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Rethinking Organizational Change in Policing

(Draft version)

A Report on a Locally-Initiated Research Partnership funded by the National Institute of Justice

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Introduction:

This project continued the APD-UNM Research Partnership's ethnographic study of the transformation of police culture as one urban police department implemented community policing throughout the police organization. The original study had given the Research Partnership extensive knowledge of organizational and cultural dynamics within the police department and between police and the community, through more than 2,000 hours of participant-observation in police operations, briefings, command-level meetings, community organization meetings, and Academy training; 120 in-depth interviews with police officers, sworn and civilian supervisors, and police management; and a small set of focus groups with personnel from the department and the community. The key findings of that study (Wood, Davis, and Rouse forthcoming; Wood, Rouse, and Davis 1999) depicted a department that had found only limited success in building a police culture guided by community policing: As of 1998, four years into the implementation of community policing in Albuquerque, a great deal of institutional energy and re-organization had focused on the new model, some very significant changes had occurred in specific areas, but shifts in overall police culture remained remarkably limited. The second phase of the project sought to continue tracking departmental efforts to drive community policing more deeply into the organization.

But in its second phase, the Partnership also sought to deepen the university-police department collaboration in a new direction. In this phase of the project, we strove to build in two ways on the knowledge generated in the first phase:

1. By feeding back into the department our key insights and knowledge of departmental

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dynamics, and findings from academic research on policing nationwide, to contribute to informed decision-making by police management and informal police leaders at all levels.

2. By tracking how this "reflexive feedback" regarding departmental culture influenced the ongoing implementation of community policing and the development of organizational culture generally.[1]

In addition, an implicit goal throughout the project was to foster a deepening institutional relationship between the Albuquerque Police Department and the University of New Mexico, as part of creating organizations dedicated to mutual learning, more open institutional relationships, and useful research.

Thus, the APD-UNM Research Partnership sought to sustain continuing research access while at the same time taking a more active role in the transformation of the police department in a direction set by its leadership. This "participatory action research" model (Cole 1992; Whyte 1991a, 1991b) represents a non-traditional research role, but one particularly well-suited to an ethnographic study of police culture – as long as we remember that the dynamics of organizational culture being studied here are not independent of the feedback created by our role in the department. Thus, the findings reported here must not be interpreted as the "natural dynamics" of a department undergoing the transition to community policing, in the way that

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[1] Although our original proposal suggested we would produce two separate final reports, one focusing on the *outcome* of community policing implementation and the other on the *process* of participatory action research as a tool of organizational change, we find that these are too intertwined to bear full separation.

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the report on the original phase of the project could be. Although many of the underlying organizational dynamics we observed appear to be common within contemporary urban police departments in the United States (see below), this is a study of how the insistent presentation of research knowledge, reflexive feedback from academic outsiders, and extensive dialogue between scholars and police leaders can influence those commonly-occurring organizational dynamics.

This report first outlines the findings of the first phase of research regarding police culture; describes the participatory action research process we followed; analyzes the development and current state of community policing implementation in the department, including its achievements and the obstacles it confronted; and assesses the impact of the our feedback process on the implementation effort. It concludes by suggesting that we need to revise our models of what processes may lead to successful implementation, and by discussing the future prospects of the Research Partnership.

Police Culture in Transition: Summary of first phase findings

The original project focused on the transformation of police culture under department-wide implementation of community policing, treating the police department in Albuquerque, New Mexico as a case study of possible wider patterns in urban policing in the United States. We examined police culture under community policing from three directions: as seen from the perspective of sworn officers, participants in community organizations, and civilian employees in the police department and other city agencies.

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As appears to be true in many departments around the country, no strong internalization of community policing had occurred among rank-and-file officers in the Albuquerque Police Department (APD). At least, we found negligible evidence for any such internalization in the practices, assumptions, and ethos APD front-line sworn personnel. In some ways, the implementation process was foundering: Along with a variety of other factors, it had broken the hegemony of the traditional culture of policing over departmental life, but this had led to a fragmentation of organizational culture into a set of subcultures which we analyzed at some length (Wood, Davis, and Rouse *op cit.*). Table 1, from our subsequent writing on this topic, summarizes that analysis:

[Table 1 about here]

Thus, some four years into the implementation of community policing, in 1998 that process could be fairly described as only a very partial success: Though all departmental personnel had been trained in problem solving, high-level officers were meeting rather regularly with community groups (and lower-level officers as well, when commanded to do so), and in a few areas significant community policing activity was occurring, the way most officers understood their job, and the way the vast majority of them did that job, bore only slight resemblance to the priorities or practices advocated under community policing models. Most police practitioners and scholars had foreseen community policing implementation as a matter of training current police personnel in new policing models, and forcing their gradual adoption of those models, with a lag time of perhaps three to five years in real success. By that standard, with APD five years into community policing, implementation has failed.

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Table I: APD Organizational Subcultures

Subculture	Mission	Beliefs	Practices	Ethos
TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE	Protect & Serve Fight Crime	➢ Autonomy of Police ➢ Loose hierarchy ➢ Us vs. Them ➢ Police as brotherhood	➢ Routinized call response ➢ Car patrol ➢ Chief serves as political buffer	"Crime Fighters" Insulated professionals
PARAMILITARY SUBCULTURE	Fight Crime Protect society from scumbags	➢ Specialized units as elites ➢ Tight hierarchy ➢ Elite Us vs. scumbag Them ➢ Military as model ➢ Political system as threat	➢ ➢ Aggressive ➢ Proactive ➢ Cultivate political support against political threat	➢ ➢ Competitive soldiers ➢ Self-betterment ➢ High energy
OPPORTUNISTIC SUBCULTURE	Organizationally: none Individually: ➢ self-preservation or ➢ self-promotion	➢ Me first ➢ Me vs. them ➢ Hierarchy exists to do me favors ➢ Only politics is internal politics of self-interest	➢ Shirking ➢ Preserve stability, avoid demands OR ➢ adopt flavor of the month but do not commit. ➢ Climb ladder OR ➢ Abuse status for gratuities, power.	➢ Collapse into raw self-interest: ➢ Careerism ➢ Narcissism
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBCULTURE	Protect & Serve in a legally & fiscally efficient manner	➢ Policing exists in political, legal economic context ➢ Priority: line officers or managers	➢ Routinization ➢ Accountability ➢ Organizational learning OR supervisory unreasonableness	➢ ➢ Bureaucratic ethos: ➢ Pragmatic ➢ Negative
CIVILIAN SUBCULTURE	➢ Reflects wider police culture: ➢ Fight crime ➢ Protect & serve ➢ Public safety	➢ Civilians crucial contributors to the department ➢ Civilians not fully accepted in policing ➢ Need for greater sworn-civilian teamwork	➢ Vary greatly ➢ 3 relational practices: ➢ Accept Status quo ➢ Reform organization ➢ Resists Status quo	➢ Unequal partnership ➢ in context of: ➢ Acceptance ➢ Reform ➢ Resistance
COP SUBCULTURE	Official community policing statements	➢ COP as best policing model ➢ Together we can make this work ➢ Open boundaries ➢ Community as a resource ➢ From hierarchy toward de-centralization ➢ Political system as a resource	➢ Problem solving ➢ Community collaboration ➢ Beat integrity ➢ Build ties to city agencies	➢ Institutional reform ➢ Collaborative empowerment ➢ Activist/teacher

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Yet significant organizational changes had occurred, including the problem-solving training, inclusion of community policing in academy training and promotion requirements, and bringing in an outside chief of police precisely to push community policing implementation. We thus described the culture of APD in late 1998 as at a kind of "tipping point": Departmental leadership might succeed in pushing it into a fuller embrace of community policing models; it might return to re-embrace traditional policing priorities; it might become a thoroughly paramilitary department; if might continue a process of fragmentation; or it might draw together various strands into a coherent culture of policing integrating the best elements of these and other priorities.

