high rates of criminality. Co-offending should become a feature in reckoning crime rates and understanding changes in them. Co-offending is also central to understanding individual differences in recidivism. Co-offenders should become targets of intervention strategies. And understanding the mechanisms by which peers influence intentional behavior should become a focus for theoretical developments.
Inspection of official records indicates that little attention has been given to identifying co-offending in relation to crime events. Indeed, police records tend to undercount co-offending, and published crime rates rarely take co-offending into account. Yet, without records that take account of co-offending, it is impossible to know how public safety is affected by crime prevention policies.

The distribution of co-offending exaggerates the contribution of young offenders to crime events. Not only are those who first offended before age thirteen most likely to be co-offenders, but, also, the size of their offending groups are most likely to be large. Most crime rates are computed over individuals, with an assumption that each criminal event reported by or about an individual represents a crime event. Yet co-offenders provide a basis for multiple reports of single crime events. The consequent reported crime rates are invalid measures of public harm.

The dynamics of co-offending appear to have an effect on crime rates and violence that is independent of the effect of age at first offense. The data therefore give reason to doubt the sufficiency of a division of delinquents into two classes in terms of the age of onset for their offending. The insufficiency of age of onset as basis for a typology is brought out most clearly by the comparison of early co-offenders with early solo offenders: Only the co-offenders have high recidivism rates and only the co-offenders commit unusually high numbers of violent crimes. These young co-offenders warrant special attention by the criminal justice system.

Peer delinquency seems to be more than a training process for learning how to be delinquent. The interaction among delinquent peers apparently serves to instigate crimes and to escalate severity. An adequate theory of crime ought to take into account both the ways that others influence individual behavior and the ways in which individuals selectively seek
companionship with others who are likely to promote criminal behavior.

One such theory, as noted above, is the Construct Theory (McCord 1997). This theory differs from most criminological theories in that it eschews desires (wants) as being necessary grounds for action. Rather, it rests motivation on reasons that appear to the acting individual as descriptions of conditions that warrant actions. These potentiating reasons serve for actions as arguments do for beliefs. Once a person develops a set of potentiating reasons, that person will use the set to organize the environment and to act upon it. Co-offending can provide such reasons by illustrating types of behavior under particular circumstances. Therefore, a young co-offender is likely to seek out co-offenders and to commit additional crimes.

The Construct Theory of motivation merges the concepts of cause with those of a certain type of reasons, potentiating reasons, reasons that are grounds for action. In doing so, the Construct Theory differs from cognitive theories that rely on actors' judgments regarding what are presumed to be the private world of motives, justifications, and values. According to the theory, motives are not purely private events. Just as we come to understand a language by watching and listening, we can discover the potentiating reasons of others by watching how they act and the conditions under which they act.

The Construct Theory of Motivation differs from other theories purporting to explain criminal behavior by specifically recognizing that actions are not "naturally" self-interested. It provides a theory of volitional action without postulating the existence of mysterious entities ("volitions"). The Construct theory of motivation is empirical and seems to provide an account of what we know about relative risks for criminal behavior. Because potentiating reasons are useful organizing categories, they tend to be stable. Yet experiences can alter intentional behavior.
through changing what a person believes about the world.

The theory implies that interventions need not be directed at deep-seated emotions. Rather, behavioral change can be expected as a consequence of changing grounds for action. Such changes come about in a variety of ways, sometimes indirectly through the acquisition of loves or friendships and sometimes through direct (possibly traumatic) experiences.

Motivation can be acquired, according to Construct Theory, by watching how others respond to the ways in which one talks as well as how one acts. Therefore, the Theory gives a basis for understanding how contexts influence behavior. Socialization practices influence action by teaching children what to count as potentiating reasons. Peer influences, too, make a difference in terms of creating potentiating reasons. The Construct theory of motivation has the advantage that it gives a plausible account of how criminal behavior can be voluntary action by showing potentiating reasons in their roles as causes for motivated actions.

To summarize: This exploration of co-offending suggests that young co-offenders ought to be targets of particular attention in a quest for crime reduction. It suggests, too, that ignoring co-offending in the computation of crime rates may result in severely misleading reports regarding public safety and effects of incarceration. It further suggests that the mechanisms of peer influence on intentional action deserve attention and that a theory of criminal behavior ought to provide an account of these influences.

References


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Table 1

A. Mean individual annual crime rates by type and age at first crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime type</th>
<th>Under 13</th>
<th>13 to 15</th>
<th>15 to 17</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solo crimes</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-offenses</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>103</td>
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B. Mean individual annual crime rate by age and age at first crime

<table>
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<th>Age</th>
<th>Under 13</th>
<th>13 to 15</th>
<th>16 to 17</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 13</td>
<td>1.3 (n=106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 to 15</td>
<td>0.9 (n=89)</td>
<td>1.4 (n=191)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 to 17</td>
<td>0.8 (n=84)</td>
<td>0.8 (n=143)</td>
<td>1.4 (n=103)</td>
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</table>

C. Mean number of violent crimes by extent of co-offending and age at first arrest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount of Co-offending</th>
<th>Age at first crime</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-offending in less than 25% of all offenses</td>
<td>1.0 (n=11)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-offending in between 25% and 75% of offenses</td>
<td>2.4 (n=52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-offending in at least 75% of offenses</td>
<td>2.0 (n=43)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Crime and Social Organization Conference in honor of Albert J. Reiss, Jr., sponsored by the National Institute of Justice and Rutgers University, July 28-29, 1997. This research was supported by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Grant Number 92-IJ-CX-K008, Delinquent Networks in Philadelphia.

2 Our data come from court folders both because the police tapes lacked information about many of the offenders' dates of birth and because our validity check indicated that the police were under-counting co-offenses. We used witness, complainant, and co-offender reports to amplify police records. If a court record could not be found for the listed offense, another crime was drawn from the appropriate list, using a random number generator.

3 The sample of 400 included 370 males (14% white, 75% black, 11% Hispanic, 1 listed as "other") and 30 females (3% white, 90% black, 7% Hispanic). Sixteen offenders were not arrested for their first "known" offenses. At the time of their first official offenses, they ranged in age from 6 to 17, with a mean of 14 years (SD=2.02), mode of 15, and median of 13.5.

4 For the effect of co-offending on violence $F_{(2)}=5.76, \ p=.0034$; for the effects of age at first crime on violence $F_{(3)}=12.05, \ p=.0001$. 
Co-offending As A Network Form of Social Organization

Elin Waring

Many crimes and other deviant activities are not committed by lone individuals, but rather by persons acting together. Called—in a term coined by Reiss (1986a)—co-offending, this phenomenon is commonly associated with the actions of juveniles in gangs or, less explicitly, with organized crime, but it plays an important role in many forms of crime and deviance, including white collar crime, drug use and burglary. Yet, despite Reiss's insight that co-offending is label that applies across the study of crime, the question of whether there is more than a surface commonality to co-offending in a variety of crime types and forms remains open. It is not obvious that co-offending can or should be treated a unitary phenomenon, as becomes apparent when individual cases are examined.2

• A group of 9 individuals—3 of whom had the cases against them dismissed—and at least 7 companies controlling a "substantial portion" of the hearing aid business in a city, fix prices by refraining from giving prices over the phone or in advertisements. They also agree to charge a fixed rate of $180 over cost for each hearing aid. These agreements are made during two meetings of the schemers in which they all participated.

• A "broker" takes a fee of up to $200 to get the credit rating of an individual altered. First he pays $10 to an employee of a car dealership that has direct access to computerized credit ratings to obtain a copy of the credit report on his "client." Then he edits it and indicates changes to be made. He then paid an employee of the credit agency a small fee to make the changes on the record.
A company claims that it has patented a new process to remove precious metals from the water in a graphite mine. These "tailings" are then used as collateral for massive bank loans intended to build factories to carry out the "process" in other countries, and company executives debate over whether Belgium or Costa Rica would be a better site. At one point an "employee" of the first company tries to sell the process to another company. The first company goes to court to get a restraining order to prevent this supposed patent infringement.

Meanwhile, in the same town, another company is put together by some of the same individuals along with a non-overlapping set of co-offenders. This company is to use another "process," this time to get ore out of dirt. They produce phony assay reports prepared by someone with a phony geology Ph.D. to "prove" that the metals were there and then sold leases to the land. Huge loans are taken out on the basis of this supposed collateral.

The entire operation is fraudulent, there being no such processes. The total losses, mainly from banks, are in the millions of dollars.

A married couple, both medical doctors, simply, but knowingly, fail to file tax returns for three years.

These examples all involve white collar crime, but a similar range of examples for many different crimes including burglary (e.g. Shover 1973; Wright and Decker 1994), drug distribution (e.g. Williams 1989; Bourgois), prostitution (e.g. Heyl 1979; Cohen 1980), fencing (e.g. Klockars 1974), gang rape (e.g. Sanday 1990) and organized crime (e.g. Finckenauer and Waring, 1998; Ianni, 1974; Blok 1974) could be given. Clearly these structures are quite varied,
ranging from long to short-term, large to small, and simple to complex. This wide variation in the size, longevity and form might lead to the conclusion that co-offending is not a coherent concept beyond its catchall use for dealing with measurement issues created by the presence of multiple participants in a single offense (Reiss 1986a; 1986b; 1988). In truth, the opposite is true: the fact that the term has sufficient flexibility to incorporate this range makes it an extremely powerful concept that provides a theoretical and empirical framework through which commonalities in criminal organization across a range of forms and crime types can be understood. This, in turn, creates the possibility of comprehensive theories about where and when specific forms of co-offending will emerge. This is because co-offending—whether in the form of an exchange of a vial of crack for money or contract fraud against the federal government committed by a Fortune 500 company—always is organized through the form of a network, although these networks may, at times, also incorporate elements of other forms of social organization. Perhaps more importantly, co-offending is never organized either as a pure market or as a hierarchy or other formal organization, although at times co-offending networks may incorporate or imitate specific elements characteristic of these other forms. The network form is characteristic of co-offending because the organization of criminal activity occurs for purposes and in contexts that are like those which lead to the emergence of networks in the licit sphere.

Approaches to Criminal Organization

A number of scholars have attempted to examine the general theoretical problem of criminal organization. Their main focus has been on the identification of a small number of types into which all crimes that are organized could be classified. For example, McIntosh (1974) identified four types of organization of professional crime: picaresque, craft, project and
business. She argues that “in different social contexts the problems confronted by criminal
groups, and therefore the appropriate organizational strategy, will vary” (1974 16). The social
context is broadly defined, characterized by the forms of property and forms of power, with
particular types of organization identified with particular types of societies, such as picaresque
organization (e.g. banditry or piracy) with weakly centralized, rural societies (1974 29-30).

Cressey (1972) differentiates between criminal organizations based on the degree to
which they are rationalized, in the sense of having a high degree of role specialization, separation
of individuals from the positions or roles they occupy, hierarchy and coordination. His is a six
level ranking of types. At the top is highly bureaucratized “commission” model, based upon the
idea of a confederation of “mafia” families at one extreme. This structure closely resembles the
corporate model of Italian-American organized crime that Cressey presented in Theft of a Nation
(1969). At the other extreme is the informal “task force” with one “guide” who makes things
happen, but has no formal title.

Each of these typologies is potentially useful, but none addresses the underlying question
of what, if anything, all of these structures have in common beyond involvement in illegal
activities. Indeed, they explicitly reject the idea that they do. Because they focus on the creation
of typologies, they are specifically trying to do the opposite, that is to focus on the differences
between specific examples of criminal organization.

One obvious approach to the study of the organization of crime in general is the adoption
of the concept of group. Yet criminologists have often found that the term group, as it is used in
the social science literature, is often not applicable to people who commit crime together
(Yablonsky, 1959; Klein, 1969). Yablonsky (1959) first identified the problems with the use of
the term group when he wrote about the gang as near-group. The term group may be non-applicable for any number of reasons, depending, in part, upon what definition of group is adopted. Thus some gangs may be too big to meet a criteria for interaction or cognizance among members (Homans, 1967: 258) or membership may be impossible to define or the relationship between crime participants may be too transitory for them (or others) to define themselves as a group.

Similarly, the theoretical approaches and terminology of the study of formal organizations, while at times useful for the analysis of particular examples, seldom seem fully appropriate to the study of criminal organization even when formal organizations are themselves criminal actors (e.g. Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Cressey, 1969; Heyl, 1979). Formal organizations can be thought of as coordinating goal-directed activities through adoption of explicit procedures and having official boundaries (Blau, 1967; Aldrich, 1979; Williamson, 1975). Often, formal organizations incorporate elements of hierarchy, featuring well-defined authority of some over others and centralized administration (Williamson, 1975). They are generally characterized by the use of contracts, the implementation of which is surrounded by a set of rules. Although not all organizations are bureaucracies, the bureaucratic model can be seen as an ideal type of formal organization. In contrast, even criminal networks which seem to have the appearance of formal organization--for example gangs and the La Cosa Nostra model of organized crime--have many characteristics that would not be found in a conventional business organization or bureaucracy, including extensive and often violent initiation rituals and a prohibition on leaving.

Clearly, co-offenders do not set up corporations with the publicly expressed goal of carrying out criminal activities. Further, even setting up a formal organization with non-criminal
Public goals and criminal secret goals may involve increased risk of exposure for all those involved in the organization if its criminal nature is discovered by the authorities. Finally, organizations can rely on the contract as their central organizing principle because they have a legal system through which all parties can seek enforcement should they believe that the terms have been violated. Despite the attempts of the swindlers involved in the investment conspiracy described earlier, criminals can not generally resort to the legal system because to do so would put them at risk of prosecution.

Alternatively, co-offending may be treated as a market phenomenon, with offenders searching for partners in a manner which maximizes the benefits of partnership and minimizes its costs (e.g. Tremblay, 1993). Markets are characterized by individualized behavior based on competition, and actors who have transactions with each other are adversaries. The identification of forms of co-offending with markets can be useful in understanding the nature of some co-offending relationships and how they are structured. This may be particularly attractive for situations in which there is actual explicit exchange such as in drug or stolen goods markets. However, in the case of co-offending, the idealized markets used in neoclassical economic analyses of social life (e.g. Becker, 1976; Becker and Landes, 1974) are not adequate. An offender seeking a co-offender for a particular offense will not follow market practices and make public the necessary information that would bring in large number of bidders for the job. Even if such market activities could be invisible to all but active criminals, the risk of detection by the authorities may remain high (if, for example, informing has low costs and high benefits for those participants who do the informing). It therefore remains unlikely that the types of bidding procedures described by neoclassical economics would operate. Of course, especially in the case
of white collar offenses, formal organization may be present. Yet this organization often acts more as a disguise meant to create the appearance of legitimacy rather than a true hierarchical structure. Other white collar offenses take place in market settings, but the crime involves undermining the legitimate operation of the market. Indeed, many sociologists and others have observed that even in the licit sphere markets are embedded in personal relationships, routines and structures that provide the context for exchanges (Granovetter, 1985; White, 1981; Macaulay, 1963; Ben-Poratt, 1980). A transaction-costs approach, such as that offered by Williamson (1975), could provide a link between these two models, explaining why, essentially, organizations or hierarchies replace markets in some situations. The inadequacy of both sides of this dichotomy for co-offending serves to make this approach not very useful as it stands.

An alternative approach is to treat co-offending as an example of a network form of social organization. Networks are defined by the actual (although perhaps subjective) relationships between individual actors rather than either formal, although perhaps nonexistent, relationships or the existence of particular positions or roles that are separate from the individuals occupying them. Because of their emphasis on the personal relationships between actors, networks are distinct from both markets and hierarchies and their respective organizing principles of competition and contract (Powell, 1990). Others who have used the term network before in the study of crime (e.g. Ianni, 1972; Cohen 1980). However, the term has mainly served as a convenient alternative to the unsatisfactory term organization --or a way to graphically represent the connections between offenders--than as a fundamental characteristic of how crime is organized. Cohen (1977), for example, discusses briefly the existence of network forms of criminal organization, although this approach is not developed. In contrast to the approach taken
here, he views networks as one of many different forms of criminal organization. Cressey (1972) and McIntosh (1975) each use the term network throughout their work. Sarnecki (1986) explicitly explores the structure of criminal networks and how they change over time. However, none see networks as the form of all criminal organization.

Some theorists (e.g. Burt, 1982) argue that all of social structure consists of relations between individuals and thus should be understood as multi-level networks. The argument that the organization of co-offending is a network phenomenon does not inherently conflict with this approach. However, because I am treating networks as a form of organization distinct from other, non-network, forms of organization it is important to recognize that the vocabulary used here is distinct from such structural language.

**When are network forms of organization preferred?**

That co-offending is not usually organized through either formal organizations or markets may seem obvious based simply on the fact that the activities are illegal. However, there are positive reasons for criminal activity to be organized through networks. Powell suggests that network forms of organization, rather than markets or hierarchies, are most likely to be adopted to organize legitimate economic activity when there is the need for specific kinds of knowledge or abilities, speed, and trust between actors (1990:324-327). Because these requirements are generally present when actors come together to commit crime at the same time that environmental constraints limit the use of other forms of organization, networks emerge. This does not mean that there are never elements of other forms of social organization present when offenders cooperate. However, even when an offense operates through a formal organization, the
personal relationships between individuals are at least equal in importance to the organizational structure. Thus within organized crime personal ties and loyalties between offenders have great importance, even though there may be a hierarchical structure and a separation of role from actor (see Cressey, 1969).

Examination of white collar crime co-offending illustrates that, for some types of crimes at least, special skills are needed, and, thus, under Powell's model, network forms should be likely to be adopted. Some white collar crimes require particular types of knowledge or skills. Securities frauds may require someone who knows how to make Securities and Exchange Commission filings that appear to be legitimate, and embezzlements may require someone with accounting skills. Other offenses, such as bid-rigging, require someone with access to restricted information. The need for knowledge may lead to the creation of a relationship with co-offenders, but this relationship may be short- or long-lived. Indeed, in some instances the co-offender may be used only once because repeated return to the same source would increase the likelihood of detection. Those who provide special access or know-how necessary for many white collar crimes are seldom subject to market-like competition and they may be unwilling to take subordinate positions in a hierarchy (Powell, 1990:324). Thus a network relationship based on ties between two individuals may emerge.

Because they can be both started and ended quickly Powell observes that network forms are often adopted in environments that reward flexibility and that require adaptability to change (Powell, 1990:325). The environments for criminal activities may change because of changes in crime prevention strategies, because of differences between potential victims, because of the incarceration of co-offenders, or for other reasons. Specific criminal acts are often short-term
(Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Gottfredson and Hirshi, 1990), and even in the case of the longer white collar crime activities, such as complex frauds, participants often aim to have the ability to end the schemes quickly in the event that the victims or the authorities become suspicious.\(^6\)

Finally, network--rather than competitive or coercive--forms may most often appear in legitimate contexts when trust exists between actors (Powell, 1990:326; Granovetter, 1985; Macaulay, 1963). Co-offending--perhaps even more than legitimate activity--generally requires some degree of trust between participants. Powell argues that "networks should be most common in work settings in which participants have some kind of common background--be it ethnic, geographic, ideological or professional. The more homogeneous the group, the greater the trust, hence the easier to sustain network-like arrangements" (326). This phenomenon of homophily--the selection of individuals like oneself--in an individual's choice of co-offenders is apparent in various studies of offenses involving co-offending and may provide a basis of trust \(^7\) (e.g. Ianni, 1972; Ianni, 1974; Reiss and Farrington, 1991). This trust may, of course, be misplaced. Co-offenders may hedge their trust in various ways, for example by skimming money from the take in a crime or by developing an informant relationship with the authorities.

Independent of homophily, co-offenders must have some degree of trust in each other in order to cooperate in an offense (Granovetter, 1985: 492). Because their agreements to cooperate in offenses are not legally enforceable, offenders need to rely on their personal knowledge and trust of their partners. At the same time, because the potential cost of the failure to live up to an agreement to cooperate is often high, they cannot rely on the threat of not having a repeat transaction to make completion of the offense more cost-effective for a potential partner than failure to complete it that would operate in a market. This also leads to reliance on trust.
relationships. One consequence of this is that offenders will often seek partners among people who they know already whether from past offending experience or through non-criminal ties such as family members and friends who have pre-existing loyalty to the offender. Even if a partner for a particular offense is not available in an offender's immediate circle, the need for trust will make it likely that they will use these "strong ties" to identify potential co-offenders rather than the more efficient "weak ties" that are most effective in the licit sphere (Granovetter, 1973). The network conceptualization allows incorporation of the embeddedness of criminal organization in other dimensions of social organization, including the context—whether that is a neighborhood or school, a stock exchange or a family—and that context also includes the regulatory and other agencies that constitute societal response to crime.

Many theories of criminal organization and of specific crime types take the form of organization as definitional. They focus, for example, what makes a gang a gang instead of an ongoing peer group or what is and is not an instance of organized crime. That these are all network structures allows a different set of questions to be raised. For example, in seeking to understand the differences between the aforementioned peer groups and gangs, networks of juveniles involved in illegal activities could serve as a unit of analysis and the correlates of large size, longevity, hierarchy and certain characteristics associated with formal organizations, such as a name, clearly defined boundaries, and membership rituals, could be identified.

Similarly, we can ask why some seemingly quite different forms of crime share some structural characteristics. For example, running a fencing operation shares certain structural similarities with running a network which matches up illegal immigrants with American citizens who are willing to marry them in exchange for a fee. Both have a central coordinator who brings
together buyers and sellers of illegal goods. Both some gangs and some antitrust conspiracies may last for decades. It may be that they share similarities in the ability to avoid breaking of trust between members and to respond to changes in their environments.

The characteristics of networks may also serve as a useful explanatory variables. Why do arrests of some members (and other interventions) seem to successfully break-up some networks and not others? For example, if a small number of participants in a price-fixing conspiracy return to competitive pricing, the conspiracy cannot continue to function (unless the remaining members use predatory techniques to drive the former members out of the market). In contrast, the removal of one person from a team of house burglars may have no impact unless that person is the main organizer or a knowledgeable informant. Younger brothers who climb in windows and open doors may, in many circumstances, be easily replaced.

Structural form may also help us understand criminal justice processes such as sentencing. For example, marginal actors may receive less severe sanctions than central ones. Being part of a big conspiracy that nets a certain amount of money may result in less severe sentences for each individual than a small conspiracy that nets the same amount. Being involved in any type of co-offending provides an opportunity to give information on a partner to authorities, where solo-offenders do not have this bargaining chip (see Waring, 1998).

Influences on Network Forms

One implication of conceptualizing all co-offending structures as networks is that it allows us to think of the characteristics of the network of as a dependent variable to be explained. Among those characteristics are its size, longevity, degree of centralization and hierarchy, and other dimensions describing how the structure is organized. At the individual level, we can seek
to understand questions such as why particular actors end up at the center or the edges of the networks, how long they remain active, and the relationship of this to network position. These possibilities are both considerably richer and more detailed than, for example, trying to predict which of a small number of discrete types of structures (i.e. McIntosh, 1975) will emerge in a given situation or location of those structures on a limited ordinal range (i.e. Cressey 1972).

While networks are a type of social organization distinct from that of formal organizations, lessons can be drawn from the study of organizations that provide insight for the study of networks. One theory about formal organizations that can, with modifications, be transferred to the study of networks, is the idea of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism is a general phenomenon that encourages those who are engaged in an organizational task to use strategies that are like those used by others in the same organizational field engaged in similar tasks. Isomorphism, they argue, operate in the context of an organizational field made up of all those organizations involved in some area of activity. Thus the organizational field for health care would include, minimally, hospitals, private practices, drug companies, the Food and Drug Administration, the National Institutes of Health and the American Medical Association. Crime networks often operate within what can be similarly understood of as a field consisting of potential victims, regulatory agencies (including police, the courts, law makers and others), other crime networks, neighborhoods and the personal networks of the offenders involved. DiMaggio and Powell identify three types of isomorphic mechanisms: coercive, mimetic and normative.

Coercive pressures are in operation when one actor in an organizational field forces another to adopt particular forms of organization. Most commonly they take the form of

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requirements or expectations that certain procedures or rules will be followed. In a licit organization these might include the adoption of a set of common accounting practices or the naming of specific types of corporate officers. Coercive forces may demand that white collar crime networks provide fraudulent statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to make sure that "losing" bids are made for contracts, and to provide legitimate names and addresses for people fraudulently receiving social welfare payments. Coercive pressures may also make it difficult for crime networks to adopt certain forms—indeed that is the intention of many crime prevention techniques (Levi, 1988:8-16).

Mimetic processes are those in which an organization copies the structure of another organization that is perceived as successful. For white collar crime networks there are two potential sources of mimetic pressure, which may operate simultaneously. First, a crime network may model itself on another crime network that it sees as successful or that a "ring leader" having succeeded using a particular technique may recruit a new set of confederates to do the same thing again. Secondly, it may be that in order to carry out particular types of crime, a co-offending network will seek to mimic the operation of a legitimate organization. So, in a setting up a scheme involving the creation of a fraudulent company in which investors will be sought, it may be beneficial to have secretaries, a treasurer, a director of research and development and other staff members that a legitimate company would have and the similar appearing offices. It would also make sense to have the appropriate types of documentation and paperwork such as SEC filings, incorporation papers, annual reports and audits, whether real or manufactured. Thus complex frauds may seek to take advantage of the operation of isomorphism in the legitimate sphere in order to give potential victims a false sense of security.
Normative isomorphism operates when the people involved in creating a structure believe that there are certain characteristics that the structure should have simply because that is the way such structures are usually organized. These expectations may develop through professional socialization or through information obtained through informal channels. The idea of professional crime (e.g. Sutherland 1937; Clinard and Quinney 1967; Wright and Decker 1994) provides one type of context through which such normative expectations could develop, as does McIntosh's craft form of criminal organization (1975, 35).

Co-offending: A Network Approach

Many analyses of the nature and causes of specific forms of crime and deviance are rooted in what are implicitly network-based understandings of the social organization of criminal activity. For example, research on drug use--ranging from studies of exchanges between buyers and sellers, to those that focus on the relationships between sellers (Williams, 1989), to the relationships between those who use drugs together (Becker, 1973; Williams, 1992)--shows the importance of issues such as recruitment, socialization, and social interaction, all of which can be seen as fundamentally network (or relational) processes. The same can be said for much of the research on gangs (e.g. Cohen, 1955; Stafford, 1984; Yablonsky, 1959), which has consistently found that simple treatments of gangs as a special case of either formal organization or as groups, are inadequate. Klockars's work on the professional fence illustrates that even a person who operates "on his own" is actually embedded in a web of contacts and must actively work to maintain the viability of the network (1974). Research on fraternity gang rape (Sanday, 1990; Martin and Hummer, 1989) provides examples of criminal behavior carried out by conventional networks, while research on the organization of burglary shows how criminal networks can
provide a population from which co-offenders can be drawn (Shover, 1973).

Ties between co-offenders may be based on personal attachment or the desire for monetary gain; they may be temporary or long term; they may be stable or changing. The variety of ties cannot be fully approached from either individualistic or organizational structure perspectives. Yet, this variety may provide explanatory power in the study of how and why individuals become involved in crime and what happens as a consequence. It is precisely in the affiliations and relationships that underlie personal ties and the patterns that they make that the network approach has its greatest strength (Granovetter, 1985; White, Boorman, and Briejer, 1981; White, 1981; Burt, 1982).

Co-offending is an important substantive issue in the study of crime, whatever approach to it is taken. However, the treatment of co-offending as a network phenomenon is particularly powerful because it has the potential to contribute both to the incorporation of co-offending into models of other aspects of crime and to the location of the social organization of crime within the broader range of forms of social organization. It does this by incorporating criminal organization into the same broad class as other forms also best characterized as networks, including policy coalitions (Rhodes, 1991), joint ventures (Powell, 1990), movie project teams (Baker and Faulkner, 1991), friendship groups (Werbner, 1991) and elites (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Burt, 1983). The inclusion of criminal activity in this list of situations that lead to the adoption of network forms of social organization may also broaden the sociological understanding of the general issue of the adoption of specific forms of social organization. Theories that attempt to be general should be capable of providing understanding of deviant and illegal activities as well as those of the conventional world, just as theories of criminal organization should be located
within broader theories of organization.

The treatment of networks as a distinct form of organization is relatively recent in most fields, and with the exception of arguments for the adoption of network analytic techniques for the purposes of data analysis (e.g. Sparrow, 1991; Coady, 1985; Howlett, 1980; Davis, 1981), the approach has not been widely adopted by those who study crime. Yet a network conceptualization of criminal organization has the potential to make a substantial contribution to the understanding of criminal organization. Many past attempts to understand the social organization of crime have done so by ignoring other, non-deviant forms of social organization. Others have adopted a single model from the conventional world--such as the formal organization or the market--and applied it to criminal organization. The adoption of a network understanding of co-offending falls into this latter category and presents the same potential for pitfalls of oversimplification and reification. Yet, despite these dangers, it opens a new door to understanding both the organization of crime and the impact of this organization on other issues.

References

Press.


Notes

1 An earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Los Angeles, California 1994 and the Conference on Crime and Social Organization at Rutgers University July, 1997. Albert J. Reiss, Stanton Wheeler and David Weisburd provided helpful comments on earlier versions of this work. This paper also incorporates elements of Waring (1993).

2 These and other case descriptions that are not based on published sources are drawn from the Wheeler, Weisburd and Bode (1988) data set and the files from which it was created.

3 Of course, there may be multiple goals, permeable boundaries and instability within many organizations. The characteristics listed are generalizations and may best fit how an organization officially defines itself rather than how it actually operates.
A related issue might be that the eligible population of potential offenders is generally small, whereas markets rely on large numbers to assure that they operate efficiently (Williamson, 1975:8-10).

The arguments in this section closely parallel those of Powell (1990).

Although this goal may exist it may often not be achieved, however.

Of course, that actors select individuals similar to themselves may be a result of limited conventional or criminal contact with people who are different.
Chapter 4

The Generality of the Self-Control Theory of Crime

David F. Greenberg, Robin Tamarelli and Margaret S. Kelley

Introduction

A logically necessary condition for any act -- criminal or otherwise -- to take place is that it not have been prevented. Whenever an act occurs, one knows for certain that nothing stopped it. A long-standing tradition of criminological theory -- now called control theory -- builds on this simple observation to assert that explanations of crime should focus on those factors that either prevent or fail to prevent its occurrence - rather than on the presence or absence of motivations.

Control theorists differ largely in their identification of the critical restraining factors. One theoretical tradition looks to threats emanating from the state to discourage predation (Hobbes, 1957) The effectiveness of state law enforcement in deterring crime continues to attract much criminological attention and debate.

A distinct sociological tradition situates social control not in the repressive agencies of the state, but in the informal social networks in which people are embedded. Emile Durkheim (1951) compiled evidence that membership in tightly-knit religious communities, and in the mini-society of marriage, helped to curb suicidal tendencies. Chicago-school theorists of social disorganization and their intellectual heirs have identified supervision by parents and neighbors, and fear of disapproval from significant others, as important restraints (Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927; Shaw and McKay, 1931; Kobrin, 1951; Nye, 1958; Hirschi, 1969; Kornhauser, 1978; Sampson, 1987; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993a, 1993b, 1995).
related body of theory sees the fear of losing educational and occupational opportunities or other valued prospects, as inhibiting criminal activity. Stakes in conformity, then, act as a social control (Toby, 1957; Briar and Piliavin, 1965; Hirschi, 1969).

A quite different strand of theorizing focuses on the mental states and processes of individuals. In Freudian psychoanalytic thinking, the ego is responsible for rational, purposeful action, including the avoidance of threats; while the superego, or conscience, upholds the moral standards of the community against libidinal and aggressive drives. Both ego and superego are potential sources of compliance with legal norms. Presumably, the stronger the superego, the less crime. Criminologist Walter Reckless and his collaborators have argued that a self-concept of oneself as "good" could shield someone who is at risk from delinquency (Reckless, Dinitz and Murray, 1956, 1957; Reckless, Dinitz and Kay, 1957; Reckless and Dinitz, 1967).

Two theoretical observations about this body of theorizing may be made. First, controls can only operate to prevent activity that would take place in the absence of controls. Criminal and delinquent acts are motivated; where there is no motivation to commit them, controls are superfluous (Agnew, 1984). Control theorists have been little concerned with motivation as a source of variation in involvement in illegal activity because they tend to hold that people are very similarly motivated. Hobbes (1957), for example, saw the desire for wealth and glory to be part of human nature, much the same for all people. Freud (1953), likewise, viewed the fundamental drives as rooted in the human body, and did not much concern himself with interpersonal variation in their strength.

Travis Hirschi (1969) has argued that the motives for common crimes involving illegal acquisition or assault - greed, anger, revenge - do not distinguish law-violators from conformists;
these motives are universal, and sufficiently uniform in strength that variation in them cannot explain interpersonal differences in illegal conduct. Implicitly, this assumption implies that opportunities for fulfilling legitimate, culturally supported success goals are available to all; that there are, for example, enough jobs, paying adequate wages and bestowing social respect and esteem, for all who seek them. Therefore no one who wants to fulfill conventional goals will have to turn to illegal means to do so. It follows that no special theory of criminal motivation is needed to explain crime; such mainstays of criminological theory as anomie, differential association and labeling, which differentiate violators from abstainers on the basis of motivational factors, are irrelevant.

The assumption of motivational uniformity strains credibility. It is a matter of common knowledge that wealth, power and status are more important to some people than to others, and that some people set their sights higher than others when they seek them. The long-term heavy user of nicotine, alcohol or heroin craves these drugs more intensely than someone who has never used them, or who uses them only casually.

Other theorists have been less strict about the assumption of motivational uniformity. Nye (1958), building on Merton’s (1938) analysis of the relationship between crime and social structure, noted that society does not permit everyone to satisfy lawful goals quickly and conveniently. As a result, some individuals have stronger motivations than others to use illegal means. Reckless (1961a, 1961b:335-59) identified legal opportunities, pressures from delinquent associates, and the influences of the mass media as social pressures that pull or push people into crime. The strength of these pressures varies from one person to another, depending on their exposure to the mass media, their patterns of association, and the opportunities they face. These
social pressure influence involvement in crime in a manner that is, to a degree, independent of control factors.

In principle, the significance of motivational factors would appear to be a matter easy to establish. However, some of the evidence that bears on their existence and importance can be interpreted in more than one way. For example, control theorist Albert Reiss (1951) found that rates of recidivism among juveniles on probation in Chicago were somewhat higher for those with low socio-economic backgrounds. Strain theorists might explain this finding by suggesting that low-income youths turn to crime to meet their greater financial needs. Reiss, however, suggested the less obvious possibility - that economic insecurity could lead to loss of personal control. Anti-social feelings stemming from resentment at society's failure to meet one's needs could reduce concern with avoiding social disapproval. Economic difficulties might reduce parents' authority over their children, leading to greater delinquency.

A second issue concerns the various sources of control - state action, informal bonds and commitments, moral beliefs, and psychological capacities for self-control. These sources of control are not mutually exclusive. Though theorists tend to focus on their own pet locus of control, there is no logical or theoretical reason for supposing that only once source operates to prevent crime. Possibly one source may do so when there are deficits in the others. Thus, someone who lacks internalized inhibitions against interpersonal violence might nevertheless refrain from assaulting people because she fears losing her job, or to avoid being arrested and imprisoned. A cartoon one of us once saw made this point by depicting a cave man carrying a club, boasting, in a paraphrase of the 23rd Psalm, "Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death I will fear no evil, because I am the meanest son of a bitch in the valley."
Conversely, even when a breakdown in law enforcement eliminates the risk of external sanctions, internalized moral beliefs and fear of informal sanctions might still prevent someone from violating the law.

The more thoughtful control theorists have realized that control can be multi-faceted, and specifically identify several sources of control. Reiss (1951) suggested that "the relative weakness of personal or social controls may account in large part for the delinquent behavior," and examined the role of personality traits, family structure, and community institutions in discouraging juvenile delinquency. Reckless (1961a, 1961b; 1962) classified constraints as "external" (membership in, and a sense of identification with, a cohesive group that provides reasonable limits, opportunities for achieving status, and means for achieving goals) or "internal" (a favorable self-image, awareness of being inner-directed, a high level of tolerance for frustration, and strong ego and superego). More recently Charles Tittle (1995) has developed a "control balance" theory of deviance that posits the existence of both internal and external sources of control.

The Gottfredson-Hirschi Self-Control Theory of Crime

Our concern here is with a version of control theory proposed recently by Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi (1990; see also Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1993, 1994), who have called it a "general theory of crime." The analysis we present here tests the generality of their "general theory."

Working along lines paralleled or anticipated by the work of Nye (1958), Jessar and Jessar (1977), Patterson (1980), Donovan and Jessar (1985), and Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that ineffective methods of parenting produce children who are
incapable of restraining their impulses, even when it might be in their best long-term interests to do so. When opportunities permit, people who cannot control themselves violate the law because they are unable to refrain from acting on behalf of commonplace, unremarkable motives such as acquiring material goods, harming those they dislike, and experiencing sensory pleasures. As in Hirschi's earlier formulation, these goals are rooted in the human condition, and are sufficiently widespread as not to distinguish violators from non-violators. Similar ideas can be found in writings about crime from Jacksonian America (Rothman, 1971:65-68) and in the writings of earlier criminological control theorists. The Gottfredson-Hirschi formulation is distinctive primarily for its denial that other sources of control, such as state law enforcement, and informal social bonds, also contribute importantly to crime prevention.

The general theory of crime is intended to explain those violations of the criminal code that entail "acts of force or fraud undertaken in pursuit of self-interest" (1990:15). These acts "provide uncomplicated pleasure or relief from pain" (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1989). This definition of crime excludes altruistic illegalities such as civil disobedience, insurrection, assassinations and terrorism, as well as some "victimless" crimes, like consensual sodomy, but includes many common classes of illegal activity. Because these activities are all seen as sharing a common cause, there is no need for distinct explanations for different kinds of crime. Under the right circumstances, impulsive people will commit any or all of them indiscriminately. The general theory, then, argues against the creation of typologies of criminals, an enterprise that has preoccupied generations of criminologists for more than a hundred years.

Hirschi and Gottfredson also note that their conceptualization "is inconsistent ... with the idea of organized crime, or organized delinquent gangs engaged in long-term and highly
profitable illegal activities, such as gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking." Presumably that is because success at these activities requires personal discipline, rational planning and cooperation, which would not be possible for someone who lacks the capacity for self-control. Because under-controlled criminals are not much concerned about the long-run consequences of their actions, threats of extended prison sentences are ineffectual. Criminals live in the "here and now."

According to the theory, low control also gives rise to some behaviors that are risky but not illegal, such as drinking alcohol, smoking cigarettes, engaging in unsafe sexual practices, and failure to wear seat belts when driving. Because these activities share a common cause, the well-documented positive correlations among them (Akers, 1984; Donovan and Jessar, 1985; Elliot and Huizinga, 1984; Johnston, O'Malley and Eveland, 1978; Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis, 1982; Osgood, Johnston, O'Malley and Bachman, 1988) are easily explained.

Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that the correlates of crime which others have construed as causes (like associating with others involved in crime) are not causes but manifestations of the same underlying trait. It is not that people steal because they can't find jobs, and consequently need money. It is rather that under-controlled individuals lack the discipline and foresight to acquire the skills that will make employers want to hire them. They don't show up for appointments, and if they do get jobs, they quickly lose them because of absenteeism and poor performance on the job. It is not that low grades in school cause psychological strain that delinquents try to relieve by showing off to their peers when they joy-ride; rather, uncontrolled youths get low grades because they talk disrespectfully to their teachers and don't study. Instead of earning money to pay for a car, they take one and drive it away when the impulse strikes. In
much the same vein, Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that the well-known correlation between involvement in illegal activities and association with others who are similarly involved (Short, 1957; Hirschi, 1969; Hindelang, 1971, 1976; Elliott and Voss, 1974; Erickson and Jensen, 1977; Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis, 1981; Akers, 1985; 1998; Reiss, 1986, 1988) does not reflect the learning of pro-criminal definitions, beliefs and attitudes. Rather, under-controlled youths who are not concerned about their future associate with peers who are involved in risky, illegal activities, and also engage in these activities themselves.

Implicitly this formulation contradicts the explanations Hirschi (1969) offered for the patterns he found in his study of delinquency in Richmond, California. Gottfredson and Hirschi now see a commitment to a conventional future, bonds to other people, and moral beliefs that it would be wrong to disobey the law - critical explanatory elements of his earlier theory - as consequences of a psychological trait, not as independent, exogenous causes of delinquency.

Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that self-control is highly stable over time, largely uninfluenced by social experience occurring after early childhood. Nevertheless, for reasons that cannot be explained sociologically, involvement in illegal activities declines monotonically with age (Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983).

The general theory claims to explain a great deal, and to do so parsimoniously. If correct, it integrates much information about crime and involvement in other risky behaviors. With claims as strong as those made in the general theory, it is important to consider with care the kind of evidence that would be needed to establish the theory's validity. To confirm their ideas empirically, Gottfredson and Hirschi need to demonstrate that (a) parental upbringing is responsible for children's ability to control themselves, (b) that this ability explains involvement
in a wide range of risky activities, (c) that this ability is highly stable over time, (d) that no other personal trait accounts for this involvement, and (e) that the relationships posited by the theory hold for all times and places. Evidence that low control increases involvement in delinquency and crime in a contemporary sample of Americans, or that styles of parental upbringing influence their children's ability to control their impulses, is far from demonstrating what is required to establish the full validity of Gottfredson and Hirschi's sweeping claims.