In entering the second phase of the Research Partnership, we assumed that we could not and should not strive to determine the outcome of this process. Instead, the Partnership proposed to help formal and informal leaders in the department shape this process more consciously and reflectively - that is, make this an arena of informed strategic choice and organizational learning, rather than of organizational drift. In order to facilitate this, we designed a strategy to continue our research and monitoring within a key arena of struggle over police culture - front line officers - and to provide regular feedback to departmental personnel.

Research Process: Ethnography and participant-action research

Rationale: In an important book on community policing implementation in Chicago, Skogan and Hartnett (1997) noted the disparity between strong political support for community

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policing nationwide and the uneven record of actual implementation efforts:

> "While there is a great deal of enthusiasm for community policing in many quarters...making it work is another matter. There is indeed a cross-country record of failed attempts to implement community policing." (p. 11)

They continue by listing the common reasons for these failures of community policing efforts. Listed first and reiterated many times as a primary obstacle to successful community policing is the traditional organizational culture of police departments. Thus, he notes: "Efforts to implement community policing have floundered (sic) on the rocks of police culture" (p.12). The remainder of the book, as well as subsequent events in Chicago (Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium 1997, 1999; see also Sadd and Grinc 1996), only confirm this diagnosis. But Skogan and Hartnett also clearly document the potential for community policing – when departments "get it right" – to reduce crime and fear of crime and to improve the quality of life in urban neighborhoods, as well as the profound organizational difficulties of getting it right. Albuquerque has wrestled with very similar difficulties, in a context with fewer resources on which to draw – a context perhaps more typical of urban police departments nationwide, compared to the resource-rich funding environment of Chicago. So understanding organizational dynamics here, and tracking how the department might benefit from a reflexive "organizational learning" process for digesting research findings, were key rationales of our effort.

Two goals thus guided the research design of this phase: Providing input and feedback to APD personnel in a format useful to them in their day-to-day leadership roles; and continuing to gather ethnographic data allowing us to track both the impact of our feedback and

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broader developments within the culture of policing in Albuquerque. In both its ethnographic data-gathering and reflexive feedback aspects, the project carefully sought to avoid being "captured" by or perceived as captured by any one faction within the Department; thus, we spent time with officers and supervisors affiliated with the full variety of subcultures identified above, and strove to provide feedback to key police leaders throughout APD, from front-line sworn and civilian personnel to supervisors to command personnel and the Chief of Police.

The feedback process occurred primarily via focus groups. From January through October 1999, the Partnership hosted a series of 21 focus groups with APD personnel. These focus groups dealt with topics we identified as areas of emerging concern or need within APD; for each, we wrote a short "Feedback Report" (from 2 to 12 pages long), and distributed it ahead of time to a list of invitees drawn up from our contacts in the ethnographic fieldwork on patrol and from participant-observation in management settings (see below). The Feedback Reports dealt with the following issues (see appendices for copies of feedback reports):

- Front-line supervisory issues
- APD and Community Policing
- Problem-solving in APD
- Subcultures of policing in APD
- Management via CompStat
- Leadership in APD
- CompStat and Community Policing

For each focus group, participants received a copy of the draft write-up and were asked to read it prior to the meeting. Focus group discussion then centered on that issue; whether our write-up adequately captured the Department's strengths, weaknesses, and the challenges; and how APD could best address this issue. We also asked for suggestions for improving our write-up,

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though we maintained editorial control within the Partnership. The principal investigator facilitated all focus group discussions, and a research associate took notes of the APD feedback. Out of this feedback, we wrote a final version of the report. At some point in this process, varying from one Feedback Report to another, the Chief of Police also read and commented upon the report. Finally, each Report was distributed throughout the Department, using APD's regular communications channels.

This process proved quite workable, generating strong participation and active engagement – indeed, some fine arguments – about substantive issues in policing at the lieutenant, captain, and deputy chief (and equivalent civilian) levels; the quality of sergeant-level focus groups was more uneven, though sometimes very strong. In addition, we periodically convened focus groups simply to check in with key informal leaders at various levels in APD and have a less structured discussion of the challenges facing APD. These have proven valuable in understanding ongoing organizational dynamics.

We encountered two primary problems in the reflexive feedback process:

1. We gained far less consistent engagement in focus group discussions from patrol officers than from supervisory and management levels in the Department: attendance was thin, sometimes with as few as two officers attending. This was due partly to personnel shortages in APD (see below), and partly to precisely the dynamics at the heart of this project: Police culture tends to assume that officers already know most of what they need to know for their work, and that any further learning can only be gained from other sworn officers. The lead research associate had to expend considerable in-

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person effort to gain sufficient officer "buy-in" to get them to attend. While viable, this involved a heavy investment. Ultimately, for dissemination among officers we had to rely partly on informal exchanges by the lead research associate with individual officers during the course of ride-alongs. Given her extensive contacts among officers, this had some impact, but could not disseminate discussion widely enough to reach all squads in the Department.

2. We also less successfully engaged civilian employees below the level of division heads and division seconds. Periodically, we successfully turned out groups of lower-level civilians for their own focus groups, and often had one or two individual civilians turn out for mixed sworn-civilian groups. But the former also involved a heavy investment of Partnership time, and the latter produced physical presence but little active participation in focus group discussions. Reticence among front-line civilians appeared to be rooted in their sense of being of lower status, not really listened to or influential in organizational life. Overcoming that alienation would have required an expenditure of effort beyond what we in the Partnership were able to make, at least in the context of other Partnership demands.

These problems aside, the focus groups at supervisory and management levels (with civilian and especially with sworn personnel) worked extremely well. Though we carefully kept participation in them voluntary, attendance was generally strong: at mid-supervisory (lieutenant) level, attendance averaged more than half those invited, with seven to nine lieutenants attending a typical session; at the management level, attendance averaged more than

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two-thirds of those invited, with twelve to fourteen captains, division heads, and deputy chiefs attending a typical session. Although occasionally the focus groups with front-line personnel were rather stilted, more typically at that level and almost universally at the higher levels, the focus group conversations were engaged and focused: APD personnel clearly wanted to be part of talking about the problems facing the Department, and liked having the opportunity to give input on documents addressing those problems in concrete ways. In addition, the Chief of Police publicly endorsed the focus group process, and allowed us to use management meetings to announce focus groups sessions.[2]

In all of this, our goal was to foster a culture of organizational learning guided by disciplined reflection on APD's own experience; by current understandings of desirable policing models; and by current research on what works in policing. We sought not to become another voice of authority within a paramilitary command-and-control model of a police organization, but rather to help foster a more dispersed model of decision-making, creative problem-solving, and active engagement in thinking about and addressing emerging challenges and opportunities in the Department. Thus, **dialogue** was the fundamental premise of our work – a dialogue in which we were active participants and sometimes-insistent critics, but also learners from the deeper experience and knowledge of police personnel. We often closed focus group discussions by asking what practical insights had emerged; the fact that dialogue was

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[2] We systematically emphasized that participation was voluntary and confidential; we guaranteed the Partnership would keep anonymous both the content of conversations and the fact of participation or non-participation. We of course could not guarantee that others would respect the confidentiality guidelines, but reiterated them regularly.

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destined to shape a specific written product helped keep it focused and practical.

In sum, our strategy in designing the reflexive feedback mechanism in the Department was informed by ideas regarding organizational learning, participatory management, and communicative action as the basis for structured strategic change.[3]

From October 1999 to October 2000, we hosted more sporadic focus groups at various levels in the Department, focusing more intensively on supervisory and upper management personnel, as well as creating greater dialogue across vertical levels of the organization. Over the course of the project, we have thus convened 38 focus groups lasting about an hour and a half, either for specific discussion of Feedback Reports or general monitoring of organizational dynamics. Of these, 14 have been at the level of division heads, captains, and deputy chiefs; 8 at the level of lieutenants and deputy division heads; 6 at the level of sergeants and first-line civilian supervisors, and 6 at the level of officers and front-line civilians. Four focus groups were cross-rank, primarily lieutenant-sergeant or captain-lieutenant.

Finally, throughout the entire second phase of the Partnership, we have provided informal feedback to the Department by discussing recent national research on policing, our analysis of organizational dynamics, police culture, and current events in APD. Some of these were informal meetings with individuals; others involved formal presentations to groups of Department personnel. These exchanges occurred at our own initiative, at the initiative of APD

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[3] On organizational learning, participatory management, and communicative action, see respectively: Cole (1989); Schein (1992) and Kanter, Stein, Jick (1992); and Habermas (1984, 1987).

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personnel, and simply in the course of our participant-observation work on patrol, in briefings, and in organizational meetings. In this vein, we met every other month with the Chief of Police, and regularly with key personnel at all other levels. Among key collaborators in this process have been the lead civilians in the Planning Division, the five area commanders, and a cross section of lieutenants, sergeants, civilian supervisors, and patrol officers.

Ethnographic research:

Parallel to this feedback process, we continued to engage in ride alongs, foot patrol, and bike patrol with police officers, though at a somewhat lower level than in previous phases of our research. To date, over the life of the project we conducted more than 3000 hours of this kind of participant observation, done primarily by the lead research associate but also by the principal investigator; there is simply no substitute for direct ethnographic experience in getting the feel of what is going on in a police organization. Lastly, we continue to engage regularly in participant observation in internal management meetings of the Department, police briefings, APD meetings with community groups, etc.; the principal investigator was the primary researcher in this aspect of the project. Except for occasional specific purposes, during this phase of the project we suspended the formal taped interviewing of police personnel; though in the first phase of the project, *after* establishing significant trust within the department, we found it entirely viable to do formal officer interviews, they were less useful for the purposes of this phase. They would also have been a significant resource drain, due to transcription costs.

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Finally, during the last six months of the current phase, the principal investigator made short (two full days, typically) research trips to four other urban police departments in the western half of the United States. These were selected by virtue of being the lead agencies in medium-sized or large urban areas with strong racial/ethnic diversity, and of being at least 4 years into the implementation of community policing. Each visit was facilitated by an insider in the host Department, chosen because of reputational factors as a respected figure not overly tied to one subculture within his/her agency. Each trip included interviews with personnel from front-line officers up through chiefs or deputy chiefs of police (average of 10 interviews/site), plus at least brief ride-along time with patrol, community policing, and special enforcement teams. All interviewees and each participating department was guaranteed anonymity.[4] Though such brief visits do not allow in-depth knowledge of organizational dynamics, they do allow us to assess which of the patterns identified in Albuquerque are idiosyncratic to local conditions and which represent common results of the forces impinging on American urban policing. We highlight here those patterns we believe hold significance for the broader organizational field of urban police departments around the country.

Community Policing in APD: Achievements and obstacles

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[4] Though confidentiality guarantees prohibit me from properly thanking the facilitators of these brief trips, I am deeply indebted to them for their help; without their endorsement, I could not have had anything like the frank conversations about sensitive police matters with the array of personnel I did. As a result, I would have far less confidence that the organizational dynamics facing APD are also faced by other similar-sized agencies.

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Since mid-1998, how far has the Department progressed in advancing community? And how much of an impact did our feedback mechanisms have on the Department? The best answers to these questions come through interpretive evidence from our ethnographic work; as detailed below, community policing in Albuquerque has progressed in some areas, stagnated in others, and regressed in still others. We here highlight those ways it has progressed, areas in which it has been less successful, and the dynamics leading to these outcomes.

We first note two very important structural obstacles the Department faced, and one common impediment to community policing implementation that it did *not* face:

First, over the last 3 years, APD faced serious staffing shortages. Despite heavy recruitment efforts, the Department experienced continuous difficulties in attracting sufficient recruits to replace sworn personnel leaving the Department (large cohorts were hired twenty years ago, and are now retiring). The sworn force has declined from over 900 three years ago to fewer than 850 at present. In addition to complicating our efforts to bring officers into focus groups (officers feel themselves to be constantly busy and under some pressure not to use work time for non-patrol efforts), this created significant turbulence in trying to analyze community policing implementation: Low staffing levels simply created enough extraneous dynamics to make it difficult to trace changes in police practices and culture (and lack thereof) back to the implementation effort. In cases where we can show real change in police practices and culture, this actually strengthens our account: if change has been possible despite staffing difficulties, it should be possible in other situations. In cases where little change has occurred, analytic problems are greater. Note, however, that although some departments nationwide have reached

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record staffing levels, the strong economy of recent years has meant that staffing difficulties have not been uncommon in American police departments; thus, though this factor raises analytic difficulties, it does not make APD's organizational dynamics unique. In any case, this report should be interpreted as an analysis of a department simultaneously striving to implement community policing more vigorously and to resolve problems exacerbated by staffing shortages.

Second, the Department faced continuous difficulties of organizational communication throughout the research period. The message departmental leaders were attempting to send – that community policing was the heart of APD's vision and philosophy, and should orient the activities of all officers – was either unclear or was not penetrating organizational layers. As a result, it was not providing anything like consistent guidance to front-line patrol personnel. As discussed below, one role of the Feedback Reports involved helping APD leaders identify, understand, and resolve these communications difficulties, and re-orient their own priorities in order to send a clearer message. This process took considerable time and remains ongoing. In Albuquerque, the messy "iterative, make-it-work development process" identified by Skogan and Hartnett (*op cit.*, p. 246) remains very much a work in progress.