**Evidence Regarding the Theory**

Gottfredson and Hirschi themselves have been surprisingly casual about producing evidence on behalf of their "general theory." They refer primarily to the fact that many criminals are versatile; they tend not to specialize in a particular type of crime. Those who have violated one criminal law have often violated others. Beyond this, they rely primarily on general consistency between their theory and impressions of criminality that are widely but not universally held by criminologists. They have not, however, undertaken more rigorous testing of their ideas; nor have they indicated just what evidence would persuade them to qualify or abandon the general theory.

It may be that the wide interest the theory attracted soon after its publication reflects something more than the existence of compelling evidence in its favor, e.g. a mood of pessimism and impatience with poverty, crime and drugs, and loss of faith that these problems can be solved through such liberal reforms as education, welfare support, and job training programs. If people are poor because their parents didn't raise them properly, the general theory says that there is no point in improving the schools, providing good jobs, or redistributing income. These measures wouldn't do any good because they come to late to alter the indelibly imprinted personality trait
of low self-control that has been established during the first few years of childhood.

Given the far-reaching implications of the general theory, it is not surprising that it has begun to attract close scrutiny, both as to its reasoning and its conformity to empirical evidence (e.g. Steffensmeier, 1989; Akers, 1991; Barlow, 1991; Cohen and Vila, 1996). The theory rests on the assumption that illegal activity is always irrational in the long run. This assumption may be doubted in relation to some types of business crime, where the rewards can be extremely high, and the risks low. Managers who, according to Gottfredson and Hirschi, are selected for self-control, might be quite rational when they perpetrate such crimes (Steffensmeier, 1989; Greenberg, 1996; Reed and Yeager, 1996).

The general theory has greater plausibility for crimes whose expected returns are low; yet when the limited lawful earning prospects of perpetrators and the low risks of being caught for these offenses (Inciardi, Horowitz and Pottinger, 1993; Freeman, 1996; Grogger, 1998) are taken into account, it may not be irrational to commit them. An appreciable body of evidence points to the rationality of much common crime - rational in the sense that levels of involvement respond to positive incentives and to the threat of negative sanctions (Landes and Becker, 1974; Heinecke, 1978; Hollinger and Clark, 1983; Schmidt and Witte, 1984; Montmarquette and Nerlove, 1985; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Lewis, 1986; Piliavin et. al., 1986; Grogger, 1991; Clarke and Felson, 1993; Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger, 1994; Pezzin, 1995; Tauchen and Witte, 1995; Zhang, 1997).

Empirical support for propositions derived from the general theory has been mixed. Numerous researchers have found evidence that low self-control contributes to illegal activity (Mischel, 1961; Brownfield and Sorensen, 1993; Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev, 1993;
Keane, Maxim and Teevan, 1993; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Wood, Pfefferbaum and Arneklev, 1993; Lyman, Moffitt, and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993; Arneklev, Grasmick, Tittle and Bursik, 1994; Burton et. al., 1994; Caspi, Moffitt, Silva, Stouthamer-Loeber, Krueger, Schmutte, 1994; Krueger et. al., 1994; Luengo, 1994; Polakowski, 1994; White et. al., 1994; Gibbs and Giever, 1995; Piquero and Tibbetts, 1996; Robins et. al., 1996; Evans et. al., 1997; Longshore, 1998; LaGrange and Silverman, 1999), as the theory predicts, though the amount of variance explained seems to be low.

Although psychometric testing shows that when considered as a personality trait, there is some continuity over time in self-control, it is not high. Correlations between personality traits measured at one time and those measured at another are typically moderate in magnitude. Some traits display aggregate shifts in level, while others do not. Along with this moderate stability there is an appreciable amount of change, particularly during the transition from late adolescence to early adulthood. Self-control appears to be one of the least stable (Conley, 1984; Haan, Millsap and Hartka, 1986; Stein, Newcomb and Bentler, 1986; Block, 1993; McGue, Bacon and Lykken, 1993; Carmichael and McGue, 1994; Caspi et. al., 1995; Caspi and Silva, 1995). In fact, a number of studies indicate that the capacity for self-control increases as children age (Caspi, 1998), possibly accounting, at least in part, for the well-known tendency of aggregate involvement in crime to decline with age (Greenberg, 1977, 1982; Farrington, 1986; Steffensmeier and Allan, 1995).

Periods of behavioral desistance from crime that are manifest in the official records of some offenders, and reductions of recidivism produced by participation in treatment programs suggest that the personal traits responsible for violations of the law may not be entirely stable.
(Ross and Gendreau, 1980; Cullen and Gilbert, 1982; Genevie, Margolies and Nuhlin, 1986; Jolin and Gibbons, 1987; Anglin and Speckart, 1988; Nagin and Paternoster, 1991; Nagin and Land, 1993), contrary to the theory. Indeed, longitudinal research has demonstrated that even without treatment, life contingencies influence criminal career trajectories in ways that are not consistent with the notion that levels of involvement are governed by a universal age distribution and a highly stable capacity for self-control. At least several distinct career trajectories, distinguished by different configurations of causal factors, have been identified (Moffitt, 1990, 1993, 1994; Laub and Sampson, 1993; 1998; Nagin and Land, 1993; Patterson and Yoerger, 1993; Sampson and Laub, 1993, 1995; Horney, Osgood, and Marshall, 1995; Simons et. al., 1994; Le Blanc and Kaspy, 1998; Warr, 1998).

Though there is evidence that styles of parenting can affect children's involvement in delinquency and crime (Cernkovich and Giordano, 1987; Fagan and Wexler, 1987; Laub and Sampson, 1988; Wells and Rankin, 1988; McCord, 1990; Paternoster and Brame, 1997; Simons, Wu, Conger and Silva, 1994), its overall importance in determining the capacity for self-control remains to be assessed. Accumulating evidence suggests that social control is substantially determined by genetic influences that may operate independently of parental behavior toward their children, or that interact with it (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985; Rowe, 1986, 1990; Rowe and Rogers, 1995; Ge et. al., 1996; Henry, 1996; Pallone and Jennessy, 1996:52-78; Slutske et. al., 1997, 1998). It has been estimated that roughly 40% of the variance may be inherited (Loehlin, 1992; Loehlin and Rowe, 1992; Rowe, 1994: 64-65; Caspi, 1998). Of the so-called "Big Five" personality traits, self-control (or conscientiousness, as it is sometimes called) is least influenced by such shared environmental influences as styles of parenting, and most influenced
by nonshared environmental factors, such as life events that are unique to each twin, or peer influences that differ for each twin. The contribution of parental upbringing to self-control thus appears to be slight ((McGue, Bacon and Lykken, 1993; Caspi, 1998).

As far as specialization in crime is concerned, a low degree of specialization is weak evidence for the generality of crime. Positive correlations among a set of crime rates can arise from many different sorts of causal models. For example, one kind of illegal behavior may lead to involvement in another. For example, addicts' need to pay for expensive illegal narcotics can drive them to steal (Anglin and Speckart, 1988). Narcotics merchants may need to employ violence to protect their business against thieves or competitors.

Although Gottfredson and Hirschi do not discuss the subject of narcotics addiction explicitly, their assumption that motivation to violate the law is uniformly distributed across the population appears to deny the existence of addicts - a distinct category of people who are psychologically or physiologically dependent on drugs, and who by virtue of their dependence might have an especially strong motivation to use or sell drugs, or to steal to pay for the drugs they crave. This denial flies in the face of a great deal of research on drug addiction, and leaves the success of methadone treatment programs in reducing both drug use and criminality (Hayim, Lukoff, and Quatrone, 1973; Anglin and McGlothlin, 1985; Kelley, 1995; National Consensus Development Panel on Effective Medical Treatment of Opiate Addiction, 1998) completely mysterious. Methadone works by eliminating craving for heroin, not by increasing capacity for self-control.

Moreover, there is evidence for some degree of specialization in law violation (Bursik, 1980; Smith, Smith and Noma, 1986; Blumstein, Cohen, Das and Moitra, 1988; Farrington,
Snyder and Finnegan, 1988; Osgood et. al. 1988; Brennan, Mednick and John, 1989; Ramirez, 1993; Hanson, Scott and Steffy, 1995). Indeed, the correlations among drug use and delinquency in the first four waves of the National Youth Survey published by Uihlein (1994) allow for a rigorous test of the hypothesis that drug use and delinquency are positively correlated only because they share common causes. Though drug use and involvement in non-drug-related delinquency both receive contributions from some of the same subject attributes, the correlations are inconsistent with the hypothesis that common causes fully explain the positive correlations between them. There must be some nonshared causal forces at work, as well. All these findings run contrary to the predictions of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s formulation of self-control theory.

Testing the Generality of Self-Control Theory

The research described here takes a different tack to the assessment of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theory. We are concerned with its generality. This is not taken as problematic in some of the other tests of the theory. Thus, the studies that examine possible differences in career trajectories, e.g. between those who initiate delinquent activities young and those who start at a later age, typically rely on an aggregate measure of involvement in illegal activity that does not differentiate between different kinds of crimes. This procedure is flawed in two respects. It creates a measure that is dominated by the most common infractions; and in adding up offenses of different types it assumes that all stem from the same underlying cause(s). The use of such a measure in causal analyses assumes that the each causal factor affects all of them with uniform strength. The procedure thus takes for granted that delinquents are complete generalists without determining that this is in fact so, even when the data for this determination are in hand. It is this
generality that we want to test.

We accept the proposition that low self-control may be an antecedent of some acts of law violation. Common sense tells us that people who have difficulty controlling their anger might often get into fights, or kill people. It is equally plausible that people who have trouble deferring the fulfillment of desires for material goods to the time when they can afford to pay for them will steal more often than those who are willing and able to postpone the fulfillment of their material goals. Our concern is rather with the claim that these insights constitute a general and exclusive explanation of all forms of deviance, to the exclusion of other personal traits that have nothing to do with the postponement of gratification or with early childhood socialization.

Our test rests on the following reasoning. If the general theory is correct, then a factor analysis of the various indicators of involvement in various criminal or risky activities in a representative population should yield just a single factor. A one-factor model should provide an adequate fit to the observed covariances among the various behavioral indicators that can reasonably be subsumed under the range restriction implied by Gottfredson and Hirschi's definition of crime. This factor can be considered a latent or unmeasured cause of the various illegal activities. Models that involve more than one factor will not provide a significantly better fit to the relationships among the variables measuring involvement in different illegal activities. That is true no matter what the cause of the deviant activity happens to be. As long as data are available for more than three types of deviance, we can test rigorously for the adequacy of a one-factor solution against the alternative hypothesis that more than one factor is needed (Kenny, 1974, 1979:117-18; Kim, 1978:47; Greenberg, 1979:72-73).

In carrying out this test, we should be aware of a conservative bias in our procedure. If a
single cause explains all the behaviors we study, a one-factor solution will be adequate. If not, a one-factor solution might or might not fit the data, depending on the way Gottfredson and Hirschi are wrong. Indeed, even if a one-factor solution provides an acceptable fit, it could still be the case that there are additional causes of criminal or deviant behavior besides the single latent factor, so long as each additional cause is unique to each specific behavioral measure, and uncorrelated with all the others.

Moreover, if a single cause other than the one Hirschi and Gottfredson have postulated lies behind the correlations of the various variables, we would still find a single-factor solution. Thus, if self-control has no effect on illegal activity, but some other variable and that variable alone did have an effect, we would still find a good fit for a one-factor model.

It should be noted that we are not the first to test the generality of Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory in this way. Osgood et. al. (1988) have done so using panel data from the "Monitoring the Future" study to estimate causal models for victimizing criminal behavior, heavy alcohol use, marijuana use, use of other illicit drugs, and dangerous driving. They concluded that each category of illegal or deviant behavior receives some contribution from a general underlying disposition toward deviance, and also from unique factors that are distinct to each category. By lumping together many kinds of illegal victimizing activities into the single category of "criminal behavior," without testing whether that aggregation over offense categories is warranted, the researchers precluded any determination of whether a single latent variable underlies different kinds of criminal activities. Our analysis is intended to repair this deficiency.

We acknowledge an important limitation to our study. Our factor analysis can only determine whether a single factor underlies many different forms of illegal behavior. It cannot
directly evaluate the claim that low social control (or any other single trait) is the only personal trait underlying that behavior. This is so because behavior can be influenced by features of one's environment, as well as by one's own personal traits (Felson and Steadman, 1983; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson, 1998).

Of course, if we find that a single-factor model fits the data well, this would be strong support for a monocausal model. In that circumstance there could be only a single trait - whether personal or environmental - causing many different kinds of law violations. On the other hand, a finding that more than one factor is necessary to fit the data would not refute the Gottfredson-Hirschi theory, as they concede the possibility that opportunities to commit crimes may be crime-specific, and vary across individuals.

Despite this limitation, we consider our analysis to be instructive. Our results show that a single factor cannot explain the behavioral data, and we argue below that the multi-dimensionality of opportunities is an unlikely explanation. We do find evidence for a "general deviance" dimension, but its explanation does not appear to lie in individuals' capacity to control their impulses.

**Data and Procedures**

The data we analyze consist of self-reports from adolescents and young adults about a wide range of activities collected in the fifth wave of the National Youth Survey (Elliot, Huizinga and Ageton, 1985). At the time of the interviews, the subjects, who had been selected five years earlier, in 1976, ranged in age from 15 to 21.

The National Youth Survey included both black and white youths. The Gottfredson-Hirschi theory is expected to apply equally to all races, so that the theory itself furnishes no
grounds for analyzing black and white subjects separately. However, previous research has shown that causal models for delinquency in the two groups are not identical (Rosen, 1985; Cernkovich and Giordano, 1987; Hill and Crawford, 1990; LaFree, Drass and O'Day, 1992).

As exploratory analyses of our data suggested that different models might indeed be appropriate to the black and white respondents, we carried out separate analyses for each group. Failure to do so could obscure patterns consistent with the theory in each group, thereby prejudicing tests of the theory unfairly. Unfortunately, the number of black subjects was too small to sustain the kinds of statistical analysis we present. We therefore restricted our analyses to the 714 white males and 647 white females in the sample.

Our restriction to white subjects yields a side benefit. Racial differences in opportunities may exist because residential patterns in the United States are substantially segregated by race (Massey and Denton, 1993; Krivo et al., 1998). Predominantly black and predominantly white neighborhoods are likely to contain different mixes of industrial, commercial and residential sites, presenting different arrays of lawful and illegitimate opportunities to commit crimes, and different kinds and levels of protection against crime. To the extent that the opportunities to commit crime are different for the different races and different sexes, our procedure helps to control for them.

To avoid the computational difficulties that can arise when pairwise deletion is used to deal with problems of missing data, we carried out all estimations using listwise deletion. This procedure left us with a sample of 604 whites males and 576 white females. It was this sample that we used in carrying out the statistical analyses reported below. Because Gottfredson and Hirschi believe their model holds universally, for all persons, we do not believe that the loss of
cases resulting from this procedure biases our test of their theory.

**Procedures - Factor Analyses**

Our first step was to carry out exploratory factor analyses of reported rates of involvement in 26 different delinquent, deviant or dubious activities. These analyses were done separately for the boys and girls. The activities we analyzed are listed in Table 1.

Insert Table 1 about here.

We began by estimating models with just a single factor. Although the correlations among all 26 variables in the model are positive, the single factor solutions provide extremely poor fits. For the males, two residual correlations are larger in magnitude than 0.50, 23 are larger than 0.20, and 210 (64% of the total) are larger in magnitude than 0.05. For the females, one residual correlation is larger in magnitude than 0.50, 21 are larger than 0.20, and 199 (61%) are larger in magnitude than 0.05. This is a wretched fit.

A maximum-likelihood estimation of the same model yielded a chi-square statistic for the white males of 23,313.37 with 299 degrees of freedom. As in the exploratory factor analysis, many of the residuals are large: 162 of 325 are larger in magnitude than 0.10, and the root mean square residual was 0.151. For the white females, the chi-square statistic is 24,196.53 with 299 degrees of freedom; 148 residuals are larger in magnitude than 0.10, and the root mean square residual is 0.166. The results make clear that a single underlying factor cannot explain the pattern of correlations among the activities measured in the study.

After excluding a one-factor solution, we carried out exploratory factor analyses with various numbers of factors. Using the rule that one should continue extracting factors so long as
the sums of squared loadings for each factor are larger than 1, eight factors proved necessary for the boys. This was also true for the girls, though the factorial structure for the girls was not the same as for the boys. As the factor analysis was undertaken merely as a preliminary exploration to help guide the construction of models to be tested and elaborated by means of confirmatory factor analysis, we did not estimate exploratory factor analyses with larger numbers of factors.

Using the exploratory factor analysis solutions as guides, we constructed separate confirmatory factor analysis models for girls and boys in which rates of involvement are treated as imperfect indicators of eight latent variables. Each behavior was allowed to load on just one latent variable - the one for which it had the strongest loading in the exploratory factor analysis.

To set a scale for each factor, one loading for each factor was fixed at 1; the others were left free. The residuals were initially assumed to be uncorrelated with one another. Unlike the exploratory factor analysis, which treated the factors as mutually uncorrelated, the confirmatory factor analysis left the correlations among the latent variables unconstrained. If a single latent trait gives rise to these correlations, they should not differ significantly from one.

The distributions of many of the delinquent behaviors across individuals in our sample are highly skewed. Typically, most of the subjects report never having done the activity in question (see Table 1). Under these circumstances, a maximum likelihood estimation, such as the one carried out by Osgood et. al. (1988), can be biased. To avoid this possible bias we used the PRELIS program to compute polychoric correlations, which are appropriate for ordinal variables, as well as asymptotic variances for the polychoric correlations. Then we carried out a diagonally-weighted least squares estimation in LISREL VII, using the asymptotic variances estimated in PRELIS.
Using the diagnostic criteria provided by the LISREL VII output for the initial model, we refined the initial model by permitting some behavioral indicators to load on more than one factor, and by permitting residuals for certain variables to be correlated with one another when called for by diagnostic indicators.

**Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - Males**

Table 2 displays the confirmatory factor analysis estimates we obtained for the boys in the sample. Panel A in this table shows the standardized coefficients (Lambda-Y) linking behaviors with the latent traits that are postulated to be responsible for the behaviors. With the exception of \( \eta_7 \), which is represented by the single variable \( Y24 \) (hit parents), each latent variable is represented by at least two latent variables. Except for variable \( Y24 \), which is forced to coincide with latent variable \( \eta_7 \), the amount of variance in the behaviors explained by the latent variables ranges from very high to very low.

All lambda-Y coefficients except those for \( Y25 \) on \( \eta_1 \) and variable 26 on \( \eta_8 \) are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. We identify the first latent variable, \( \eta_1 \), as a "drugs" factor; \( \eta_2 \) as an "alcohol/pot" factor; \( \eta_3 \) as a "theft-1" factor; \( \eta_4 \) as a "vandalism" factor; \( \eta_6 \) as a "violence" factor; \( \eta_5 \) as a "tranquilizer" factor; \( \eta_7 \) as a "family violence" factor; and \( \eta_8 \) as a "theft-2" factor. Most of the variables load on just one latent variable; however, "used marijuana" is, plausibly enough, influenced by the "drugs" and the "alcohol/pot" factor; "stole an amount greater than $50" is influenced by the "drugs" factor as well as by the "theft-1" factor; and "used alcohol" by the "violence" factor as well as the "alcohol/pot" factor. The coefficient linking "stole from family" with the "drugs" factor is not statistically significant.
Panel B displays the estimated correlations among the eight latent variables of the model. It is these correlations that lie at the heart of our analysis. If various criminal behaviors are simply manifestations of a single personal trait, none of these correlations should be statistically different from 1. Comparison of these coefficients with their standard errors (shown in Panel D) indicates that $\eta_6$, "theft-2" is not significantly different from the other factors. Although the correlations between the two variables that load on this factor with the other variables in the analysis are not exceptionally high, the standard errors are large. This is probably because the distributions on these two variables are extremely skewed.

The off-diagonal element of the TE matrix (Panel C of Table 2) indicates the presence of a non-vanishing correlation between the prediction errors for the rates of alcohol consumption and beer consumption. Normally such a correlation points to the possible existence of a variable that contributes to alcohol and beer consumption but not to any of the other behaviors. This could be considered evidence for a distinct factor, and could be modeled as such. However, in this instance the correlation is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and it may be definitional in origin: someone who has drunk beer has necessarily drunk alcohol.

Chi-square for this model is 5965.33 with 267 degrees of freedom ($p = 0.000$). Were we to treat this value of chi-square as a test statistic, we would have to conclude that the fit is unacceptable, and seek to improve the model. We did not do this for a number of reasons. First, chi-square tests are based on simple random sampling. However, the National Youth Survey selected its subjects by means of a more complex sample design. Second, the value of chi-square increases with sample size, and for this reason is not a good measure of substantive goodness of fit. With sample sizes as large as ours, it is possible to have a large value of chi-square even
though the model fits the data quite well. Third, when variables are skewed, as is the case in our
data, the value of chi-square is larger than would be expected on the basis of the substantive
goodness of fit. The goodness-of-fit index for our model is 0.995, and the adjusted goodness-of-fit index is 0.994; these are considered excellent values. Fourth, although we could improve our fit somewhat by freeing additional Lambda-Y and off-diagonal TE parameters, these parameters are not of substantive interest for our analysis, and to free them would probably result in overfitting the data. Our goal is to test a theory that makes predictions for the correlations between latent variables, not to develop the best possible predictions for each observed behavior. When we did attempt to improve the overall fit by freeing additional parameters, our estimates of the parameters already in the model hardly changed at all.

Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results - Females

We repeated these procedures for the females in our sample. After carrying out an exploratory factor analysis and provisionally accepting a solution with eight factors, we set up and estimated a confirmatory factor analysis model. However, we encountered computational difficulties: the covariance matrix of prediction errors for the model could not be inverted. When variables are extremely skewed - as they are for quite a few of the variables in the female sample - estimates can be unstable. By deleting the most skewed variables from our model we were able to obtain estimates that were free from pathologies. These estimates are shown in Table 3.

Insert Table 3 about here.

As in Table 2, the figures in Panel A are the coefficients linking the observed rates of involvement in sixteen different delinquent or dubious activities with the four hypothesized
causes we postulate on the basis of the exploratory factor analysis. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

On the basis of the loadings, we identified the first latent variable, \( \eta_1 \), as an "alcohol/pot" factor. Three of the four variables that load on \( \eta_2 \) involve sale of drugs and theft. Therefore we designated this factor as "illegal acquisition." The fourth variable that loads on this factor is "attacked someone." These attacks may have occurred in the context of a robbery. The third factor groups the use of amphetamines, barbiturates, codeine and tranquilizers; we call it "illicit drugs." The fourth latent variable involves damage to property, and we so label the factor. The interpretability of these factors, together with their substantial similarity to the factors we found for the males, gives us confidence that the factors we found are not an artifact of the computational process and do not arise from capitalization on chance, but reflect genuine systematic patterning in delinquent or dubious behavior in the two samples.

Panel B of Table 3 displays the correlations among the four latent variables in the model. Those among the first three factors are fairly substantial; however, the fourth factor is less strongly correlated with the other three. All correlations are at least 1.645 standard deviations from unity. Thus, there are four distinct factors, even though some of them are strongly correlated with one another. As with the boys, the prediction of the general theory - that all these correlations should be consistent with 1 - is disconfirmed.

Chi-square for this model is 3364.63 with 97 degrees of freedom (\( p = 0.000 \)). The goodness-of-fit index is 0.994; the adjusted goodness-of-fit index is 0.993. We based our conclusions on this model. Improvement of the fit by adding additional parameters linking behaviors with latent variables, or by introducing correlations among the prediction errors, would
improve the fit only to a very modest degree without significantly altering our conclusions about
the correlations among the elements of the eta matrix. It is those correlations that concern us.

Second-Order Factor Analysis

Before declaring the results of our factor analyses inconsistent with predictions derived
from the Gottfredson-Hirschi theory we considered the possibility that a single latent trait might
underlie the correlations among the 8 latent variables we found in our analysis of the
delinquencies of the males, and the 4 latent variables we found for the females. A second-order
factor analysis, in which the variables subjected to a factor analysis are the factors extracted in
the first-order factor analysis, can test this possibility.

Carrying out an exploratory factor analysis of the correlations among the 8 latent
variables for the males, we found that a one-factor solution explains 55.98% of the variance. As
10 of the 28 independent residuals (differences between observed and predicted correlations) are
larger in magnitude than 0.10, this fit is unsatisfactory. A two-factor solution explains 67.04% of
the variance, and reduces the number of residuals larger in magnitude than 0.10 to 3, a
contributions primarily from the first second-order factor; "vandalism" and "theft-2" primarily
from the second; and "family violence" from both. A three-factor solution did not converge.

Repeating this procedure for the girls, we found that a one-factor solution explains
64.08% of the variance among the four first-order factors, but leaves 2 of the 6 independent
residuals larger in magnitude than 0.10. A two-factor solution explains 77.69% of the variance,
and leaves none of the residuals larger in magnitude than 0.05. The traits "alcohol/pot" and
"illicit drugs" receive contributions primarily from the first factor; "property damage" primarily
from the second, and "illegal acquisition" from both factors.

These results are not consistent with the predictions of the Gottfredson-Hirschi theory. The results for the females seem more readily interpretable than those for the males. However, for reasons explained in the next section, it is not clear that a factor analysis is the best way to model the relationships among the different behaviors reported in the National Youth Survey. Therefore we refrain from commenting on the theoretical implications of the second-order factor analyses.

Procedures - Multidimensional Scaling

Under special circumstances, data possessing a single dimension will yield more than one factor when subjected to a factor analysis. This can happen, for example, when the data conform to a pure Guttman scale. The factor analysis model assumes that a score on one variable has no causal influence on the scores on other variables. This is not true if a Guttman scale is present (Kessler, Paton and Kandel, 1976; Greenberg, 1979:192-93).

Realization that factor analysis might not be appropriate to the analysis of delinquent behaviors led several delinquency researchers to use Guttman scales to analyze self-reported delinquency (Nye and Short, 1957; Dentler and Monroe, 1961; Slocum and Stone, 1963). However, as Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis (1982:48-51) note, these studies suggested that the collection of diverse behaviors classified as delinquent were not unidimensional. This line of research quickly died out.

Although Guttman scalogram analysis may not be appropriate for analyzing delinquency data, there are good reasons for considering alternatives to factor analysis. When one type of illegal activity is influenced by the occurrence of another type of illegal activity, as well as by a
single latent trait, a one-factor solution in which residuals are taken to be uncorrelated, will not
fit the data. The factor analyst will then conclude that a multi-factor solution is needed to
provide an adequate fit. As we noted earlier, heavy drug use leading to addiction is a type of
illegal activity that may cause another type of illegal activity - stealing.

To explore the possibility that the confirmatory factor analysis was yielding too many
dimensions because of its inappropriate assumptions about the relationships among the variables,
we carried out multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyses of our data. MDS entails the
construction of a proximity matrix for a set of objects, which in our case are the 26 behavioral
variables. We chose the Pearson correlation coefficient as the measure of proximity. The closer a
correlation coefficient is to 1, the closer the two variables are to one another.

The MDS procedure uses the proximities to assign to each variable a point in a space of
given dimensions, in such a way that the distances between the points reproduce the proximities
as closely as possible. The accuracy of this reproduction is measured by the stress of the solution
(Kruskal, 1964; Greenberg, 1979:186). Like Guttman scaling, MDS does not assume the
stringent relationships among the variables assumed in factor analysis; unlike Guttman scaling, it
does not assume that the variables under consideration form a unidimensional scale. We
obtained solutions of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 dimensions separately for the males and female samples.

Results - Multidimensional Scaling Analysis

Stress statistics for the multidimensional scaling analyses we carried out are reported in
Table 4. Thus far, statisticians have not developed formal rules dictating how many dimensions
should be kept. A common practice is to settle for a solution such that the stress associated with
solutions in higher dimensions is only slightly less than the solution chosen. Examination of the
stress statistics in Table 4 shows that the stress associated with a one-dimensional solution is fairly high, and that the stress is substantially lower in solutions of two or more dimensions.

The incremental reduction in stress achieved with solutions of five or more dimensions was small; therefore we chose the four-dimensional solution for both males and females. Coordinates for the first dimension of each solution are shown in Table 5.

Examination of the coordinates of the first dimension enabled us to identify this dimension substantively. The variables with the most negative coordinates are "drinking alcohol" and "drinking beer." Somewhat less negative are "drinking hard liquor," "being drunk," and "using marijuana." The most positive coordinates are for "selling hard drugs," "using barbiturates," "stealing," "damaging property," "engaging in gang fights," "carrying a hidden weapon," "attacking someone," "using codeine," "using tranquilizers," "hitting parents," "stealing from family," and "taking a vehicle."

The presence of several drug-related activities with strongly positive scores preclude identification of this factor as a dimension that ranges from "victimless" crimes to victimizing crimes. We suggest that this dimension is a measure of how seriously wrong the behavior is considered in contemporary American culture.

We are aware that American culture is not entirely uniform. Recognition that American value systems are not entirely homogenous received much emphasis in labeling theory writings of the 1960s and 1970s, but there were early precursors, e.g. Sellin (1938). Among control theorists, there has been some disagreement about the extent of the heterogeneity, and about its
character. Hirschi (1969:23) asserts that "control theory" assumes the existence of a common value system within the society or group whose norms are being violated," and that the delinquent "believes the rules even as he violates them." However, "there is variation in the extent to which people believe they should obey the rules of society" (Hirschi, 1969:26, emphasis in the original). Other control theorists have not assumed normative consensus. Reckless (1962), for example, cited some groups in which "criminal pursuits are part of the prevailing culture," and are learned by those growing up in those communities, citing the illegal production of whisky in the Appalachian region of the United States, and gambling among Chinese immigrants before World War I as examples. Nye (1958) noted that some delinquency is learned from family members and peers, but contended that this was relatively infrequent. Reiss (1961) observed that in some neighborhoods, "the norms of residents are observed to be relatively at variance with the norms and rules of the social system." More recent subcultural theorists have continued to argue for the existence of regional, racial or ethnic differences in attitudes toward various forms of illegal behavior (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967; Hackney, 1969; Gastil, 1971; Curtis, 1975).

Empirical research has demonstrated that there is a substantial degree of consensus about the relative seriousness of different illegal activities (e.g. Sechrest, 1969; Buffalo and Rodgers, 1971; Erlanger, 1973; Erlanger and Winsborough, 1976; Rossi, Waite, Bose and Berk, 1974; Figlio, 1975; Sellin and Wolfgang, 1978; Wolfgang, Figlio, Tracy and Singer, 1985; Shoemaker and Williams, 1987; Ellison, 1991; Adams and Jensen, 1997). Yet this consensus is imperfect. Sampson and Jeglum Bartusch (1998) summarize a number of studies demonstrating the existence of some subcultural differences in assessments of the seriousness of crime associated with race and ethnicity. There is, moreover, individual variation unrelated to region, race or
As Hirschi suggested, there is variability on how important it is to abide by normative rules, and how seriously violations should be taken. Drinking alcohol is acceptable behavior for much of the American population, though not for all of it. Being drunk is less acceptable, but nevertheless not considered seriously wrong. Selling drugs, stealing, damaging property, carrying a hidden weapon and engaging in assaultive behavior are considered more serious, and there is less dissensus about this assessment. The hold of the moral order, then, is a matter of degree. Some norms are very widely shared and thought to be extremely important. Laws prohibiting murder and treason are examples. Most individuals possess strong inhibitions against violating such norms, and violate them infrequently and only in special circumstances. To use the terminology of Sykes and Matza (1957), most potential offenders will not easily "neutralize" these bans by finding justifications and excuses for violating them. The consensus on other norms is weaker, and even where it exists, violations are not considered such a grave matter. When a violation is considered a mere peccadillo, not a mortal sin, a transgression is easier to justify to oneself, and violations will occur more often.

The other dimensions of the MDS solutions largely distinguish different kinds of drug use. We do not wish to reveal the extent of our personal familiarity with the psychopharmacological properties of the different drugs by interpreting these dimensions, and therefore restrict our discussion below to the first dimension, which differentiates the different behaviors more effectively than the remaining factors.

Discussion

Separate confirmatory factor analyses carried out for males and females in the fifth wave of the National Youth Survey disconfirm the proposition that a single causal factor is responsible
for a wide range of common forms of illegal or dubious behavior (inter-personal violence, theft, vandalism, alcohol consumption, and the sale and use of illegal drugs). If one cause or combination of causes had been responsible for these behaviors, the correlations of the eight latent variables postulated for the model would have been consistent with their being perfectly correlated in the LISREL analysis. Although some researchers, using different data sets, have found that one-factor models for various kinds of deviant behavior provide satisfactory fits (Gold, 1970; Donovan and Jesser, 1985; Donovan, Jesser and Costa, 1988; Rowe and Flannery, 1994), most researchers have found that more than one factor or cluster are needed (Nye and Short, 1957; Scott, 1959; Quay and Blumen, 1963; Short, Tennyson and Howard, 1963; Short and Strodtbeck, 1965; Kulik, Stein and Sarbin, 1968; Nutch and Bloombaum, 1968; Senna, Rathus and Siegel, 1973; Hindelang and Weis, 1972; Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis, 1981; Uihlein, 1994; Le Blanc and Kaspy, 1998). On the basis of these studies it was well-understood by an earlier generation of delinquency researchers that juvenile delinquency is multidimensional. Our finding that in the National Youth Survey prohibited and dubious behaviors are multidimensional is consistent with a substantial body of earlier research, some of it now overlooked in contemporary discussions regarding the dimensionality of deviance.

Though all the correlations among the latent variables in our analysis are positive, the correlations are not high, and are not consistent with perfect correlation. These results are consistent with those obtained by Hindelang, Hirschi and Weis(1982:71-72), who concluded on the basis of their analysis of self-reported and official data on juvenile delinquency in Seattle, that “subsets of items are relatively highly correlated with each other and relatively weakly correlated across subsets,” with the weak correlations among different items (types of
delinquency) tending to be positive. Given the weight that has been attached to the issue of the dimensionality of deviance in tests of the general theory, we think this conclusion on the part of one of the architects of the general theory to be especially noteworthy.

Because the latent variables in our analysis are purged of measurement error, the fact that these correlations are substantially lower than 1 cannot be attributed to random response errors or to random environmental effects. Taken at face value, our confirmatory factor analyses seem to suggest instead that different kinds of delinquent/criminal or risky behaviors have distinct causes. Unlike Osgood et. al. (1988), whose analysis of the Monitoring the Future data found evidence for a general deviance factor as well as factors distinct to each type of deviance, we found no evidence in the National Youth Survey for a general deviance factor.

These results have obvious implications for researchers who, in studying the causes of crime or delinquency, take as an indicator of involvement in illegal activities the total number of offenses or arrests for each subject, irrespective of the type of activity. Different types of offenses cannot be casually assumed to have the same causes.

Failure to take differences in types of offenses into account - a failure that characterizes much delinquency research published in recent decades - will reduce the strength of the effects estimated in the analysis. The small amount of variance explained in many analyses (Greenberg, 1999) may result from the failure to take type of offense into account. In addition, a delinquency or deviance scale constructed by summing involvement in various types of behavior will produce a scale dominated by those offenses that occur most often in the sample. For much the same reason, it will be important to take offense type into account in research on criminal careers (Greenberg, 1996). Given that different offenses may have different causes, there is no reason to
assume that the temporal trajectory of involvement in one type of offense will be the same as the
temporal trajectory for other types.

To ensure that our results are not contingent on overly restrictive and inappropriate
assumptions built into the factor analysis model, we supplemented our factor analyses with
multidimensional scaling analyses of the rates of involvement in different kinds of dubious
behavior. Here, too, we found patterns that were not consistent with a single dimension
underlying all these different behaviors.

We tentatively identified the first dimension of our multi-dimensional scaling solutions
for both males and females as a "seriousness" dimension. Even if this dimension satisfactorily
accounted for all the covariation among the variables, it would point to a phenomenon quite
different from what the Gottfredson-Hirschi theory suggests. There is nothing in their theory to
explain why juveniles who have difficulty postponing the gratification of their impulses engage
in some kinds of self-gratification (like smoking marijuana or drinking alcohol) more frequently,
and other forms of self-gratification (like using cocaine, selling hard drugs, or stealing) less
often. Differences in opportunity to commit these different types of crime are unlikely to explain
differences in the proportions of the subjects in our sample who engaged in them.

We think these patterns can be explained, at least in part, by reference to their
seriousness. As Hirschi (1969) argues, the more young people share general societal assessments
of some kinds of behavior as seriously wrong, they will tend to refrain from engaging in
them. Moreover, a juvenile who did not share in this consensus might still be governed by it
because the potential costs of an infraction (legal penalties, informal sanctions such as scorn,
ridicule or ostracism) are likely to be higher for the more serious infractions. Obviously, to the
extent that prospective offenders do take potential costs of involvement into account, they cannot be considered oblivious to the long-term consequences of their acts, as the Gottfredson-Hirschi theory suggests.

In addition, many of the activities studied here - especially the various drug offenses - are social in character. An individual who has no internalized beliefs discouraging her from using drugs, and who is not afraid of informal social costs connected with their use, might still encounter greater difficulties in finding peers who are willing to participate in an activity regarded as seriously wrong than in one regarded as relatively minor. Future research could usefully test our interpretation by measuring subjects' assessments of the degree of wrongfulness of different illegal or dubious behaviors.

Our introductory remarks noted that the multi-dimensionality of criminal behaviors could be reconciled with the general theory if it were due to the opportunities that must exist in order for low control to manifest itself behaviorally in illegal activity. This observation was, in fact, made by Hirschi and Gottfredson (1986) themselves. If opportunities are distributed across individuals in a patterned manner rather than randomly, factor analyses and multidimensional scaling analyses will yield multiple factors rather than a single factor. This is because the analyses model behavior rather than personality traits, and therefore treat patterns that reflect environmental circumstances on the same footing as those that stem from individual differences.

Like all other published research testing the general theory, we have no measures of objective opportunity to commit different offenses. However, some of the factors found in our analyses might well be due to such external contingencies. If some subjects know someone who will supply codeine and tranquilizers, but not other drugs, they and their friends may use only
those drugs, while other youths with the same disposition to use drugs may use marijuana or amphetamines because those are the drugs they can obtain from suppliers. The distinct factors and dimensions for different kinds of drugs could thus reflect the distinct social networks in which the subjects are embedded, not differences in their personal traits. Thus, our results do not exclude the possibility that the personal trait that leads to crime is a single, homogeneous entity, though they definitely exclude the possibility that criminal behavior is a single, homogeneous entity.

We think it unlikely that this possibility could account for our findings. There are some offenses for which opportunities are highly restricted. Price-fixing is an obvious example; in order to fix prices one has to hold an organizational position that gives one responsibility for setting them. Bribe-taking depends on possessing the power to confer benefits to the bribe-payer. Many individuals are not in such positions and could not easily be in one if they wanted.

On the other hand, opportunities to commit many of the thefts and interpersonal assaults under study here abound, or can easily be found. Surely it is not for lack of opportunities that some of our burglars did not commit any assaults. Our subjects lived in the middle of communities full of people who could have been assaulted. They were surrounded by residences and businesses that could have been burgled. As already mentioned, controlling for race and sex should control at least in part for important inter-personal variations in opportunities to commit different kinds of crime.

Moreover, opportunities are not always stumbled upon fortuitously, unsought. Some offenders look for opportunities, for example, by assessing buildings to see whether they easily be burgled (King, 1972). Some gang members look for occasions to provoke fights so that they
can enhance their reputations for fighting (Horowitz, 1983). While rapes often occur when they were not explicitly sought, as when a burglar breaks into an apartment and finds a female present, they also occur when would-be rapists go out looking for victims (Amir, 1971:140-42; Athens, 1980:23-24). Lack of opportunity might explain failure to commit some of these crimes on a given day or in a given week, but is less plausible as an explanation of why the abstainers failed to do so during the course of an entire year. Specialized motives distinct to some kinds of crime could well do so.

Although our findings do not support the unidimensionality of illegal and risky activity, we do not argue on that account that the Gottfredson-Hirschi general theory should be rejected. By drawing attention to the ability (or willingness) of individuals to refrain from potentially rewarding activity, it makes an important contribution to our understanding of a number of different kinds of behaviors. Yet the social world is complex, not simple; and the general theory does not fully capture that complexity. Self-control is not the only personality trait relevant to the explanation of illegal activity. Several have been shown to influence juvenile delinquency (Tremblay, 1992).

Earlier formulations of control theory by Reckless and by Reiss., and more recent versions such as that of Tittle (1995), capture more of the world's complexity through their recognition that there can be multiple sources of control. Moreover, there exists evidence for the existence of criminal motivation effects on crime that are distinct from opportunities or self-control (DeFronzo, 1983; Bernard, 1984; Thornberry and Christenson, 1984; Farnworth and Leiber, 1989; Simons and Gray, 1989; Agnew, 1989, 1995; Agnew and White, 1992; Smith, Devine and Sheley, 1992). Recognition of the multiple factors that influence delinquency
permits the creation of causal models of delinquency and crime that have greater theoretical coherence and superior predictive value.

Low self-control belongs in criminological theory as one element in a complex causal integrated model that includes motivational elements and controls, not as the sole organizing concept of a general theory. Over the past two decades, integrated theories have been called for as a way of overcoming an unnecessary war between theoretical positions that can be reconciled, and criticized by monists as unnecessary complications (Messner, Krohn and Liska, 1989). A growing body of evidence points to their necessity.