Third, one barrier to effective implementation that some police agencies have faced does *not* appear to be a factor in APD: Police leadership who, in response to political pressure in favor of community policing, pay lip service to that model but in fact offer no real commitment to it. The local chief of police during this research phase was brought in specifically to implement community policing and has invested himself repeatedly, publicly,

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and strongly in endorsing its priorities and assumptions. He has also worked to place advocates of strong community policing models in key authoritative roles in the agency, most notably in control of Area Commands and the Police Academy. Whatever limitations of organizational communication have plagued the implementation process, they have not been rooted in lukewarm support from above, at least of community policing *principles*.

Achievements:

Within these constraints, the most important achievement in community policing implementation in Albuquerque has been decentralization of resources and authority out to five Area Commands with their own geographically-dispersed facilities. This process has been underway for several years, particularly in its geographic dimension, and thus is not entirely new. But the last two and a half years have seen a marked emphasis on matching authority and control over resources to that geographic dispersal - concretely, this means that area commanders have been given prestige, resources, authority, and access to departmental decision-making. At the same time, the department has striven to hold area commanders accountable for crime and quality-of-life dynamics in their geographic areas. Significant controversy has attended this decentralization, and some mis-steps have occurred; some units had to be re-centralized when they could not function effectively after decentralization. But by and large this decentralization has proceeded and resulted in significant change in organizational culture, including some heightened status for Area Command-linked field patrol officers; this serves as a countervailing force to the longstanding prestige of specialized units,

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particularly those with paramilitary trappings.

A second area of progress in community policing implementation concerns promotional advancement at the area commander level: These prestigious slots are perceived as having gone to those mid-level supervisors who combine strong leadership abilities with authentic commitment to community policing priorities (at least some defensible version of community policing beyond lip service, albeit not always a full problem-solving/community partnership model of community policing). With some exceptions, these promotions have sent the message that status and responsibility in the Department will go to community policing advocates.[5]

A third area of progress has been the Academy training program: At one time rather resistant to incorporating community policing priorities systematically into its curriculum, the Academy has now done so, albeit only through an extended struggle by departmental leadership to impose changes. Our research has not focused primarily on the Academy, and our ethnographic data there is thus too thin to confidently assess whether this has represented an overall improvement in police training in Albuquerque; we simply do not know enough to make that assessment in either direction. The point here is that Academy training at least gives cadets some initial grounding in the practices, assumptions, and orientations of community policing; whether this is successfully integrated in a strong model of overall police training – in

[5] This oversimplifies matters somewhat. Some promotions and non-promotions have undercut this message, primarily because support for community policing has naturally not been the *only* factor at play in promotion decisions. Most notably, officers believe that politically-driven factors including demographic characteristics and internal alliances have partly driven promotion decisions.

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Albuquerque or elsewhere – awaits future researchers.

Fourth, APD has shifted its youth focus away from DARE (and similar programs with little evidence of positive impact) to a school resource officer (SRO) model that places an officer full-time in each middle school and high school that requests one. This was achieved despite significant local opposition to eliminating DARE. Though the Department has yet to fully exploit the opportunities represented by this large investment of officer time, the SRO program has laid the foundation for an enhanced police relationship with youth (and, potentially, for more successful recruitment into policing as a career).

Fifth, in specific geographic areas of the city and in specific patrol teams within APD, some very important examples of sophisticated community policing have occurred and continue to occur on a regular basis. These include strong police-community partnerships in identifying and addressing problems believed to generate crime and quality-of-life problems; police-led court monitoring initiatives; and community-based crime prevention initiatives that receive resources and support from APD programs. None of the analysis which follows should be interpreted as detracting from these isolated instances of real success; the key question is whether they are being replicated as models throughout the Department.

Stagnation and Regression:

Despite these achievements, in other areas community policing has not advanced significantly, and perhaps even regressed. None of these areas appear to be irreversible, but changing them will require focused organizational effort. Such efforts will be especially crucial

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in the current context: The sunset of the 1994 Crime Bill, along with the changing federal administration, suggests that the tone and extent of future federal support for community policing initiatives are uncertain. That support, and the legitimacy and financial resources for community policing it has brought, has been important in keeping community policing alive within police culture even as implementation has waxed and waned. The next few years will therefore be the critical test period for whether community policing has grown deep enough local roots to survive on its own merits. Local leaders will have to turn around these areas of stagnation, or community policing models may wither on the vine.[6]

By far the most serious area of stagnation has been within police culture at the level of experienced front-line patrol officers. Quite simply, they have heard the term "community policing" too frequently for too long, and seen too little resulting change in what is expected of them or what they are rewarded for doing, for them to give the term a great deal of credence. It is not that community policing is dead-and-buried within the world of patrol officers; it is simply irrelevant at present for the majority of them. Many do not understand it well, feel themselves too busy to practice what they do understand, and lack any clear sense of direction from above that encourages them to do something specific and concrete that they can label

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[6] As will become clear in the conclusion, the Partnership adopts a pragmatic stance on this question: Where there is good evidence that specific elements of community policing work in reducing crime, easing fear, and strengthening quality of life, we have helped bring that to the attention of police leaders. We assume that the strongest model of policing for the future will integrate those elements as well as others; whether that model goes under the name of "community policing" or not is less important – though the symbolic damage of letting that term die might fatally damage even its most effective elements, given the organizational politics of policing.

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"community policing." The overall situation of police culture in this regard has changed little from the time of our 1998 assessment summarized above. Because more time has gone by, however, officers – both those oriented by community policing and those opposed to it – have less of a sense of it as the wave of the future in policing. This again highlights the next few years as crucial.

I would emphasize that this is *by no means* unique to APD; a similar dynamic characterized officer-level practices in three of the four other departments I visited. In Albuquerque, at least, the best judgment from focus groups and informal interviews appears to be that community policing as a credible model to guide police work can be revivified – but that it will take consistent direction from above and clear evidence that it can impact crime (evidence which exists, but of which few officers are aware).

The situation is somewhat different among officers who completed their training within the last year or so: They received enough training, and have been on patrol briefly enough, that some appear to be incorporating it into their patrol practices. At least this is the case in those area commands that strongly endorse it; elsewhere, attitudes and practices appear to depend entirely on front-line institutional leaders such as squad commanders, elite role models among officers, and field training officers (see later discussion of the role of such positions as the *institutional levers of change* in police organizations).

More specifically, on each of three core components of community policing, our ethnographic research suggests that levels of officer-level activity have declined:

- *Problem-solving:* With isolated exceptions, and despite the fact that virtually everyone

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working for APD has had a two-day training module on problem-solving, most officers neither claim to do significant problem solving nor can be discerned actually doing any during the course of a 10-hour ride-along – at least under anything approaching an adequate definition of problem solving (see Goldstein 1979, 1990; Eck and Spellman 1987). Much of what is claimed as problem-solving activity is essentially traditional "tactical plans" re-labeled with a new terminology. A more rigorous understanding of what constitutes an adequate long-term "response" to an adequately analyzed "problem" is sorely needed – along with adequate tracking of the results (and adequate staffing to make all this possible).

- *Community partnerships*: This might best be characterized as an area of bifurcated results. Many area commanders and some lieutenants spend considerable time meeting with neighborhood associations and other community groups. This has clearly been institutionalized as an expectation of their jobs – to a degree that actively interferes with other aspects of their positions, and sometimes when the presence of lower-level officers might be as effective and would certainly represent an opportunity for socializing officers into community interaction as a tool of police work. Yet the expectation that officers or sergeants will attend such meetings, much less actively participate, has largely withered in the face of staffing shortages and, at times, the demands by community members to have high-level command officers present.
- *Proactive patrol*: Reduced staffing without corresponding reductions in calls for service has generated a situation in which officers *feel* constantly besieged by incoming and

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waiting calls for service. We are certainly aware that this is the long-standing claim of many officers, about which a strong dose of scepticism is warranted. In this case, however, our ethnographic observations confirm that, for some shifts some of the time, the situation has indeed deteriorated. At the same time, it is certainly true that many officers continue to have unallocated time during a shift. The fundamental problem has less to do with available time than with what might best be termed the flow of police work and the habits of officers.[7] The sporadic nature of calls for service means that calls do "stack up" during busy periods. But more important is officers' sense that calls may **begin** stacking up at any time; dedicated officers have strong habits of staying available for that eventuality, and opportunistic officers have strong habits of staying unavailable for calls. Thus, the likelihood of calls stacking soon serves to undermine the focus of those who previously practiced proactive patrol, and to justify those who never did.

Some significant advances in the Department's implementation of community policing – particularly in the area of organizational structure – were thus paralleled by significant stagnation in the on-the-ground practice of community policing in the work of the majority of patrol officers. That stagnation is traceable to staffing shortages and to shortcomings in organizational communication. Greater insight into the nature of communications difficulties

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[7] See Pierre Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* on the role of the ingrained habits – "habitus" – in shaping social actors.

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may come from a case study of one of the key areas in which those difficulties arose: the relationship of community policing to the CompStat management process APD adopted in late 1998.

As detailed in the accompanying feedback report (see appendix), APD like many urban departments adapted the CompStat process pioneered by the New York Police Department as a tool for promoting greater management accountability within a large bureaucratic police organization (Bratton 1998; Silverman 1999). Though the Chief of Police intended for this to be a mechanism precisely for stronger implementation of community policing initiatives, it was perceived from the beginning by many supervisors, officers, some management – and perhaps most damagingly by some champions of community policing in the Department – as a new initiative *replacing* community policing as the Department's direction for the future. A kind of organizational schizophrenia developed. The strategic direction of the organization continued to be defined from above as an ever-deepening reality of community policing, but perceived from below as the jettisoning of community policing priorities. Officers and especially front-line supervisory personnel adjusted rapidly to new signals they perceived: that what now mattered for career advancement had little to do with community policing and was tied tightly to traditional policing measures (clearance rates, response times, and knowledge of specific criminal cases).[8]

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[8] Note that this is different from a more typical organizational schizophrenia in policing: Police leaders telling political leaders and media representatives what they believe the public wants to hear, while continuing to run the police organization in ways bearing no relationship to that public representation. This suggests what may be an important structural

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This became one of a series of emerging organizational issues around which the Research Partnership instituted organizational dialogue via the feedback reports and focus groups. We now turn to assessing the impact of that process, in the case of CompStat as well as more generally.

Assessment of Feedback: Toward a more reflexive organization

Two areas in which those involved in the Partnership hoped it would make a substantial difference in the Albuquerque Police Department were (1) undermining the high wall dividing sworn and civilian police employees by fomenting much greater civilian/sworn collaboration built on mutual respect; and (2) fostering the consolidation within APD of what we have termed a "strong culture of policing" that combines the most necessary and effective elements of all the current subcultures into something approximating a coherent organizational culture of policing.

Regarding neither can we discern the kind of fundamental transformation to which the Partnership aspired. (1) was seen as an important goal by some key Partnership participants and as a hoped-for secondary effect by others; in any case, the fact that front-line civilian employees and first-level supervisors were only brought into the focus group process with

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change in American policing: political officials and the public now have sufficient knowledge about policing, and pay sufficient attention to policing issues, to place proponents of reform models of policing into key positions in senior police management. But these senior police managers may rarely have the organizational tools or knowledge to successfully push those reforms down into lower ranks.

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great effort and marginal success (as noted above) meant that little headway was made in fostering mutually-respectful interchange or dialogue at this level. Fostering such dialogue was much more successful at higher levels, with civilian and sworn managers and upper-level supervisors engaging actively in vigorous conversations and healthy arguments about problems facing the Department. Such dialogue is an achievement – but these civilians were already in positions of authority from which to enter into them; the Partnership simply provided a structured forum for doing so.

For reasons already discussed, (2) has not occurred to a significant degree, either. Problems of organizational communications and sworn staffing presented insurmountable obstacles to the effective consolidation of a strong organizational culture incorporating the best elements of community policing and other subcultures. At least, those obstacles have been insurmountable so far, in this and apparently numerous other urban departments, if our brief visits and the available literature are any indication.[9]

Thus, at one level our blunt assessment is that the feedback process had remarkably little hard impact on the Albuquerque Police Department: Nothing about our input deeply transformed the way APD personnel experienced their jobs or ran the Department. So far, community policing implementation has played out largely as it would have if our role had been entirely absent. Police culture in Albuquerque continues to represent a fragmented

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[9] See Skogan and Hartnett (1997); Chicago Community Policing Evaluation Consortium (1999). On wider outcomes nationally, see the various evaluation papers to be published in a volume edited by Wesley Skogan.

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agglomeration of remnant and partial subcultures of traditional policing, paramilitary policing, community policing, police administration, etc., and it remains undetermined whether a strong organizational culture will coalesce out of this fragmentation – and if so, which priorities it will emphasize. This remains an ongoing struggle for the soul of policing, as we have chronicled elsewhere (Wood, forthcoming).

Yet, in other ways, we believe that the feedback process has had a discernible impact – albeit via "soft" influence – on the situation in the Albuquerque Police Department. We here strive to document this assertion, using interpretive evidence, some harder evidence, and the CompStat-and-community-policing situation as a case study. We believe that in fact the Research Partnership has been a success on a number of levels, including some with significant long-term implications for policing in Albuquerque.

1. By having outstanding ethnographic access to front-line officer culture and to key informal leaders among sworn and civilian personnel at all levels of the Department, and by regularly raising questions, noting employee concerns, and identifying tensions within APD's community policing implementation, the Partnership helped keep Department leadership relatively self-aware of the holes and setbacks in that implementation, and confronted managers with the "real situation" as seen from grassroots levels of the organization. To their credit, at least some APD managers recognized their need for regular "reality checks" of this kind, and welcomed even unpleasant feedback. At no point were we asked to stifle frank feedback or threatened with severing of our access to the Department. Much to the contrary, our access was

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regularly facilitated, although at several points we had to troubleshoot strained relationships; this alone is remarkable in the tenuous world of academic-law enforcement collaboration.