Acknowledgements

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Table 4.1. Proportions Admitting Involvement in Dubious Behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Proportion of Males Reporting No Involvement</th>
<th>Proportion of Females Reporting No Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1$</td>
<td>used cocaine</td>
<td>.870</td>
<td>.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_2$</td>
<td>used hallucinogens</td>
<td>.900</td>
<td>.929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_3$</td>
<td>sold hard drugs</td>
<td>.955</td>
<td>.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_4$</td>
<td>sold marijuana</td>
<td>.815</td>
<td>.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_5$</td>
<td>used amphetamines</td>
<td>.833</td>
<td>.889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_6$</td>
<td>used barbiturates</td>
<td>.954</td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_7$</td>
<td>drank alcohol</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_8$</td>
<td>drank beer</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_9$</td>
<td>drank hard liquor</td>
<td>.358</td>
<td>.366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{10}$</td>
<td>been drunk</td>
<td>.534</td>
<td>.628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{11}$</td>
<td>used marijuana</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{12}$</td>
<td>drank wine</td>
<td>.447</td>
<td>.328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{13}$</td>
<td>stole $5$-$50$</td>
<td>.942</td>
<td>.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{14}$</td>
<td>stole &lt; $5$</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{15}$</td>
<td>stole &gt; $50$</td>
<td>.954</td>
<td>.986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Y16  damaged school property  .893  .965
Y17  damaged other property  .822  .958
Y18  damaged family property  .916  .962
Y19  gang fights  .916  .979
Y20  carried a hidden weapon  .903  .972
Y21  attacked someone  .937  .974
Y22  used codeine  .942  .929
Y23  used tranquilizers  .919  .938
Y24  hit parents  .965  .967
Y25  stole from family  .934  .958
Y26  took a vehicle  .914  .970

* Proportions of males and females are computed using the number who answered the question as a base.
Table 4.2. Diagonally-Weighted, Standardized Least Squares Estimates of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model for Males* (N = 604)

Panel A: Lambda-Y and Variance Explained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$\eta_1$</th>
<th>$\eta_2$</th>
<th>$\eta_3$</th>
<th>$\eta_4$</th>
<th>$\eta_5$</th>
<th>$\eta_6$</th>
<th>$\eta_7$</th>
<th>$\eta_8$</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
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<tr>
<td>$Y_1$</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.772</td>
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<td>$Y_2$</td>
<td>.907</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_3$</td>
<td>.954</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_4$</td>
<td>.903</td>
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<td>.815</td>
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<td>$Y_5$</td>
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<td>$Y_6$</td>
<td>.905</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>.819</td>
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<td>$Y_7$</td>
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<td>-.168</td>
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<td>.810</td>
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<td>$Y_8$</td>
<td>.871</td>
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<td>.758</td>
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<td>$Y_9$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{10}$</td>
<td>.857</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>.734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_{11}$</td>
<td>.677</td>
<td>.221</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.739</td>
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<tr>
<td>$Y_{14}$</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>.753</td>
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<tr>
<td>$Y_{15}$</td>
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<td>.634</td>
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<td>$Y_{16}$</td>
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<td>.755</td>
<td>.570</td>
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### Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Eta Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>η1</th>
<th>η2</th>
<th>η3</th>
<th>η4</th>
<th>η5</th>
<th>η6</th>
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<td>η2</td>
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<td>η3</td>
<td>.498 .453</td>
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<tr>
<td>η4</td>
<td>.354 .298 .695</td>
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<tr>
<td>η5</td>
<td>.680 .561 .524 .545</td>
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<tr>
<td>η6</td>
<td>.771 .534 .320 .405 .672</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>η7</td>
<td>.409 .314 .274 .509 .680 .469</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>η8</td>
<td>.710 .516 .691 .551 .778 .776 .509</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Y17 | .989 | .978 |
| Y18 | .672 | .452 |
| Y19 | .776 | .602 |
| Y20 | .812 | .660 |
| Y21 | .821 | .674 |
| Y22 | .719 | .517 |
| Y23 | .891 | .794 |
| Y24 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
| Y25 | -.368\(b\) | .992 .587 |
| Y26 | | .757\(b\) .574 |
Panel C: Off-Diagonal Elements of TE Matrix

\[ \text{TE}_{78} = 0.242 \]

Panel D: Standard Errors of Correlations in Eta Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \eta_1 )</th>
<th>( \eta_2 )</th>
<th>( \eta_3 )</th>
<th>( \eta_4 )</th>
<th>( \eta_5 )</th>
<th>( \eta_6 )</th>
<th>( \eta_7 )</th>
<th>( \eta_8 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>( \eta_3 )</td>
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<td>0.074</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_4 )</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.178</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_5 )</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_6 )</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_7 )</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_8 )</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Blank entries are zero.

* Not statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 4.3. Diagonally-Weighted, Standardized Least Squares Estimates of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model for Females\(^a\) (N = 576).

Panel A: Lambda-Y and Variance Explained

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>( \eta_1 )</th>
<th>( \eta_2 )</th>
<th>( \eta_3 )</th>
<th>( \eta_4 )</th>
<th>( R^2 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( y_7 )</td>
<td>.944</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_8 )</td>
<td>.835</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_9 )</td>
<td>.781</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{10} )</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{12} )</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{11} )</td>
<td>.323</td>
<td>.630</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{15} )</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{14} )</td>
<td>.883</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{21} )</td>
<td>.744</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_4 )</td>
<td>.913</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{23} )</td>
<td>.816</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_6 )</td>
<td>.985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_5 )</td>
<td>.923</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y_{22} )</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.215</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Eta Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \eta_1 )</th>
<th>( \eta_2 )</th>
<th>( \eta_3 )</th>
<th>( \eta_4 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_1 )</td>
<td>( \eta_1 )</td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_2 )</td>
<td>( \eta_2 )</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_3 )</td>
<td>( \eta_3 )</td>
<td>.722</td>
<td>.821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_4 )</td>
<td>( \eta_4 )</td>
<td>.268</td>
<td>.670</td>
<td>.543</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel C: Standard Errors of Correlations in Eta Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \eta_1 )</th>
<th>( \eta_2 )</th>
<th>( \eta_3 )</th>
<th>( \eta_4 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_1 )</td>
<td>( \eta_1 )</td>
<td>.0820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_2 )</td>
<td>( \eta_2 )</td>
<td>.0653</td>
<td>.0913</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \eta_3 )</td>
<td>( \eta_3 )</td>
<td>.0475</td>
<td>.0710</td>
<td>.1014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Blank entries are zero.
Table 4.4. Stress Statistics for Multidimensional Scaling Analyses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Kruskal's Stress Males</th>
<th>Kruskal's Stress Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.238</td>
<td>.281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.5. Coordinates of Variables in First Dimension of Four-Dimensional Multidimensional Scaling Analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Male Coordinates</th>
<th>Female Coordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Y1</td>
<td>used cocaine</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2</td>
<td>used hallucinogens</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y3</td>
<td>sold hard drugs</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y4</td>
<td>sold marijuana</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y5</td>
<td>used amphetamines</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used barbiturates</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drank alcohol</td>
<td>-5.06</td>
<td>-5.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drank beer</td>
<td>-5.17</td>
<td>-4.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drank hard liquor</td>
<td>-2.32</td>
<td>-2.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Been drunk</td>
<td>-1.39</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used marijuana</td>
<td>-2.65</td>
<td>-2.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drank wine</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>-2.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stole $5-$50</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stole &lt; $5</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stole &gt; $50</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged school property</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged other property</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damaged family property</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang fights</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried a hidden weapon</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacked someone</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used codeine</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Used tranquilizers</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit parents</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stole from family</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took a vehicle</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is less clear what effect a strong ego would have on involvement in crime. Depending on the circumstances it might seek to avoid the risks of crime, or initiate criminal activity on behalf of an individual's self-interests.

Gottfredson and Hirschi do not carefully distinguish inability to control oneself from simple failure to do so on the part of those who could control themselves if they wished. The distinction is conceptually important, and in some circumstances may be of practical importance.

Even when rationality is construed in a strictly material sense, it is difficult to assess the rationality of crime, because of difficulties in measuring the expected costs and returns of criminal activity. One attempt to do so concluded that "economic incentives are instrumental for a relatively small proportion of the criminal population, but this segment accounts for a disproportionate share of all crime income" because "economic incentives are more consequential for higher-income crimes, such as drug-dealing, than for minor crimes, such as numbers" (Viscusi 1986). Viscusi further found that "the criminality among those who are not in school or employed is very sensitive to economic incentives."

Hirschi's (1969) formulation of control theory also explains very small percentages of the variance in delinquent behavior (Krohn and Massey, 1980; Agnew, 1985, 1991; Greenberg, 1999).

Warr (1993) and Akers and Lee (1999), have found evidence that social learning processes substantially account for the age dependence of a number of offence categories.

Some recent work suggests that a substantial portion of the effects that researchers have found to be genetic actually reflect the influence of prenatal environmental factors, such as the mother’s diet. These effects, then, may be congenital, but not genetic.
7. Where specialization has been found, it has usually not been very high. The methods used to detect specialization are poorly suited to detect a small minority of specialized offenders in a larger set of non-specialists.

8. Details of the sampling design are given in Elliot, Huizinga and Ageton (1985:91-92).

9. Some of the activities, such as drinking alcohol, were not illegal for those members of the sample who were above the age at which it was lawful for them to imbibe alcoholic beverages. We included them because Hirschi and Gottfredson see these behaviors as manifestations of the same underlying personality trait that causes illegal activity. Regrettably, the survey did not examine the contexts in which these behaviors occurred. Wine can be drunk while taking communion, and codeine for a toothache. Probably such instances should not count as deviant or dubious for the purpose of testing Gottfredson and Hirschi's claim. Rates were measured on a scale in which 1 = never, 2 = once or twice, 3 = once every 2-3 months, 4 = once a month, 5 = once every 2-3 weeks, 6 = once a week, 7 = 2-3 times a week, 8 = once a day, 9 = 2-3 times a day.

10. In the model for the male sample, the latent variable on which "hit parent" loaded was not represented by any other variable. To achieve identification, the residual for "hit parent" was fixed at zero.

11. If two factors are perfectly correlated they are for all practical purposes the same.

12. A polychoric correlation is actually not a correlation between two variables but "an estimate of the correlation in the latent bivariate normal distribution representing the two ordinal variables."

13. Diagonally-weighted least squares estimates are not asymptotically efficient, but are used because the computation of asymptotic covariance matrices can be extremely time-consuming (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1988: 1.28-1.29, 1989:22). We repeated our analyses using maximum-likelihood estimation.
and found very similar results.

14. In a one-tailed test, which is appropriate because the general theory predicts a (positive) sign for the correlations between the latent variables, the distinctiveness of $\eta_6$ (tranquilizers) and $\eta_1$ (drugs) barely achieves statistical significance. Given the nature of these two factors, it is not surprising that they overlap more than some of the other factors.

15. We deleted variables $Y_1$-$Y_4$, $Y_{13}$, $Y_{16}$, $Y_{19}$-$Y_{20}$ and $Y_{24}$-$Y_{26}$.

16. Were we doing formal significance testing, a $z$-score of 1.645 would indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test.

17. From the point of view of those residents, informal social control may be effective in bringing about compliance with local norms, while promoting violations of official norms. Reiss sees this situation as one of low social control, taking the point of view of the official norms.

18. In Gottfredson and Hirschi’s self-control theory, however, moral beliefs do not influence involvement in crime. Poorly-controlled individuals might engage in illegal activity in order to obtain immediate gratification, even though they disapproved of the illegality.

19. Discussions of the general theory have tended to speak as if there were only two types of people, those who are under-controlled and concerned not to jeopardize their future prospects, and those who are adequately controlled and concerned. We ourselves have, for convenience, used this language here, but this usage oversimplifies, and can be misleading. Surely, self-control is a continuous variable; people have self-control, and exercise it, to varying degrees. Once this recognized, then it follows that the threat of official and informal costs associated with law violations operate as a deterrent to a degree, even for people with capacities for self-control that are low but not zero.

20. Grasmick et. al. (1993) have a measure of perceived opportunity, and find that it has a significant
direct effect on self-reported crime. In addition, it interacts with low self-control. We think it likely that all their subjects encountered circumstances in which they could have committed an act of force or fraud that would have been easy to carry out, would have been gratifying at the moment, and where there was little chance that someone who might do something about it would find out quickly; but those who were more crime-prone were more likely to think of the possibility of committing a crime in these circumstances. For this reason, perceived opportunity may not be a good indicator of objective opportunity. We concur with Viscusi (1986), who observes that perceived opportunity cannot be considered exogenous to illegal activity. It might actually be a measure of it. After we completed this paper, a study by LaGrange and Silverman (1999) appeared that included measures of low opportunity (level of parental supervision, curfew, time spent with friends or driving around). Interactions between low self-control and opportunity contributed to property offenses, violent offenses and drug offenses.

21. Ideally one could test the contribution of opportunities in the environment to the multi-dimensionality of deviance by carrying out the factor analyses and multi-dimensional scaling analyses holding opportunities constant. However, our data set - like all other data sets for self-reported delinquency known to us - does not have good indicators of environmental opportunities.

22. In a national survey of more than 1100 adolescents aged 12 to 17, for example, 41% of the high school students had seen illegal drugs sold at their high school, and 24% said that they could buy marijuana in an hour or less (Wren 1997). Presumably a larger percentage of students could locate a seller eventually, asking their peers for help if they did not a seller themselves. They survey did not ask for specifics about the drugs sold.
Chapter 5

Organized for What? Recasting Theories of Social (Dis)organization

Robert J. Sampson

The concepts of "community" in general, and "social disorganization" in particular, have made remarkable comebacks in criminological discourse. Once relegated to the intellectual dustbin by the likes of Edwin Sutherland and William F. Whyte, social disorganization theory -- gussied up a bit for the nineties -- is indeed alive and well. Among others, Bob Bursik and I have been proponents of the reformulation and resurgence of this classic framework on communities and crime.

This move has not been without its detractors, however. Bursik and Grasmick supply an amusing anecdote in Neighborhoods and Crime (1993). Recalling a conversation at the annual meeting of the ASC in the late 1980s, they were told by a respected but unnamed colleague that "social disorganization is the herpes of criminology... once you think it is gone for good, the symptoms flare up again" (1993: 30). Although I have several suspects in mind as the source of this comment, Al Reiss is at the top of the list. In his lead-off essay in Communities and Crime (1986), "Why are Communities Important for Understanding Crime?," Reiss trained his critical eye on social disorganization theory. Against a backdrop of admiration for the efforts of Shaw and McKay and others in the social-disorganization tradition, Reiss pointed out that in many so-called disorganized slums, there existed criminal networks, organized gangs, and often a complex density of social ties. Surely it would be a mistake to consider Whyte's North End, to use Reiss's example, as simply disorganized. Yet it did have high crime rates, and many of the features of Shaw and McKay's delinquency areas.

Characteristically, then, Reiss raised a paradox: high-crime areas often seem to be both organized and disorganized simultaneously, yielding an uneasy co-existence within the same boundaries. How can
this be, one wonders? Wouldn't it be best, as Bursik and Grasmick's critic implied, to simply eradicate social disorganization theory once and for all?

In this paper, I propose a solution for solving the "disorganization" conundrum. Building upon prior empirical research and a larger theoretical effort (Sampson, 1999), I recast the concept of social organization based on an appraisal of what community supplies in modern society. I then trace some of the implications of this theoretical strategy, adding some lessons from ongoing collaborative research in Chicago. The key to solving the dilemma turns, I believe, on the question: organized for what? Before explaining and then answering this question, let me briefly rehearse the theoretical stakes.

**Community Social Disorganization: Origins**

Steeped in the "Chicago school" tradition of urban sociology pioneered by Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925), Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay spearheaded a community-level approach to social disorganization. In their classic work, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, Shaw and McKay (1942) argued that three structural factors -- low economic status mediated in turn by ethnic heterogeneity and residential instability -- led to the disruption of community social organization. Delinquent gangs and the age-graded transmission of delinquent traditions ensued, accounting for time-stable variations in crime and delinquency rates. Delinquency traditions and high crime rates persisted in the same communities, they maintained, regardless of the race or ethnic groups passing through.

As later extended by Kornhauser (1978), Bursik (1988), and Sampson and Groves (1989), social disorganization has been defined, in the abstract, as the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls. This social disorganization approach has been further grounded in what Kasarda and Janowitz (1974: 329) call the *systemic* model, where the local community is viewed as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks, and
formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and on-going socialization processes. So much for the basics.

Criticisms

In _Street Corner Society_, Whyte (1943) argued that what looks like social disorganization from the outside is actually an internal organization. He discovered through extensive fieldwork an intricate pattern of social ties embedded within the social structure of a low-income Italian area of Boston -- the North End. There were organized gangs and an integration of illegal markets with the routines of everyday life. Noting the relative nature of organization in the community, he maintained that the real problem of "Cornerville" was that its social organization failed to mesh with the structure of the society around it. Whyte's research came to be seen as a repudiation of the then prevalent theory that slum communities were "disorganized."

A bit later, circa the 1950s and 1960s, ethnographic research discovered thriving urban communities and ethnic enclaves where kinship and friendship solidarities flourished (e.g., Gans, 1962). Especially in poor urban neighborhoods, the evidence of dense social networks and local identification remained strong (see also Jacobs, 1961; Stack, 1974).

Two recent ethnographies in Chicago provide further insight supportive of this line of critique. In an ethnography of a black middle-class neighborhood on the south side of Chicago, Mary Pattillo (1998) found that the dense social networks fostered by residential stability did in fact facilitate the informal supervision of neighborhood youth and enhance the mobilization of local institutions. At the same time, however, the incorporation of gang members and drug dealers into the networks of law-abiding kin and neighbors thwarted conventional efforts to rid the neighborhood of its criminal element.
In an interesting twist, Pattillo found that the leader of a large black gang was a long-time resident who engaged in multiple acts of informal social control (e.g., threats, payoffs) to keep the neighborhood free of street crime and signs of disorder (e.g., graffiti, vandalism, prostitution). A major reason was that his mother, relatives, and friends -- all of whom were neighborhood residents -- would have faced potential victimization otherwise. These conflicting and paradoxical manifestations of dense networks pose a unique challenge to the traditional social disorganization framework.

Sudhir Venkatesh (1997) recently reported on a four-year study of community life in a poor, all-black housing project also on Chicago's south side. He uncovered an interesting transformation wherein the early 1990s signaled the arrival of the street gang as an important element in local social organization. The gangs did not exercise absolute dominion; rather they became "corporatized" through systemic involvement in drug dealing. Defense of turf was no longer the determining agenda as it was for prior gangs. For their part, residents did not welcome the gang, but many benefited materially (e.g., through cash, gifts, repair of property) and all had to take into account gang members through daily interactions in ways not seen previously. Venkatesh, like Pattillo, suggests anew that "disorganization" is not the correct lens from which to view the complexities of urban life in the modern metropolis.

Resolution

How, then, do we reconcile these seemingly disparate views of the nature of community social organization? Let me offer five observations by way of rejoinder.

Point number 1. Going back to Reiss's insight, but also Ruth Kornhauser, we must first recognize that social organization is goal oriented. It confuses matters to think about social disorganization in the abstract, absent any content. For criminologists, content is grounded in the
common goal of living in an area free of the threat of crime. Here, social organization refers to the collective and concrete efforts of neighborhood actors toward meeting this goal. The North End of Boston might have been organized with regard to intricate social ties, but perhaps not toward the goal of collectively controlling deviant behavior. Ironically, Pattillo's gang leader proves the point in that he assumed a large responsibility for keeping the middle-class black neighborhood relatively free of serious crime.

Point 2 flows from the first. Social disorganization does not imply chaos, and in fact does not mean the lack of social ties. I must confess that I erred conceptually on this point back in my 1989 paper (Sampson and Groves, 1989) testing a reformulated social disorganization theory. There we defined the structural dimensions of community social disorganization partly in terms of the prevalence and interdependence of social networks in a community. To be sure, social disorganization may be influenced by the configuration of informal networks (e.g., the density of local acquaintanceship; intergenerational ties), but they are nonetheless independent constructs. In some contexts, such as socially isolated and segregated neighborhoods in the inner city (Wilson, 1987), dense social ties may inhibit collective action to tackle local problems. As network theorists in sociology have argued, weak ties (or structural holes) are often the most useful form of social organization for getting things done (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1982).

Third, criminologists have too often defined neighborhoods themselves -- not just social disorganization -- in terms of social cohesion and dense primary ties. As Donald Warren remarked in his masterful study of Detroit (1975: 50), "the belief in the demise of neighborhood as an important social unit, is predicated on the assumption that neighborhood is exclusively a primary group and therefore should possess the 'face-to-face' intimate, affective relations which characterize all primary
groups." But this assumption is false, and plays right into Whyte's critique. Neighborhoods are ecological units -- the extent of organization (and for what) is an empirical question. Hence we should not conflate ecological areas or the constitutive elements of social control, such as taking action, with primary social ties, such as with friends and kin. Rejecting a narrow focus on private ties, Bursik and Grasmick (1993) similarly emphasize that we pay close attention to community-wide and extra-community ties -- regardless of affective identification.

At the macro level, one might even have an active and shared willingness to intervene among complete strangers. Consider Sweden as a society. There are strong norms about public behavior -- drunk driving, hitting children, littering, and so on. Public expectations about responding to such acts leads to high social control, regardless of personal ties among potential participants. The nature of social ties and its relationship to social control is thus empirically variable.

Fourth, the connection of law-abiding citizens with criminal offenders -- as Pattillo (1998) and Venkatesh (1997) so clearly found, and Whyte (1943) before them -- does not undermine a theoretical concern for the conditions under which neighborhood collective action occurs. After all, should we be surprised to find that delinquents have brothers, sisters, grandmothers, and neighbors that know them well? That defend and love them even as they condemn their behavior? It does not seem to me that middle-class parents are any less likely than lower-class parents to disown their children when they get in trouble with the law. The differences we find across communities are largely structural -- the disadvantaged are more often exposed to the realities of crime, breaking down the "we-they" duality criminologists are wont to promote. As Pattillo (1998) and Eli Anderson (1990) have shown, the proximity of black middle class communities to high-crime areas means that on a day-to-day basis, local residents must negotiate with a streetwise and often criminal element.
Fifth, we should stand firm on the issue of common values with respect to safety. Criminologists have mistaken what Kornhauser (1978: 122) calls a "jaundiced" view of indigenous crime and gangs for tacit acceptance -- thus opening the door to misguided subcultural and differential association theories. To be sure, I believe that the existential reality of living in dangerous environments may reduce one's emotional distance from the criminal "other" --- but that does not imply normative acceptance in the deeper cultural sense. Anderson's (1978) ethnography of Chicago's southside black ghetto, for example, showed how primary values coexisted alongside residual values associated with deviant subcultures (e.g., hoodlums) such as "toughness," "getting big money," "going for bad," and "having fun" (1978: 129-130; 152-158). According to Anderson, the use of violence is not valued as a primary goal, but it is expected as a fact of life. Much like Rainwater (1970), Suttles (1968), and Horowitz (1987), Anderson's research suggests that in certain ghetto contexts the wider cultural values recede against the daily realities of social disadvantage. Shaw and McKay (1942) offered a similar interpretation, arguing that while the tradition of delinquency and crime is a powerful force in certain communities, it is only a part of the community's system of values. They argued, in fact, that "the dominant tradition in every community is conventional, even in those having the highest rate of delinquents" (Shaw and McKay, 1942: 180).

More forcefully, Kornhauser argues that to charge criminologists with "middle-class moralizing" for claiming universalism with respect to definitions of crime and disorder is disingenuous. For this charge implies that it is self-evident that slum dwellers are the apostles of a distinctive morality. Or, put differently, that slum dwellers are the purveyors of a lower-class morality! Surely we do not wish to resurrect Banfield's fantastic conception of lower-class culture. I thus side with Kornhauser -- critics of social disorganization assume large cultural differences that have not been shown to exist. Although
existential wariness in the inner-city may lead to a greater tolerance of certain forms of deviance (Sampson and Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998), it is precisely the acceptance of core societal standards by residents and even gang leaders themselves that underlies efforts to establish social order and safety -- however unconventional these efforts may be (Pattillo, 1998). From this view, subcultural tolerance of deviance is contextually shaped and not part of a cultural system writ large.

**Recasting Social (Dis?)Organization**

We are now in a position to recast disorganization theory, mainly through an enlightened conception of the complex nature of community in mass society. The alchemy, admittedly incomplete, goes something like the following.

I begin by elevating the role of social control, which at bottom is about the articulation of social structure with the realization of common values (Kornhauser, 1978; Bursik, 1988; Sampson and Groves, 1998). Social control should not be equated with repression or forced conformity. Rather, social control refers to the capacity of a social unit to regulate itself according to desired principles -- to realize collective, as opposed to forced, goals (Janowitz 1975: 82, 87). This conception is similar to Tilly's (1973) definition of collective action -- the application of a community's pooled resources to common ends. As noted, one of the most central of such common goals or ends is the desire of community residents to live in safe and orderly environments free of predatory crime. Extant research points as well to a substantial consensus among Americans of all stripes on the virtues of neighborhoods characterized by economic sufficiency, good schools, adequate housing, and a clean, healthy environment. The capacity to achieve such common goals is linked to both informal role relationships established for other purposes and more formal, purposive efforts to achieve social regulation through institutional means (Kornhauser, 1978: 24).
In turn, I de-couple social control from the notion of homogeneity, whether cultural or socio-demographic. Culturally diverse populations can and do agree on common goals such as safe streets. And social conflicts can and do rend communities along the lines of economic resources, race, political empowerment, and the role of criminal justice agents in defining and controlling social deviance (e.g., drug use, gangs, panhandling, police misconduct). It is around the distribution of resources and power that conflict usually emerges, not the content of core values (Kornhauser, 1978). As Philip Selznick puts it: "communities are characterized by structural differentiation as well as by shared consciousness" (1992: 367). The goal of community is thus "unity in diversity," or the reconciliation of partial with general perspectives on the common good (Selznick, 1992: 369). This sociological conception of social control addresses the longstanding criticism (Whyte, 1943) that theories of community social organization downplay social conflict.

As implied earlier, my next move is to focus on communities in ecological space -- neighborhoods and local community areas -- rather than elevating solidarity or identity to the major definitional criteria. Following Tilly, that is, I "make territoriality define communities and leave the extent of solidarity problematic" (1973: 212). When formulated in this way, the dimensions of social control are variable and analytically separable from not only from potential sources of variation (e.g., concentrated poverty, instability), but from the definition and operationalization of the units of analysis.

Furthermore, in contrast to formally or externally induced actions (e.g., a police crackdown), I stress the role of informal mechanisms by which residents themselves assume some responsibility for social control. Examples of informal social control with respect to public order include the monitoring of spontaneous play groups among children, the willingness to intervene in preventing acts such as truancy and street-corner "hanging" by teenage peer-groups, and confronting persons who are exploiting
or disturbing public space. Not only is much crime committed by and against young people, even among adults it regularly arises in public disputes, in the context of illegal markets (e.g., prostitution, drugs), and in the company of peers. The capacity of residents to control group-level processes and visible signs of social disorder is thus a key mechanism influencing opportunities for interpersonal crime.

Parenthetically, I would argue that informal social control as conceptualized here is not the same thing as "neighborhood watch" interventions as commonly implemented. Such interventions may or may not foster social control; the evidence suggests that neighborhood watch programs targeted specifically to crime are largely ineffective (Rosenbaum, 1991). Community policing, by contrast, is more relevant to the extent that it fosters greater civic involvement by residents in the general life of their neighborhoods. Indeed, one of the major goals of community policing is for the police to act as a catalyst in sparking a sense of local ownership of public space and thus greater activation of informal control. Getting the public to view the police as partners in the effort to establish safe communities is crucial -- citizen calls to the police, after all, are a form of social control "from the bottom up." Thus informal social controls need not exclude the police, and in fact most acts of informal control involve some form of collaboration between the police and the public. There is recent evidence from Chicago that community policing has led to increases in police-citizen collaboration to foster safer neighborhoods (Skogan and Hartnett, 1998).

Collective Efficacy

Thus conceived, informal social control is a general phenomenon differentially activated across neighborhoods. It is for this reason that my colleagues Tony Earls, Steve Raudenbush, and I (Sampson et al., 1997) see an analogy between individual efficacy and neighborhood efficacy: both are activated
processes that seek to achieve an intended effect. At the neighborhood level, the willingness of local residents to intervene for the common good depends, in addition, on conditions of mutual trust and solidarity among neighbors. Indeed, one is unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood context where the rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another.

Private ties notwithstanding, socially cohesive neighborhoods will therefore prove the most fertile contexts for the realization of informal social control. In other words, it is the linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighborhood context of what we term collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997). Just as individuals vary in their capacity for efficacious action, so too do neighborhoods vary in their capacity to achieve common goals. And just as individual self-efficacy is situated rather than global (one has self-efficacy relative to a particular task or type of task), in this view neighborhood efficacy exists relative to the tasks of supervising children and maintaining public order. It follows that the collective efficacy of residents is a critical feature of urban neighborhoods which inhibits the occurrence of predatory crime, regardless of the demographic composition of the population. Our empirical analysis of Chicago neighborhoods supported this general theoretical orientation with respect to rates of violence (Sampson et al., 1997).

Institutions and Public Control

The present explication of a theory of community social organization should not be read as ignoring institutions, nor the wider political environment in which local communities are embedded. The institutional component of the systemic model is the resource stock of neighborhood organizations and their linkages with other organizations, both within and outside the community. For example, Kornhauser (1978: 79) argues that when the horizontal links among institutions within a community are
weak, the capacity to defend local interests is weakened. Moreover, institutional strength is not necessarily isomorphic with neighborhood cohesion in personal relationships. Many areas exhibit intense private ties with friends and kin yet lack the institutional capacity to achieve social control.

Vertical connections to the outside world are potentially more effective. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) highlight the importance of public control, defined as the capacity of local community organizations to obtain extra-local resources (e.g., housing development, block grants) that help sustain neighborhood social stability and local controls. The differential ability of communities to respond to cuts in public services -- such as police patrols, fire stations, garbage collection, housing code enforcement -- also looms large when we consider the known link between public signs of disorder (e.g., vacant housing, vandalism) and more serious crime (Skogan, 1990).

More generally, Hunter (1985: 216) argues that parochial or within-community social order based on interpersonal networks and the interlocking of local institutions, "leaves unresolved the problems of public order in a civil society" (p. 216). The problem is that public order is provided mainly by institutions of the State, and we have seen a secular decline in public (citizenship) obligations in society accompanied by an increase in civil (individual) rights. This imbalance of collective obligations and individual rights undermines the effectiveness of public-private alliances as an approach to order. According to Hunter (1985), communities must work together with the forces of public control to achieve social order, principally through the interdependence among informal social-control efforts and formal institutions such as the police. To the extent that community policing shares this vision (e.g., Skogan and Hartnett, 1998), collective efficacy may be seen as a private-public venture.

Summary

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By way of summary, there are at least three advantages to the theoretical conceptualization just offered. One is its emphasis on human agency and social action. Structural factors may be constraining but they are certainly not deterministic. Although it may seem subtle at first, moving away from disorganization and toward an analysis of the conditions under which collective efficacy and social action are triggered liberates us from the crippling limitations of traditional models. Not the least of these is the rather invariant portrayal of disadvantaged communities in the literature. One of the striking things uncovered in our analysis of collective efficacy in Chicago was the tremendous variation across communities that shared the same structural constraints (e.g., poverty, segregation). Recognizing the interpenetration of constraint and action, then, moves us closer to what we know in our own lives to be true -- the future is never fixed and "structures" are built up through socially reproduced action on a daily basis (Sewell, 1992; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998).

Second, this conceptualization rests on a theory that makes explicit what community does and does not supply in mass society. In the version I have offered, community is no all-purpose elixir, contra the mantra of current rhetoric. It is unfortunate that the present nostalgia for community has emerged almost oblivious to a vigorous research cycle in sociology of community lost, saved, and liberated (Wellman, 1979). The evidence supports the liberated argument, suggesting that community has been transformed rather than lost. Namely, the research evidence is now clear that urbanites rely less on local neighborhoods for psychological support, cultural and religious nourishment, and economic needs/transactions (e.g., shopping, work) than in the past. Spurred by the advances in modern technology we can shop, work, go to church, and make friends throughout geographical and, increasingly, cyber space. This fact alone suggests that interventions in the local community are unlikely to succeed to the extent that they attempt to penetrate the private world of personal relations and
Extending Janowitz's (1975) notion of the community of limited liability, I have argued elsewhere (Sampson, 1999) that we do not need communities so much to satisfy our private and personal needs, which are best met elsewhere, nor even to meet our sustenance needs, which, for better or worse, appear to be irretrievably dispersed in space. Rather, the local community remains essential as a site for the realization of common values in support of social goods. As elaborated above, these goods include public safety, norms of civility and mutual trust, efficacious voluntary associations, and collective socialization of the young -- in short, for what we can think of as the products of community social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993) and collective efficacy (Sampson et al., 1997).

The local community remains important today for another reason, of course -- economic resources and social-structural differentiation in general are very much a spatial affair in the United States. The bedrock of physical and human capital (e.g., income, education, housing stock) is distributed in a highly uneven form across ecological space -- often in conjunction with ascribed characteristics such as racial composition. The continuing and in some cases increasing significance of such ecological differentiation is fundamental to a full understanding of what community "supplies" (Sampson, 1999). Linking structural inequality with a conception of social capital and collective efficacy thus forms an important agenda for the future.

**Dangers of Community**

Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, the third advantage of the present theory is that its implicit normative conception recognizes the potential dangers in unbridled versions of community. In the pursuit of informal social control, there is always the danger that freedoms will be restricted unnecessarily -- that individuals face unwanted and even unjust scrutiny. For example,
surveillance of "suspicious" persons in socially controlled communities can become translated into the widespread interrogation of racial minorities (Skogan 1990). Suppose further that a community comes together -- through the mobilization of social networks -- to block the residential entry of a racial outgroup. Put more bluntly, what if racism is a goal pursued among residents of certain neighborhoods? Such exclusion prompted Suttles (1972) to warn of the dark side of "defended neighborhoods."

Consider also the historical connection between official corruption and local solidarity. Whyte (1943) was one of the first to document the ironic consequences of dense, multiplex relationships in cohesive communities for law enforcement. He writes: "The policeman who takes a strictly legalistic view of his duties cuts himself off from the personal relations necessary to enable him to serve as a mediator of disputes in his area." By contrast, "the policeman who develops close ties with local people is unable to act against them with the vigor prescribed by the law" (p. 136). It follows that police corruption is an ever-present danger under conditions of social-network closure, even as it aids in dispute resolution and informal social control because of interlocking social ties. The nationwide move to embrace community policing has perhaps not recognized the risks inherent in the community side of the equation.

Obviously we would not do well to think of racism, norms of social exclusion, and instruments of corruption as desirable forms of social capital, and hence we must balance 'community' with a normative or cultural conception of social justice. Difficult though it may be, criminological theory needs a language to condemn certain forms of conduct as outside the circle of civil society. It is for this reason that I have focused on widely expressed desires regarding community that transcend race and class boundaries -- especially social order and public safety. Not just any goal will do, therefore, and even when subscribed to widely, pursuit of common goals must proceed cautiously and with respect for
individual rights, diversity, and limits on state power. Fortunately, legal justice and community are not
the antinomy common wisdom suggests (Selznick, 1992). The constitutional law tradition has long been
concerned with balancing individual rights against the need to promote the health and safety of
communities (Gillman, 1996).

Conclusion

There is, finally, the matter of social disorganization. Is it the herpes of criminology? My
analysis suggests that the critics of social disorganization theory have it partly right but that they have
also become captives of metaphor. To claim that social disorganization is flawed analytically because
high-crime communities can be considered in some way "organized" is both true and a red herring.
After all, this argument is tantamount to asserting that organization is a constant (i.e., that all
communities are organized). If you allow that organization is not a constant, then it must vary. And if it
can vary, then logically there can be disorganization.

In conclusion, then, social disorganization does not mean chaos, it does not mean lack of social
ties, and it certainly does not mean that grandmothers disown their delinquent grandchildren. What
vision of human nature is that anyway? Yet language does matter, and thus I do not think that much
would be lost by dropping "social disorganization" from our criminological lexicon. Better to emphasize
straightaway the essence of the matter -- variation in the articulation of social structure with goal-
directed values; variation, that is, in the sources and consequences of collective action. Testable and
falsifiable hypotheses emerge from such a perspective: for example, that neighborhood instability
undermines collective efficacy, or that informal social control is inversely related to rates of crime. But
in the end, I think it is nonetheless clear that when it comes to the fundamentals, social-disorganization
theorists have been heading on the right track all along.
References


Notes

Chapter 6

Social Selection and Social Causation as Determinants of Psychiatric Disorders

Beat Mohler and Felton Earls

Introduction

At an early stage of planning the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN), its investigators were alerted to the fact that communities may change, as much, and possibly more, than individuals do (Reiss 1986). PHDCN is a multi-disciplinary project using sociological and epidemiological methods to investigate the role of neighborhood, family and individual factors on the development of children and adolescents. The sociological design integrates a community survey and neighborhood observation. The epidemiological design consists of a longitudinal study of multi age cohorts sampled from eighty neighborhoods in Chicago stratified by ethnicity and socioeconomic status.

Theoretical and analytical issues have been carefully considered in forging an integrated design (Earls and Buka 1998; National Institute of Justice 1994; Sampson et al. 1997).

A static view of neighborhoods was clearly unacceptable. The fully specified design of the project should be able to detect the pattern of how and why individuals moved across neighborhoods as they grew up. The thrust of theory supporting a link between antisocial behavior and substance abuse (including, but not limited to criminal behavior) posited features of social control or social organization (Tonry et al. 1991). If individuals moved, and if neighborhoods changed, what causal influences could be deduced about the influences of neighborhoods as opposed to characteristics of the person? In an open society such as the United States, frequent moves are stereotypically viewed as a sign of success, an indication of upward mobility. But to what extent, we asked, was this conditioned by race, ethnicity, gender, education, and region of the country to mention some of the more obvious considerations.
Spatial mobility is connected to social mobility, and it also varies across societies and changes over time (Rahkonen et al. 1997). Europeans move less frequently than Americans. Distributions of socioeconomic class change over time and differ between countries, as shown in European studies (Rahkonen et al. 1997). A combination of historical factors converged in the first half of the twentieth century to increase mobility in Western Europe and especially in the United States. Among these were industrialization, the introduction of universal education, the World Wars, and the growth of cities followed by the expansion of suburban areas.

Given this accumulation of powerful social and economic factors, it seems possible that the question of who moves and who does not could be related as much to individual characteristics as to social circumstances. Any number of personality or motivational factors could be posited as sorting out those persons who move from those who do not. Further, both positive and negative valences might be associated with moving; for instance, two persons migrating out of the same neighborhood could be doing so for quite discrepant reasons, seeking opportunity on the one hand and escaping social disapproval or rejection on the other (see, for example, Odegaard’s study of immigrating Norwegians to the US; Odegaard 1932, and Freire Coutinho et al. 1996 on internal migration in Brazil). Recent publications describing better mental health among immigrants than among of the same ethnicity born in the U.S. challenge long-standing tenets in psychiatry such as the damaging effect of migration and the positive psychological effect of acculturation (Vega et al. 1998; Escobar 1998). Another recent investigation of migration between rural and urban areas in the Netherlands showed that it applies only for younger age groups that the movers are healthier than the stayers (Verheij et al. 1998). Looking at neighborhoods, one would hope that some regularities existed between areas. Some neighborhoods would be more likely than others to be stable and to have residents who when they do move do so for fairly
similar reasons.

This type of reasoning led us to distinguish between social selection and social causation effects. By social selection, we refer to a process in which the health status (or some other indicator of well-being) of individuals determines their capacity to adapt to the material, psychological and social demands of a given social setting. The causal mechanism is assumed to be within the individual’s constitution. It determines whether or where a person moves between SES and/or geographically distinct areas. Social causation, on the other hand, imputes the mechanisms associated with poor health as a feature of the economic, physical (e.g. quality of housing) or social environment. As a meta-theory, social causation has a number of intermediate level theories that are well established in sociology and criminology literature (e.g. social control, differential social organization, subcultural, social disorganization). Social selection has fewer intermediate theories. Theories, such as Wilson and Hernstein’s (1985), that stress the importance of personality characteristics represent the predominant trend. These would be compatible with a number of mechanisms, both biological (genetics) and social (early experience).

In this paper, we aim to review what is known about the social selection, social causation distinction from literature on psychiatric disorders. The question of social selection and social causation has long intrigued researchers interested in how changing social and material conditions intersect with the prevalence, duration and course of various types of mental disorders. Nearly a century and half ago, Jarvis (publication 1971) observed that psychotic patients admitted to asylums in Massachusetts came primarily from the poorest sectors of society. A century later, Odegard (1932) studied the selection processes responsible for emigration, and Faris and Dunham (1939), noted the residential patterns of admissions to psychiatric facilities in Chicago. While schizophrenics lived in the poorest sections of the city, patients with manic-depressive psychoses did not. The investigators posited that many of the
schizophrenics drifted into these poor areas as a consequence of their debilitating disease. The assumption was that manic-depressives, despite their convincing symptomatology, were not as socially or physically impaired. A few decades later the notion of social drift was refined in a classic study by Goldberg and Morrison (1963). By comparing the social status of the parents of first admission schizophrenics with the social status of the patients themselves, these investigators demonstrated a downward social mobility associated with the disorder. Turner and Wagenfeld (1967) investigated in a similar way the occupational mobility of schizophrenic patients. The notion of social drift became distinguished from social selection; the former implying a decline in social status following the onset of the disease and due to impairments associated with it, while the latter leaves open the question of whether premorbid conditions may also contribute to the decline over time (Goldmann 1994). Use of the term, social selection, as proposed by West (1991), does not differentiate between upward or downward mobility but focuses on a comparison between populations, specified by health indicators. Thus, social selection can be defined as health related social mobility.