2. By regularly drawing the attention of key formal and informal leaders in APD to the large-scale picture within the Department, the Partnership may have helped keep some organizational focus on the strategic vision of community policing as a long-term shift, and contributed to preventing reform implementation from being inundated with the details of management. In the perception of front-line officers, community policing has at times been under siege, on the verge of being relegated to complete irrelevance in police culture. In direct response to our noting this, upper level command staff have periodically re-affirmed the strategic direction of the Department in line with community policing and shifted organizational priorities to try to relaunch that effort. Partly as a result, community policing has remained a significant reality – albeit only one among several – in the Department and not been lost entirely in the midst of personnel shortages.

3. The Partnership has been one key instrument through which the chief of police has forced open the police department to the presence and influence of outsiders. Though the Partnership predated his arrival here in 1998, Chief Galvin brought with him to APD a commitment to breaking open the traditionally-closed culture of police organizations; in myriad ways, he has done so. Though this has not been limited to the academic personnel of the Partnership, the latter has represented one crucial aspect of

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this more open environment in the Department. Thus, to take one example, when the principal investigator's presence at a sensitive upper-level staff meeting was openly challenged by a high command officer, the researcher was not simply encouraged to stay but publicly endorsed. Likewise, when the research associate's reliability and trustworthiness were challenged for unfounded reasons, her continued access was ultimately reaffirmed and indeed enhanced. These are minor issues in the flow of events in a major urban police department, but appear to have sent a clear message: the organization need not blindly distrust all outsiders.

4. Through forthcoming publications and extensive oral presentations nationally, the findings of the Partnership have become part of the national conversation among scholars, police leaders, and federal funding agencies regarding the current dynamics of policing reform in the United States.[10] Our contribution has revolved around new insight into cultural dynamics of policing, organizational implementation strategies, and re-emphasizing the value of ethnographic research for informing cutting-edge thinking about law enforcement.[11]

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[10] See Wood, Davis, and Rouse (1999); Wood, Davis, and Rouse (forthcoming 2001a); Wood and Davis (forthcoming 2001); Wood (forthcoming 2001). We have also presented various aspects of our findings at annual meetings of the American Criminological Society and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences; the NIJ/COPS National Policing Conference; and at a Chicago working session of a group of prominent policing scholars for an edited volume.

[11] Of course, there is a long and respected tradition of ethnographic work on policing (Skolnick 1994 [1966]; Wilson 1968; Bittner 1967, 1970; Wambaugh 1975; Muir 1977; Van Maanen 1978; Reuss-Ianni 1983). More recently, despite extensive funding for policing research in the late 1990s, little new ethnographic work has been published - leaving police scholars citing these classics, and sometimes assuming erroneously that little has changed in

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5. Significantly, the Partnership appears to have moved some distance in changing the relationship between the flagship law enforcement agency and the flagship university in the state of New Mexico. As discussed below, the institutional partnership between the Albuquerque Police Department and the Institute for Social Research at the University of New Mexico will continue past the end of two rounds of NIJ funding. As important, though difficult to trace to any direct influence of the Partnership, at least three other research or evaluation projects involving faculty from ISR or former researchers from this Partnership are now underway. All these developments suggest that opening up APD to outside collaboration has not been only sporadic or personalistic, but has been institutionalized in new long-term organizational relationships.

6. Regarding the CompStat management strategy: Over the last year, the priorities and emphases highlighted in Compstat meetings have changed. Partly in response to our input and partly in response to management self-critique and feedback from lower level supervisors (the latter partly rooted in focus group discussions), management has shifted the CompStat process to better link it with community policing emphases. In particular, greater focus has been placed on reporting the results of problem-solving efforts in each area command. Some of this shift was initiated by area commanders themselves, some by senior managers. Thus, rather than focusing only on traditional statistics such as reports written, arrests made, crime rates, and clearance rates,

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contemporary policing. Valuable ethnographic work by Steve Herbert (1998) is the strongest exception to this pattern.

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representatives from area commands have begun to report on their problem-solving efforts during their formal presentations at CompStat meetings. Following those presentations, more of the questions now focus on problem-solving and the role of community partnerships. This shift appears to be ongoing, and is the subject of an article we will shortly publish in an NIJ-sponsored edited volume that reports on the work of research partnerships around the country. APD is also now moving to try to track the long-term impact of problem-solving projects, partly via the Partnership. Likewise, CompStat and morning chief's briefings now generate more information-sharing across area commands and departmental divisions. Though we cannot trace these shifts directly to any influence of the feedback process of the Partnership, it is true that we have repeatedly called attention to the need for greater sharing of information and resources, and for making CompStat dovetail much more fully with community policing (see attached feedback report).

7. At management team meetings, the principal investigator has presented summaries of recent research findings on the effectiveness of community policing in other cities, including findings from Chicago on the need to broker participation by other (non-police) city agencies in problem-solving efforts. That input sparked efforts by APD to generate similar broad city participation in solving crime- and disorder-generating problems. At present, this has born fruit with some city agencies but not with others; the principal investigator has been asked to present the same findings at a meeting of all city department heads, and will do so early in 2001.

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8. The last area of possible success is the hardest to document but may be as important as any other more concrete result. Through multiple iterations of the focus group process at the supervisory and command levels, the Partnership has introduced into the core organizational life of the Department, and into the experience of senior sworn and civilian personnel, a degree of public dialogue that appears to be relatively rare in large police departments, where command-and-control models often hold sway (Maguire 1997; Langworthy 1986; Manning 1977). Over the long term, this may have planted the seeds for a stronger culture of mutual learning at the command level, i.e. talking and thinking together about what works, drawing more fully on competing ideas about what is best for the organization, etc.

The Partnership effort was not designed as a scientific pre- and post-test of a single organizational intervention, but rather as an ongoing process of organizational feedback and monitoring that allows the kind of interpretive argument presented here for the impact of continuing "participant action" intervention within departmental dynamics. The findings presented here – now including this draft report – have been fed back into the Department through the same feedback process, and APD personnel afforded the opportunity to confirm or take issue with them. We believe that the interpretive argument presented here and the confirmation by organizational representatives offer the most useful evaluation of the Partnership available to us, given the nature of the project.

However, a survey of APD personnel done for other purposes by an outside consultant

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in late 2000 offers some interesting data also relevant here.[12] First, the data clearly show problems in the current implementaton status of community policing in the Department: When senior managers (sworn and civilian) were asked to identify "two basic principles of community policing," only 32% could name two; 40% could name one; and 32% could not name any such principles – despite quite a permissible standard of what would "count." Likewise, two-thirds could not identify the "elements of SARA," the problem-solving process in which the Department has invested considerable organizational resources. Second, both the questionnaire data and the subsequent open discussions of it suggest that APD personnel have at least partially internalized a culture of frank conversation and mutual critique. Specifically, senior managers were asked:

> "Are the mission, goals, direction, and vision of the Albuquerque Police Department clearly articulated to all department personnel?"
> "Are the mission, goals, direction, and vision of the Albuquerque Police Department clearly articulated to the community?"
> "Has the leadership of the Albuquerque Police Department articulated the direction of the organization regarding community policing?"