The mechanisms associated with intergenerational downward mobility, as opposed to a loss of intergenerational mobility, set the stage for contemporary research in psychiatric epidemiology that aims to sort out social selection from social causation. More recent studies accept potential effects of both causal mechanisms. The differential effects of social selection and social causation for various disorders have become the focus of interest. Theoretical models like the one described by Dohrenwend et al. (1992), applied by Levav et al. (1987) and reproduced in Figure 1 aim to discriminate whether social causation or social selection processes are of greater importance in the observed differences in the prevalence of mental disorders. The model includes ethnic advantage versus disadvantage in addition to socioeconomic status (SES). Relating ethnic disadvantage either to negative health outcomes or to
limitations in social mobility (upward) leads to different predictions of the prevalence of disorders by SES and ethnicity. The social causation model predicts that the incremental adversity experienced by disadvantaged ethnic groups leads to incrementally higher rates of psychopathology at every SES level. The social selection model assumes that social disadvantage would effect social mobility rather than psychopathology. Therefore healthier members of disadvantaged ethnic groups would be less likely to rise from lower SES positions than similarly healthy members from advantaged ethnic groups. The result would be lower rates of psychopathology in disadvantaged ethnic groups, by SES.

Benchmark studies on social selection and social causation

We review current knowledge by describing three key studies in details. These three papers stand out as benchmarks because of key features of their designs. Different approaches in design and analysis have been used to test whether social selection or social causation is more important in the causation of observed differences in prevalence of psychiatric disorders between social classes. Three investigations published by Birtchnell (1971), Dohrenwend et al. (1992) and Timms (1996) are representative of a series of papers on this issue published during the last three decades. All used direct assessment of psychiatric disorder and involved sufficiently large samples.

Birtchnell (1971) based his analysis on male patients referred to psychiatric services in Northeastern Scotland between 1963 and 1967 and a comparison sample of the general population drawn from general practices. Psychiatric and comparison samples included only males aged 20 and over. The available patient records included information on psychiatric diagnoses (based on the International Classification of Diseases, Seventh Revision), the patients' and their parents' occupations. Social class was based upon the General Register Office Classification of Occupations, 1960, which focused on the usual occupation.
Birtchnell’s basic analysis revealed different distributions of social class by decade of birth and differences in social mobility between psychiatric patients and general population.

Psychiatric patients stratified by decade of birth did not differ significantly in their distribution of social class. During the same time period (year of birth ranging from 1890s to 1949) the general population in this region showed a significant increase in the proportional size of SES level III (skilled laborers). In line with earlier findings an over representation of psychiatric patients in the lower social classes (SES IV and SES V) was found. The findings of different distributions of psychiatric patients and comparison groups by parental social class and by the subjects’ achieved social class support differences in health related social mobility. Birtchnell found statistically significant differences in mobility of patients and controls of lower social class origin. The psychiatric patients were less upwardly mobile, remaining in their parents’ lower social class or dropping from SES IV to V more often than the population controls. No significant differences were found between patients and controls with higher parental SES.

Birtchnell analyzed social mobility in the different diagnostic groups taking into account differences in age and/or decade of birth. He describes the differences between observed and expected number of patients in each SES for three diagnostic groups. Marked discrepancies from the expected are detected for psychotic patients, where lower social classes (SES IV and V) are significantly overrepresented. A mixed picture is observed for depression with more people than expected in SES II and in SES IV. For patients with personality disorder the observed distribution shows slightly higher percentages of SES IV and V than expected. With exception of the group “neurotics other than depressive” all differences between observed and expected were significant.

Birtchnell supports the findings of earlier investigations (Turner and Wagenfeld 1967; Goldberg and Morrison 1963) describing a significant effect of the illness and course of schizophrenia on social mobility.
For the group of patients with personality disorder, only some support for social selection is found. Patients with depressive or neurotic disorders - as defined by ICD 7 - did not show any influence of their illness on their achieved social class.

Dohrenwend et al. (1992) chose a population sample in Israel to test predictions on the causal relationship between socioeconomic status and psychiatric disorder. In a two-stage design, both screening and clinical interviews (Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview, Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia and Research Diagnostic Criteria) were performed to obtain information on social class, ethnicity (European or North African) and psychiatric diagnosis (DSM-III). These investigators based their analysis on a theoretical model that pitted social causation against social selection. As described earlier (Figure 1), both mechanisms predict an inverse relation between socioeconomic class and prevalence of psychopathology. The social causation model assumes that the greater degree of stress experienced as a consequence of ethnic discrimination by North Africans in Israel will result in higher rates of psychopathology. Thus, the prevalence of psychopathology for this group (as opposed to European-born Israelis) is predicted to be higher at every level of socioeconomic status (the numerator effect). Social selection, on the other hand, predicts that healthy people are able to rise to or maintain themselves at higher social classes. Healthier people from the disadvantaged group would rise at a lower rate and therefore lead to a decrease in prevalence of psychiatric disorder in lower social classes (the denominator effect). Only the healthiest people from the disadvantaged North African-born group would attain the highest socioeconomic class. Thus, the rate of psychiatric disorder for the relatively advantaged European-born Israelis is predicted to be incrementally lower at every level of social class.

In this study the level of completed education was used as a substitute for social class. The prevalence decreases by level of education for all diagnostic groups. In Figure 2 the sample is stratified by
gender and ethnicity. For schizophrenia the data provide some support for social selection, given the lower rates for females than males and for those of North African versus European backgrounds. With regard to substance use disorder, the evidence provides some support for social causation. At lower education levels, North African males show higher rates than European males, suggesting a greater role of social causation in substance use disorders. Similar results have been found for major depression in females.

Figure 2 Here

Timms (1996) analyzed the relation between social mobility and mental health based on data from the Swedish Project Metropolitan. The study investigated longitudinally the development of male children born in Stockholm in 1953. Information on parental SES was drawn from parent interviews. The subjects’ socioeconomic status, defined by occupation, ownership of capital and education, was assessed at age 27. Information on mental health was available through a psychiatric inpatient register at age 27 and military draft board records at age 18-20 (available for 96% of the study population). The latter included psychological tests, questionnaires and psychiatric diagnoses. Psychiatric impairment was based on the International Classification of Diseases, setting a threshold at a level of being disabled for military service. Examining the social class of subjects at age 27, a larger number of subjects were found to be impaired or to have had psychiatric hospitalization in lower than higher SES groups. Subjects with psychiatric impairment and hospitalization were more often downwardly mobile. Coping skills showed a trend in the opposite direction. Two thirds of the subjects with high coping are in the upwardly mobile group.

Discussion

The three selected studies used different designs and methods of analysis to assess the direction of the causal relationship between social environment and psychiatric disorders. Even though they describe populations from different societies, the findings are coherent. All three demonstrate a significant effect of
severe disabiliating mental illness on social mobility. Birtchnell (1971) and Dohrenwend et al. (1992) demonstrated this pattern for schizophrenia in contrast to other psychiatric patients. Timms (1996) concludes more generally that severe psychiatric impairment is an important factor leading to social selection processes. Social causation and social selection processes occur differently and with variable strength depending on the particular kind of mental health problem. Schizophrenia, including its premorbid stages, represents a psychiatric disorder with severe social or functional impairment which elicits a social selection mechanism during adolescence (Jones 1993). Disorders like schizophrenia start to affect performance and development often during school age and early occupational career, therefore negatively influencing school and job outcomes at a vulnerable stage. On the other hand, depression represents a psychiatric disorder for which social causation mechanisms would appear to operate. Significant effects on social functioning occur only at more severe stages, over shorter periods of time or later in life, after some social status has been achieved. Another factor might be found in the higher social tolerance for disorders like depression. Antisocial personality and substance use disorders might be placed somewhere in between schizophrenia and depression, but having greater support for social causation than social selection processes. As Dohrenwend et al. (1992) concluded, gender seems to be another important factor modifying the effect of social causation and social selection mechanisms. This might be explained through a gender effect on the age of onset and severity of symptoms for a specific disorder, through gender related vulnerabilities in school and job success.

Limitations on the validity and generalizability of the results exist for all three studies. Birtchnell (1971) looked only at male subjects and his retrospective design weakens the potential of determining causal relationships. Parent’s social class was assessed through their adult children and patient information was based on records, therefore reducing the validity of both SES and psychiatric diagnosis. The
Dohrenwend et al. (1992) study was limited by their cross-sectional design and, as pointed out by Goldmann (1994), their simple theoretical prediction model, which might not fully apply to the complex dynamics between ethnic disadvantage, social class and mental health. Ethnic disadvantage, as for North African-born Israelis, would have to exist with a similar weight throughout all social strata, which might not be the case, and three levels of educational status may represent only a crude indicator of social class. Timms (1996) investigation is limited by the psychiatric assessment, the definition of impairment and in the restriction to male subjects.

**Conclusions**

Integrating the results of these three studies leads us to assume complex mechanisms of both social causation and social selection processes influenced by characteristics of the specific mental health problem and additional factors like gender and birth cohort. Those models with specific psychiatric disorders influencing both social selection as well as social causation processes might help us decide whether the design of our investigations is able to control for the processes significant for the disorder being studied.

We conclude that social selection processes would not represent a major confounder of the observed causal pathway from environment to antisocial behavior and substance abuse. This supports the focus on the assessment of neighborhood factors in the PHDCN. The question is, as West (1991) argues, whether health selection is worth studying at all. Still, historical, structural and economic changes in populations lead to changes in the dynamics and magnitude of causal mechanisms. We think of changing opportunities and ways of entering careers, decline in public education, high degrees of residential segregation (with high indices of concentrated poverty), widening economic disparity, changing welfare regulations and poor quality of nonparental child care in this regard. These potential influences on social selection still should be...
incorporated in a study of antisocial behavior and substance use disorder. The papers reviewed here show which design features are important. Processes developing over longer periods of time can be described with more power through longitudinal designs. Information on longitudinal patterns of social environment includes an assessment of social class and ethnic origin of parents and an assessment of education, occupation and interpersonal social environment (including marriage) of the participants. The definition of parental social class and the age at which a child participant achieves her own social class are challenges in a longitudinal design.

For the PHDCN much effort has been placed in measuring the social organization of neighborhoods, and tracking of the participants over time. There is an ongoing effort to increase information being gathered, such as retrospective assessment of all earlier places of residences and schools attended. Assessing the history of the individuals’ changing environments will help to control selective social processes. But the goal of a study like the PHDCN does not purely focus on the detection and description of all underlying social mechanisms. Research in Public Health, like the PHDCN, produces data that can be applied to reduce morbidity or mortality and to promote health in a given society. Future application of the PHDCN is aimed at producing knowledge on how to transform social environments in a manner that promotes health and reduces the prevalence of antisocial behavior and substance use disorder. Thus, there is a bias towards favoring social causation mechanisms. Results from a limited but salient review of existing studies provides some support for this point of view.
Figure 2. Observed Relationships between the Prevalence of Schizophrenia and Substance Use Disorder and Socioeconomic Status

after Dohrenwend et al., Science, 1992, 255, 946-952
Figure 1. Predicted Relationship between the Prevalence of Psychopathology and Socioeconomic Status for Social Causation and Social Selection Models

Social Causation

- socially advantaged group
- socially disadvantaged group

Social Selection
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**Notes**

1 The paper has been presented at the NIJ conference honoring the research career of Albert J. Reiss, Jr. at Rutgers University, August 1997

2 Changes in the causes of schizophrenic-like illnesses should be considered. In the 19th century infectious and nutritional causes were predominant causes among new hospital admissions. By the 20th century many of these causes had been controlled leaving a heritable form of disorder as the major etiology among first admission cases.
Chapter 7
Authority, Loyalty, and Community Policing
Peter K. Manning

Prologue

In July, 1998 (as the chapter was being re-written), published rumours anticipated the imminent firing or resignation of Chief W. of Western P.D. (a pseudonym). He was expected to leave office before the August primary elections when the Mayor and City Council would stand for re-election. In mid-July, the local newspaper reported Chief W's resignation and retirement as of August first.

W. was hired by a local College to teach in a COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services)-funded training program. Other changes resulted. Captain C., head of West precinct, was named Acting Chief. A pro-community policing Lieutenant was promoted to Captain and named head of the West Precinct. Captain C. first agreed to be a candidate for Chief and then withdrew his name and retired.

Previously, in March, 1998, a Black, crime-focused former chief of a southern city, Mr. S., was named Chief. He removed CP officers from territorial assignments, put 28 officers "back on the streets," emphasized crime-focused policing, and the need for full patrol throughout the city. S. is then criticized by neighborhood associations in the press. In that same month, a Federal Jury ordered the city to pay 12 million dollars to the family of Mr. A, a mentally ill black man who died in custody in Western in the previous year.

Introduction

Albert J. Reiss Jr., in a series of brilliant and original essays on police organization (Bordua and Reiss, 1966, 1967; Reiss and Bordua 1967 and in The Police and the Public 1971), displayed conceptual and theoretical sophistication and elaborated and refined his ideas with detailed, rich and focused empirical
research (Black and Reiss, 1967). Reiss also shaped field methods for police studies, linking organizational analysis with detailed and structured fieldwork utilizing several interrelated techniques (Reiss, 1971; 1968.). His work explicated the fundamental interrelated problems of policing- sustaining the mandate of an ecologically dispersed inspectorial bureaucracy dispensing potentially fatal force while managing internal command compliance. Elaborating and specifying the problematics of legitimating command with the implied, subjective, interpersonal and situated nature of orders, Reiss set forth a formidable agenda research that stimulated 30 years of research.

Reiss argued that the police problem is connecting performance expectations, technology, and supervision within organizational context with interorganizational relationships in a chaotic, turbulent external environment. The compliance problem is two-sided- managing compliance from publics while sustaining the capacity to mobilize work effort. Historically, Anglo-American societies have sought to insulate the police from alternative sources of influence through various social and political mechanisms (Bordua and Reiss 1966), while police command have emphasized close scrutiny and supervision of officers. This salutary combination has rarely been achieved in practice.

The nature of compliance and legitimacy during transition is explored here in a case study of community policing in Western (a pseudonym). Reform and reorganization, including four chiefs in seven years, continues in Western. This is not a study of implementation or of reform’s failure, it is an analysis of the phenomenological bases for policing. More external support and resources, better training, more sophisticated leadership and imagination would not have altered the story. The evidence is clear and demonstrates the rhetorical character of community policing and its ephemeral and often non-existent reality on the ground (Greene, 1998, Rosenbaum 1994). The aim here is to explain the social bases of loyalty and commitment within policing, not why or whether "community policing" succeeds or fails.
The patrol officer's role entails handling situational contingencies, and from time to time it requires the fine dissembling skills of an actor. The extent to which these skills actually exist is an empirical question (Bayley and Bittner, 1984, Bayley and Garofolo, 1991, Mastrofski, 1995, forthcoming), and whether community policing alters interactional styles remains an open question. The vicissitudes of police encounters with strangers is an abiding theme in the patrol segment's oral culture. Consider the following depiction (1971: 3) Patrol work usually begins when a patrolman moves onto a social stage with an unknown cast of characters. The settings, members of the cast, and the plot are never quite the same from one time to the next. Yet the patrolman [sic] must be prepared to act in all of them.

Regardless of the dynamics of police-citizen interactions, they are typically of short duration, problematic, and banal rather than dramatic crime-focused confrontations (Rubinstein, 1973). The law remains an important resource shaping interactions, as do common status, gender, and class-based differences. Communicational skills, the craft of the work, remain essential to interactions, whether mildly contentious, information-seeking or hostile (Mastrofski, 1995). Given the control theme of police work, police will generally act to sustain a focused definition of the situation (Reiss, 1971:3), and to control its contours.

How do patrol officers cope with changing authority and role when the organization is shifting its bases of legitimacy? The analysis, cast in an organizational framework, explores the problematics of policing when change affects both the internal and external dimensions of policing. An organizational reform such as community policing presents officers with self-presentational and teamwork dilemmas, such as the nature of teamwork, loyalty (to whom), and primary audience(s). Granted that "teamwork" in the face to face sense is rare, the symbolic issues, those of loyalty, significant others, and performance management remain regardless of the dynamics or frequency of such encounters.
The Work: Drama and Routines

Patrolling, according to Reiss, is a particular kind of problematic performance, the understanding of which calls for close examination of organizational grounds of work. Occupational routines and roles emerge within tacit constraints, and the adagio between performance and normative organizational constraints is ever lively. Police work, no less than other work, is shaped by well-established occupational routines (Bordua and Reiss 1966: 68). Routines, a reflection of occupational and organizational processes, when repeatedly played, selectively shape occupational roles, and constrain the realization of performances. This investigation of the consequences of organizational change in policing seeks to uncover the mechanisms and behaviours facilitating or impeding the realization of roles via occupational routines. This question is embedded in the success or failure of a reform, but exists in all organizations, regardless of their overt stability.

Occupational routines are linked rather distantly in policing to sentiments of honour and duty that are publicly believed to connect roles and structure. The practice of policing is often boring, dirty, frustrating and tedious, but it can also be exhilarating, exciting, passionate and elevating. The contrast between front and back stages versions of the work is always a potential source of tension. The violent and honourable aspects of policing are archaic in many respects, linked to medieval ideas and the military. Traditional in their public values, the police contrast with more mundane occupations. They contain dramatic potential insofar as they are a violent, quasi-sacred, occupation in a secularized world (Manning, 1977). Yet, much of the modern world denies the validity of these claims, seeing policing as mere 'service' to be managed, customer-oriented and market-driven, concerned with their job conditions and pay, and resistant to public accountability.

While symbolic resources supporting the claim to legitimacy may be abundant, and violence stands
as a remedy, the absence of violence is generally sought (Klockars, 1996). Police appeal to signs that enhance conformity—the flag, city and state symbols; they conceal actions inconsistent with moral circumspection, and maintain highly stylized routines for interacting with the public, suspects, victims, and the media. (Black and Reiss, 1970 Mastrofski, 1995). They emphasize through these routines claims for honourable and dutiful character. The police are constrained, as are other occupations, to perform their roles in accord with principles that pattern the realization of their dramatic potential. These constraints, the outlines of their mandate, change as the meanings of violence, crime and fear of crime change.

Police command draws on traditional charismatic authority and rational legal authority. These are often in tension, yet police command is little studied (Boruda and Reiss 1966:68). Magenau and Hunt (1989: 547) remark "...surprisingly little attention has been given to understanding the process by which police roles are shaped." Command decisions broadly shape work, and this study intends to highlight how command decisions during a reform altered patrol routines and roles.

Policing as Team Performance

Policing on the ground is a performance by loosely connected teams who must rely on and engender deference and demeanor from strangers in both public and private spaces. Policing is an individual and collective performance or "show" based in face to face interaction, that relies heavily upon public deference. The public, non-police "audience," seen from the police perspective, varies widely, is unpredictable, and yet essential to success. Police are a "service" organization with a "people work" technology, whose organizational boundaries and authority require as much or more resources to maintain as do "law enforcement" or "protecting and serving." The primary arena for marking boundaries and setting vertical and horizontal alignments is public-police encounters. An infrastructure, material resources, personnel, management skills, and organizational strategies and tactics are also required. These, taken
together, make possible the concrete enactment of the mission, and the symbolization of the mandate.

Policing is a quasi-entrepreneurial role, based only partially on actual cooperative teamwork. Teamwork is a rather tenuous idea in policing because of the ecologically dispersed nature of the work, and the substitution of communications technology for close interpersonal supervision (Jermeir and Berkes, 1979). Teamwork is a joint performance by individuals who cooperate to stage a routine and maintain a projected definition of the situation. It is threatened by miscues and responses to failed or potentially failed (collective) impression management. "Team" and "teamwork" are performative terms, not functional descriptions of the bases for agreement on purpose or even the means of sustaining an imagery. These minimal requirements for interaction do not imply mutual orientation to a shared goal or purpose, and while situationally constrained to carry off and interaction, a situated performance does not necessarily serve to achieve an organizational objective or goal. The constraints of teamwork are situated and context-bound.

Teammates rather more commonly attempt to achieve the impression that they are achieving certain ends rather than to achieve ends (1959: 250-1 Davis, 1987). Teammates are reciprocally dependent even though they may not be familiar with each other: [a teammate is] "someone whose dramatic cooperation one is dependent upon in fostering a given definition of the situation." (1959: 79). A team can easily misrepresent matters to others, but will be hard-pressed to sustain this misrepresentation amongst themselves (1959: 82-83). Teammates differ in many respects - in trustworthiness, in control over the collective performance, in their interactional roles, but they are nevertheless obligated to avoid "false notes," follow the team's definition of the situation, and avoid sanctioning teammates before an audience. The drama of life, seen in team performance, creates constraints which nevertheless may be violated intentionally or unintentionally. Secrets may be betrayed or simply given.

The rhetorical elevation of the citizen to a "partner" or a member of the team colluding with police
in the interests of mutual benefit, the identification involved in "co-production of order," prioritizing work and engaging in mutual problem-solving, may shift the salience of the citizenry. Interactions place citizens variously- as teammates with the police, co-conspirators, when victims or witnesses to crime, as an audience, when cooperating with police, or as a hostile and uncooperative other. The undifferentiated public are a significant audience not seen, or served directly, either as victims, witnesses or offenders encountered as a result of reactive, radio-dispatched, work. The audience is more diffuse and appears in new settings while interaction arises around new problems. The individual officer may no longer be expected to take control or solve a problem. Interpersonal tactics and routines required when intervening and controlling, or reacting to a complaint, differ from those in which the police are but one party in a negotiation, or in a meeting-problem definition-session. From an organizational point of view, as Boruda and Reiss note (1967), the management of interaction sustains the boundaries of the organization as well as marks the limits on political legitimacy. Yet, policing displays a fundamental irony: the police enact a collective drama which they can only partially script, cast and organize. They are personally wedded to an entrepreneurial, "individualistic" model of the work except in crisis, and rarely actually work in teams. Except in rare public order situations such as riots, disasters and rebellion, "policing" as social regulation or governmental social control, is performed by individual officers in complex public and private situations in which the necessary public cooperation essential to sustain a routine may be absent, minimal or dubious. Performances may fail, and fronts may not adequately be combined with setting and routines to sustain a single focused definition of the situation. In many respects, the dominant view of police work is represented in the ideology of the patrol officers- "police work is on the streets." (Holdaway, 1996). Implicit demarcation of team ("us") and others ("them") is a fundamental division in the drama of work (Hughes, 1958), yet always somewhat problematic. Police emphasize symbolic dependence on others, symbolized by
trust in the context of work uncertainty and "...common allegiance between colleagues." (Holdaway, 1996).

More educated officers are perhaps less likely to stereotype and divide the world in binary categories, but the rhetoric remains strong and permeates the oral story-telling culture. Clearly, the collective drama, as seen by police supervisors and top management, may require new skills.

Thus, performances are tied to audiences and successful performances require the management of information, settings, and fronts. The police performative task is complicated by the several factors noted above, especially teamwork, as well as the 'audience' problem. Organizational change can interpose new routines, roles and audiences, all of which affect teamwork.

One source of change is "community policing." The dynamics to which this case study is directed are produced by the local version of transition from "professional policing" to "community policing." The extent to which this local version fits some analytic model requires further research and evaluation. This is not a study of community policing, but of managing the police role.

The officer's role in a community policing scheme is to act as relatively visible, available, watcher, based nominally in an area, and to represent dedifferentiated social control. The officer strives to prevent and control crime and produce order-maintenance. The community, for its part, is expected to provide problem concerns, information, support and feedback. While the community (undefined) should filter and screen problems to focus police actions, the police are expected to respond to citizens' concerns whether expressed at meetings, rallies, in person or by phone. A variety of strategies and tactics can be used to distribute services. Community Policing advocates reject the mobile, shift-based, specialized, distant and crime-focused mode of policing.

**Methods of Study and Setting**

The study, part of a program of training, research and evaluation of community policing in some
seven sites in a large Midwestern state, was funded by the Community Oriented Police Services Agency (COPS) in March, 1996 and continued through the end of 1998. In early 1997, two graduate students observed in four designated "community policing areas" (two in the East and two in the West precinct); gathered workload data from calls and logbooks, and studied workload. Several focus groups composed of officers discussed issues of community policing, labour-management and performance evaluation. These were held with top command [2 sessions] sergeants [2] and officers [5]). Interviews have been done with 1/2 the sergeants (10), all the lieutenants (4) and captains (3), and a now retired Captain who managed the introduction of "laptops" in the fall of 1996. Assessing the role of crime analysis and geo-mapping in the context of community policing was also done. In spring, 1997, a survey of officers' attitudes toward community policing was conducted.

Western, a city of some 127,000 in a metropolitan area of nearly 400,000, employs some 349 officers (14.9% minority; 73.4% men), most of whom were hired 20-25 years ago. The department hired 90 new officers in the last few years and expects to loose some 20-25% of the force in the next ten years. Patrol officers cover 20 districts, working ten hour shifts and rotating by squads through the midnights, afternoons, days sequence. This change to ten/four contrasts with the previous pattern of patrol officers working 14 districts in 8 hour shifts. The CP officers, whether in a dedicated unit or when assigned to teams, remain on the patrol strength. The imagery of police work is the "professional model" in Western, and it is shared by most of the patrol officers and sergeants, and some of the command officers, including the Deputy Chief. Frequently in disagreement with Chief W., the Deputy is an appointee of a previous Chief.

The city has minority population of slightly over a quarter of the total, a large industrial and educational base, and is a center of government. Long a center of the auto industry, it is known as a "union
town" with a strong UAW presence. A large University is located nearby and a community college is in the
City. It is a highly educated population with a varied minority population of over 18 per cent
African-American, and over 7% other minorities, most of whom are Hispanic. Its official crime rate
dropped modestly (4%) in 1996, and its murders in the 7 years range from 9 to 16. It is governed by an
elected Mayor and area-based elected City Council. Chief W., a white male with 29 years experience in
office some 6 years, has a master's degree in criminal justice. The last five years, and especially the last two
years, have been punctuated by incidents, political protest and almost constant reorganization (see footnote
2).

Reorganization in Western

The reorganization story takes place in three acts. In act one, Chief W set the reorganization in
motion and created a dedicated CP unit. Tensions and envy were associated with this division of labour,
and the CP unit was disbanded in 1996. In the second act, CP was replaced by a team policing approach.
The third act, foreshadowed in the prologue, features the resignation of the Chief and the hiring of his
replacement. We begin at act one.

In 1991, shortly after being named, Chief W. re-organized Western. To set reform in motion, Chief
W. appointed a study group with officers from several ranks. He followed with an implementation group
(mostly higher command officers) charged with carrying out the changes recommended by the study group.
Several training sessions (1-2 days) introduced the concept of community policing to officers. An advocate
of Trojanowicz-style community policing, he created a dedicated community policing unit, a network
center, and targeted a few areas of the city for community policing experiments. Plans to further
decentralize command began with the opening of the West precinct in the spring of 1996. The East Precinct
is presently in the headquarters building, but has been scheduled to move into a separate facility for the last
three years (In December, 1998, renovations were unfinished).

This first reorganization, partially based on financial pressures and the loss of some 35 officers through retirement in recent years, created a set of tensions and declining morale within the force. Sharp conflict between patrol officers and CP officers arose, punctuated by discrimination and affirmative action suits and a nasty racist drawing displayed on a bulletin board in a patrol office. The conflict was based in part on stereotypic ideas and beliefs—the notion that CP officers shirked work, went to amusement parks with kids on duty, attended neighborhood meetings and ate cookies and drank punch, and were not crime-oriented. The "road officers" saw themselves as the backbone of the department, overworked and underrewarded, and at the front line of crime control. The work of the CP officers, they felt, was not only counter-productive and irrelevant socially, but their absence from the patrol rota meant additional work for the present patrol. Other sources of conflict were more accurate. CP officers were seen as autonomous (they set their hours) and as carrying a low workload. The CP officers were a political force, or clique, who had the Chief's support. A rallying point for opposition to community policing was the national success of one CP officer in an experimental area in the city in the first few years of the reform. The sergeant working there was personable, immensely successful and popular in the neighborhood. He was featured in several national television and radio programs, was referred to in local newspapers as a success story, and symbolized visible accomplishment for community policing. In summary, in a theme that remains viable in Western, the dominant political segment in Western, "road officers," see real police work as crime-related, and reject CP as non crime-focused. They denigrate CP and ex-CP officers. They find little of (what they imagine to be) team work that is consistent with their (ideological) construction of police work.

In 1995, having experimented with community policing officers (CPOs) in a separate unit with supervising sergeants for some 3-4 years, Chief W. made further changes. The community policing unit and
"CP" (the named position) were removed from the organizational charts. Key loyalists, and community police advocates, sergeants and lieutenants, were promoted. After another self-study in 1994-5, Chief W. announced yet another reform: team policing. The team concept (area based) became the community policing vehicle in the spring 1996. The Chief remained committed to a modified community policing approach.

In late 1995, team policing was added to the usual reactive approach. It was the public face of a strategy of decentralized, citizen-guided, service-oriented policing. The new plan, both the changes and the unchanged factors, played a role in the resultant drama.

While some changes were underway, other structures remained unaltered. The communications system of the department, allocating and prioritizing 911 calls, was unchanged. The 911 telephone system, in which Western was a partner, a patchwork of several police departments and small towns in the region, did not include departments in the region who refused to participate. Fire and EMS dispatching in Western remained a separate, uncoordinated function. Dispatching practices, informal understandings, and priorities were unaltered.

Other technological innovations are in progress. Criminal records are available in several locations via terminals, motorists can make accident reports in either precinct, and laptop computers are being introduced to provide direct digital communication with records and other units. Each precinct issues lists of officers by team and shift with voice mail numbers, and sergeants use voice mail to send group messages to a team, for example, or an entire shift. A "hot line" and a media information line are updated daily to include information on criminal incidents, community meetings, and current police issues. Lists of officers in teams and neighborhoods were printed and distributed, but lead to complaints because reassignments of officers and foul-ups in the voice mail system made them quickly obsolete. Where officers were successful,
the associations wanted them to stay, but they were reassigned. In spite of uneven performance of the voice
mail in the West precinct (It's never worked...." said the Captain in charge) it increases some sergeants' workloads because they receive direct calls from citizens which they then assign.

The teams were assigned to fixed areas within selected precincts. The two precincts, East and West, had some control over resources and decisions) had ten teams, and were headed by a Captain and two lieutenants. Teams, not shifts, were to become the working basis for local policing. Ten teams of officers were formed in each precinct. Officers assigned to West enjoy a remodeled, light and airy, former school with a basketball court, offices, meeting and conference rooms and computer facilities.

The 20 problem-solving teams include officers formerly assigned to the community policing unit, traffic, K-9 duties, the Detective Bureau (DB), and patrol. The formerly designated community police officers retain the CPO title. In the East Precinct, six teams have at least one CPO, one has two, and three have none. In the West, two teams have two, one has one, and five have none. These latent identities continued to be a basis for reference and interaction. One sergeant heads each team, but does not serve on the same shift as all team members. For example, the designated head of the team, a sergeant, may be on "days" and have only one "teammate" officer on the same shift since the other team members are on afternoons or nights. Sgts. are expected to hold team meetings at least once a month and officers are paid overtime to attend if off duty at the time.

Some reorganization of the other officers was attempted. Detectives, once housed only in headquarters near City Hall, were now precinct-based, and assigned nominally to teams, but retain considerable independence. Special Operations Division (SOD), Criminal Sexual Assault; and Crimes Against Persons units remain in headquarters, as do K-9, the regional ("Metro") drug squad, and the administrative component (records, personnel, the jail, Chief's office, and Internal affairs). Very telling is
The prestige and considerable independence of SOD, which remains outside the team-based structure and symbolizes active crime control, raids, warrant service, surveillance and dramatic interventions. Special ad hoc squads, composed of officers who are rotated through, operate under acronyms such as "COPS," still exercise extra-territorial authority, operate across the city, carrying out raids, serving warrants, making arrests and investigations. The traffic division was particularly resilient to being disbanded as they had ceremonial and control functions as a result of the proximity of the State Capital building and grounds. These specialized units work at their own agendas, at their own speed, place and time, with no coordination with the CP teams. The "team policing" idea was operational only among patrol officers, and no formal coordination existed between investigations, special weapons and tactics groups, or detective work the teams.

**Tensions in Reform in Western**

There are organizational consequences of establishing team policing in Western, several of which consequences for officers and supervisors. In Western, problem-solving and teamwork are rationalized as the basis for re-organization. Yet, the basic notion- that policing is individual, discretionary, practical, direct problem-management in a face to face or emergent tactical solution, punctuated by the occasional risky chase or confrontation- contrasts markedly with, and often may be in conflict with, group-based, mutually cooperative, teamwork seeking to prevent or ameliorate problems. This is true not only in real time terms, since officers may be involved in both potentially at a given time, but may affect long term personnel needs and resource allocation. Ethnographic evidence suggests that both practical and ideological constraints are operative.

Patrol officers perceive an increased burden of work as a result of the reorganization. In effect, since the team concept is overlaid on unmodified random patrol-based areas (defined initially by workloads), and
with equivalent or less support from specialized units, any problem-solving creates additional obligations, contingencies, and unrewarded responsibilities for officers. Conversely, CP is believed to withdraw some officers from "the road." As Chief W. noted dryly, "There is a perception of overwork out there....."  All officers are expected to answer calls and service uneven citizen demand. Officers expect each others to share the load, cover for them when they are out of service, and range widely within the city to pick up work if needed. While fewer officers are routinely on the road as a result of attrition, re-organization, and re-assignment, actual changes in demand or workload resulting from the reorganization of the last five years, is unknown.

Little training was given, and that which was provides no basis for systematic problem-solving, organizing, or meeting with neighborhood associations. Three days of training for community policing was given new officers in the local Academy, but none was given to serving officers. Yet, patrol officers are ware of command expectations that they should engage in proactive problem-solving and team activities. "Problem solving," using a SARA model or equivalent, the practical dynamics of joint or team policing, and crime prevention are only terms they have heard or read.

Regardless of the dominant patrol ideology described above, team policing caused reflection on old approaches to patrol- "push things around, move 'em out of your turf, clean up the work at the end of the shift." Problems were place-specific- one could push problems into another precinct, across the river; to a nearby Township, or to another district or beat. This worked Western because a freeway and a river divide the city (they are boundaries between East and West precinct); two radio channels; and demographic differences e.g., the per cent owner occupied housing is much higher in West. A senior patrol officer disagreed with this territorial strategy and claimed he did not want to "work for Atlas" (i.e. moving crime, people and problems around); he wanted to "work for Orkin" (the bug exterminator). He saw the job as
crime-control. Of course, the "Atlas Van lines" approach he attributed to team policing is consistent with the old notions of narrow responsibilities to maintain one's own turf and ignore displaced crime, or problems that transcend several districts.

Crime prevention, or community cooperation, was not discussed in focus groups, although the department has targeted several areas in the city for concentrated efforts—harassing prostitutes and drug dealers, and placing barriers to block access to streets to reduce traffic flow. These "crime-fighting" efforts and projects (usually targeting 'crack houses') of the "COPS" program (special task-forces in community-oriented projects) are governed by traditional tactics.

**Team Policing in Western**

The content of team policing as described in the focus groups and by our observers, is rather superficial. Some sergeants assign duties such as checking overnight parking violations when on nights (parking is prohibited on the street for snow removal); check for truants around schools on days; most sergeants do not specify duties, so officers adjust tactically as described below. Many of the problem-solving activities are carried out by lieutenants who are given problems by the Chief's office to look into (a fairly standard procedures in a police department), shifted up to them by sergeants, or developed in responses to calls to them from citizens (usually community worthies and activists).

Occasionally, someone from the Mayor's office will call with a problem that needs addressing e.g. homeless or drunks approaching customers outside restaurants in a popular area of the city. In this sense, much problem-solving is ad hoc responses to current here and now problems or incidents, rather mimeing the SARA model, or responding to neighborhood problems. When officers did "problem-solving" it involved such things as watching a "crack house" to raid it, taking the keys from a drunken family so they would not drive, or getting a van owner not to park his van on the street. The reported content of community policing

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was strikingly thin, ad hoc, and undirected, and did not differ in substance, time frame, or outcomes from
the "business-as-usual" approach of patrol officers generally. Some further examples are given below.

Challenges to the Traditional Police Officer Role

The bases for the role are challenged, nevertheless, by reorganization, and stimulate counter-tactics
and adjustments designed to stabilize role relationships. Fieldwork in Western suggests that seven aspects
of the police officer and first line supervisor's role are made problematic by reorganization: a) changes in
routines b) altered socialization c) confused supervision and d) evaluation e) weakened teamwork f) new
patterns of job control and g) eroded loyalties. Recall that all police work is learned apprentice-like; it is a
craft with uncertain contours; styles and tactics vary widely and are accepted as such; and that personal
style, if any, emerges in a dialectic between past experiences such previous work, one's field training
officer, and current and past partners.

Routines The routines officers learn are formatted, metaphorically and literally, and serve to pin
down procedures in complex, interpersonal "people work." Through routines, officers manage to combine
autonomous action and avoid supervision. Routines, as Goffman (1959: 16) reminds us, coalesce in time
into a role, or set of audience (and performer) expectations associated with the social status. Learned often
through apprenticeships with a field training officer, the patrol role ideally fits the scenes, fronts and
settings in which it is manifest.

Some twelve core routines are practiced by officers in Western: making a traffic stop; a juvenile
stop; an arrest; a search of a car; a drug (or any other major crime) investigation; handling a domestic or
order disturbance (loud party, fight, neighborhood fight); searching for a missing person; interviewing and
questioning a person (victim, suspect, witness); intervening in a street fight; taking a report (stolen car,
missing person, burglary); making an inquiry via radio about a warrant, criminal record, or vehicle; and
going in and out of service (taking a break or finishing a shift). These are taught in the Academy and reviewed by FTOs (field training officers who ride with probationers).

Consider working traffic. Routines (and subroutines) for making a safe and effective traffic stop, checking operator's license, motor vehicle registration, and outstanding warrants; making a simple investigation; doing a breathalyzer, filling out a reports, and questioning suspects at an accident scene, are soon well known. These become the basis for characteristic strategies and tactics of interpersonal control, teamwork and impression management. Officers learn routines by observation, emulation and personal experimentation.

New routines are required by team policing. These include routines as organizing, planning, chairing and find a location for a meeting; mobilizing and nuturing a block club or neighborhood association; teaching a DARE class or giving a speech; answering questions about police policy and procedures, defining, analyzing, solving and tracking a social problem (especially one requiring paperwork and planning and defies immediate closure); networking with city agencies; working as a school officer; doing an analysis, including maps, of crime trends in an area; providing information to a neighborhood (e.g. via a newsletter, handout, or newspaper); advising citizens on the security of their homes, businesses and schools. None of these is explicitly taught to officers and they have had little if any opportunity to observe others performing them. They have few role models. This list is a speculative one, not based on observation of officers, or their stories.

Socialization. Western officers are subjected to a harsh, brief, and intense 16 week socialization in a regional Academy followed by apprenticeship learning. Young officers learn by adopting-stylistic variations, "dramatic realizations," that highlight activity with signs intended to confirm impressions the officer and teammates wish to convey [to an audience] (1959: 83). In many respects, one's partner, sergeant
and FTO (field training officer), are concrete models manifesting what "works" and why. These styles emerge pragmatically. Older officers don't want to be involved in CP activities, so younger officers are assigned initially to CP. The youngest and least experienced officers are given the undesirable assignments. Officers can apply for a different assignment every three months by union contract, but actual assignments are based on seniority. This means that it is relatively difficult to recruit officers into a unit if a sergeant is CP oriented.

While the content of the formal academy-training remains unchanged, and the new strategy has not been reflected in changes in specific on the job training in Western, ad hoc seminars and focus groups on performance evaluation, community and team policing, along with a series of incidents (see below), have heightened awareness and reduced morale. Command officers in private and the Plea for Justice group both question the adequacy of police training.

Rewards and Evaluations: What counts? Officers learn routines, strategies and tactics that comprise a style of work reflecting their assessment of what counts. "What counts" is not always counted, or recorded, nor easily counted, and it varies within and across squads and segments. In patrol, the focus is on handling the call load. The routines stand for active or reactive control: traffic stops, arrests, and other crime-related activities (Rubinstein 1973; Walsh 1985), punctuate the otherwise sporadic call load. What "counts," as Rubinstein (1973) and Van Maanen (1983) have exquisitely described, encourages officers to learn routines from other officers for accomplishing repetitive tasks. These emerge with practice, usually during field training, and are rewarded both informally and formally (Bayley and Bittner 1984; Mastrofski 1995).

An ex-Captain characterized practices prior to the Western reorganization: "We [patrol officers] know what counts, and we know how to do those things that count [traffic, etc.]. We go to a familiar fishing

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A Lieutenant said, "Officers don't like to just walk around and chat; they like it when it is: 'I talk, you listen....' Officers know how to make a stop, shake someone down [search them], make an arrest, or take someone to jail, but they are uneasy when the job is not control...." The official redefinition of patrol work from answering calls and random patrol to these routines plus problem-solving, team work and team meetings, means that team policing creates new expectations for filling time and uncertainty about what counts. Old routines no longer firmly undergird roles.