In every case, at least 80% of APD managers responded negatively. This confirms both the problems of organizational communication discussed above, and perhaps the beginnings of

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[12] See "Strategic Planning Initiative: Planning Session Workbook – Data & Exemplars" by Jerry Heuett (Albuquerque Police Department, October 2000). Done as part of an innovative strategic planning process designed by APD Planning Director Roy Turpen, the survey involved oral questionnaires of senior management personnel and focus groups with lower-level personnel and community representatives. The methodology employed was quite appropriate for the purposes of strategic planning, but the selection process for focus group participants does not allow appropriate use of that data in the present context. However, since the entire universe of senior management personnel were interviewed, selection bias is not a factor in that portion of the data, which is used here.

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a culture of frank critique and organizational learning. The latter interpretation is buttressed by the character of some of the public discussions at management meetings following the release of the

survey data: Those discussions transcended the hierarchical roles in which police meetings are often frozen, and generated passionate and thoughtful conversations about where the problems lay and what might be done to remedy them. Again, we cannot assume this to be a result of the feedback process, but the institutionalization of frank dialogue and critical thinking among command-level personnel might plausibly be seen as having helped create or strengthen an organizational culture in which such dynamics are possible.[13]

Though the nature of the project militated against the kind of hard outcome measures often preferred in scientific evaluation, we believe we have a plausible case for specific and significant impact of the Partnership on organizational life in the Albuquerque Police Department - despite having neither dramatically transformed civilian-sworn relations nor catalyzed the successful consolidation of a strong culture of community policing. Indeed, we argue that the case presented here is stronger and more plausible, given the nature of the project, than many superficially more "scientific" findings employing questionable quantitative outcome measures. Note that we do not claim that the Partnership alone influenced organizational culture in the ways discussed here; rather, as is appropriate within a true

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[13] Of course, even on this interpretation, the Partnership would be only one of several important factors; others include command personnel with the inclination and autonomy to voice disagreements, a chief willing to countenance open discussion, etc.

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partnership between police leaders and scholars, a process of mutual enlightenment, frank dialogue, and shared focus on organizational problems helped APD leaders at various levels advance the slow transformation of their own department in subtle ways. We hope that they prove to be long-term ways with more "measurable" impact on policing practices and organizational excellence.

Toward the Future: Long-term change in policing

This project, like the Albuquerque's own implementation of community policing beginning in 1995 and very likely most implementation efforts around the country, initially assumed a model of organizational change in policing something like the following: If reform leaders from within the policing profession could be matched with political support from their local government, new financial resources from local and federal government, new ideas about policing from recent work by scholars and practitioners, and community involvement by positive elements in local neighborhoods, they could push community policing down into the ranks of supervisors and officers. Few assumed this would be easy, and it became commonplace to say that full implementation of community policing would take 3 to 5 years. Indeed, this realist model was often juxtaposed to a naive model in which commanders could just order a new set of policing practices, provide some training, and see the new model implemented in relatively short order. The latter model was seen as naive precisely in its failure to appreciate the strength of resistance from "traditional police culture" – thus the premise and value of our original research project tracking changes in police culture.

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However, the findings from this project and other recent studies of community policing implementation strongly suggest that even the realist model was too naive in its view of the process and timeline for successful implementation, at least in large urban departments. With only rare exceptions, mostly in atypical departments or local communities and often poorly documented, no large urban departments have succeeded in radically transforming the organizational culture of policing in ways strongly consonant with the practices and premises of community policing. Changes have been made, old ways called into question, new ideas have been tried out and sometimes found valuable. But so far nowhere has what we have called a "strong culture of community policing" truly emerged hegemonic.

How can we best understand this? Does it mean the new ideas don't work, i.e. represent the fundamental failure of the collection of reform ideas about policing that are grouped under the label "community policing"? Or does it mean the new ideas were never really tried, i.e. represent the operational failure to implement reform ideas? Ten years or more into implementation, an affirmative answer to either calls the whole community policing program into question.

We want to suggest a different answer entirely.[14] Indeed, we suggest that before we can reach an adequate answer to what lessons are to be drawn from the last ten years, we must ask a prior question: What does the process of successful implementation really look like? Given

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[14] This line of thinking emerged in a conversation with a dozen scholars of policing convened in Chicago in October 2000 by Wes Skogan. Though, as always in such settings, exact intellectual authorship is difficult to trace, the principal investigator was one of several key participants in the discussion that generated this line of thinking.

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the experience of the Albuquerque Police Department, the actual process that might lead to successful implementation appears to combine: (1) Institutional change, i.e. strategically-led shifts in the *institutions* of police culture – that is, the key organizational symbols, positions, power centers, decision-making processes, and assumptions about police work; and (2) Cohort turnover, i.e. the gradual shift in officer perspectives and practices made possible as incoming officers are socialized within the transformed institutions of police organizational life.

More specifically, a typical innovation process in large urban departments looks something like this:[15] Scholars and a handful of police leaders generate new ideas regarding police reform, some of which are picked up by influential national centers of opinion-formation and police funding (PERF, IACP, Department of Justice). These ideas become accepted models, generating isomorphic pressures familiar in the literature on the new institutionalism (Dimaggio and Powell 1991) – pressures that come into play in local political struggles. Under the influence of local political dynamics or litigation pressures, police leadership feels constrained to endorse – at least publicly – the reform ideas. This begins a glacial shift in department priorities; initially, that shift may be minimal, political, and purely linguistic, but even such small changes serve to legitimate the new ideas and reinforce the political pressures in favor of reform ideas; they may also embolden champions of reform ideas from within

[15] Though, for presentation purposes, we outline these in a rough chronological order, this is for illustrative purposes only; analytically, the process might occur in differing sequences. We suggest only that something akin to these dynamics appears to have occurred in many departments that are moving forward with community policing implementation – albeit in fits and starts.

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police ranks. Also, local or national funding priorities may dictate new initiatives in line with the reform ideas. Gradually, these pressures converge to produce some substantial departmental efforts to implement the reform ideas at the local level, even where official support was tepid and for public consumption only (more rarely, police leaders themselves commit early on to reform ideas, becoming convinced of their value for more effective police work and community relations rather than purely to assuage political pressures).

In either case, these initial implementation efforts have typically been guided implicitly or explicitly by either the "naive" or "realistic" model of organizational change in policing sketched above, positing either immediate or three- to five-year implementation timelines via the imposition of reform ideas onto extant police culture. With rare exceptions, this strategy fails, leading to any of three outcomes: (1) declaration of failure, with a return to traditional police practices or embrace of other policing priorities (e.g. paramilitary models, one-dimensional enforcement policing driven by CompStat, etc.); (2) replacement of departmental leadership, i.e. finding new formal leadership to oversee reform implementation; or (3) strategic re-assessment of reform implementation, i.e. reconsidering the timing, process, and strategy for implementing reform ideas.[16]

If the first option is adopted, reform implementation ends; community policing is declared a failure. If the second option is adopted, new leadership may declare community

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[16] These three correspond respectively to the classic choice options: exit, loyalty, and voice. See Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (1970).

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policing dead; or new leadership may launch a strategic re-assessment; or new leadership may naively start the whole process over and eventually lead once again to the same set of organizational choices. If the strategic reassessment option is adopted, a more coherent process of organizational learning may result, involving more reflexive learning about how to implement reforms (How can we do this better?) and reexamination of reform ideas themselves (What really works? What does not? Why?).