Clearly, changing routines affects what counts, unless sergeant and officer supervised are in tacit agreement about the extent of commitment to the team policing concept. Presently in Western evaluation criteria are uncertain. Formal consideration of modes of performance evaluation (what counts, why and how) are under way. At present, "team policing" emphasizes problem solving, but few sergeants have any grasp of it, how to teach or evaluate it. It has not been translated into clear expectations by supervisors.

Patrol practices and habits remain, and "crime" is the preferred focus, a source of risky activity and excitement. This would be true, regardless of the extent of implementation, because the changes destabilize basic patterns of routines, loyalty and audience.

**Supervision.** How is "what counts" translated in supervision? Past supervision by sergeants was based on a resource-exchange model of giving and receiving favours and mutually negotiated obligations between sergeants and officers (Van Maanen, 1983). Working on the same shift day after day, usually on the same precinct with the same partner, officers learn their Sergeant's expectations. The sergeant is a source of personalized accommodation to the authority structure of the organization (Van Maanen, 1983). Face-to-face supervision, decisions about assignments, the quality of paperwork, and one's "production," or activity, are done with a sergeant who rotates through the shift pattern with his or her squad. Supervision in Western has changed. As Reiss and Bordua noted (1967), a communications-based system of dispatching
and assignment alters supervision, emphasizing surveillance and correction, rather than direct guidance. Modern supervision is virtually always after the fact. Latent identities such as the ethnicity and gender of individuals holding sergeant and middle management ranks produce conflicts and status discrepancies. Several affirmative action and discrimination suits have been filed against the department. Presently, supervisors are ambivalent about the new organization and some are very negative (usually covertly). Their expectations of their officers and of themselves are unclear while officers are profoundly ambivalent about supervision, complaining both about the absence and the presence of sergeants. Officers serve now both a shift sergeant (some shifts do not have a sergeant, however) and a team sergeant. They may not experience, or rarely experience, routine, predictable face to face communication with their sergeants. There is no consensus among the sergeants about the new philosophy and re-organization plan, and they have no experience in group-problem solving. On the contrary, their experience, like those of their officers, has been individual problem solving with little direct help or supervision. Sergeants make assignments to individual officers as noted above, but no record is kept of cp projects, problem-solving activities, or outcomes.

Sergeants are unclear and confused by the idea of problem-solving. One sergeant refused to be directly involved in problem solving, especially in community meetings. He challenged the Lieutenant to order him to carry out community policing. "Order me.....tell me what to do." One sergeant said in a focus group meeting: "I have no idea what 'problem solving' means....how can I tell anyone how to do it?" On the other hand, some senior officers and a handful of sergeants are quite adept at public relations and problem-solving, develop and solve their own list of problems and report them to the newspapers and researchers.

One successful team-oriented sergeant works in the same area in which the previous heroic CP officer worked. In a focus group, he called himself a "shit magnet." He attracted a lot of work via phone and
voice mail, and learned how to distribute it. Sergeants and lieutenants who are apt problem solvers now have increased work loads and broader responsibilities. For the majority of officers, particularly those in the West precinct who lack sergeants who encourage teamwork or problem solving, it is police work as usual.

**Squads, Sergeants and Teamwork.** Joint collective action is quite rare. Often, if and when an officer requires assistance, it is forthcoming. It is a default option, since officers prefer to solve incidents, absent paperwork, and "return to service" (meaning being available for the next call, but in fact being "out of service" until then). The interdependence of officers is dramatized in public order and risky situations, especially when an officer in danger requires back-up or prompt assistance. Shift work, having squads headed by a sergeant rotate together through a predictable sequence, precinct-based patrol, and two person cars, all integrate and reinforce mutual concern and obligations.

Teamwork in community policing in Western is being redefined. Sergeants no longer share a shift with those they supervise. Supervisors may see officers face to face only at monthly team meetings. Lieutenants in the West precinct split days and nights rather than territories, while East lieutenants divide responsibilities territorially. While the idea of a team suggests leadership and direction, few (at least two in the East meet monthly with their teams) give explicit guidance or feedback. Many officers do not see the arrangement as "teamwork," because they to not share goals with other team members, or are just assigned to a "problem-solving team." The reported level of communication between team members varies from team to team. One sergeant keeps a "team book" in which problems are entered.

**Patterns of job control.** The focus of the patrol officer historically has been job control—defining and controlling the workload and the conditions of work defined fairly narrowly. In the last twenty years, police have unionized, typically with a patrol officers union and a middle management union (or sergeants and a second group composed of Lieutenants and equivalent). The union is a political means for maintaining job
Current union contracts that stipulate modes of transfer and promotion are profound operational obstacles to policing reform in Western. The union-driven personnel policies of the Department are based on contracts which define how positions will be filled. Some have been modified as a result of negotiations in the past few years between the city and the patrol officers' union. Contractual arrangements shape authority significantly. For example, 80% of the designated community police officers were "new hires" in 1997. Officers may change divisions every three months, and pick assignments, transferring in and out by seniority, by union contract. Transfers and assignments cannot be controlled by sergeants and officers can transfer from teams or areas. Union rules give preferences to senior officers. Officers who do not like their sergeant (team head) can transfer to another precinct and/or division. Clearly, these factors mean that most CPOs will be young and inexperienced and that high turnover is likely in team policing areas.

Loyalty To whom is an officer most loyal? The loyalty question highlights the performer's "expressive responsibility," or obligation to share the team's definition of the situation (Goffman, 1959: 79). The problem of loyalty remains. Loyalty and teamwork are traditionally linked (at least situationally). A team as a problem-solving and interactional unit is problematic under re-organization. Questions of loyalty, symbolizing the personalized form of authority suffuse modern policing (Bordua and Reiss 1966). The loyalty question arises when traditional modes of interacting that produce personal loyalty, such as roll calls, joint work on incidents, exchange of work duties arising from rotating shift work, and tolerance, are changed by new work routines. Loyalty, like trust, and the significant audiences outlined above, is configured something like an onion, but is reinforced in interactions.

In summary, these constraints lead to dilemmas of the work- new routines have emerged. Tactics for coping with uncertainties while maintaining the appearance of loyalty and compliance emerged during the
Tactics Designed to Cope with the Dilemmas

Officers in Western manage re-organization in several ways. These are coping mechanisms for sustaining the show (Goffman, 1959: 34), and strategies for managing organizational change.

Redefinition. Some officers redefine the job using their present skills expecting that will produce predictable results. They patrol and continue to answer calls for service, but add a routine to make visible their problem-solving activities. One officer drove to the gates of a large factory, parked and observed the prostitutes and made arrests when they propositioned men coming off the night shift. Some officers embed old practices in new visible activities and apply new labels. "COPS" teams plan busts of drug houses, and sweeps and neighborhood stops. They focus on visible crime control, symbolized by street-based drug dealers, crack houses, or prostitutes; on matters they can handle using the old routines. They can devise, execute, and complete their strategy without fear of dependency on citizens. Ironically, they call on previous forms of authority to mobilize actions, now under the CP rubric. This is viewed by supervisors (Lieutenants and Captains) as part of the exchange- "....give 'em something that's fun in exchange for doing the community policing." (Western Captain). In other words, some conflation of the two forms of policing occurs in a given role performance.

Creative Paper Work and Self-Presentation Some officers take a few inquiries in a neighborhood and label it a project, and continue to mention it to their sergeant as an aspect of community policing. One officer spent several days trying to convince an elderly alcoholic man not to drive his car. These paper projects were never realized, but could be reported on at team meetings if they were held—Like drug officers whose work is largely invisible unless they make an arrest, officers could continue to construct a burden of mythical "problem-solving." Other officers mention what will be done (future projects being discussed).
Minimalization Most officers carry out minimal team duties, seeing problem-solving as an extra burden in addition to their current pressing obligations—answering calls, controlling crime, keeping juveniles and petty criminals in line. Fielding (1994) shows that CP officers are caught with a fundamental dilemma because they hold role definitions provided by their colleagues and traditional policing, answering calls and keeping their numbers up, but they are expected to attend meetings, call on shop keepers, show the flag by parking the vehicle and walking, problem-defining.

Work as usual: no team; no problems In the sergeants' focus groups, only two admitted to understanding problem solving. One reported actively solving problems himself and did not give examples of how he assigned problems to others, supervised them, or evaluated results. The officers' focus group produced one example of problem-solving, and the remainder of the officers could give no examples, or named complaints passed on from their sergeants or the Chief's office as "problems" they were expected to solve. The concept of a team had little reality to them, and it appears to be in a formative stage in Western. Sergeants in Eastern precincts used the overtime money set aside for "shift meetings" to pay straight overtime, saying that it was needed from crime control activities. Problem solving, when done, is defined as residual; a label for a variety of work arising from sources other than radio calls.

Keeping Busy In a given shift, 3-5 officers are working on a precinct covering some ten beats. Practically speaking, they cover the entire precinct because calls are dispatched by precinct, and officers cover calls out of their areas, back up officers, and fill in on other districts when work is heavy. As Reiss (1971:99) found 25 years ago, areal based policing is an administrative fiction—officers in Western are more off their designated districts than on them. The successful team sergeants, those who organized responses to problems, retained the old territorial notion of policing—"keep 'em (Lieutenants) happy and off our backs" and "push things around." Patrol officers easily maintain a workload, or avoid it, depending style; absent
assignments there is little time left for CP.

The most interesting aspect of this ethnographic material is that the old forms are being used to display CP, e.g., keeping busy, showing activity, keeping your head down, and sergeants form tacit collusions with officers not to "penetrate" the facade of apparent CP work. The tactics of patrol officers and supervisors' countermoves reproduce the game of supervision and control in most departments.

Conclusion

Changes in the organization of resources, the strategies of policing, especially implementing the team concept of territorial responsibility, and altering the role of the officer, are attempts at major organizational change.

The analysis began with a story describing the resignation of Chief W, appointment of Chief S, and suggested subsequent re-organization of policing in Western. This story ended the period of reorganization and reform that began almost ten years ago, when the Chief prior to Chief W retired. This punctuated a longer period of crisis and reorganization in a department that remains in flux. Currently, in late 1998, public enthusiasm for community policing in Western, remains, as does divided support amongst top command. Patrol officers view the recent changes mandated by the new Chief, more emphasis on crime control, patrol, and putting more officers on the streets, with optimism. Union constraints on officer assignment and contractual provisions for officers to make choices play an important role in Western, because they shape the allocation of personnel and the "fit" of officers to role, territory and audience. This tension surrounding the content of the police role is exacerbated by union rules and personnel practices that set the job-control interests of officers against the interests of middle management and top command. The divided community and City Council opinion about policing in Western is less severe than in many cities, and violence, drugs and gang activity are quite modest. The Western department is facing a major
demographic transition as the large hiring cohorts of 20-25 years ago depart and new officers are slowly being hired. The absence of new hires due to budget restraints and crises has had a morale effect.

The critical incidents facing the Chief and the Department in the last two years, the lively and active community pressure group, "Plea for Justice," a sustained presence (stable leadership, media attention, two marches to City hall) for almost two years, a factor in the resignation of the Chief, are quite significant in this case. The gassing of union workers in a strong union town in May 1997 was the turning point in police community relations and what might be called the "high politics of policing." In the late summer of 1997, the Mayor won a resounding electoral victory, two the opponents of the ex-Chief did not run for re-election, and one was defeated. By July 1998, considerable confusion exists about organizational mission, mandate, and roles in the WPD. Chief S. introduced changes and reorganization, and further uncertainty - he promoted one lieutenant (a strong supporter of CP, and university graduate) to Captain and appointed him to head West Precinct, forced the resignation of the former deputy Chief and accepted the retirement of a Captain, and removed the highest ranking female, a captain, from head of a precinct and moved her to administration. Three of the four captains, four of the ten lieutenants, and two sergeants were educated at the nearby University, and are advocates of CP. The new crime-oriented chief is surrounded by command personnel who still favour CP-oriented reforms.

Connections between external and internal dynamics are revealed in the ways in which roles and routines are linked to organizational authority and loyalty. Community policing, in many respects a movement to reduce social distance between police and public, may have the somewhat predictable consequence of lessening loyalty and weakening commitment to organizational norms (Bordua and Reiss, 1966, Bordua, 1968). Shifting bases of authority are evident.

This is a rather stark picture of a "reform," and it is quite easy to dismiss it as just another picture of
failed program, or a transition that did not occur. Attempts at change, accompanied by presentational strategic rhetoric, have been a visible part of policing in the United States, and police patrol has flexibly adapted. The story here is not about the failure of a reform or of a transition, it is about how such reforms, when viewed "from the ground up" are both predictable and common, and the officer is still solving problems on the front line regardless. The difference with respect to the adaptation and tactics of the officers is that community policing adds work and vague expectations, and comes at a time when in general demand for services is increasing, technological means to monitor and evaluate officers are more prevalent, and the police mandate seems to be broadening to include fear of crime and quality of life issues as well as crime control. Specific changes in Western are notable, however.

Command authority is questioned in Western. Changes in the work, namely added routines and obligations, in supervision, in the kinds of teamwork expected, the focus of evaluation and command expectations and strategies, blur traditional bases of authority, and the tacit bases for teamwork. The bases of command authority are shifting and unclear, especially with four serving chiefs in less than 8 years. Further, the implementation of the program, including the absence of problem-solving role-definition, the lack of organization of personnel within the team (shift differences), and unresolved differential attachment to the philosophy of CP by some sergeants and command officers, adds additional unclarity.

The boundaries of the police officers' role are blurred in Western. The team structure, combined with proactive policing and problem-solving emphasis, left the sources of the officer's authority in audience terms unclear. From colleague (Cain, 1972) to team orientation and from team to community orientation is a transition in audience routines and role-conception. Familiar connections between routines, roles and status are made problematic, rendering also the moral burdens of mutual obligation between team members and between the team and audiences also unclear.
The police officer's personal authority is modified. These changes in Western made abundantly clear that the officer is not obeyed because of "legal authority," symbolized by uniform, badge, gun, and equipment, but because of interpersonal presence, the support and concern of the public, and the lurking presence of other officers. Such interdependencies are rarely admitted and are associated with cognitive changes in the definitions of the public as well.

The authority of supervisors is questioned. Although the traditional bureaucratic police role implies discretion, freedom of choice, and options in controlling disorder, matters highly dramatized in the occupational ideology of the patrol segment, traditional patrol work is governed by a concrete logic of the work that emphasizes job control, security, protection of personal time, and freedom from close supervision. On the other hand, the denial of dependency, the wish to be commanded (at least indirectly) and subject to clearly stated and applied performance measures and evaluation, and efforts to control and limit the level of effort, are central concerns of patrol officers (Hughes, 1958). Organizational changes which emphasize initiative in problem definition and solution, team work with other officers, and proactive elaboration of the role, all blur the outlines of supervision and the capacity (including well-developed and understood tactics) to control workload, and minimize or avoid work.

This analysis suggests the need to examine the impact of organizational change and transformation on the instrumental, goal-attaining aspects of work, as well as the expressive and symbolic aspects (Barley, 1990; Zubhoff, 1986; Manning, 1992a; Thomas, 1994). The precise nature of changes in team loyalty, dramaturgical discipline, and circumspection as a result of the (on-going) reform are unclear. Organizational authority and supervision are being altered and the definition of a team is being nominally refashioned. These interpersonal adjustments and choices, perhaps emerging as patrol tactics, are indications of structural change. Whereas in the past, routines, teamwork and the game of avoiding
supervision were learned and simulated by watching others work, formally defined teamwork alters this.

The patrol officer's role in an inspectorial bureau, where officers work alone together, is a anchoring point of the organization. CP, a social reform movement that aims to reduce social distance between the police and the publics they serve, raises questions of performance, teamwork and loyalty (to whom?). Even ill-conceived reforms target some practices, raise reflections upon practice, and disequilibrates sentiments and exchange patterns sustaining formal institutional patterns for patrol officers and sergeants. Technology, organizational routines and roles, supervision and teamwork, are all affected (Manning, 1992, 1996a). From the patrol officers' standpoint, community policing is yet another "presentational strategy," a means of selectively highlighting some changes in urban policing, while suppressing information about others. The underlying structure, evaluation, allocation of resources and management remain largely unchanged, but pressures to alter the role on the "front line" are considerable. The fundamental problem of policing, managing a turbulent environment with limited resources and technologies, and maintaining compliance, is heightened, it would appear, in reform periods, and the adaptations and tactics of patrol officers, redefining teamwork, are a part of the dialectic of organizational change.


Notes

1. 1 April 1999. Revision of paper presented at a conference on crime and social organization held in honour of Albert J. Reiss, Jr. at Rutgers University, July 27-29, 1997. This research is funded by two grants from the Community Oriented Policing Services Agency to Michigan State University School of Criminal
Justice in 1996-98, and to the Western Police Department. I am very grateful to Rosanna Hertz for revision suggestions- the story as an opening, a narrative structure for this chapter, and the themes developed in the conclusion.

2. Excerpted from my field notes. The Chief resignation was is the finale to a series of events in Western City during 1995-1997: a). Several dramatic murders, including a beheading, a 17 year old shot in the head in a drug dispute; a 19 year old shot in a fight after a symbolic traffic dispute; a stabbing of a 17 year old in the heart in front of her mother. The 11 murders in 1996 were a 3 year low. But, in March of 1997, a series of near-fatal shootings were part of a mini-moral panic. b). Several police killings (9 in 13 years, but three in 1996), including a man who burned down his house and threatened officers at a distance who was shot dead by a sniper; a Chicano who was shot dead outside a motel because he threatened officers with a BB gun officers thought was a rifle; and a Chicano who threatened officers with a knife. c). Two violent incidents within two days in February 1996 resulting in death. The police were absolved of criminal responsibility by investigations of the Prosecutors' office and the Department of Justice in each case. The first was a mentally disturbed (diagnosed psychotic) black man who died in custody of heart failure after being "hogtied" (his feet connected to his hands behind his back with plastic restraints). The second was another black who died in a nightclub parking lot after being wrestled to the ground by "bouncers" at the club and also constrained with plastic handcuffs (arms behind his back) in below freezing weather. The first incident lead to a 40 million dollar suit (won for 12 million) against the police department and touched off the "Plea for Justice" campaign demanding hiring more minorities and reforms in the complaints procedure. d). An on-going protest about the establishment of a East Precinct (presently housed in police headquarters, but to be moved to a remodeled warehouse in 1998); and community policing. The protest in part arose because changes in the community policing approach- to a team organization from a specialized CPO unit...
and a new "COPS" agency grant to the City and a nearby University. The Plea for Justice group mounted protests, including a march on City Hall, group appearances at several City Council meetings (one of which was attended also by the Chief and police in uniform as citizens who spoke on their own behalf) and speeches by the leader, stretched from the 1996 through 1997. In December 1996, the Mayor responded with a plan to increase minority representation on the force; increase the number of officers living in the city; add the East Precinct; revise the civilian complaints scheme, form a police community forum to meet yearly beginning in April of 1997, and create a Deputy Chief responsible for community relations. The protesting group was angered that it was not consulted on these proposals, and continues (as of July, 1998) to claim racism and advance reforms. f). Fifty riot-equipped officers from the Western Police assembled and eventually used tear gas on 100 assembled union strikers who were blocking the entrance of picketed factory in May, 1997. The police claim they refused to move after being warned via loudspeaker. Video evidence shown to a Investigatory Commission appointed by the Mayor showed the strikers did not appear to hear the warning. The City Council and the Police Commission both held investigations. One council member was quoted as saying that the police were "acting like Nazis" in using the gas. The police were publicly absolved of responsibility by the Council. In January, 1999, three Western Police officers shot 18 times and killed a young black man. He reportedly had shot a police dog that chased him into a basement.

3. Erving Goffman's classic peroration, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life ([1959] 1959: 33), frames how occupational routines shape roles and hence give life to the drama of work. Goffman elaborates a research question (1959:34)- occupations that have mastered these ways of dramatic [self] realization "...would provide a suitable group in which to study the techniques by which an activity is transformed into a show." By "activity," he means the passing behaviour of performers, giving and giving off cues, but "show" signals the idea of concerted, shared performances presented before an audience (and often
An occupation having mastered these is a strategic choice for analyzing the consequences of alteration or disruption of once established routines.

4. Feldman (1989) uses the concept of routine as central to organizational analysis, and suggests the consequences arising from alteration of routines, and the necessity of changing them if organizational change is to ensue.

5. Official workload data are notoriously misleading even of the overall work load officially assigned. They are also misleading unless context of the work is examined. Official data omit self-initiated work, the differential time and severity of calls, unofficial "back-ups" of other officers in potentially risky or exciting calls, cooperation in radio reports and paperwork to maintain the appearance of legality and propriety, the differential work-speed of given officers and their facility with differing calls. Officers take calls assigned to others, share work, swarm at certain calls that are unofficially attended, create work -traffic and juvenile stops, interviews, and surveillance- and attend calls off their beat and even out of the city limits. Informal conventions about reporting work also exist. A preliminary investigation of workload by a study observer determined that only about 40% of the officers kept a reasonable and valid logbook.

Departmental data showed a slight decline in calls for service in the previous two years. Patrol officers in the focus groups rejected this, saying they did not know where command got such "lies" and "misinformation." They felt the workload had increased and felt overworked and unsupported by supervisors and that top command did not listen to them. The stability in demand and official workload, when coupled with the perception of overwork and being underappreciated, is phenomenologically important and contributed to the low morale and anger of the patrol segment. Officers also felt a lack of support in problematic decisions like felony stops when mistakes were made and innocent people complained of racism and incivility, and the public criticisms resulting from deaths in custody. Officers

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who claim changes in workload may be reflecting their own experience, or offering an opinion. The impact of the reorganization in Western on workload varies by Precinct (East vs. West), shift, assignment (beat) and team. It is also reflected in individual officers' work styles. Furthermore, as noted above, the slots authorized, 329 officers, are not filled presently. The current number is about 315. Calls to the WPD revealed that each precinct has authorized 60 officers, 3 lts, and 9 sergeants. This is means about 72 in each precinct, totaling 144. Adding the captain in charge of the patrol division, this is 145, or about 46 per cent of the force. The national average, according to LEMAS (1998) is 60+ per cent. on patrol. About 15 officers are designated as community police officers, even though they patrol, some of whom are funded by grants. This figure represents about 50% of the force, and suggests the workload complaints are valid, given the working rules and conventions governing patrol in this city.
Chapter 8

The Romance Of Police Leadership

Stephen D. Mastrofski

When I behold, upon the night's starred face,

Huge cloudy symbols of high romance.

John Keats ("When I Have Fears")

A romantic theme pervades the literature on police management—that the chief governs the department and thereby shapes the character of policing it delivers.¹ This romance is built upon an image of the police chief atop the organization, not only responsible for, but directing the operation. In some quarters, the romance extends the chief's domain to the community, suggesting that it is within a chief's capacity to determine levels of public safety and the quality of life. The chief-in-charge image has changed over the last century from military icons of "command" to evocations of the preacher, teacher, or business person who inspires, educates, or makes deals. In any of these forms, the chief's leadership helps account for important events in the life of a police department, and it helps to satisfy popular impulses for a clear chain of causality or, in policy terms, accountability. Even in its recent incarnations, the romance misstates the chief's influence and diverts attention from the processes by which chiefs are most likely to exert it. More importantly, it ignores the consequences most keenly felt. This paper promotes a different metaphorical framework for the chief's role, a dramaturgical one.

To the extent that the chief's role can be spatially described, it is more appropriate to place him, not at the top, but in the middle of both his organization and its environment. The chief is appropriately conceived as one of many "players" inside and outside the organization who contend with others to...
influence it. And if the chief’s capacity to govern internally is modest, his capacity to influence those forces in the environment—beyond the scope of his formal authority—is even more limited. Yet those who study police organizations, those who attempt to reform them, and those who make policy about them labor too often under the assumption that the chief is the principal mover and shaker, someone who makes things happen. This is a romance that leads them to expect things of chiefs that are not within their capacity to deliver, it encourages them to assume a breadth, depth, and immediacy of impact that is not supported by the evidence, and it diverts attention from the contributions that chiefs can and do make to public police organizations.

The perspective, as well as the title, of this paper is taken from Meindl and colleagues (1985:79):

It appears that as observers of and as participants in organizations, we may have developed highly romanticized, heroic views of leadership—what leaders do, what they are able to accomplish, and the general effects they have on our lives. One of the principal elements in this romanticized conception is the view that leadership is a central organizational process and the premier force in the scheme of organizational events and activities. It amounts to what might be considered a faith in the potential if not the actual efficacy of those individuals who occupy the elite positions of formal organizational authority.... We suspect that the romanticized conception of leaders and leadership is generalized and prevalent. The argument being advanced here is a perception that plays a part in the way people attempt to make sense out of organizationally relevant phenomena. Moreover, in this sense-making process, leadership has assumed a romanticized, larger-than-life role.
Over the last twenty-five years a body of scholarship has grown that questions the capacity of managers to exercise dominion over their organizations and to shape outcomes (Lieberson and O'Connor 1972; National Academy of Public Administration 1986; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977; Warwick 1975; Weiner and Mahoney 1981). Concurrently scholars have opened another line of analysis—that organization leaders matter, but in a different way than romanticized. That is the perspective taken in this paper. The leader's principal function is more expressive than instrumental—to convey meaning for the organization, its activities, and their consequences—to construct a way for others to identify what is significant and to understand it (Calder 1977; Pfeffer 1977; 1981; Manning 1997).

This essay will summarize the major features of the romance of police leadership. It will show how this perspective does not square with the realities of the police chief in metropolitan America. It will discuss an alternative analytic tool that characterizes the chief's principal function as dramaturgical. The paper will present a line of argument; it will not attempt to offer an empirical test or proof of its validity. It will conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this line of argument for future inquiry into the role of the police chief.

The Chief's Capacities

There are a number of assertions about the powers or capacities of chiefs that undergird claims that they can direct their organizations. The romance is not that all chiefs have these capacities or that all chiefs exercise them well, but that (a) they are generally within the reach of police chiefs in metropolitan America, or (b) that the exercise of these powers will determine the practices and accomplishments of the organization.

**Personnel gate keeping.** The chief can determine who joins and leaves the department by hiring and firing.
Policy making. The chief can determine official policies that tell subordinates what they can and cannot do, what they should and should not do.

Extrinsic motivation of employees. The chief can develop, promote, sustain, and manipulate a system of extrinsic motivators that reinforces subordinate performance in accord with the leader’s goals. They can reward those who follow policies, strive for and achieve goals. They can withhold rewards from those who do not. They can punish the most egregious cases of bad performance.

Resource acquisition. The chief can acquire the resources needed to perform tasks essential to the accomplishment of the department’s goals. These resources include such things as training, technology, and materiel.

Power sharing. Police chiefs can enhance their capacity to get things done by sharing power with others inside and outside the organization. This is accomplished by forming alliances or “partnerships,” in which the chief gives up or shares some prerogative in order to expand her ability to realize important organizational goals or pursue those core values with which the organization is identified. Power sharing occurs within the organization by administrative decentralization or participative management. Outside the organization it is accomplished by enlisting the department’s clientele in making policies or carrying them out.

Intrinsic motivation of employees. By identifying, promoting, and protecting certain distinctive values about the department and its mission, the police chief provides both direction and inspiration to members of the department, who come to embrace these values as their own, not out of self interest, but because they represent what is “right.” The values promoted by the chief define what it means to be an officer in that department and provide the bases for the intrinsic motivation for subordinates' membership and performance.
These elements represent a sort of tool kit from which chiefs might draw to govern. As fashions in management wax and wane, different of these “tools” have become more and less popular. It will be helpful to note briefly America’s transition from one perspective to another over the last three decades.

Had the list been compiled thirty years ago, the most visible of the nation’s municipal law enforcement leaders would have given prominence to the chief’s policy making powers, treating extrinsic motivation and personnel gate keeping as its reinforcing elements. What I have termed “policy making” is sometimes termed the capacity to “command and control” subordinates. Reiss and Bordua (1967:49), writing at that time, provide a detailed description of command as a basis for the governance of a municipal police agency. They describe a set of expectations about the chief’s capacity to achieve results by ordering subordinates, and by the legitimacy and high honor subordinates presumably accorded obedience. This is an expectation born of the reform waves of the late 19th and early 20th century, when police chiefs lacked both the authority and the power to establish policies and see that they were carried out. Governance of the police organization was fragmented into separate fiefdoms no larger than the domain of each ward boss, whose power of political patronage determined who would be hired and fired in the police department. In their attempt to wrest control of the police from the political machines, reformers advocated that municipal police in America be modeled after the military -- a centralized bureaucracy that consolidated power and established a “chain of command” from the highest general to the lowest private. The chief was to be the commander of the police force, accountable to the mayor and city council in the same way that a general of the army was accountable to the President and Congress.

This command view is now explicitly rejected or downplayed by most who speak on behalf of the contemporary reform perspective, community policing.²
Top administrators can no longer—if they ever could—bring about major changes in operating philosophy through fiat. And serious limits exist on what can be achieved simply by reassigning personnel, changing the organizational structure, recruiting new personnel, and conducting training programs (Goldstein, 1990:155).

Instead, reformers emphasize power sharing through partnerships inside and outside the organization in a language redolent with the argot of “empowerment.” They also stress the need for chiefs to develop an organizational culture in which officers internalize core values that define the chief’s vision of the organization’s mission.

**An Assessment of the Chief’s Capacities to Govern**

There are two questions for assessing the romanticized manager model: to what extent do chiefs possess these powers, and when they attempt to exercise them, do they achieve the desired results? Of course, situations vary across metropolitan America, but the following describes what is characteristic about big-city police forces in the United States.

**Personnel Gate Keeper**

The chief’s capacity as a personnel gate keeper is perhaps the most limited of all, because so many others exercise authority in this arena (civil service commissions, employee bargaining units, the courts, civil rights agencies, labor relations boards, the city’s chief executive). They constitute what Reiss terms “third-party limitations on the exercise of bureaucratic authority” (1992:87). Chiefs do have a say in establishing hiring standards and recruitment practices for the department, but these are closely watched by other interested parties and government agencies assigned the task of judging their legal adequacy. There is an irony in the current state of affairs, since the civil service and hiring standards were intended to free the
selection of officers from the control of political parties, to provide chiefs with subordinates who owed no fealty to any other than the department hierarchy, and to assure that only those most qualified were hired (Fogelson 1977; Walker 1977). But isolating hiring from party politics made police positions no less valued, which has meant that the political arena has merely shifted to courts and regulatory bodies, where contending groups vie to secure or protect access. Further, to promote hiring standards that are acceptable to the various legal authorities, police agencies have resorted to standards that may appear to be uniform and objective, but which bear no empirically demonstrated capacity to predict performance (e.g., scores on standardized tests, college education) (Fyfe et al., 1997:280-288). This, is of course, complicated by an overlay of equal employment standards which introduce race and sex as relevant considerations. All of this means that chiefs have little to say about who is hired.

They have more to say about who is fired, but dismissing a police officer is not easy to accomplish except in cases where there is strong evidence of serious malfeasance. There are many avenues for officers to appeal dismissals, making the process potentially a long, time consuming one that probably deters chiefs from using it in any but the most egregious cases. Job security remains an attractive feature of police employment.

The ability to determine where individual employees are assigned (by job, shift, and territory) has long been thought a management prerogative, but most big city chiefs find their hands tied by labor contracts that give employees the right to select assignments by seniority (Skogan and Hartnett 1997:75). Contracts also further limit management’s discretion in deciding who is best suited to specific assignments. Whether and how much management can ask workers to flex their work time (to avoid paying costly overtime) is also constrained. Not only do these constraints limit the chief’s capacity to optimize the use of the work force available to her, they also limit her ability to offer and withhold rewards selectively for
performance, support, and compliance from the rank and file.

Chiefs usually have authority to hire, dismiss, demote, and reassign at least some of the top echelons of the administrative ranks in the department. Where chiefs enjoy this power, they can more readily secure the loyalty and compliance of their upper level managers. But one can overstate the impact of these high-ranking subordinates on the practices of the rank and file. Their efforts concentrate mostly on matters of cross-unit coordination within the organization and relations with outside agencies and groups (Reiss, 1992:72). Their time is consumed by meetings and paperwork; little is available for seeing that street-level officers pursue operational objectives and follow policies. These tasks are left to line supervisors, whose allegiance is often stronger to labor than management (Van Maanen, 1983; 1984).

Policy Making

The chief’s policy making powers too are constrained. Reiss and Bordua (1967) note that what is in the written law (whether procedural or substantive) is largely beyond the control of police. Legislatures and courts set legal boundaries within which police must act to be legitimate. Despite the alleged decline of labor union power, chiefs in most of the nation’s large metropolitan forces must now deal with negotiating units, not only on salary, benefits, and working conditions, but also on matters once considered exclusively management’s prerogative: equipment, training, assignment practices, dispatching, performance evaluation, and even field tactics and strategies. And even where managers enjoy formal unilateral decision-making power, they can rarely take bold steps without the acquiescence of the elected official(s) to whom they are immediately accountable. And those officials, as Reiss and Bordua (1967) point out, are themselves quite sensitive to “political” considerations.

One of management’s policy-making prerogatives deserving special attention is the capacity to organize and mobilize the department’s resources in pursuit of policy objectives. As with all public human
services, police chiefs have very little freedom to manipulate their agency's operating budget. Most of the
budget is given to wages, salaries, and benefits of full-time permanent employees. These costs are mostly
fixed. Hiring freezes and layoffs are management options, but except in times of fiscal crisis these
personnel items are subject to change in small increments. The remainder of the budget, devoted to
equipment, materiel, contracts and purchased services, is more susceptible to management manipulation,
but seldom constitutes more than fifteen percent of the whole.

Chiefs rarely shift large portions of the budget between general categories, but they are fond of
revising the organization chart--altering the chain of command, the relationship of bureaus and units to each
other, and the creation, combination, or elimination of units. Most chiefs enjoy discretion in this regard, but
vested interests in and outside the organization can make it challenging even to rearrange the organization
chart. Doing something as simple as moving command of detectives from headquarters to a precinct is an
ambitious undertaking, precisely because of the intense opposition it will face inside the department. Once a
department has assigned community policing officers to specific neighborhoods, residents vigorously
oppose alterations to that arrangement. Chiefs are fond of creating new specialist units to deal with freshly
identified problems (e.g., domestic violence, illicit firearms, street-level drug traffic, hate crimes, drug
awareness education, community policing) because it is easier to create something new than to disband
established units. However, resources are limited, so that the unit's size will often be smaller than the chief
would like. As desirable as community policing may appear to some chiefs, none are willing to gut the
calls-for-service operation staffed by generalists to support a large unit of community policing specialists,
for to do so would not only generate tremendous internal resistance but certainly result in an uproar from
the city's residents. One may nibble occasionally at the edges of the core service operations of the police
organization, but large bites will not be tolerated.
Almost as perilous is a large-scale geographic redistribution of resources, especially in the largest, the uniformed division. The elimination or creation of precinct/station houses or the substantial redistribution of patrol officers from some areas of the city to others have obvious implications for who will get what, and therefore are likely to generate considerable city-wide interest and opposition from at least some parties. These redistributions do occur, even on a large scale, from time to time. Chiefs can accomplish them, but they rarely occur without the concurrence of important elected officials, and to be successful, they nearly always require “selling” to important constituent groups in the community (businesses and neighborhood associations). Nearly always they are justified by an intensive internal study of the “needs” of different parts of the city, often followed by consultation (both visible and otherwise) with stakeholders (to secure support for beat boundaries, staffing levels, etc.).

Where chiefs enjoy greatest freedom in this domain is short-term and small-scale resource reallocation that deviates from “normal” practices without the creation or permanent realignment of organizational units. Such reallocations tend to be reactions to complaints and problems that achieve enough notoriety to require some visible response; they are seldom initiated proactively. When enforcement is the response strategy, these are manifested as “crackdowns.” Because they minimize disruptions to routine operations department-wide, because of their structural flexibility, and because they promise felicitous results (even if only for a short time period), they may be an increasingly popular management option (Sherman, 1990). The prospects for conducting crackdowns on a broad scale over the long term, though recommended in some quarters (Sherman, 1995:343), seem poor, because doing so detracts from the very things that make them attractive to chiefs: smallness of scale and flexibility.

Resource Acquisition

Chiefs enjoy a great deal of formal authority to organize and allocate the department’s resources,
though their options are quite limited due to economic and political conditions that make change feasible only in very small increments. As the ranking police official, the chief also has a role in the acquisition of resources for the organization. Here, however, the traditional separation of powers among (and within) branches of government places chiefs primarily in the role of supplicant. The local legislature holds the municipal purse strings; other sources of resource acquisition pale in comparison. Asset forfeitures from enforcement actions are one source where there has been considerable growth in recent years, although it remains a small portion of the overall budget. Grants from state and federal governments are the most frequent and not inconsequential (especially since the passage of the 1994 Crime Act). Chiefs increasingly find themselves going hat-in-hand directly to the private sector to seek support for special programs. This may increase the chief's capacity to fund special projects, but heavy reliance on direct private sector support risks the appearance that the public police are for hire by special interests, thus reducing the public's support for the department as a disinterested government agency free of the influence of special interests. It is possible that dependence on such external funding sources may come to be viewed as legitimate (Tolbert 1985), but the extent to which they are currently institutionalized is not yet empirically demonstrated for police.

An interesting and little-examined limitation on the chief's capacity to acquire resources is the degree to which American police agencies give away lucrative business by allowing officers to sell their publicly granted and supported police powers to the private sector. The practice of allowing police officers to do contract, "off duty" work is widespread, but very little is known about the implications of the various financial arrangements through which this occurs. Some departments serve as the contractor, but many allow officers to contract directly (Reiss 1988). Either way, police agencies may fail to recoup the costs in public resources used to train, equip, coordinate, and supervise officers working for the private sector.
Further, such policies may impose hidden costs for the organization by giving labor representatives a vested interest in securing work conditions that facilitate off-duty work (e.g., shift schedules) but that limit the organization's capacity to pursue the chief's goals. This analysis is complicated by difficulties in distinguishing the public benefits from the private ones when police work in an off-duty capacity (Reiss 1987). It is conceivable that a careful analysis would reveal that these arrangements tend to produce more cost than compensation for the public.

Extrinsic Motivation of Employees

Chiefs are severely constrained in their capacity to create and manipulate sources of extrinsic motivation for their employees (Mastrofski and Ritti 1992). Pay raises are strictly regulated by a payroll system that prevents the chief from giving individuals substantial merit raises or salary cuts based on performance. The chief has limited influence on promotions, most of those selections being determined by candidates' scores on standardized written tests and performance in interviews and assessment center exercises. Officers learn that performance on the street has little consequence for promotion chances, thus removing a major incentive for striving for the chief's goals. And given the few supervisory positions available relative to the large number of those in bottom ranks, even when the chief has significant influence on promotions, most officers soon come to know that their odds for promotion are very poor.

Chiefs enjoy greater leeway in other career-enhancing areas (job assignments and training), although as previously stated, these too are governed by personnel rules that are difficult to change, and are increasingly negotiating issues with labor unions. Chiefs enjoy the greatest freedom in according officers recognition for good work: giving them special awards and publicizing their successes. Recognition for good work is not an irrelevant motivator, but it does not seem to be a powerful one as practiced in police agencies. Studies show that officers in large metropolitan departments do not perceive the "brass" as aware
or willing to acknowledge much of the good performance that "really" occurs at the street level (Brown 1981; Mastrofski and Ritti 1996; Reuss-Ianni 1983). Field studies suggest in fact that, first-line supervisors exercise more effective control over extrinsic motivators for officers than does top management (Muir 1977; Van Maanen 1983), and these tend to be the "little things" (approval of requests for days off, partner and beat assignments, overtime approval). First-line supervisors often decline to use their limited power over these motivators to reinforce top management's priorities, thus bifurcating the system of control.

What the chief can offer subordinates in the way of things they truly value is to leave them alone—or to protect them when they get in trouble. Chiefs with this predilection enjoy strong support from the rank and file. Some chiefs have made a national reputation in this way, others as strict disciplinarians who keep the discipline "in-house." This is not unique to police, who, like many other service occupations, work in "punitive bureaucracies." Unfortunately, however, because of changes in the way that chiefs are exposed to political influence, the protection of officers whose actions are highly publicized (especially in cases of use of force, corruption, and failure to intervene) places the chief "between a rock and a hard place." The high visibility of these choices (due to news media interest and eagerness to exploit adversarial relationships) and the chief's increasing reliance on external, community alliances to get things done often imposes a significant cost to the chief, which ever way she chooses. The emergence of a bifurcated street-cop/management-cop culture (Reuss-Ianni, 1983) is due largely to this environmental transformation. The net effect is to make it much more difficult for chiefs to act in an unfettered fashion in protecting their officers. The contemporary urban political environment pressures chiefs to take dramatic actions to hold individual officers accountable. Finally, psychologists have documented the substantial differences in the behavioral consequences between manipulating positive incentives and selectively punishing. The former approach, largely beyond the chief's capacity, is most effective in securing the kinds of positive, innovative,
and risky actions that contemporary reformers hope police will pursue. The latter is more effective at extinguishing undesired behaviors (e.g., excessive force), but not promoting desired ones (applying just the right amount of coercion or using alternatives to coercion).

**Power Sharing**

Power sharing is currently one of the most popular recommendations among reformers and police management consultants. If one accepts the above portrayal of police management’s limited powers, it seems counterintuitive to give up what little power one does have. In fact, power sharing is probably necessitated because chiefs can rarely exercise it unilaterally. Three forms of power sharing are advocated for chiefs: administrative decentralization, participative management, and the formation of alliances with groups external to the organization.

Administrative decentralization, the delegation of decision making authority to lower level administrators, is certainly an option, but middle managers, such as precinct commanders, are no less constrained than chiefs in exercising whatever authority they are given. Their smaller, and presumably more homogeneous clientele may make it possible to fashion more effective policies customized to their precincts. However, they face the same challenges as their chief in enlisting subordinates and securing compliance with policies. And for reasons stated earlier, chiefs should not assume that their middle managers will have the will and skill to pursue the top leadership’s goals. While decentralization has been an enduring element of progressive reform for the last three decades, there is no more than anecdotal evidence that it actually enhances the chief’s overall capacity to govern. Its effectiveness is no doubt contingent on a number of factors, making it hazardous to apply in the one-size-fits-all manner that reformers and management gurus prescribe (Mastrofski and Ritti, 1995; Thompson, 1967).

Participative management by low-level employees (an element of Total Quality Management) is
popular nowadays as another means of power sharing to accomplish broad organizational objectives. This is justified by the proposition that police officers are professionals who have the knowledge and judgment to make decisions that have traditionally been reserved for their superiors. The rank and file are wary when management attempts to bestow such powers, because they fear, not without reason, that it exposes them to *ex post facto* punishment when things go badly or officers make choices that may be good for their small, focused clientele, but which run counter to management’s “big picture.” A community policing officer may be told that she is the “chief of her beat,” but when she mobilizes the neighborhood residents to do things that complicate the chief’s job, the officer will soon find herself “on the carpet” before the chief. Finally, there is little hard evidence about the capacity of participative management programs to yield tangible external outcomes beyond (sometimes) improved employee morale (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 1996; Walters 1992; West et al. 1995; Wycoff and Skogan 1994).

Advocacy of power sharing with those outside the organization has grown in popularity with the advent of community policing. This takes the form of police “empowering” outsiders or “partnering” with them to achieve mutually beneficial objectives and the common good. Potential partners include grassroots community groups (neighborhood organizations, victims groups, churches, civic associations), businesses, and other government agencies. Such alliances afford interest groups access to the department in formulating policy and airing complaints, the traditional function of amplifying “voice” to constituencies in pluralistic democracies. The department, in turn can use these relationships not only to fashion its policies, but to sell them and itself to their partners. They can also mobilize their partners to pressure others in the community on behalf of the department’s interests--for example, to lobby for a municipal ordinance giving police some new enforcement tool. Finally, alliances can be formed to enlist outsiders in joint projects designed to enhance public safety and the quality of urban life (e.g., Neighborhood Watch, drug-free block...
projects, neighborhood cleanups, anti-truancy campaigns). Usually presented in terms of volunteerism, it has proven a popular way to maintain or enlarge government programs without commensurate tax increases.

The chief is in an excellent position to initiate overtures for such alliances and to respond on behalf of the department to outsiders' initiatives. However, chiefs who make important decisions about these alliances without at least the acquiescence of the mayor or manager do so at considerable peril for their job security, especially when the alliance may be used to apply political pressure. Neighborhood groups, churches, business associations, and civic groups have replaced political parties as the mobilizers of local political action, so mayors and others have a keen interest in what alliances are formed and which of those receive the most attention.

Despite an extensive scholarly literature on interorganizational alliances and networks in the public and private sectors (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997), there has been little systematic research that describes patterns in such alliances involving the police (Sharp, 1978; Skogan and Hartnett 1997). Little is known about the extent to which police management shapes (as opposed to having their practices shaped by) these alliances, and even less about their long-term consequences for the capacity of the chief to govern. I have already noted that chiefs do not have a lot of flexibility to offer additional resources to partners and prospective partners on a large scale (e.g., more officers assigned to the neighborhood), so they usually resort to lending the agency’s expertise in problem-solving and legitimizing the activities and programs conducted by their partners. These often take the form of symbolic gestures (e.g., neighborhood watch programs, “red-ribbon” campaigns for drunk-driving victim groups). Symbolic gestures may, in fact, sustain the alliance, and prevent the outside partner from demanding a more tangible response (Mastrofski and Ritti 1992). Evidence on the impact of such alliances on community outcomes is sketchy, but in the one
area that has been evaluated with some rigor--community crime prevention programs--the evidence is not particularly encouraging (Rosenbaum 1988; Sherman 1997a).

**Intrinsic Motivation**

Scholars and management gurus have long been interested in the leader’s capacity to motivate others, not by appealing to self interest, but by inspiring others to pursue objectives because those objectives are inherently worthy. Selznick (1957) identified this as the essence of “institutional leadership,” and others labeled it “transformational leadership” (Bass 1985; Burns 1978), because it lifts followers to transcend the pursuit of personal rewards, seeking nobler goals for the organization, its clientele, and society generally. Leaders accomplish this primarily through adept communication rather than transacting exchanges of rewards for performance (Bennis and Nanus 1985). Leaders accomplish this by articulating a vision of the organization’s mission in ways that invest workers’ jobs with larger meaning. They achieve success by identifying themes and finding effective symbolizations of those themes and what success means. They emphasize the prospects of success and encourage others to experiment, taking risks to achieve it. Success is achieved by shaping the culture of the organization, the fundamental symbols and values that yield a pattern of shared meaning in the organization and to those outside who attend to it (Trice and Beyer 1993). These meanings concern basic assumptions about the organization and its relationship to the environment, its values and priorities about goals and methods, and the tangible manifestations of these things (work processes, technology, procedures, logos and jargon, and ceremonies) (Schein 1992). Leaders may engage in a variety of obvious efforts to shape the organization’s culture (draft mission statements, serving as a personal role model, reorienting organizational structures, changing physical spaces), but they take every opportunity to invest even mundane work activities and events with meaning in the larger sense of the culture they want to create. Staying “on message” and helping followers see the integrated, “big
picture" is basic to the effective exercise of this capacity.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed tremendous interest in strengthening organizational leadership through institutional/transformational means. Law enforcement management gurus eagerly embraced it, along with others in the public and private sectors. A common claim was that the new community policing reform, rising fast in popularity, was a "philosophy, not a program." Its advocates argued that the most pressing need was not to restructure police organizations and their environments, but to change the beliefs and values of the police subculture. Numerous publications prescribed how this should be done and detailed case studies of how some chiefs had done it (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990; Moore and Stephens 1991).

The chief's position is generally the best vantage point from which to exercise institutional/transformational leadership. Chiefs, as the "top cops" in their cities are expected to define and express their organization's mission, to state and embody what the department "stands for." They enjoy considerable status that signifies their special qualifications to speak expertly on issues concerning the police. On occasion, mayors or city managers may assume this role, but it is rare nowadays. The chief's office makes a "bully pulpit," one not only to reach those inside the organization, but also to inspire outsiders. Notwithstanding this, no body of systematic empirical research supports the claim that police chiefs successfully govern in this fashion. Empirical evidence, when it is mustered at all, comes in the form of anecdotes dressed up as case studies (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996). This applies, not only to policing, but to the field of organizational leadership generally. It is littered with conceptual fuzziness in defining transformational leadership and organizational performance, not to mention severe measurement and design limitations (French and Bell 1990).

Given the importance that community policing advocates give to changing the organizational
It is noteworthy that so many case studies report that rank and file resistance is a persistent and onerous obstacle to reform (Sadd and Grine 1994; Greene et al. 1994; Wilkinson and Rosenbaum 1994). Police officers may accept that “community policing is here to stay” (Weisel and Eck 1994), but large numbers remain skeptical of its utility beyond public relations. Many advocates have remarked on this skepticism as mired in the officers’ past socialization, but they ignore fundamental problems faced by those who seek to lead by inspiration. Police workers are wary of managers who bear “gifts,” such as newfangled ways of working. They wonder if this is merely another way for those at the top to get more from workers without paying for it. Some are attracted to the concepts and “philosophy” of the new values management espouses, but they are keenly aware when, as is so often the case, management does not deliver on the tangible things, such as resources, training, a supportive reward system, and a host of policies and structures that make the organization’s commitment more than rhetorical (Manning 1997:14). A reasonable hypothesis is that transformational leadership works only when there is not too great a gulf between the leader’s lofty values and management’s ability to back words up with action.  

Implications

The metropolitan police chief is not powerless to effect substantive results, but he is not as powerful as the romance of leadership suggests. The chief’s leadership is important, but it is not the “key determinant of organizational success or failure” (Hall 1991:134). He is one of many actors or forces who influence what the members of the organization do and accomplish. His authority is limited, and that authority is seldom translated directly into power that can realistically be exercised unilaterally. The powers of his office are not unlike those that Neustadt attributed to the president of the United States in his classic analysis of presidential power (1960). Neustadt noted that to govern, a president must get people to do what he wants, but this can rarely be achieved simply by issuing commands, especially when the objectives of
Governance are ambitious. Like the presidency, chieftaincy confers certain advantages in bargaining with others inside and outside the organization to get them to do what he wants. These include the status and authority of the office. Within the far more limited domain in which police chiefs operate, their status and authority are more constrained than the president’s, for nearly all are directly accountable to an executive (usually a mayor) who has the authority to direct the chief on matters of policy. Many, indeed, are empowered to dismiss the chief without even the concurrence of other governing entities. Thus, chiefs, even more than presidents, must make what they can of the limited advantages they have in governing. It is their personal skill in cultivating their own status and their development of a personal reputation for responding in ways that benefit friends and impose costs on adversaries that increases their chances of getting their way. Effective leadership is thus the product of artful practice, not the application of science.

The dominant constraints on the chief’s practice of leadership arts are environmental (Reiss 1992; 1993; Reiss and Bordua 1967). Opportunities to exercise various managerial capacities are driven mostly by external political/resource demands and dependencies (Pfeffer 1981:5). Managerial proactivity, planning, and the long-term strategic perspective have little to do with the central activities or contributions of the police chief, or for that matter, the heads of large organizations generally (Luthans et al. 1988; Mintzberg 1973). The chief can summon spirits from the vastly deep, but the odds of their coming when called are seldom good, especially when those spirits are asked to accomplish ambitious results (crime reduction, police integrity, social integration of a diverse citizenry). Validation of this leadership role requires that something actually happens, but so often it does not, or at least it cannot be empirically verified.

The romantic view of police chiefs attributes an instrumental purpose to their leadership. Leadership is a means to the accomplishment of the organization’s ostensible goals. The powers believed to serve this function are highly circumscribed. But chiefs also serve an expressive function that coexists with the
instrumental one, and the chief is less environmentally constrained in fulfilling this one. It is a symbolic, presentational, or dramaturgical function, one that selectively highlights events, rationalizes them, and gives them meaning for an audience. Here the requirements of success are different. The audience must perceive that something desirable has occurred, and that it can be attributed to the chief’s efforts. The consequence is legitimation and support for the regime. To be effective, this presentation requires staging: script, costumes, props, and so on. The chief may or may not have written the script, directed, or produced the performance, but she is definitely a main character, often on stage at key moments, and likely to receive accolades or jeers, depending upon the relevance and believability of the performance.

The Chief’s Dramaturgical Function

The police are ostensibly in the business of controlling or managing people’s behavior, but they are also in the business of managing appearances for “audiences.” One of the ways in which they do this is to become involved in the development, presentation, and management of images about themselves, the communities they police, and the problems they experience. The sustenance of public police organizations generally, and of any administrator’s regime in particular, depends heavily upon such presentations precisely because the police fall into a class of organizations in which technical performance (e.g., reducing crime) is so difficult to demonstrate in any other than nonscientific terms. Other such organizations include mental hospitals, schools, legal agencies, and churches (Scott 1992:133). This perspective on organizations has been termed an “institutional” perspective, about which there is a substantial body of literature in organization theory. It has been reviewed and applied to police in several essays (Crank 1994; Crank and Langworthy 1992; Mastrofski et al. 1987; Mastrofski 1997; Mastrofski and Uchida 1993). I refer the reader to that literature, concentrating here on the chief’s important place in the presentation of his organization to those who have a significant impact on whether and how the organization prospers.
Dramaturgy is a metaphor helpful in organizing our understanding of the presentation of appearances regarding the police. Peter Manning (1980; 1988; 1997), building on the work of Goffman and others, has done more than any other scholar to apply the dramaturgical metaphor to police. A dramaturgical outlook

... refers to the selective presentation of behaviors for public view and the symbolizations referring to those behaviors conveying a message or set of messages about the meaning of those behaviors (1997:35).

The dramaturgical perspective is one applied by the observer, and not necessarily the observed. It finds parallels in the play of events to the elements of drama: a plot or script, actors, makeup, staging, costumes, props, lights, special effects, and so on. Those who participate as players may or may not do so consciously or voluntarily, but they do participate in a process that creates illusions.

The argument, then, is that police chiefs are heavily engaged in the social construction of meaning about their organization, and that this defines their principal value to the organization and its audiences. How does one distinguish symbolic from substantive actions? This is complex because not all acts can be classed as either purely symbolic or purely substantive. A purely symbolic act is one where there is no substantive consequence (e.g., a presidential apology for slavery). A purely substantive act is an observable act with a physical referent that can carry no symbolic freight (e.g., the secret order to undertake an undercover operation). But many chiefs’ actions can have both substantive and symbolic effects.

Pfeffer (1981) suggests several ways that managers attempt to shape the meaning of their organizations. One is the creation or illumination of symbols--using an image of one thing to represent something else (the badge as the majesty of police authority, the civilian review board as external
accountability, a training program as expert skill). Ceremony or ritual is another. This is following a protocol or convention of symbolic gestures well known to the audience to convey a meaning about an event or series of events. The divestiture and investiture of police leadership is fraught with ritualistic actions designed to signify change, stability, or both. Language, of course, conveys meaning, and certain terms serve to obscure, over-, or understate such things as dissensus, conflict, status differences, technological sophistication, innovation, efficiency, and so on. Currently popular catchphrases employed by progressive managers are partnership, community, empowerment, reengineering, reinventing government, and diversity. Another powerful tool to convey meaning is to alter or use settings--changing building design or location (e.g., a more inviting reception area signifies greater concern for the customer), opening branch offices (to signify greater local responsiveness), or taking action in a particular setting (e.g., announcing new initiatives in police-community relations at a march against drug dealers).

From a practical perspective, the simplest way to measure the strength of the symbolic component of an act is the extent to which it is, intentionally or not, displayed to others. News conferences and other made-for-prime-time events are high in symbolic content. Speeches, reports, publications, logos, slogans, mission statements, and other materials or images intended for wide dissemination will also be heavily ladened with symbolic materials.

Manning (1997) notes how the entire range of the policing enterprise is suffused with the construction of meaning, from the rituals of everyday police-public encounters to the actions of the top leaders. He identifies several common presentational strategies that invoke the language and symbols of values to which intended audiences resonate (professionalism, bureaucratic and technological efficiency) or which mystify and shield controversial practices (through secrecy). There are many other cultural issues to which police leaders may play, crafting their messages to suit what is currently in fashion: altruistic, public-
interest democracy versus entrepreneurial pursuit of self-interest, small-is-beautiful versus big-is-better, pastoral villages and “natural” systems of social control versus the powerful welfare state, communitarian ideals versus individualism (Gans 1979; Manning 1984). The adept chief is sensitive to what will play locally, which may vary considerably due to regional variations in the political culture (Wilson 1968).

These substantive messages are often played out in the context of generic plots or dramatic themes, which are the occasion for the “performances.”

**Common Dramatic Themes**

Police chiefs participate in many types of dramatic presentations, but some themes recur frequently, focusing on persistent problems for police organizations and their leaders. Two will be discussed in some detail and two mentioned in passing.

**Accountability**

Societies need to account for important phenomena, and they want to hold someone responsible when they occur. The social pressure for accountability is particularly strong when adverse events must be explained. Occasions for demonstrations of accountability are frequent for police departments. Chiefs play a critical boundary-spanning role, responsible for holding subordinates accountable internally, and chiefs are themselves the principal medium of the organization’s accountability to external authorities (Reiss 1992; Reiss and Bordua 1967). The twentieth century has witnessed relentlessly increasing pressures for police organizations to become externally accountable, and numerous structures have evolved to accomplish this, or at least give such an appearance: civil service, labor unions, civil liability laws, civilian review boards, blue-ribbon investigative commissions, accreditation, and the whole movement toward performance measurement and evaluation (Reiss 1993). Defenders of police agency autonomy point to these institutions as manifestations of agency accountability, ignoring or obscuring the challenges of
accountability that link actual practice to policy. They are driven to do so precisely because of the
chief's very limited access to organizational "accountability" (Ericson 1995; Reiss 1993). Account ability
is the capacity to monitor and measure organizational practices and outcomes, an issue of information
acquisition. In contemporary American police organizations, it is a chronic weakness due largely to
shortcomings in record keeping and supervision (Reiss 1971; Van Maanen 1983). A classic example of this
is to focus public debate and policies on who is allowed to review the evidence on alleged police
misconduct (police administrators, officers, other legal professionals, or lay civilians), what constitutes
misconduct, and what an appropriate punishment is. These issues obscure the fundamental account ability
problem of how to gather reliable evidence to establish the veracity of such allegations.

Dramas of accountability for police agencies occur most frequently as an outgrowth of scandal,
abuse of authority, or massive disorder. Occasionally they arise from indicators of managerial
incompetence (criticism from the rank and file). The elements of dramatic action (conflict, confrontation,
crisis, resolution, and denouement) are detectable in these "plays," usually (although not always) assuming
tragic qualities. The triggering event (e.g., a news story about corruption, a riot in response to a police
shooting) is rarely instigated by the chief, but he is nearly always a party to the ensuing conflict. The
conflict may be between the department and some segment of the community that takes special affront (e.g.,
minority groups, civil rights advocates, victims' groups). The chief often finds himself in the middle of two
or more groups, each demanding justice in terms that conflict directly with others. One of these groups is
nearly always the rank-and-file officers.

Following such an event are two "acts," one in which the players jockey to assign blame and one in
which a course of corrective action is selected. Chiefs aspire to control the story line in both acts,
determining or explaining who is at fault (e.g., ordering an investigation by internal affairs, holding
wearing) and selecting the remedial action (e.g., punishment of parties in the wrong, replacing personnel, implementing new policies). These processes assume the character of ritual. Artful chiefs effectively use symbols that powerfully convey their central role in maintaining organizational purity by showing how the chief banishes the wicked. "A little ‘confessed’ evil saves one from acknowledging a lot of hidden evil" (Barthes 1957:42).

Such an example is given by William Bratton, former commissioner of the New York City Police. When twelve officers were arrested on corruption charges, Bratton held a press conference that powerfully conveyed his commitment to ridding the department of corrupt officers. It was not so much what he said, but that as he said it he held before the cameras the badges taken from some of the dozen officers just arrested (Fyfe et al. 1997:108). This scene was designed for the "frontstage" to signify the chief’s role in holding corrupt police accountable (Manning 1997:43). Obscured is the "backstage" reality of the tremendous limitations on the chief to alter the conditions that invite corrupt practices, identify corrupt officers, and remove them from the force (Manning and Redlinger 1977). Such “tip of the iceberg” presentational strategies leave unexamined and undisturbed the great bulk of organizational practice and environmental causes of corruption, but they assuage expectations that “something is done.”

Although the example above illustrates the dramatic trajectory of most instances of alleged police malfeasance, they are occasionally of such scope or intensity that the chief himself becomes the target rather than the instrument of accountability. When events reach this stage, it is difficult for the chief (who is presumed to embody the organization’s general character) to avoid blame. He is often then cast out for the sins and failings of subordinates, even though most of the alleged malfeasors remain. This parallels a passion play quite familiar to Western culture. Such events constitute profound crises of legitimacy for the organization itself and demand a ritual, cathartic “cleansing” involving the degradation and removal of the
chief (Crank and Langworthy 1992:358), precisely because it is usually far easier to remove the one “in charge” than actually correct the problem. This is followed by the equally ritualistic installation of a “new broom” with a mandate to remedy the organization’s flaws.

An example of this dramatic form of accountability is the removal of Los Angeles chief Daryl Gates in the aftermath of the Rodney King incident. Before the King incident, Gates had served as the personification of his organization (Sparrow et al. 1990). Whether that image reflected the true “character” of the agency, Gates as chief played the lead role in projecting the community’s intentions about what that character should be. Gates’ involuntary retirement, like most, was not due to a demonstration of managerial incompetence. It had to do with accommodating changes in the consensus about what the department’s character should be, and dramatic revelation of the apparent fiction of what the department’s character had been. The videotapes of the King incident “showed” the LAPD not to be the rigorous rule-governed paramilitary organization promoted for decades, but rather a loosely supervised conglomeration of lawless rogues. The LAPD’s subsequent poor showing in dealing with the post-verdict riots irreparably damaged the department’s image as an effective force for at least maintaining order and safety in a time of mass civil disturbance. The image of the LAPD as a well-regulated, efficient public safety agency was obliterated, and Gates’ forced departure from the chief’s office was guaranteed, despite his reputation and civil service protections. Despite his efforts to highlight a different kind of drama (see the section below on “conservation and preservation”), he could not marshal symbols powerful enough to overcome those beyond his control, presented on the nightly news. Gates’ departure was followed closely by the installation of his successor, Willie Williams. Williams, whose mandate was to imbue the department with a new community-friendly culture, found himself in a similar position, when the rank and file repeatedly and vociferously criticized his leadership and personal integrity. Blamed for the widespread “malaise” of his
officers, the city declined to renew his contract at the end of his first five-year term. Thus the cyclical drama of accountability was replayed anew.

Accomplishment

Unlike dramas of accountability, dramas of accomplishment are frequently scripted by the police chief and other high-ranking officials. When the news is good (e.g., a declining crime rate), the dramatic production may be impromptu and quite limited in scope, simply a comment to the press that takes advantage of a fortuitous turn of events. The chief attributes the good news to one or more of her programs and the efforts of the rank and file. More elaborate productions tend to arise as reactions to external pressure for better performance. Victim advocates criticize how the department handles certain offenses, and the chief responds with a crackdown, new specialist unit, new policies, more training, or speeches that denounce the problem and affirm the department's commitment to its melioration. Nearly always, the corrective program is untested, but it has the virtues of (a) clearly signifying police responsiveness, (b) constituting (absent rigorous empirical validation), a line of action that is widely accepted in itself as the "right" way of handling things -- that is, what other progressive departments around the nation are doing, and (c) offering little interference in the routine practices of the organization's core technology. For example, the creation of a small community policing unit or program in response to complaints about hostile or uncaring police serves these functions admirably. The chief can point to a new, tangible unit in the organization, one that is popular with many other police agencies, and one whose operation will do little to disrupt the practices of the vast majority of officers who patrol the community.

On the whole, however, police agencies and their leaders have not invested much effort in elaborate, planned productions to dramatize accomplishments. I suspect that a comparison of the annual performance reports of big city police agencies to those of comparably sized private corporations would show that,
 Unlike the latter, the former do little to highlight outcomes that apportion responsibility for these results between leaders' strategies and environmental forces (Salancik and Meindl 1984). But this may be changing. Big city chiefs have become more sophisticated in “spinning” the news, as their press relations staffs and “research and planning” staffs grow in size and expertise (Chermak and Weiss 1997). Chiefs’ rapidly increasing use of outside consultants and evaluators speaks, not only to their willingness to seek independent and sometimes scientific evaluations, but also to chiefs’ increased confidence in their ability to exploit such evaluations to shape their own image and that of their organizations.

A case study in the expert production of a drama of accomplishment is given in the brief, but much celebrated tenure of William Bratton as New York City’s Commissioner. Bratton’s reputation as a police manager was established in previous chief executive positions as a “take-charge guy” who invigorated hide-bound, inefficient law enforcement bureaucracies by establishing internal accountability for the organization’s performance and inspiring the entire organization to internalize his sense of mission. Achieving belief in and support for one’s administration requires first and foremost selecting a distinctive, if not popular, package of organizational changes.

Regardless of the content of these changes, their “packaging” is essential to their success, for the audience must understand the “story” or “plot line” of the leader’s drama. Bratton came to office with the clear appreciation that the previous mayoral administration and department leadership were deposed because their “package” was out of step with the electorate’s preference for safer streets and less crime, instead of the previous administration’s “softer” version of community policing that stressed attentiveness to a wide range of neighborhood problems and the redistributive politics of racial justice. Newly elected Mayor Giuliani’s appointee, Bratton, offered a different brand of community policing, one that emphasized first and foremost a return to the now traditional theme of reducing crime. But what qualified Bratton’s
presentation of the organization's mission as innovative was his strategy for achieving crime reduction. Rather than focus their efforts solely on "serious crime," New York City Police were to attend aggressively to the minor disorders in public places, along the lines suggested in Wilson and Kelling's "broken windows" thesis. Giving these offenses higher priority was new for New York, and at least until very recently, quite popular (Reibstein 1997). Bratton's message is powerful because it "...is about the seamless web that connects disorder, fear, serious crime, and urban decay" (Kelling, 1995:40). Even though it is based on a theory for which there has been little rigorous empirical testing, "broken windows" provides a simple, readily understandable explanation for complex social processes.\footnote{Making the vast NYPD bureaucracy responsive to any direction from the top is a recurring theme of reformers since Theodore Roosevelt was commissioner. Bratton used methods that are currently popular among organizational development gurus (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996:277). He decentralized decision making about resource allocation and strategic practice to the precinct commanders, while at the same time, monitoring their "bottom line" performance by employing an upgraded, computerized data information system that allowed headquarters to assess crime and police activity statistics on a timely basis. His ingenious presentational strategy, however, was to present a clear image of these changes in the twice-weekly Compstat (computer statistics) meetings attended by a variety of government agencies an outside observers, as well as police personnel (Bratton 1998:233-239; Kelling 1995:43-45). At each meeting several precinct commanders stood at the podium, one after another, to summarize the public safety problems within their jurisdiction, noting actions taken to resolve them. Displayed on a projection screen were up-to-date statistics on a dizzying array of computerized crime maps and charts detailing offenses, calls for service, arrests, and other activities for each precinct. Each commander was interrogated by high-ranking police managers about the numbers and maps and what was being done about the problems thus...}
uncovered. They demanded answers, not excuses. Poor showings at these events could cost the commander his or her post.

Bratton himself called Compstat “great theater” (1998:296). Such events are staged and made available to the press to convey a powerful image of a technologically empowered leadership holding middle managers accountable to high performance standards. For a public audience, frustrated by municipal red tape and the bureaucratic runaround, such a display focuses attention on what the police are doing for the neighborhoods.

It is possible that Bratton’s strategy for increasing middle management’s responsiveness to his objectives contributed to crime reduction (murder down 31 percent and all crime down 18 percent between 1994 and 1995) (Bratton 1998:289). Rigorous, disinterested analyses of these consequences are as yet unavailable. What is murky is (a) whether this chain of accountability extended down to the rank and file, and (b) how much of the crime reduction can be traced through their efforts back to Bratton’s. What special tools were given to precinct commanders to accomplish the far more daunting task of getting their officers to carry out their directives, implement their projects, and exercise initiative? To what extent did officers use Bratton’s four “guiding methods” of crime control: “accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment; effective tactics, and relentless follow up and assessment” (Kelling and Coles 1996:147)?

Kelling and others are convinced that Bratton’s leadership inspired a transformation in the culture and ultimately the behavior of rank-and-file officers (Gurwitt 1998; Pooley 1996; Remnick 1997). The Commissioner presented subordinates with crime control as the agency’s core mission; he provided them with the “broken windows” theory of aggressive order maintenance to accomplish it; he obtained legal tools to do this; and he provided a means of tracking crime statistics to monitor success on a timely basis. Could these things produce profound changes in a department of 38,000, renown for resistance to reform? And
could these practices reasonably account for sharp declines across a wide range of crimes, including homicide, which is more often than not far removed from the public spaces presumably protected by broken windows strategies? How credible is Bratton's willingness to take credit for this decline when other big cities around the nation are also experiencing a sustained period of crime reduction (albeit not as large as New York City's)—even though they have not employed Bratton's approach? And could all this take place within a year or so of Bratton's becoming commissioner?

There are currently no evaluations of Bratton's interventions that have sufficient scientific rigor to rule out alternative explanations for all or much of the decline in New York City's crime rates (Sherman 1992). So these claims would seem to require a willing suspension of the disbelief which is supposed to be the social scientist's constant companion. But neither the press nor politicians are burdened with this obligation, where there is widespread acclaim for Bratton's success. Featured on the cover of *Time* and countless other press stories, Bratton received credit for brilliant leadership, even the grudging admiration of two journalists for the *Economist*, who wrote a skeptical review of management gurus (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 1996:277-279). Students of the mass media have noted the inclination of the Western press to attribute social phenomena to the influence of leadership, not faceless social, demographic, and economic forces (Gans 1979; Katz and Dayan 1986) and to render favorable interpretations of the leader, even in the face of clear evidence of failure (Chen and Meindl 1991).

Former police chief Tony Bouza noted, that Bratton "had the good sense to be lucky" (1997:8), but I believe that Bratton's record suggests that his success is due to his skill at presentational strategies, not luck in outcomes. Bratton did not modestly accept credit, but aggressively sought it, drawing effectively upon a well-crafted script and well-set stage with all the props to make a convincing drama. The orchestration of his various presentational strategies is impressive by itself and would probably suffice to secure Bratton a
place in the pantheon of "great" commissioners. He has undertaken new strategies, presented them
effectively as bold and innovative, and has packaged them in powerful, dramatic terms that make the effort
itself a validation of their merit. His efforts have received added punch from the precipitous decline in
recorded crime that occurred during his administration, but he provided a more compelling account than
any other chief around the nation about why crime was declining, one that featured his leadership.11 That
was not luck, but great showmanship, so great in fact that it is widely believed it led to his ouster by Mayor
Giuliani.

Discovery, Revelation, and Conversion

Even more than dramas of accomplishment, dramas of discovery, revelation, and conversion are
often contrived by the leader. The chief discovers a vision of a new organizational mission or a new role for
employees, which is revealed, followed by a period during which there is a struggle to convert the
organization. The ostensible target of this transformation is often (though not always) internal, but the
audience for the presentational strategies that demonstrate the success of such conversions always includes
external groups. Such dramas pit the chief against forces inside and outside the organization who resist
change. The chief fixes the opposition by presenting them in a negative light -- venal, incompetent,
unimaginative, or unenlightened. Teddy Roosevelt campaigned against the grip of ward politicians during
his reign as New York City's commissioner (Berman 1987). Vollmer and Parker campaigned in Los
Angeles against corruption from gamblers, bootleggers, and legitimate businesses (Douthit 1975). In both
Houston and New York City Lee Brown fought police alienation from the community, racism, and brutality
with a "neighborhood-oriented" approach (Oettmeier and Brown 1988). In Newport News Darrel Stephens
attacked reactive, incident-driven policing with a problem-oriented approach (Eck and Spelman 1987).
Instances are also found in campaigns against the drinking driver, spouse and child abusers. And the current
movement to professionalize police by requiring a four-year college degree is a prime example of requiring a credentialing ceremony (conferring of the baccalaureate) to attain admittance to police status (Ritti 1994:288). Such a conversion will surely raise the status of police, although it bears no well-documented relationship to improved performance.

One example of a presentational strategy to promote the revelation and conversion of the police was Brown’s high visibility nationwide as an ambassador of neighborhood-oriented community policing. In Houston he initiated “executive sessions” in which a small number of officers and civilians representing all ranks in the department conducted lengthy discussions of problems and possible solutions. Such sessions signified a bottom-up, democratic approach to management, more openness to outsiders (non-police consultants), academic rigor (requiring participants to engage in reading assignments before each session), and generated “initiatives” (projects to deal with some of the problems). While he headed departments in both Houston and New York City, Brown promoted national visibility for his efforts by giving speeches, publishing articles and books. He also benefited from a cover story of the New York Times Sunday magazine that featured one of his New York community policing officers (who was later honored at President Clinton’s State of the Union address). Outside evaluations of Brown’s programs in both Houston and New York City later noted severe implementation deficiencies in the neighborhood-oriented approach (Law Enforcement News 1991; Sadd and Grinc, 1994), but the early presentational strategies had already served the purpose of giving high visibility signs of progress toward the chief’s vision.

Conservation and Preservation

These are dramas where the leader casts the organization’s role as one of preserving social institutions and conventions from the forces of social decay or radical change. Some examples are Bull Connor’s leadership in Birmingham, Frank Rizzo’s in Philadelphia, and Harold Brier’s in Milwaukee, all
oriented to protecting whites from racial minority groups. Police leaders in this type of drama present themselves as defenders of the traditionally dominant culture against intrusions from rising or restive social groups.

It may be easier to think of all of the above dramas in terms of external audiences, but they are equally applicable to internal audiences, such as the officers. Chiefs usually become disfavored (or, on occasion, favored) by the rank-and-file far more for what they symbolize than what they do to affect wages, benefits, and working conditions. Chiefs who espouse the management gurus’ arguments that “The customer is our highest priority,” face the daunting challenge of selling that to officers who feel betrayed by a leader who seems to place the public’s authority and welfare above their own. A chief who presents himself as “one of the troops” (through symbolic gestures of wearing the uniform, attending roll call, responding to calls, making arrests, and socializing with the rank and file) presents a very different image, albeit one with virtually no substantive policy content. And the classic occasion for high drama of this sort is when an officer shoots a citizen. The chief who criticizes or disciplines the officer sends a message that is not limited to this case. It speaks to the much larger issue of where the chief stands on protecting or exposing his subordinates to a hostile environment. Employee support, or at least the absence of extreme antagonism, is an important contributor to a chief’s tenure.

The Impact of Symbolic Leadership

There are two domains in which symbolic acts can have consequences (Pfeffer 1981). One is substantive or technical — “real” in everyday parlance. This involves objectively verifiable actions taken by those the leader targets for mobilization (e.g., whether police officers engage in problem-solving or residents engage in crime watch activities), or it involves objectively verifiable outcomes (e.g., whether there is less crime, fewer traffic accidents, fewer disturbances). The other domain is symbolic outcomes,
those that require an audience’s subjective judgment to determine (e.g., perceptions of safety, perceptions of neighborhood quality of life, attitudes about police service, support for the police department). There is a tendency nowadays to conflate the two domains, often treating symbolic outcomes as on the same plane as technical results. A reduction in fear of crime is viewed as comparable to reducing the objective risk of crime, independent of its consequences for crime reduction (Moore and Stephens 1991). An increase in citizen satisfaction with police service is the same as better service. Residents’ perceptions of a more orderly neighborhood are tantamount to fewer disturbances in the neighborhood (National Institute of Justice 1997). There may be several reasons for this. First, many police programs, such as those falling under the expansive umbrella of community policing, may be intended primarily to serve symbolic purposes, thus making it more important to see how they register on the sentiments and perceptions of targeted audiences. Second, some theories of crime control (e.g., broken windows), make these conditions an essential intervening step between police action and technical results, such as safer neighborhoods. They are important because of their presumed instrumentality for accomplishing technical results. Third, it is probably much easier for police to influence these symbolic outcomes by changing people’s expectations and understandings of events than it is to change those events themselves. The presence of police on foot patrol becomes the *sine qua non* of safer neighborhoods in residents’ minds, even if they have no impact on the crime rate (Police Foundation 1981).

Two dimensions of management action and outcomes have been suggested—one symbolic and one substantive (Pfeffer, 1981:34). It is clear that manager actions carrying lots of dramaturgical freight can be expected to have symbolic outcomes, but can they also have substantive impacts? That is the argument for institutional/transformational leadership—that substantive results can be produced from artful symbolic manipulations, such as things that promote the department’s “core values.” There are, of course,
demonstrations of symbolic management changes producing substantive results. Perhaps the best known of these is the Hawthorne effect, where management’s changes of lighting levels in a factory had no technical merit regarding worker productivity, but such manipulations, fraught with symbolic meaning about management’s interest in the workers, were shown to have a significant impact on worker motivation (a symbolic outcome) which caused them to increase their objectively measured output (a technical outcome). The position taken here is that rather than the tight coupling to substantive outcomes suggested by advocates of transformational leadership, the linkage is quite loose. The principal benefit of the symbolic presentation is that it can produce support for the chief or the department regardless of the technical, substantive consequences.

A “crossover” can occur between a small-scale technical result and a broader symbolic impact. The organization makes an example of an instance of technical performance and uses it to signify the organization’s technical performance on a much broader scale. An example of this “poster-boy” effect is available in an analysis of the NYPD’s campaign against “squeegeemen” (people who without solicitation wash the windows of vehicles stopped in heavy traffic and then solicit payment for service) (Kelling and Coles 1996). Squeegeers epitomized the kinds of social disorders featured in the “broken windows” theory of neighborhood decline. Although the actual risk of theft or violence was small, motorists were reportedly terrorized by the experience, and a department study of a sample of arrested squeegeemen indicated that half had prior arrests for serious crimes (Kelling and Coles 1996:142, 227). Under Bratton’s leadership, NYPD carried out an enforcement program to rid New York’s streets of the squeegeemen. This was accomplished by citing squeegeers for a minor infraction. The infraction itself was punishable by only a small fine or community service. Offenders rarely appeared at proceedings to take their punishment, but the police department worked with the prosecutor’s office to flag nonappearance cases, issuing warrants for this
Available offense and sending them directly to the officer who had issued the citation. Although the authors present no data, they maintain that squeegeeing virtually disappeared as a consequence.

Taking the technical success of the squeegee campaign as a given, we find that this technical victory was used to buttress the Commissioner’s far more tenuous claim that his programs are responsible for the large reductions in a wide range of crimes throughout the city. The campaign against squeegeers was effective symbolically as well as technically. Squeegeers were high visibility offenders observed by large numbers of citizens. Like COMPSTAT, the squeegee campaign provided opportunities to show visuals (first squeegeers, then their absence), more powerful than other order maintenance strategies NYPD employed. It is a mighty leap to jump from this limited technical effect to precipitous and continuing declines in murder, robbery, felony assaults, burglary, and larceny (Kelling and Coles 1996:153). But the symbolic power of that claim is fortified by the power of the technical success of this program, providing audiences with a tangible small scale success from which to generalize presumed success on a much grander scale.

Some Implications for Research

To state the case for the dramaturgical perspective in the strongest terms, one might compare the role of the big-city police chief to that of the current British monarchy, whose sole function is to symbolize governance, not to do it. As intriguing as this comparison is, it understates the things that American police chiefs can accomplish in directing their organizations. However, it is a useful device to free us from the equally distorted, and far more popular, perspective that the chief’s principal purpose is governance. It helps us rethink the role of the big-city chief as a manager. He manages people, money, and other tangible things, but most of all, symbols. This is his domain of greatest consequence.

The level of police chiefs’ symbolic manipulation and its impact vary. In big cities, the dramaturgy
becomes known to most of the audience via the news media. Monitoring the content of those media is a good way to monitor the extent to which chiefs are involved in symbolic presentations. One might measure the extent of symbolic involvement by noting the frequency and prominence of these news accounts. One might analyze the content of those accounts to determine the symbolic freight they carry -- the dramatic themes and the symbols employed, including the ways in which technical proficiency is characterized. Consequences could be measured in both technical and symbolic terms. For example, suppose that a police chief launched a high-publicity campaign to organize residents on a block-by-block basis to work with police to reduce drug dealing (Maas 1998:6). One might track its technical consequences by noting what resources were mobilized (e.g., how police officers and block residents reacted to the initiative), what policing practices changed, and what impact they had on drug dealing in the targeted areas. One could track its symbolic impact by noting the reactions of key actors (reported in the press) and also by interviews or surveys of audiences thought relevant to that problem. How were the chief’s and department’s image affected? Opinions about the administration? Did new themes or players (antagonists or supporting actors) emerge? How long was the issue highly visible and what role did it play in the regime’s prosperity (e.g., the chief’s tenure, the mayor’s political future, budget acquisitions, approval of new policies and programs, turf protection)?

If one conducted a number of such analyses on different chiefs -- in the same and different departments -- one could address questions about what influences symbolic practices and outcomes. To what extent are symbolic impacts determined by the chief (e.g., her skill and experience in symbolic manipulation)? To what extent does the department’s organizational capacity for effective symbolic communication influence results? One might expect that the more organization resources geared to symbolic work, the greater the resources available to the chief for shaping the dramaturgy to her purposes.

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Press and public relations units (Chermak and Weiss 1997; Cohen and Eimicke 1995), as well as crime analysis and research and planning have played a critical role in Bratton's successes in New York City (Bratton 1998). What roles do public relations advisors play in shaping the chief's policy choices? These and other structures can channel and shape the message, affecting the chief's internal control over the dissemination of information with symbolic potency (Ritti 1994:287). Especially in large departments that rely on decentralization to deliver services, it is a special challenge to get everyone "singing from the same page" and not "stepping on the message." And of course, those things external to the organization -- its environment -- may shape the chief's symbolic practices and outcomes (Reiss 1992; 1993; Reiss and Bordua 1967). This requires a more detailed discussion.

Environmental forces are "givens," and difficult for chiefs to control. They may be harnessed, or they may be rendered less intrusive when organizations develop effective buffers (Thompson 1967).

Although organizations strive to create such buffers to stabilize their work environment, reduce uncertainty, and make things run smoother, they vary in their capacities to do so. Despite a century's efforts to buffer American police from local politics, police remain highly penetrated by, dependent on, and susceptible to environmental influences (Reiss 1993). Because city departments are creatures of local government, we usually construe a police department's "environment" in local terms: local political actors, local cultural norms, the local economy, the local demography, the demand for police work in the city, and so on. However, state, national, and international environmental forces are relevant too, often visible in the population migrations, new technologies, the passage of laws, or in policy debates and political contests.

Whether an organization's technical performance may be attributed to the leader or his organization's environment is difficult to determine (Salancik and Meindl 1984). This issue has recently been revived for police leaders by those willing to attribute striking declines in big city crime rates to their
own policy efforts (Bratton 1998; Witkin 1998). Whatever rigorous empirical research may ultimately suggest about those claims and their generalizability to other leaders, other departments, and other times, it seems obvious that police chiefs acting in their symbolic capacity are less environmentally constrained than when seeking technical results. For example, like the president, the chief has greater freedom to select dramatic themes and symbols without the acquiescence of others. And the chief may exert greater control over the parts of his organization that are critical to the creation and dissemination of symbolic messages than he is over police operations themselves. One might suppose that when issues arise in more technically constrained environments, chiefs, are more likely to resort to symbolic solutions and define success in symbolic terms. For example, more turbulent, heterogeneous, resource-scarce, and unstable police agency environments should generate more effort at symbolic manipulation to resolve the problem. A big city chief confronted with visible manifestations of interracial tension and diverse, competing victim groups, understandably looks for large symbolic gestures to cope with these problem. This may involve high-profile discipline of abusive officers, and one or more new programs that signify outreach to alienated groups. Regardless of their impact, the carefully crafted presentation of these leadership actions signals the chief’s commitment to results.

We might also expect to see patterning in the substance of chiefs’ symbolic presentation by fairly stable features of the department’s environment. Wilson (1968) argues that the political culture is an important, stable influence on top department leaders, and through them, the policies and practices of the organization. Extending this argument, we might speculate that where the dominant local political culture emphasizes competence, such as “good government” cities, the chief will rely heavily on technological and quantitative measures to symbolize success (Manning 1997:122). Where the overwhelming pressure concerns distributional responsiveness, presentational strategies should feature who is getting what --
opening of new police facilities in neighborhoods, new services for special victim groups, the reassignment of officers to neighborhoods.

For the purpose of assessing the symbolic actions and impact of police chiefs, the department’s news media environment is particularly important. The amount of attention paid by the press to the police, the resources devoted to independent investigation (as opposed to department records and press releases), the availability of diverse news media outlets, and the degree to which the press strikes an adversarial pose with police are critical influences on how the chief can use the press as an effective vehicle for symbolic communication (Garnett 1992; Linsky 1986).

Finally, researchers may observe the impact of the chief’s role in symbolic communications in the processes of executive selection, turnover, and succession. I have already argued that the highly visible processes of selecting and rejecting top police leadership are central to the dramaturgical role of the chief. This might be tested by using measures of both technical and symbolic performance of the organization to predict turnover in the top leadership of big-city departments. Excluding departures due to death, illness, mandatory retirement, and personal reasons, one might attempt to predict turnover at the top based on measures of the agency’s technical and symbolic performance, as well as indicators of the chief’s personal performance (e.g., personal scandals and awards). Consistent with this paper’s line of argument, one would expect turnover to be best predicted by changes in symbolic fashion (as when a new mayor with a different political perspective takes office) and following dramatic crises involving the department. One would expect the correlation with poor technical performance (e.g., increasing crime rates) to show at best only a weak relationship to turnover, a recurring finding in studies of private sector CEOs (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996:168).

We might also expect to note over long periods of time a shift in who is selected and rejected for top
Police leadership positions. If symbolic communication is increasing in importance, one would expect to see a concomitant shift in those competing and being selected for the top slot. Training, skill, and experience in dealing with symbolic communication should become better predictors of who is selected, and these will take growing precedence over technical training, experience, skill, and knowledge of the department. Thus, we would expect more chiefs hired from outside department ranks, more with advanced degrees, and more who satisfy those making the hiring decision that they are effective with the press and public relations.

The romantic view of police leadership is a powerful force in American society because (a) police are powerful people in whom we invest a great deal, (b) we want them to accomplish good things but be controlled, and (c) we want someone to see that these things are done. The romance of leadership is thus an essential building block for a larger edifice of cultural belief in the improvability of American institutions.

Some may be disquieted to hear that the chief's principal impact is not the improvement of the police in a technical sense, but rather to manage the appearance of improvement. This position does not deny that chiefs can and do contribute to substantive organizational improvement, but it argues that is not the primary reason we have chiefs and invest so heavily in them the trappings of authority and power. More than anything else, we use police leaders to interpret, explain, and represent events of consequence to their organizations and the communities they police.

Notes

1. This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Crime and Social Organization Conference at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, July 28-29, 1997. The author appreciates the suggestions and comments of R. Richard Ritti during the development and writing of this paper and also the comments of Edward R.
Maguire and Roger B. Parks on an earlier draft.


3. Some might argue that the chief's environment permits large scale changes in resource allocation in times of crisis. Afforded a window of opportunity, the chief can mobilize support inside and outside the department to shift resources substantially. I am unaware of any systematic study of the frequency with which chiefs take advantage of these windows, and if so, how long they endure. My impression is that relative to the frequency of such opportunities, substantial realignment of resources is rare and very unlikely to be sustained for long beyond the chief's tenure.


5. These environmental limitations on the big city chiefs' power are felt all the more keenly because, due to other environmental considerations, few enjoy the prospect of lengthy tenure. Most assume this office at the pinnacle of their career, although some serve "at the top" in more than one department. On average, chiefs in large agencies serve five years (Maguire 1997). This instability may in part reflect a political instability that also increases the frequency of mayoral turnover, but a stability in the mayor's office is scant guarantee for a police chief. Indeed, the chief's tenure is more than occasionally the price paid to secure the mayor's reelection. The mayor selects appointees, not so much to establish long-term policy consistency, but more to respond to the most recent crisis and satisfy fluctuations in the local political agenda. Consequently, big city chiefs begin their administrations with a widely held assumption both within and outside the organization that they will not be there long. This makes it especially difficult to generate a sense of either...
loyalty or fear, both useful in securing the support of subordinates and suppressing sabotage of the chief’s priorities. For this and other reasons, frequent executive turnover is associated with diminished executive control (Grusky 1970).

6. For a discussion of this use of training as a response to environmental pressures for organizational performance, see Scott and Meyer (1994) and Mastrofski and Ritti (1996).


8. “... Bratton has made sure that everyone understands the business of the NYPD: to reduce crime—not just a little, a lot. (‘Think bold,’ he said shortly after taking office. ‘I don’t want a 2 to 3 percent reduction in crime this year—I want 15 to 25 percent.’ And he got it)” (Kelling, 1995:40).

9. Sherman’s review of five studies of “zero tolerance arrests” using “moderately strong” research designs leads him to assess the broken windows approach as “promising,” warranting further assessment (1997b:8-33).

10. However, it seems likely that at least some precincts employed the traditional method of “cooking the books” to give the appearance of crime reduction, a not-uncommon occurrence when pressure to cut the crime rates is intense (Butterfield 1998; Fyfe et al. 1997:381).

11. Researchers have noted that managers do consciously fashion causal attributions of their efforts to create the illusion of their mastery of the environment and their ability to produce results (Salancik and Meindl 1984).

12. Bratton has also attributed improvements in the city’s economic indicators to his agency’s efforts as well (Pooley, 1996).

13. See Aldrich (1979), Dess and Beard (1984), Miles (1980), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) for a
discussion of these and other dimensions of organization environment.

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See Skogan and Hartnett (1997) for an account of some management success in transforming officers' intrinsic motivation to do community policing.

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For a discussion of this use of training as a response to environmental pressures for organizational performance, see Scott and Meyer (1994) and Mastrofski and Ritti (1996).

Bratton's leadership has received extensive coverage in the general press, professional journals, as well as books. For this analysis, I draw heavily on Bratton (1998) Kelling (1995) and Kelling and Coles (1996).

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Chapter 9

From Criminals to Criminal Contexts: Reorienting Crime Prevention Research and Policy

David Weisburd

Crime prevention research and policy has traditionally been focused on offenders or potential offenders. We have looked to define strategies that would deter individuals from involvement in crime, or that would rehabilitate them so that they would no longer want to commit criminal acts. In recent years crime prevention efforts have often focused on the incapacitation of high rate or dangerous offenders so that they are not free to victimize law abiding citizens. In the public debate over crime prevention policies, these strategies are often defined as competing approaches for doing something about the crime problem. However, they have in common a central assumption about crime prevention: that our efforts to understand and control crime must begin with the offender. In all of these approaches, the focus of crime prevention is on people and their involvement in criminality.

While this assumption continues to dominate crime prevention research and policy (Brantingham and Brantingham 1990; Felson 1994), it has begun to be challenged by a very different approach that seeks to shift the focus of crime prevention efforts. The new approach developed in good part as a response to the failures of traditional crime prevention programs. The decade of the 1970s which saw a shattering of traditional assumptions about the effectiveness of crime prevention efforts (e.g. see Lipton, Martinson and Wilks 1975; Martinson 1974; Sechrest, White and Brown 1979), led to a reevaluation of research and policy about crime prevention (Visher and Weisburd 1997). For many scholars and policy makers, this meant simply that we had to rethink our assumptions about criminality and how offenders might be prevented from participation in crime. But others suggested that a more radical reorientation of crime prevention efforts was warranted. They argued that the shift must come not in terms of the specific...
strategies that were used, but in terms of the unit of analysis that formed the basis of crime prevention efforts. This new crime prevention called for a focus not on people who commit crime, but on the context in which crime occurs.

This approach, which is often associated with situational crime prevention, looks to develop greater understanding of crime and more effective crime prevention strategies through concern with the physical, organizational, and social environments that make crime possible (Brantingham and Brantingham 1990; Clarke 1980; 1983; 1992; 1995a; Cornish and Clarke 1986). The situational approach does not ignore offenders, it merely places them as one part of a broader crime prevention equation which is centered on the context of crime. It demands a shift in our approach to crime prevention, from one in which we are concerned primarily with why people commit crime to why crime occurs in specific settings. It moves the context of crime into central focus, and places the traditional focus of crime, the offender, as one of a number of factors that impact upon it.

In the sections that follow, I will argue that reorientation of crime prevention research and policy from criminals to criminal contexts provides much promise. But I will also suggest that there is much more work to be done before we can assume that this shift in focus will indeed provide for more successful crime prevention. In order to place these issues in context, I begin by reviewing the factors that have hindered the development of a situational approach to crime prevention in the past, and those that have contributed to its growing influence in recent years. I then compare the relative strengths of this approach with more traditional approaches to crime prevention. Here I identify areas where situational crime prevention has generated new insights about the crime problem and potential responses to it, and discuss the strength of the evidence that has been brought in support of situational crime prevention strategies. In concluding, I suggest that researchers must critically explore the assumptions of situational prevention, by improving...
Why Crime Prevention Research and Policy Has Traditionally Ignored the Context of Crime

At the core of situational prevention is the concept of opportunity (Clarke 1995b; Cornish 1993). In contrast to offender based approaches to crime prevention which usually focus on the dispositions of criminals, situational crime prevention begins with the opportunity structure of the crime situation (Felson and Clarke 1998). By opportunity structure, advocates of this perspective are not referring to the broad societal structure of opportunities that underlie individual motivations for crime (e.g. see Merton 1938), but to the immediate situational components of the context of crime. Their approach to crime prevention is to try to reduce the opportunities for crime in specific situations. This may involve efforts as simple and straightforward as target hardening (e.g. Poyner et al. 1988; Webb and Laycock 1992) or access control (e.g. Matthews 1990; Poyner and Webb 1987), and often follows a straightforward and common sense notion of how to deal with crime problems that has long been accepted by citizens and practitioners who deal with crime prevention at the everyday level of protecting property or reducing victimization (Tonry and Farrington 1995). But there has been resistance to this approach almost from the outset among scholars and policy makers who have crafted crime prevention research and policy.

This resistance is often stated in reference to the problem of displacement (Farrington 1993:94; Laycock and Tilley 1995). Displacement refers to the shift of crime either in terms of space, time or type of offending from the original targets of crime prevention interventions (Repetto 1976). If opportunity based crime prevention strategies simply move offenders from place to place, or shift their activity from one time of the day to another, or lead to adaptations in the methods offenders use, then situational prevention does not
provide a vehicle for dealing broadly with the crime problem. As Repetto argues in terms of police efforts
to reduce crime opportunities:

The police, however, cannot be everywhere; all houses and commercial establishments
cannot be secured with attack-proof doors and windows, and all neighborhood environments
cannot be altered. A differential level of protection between various potential targets, both
human and nonhuman, will always exist. Given the differential and no reduction in the
offender population, will not the foreclosure of one type of criminal opportunity simply shift
the incidence of crime to different forms, times and locales? (1976:167)

There may of course be benefit to the community when it harnesses the displacement phenomenon.
For example, it may be desirable to move prostitutes from an area near a local school, or shift the time of
prostitution later into the night when younger people or commuters are less likely to be present. In turn, if
offenders can be displaced from more to less violent crime, the community may benefit. Nonetheless, if
displacement is an inevitable result of situational prevention, then the utility of situational approaches to
crime prevention would be limited.

Based on assumptions about the large number of crime opportunities available in modern societies,
and the highly motivated nature of much offending, crime prevention scholars have traditionally assumed
that most of the crime control benefits of situational prevention strategies would be lost due to
displacement. Some early studies of displacement appeared to support this position (e.g. Chaiken et al.
1974; Lateef 1974; Mayhew et al. 1976; Press 1971; Tyrpak 1975). However, careful review of these
findings as well as a series of recent studies of displacement in the 1980s and 90s has led to agreement that
displacement of crime prevention benefits is seldom total and often inconsequential (Barr and Pease 1990;
Evidence suggesting that displacement is much less of a problem for situational prevention than had originally been assumed, can be understood only if we abandon simplistic assumptions about opportunity and crime that have been predominant among crime prevention scholars. The idea that criminal opportunities are indiscriminately spread through urban areas has been challenged by a series of studies showing that crime is concentrated in time and space (Brantingham and Brantingham 1981; Sherman et al. 1989; Weisburd et al. 1992; Weisburd and Green 1994). Moreover, criminal opportunities are differentially distributed, both in terms of the benefits that they offer and the ease with which such opportunities can be seized.

In one study of situational measures used to prevent bank robberies, for example, little displacement was noted to other types of targets (convenience stores and gas stations) primarily because they did not offer enough financial reward for the criminal gangs that had victimized the targeted banks (Clarke, Field and McGrath 1991). Using the example of homes and cars, Clarke (1995a:106) suggests that what appears at first glance as an endless quantity of criminal opportunities, may be bounded both by issues of guardianship and significant variation in the value of goods that can be stolen (see also Hesseling 1994).

The portrait of offenders as driven to criminality has begun to be replaced by one that recognizes the situational, often serendipitous, character of much offending (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Weisburd and Waring, forth). Even for crimes that have been assumed most vulnerable to displacement effects, there is evidence that situational characteristics may lead to a dampening of displacement impacts. For example, in an evaluation of a crackdown on prostitution in Finsbury Park, London, Matthews (1990) found little evidence of displacement. He explains this fact by noting that the women involved were not strongly committed to prostitution, but looked at the targeted locations as an easy area to solicit from.
In studies of drug markets, similar crime prevention benefits without displacement have been noted (Green 1995; Weisburd and Green 1995a). Taking into account evidence that drug offenders are responsive to situational factors (e.g. Cromwell et al. 1991) and the importance of such factors in the "geography of the illicit retail marketplace" (Eck 1995), such findings are not difficult to understand. Successful drug markets depend on certain types of access for potential buyers, and easy escape routes if the police decide to crack down on market activities. Drug dealing will be harder in areas where residents or businesses are strongly organized and likely to resist their intrusion. Often drug markets are on main arteries that make them accessible to people from outside the communities where they are found (often suburbanites coming to city). In turn, drug markets are often near convenience stores that allow access to quick snacks and paraphernalia important to the drug trade. Clearly, not every area is suitable to be a drug market, and possible displacement areas that will allow for successful drug dealing are likely to be limited.

Further challenge to the displacement hypothesis, is found in recent studies that suggest a positive though unanticipated consequence of situational prevention. In these cases investigators found improvement in areas close to but not targeted by crime prevention efforts (e.g. see Green 1995; Weisburd and Green 1995a). Ronald Clarke and I argue that this phenomenon is general enough to be deserving of a standard term, which we define as "diffusion" (Clarke and Weisburd 1994). It has been described elsewhere by investigators variously as the "free rider" effect (Miethe 1991), the "bonus" effect (Sherman 1990), the "halo" effect (Scherdin 1986), or the "multiplier effect" (Chaiken 1974). Diffusion is the reverse of displacement. It refers to the diffusion of crime control benefits to contexts that were not the primary focus of crime prevention initiatives. Diffusion has now been documented in crime prevention strategies as diverse as police crackdowns (e.g. Sherman 1990; Weisburd and Green 1995a), book protection systems...
Some situational crime prevention scholars have seen the growing critique of the displacement hypothesis and the concurrent growth of evidence of diffusion of crime control benefits, as leading to an end to the overall academic skepticism that has surrounded situational approaches (Clarke 1995a; Laycock and Tilley 1995). But irrespective of the growing confidence of situational prevention scholars, many sociologists and criminologists still view the context of crime as of secondary importance in the development of research and policy about crime prevention. Many main stream theorists (e.g. Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990) and researchers (e.g. Earls 1991) have come to recognize that situational components of crime cannot be ignored. However, they place these in the context of their relationship to the motivations and actions of individual offenders. Situational prevention is for the most part, viewed as a stop gap measure, that is necessary as long as we do not have a real understanding of the causes of individual criminality (e.g. see Earls 1991). The context of crime remains a secondary concern, even as the assumptions that have most hampered its original acceptance in crime prevention research and policy have begun to be overturned.

Advantages of the Situational Approach

While crime prevention continues to focus on criminals and not the context of crime, there is a growing awareness both among scholars and practitioners of the significant barriers faced in development of effective offender based crime prevention policies. In part, it is basic research associated with understanding the causes and development of criminality which has produced this concern. Researchers have found it difficult to identify who is likely to become a serious offender, or to predict the timing and
Types of offenses that repeat offenders are likely to commit in the future (e.g. Albrecht and Moitra 1988; Barnett and Lofaso 1985; Blumstein and Cohen 1979; Elliot, Dunford and Huizinger 1987; Estrich et al. 1983; Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1990). What this means is that present knowledge does not offer a clear program either for selecting individuals who would be amenable to crime prevention interventions or for development of effective crime prevention strategies that would alter the patterns of criminality among offenders (Earls 1991; Earls and Carlson 1995). Even where there is stronger evidence of prediction, for example in the case of specialization for some types of adult offenders (e.g. Blumstein et al. 1988; Kempf 1986), legal and ethical dilemmas make it difficult to base criminal justice policies on models which still include a substantial degree of statistical error (Moore 1986).

Given the difficulty of predicting criminality, it is perhaps not surprising that applied research in offender centered crime prevention has more often than not illustrated the significant barriers that are faced in the development of successful interventions. Beginning with Robert Martinson's critique of rehabilitation programs in 1974 (see also Lipton, Martinson and Wilks 1975), there have been a series of studies documenting the failures of traditional crime prevention initiatives (e.g. Sechrest, White and Brown 1979; Whitehead and Lab 1989). A number of scholars argue that many such failures are due to inadequacies in program development and research design in prior studies (e.g. Goldstein 1990; Farrington, Ohlin and Wilson 1986). Moreover, some reviews have stressed that there are examples of successful offender focused crime prevention efforts, which can provide guidance for the development of more effective prevention policies (Lipsey 1992; Farrington 1983). Nonetheless, even those scholars that look to improve such policies, have come to recognize the difficulties inherent in trying to do something about criminality (Visher and Weisburd 1997). Summarizing the overall standing of what they define as traditional "offender centred" crime prevention, Patricia and Paul Brantingham write: "If traditional
approaches worked well, of course, there would be little pressure to find new forms of crime prevention. If traditional approaches worked well, few people would possess criminal motivation and fewer still would actually commit crimes." (1990:19)

Situational prevention advocates argue that the context of crime provides a promising alternative to traditional offender based crime prevention policies. It is assumed for the most part that situations are a much more stable and predictable focus for crime prevention efforts than are persons. In part this assumption develops from common sense notions of the relationship between opportunities and crime. For example, shoplifting is by definition clustered in stores and not residences, and family disputes are unlikely to be a problem in industrial areas. High crime places, in contrast to high crime people, cannot flee to avoid criminal justice intervention. Crime that develops from the specific characteristics of certain market places or organizations cannot be easily transferred to other organizational contexts (Goldstock 1993).

There is also strong theoretical support for the predictability of crime in specific contexts. Following the insights of routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 1986; 1994) advocates of the situational approach to crime prevention argue that specific types of targets are found in specific situations, and the type of criminal activity that develops in such situations is linked strongly both to the nature of those targets and the types of guardianship and the nature of the offenders that converge within them. Combining this approach with a "rational choice perspective" which emphasizes the rationality of offender decisions about criminality (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cornish and Clarke 1986) a significant degree of specialization of crime is expected. For example, robberies are seen as most likely to be found in places where many pedestrians stroll (such as bus stops and business districts), where there are few police or informal guardians (e.g. door men), and where a supply of motivated offenders can be found nearby or at least within easy public transportation access. Such places are not likely to be centers for prostitution,
which would favor easy access of cars (and little interference by shop keepers who are likely to object to the obvious nature of street solicitations), nor flashing which is much more likely to be found in the more anonymous environments of public parks (see Sherman 1995).

Empirical support for these assumptions has been developed in regard to a number of different types of crimes and crime situations (Clarke 1992; 1995a). Recent studies for example, point to a significant concentration of crime events at crime "hot spots" usually defined as a cluster of addresses or street segments (Pierce, Spaar and Briggs 1986; Sherman et. al. 1989; Weisburd et al. 1992; Weisburd and Green 1994). Lawrence Sherman (1995) argues that such clustering of crime at place is even greater than the concentration of crime among individuals. Using data from Minneapolis, Minnesota and comparing these to the concentration of offending in the Philadelphia Cohort Study (see Wolfgang, Figlio and Selin 1972), he notes that future crime is "six times more predictable by the address of the occurrence than by the identity of the offender" (1995:36-37). He asks: "why aren't we doing more about it? Why aren't we thinking more about wheredunit, rather than whodunit?"

Specialization has been identified even within crime types that ordinarily go undifferentiated in crime prevention analyses and programs. For example, Eck (1995) and Weisburd and Green (1994) find a high degree of specialization in the context of street level drug markets. Not only are specific drugs concentrated in specific drug markets, but there is a clear relationship between the physical and geographic characteristics of the markets and the drugs that predominate in them. Such relationships are explained by the nature of the use of the drugs involved and the types of individuals most likely to buy and sell them. Poyner and Webb (1991) also point to the importance of recognizing specialization within crime categories. They show that residential burglaries committed for cash and jewelry are carried out by opportunistic offenders who walk to their targets, while residential burglaries committed in order to take electronic goods
demand much more committed offenders who drive to their targets. The importance of easy access by cars on the one hand and the more spontaneous aspect of crime events on the other have important implications for our understanding of the types of burglaries that occur in different contexts.

While these and other studies suggest that scholars may have more success in predicting crime in situations than crimes of persons, such assumptions should not be made too quickly. In the first case, much of this evidence is drawn from applied research studies focusing on assessments of crime prevention efforts. In turn, in a few studies that have subjected these assumptions to large scale empirical analysis, results have been mixed. For example, Weisburd et al. (1992) do find a degree of specialization of crime types at crime hot spots, but report that most places evidence a mix of related offenses (see also Sherman 1995). In examination of the criminal careers of public places in Boston over a three year period, Spelman suggests that a substantial reduction in crime can be developed by concentrating crime prevention efforts at the worst locations. Nonetheless, he concludes that "(m)uch of the concentration of crime among locations is due to random and temporary fluctuations that are beyond the power of the police and the public to control reliably" (1995:142).

Whatever the empirical support for the assumptions underlying situational approaches, there is a vast array of applied studies that point to the success of situational measures in reducing crime and crime related problems. These studies have been reviewed extensively elsewhere (see Clarke 1992; Clarke 1995a; Eck 1997; Poyner 1993;). Nonetheless it is important to note that they span a very broad group of crime contexts and involve a broad array of opportunity reducing measures. Clarke (1995a) suggests that such programs can be divided into twelve broad categories. These include target hardening (e.g. Webb and Laycock 1992), access control (e.g. Matthews 1990), deflecting offenders (e.g. through physical barriers; see Shearing and Stenning 1984), controlling facilitators (e.g. gun controls, see Earls 1991), entry/exit
screening, formal surveillance (e.g. security guards or electronic screening systems, see Scherdin 1986), surveillance by employees (e.g. doormen, see Waller and Okihiro 1978), natural surveillance (e.g. street lighting, see Ramsey 1991a), target removal (e.g. Markus 1984), identifying property (e.g. Clarke and Harris 1992), removing inducements (e.g. rapid repair, see Smith 1995) and rule setting (e.g. Ramsay 1991b).

Based on such successful case studies, there is growing interest both among crime prevention scholars and practitioners in the situational approach (Laycock and Tilly 1995; Tonry and Farrington 1995). Nonetheless, in most of these studies the methods of evaluation used meet only minimal technical standards, follow-up is often very short, and reliable control groups are generally absent (Clarke 1995a). Eck writes, for example, in terms of the broad success shown by studies of opportunity reducing strategies at places, that the scientific rigor supporting the conclusions is usually moderate at best, and is frequently weak (1997:40). It is important to point out in this regard, that there was general agreement among crime prevention scholars and practitioners regarding the effectiveness of offender based prevention programs before Robert Martinson (1974) reported the results of his systematic review of existing research. In good part he and his colleagues (Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks 1975) found that the weaker the research design employed the more likely that success was to be reported.

The evidence supporting situational prevention appears so broad as to make a similar conclusion unlikely. Moreover, a few experimental studies have recently been completed which do show significant crime prevention effects (e.g. Sherman and Weisburd 1995; Weisburd and Green 1995a). Nonetheless, the enthusiasm surrounding situational prevention must be tempered by the weakness of the methods used in most existing evaluation studies.

Filling the Gaps: Basic Research and Stronger Evaluation
While there is much reason for optimism concerning the situational approach to crime prevention, there are still substantial gaps in our knowledge of how crime develops in specific contexts and in our assessment of the overall success of situational prevention initiatives. In part such gaps have developed from a lack of basic research examining the context of crime. Studies of situational crime prevention have most often been applied. This is the case, in part, because of a traditional lack of interest among funders in basic as opposed to applied research in crime prevention. But it also results from the emphasis on practical crime prevention that is implied by the most common designation of this perspective as "situational crime prevention." The basic concern of situational crime prevention scholars has been with what works in crime prevention. They have been less concerned with basic research questions that would allow a more complex understanding of why situational strategies are successful.

Present knowledge, however, does not offer a solid basis upon which to define a widespread societal approach to situational prevention. Nor does it allow us to say with confidence that the assumptions underlying situational crime prevention are more solid than those that underlie offender based prevention programs. Basic research in this area will fill important gaps in our understanding, and provide guidance and insight for public policy initiatives.

For example, we need to gain a greater understanding of those factors that influence the development of crime in specific contexts. Such research is likely to take a direction similar to that of offender based studies of criminal careers (Blumstein, Cohen, Roth and Visher 1986; for an application of this perspective to places, see Sherman 1995). We need to consider why crime develops in a particular place, situation, or organizational context---what criminal career theorists define in terms of offenders as the problem of "onset". We also need to develop knowledge on why some criminal contexts include a very high rate of criminal activity and others experience only a few incidents, or why some include more serious
crimes. That is, we must develop understanding of the factors that influence the "frequency" or intensity of offending and its seriousness. A major factor that has impeded offender focused crime prevention is the lack of "specialization" in criminal careers. We need to define to what extent there is specialization in the types of offending that occur in criminal contexts, and to develop a greater understanding of situations in which there is "transition" among offenses. Finally, we need to define more carefully the factors that lead to a cessation of criminality in specific contexts. This is particularly important given the claims of success of situational prevention advocates. Both the natural and programmatic influences that lead to "desistance" of crime situations must be explored.

While the basic themes of criminal career research can be applied easily to criminal contexts, scholars will face significant challenges in defining common units of analysis in carrying out such studies. The boundaries of context are not as easily defined as those of persons. Complexity in criminal career research has increased as a result of the concept of co-offending (Reiss and Farrington 1991), which suggests that there may be a diverse set of potential units for understanding the development of crime among persons, from the individual, to the family, to the friendship group, and larger units such as gangs. Nevertheless, the diversity of potential units of analysis is much greater in study of the contexts of crime.

Context may be defined in terms of physical places (e.g. Eck and Weisburd 1995; Sherman et al 1989), or organizational settings (e.g. Goldstock 1993). Even within a common type of context, such as place, there is a wide variety of potential definitions that can be applied in defining units for analysis. For example, study of crime hot spots has focused on addresses (e.g. Sherman et al. 1989; Spelman 1995), block faces (e.g. Sherman and Weisburd 1995), or even large areas or neighborhoods (e.g. Cohen, Gorr and Olligschlaeger 1993). Hot spot studies have also included units of various physical size, based on criteria of the clustering or consistency of crime events (e.g. Block 1994; Weisburd and Green 1994). The diversity of
of potential units for study may add to the sophistication of our knowledge about the context of crime. Nonetheless, such ambiguity points to the importance of clearly defining what is meant by context in any particular study.

A basic research agenda is also needed for assessing the related issues of displacement and diffusion. Evidence of these effects has been gained primarily as a by product of studies that examine the direct impacts of crime prevention programs (Weisburd and Green 1995b). Accordingly, such studies are designed first to examine the main effects of a program and only secondarily, and often simply as a defense against potential criticism, do they respond to concerns about displacement and diffusion. The weakness of this approach is two fold. First, there is often a tension between research design for measuring direct and displacement and diffusion effects (Weisburd and Green 1995b). For example, given the choice of investing resources in measurement of direct or potentially diffuse displacement outcomes (see Barr and Pease 1990), it makes good sense for the evaluator to invest resources in the main effects of the study. But it is also the case that applied crime prevention studies are unlikely to allow a broad review of the nature of displacement and diffusion impacts. Such studies are generally designed to minimize displacement and maximize diffusion effects. They do not provide an optimal context in which to gain a reliable understanding of how displacement and diffusion operate in a diverse set of circumstances.

In order to develop a better understanding of displacement and diffusion, studies must be initiated that are directed at these effects and not the primary outcomes of crime prevention initiatives. Such studies would be concerned with main program impacts only in so far as they provide a setting for understanding displacement and diffusion. For example, an ongoing Police Foundation study supported by the National Institute of Justice is bringing highly concentrated and focused policing interventions to three sites in Jersey City, N.J., in order to track potential displacement and diffusion impacts. The Police Foundation study is
Concerned with direct program effects only in so far as they allow the potential for displacement and diffusion. Its main concerns are with the nature and types of displacement produced for three different crime types, and on the methodological problems associated with measurement of displacement and diffusion, in particular those that relate to the potential for such effects to be dispersed across space, time and offense type. More generally, studies might use expanding knowledge about successful crime prevention initiatives to manipulate the form and intensity of displacement and diffusion in a wide variety of contexts and in regard to a broad array of crime types.

A third area of basic research has less to do with the effectiveness of situational approaches, than with their application in real human settings. It does not take a sustained research effort to recognize that cracking down on a place or situation and cracking down on an offender are likely to have very different implications both in terms of legal norms and public perceptions. Situational approaches have in part been advocated on this basis, under the assumption that situational approaches to crime prevention, present fewer legal and ethical difficulties than do offender based initiatives. Nonetheless, legal and moral questions may be raised about the potential intrusiveness of situational crime prevention measures in the everyday lives of ordinary people (e.g. see Green 1996). The legal and moral implications of situational prevention should be a focus of research attention. To date, there has only been limited discussion of the legal implications of situational prevention strategies, and the long term impacts that wide spread adoption of situational measures might have on the quality of everyday life. Such discussion needs to be informed by concentrated legal scholarship and social research.

While basic research is crucial to the development of effective situational crime prevention initiatives, it is also important to encourage a more methodologically sophisticated approach to applied
studies in this area. Summarizing the evaluation studies that provide the bulk of positive evidence about situational prevention, Ronald Clarke writes:

…it has to be recognized that in most cases the individual evaluations were comparatively rudimentary. Follow-ups were often short, so little is known about the durability of success. True experimental designs were almost completely absent from the studies (most of which consisted of simple time-series or quasi-experimental designs), with the result that in most cases it was impossible to be sure that the identified situational measures had produced the observed reduction in crime. (1995a:108)

In many areas of situational crime prevention practice, the rhetoric of success has clearly outstripped the empirical evidence available. Problem oriented policing, for example, which uses an action research model similar to that suggested in situational prevention (see Goldstein 1990), has exploded onto the American police scene. However, there is to date not a single controlled study that supports the success of problem oriented policing, and only a handful of solid non-experimental evaluations (e.g. Eck and Spelman 1987).

In order to avoid the danger of overstating the effectiveness of situational crime prevention-- a common pitfall in crime prevention research generally--- we must begin to develop more rigorous and more controlled evaluations of situational prevention programs. Given the costs of such evaluations, we should begin by focusing on those public policy questions of greatest concern and on those programs that suggest the most likelihood of success. In this we should follow earlier lessons drawn from the failures of offender based studies. Too often, scarce research resources have been wasted on evaluations of programs that were poorly constructed and implemented, and in retrospect had little possibility of success in the first place (Farrington, Ohlin and Wilson 1986; Weisburd 1993). Researchers and policy makers can help to avoid
waste in the development of such research by defining a long term agenda for applied studies, clearly identifying criteria for evaluation and areas of keen interest. Whatever that focus may take, it is time to subject situational crime prevention to the same level of scrutiny that has been applied to offender focused programs.

Conclusions

In deciding on crime control policies we are faced with a difficult dilemma. Societal resources to control crime are scarce and cannot be devoted to every potential crime prevention policy. Hard choices must be made. In this context the role of research and evaluation is particularly important. They can help in making informed decisions about what types of policies are likely to be most effective at the least social and economic cost. Present knowledge suggests that we should invest more in situational crime prevention policies. But the evidence to date should lead as well to caution in embarking on such policies. It is time to invest in basic research concerning the context of crime, and in solid controlled evaluations of situational crime prevention programs.

References


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Notes
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Chapter 10

Evidence-based Policing: Social Organization of Information for Social Control

Lawrence W. Sherman

Of all the contributions Albert J. Reiss, Jr. has made, perhaps the most influential is his work on the social organization of social control. The best evidence for this claim is the widespread use in modern speech of Reiss's concept of "proactive" strategy (Reiss and Bordua 1967; Reiss 1971) which takes the initiative to control a situation by anticipating events rather than responding to them. The concept of proactive policing has had profound influence on police work, especially on the national reinvention of police management begun in New York City in the 1990s (Reppetto 1997). To the extent that changes in policing may have helped reduce rates of homicide and robbery (Blumstein 1998), it is no exaggeration to credit this change in substantial part to Reiss's analysis of the social organization of police work.

The concept of proactive mobilization has spread far beyond policing to such worlds as business, charitable fund-raising, and personal time management. Yet when the concept was first described in a paper submitted to a major sociological journal in the early 1960s, the paper was rejected on the grounds that "there is no such word as proactive in the English language" (Reiss 1991). There is now. The Oxford English Dictionary (1989 Vol XII: 533) credits Reiss (1971) with the first usage of the word.

Less well-known, but equally important, is Reiss's work on the social organization of information processing. This work includes landmark contributions to the measurement of personal crime (Reiss 1967), organizational crime (Biderman and Reiss 1968), crime against small business (Reiss 1969), repeat victimization (Reiss 1980), co-offending (Reiss 1988) and other crime problems. It also includes his last published analysis of the social organization of police organizations (Reiss 1992:82), in which Reiss describes "the production and processing of information" as "the core technology of police organizations."
This view challenges and refines a widely-held definition of the police as an institution centered on its power to dispense force and threats of force as situationally required (Bittner 1970; Klockars 1985). Reiss also laid out a theoretical framework that anticipated the New York City Police Department's later innovations in policing by crime analysis (Bratton 1998) known as "COMPSTAT" or computerized crime statistics (although Reiss gave far greater attention to problems of legitimacy in proactive citizen encounters, see e.g., 1971: 175-180).

Taken together, Reiss's concepts of proactive mobilization and of formal organization as information processing provide a clear framework for a new paradigm in professional decision-making. This paradigm began in medicine in the early 1990s and is spreading rapidly to other fields. The paradigm proactively mobilizes information about cause and effect into guiding decisions about matters that recur with substantial similarity in high volume. The paradigm focuses on the commonalities across such problems as breast cancer, domestic violence, and learning disabilities, rather than just the unique characteristics of each case. The paradigm assumes uncertainty in decision-making, but seeks the best "evidence" from all possible sources about the likely consequences of alternative practices or policies for general categories of cases. The paradigm further assumes that evidence varies in its reliability, and that the quality of evidence should be a major issue in creating and evaluating guidelines for practice.

Applying Reiss's conceptual framework to the paradigm of evidence-based practice yields the following thesis of this chapter: American (and perhaps world) policing has made major strides in the use of information to organize police work more effectively, but it still has a long way to go. A new emphasis on identifying and policing patterns of criminal events across places and times, led by the movement for Problem-Oriented Policing (Goldstein 1979), has been supported by the rapid spread of personal computer technology in major police agencies. But as Reiss (1992: 92-93) points out, problem-oriented policing
(POP) is "highly dependent on research and development as its core technology." Adumbrating the conclusion Herman Goldstein (1998) later presented to the leaders of the POP movement, Reiss (1992: 86) pinpointed the major barrier to better use of information for organizing social control:

Research is empirical investigation that describes and explains how things behave and how that behavior can be changed. Development is the implementation of models that demonstrate that an intervention works in a predictable way. Police organizations essentially lack research and development units. (italics added)

Reiss goes on to argue that the absence of true research and development in police departments is a major hurdle to the success of the POP strategy. He attributes this in part to the problem of resources (1992: 93):

Research and development generally requires more resources than a single police organization--even the largest ones--can command for the wide variety of problems the organization faces. A problem-solving police will have to find collective research and development models of problem solving.

This chapter attempts to provide one possible solution to the problem Reiss identified. It combines collective models of research and development (such as federally-sponsored basic research) with agency-specific models for local application and extension of collective research. The chapter proceeds from Reiss's arguments that 1) information processing is the core technology of policing, including problem solving, and 2) research and development is the core information technology of problem solving. Without research and development, policing lacks the information needed to solve crime problems. Solving crime problems, however, requires not only that the information be produced. It also requires that the information be applied: that research evidence be put to work in guiding police operations. The twin hurdles of
producing and applying research can be overcome by using the evidence-based practice paradigm in the social organization of information for decisionmaking about social control.

This chapter outlines the major elements of an evidence-based paradigm for using information in police organizations. It begins by reviewing the social organization of information for medical decisionmaking as a useful point of reference, although not an exact analogy. The medical discussion focuses on the role of organizational "evidence cops" as internal accountability managers providing information on outputs and outcomes to all levels of the organization. The chapter shows how such performance information can be socially organized to monitor and change police practices on a continuing basis for improvement in results. It illustrates the paradigm with the example of research and practice in policing domestic violence. Finally, like Reiss's own analysis, the chapter ends by identifying further hurdles that must be overcome in order for the paradigm to operate as intended.

The Evidence-Based Paradigm

Evidence-based practice is a paradigm for making decisions. It requires learning as much as possible about cause and effect in professional practice, then mobilizing that information to guide practice toward producing more desirable results (Millenson 1997; Zuger 1997). The paradigm consists of proactively identifying as many sources and kinds of variation in practice as possible, in order to isolate the variations which measurably affect the desired outcomes. Once isolated, those factors are then used to create guidelines for practice, especially in making high-volume decisions about frequently recurring situations. An evidence-based diet employs guidelines based on the best evidence about the effect of what you eat on how you feel, how you look, and what diseases you may suffer. Evidence-based parenting takes guidance from the best research about how to raise children to be happy, self-reliant, and honest. An evidence-based school is one that is guided by the best research on how children learn different kinds of knowledge. Like
the decisions made for doctoring and policing, the decisions made for eating, parenting and schooling occur and recur millions of times each day, and are thus far more amenable to guidelines for practice based on scientific research than are such low volume decisions as war or foreign trade treaties.

Evidence-based practice does not require perfect knowledge of cause and effect. It merely seeks to implement guidelines for making decisions based on the best knowledge available. Such knowledge can be derived from published research in other settings, from applied research in each setting, or from both.

Published research, for example, may show that police officers who treat criminal suspects more politely may cause lower repeat offending rates than do officers who treat offenders with less respect or courtesy (Tyler 1990; Paternoster et al. 1997). This research could form the basis for national, evidence-based guidelines on how to talk and listen to suspects during the arrest process. A local police commander could then examine the effectiveness of the guidelines by analyzing differences in repeat offending rates across officers, controlling for the prior offending rates of the suspects who each officer arrests. Examining differences by officer can be the basis for comparing more specific aspects of the arrest process, and isolating the factors that reduce repeat offending in that particular neighborhood and arrest caseload.

Similarly, a computerized history of crimes committed against any one victim, as well as police responses to those crimes, may reveal that the victim has not been afforded police protection against repeat occurrences in the immediate aftermath of many offenses. It may also show that officers who took certain actions were able to reduce the risk of a repeat offense against victims of certain kinds of offenses for longer periods than officers who did not take those actions. Such evidence could then lead a group of officers to develop local guidelines for preventive action. These guidelines would have measurable outputs, such as installing a temporary burglar alarm, that could then be subjected to further research. If the
production of those outputs failed to prevent repeat offending, the guideline might be abandoned. If the output was clearly able to reduce repeat offending, but not all officers produced the output, the evidence could lead to management efforts to obtain greater officer compliance with the guideline.

The evidence-based paradigm is clearly different from other ways of thinking, drawing conclusions, making decisions and guiding behavior. It is fundamentally skeptical about experience, wisdom, or personal credentials as a basis for asserting what works. Like the U.S. Supreme Court's rules for allowing expert testimony (e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow and Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael), the paradigm is especially skeptical about the value of experience alone to reveal probabilistic relationships of cause and effect, at least without the application of systematic rules to processing of information derived from experience. For every claim that X causes Y, evidence-based thinking asks only "what is the evidence?" and not "who says so?" The answer can then be graded from weak to strong, based on standard rules of scientific inference. A before-after comparison is stronger than a simultaneous correlation, and a randomized controlled test is stronger than a longitudinal cohort analysis. Strong evidence trumps weak, irrespective of how articulate or charismatic the person presenting the evidence may be.

In this respect, evidence-based practice is no different from the basic epistemology of science. But it can be attacked with as much fury as science itself was attacked in the Renaissance, when cause and effect were matters governed by religious doctrine. In the modern world, the doctrine of learning by experience is just as powerful, and just as threatened by evidence-based thinking.

The idea that each specific case of a given problem is too complex and idiosyncratic to be solved by reference to guidelines or prior research is a powerful force against evidence-based thinking. Even unique historical situations, such as military confrontations with a particular nation, can be informed by qualitative historical evidence that focus on similarities to past events (Neustadt and May, 1986). The argument that all
cases are unique is also a powerful defense against criticism of those who exercise discretion in dealing with problems. If there is no right way to do something, no one can ever be wrong. That viewpoint is ultimately nihilistic, and a major obstacle to making progress.

Evidence-Based Medicine

The power of resistance to evidence-based thinking is most clearly exemplified in an institutional setting where it is least expected. Of all the human service professions in modern life, medicine is arguably the most scientific in its culture, values, and epistemology. Yet the evidence shows that doctors are strongly resistant to using new evidence to change practices. The medical example also shows, however, that proactive mobilization of information can increase the effectiveness of social control, where it has already saved many lives in such operations as coronary bypass surgery.

Medicine outranks all other professions in the volume of high-quality evidence it has produced. The number of randomized controlled experiments in medical practice is now estimated to number some one million in print (Sackett and Rosenberg, 1995). This achievement has been reached in a mere fifty years since an economist-turned medical statistician, Sir Austin Bradford Hill, first used the randomized experiment to test streptomycin as a cure for tuberculosis in 1948 (Brown, 1998).

The massive production of evidence in medicine, however, has not been nearly equalled by its application of evidence to decisionmaking in medical practice. Close examination reveals that medicine has long been a battleground between research and tradition. It is over a century since Ignaz Semmelweis lost his job for arguing that doctors should wash their hands before delivering babies, but similar battles are still being fought (Millenson, 1997: 4, 122, 131):

- An estimated 85% of medical practices remain untested by research evidence.
- Most doctors rarely read the 2,500 medical journals and base their practices on local custom.
Most studies that do guide practice use weak, non-randomized research designs.

Many guidelines based on careful reviews of evidence are widely ignored.

The use of evidence to create national guidelines promulgated by the National Institutes of Health is a case in point. Based on intensive reviews of research evidence on specific medical practices, NIH convenes advisory boards to issue recommendations to physicians. These recommendations usually receive extensive publicity, and are reinforced by mailings of the guidelines to every doctor they affect. But according to a RAND evaluation, doctors rarely change their practices in response to publication of these guidelines (Kosecoff, et al, 1987, as cited in Millenson, 1997). Thus three years after research found that heart attack patients treated with calcium antagonists were more likely to die, doctors still prescribed this dangerous drug to one-third of heart attack patients. Eight years after antibiotics were shown to cure ulcers, 90 percent of ulcer patients remained untreated by antibiotics (Millenson, 1997: 123-125). While it would be mechanistic to argue that every patient should be treated according to guidelines, regardless of patient preferences or other factors, it seems equally extreme to see research-based recommendations so widely ignored.

Evidence Cops

The struggle to change medical practice based on research evidence has a long history, with valuable implications for policing. In the 1840s a Viennese doctor named Ignaz Semmelweis discovered that maternal death in childbirth was associated with medical students delivering babies immediately after performing autopsies. He conducted a simple experiment that showed deaths were greatly reduced when doctors washed their hands before a delivery. He then tried to create a guideline for medical practice based on this research, and suggested that even his own superior, the chief obstetrician, wash hands before childbirth. This led to Semmelweis being driven out of town. Hundreds of thousands of women died
because the profession refused to comply with his evidence-based guidelines for some 40 years. The story shows the important distinction between merely doing research, and proactively applying research to redirect professional practices.

One way to describe people who try to apply research is the role of "evidence cop." More like a traffic cop than Victor Hugo's detective "Javert," the evidence cop's job is to redirect practice through compliance rather than punishment. While this job may be as challenging as herding cats, it still consists of pointing professionals to practice "this way, not that way." Like all policing, the success rate for this job varies widely. Fortunately, the initial failures of people like Semmelweiss paved the way for greater success in the 1990s.

Consider Scott Weingarten, M.D., of Cedars-Sinai Hospital in Los Angeles. As director of the hospital's Center for Applied Health Services Research, Weingarten is an evidence-cop-in-residence. His job is to monitor what the 2,250 doctors are doing with patients at the hospital, and to detect practices that run counter to recommendations based on research evidence. He does this by prodding rather than by punishment, convening groups of doctors who treat specific maladies to discuss the research evidence he brings to their attention. These groups then produce their own consensus guidelines for practice that become hospital policy; thirty-five such sets of guidelines were produced in Weingarten's first four years in the job (Millenson, 1997: 120).

The basic premise of evidence-based practice is that we are all entitled to our own opinions, but not to our own facts. Yet left alone to practice individually, practitioners do come up with their own "facts," which often turn out to be wrong. A recent survey of 82 Washington State doctors found 137 different strategies for treating a urinary tract infection (Berg, 1991); no doubt the same result could be found for handling domestic disturbances. But few of these strategies are supported by systematic evidence, which
can produce very different results from experience. A study evaluating the accuracy of strep throat diagnoses based on unstructured examination by experienced pediatricians found it far inferior to a systematic, evidence-based checklist used by nurses. The mythic power of subjective and unstructured experience holds back every field, and keeps it from systematically discovering and implementing what works best in repeated tasks.

A prime example of evidence-based decisionmaking shows how it can mobilize social control to save lives. In 1990, the New York State Health Department began to publish death rates in coronary bypass surgery by hospital and individual surgeon. This action was prompted by research showing that while the statewide average death rate was 3.7 percent, some doctors had as high as 82 percent of their patients dying on the operating table. Moreover, after adjusting for the risk of death by the pre-operation condition of the patient caseload, patients were 4.4 times more likely to die in surgery at the least successful hospitals as at the best hospitals. Despite enormous opposition from hospitals and surgeons, these data were made public, revealing a strong practice effect: the more operations doctors and hospitals did each year, the lower the risk-adjusted death rate. Using this clear correlation to push low-frequency surgeons and hospitals out of this business altogether, hospitals were able to lower the death rate in these operations by 40 percent in just three years (Millenson, 1997: 195).

What the New York State Health Department, NIH, UCLA's Dr. Weingarten, and the 1995 founders of the new journal called "Evidence-Based Medicine" are all trying to do is to push research into practice. Just as policing has become more proactive at dealing with crime, researchers are becoming more proactive about dealing with practice. This trend has developed in many fields, not just medicine. Increased pressure for "reinventing government" to focus on measurable results is reflected in the 1994 U.S. Government Performance Results Act (GPRA), which requires all federal agencies to file annual reports on quantitative...
indicators of their achievements. Education is under growing pressure to raise test scores as proof that children are learning, which has led to increased discussion of research evidence on what works in education (Raspberry, 1998). The US Congress has required (104th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives Report 104-378, Sec. 116) that the effectiveness of federally funded crime prevention programs to be evaluated using "rigorous and scientifically recognized standards and methodologies" (Sherman, et al, 1998). All this sets the stage for applying Reiss's principles of social organization to the evidence-based paradigm to make research more useful to policing than it has ever been before.

**Key Questions**

In describing Reiss's framework as a new paradigm called evidence-based policing, there are four key questions to answer: What is it? What is new about it? How does it apply to a specific example of police practice? How can it be institutionalized?

**What Is It?**

Evidence-based policing is the use of the best available research on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units and officers. Put more simply, evidence-based policing uses research to guide practice and evaluate practitioners. It uses best evidence to decide what constitutes best practice. It is a systematic effort to parse out and codify unsystematic "experience" as the basis for police work, refining it by ongoing systematic testing of hypotheses. Evaluation of ongoing operations has been the crucial missing link in many recent attempts to improve policing. If it is true that most police work has yet to go "Beyond 911" (Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy, 1990), the underlying reason may be a lack of evaluation systems that clearly link research-based guidelines to outcomes. It is only by using such evidence that policing can become a "reflexive" or "smart" institution, continuously improving itself with ongoing feedback.
Evidence-based policing uses a wide range of research methods and designs to answer different kinds of questions. At least five key questions can drive the paradigm: 1) What guidelines worked elsewhere, 2) Which units get the best results here, 3) How much does each unit comply with current guidelines, 4) What can reduce repeat offending against each particular victim or by each particular offender, 5) What guidelines generally work best for preventing crime in this kind of crime pattern? Each of these questions may require different kinds of evidence to answer them.

Published research from other agencies offers the best answer to the first question, more precisely framed as "what would happen if we could replicate a certain practice tested elsewhere?" In-house retrospective research on the agency's varying crime outcomes across units and officers helps answer the second question: "who in our agency has been getting the best results, given the relative seriousness and difficulty of the crime problems they confront?" Retrospective research can also answer the third, related question: "how much compliance with agency guidelines for dealing with certain crime problems is found in each police unit and on each shift?"

Other questions can also be answered by in-house research. Both repeat victims and repeat offenders can be examined proactively, using new kinds of information systems. Victim-based and offender-based records can be organized like medical charts on patients, recording the history of crimes and police responses for each victim or offender. These would differ from offender "rap sheets" by providing far more detail about the nature of the crime, the way in which police identified the parties, and the specific response imposed by the courts or other systems (such as mental health or drug treatment programs). These "victim charts" or "offender charts" can help answer the fourth question: "what proactive approach might we invent or replicate to reduce the risk of further crimes against this particular victim?" or risk of crimes committed by a particular offender. In-house prospective research--experimental, quasi-experimental or even
correlational-- could help answer the fifth, more general question: "which of several plausibly effective interventions in a common pattern of repeat victimization or offending--such as burglary, domestic violence, or commercial robbery--produces, on average, the best chance of preventing further harm against victims?"

**Numbers and Stories**

These five questions suggest a basic tension between using numbers or stories as the basis for making decisions. Evidence-based policing presumes that statistical analyses are superior to, but still in need of, case studies as a means of answering what are essentially quantitative questions: how much impact does directed patrol in hot spots have on robbery, how many repeat offenses occur on average after arrests are made by different units and officers, how often are burglary victims burglarized again within a week of the last burglary and how much can police reduce that risk with response A versus response B.

Such "thinking in numbers" is one side of an unfortunate cultural war that goes well beyond policing into medicine, and even into academic criminology. On one side is the foreign-policy metaphor of using stories for "thinking in time" (Neustadt and May, 1986), in which the qualitative case-study analysis of relevant history and rich details of each single problem (and relevant historical precedents) is proposed as the best evidence for dealing with that single problem. Even when numbers inform such analysis, numbers disappear at the crucial point of choosing from among alternate possible interventions. On the other side is the medical metaphor of statistical comparisons of alternate interventions across thousands and sometimes millions of cases of the same problem. While these comparisons show what the results were, they do not clearly show how they may be replicated. This is especially true of problems of implementation (Braithwaite, 1993), where nuanced accounts of power relationships and impediments to new policies become necessary to put statistical findings into practice.
Evidence-based policing seeks to combine numbers and stories, but to use different kinds of evidence for different kinds of questions (Braithwaite, 1993). Statistical evidence, for example, can reveal that one police district has a much higher rate of repeat offending after domestic violence arrests than other districts, even controlling for relevant risk factors in each district's offender population. Qualitative evidence is necessary for understanding why that difference exists, and to identify a range of creative solutions to choose from in trying to reduce the high recidivism rate.

**Experiments and Outcomes**

In addition to numbers and stories, we must also distinguish between experiments and outcomes monitoring. The difference here is not one of research method, but rather of research design: the logical structure by which we reach conclusions. A method is a means of gathering data, such as open-ended interviews or police crime reports. A design is a means of drawing conclusions, such as comparisons of crime rates in one neighborhood to crime rates in another. Evidence-based policing proactively mobilizes two very different kinds of research designs: basic (usually experimental) research on what works best when implemented properly under controlled conditions with a limited sample, and ongoing correlational "outcomes" monitoring of the results each unit is actually achieving in all cases, every month of each year. This point, further illustrated below as part of what is new about evidence-based policing, helps makes it far more powerful than stand-alone "ivory tower" research.

This combination of experimental and ongoing outcomes research allows police management to create a feedback loop. The process begins with either published or in-house studies suggesting how policing might obtain the best effects. The review of this evidence can lead to guidelines taking law, ethics, and community culture into account. Those guidelines would specify measurable "outputs," or practices police are asked to follow. Their varying degrees of success at delivering those outputs can then be assessed
by tracking risk-adjusted "outcomes," or results over a reasonably long followup period. These can be
defined or measured in several different ways: offenses per 1,000 residents, repeat victimizations per 100
victims, repeat offending per 100 offenders, and so on. The observation that some units are getting better
results than others can be used to further identify factors associated with success. That in turn can be fed
back as new in-house research to refine the guidelines and raise the overall success level of the agency.
In-house research could also be published in national journals, or at least kept in an agency data base as
institutional memory about success and failure rates for different methods.

Bottom-Up and Top-Down

The evidence-based paradigm exposes a major fault line in modern American culture: preferences
for hierarchical versus egalitarian structures of social organization. This fault line is especially strong in
police culture, despite its outward pretense of paramilitary hierarchy. The highly autonomous and
unsupervised character of police work fosters an egalitarian view of decision-making much like one finds in
medicine. In this view, the people who know the problems first hand are in the best position to make
decisions, and people behind desks at headquarters should mind their own business, whatever that may be.
Other than preventing lawsuits and punishments of police officers for "just doing their jobs," the tasks of
top police managers are poorly legitimated among the rank and file. Certainly the idea that police
executives should dictate how street officers exercise their discretion has been widely scorned and flouted
(e.g., Ferraro, 1989).

This tension between equality and hierarchy is deeply rooted in American history. As Baltzell
(1979) points out, the egalitarian position has long been associated with anti-intellectualism, hostility to
"book-learning," compliance with rules, and respect for authority. It is predictable that a strategy of using
research rather than individual experience to make decisions will be attacked as "top-down," as if any form
of consensus or general agreement is somehow un-American. That has already happened repeatedly in
discussions of this paradigm. Yet there is nothing inherently "top-down" about evidence-based policing.
The best ideas for improving effectiveness can come from any location in a police hierarchy. Just as in
Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) processes in industry, the mobilization of research and analysis can
occur at multiple levels simultaneously. The rules of scientific evidence are not hierarchical. They apply
equally to patrol officers and police chiefs, precinct commanders and sergeants in crime analysis. Each
police department has different power structures and patterns of accountability. It is unlikely that any two
police agencies will apply the evidence-based paradigm in exactly the same way. What matters is that the
rules of evidence, and not the rules of power, drive the process of reaching conclusions and making
decisions. For evidence-based policing, guidelines are only a means to an end. They are not an end in
themselves. A relentless focus on results can prevent guidelines from becoming too prominent.

Mechanisms fostering bottom-up analysis, including open access to data systems, can help maintain the
focus on results. Even citizen access to the data (Butterfield, 1999), with suitable privacy protections, could
help maintain a more creative climate, and introduce ideas and resources that might not otherwise be
available.

In sum, evidence-based policing is neither a particular management structure nor a set of
bureaucratic principles. It is a process of making decisions about how police agencies produce the best
results. The process can fit into any management structure. It focuses decisions on what works, and how we
know what works, far more intensively than police—or even doctors—are accustomed to doing. It is not a
paradigm for how to do police work, but a paradigm for evaluating and improving whatever police do. In
that sense it supports, rather than replaces, other paradigms for doing police work.

What Is New About It?
Skeptics may say that there is nothing new in evidence-based policing, and that other paradigms already embrace these principles. On closer examination, however, we will see that no other paradigm provides specific principles for making decisions and evaluating outcomes. While other paradigms provide general guidance on how police work should be done, evidence-based thinking provides a means for deciding which paradigm or practice may work best for which problem. This claim requires supporting evidence from a comparison of evidence-based policing to three prevailing paradigms of how to do police work: incident-specific policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing.

Incident-Specific Policing. The paradigm of incident-specific policing has been much maligned by proponents of competing paradigms. Yet it remains the dominant paradigm for delivering police services. Most police officers still spend most of their time "in-service" awaiting 911 calls, or "out of service" while responding to tens of millions of calls per year. This work currently has few outcome measures except time out of service." Police officers who take too much time to handle a call are sometimes accused of shirking, and urged by supervisors to work faster. But no one tracks the rate of repeat calls by officer or unit to see how effective the first response was in preventing future problems. Evidence-based policing could use such "outcomes" to justify longer times spent on each call on the basis of an officer's average results, rather than a crude demand to stay within an average time limit. It could also place much more emphasis on learning what methods each officer uses to deal with each call most effectively and preventively, a question that currently gets little attention.

Community Policing. The absence of outcome measures is not unique to incident-specific policing. It is also true of community policing, usually defined as a method of doing police work in collaboration with members of a community. This paradigm is usually thought of as a set of outputs, such as community meetings or visits to schools, rather than as a set of desired results, or "outcomes."
specting community members are all important elements of the paradigm, which implies a larger goal of shoring up the legitimacy of police authority. But the paradigm does not contain the elements for measuring its own success. Rather than ignoring the measurement of results, the paradigm can be strengthened by better evidence. Adding the accountability systems from the paradigm of evidence-based policing could actually make police far more active in working with the community, or successful in enhancing police legitimacy. And if public satisfaction with police performance is the explicit goal of community policing, then police investment in survey research to measure that outcome (already practiced in some agencies) is a means of using the evidence-based paradigm to help accomplish that goal (Butterfield, 1999).

Problem-Oriented Policing. Problem-oriented policing (POP) is clearly the paradigm most similar to evidence-based practice. Yet this paradigm also lacks specific principles for making key decisions. Goldstein's (1979, 1990) writings, as well as Eck and Spelman's (1987) SARA model, clearly emphasize assessment of problem-solving responses as a key part of the process. Yet as Goldstein (1998) has observed, the paradigm in practice has failed to generate sufficient knowledge about what works and what doesn't. That is a problem that the evidence-based paradigm can help solve.

POP itself provides no mandate for the use of scientific evidence in setting priorities among problems, selecting strategies for responding to problems, or monitoring the implementation and results of those strategies. Reports on problem-oriented policing have so far produced little evidence from either controlled tests or outcomes research. Because the paradigm in practice stresses the unique characteristics of each crime pattern or "problem," POP has not been used to respond to highly repetitive situations like domestic assaults or disputes. Few comparisons of different methods for attacking the same problem have been developed. Few officers are even held accountable for not implementing a problem-solving plan they have agreed to undertake. Problem-oriented policing has clearly revolutionized the way many police think
about their objectives, moving them away from a narrow focus on each incident to a broader focus on patterns and systems. But in the absence of pressure from an evidence-based approach to evaluating success and management accountability, problem-oriented policing has been kept at the margins of police work. Evidence-based decisionmaking could move it to center stage.

**NYPD's COMPSTAT.** The best example of POP reaching center stage is the New York City Police Department's Compstat strategy (Bratton, 1998). This strategy has pushed the POP focus on results farther than ever before, but has not used the scientific method to assess cause and effect—either for crime control or the legitimacy of the police. No systematic evaluations of specific strategies, using such basic tools as control groups, are built into the COMPSTAT process. No record of successful and unsuccessful results is created, and failed methods to reduce crime may be hidden away as embarrassing threats to career advancement. Success in Compstat is defined simply as crime trends going down. It is not defined as learning why crime goes down. Multiple treatments are used simultaneously, with no systematic attempt to identify the most effective treatments. Precinct managers are rewarded when crime goes down, but no record of the reasons for success in that precinct may survive to assist future commanders. The process lacks the cumulative character of the scientific method, limiting each new cohort of managers to oral tradition as a source of evidence about effective practices.

What evidence-based policing adds to all these paradigms is a new emphasis on the key principle for decisionmaking: scientific evidence. Most police practice, like medical practice, is still shaped by local custom, opinions, theories and subjective impressions. Evidence-based policing challenges those principles of decision-making, and creates systematic feedback to provide continuous quality improvement in the achievement of police objectives (see Hoover, 1996). Hence the inspiration for this paradigm is not only medicine and its randomized trials, but also the principles of manufacturing quality control developed by
Walter Shewhart (1939) and W. Edwards Deming (1986). These principles were initially rejected by US business leaders, but were finally embraced in the 1980s after Japanese industries used them to far surpass US manufacturers in the quality of their products. These principles are also clearly congruent with the proactive mobilization paradigm Reiss (1971) has used to describe the social organization of social control.

Prevailing paradigms, in contrast, have no rules of evidence. Even POP, which places the most emphasis on results, has no rules for measuring or defining results. It allows all four stages of the process of scanning, analyzing, responding and assessing (Eck and Spelman, 1987) to be guided by intuitive reasoning and untested theory. Problems are often chosen from scanning based upon "pet peeves" of officers rather than quantitative data ranking frequency and seriousness of crime patterns. Analysis of the causation of problems pays little heed to the body of published literature on specific types of offenses and offenders. Responses to crime problems are unmeasured and undocumented, ignoring the process of implementation--and variations in implementation across officers. Crucially, failures are buried, and the limited published record of successes constitutes a biased sample of all attempts to reduce a certain kind of crime pattern. Evidence-based policing turns information on the implementation of guidelines (outputs) and the impact of that implementation (outcomes) into the major focus of police work and management. Whether or not it is combined with a POP process, the evidence-based paradigm mobilizes information for controlling both police conduct and criminal offending. It can guide Compstat meetings by starting with measures of police outputs, including variability in those measures across units and officers. It can contrast that evidence with guidelines for practice, and use the evidence to hold managers accountable for compliance with guidelines. It can also hold them accountable for outcomes, to the extent that evidence on outcomes clearly related them to compliance with guidelines. But where guidelines are not found to be
Effectively producing desired outcomes, the paradigm can lead to abandoning guidelines, justifying exceptions to them, or revising them based on new evidence.

The evidence-based paradigm can be used in almost any kind of organizational power structure. It can be used by street-level work groups, examining their own work and reporting to the rest of the organization in a bottom-up fashion. It can be used by middle managers to compare the performance of individual officers, using the results to seek better results and compliance with guidelines from the less effective officers. It can be used by top managers to steer the entire police agency, including the allocation of resources across tasks and units, and (where possible) the selection and assignment of unit commanders.

Limits of Controlled Experiments

What is also new about evidence-based policing is a clearer statement of the limits to guidelines based upon randomized controlled experiments. These limits are created by the variability within treatment groups in any experiment. That variability reveals a basic difference between all evidence-based practice in human services and the Continuous Quality Improvement model, which was originally based upon manufacturing processes.

Both policing and medicine differ from manufacturing in the far greater variability in the raw material to be processed: information about human beings. That is what gives the gold standard of human services research, the randomized controlled trial, both its strength and its limitations (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The strength of that research design is its ability to reduce uncertainty about the average effects of a policy on vast numbers of people. The limitation of the research design is that it cannot escape variability in treatments, responses, and implementation.

The variability of treatments in policing is much like that in surgery, which stands in sharp contrast to drugs. While the chemical content of drugs is almost always identical, the procedural content of surgery
varies widely. Similarly, the style and tone each officer brings to a citizen encounter varies enormously, and
can make a big difference in the outcome of a specific case. Even drug prescriptions, like police work, vary
widely in dosage, timing and followup. Holding treatment constant, there is evidence that both patients
and offenders respond to treatments with wide variations, some of which are called "allergic reactions" that
can kill some people with treatments that cure most others. Offenders are known to vary in their responses
to police actions by individual, by neighborhood, and by city. In theory, it is possible for experiments to
identify all these variable reactions and test different practices for different kinds of people. But in practice,
neither medicine nor policing has ever been able to refine experiments into separate tests for many different
subgroups.

Evidence-based practice therefore assumes that experiments alone are not enough. By combining
evidence from controlled tests with ongoing outcomes monitoring research, evidence-based policing shows
both the average effects of guidelines on practice, as well as the range of variation in those effects. While
outcomes monitoring offers less internal validity than a controlled experiment as a test of cause and effect
(Cook and Campbell, 1979), it provides more external validity than off-site experiments about the effects of
the guidelines in the specific police agencies and units applying them. Such analysis can also examine a
wide range of outcomes, from crime reduction to police courtesy towards citizens and the legitimacy with
which offenders perceive police. It may even reveal surprising connections across such outcomes, as the
following example suggests.

Application to an Example: Policing Domestic Violence

The policing of domestic violence offers a clear illustration of what is new about the evidence-based
paradigm. Domestic violence has been the subject of more police practices research than any other crime
problem. The research has arguably had little effect on police practice, at least by the new standards of
evidence-based medicine. Yet the available evidence offers a fair and scientifically valid approach for holding police agencies, units and officers accountable for the results of police work as measured by repeated domestic violence against the same victims.

Research and Guidelines

National Institute of Justice research has provided policing with extensive information on what works to prevent repeated violence. The research has also shown that, like surgery, police practices vary greatly in their implementation. These variations in practice cause varying results for repeat offending against victims. Even holding practice constant, responses to arrest vary by offender, neighborhood and city (Sherman, 1992; Sherman et al, 1998). Finally, research shows very poor compliance with mandatory arrest guidelines after they are adopted (Ferraro, 1989). There are many varieties of arrest for misdemeanor domestic violence. The offender may or may not be handcuffed, arrested in front of family and neighbors, given a chance to explain his version of events to the police, or treated with courtesy and politeness. Do these variations on the theme of arrest make a difference? They should, according to the "defiance" theory of criminal sanction effects (Sherman, 1993). And they did in Milwaukee, according to Paternoster and his colleagues (1997: 185). The Milwaukee evidence (Sherman, 1998: 7) reveals that controlling for other risk factors among 825 offenders, those who felt they were not treated in a procedurally fair and polite manner were 60 percent more likely than those who felt they were treated fairly to commit a reported act of domestic violence in the future.

This finding suggests three ways to push research into practice: 1) changing guidelines for making domestic violence arrests to include the elements making offenders perceive more "procedural justice" 2) holding police accountable for using these guidelines by comparing rates of repeat victimization associated
with different police units, and 3) computing these rates using statistical adjustments for the pre-existing level of recidivism risks.

The NIJ research provides other evidence for ways that police can reduce repeat offending in misdemeanor domestic violence. Rather than a one-size-fits-all policy, the evidence suggests specific guidelines to be used under different conditions. Offenders who are absent when police arrive—as they are in some 40 percent of cases—respond more effectively to arrest warrants than offenders who are arrested on the scene (Dunford, 1990). Offenders who are employed are deterred by arrest, while offenders who are unemployed generally increase their offending more if they are arrested than if they are handled in some other fashion (Pate and Hamilton, 1992; Berk et al, 1992; Sherman and Smith, 1992). Offenders who live in urban concentrated poverty areas commit more repeat offenses if they are arrested than if not, while offenders who live in more affluent areas commit fewer repeat offenses if they are arrested (Marciniak, 1994). All of these findings could be changed by further research, but for the moment they are the best evidence available.

This research evidence could support guidelines for policing domestic violence differently in different neighborhoods, and for situations in which offenders are absent or present. It could also support guidelines about listening to suspects' side of the story before making arrest decisions, and generally treating suspects with courtesy. Other evidence, such as the extremely high risk period for repeat victimization in the first days and weeks after the last police encounter (Strang and Sherman, 1996), could be used to fashion new problem-oriented strategies. Most important, the existing research can be used to create a fair system for evaluating police performance on the basis of risk-adjusted outcomes. That evidence shows that the likelihood of a repeat offense is strongly linked to the number of previous offenses each offender has.

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Outcomes and Accountability.

Once the risk of repeat offending can be predicted with reasonable accuracy, it becomes possible to use those predictions as a benchmark for police performance. Just as in the bypass surgery death rates in New York, the outcomes of each police officer's work can be estimated by using statistical controls for the risk level inherent in the caseload each officer faces. Using a city-wide data base of all domestic assaults, now running over 10,000 cases per year in cities like Milwaukee, a risk model can be constructed to assess the risk of repeat offending in each case. The overall mix of cases in each police precinct or for each officer can generate an average risk level for that caseload. Each police patrol district can then be evaluated according to the actual versus predicted rate of repeat offending each year. All patrol districts in the city can then be compared on the basis of their relative percentage difference between expected and actual rates of repeat domestic assault.

By constructing information systems for this kind of outcome research, police departments can focus on an objective that has only previously been measured in major experiments. Making the goal of policing each domestic assault the outcome of a reduced repeat offending rate rather than the output of whether an arrest is made would have several effects. One is that crime prevention would get greater attention than retribution for its own sake. While not everyone would welcome that, it is consistent with at least some police leaders' view of the purpose of the police as a crime prevention agency (Bratton, 1998).

Another effect would be to seek out and even initiate more research on what works best to prevent domestic violence. In the world as we now know it, no one in policing—from the police chief to the rookie officer—has any direct incentive to reduce repeat offending against known victims. No one in policing is held accountable for accomplishing, or even measuring, that objective. As a result, no one knows whether repeat victimization rates get better or worse from year to year. Using outcomes evidence to evaluate
Performance would make police practices far more victim-centered, with the top priority of preventing any further assaults.

How Can It Be Institutionalized?

While the changes described above would have to occur one police agency at a time, there are certain national forces that can help institutionalize evidence-based policing. These include national rankings of big-city police agencies, state and federal mandates for improving police data systems to provide better evidence on what works, and better research evidence on how evidence can become more influential. Yet even such external pressures will need internal evidence cops like Scott Weingarten to import, apply and create research evidence.

National Rankings

No institution is likely to voluntarily increase its accountability except under strong external pressure. It is unlikely that evidence-based policing could be adopted by a police executive simply because it appears to be a good idea. The history of evidence-based medicine and education strongly suggests that professionals will only make such changes under external coercion. Nothing seems to foster such pressure like performance rankings across agencies (Millenson, 1997; Steinberg, 1998). The 1919 results of the first national rankings of hospitals were deemed so threatening that the American College of Surgeons decided to burn the report immediately in the furnace of New York’s Waldorf-Astoria hotel (Millenson, 1997: 146). Just as various public performance measures allow stockbrokers to rank publicly held corporations, public information ranking police performance would create the strongest pressure for improvement.

One example of how the larger police departments could be ranked on performance can be found in their homicide rates, which already receive extensive publicity. What these statistics lack, however, is any scientific analysis of expected risk. Police performance has nothing to do, at least in the short run, with the
social, economic, demographic, and drug market forces that help shape a city's homicide rate. While police performance may also affect those homicide rates, the other factors must be taken into account. Using risk-adjusted homicide rates provides one indication of how well a police department may be doing things like confiscating illegal weapons, hot spots patrols, regulation of violent taverns and drug markets, and monitoring youth gangs. While the basic research literature would increasingly provide a source of guidance for taking initiatives against homicide, a risk-adjusted outcomes analysis would indicate how well that research has been put into practice. Many of the basic risk factors would be computed from Census data that could be out of date by the middle of each decade, but other risk data can be derived from annually updated sources, such as the NIJ ADAM data on drug abuse among arrestees. Unemployment, school dropout, teen childbirth and infant mortality data are also available annually for each city, and could help predict the expected rate of homicide.

If a credible national research organization would produce such "league rankings" among big city police departments each year (like the US News & World Report rankings of colleges and universities), the predictable result in the short term would be attacks on the methodology used. That is, in fact, what continues to go on in New York with the death rates in surgery. But the New York rankings have spread to other states, and consumers have found them quite valuable. Doctors, and police, may also find rankings very valuable in the long run. Both professions should enjoy greater public respect as they get better at producing the results their consumers want. State agencies such as the criminal justice statistical centers could also produce police rankings as a service to taxpayers. States already have the option of spending federal funds on such a purpose under the broad category of evaluation funds.

Data Integrity
The more performance indicators affect the fate of organizations, the more likely such indicators are to be subverted. Recent examples include the US Postal Service in West Virginia, where an elaborate scheme to defeat the on-time mail delivery audit was recently alleged (McAllister 1998). Other examples include teachers helping students to cheat on their answers to national achievement tests, and of course police departments under-reporting crime. The New York City police have removed three commanders in the past five years for improperly counting crime to make their performance look better (Kocieniewski, 1998), and several chiefs of police elsewhere have been convicted on criminal charges for similar conduct.

Quite apart from pressures to corrupt data, criminologists have long known that police crime reporting is not reliable, with the possible exception of homicide. No two agencies classify crime the same way. The same event may be called an aggravated assault in one agency and a "miscellaneous incident" in another. The well-publicized FBI decision to drop all of Philadelphia's 1997 data from the national crime reporting program was not an isolated decision. In 1988, the FBI quietly dropped the entire states of Florida and Kentucky. In 1997, the FBI omitted Chicago's rape statistics for failure to meet national UCR guidelines. Since the FBI lacks resources to do on-site audits in each police agency every year, these examples are just the tip of a very big iceberg. There are already rising suspicions of police manipulation of crime data as crime rates fall in many cities. More serious pressure from national rankings would threaten data integrity even more.

One viable solution to this problem is a federal requirement for police departments to retain CPA firms to produce annual audits of their reported crime data. This requirement could be imposed as a condition for receiving federal funds, just as many other federal mandates have already done. Anticipating court challenges about unfunded mandates, Congress could also provide funds to pay for the audits. Crime counting standards could be set nationally by the
accounting profession in collaboration with the FBI. Alternatively, each state legislature could require (or even fund) these audits as a means of assuring fairness in performance rankings of police departments within the state.

**Victim charts, Officer Batting Averages**

In the process of revitalizing crime data integrity, there would be great value in reorganizing police data systems. Most important would be to create a "medical chart" for each crime victim and repeat offender, as suggested above. Also useful would be a "batting average" on repeat offending for each officer. Both systems could employ existing data collection with revised software packages to display the data in support of evidence-based decision-making.

The victim chart, like computerized patient records in hospitals, would show the diagnosis (offense description) for each presenting incident a victim has with a police agency, perhaps anywhere in the state. The chart would also show what police did in response: everything from taking an offense report to arresting an offender whose release date from prison is also kept, updated, in the computerized victim chart. This information tool could help develop many proactive police methods for preventing repeat victimization. Similar systems could be developed for repeat offenders, with special emphasis on displaying their co-offenders or people arrested with them, in order to locate them in their social networks. Very often, victims, offenders and co-offenders will overlap, and easy access links across data systems will improve investigation as well as evaluation. Allowing officers to use these data to keep their own private "batting averages" for repeat victimization may encourage officers to become involved and committed to doing a better job at preventing crime. Even without adjusting for risk, the raw rates (or even case-specific results) will help them focus on what happens after each call. This change in time horizon could have enormous impact in police culture, and help to place far greater emphasis on results.
Similar charts are also needed for repeat-crime locations, showing what police have done with each crime in each place or part of some other pattern of offending. "Offense history charts" for violent taverns, frequently robbed convenience stores, and other "hot spots" where most crime occurs would be very useful for ongoing problem-oriented policing attempts to reduce repeat offending at those places. Similar records could be kept about a pattern of crimes spread out across a wider area at categories of locations, such as automatic teller machine robberies. If officer teams or units declare these places or patterns as crime targets and designate a control group, these charts can become the basis for estimating how much crime each police unit has prevented.

Field Access to Guidelines

Computers can also help police officers to implement practice guidelines. Medical computer systems now offer recommended practice guidelines in response to a checklist of data, as well as warning when drug prescriptions fall outside programmed parameters of disease type and dosage. The use of hand-held computers to advise officers in the field and provide instant quality control checks may not happen soon, but the growth of police research may make it inevitable in the long run. Doctors are not expected to keep large amounts of research data in their heads, nor even medical guidelines for each diagnosis. Computers will not replace good judgment, but they can clearly enhance it.

As data analyses accumulate, even the idea of a "guideline" can be transformed to something far more customized for each case. Given the high volume of domestic violence cases, for example, it is possible that patrol car computers could provide advisory recommendations for each specific arrest or victim protection decision, based upon data entered by officers from field settings. When combined with existing data on offender and victim history, the characteristics of the current case could be used to predict the course of action with the best odds of success. Officers could even request a comparison of the two or
three specific courses they prefer, and obtain computerized analysis of which of those courses has the best odds of protecting victims in each particular case.

**Departmental Criminologists**

Federal rules could also require police departments to appoint a certified police criminologist (either internally or in partnership with a university or research organization), who would become the agency's "evidence cop." Like Scott Weingarten of Cedars-Sinai, the Departmental Criminologist would be responsible for putting research into practice, then evaluating the results. Whether the role is actually filled by an employee or a university professor working in partnership with the police may not matter as much as the role itself. It is this role that could help develop more effective guidelines for preventing repeat offending. It is this role that could develop expected versus actual repeat offending data by offense type for each police district or detective unit. It is this role that could add the scientific method to the NYPD COMPSTAT process (Bratton, 1998), providing statistics in each meeting on each patrol district's crime trends and patterns, its complaints against police officers, and public satisfaction levels in relation to the district's level of risk factors. Building the capacity to import, apply and create evidence within each police agency may be an essential ingredient in the success of this paradigm.

We may also find that the traditional distance between researchers and police officials shrinks when researchers provide more immediate performance information on units and individuals. Criminologists have long refused to provide data on particular officers as contrary to the ethics of basic research (Hartnett, 1998), despite police managers' requests for such data. By transforming the in-house research role from "basic" to "client-centered," there would be a clear ethical basis for providing individual performance data in a scientifically reasonable format. This could make criminologists far more effective at pushing research into practice.
Widence on Evidence

Criminologists can also act on the evidence that doctors tend to change practices based on personal interaction and repeated computerized feedback, and not from conferences, classes, or written research reports (Millenson, 1997: 127-130). Similar findings have been published about the effectiveness of agricultural extension services, in which university scientists visit farms and show farmers new techniques for improving their crop yields.

The one test of this principle in policing to date is Alex Weiss's (1997) research on how police departments adopt innovations. Based on a national survey of police chiefs and their top aides, Weiss discovered that telephone calls from agency to agency played a vital role in spreading new ideas. While written reports may have supplemented the phone calls, word-of-mouth seems to be the major way in which police innovations are communicated and adopted.

Weiss's study suggests the great importance of gathering more evidence on evidence. The empirical question for research is what practices work best to change practices? This inherently "reflexive" posture may lead us to empirical comparisons of the effectiveness of, for example, NIJ conferences, mass mailings of "research-in-brief" reports, or new one-on-one approaches. One example of the latter would be proactive telephone calls to police agencies around the U.S. made by present or former police officers; callers could be trained by research organizations to describe new research findings. If national consensus guidelines for practice were developed by panels of police executives and researchers, the callers could communicate those as well. Other approaches worth testing might include field demonstrations in police technique -- not based on experience, as the current Field Training Officer system does, but rather based on evidence that the method being demonstrated has been proven effective in reducing repeat offending.

Conclusion

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Evidence-based practice is a paradigm for the social organization of decisionmaking. Applying it to policing predictably creates cultural wars over important values: autonomy, accountability, wisdom, and the philosophy of knowledge. To the extent that the values of the larger culture show decreasing respect for rules, expertise and authority derived from printed words (Baltzell, 1979), evidence-based policing will face many obstacles to implementation within policing. To the extent that the concept of scientific truth may be replacing religion in a secular society, however, there may be increased pressure from society on police to adopt the evidence-based paradigm. This pressure will be fed by demands that police prevent both crime and abuses of police power.

The most likely future is a long and continuing battles over evidence in policing, just as we continue to see in medicine. As John Maynard Keynes suggested, the influence of ideas may be far more glacial than volcanic. The pressure for better measures of results is in the spirit of the age of distrust for Governmental authority (Nye, et al, 1997), and police can not long escape it. How police negotiate that pressure remains to be seen. Their responses could be merely reactive. Or they may be proactive, seizing the floor in the ongoing public debate by pointing to demonstrable success achieved with (or without) the evidence-based paradigm.

The macro-level factors influencing the proactive mobilization of social control systems are not well understood, and remain an important line of research for policing and crime control in general. A logically prior step to police-initiated efforts to reduce crime, however, is the accumulation of information about the relative effectiveness of alternative strategies. Thus if research and development is a core technology of police work, it raises the crucial question of how the production and application of that information is socially organized. On this, as on so many questions, the work of Albert J. Reiss, Jr. provides fertile ground.
for understanding how social organization shapes behavior, and imagining how that behavior may be changed.
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Notes

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