The latter process – assessing the reform ideas grouped under the rubric of "community policing" – is ongoing, the province of a wide group of national and international scholars, police leaders, and policy makers. Here, we hope to make some contribution to the process of re-assessing reform implementation. The experience of the Albuquerque Police Department, with which we are intimately familiar, and of the other departments with which we are more distantly familiar, suggests that an adequate re-assessment must start with the insight that attempting to force long-time officers deeply entrenched in the practices, beliefs, and ethos of traditional policing is simply destined to fail. Such a battle may capture the "hearts and minds" of a minority of experienced officers, but nowhere to our knowledge has it successfully won over anything like the majority of officers. Rather, where implementation has been at least partially successful, it has been through the process of taking control of the *levers of institutional change* in a departmen – the key positions and processes that reproduce police culture over time. Those key institutional levers include:

- Cadet recruitment and selection
- Academy training
- Post-Academy on-the-job training, especially the selection of field training officers who

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first socialize cadets just coming out of Academy training
- Continuing training (state-mandated, optional, and supervisorial)
- Promotional processes
- Union leadership
- Authorization of overtime expenditures
- Departmental awards
- Shift briefings
- Management-level meetings
- Departmental awards
- Disciplinary proceedings
- Media portrayals of police work
- Labor relations and negotiations

Strategic implementation of reform ideas appears to involve the "capture" of these key institutions of police organizational life and linking them systematically and publicly to reform priorities, without attempting to "shove community policing down our throats," in the words of one APD veteran. Rather than attempting to create dramatic change immediately, this process fosters the slow shift of police culture by creating an organizational climate in which strong police practices – especially those rooted in reform ideas, but also those from traditional policing that are perennially valuable – are encouraged, rewarded, and given status. Equally important, these institutional levers can be used to undermine recalcitrant traditionalists who seek to actively subvert the reform model, especially among the cadets emerging from academy training; if reformist ideas are to take hold, this emerging class of officers must be the seedbed in which it can flourish.

Throughout, the goal of a strategic implementation process is not the wholesale destruction of established police culture – at least, not where it has embraced truly professional norms – but rather the forcing open of that culture to new ideas and practices so that it can be

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integrated with the reform model in a new cultural synthesis we have labeled a "strong culture of policing," integrating the best elements of all the police subcultures.

The remarkable hostility of traditional police culture to reform ideas means that reform zealots, true believers dedicated to forcing new ideas into resistant departments, will be crucial to successful implementation; but the need to synthesize disparate police cultures means there is also an important role for pragmatists, well-rooted in extant police culture, who mediate relations between zealots and established formal and informal police leaders. The best hope for police reform in large urban departments will come from combining community policing zealots and reformist pragmatists (from both the civilian and sworn ranks) in a strategic partnership for truly long-term institutional and cohort change in policing. In forthcoming publications, we hope to contribute to the understanding of this process by both scholars and law enforcement practitioners.

Whither the Research Partnership?

The Albuquerque Police Department has recently begun a long-term strategic planning process, an innovative effort designed and led by APD's Planning Department.[17] It has three key components: First, solicitation of input on departmental direction from APD personnel in a bottom-up process beginning with front-line civilians and sworn officers and extending up through all ranks. Second, solicitation of input on departmental direction from key

[17] Key leadership is provided by Director of Planning Roy Turpen and lead planner Karen Fischer, under Chief of Police Jerry Galvin.

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stakeholders from a variety of community groups, through a process of ten focus groups throughout the city and subsequent synthesis of insights by sworn, civilian, and community representatives.[18] Third, the development of a strategic plan for the Department, designed to re-invigorate community policing implementation over the next three years; the strategic goals and objectives are being generated from the input of the first two steps, subjected to internal revision, and then prioritized in light of current organizational capacity and future needs.

In moving toward this strategic planning process, the Planning Department and the APD Chief of Police asked this principal investigator to serve as a consultant. That request has been re-worked into a continuing institutional relationship between APD and the UNM Institute for Social Research, in which the principal investigator will help develop the strategic goals and objectives and design organizational change strategies. It represents an opportunity to deepen the collaboration between research scholars and law enforcement professionals that since 1997 has been seeded through the National Institute of Justice's locally-initiated research partnership program. When the research and service agreement is signed (probably January 2001), it will institutionalize a formal relationship between the premier research university in New Mexico and the lead police agency in the largest metropolitan area of the state. We believe this represents an area of significant advance in police research, the product of Department of Justice leadership in promoting scholar-practitioner partnerships. In Albuquerque, it represents significant learning on the part of both university-based academics

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[18] The first and most of the second steps were done by APD Planning in collaboration with consultant Jerry Heuett, a former sworn officer in Arizona brought in for this purpose.

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and agency-based sworn and civilian police leaders. In the years ahead, we hope this experience can contribute to other partnership arrangements nationally.

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APPENDICES

FEEDBACK REPORTS ON THE FOLLOWING TOPICS

1. Front-line supervisory issues
2. APD and Community Policing
3. Problem-solving in APD
4. Subcultures of policing in APD
5. Management via CompStat
6. Leadership in APD
7. CompStat and Community Policing
8. Crisis Intervention Team and Community Policing

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APD-UNM Research Partnership
Section of appendix to report:
The "point system" approach to police supervision:
5/99 draft version

[Note: This is one of several short sections that update our report to the present. Each section discusses some emerging issue within APD, which we believe important enough to merit broader discussion among formal and informal leaders in the Department. We see these short sections as part of our "strategic feedback" role -- providing grist for continuing departmental discussion and decision-making. Deputy Chiefs/Director and Captains are invited to a focus group to discuss this:

This Thursday, May 20, 1999 at 12:00 noon (lunch provided)
Institute for Social Research, 2808 Central SE, Conference room 107
Please RSVP to Katie Owens at 277-5081 or page Wood at 540-4693

One important practice emerging within the Albuquerque Police Department is the use of some variety of a "point system" to motivate officers and hold them accountable for their work productivity. This represents one of several approaches to officer supervision now being used, with the choice of approach usually left up to the discretion of individual supervisors. That discretion is usually exercised at the lieutenant level, and occasionally at the sergeant or Area Commander level. On one level, supervision through a point system represents a logic similar to that of "mandatory minimums" (usually 2 DUIs and 20 traffic citations per month): Both systems try to elevate officer productivity by holding them responsible for sustaining a minimum level of activity. The key difference with the "point system" lies in the nature of the activities for which officers can gain points: the extensive list of activities and associated points now in use rewards officers for a wide range of activities, as opposed to the more narrow range of activities rewarded under most mandatory minimum systems.

Advantages of supervision through point systems:

The key advantage of the point system is that it allows supervisors to have some meaningful and comparable measurement of their patrol officers' activity levels. This has always been a key challenge of police management, since most officers work far away from any direct supervision. Tracking points allows supervisors to demand some significant work output from all officers, particularly those engaged in opportunistic evasion of work responsibilities that other officers must therefore perform (or responsibilities such as problem-solving which can be avoided altogether, even if they are important for fighting crime). In this way, the point system defines a minimum acceptable work level, allows some flexibility of officer priorities, can encourage a broad police function, and provides at least the appearance of comparability across shifts, squads, and area commands. Finally, when lieutenants or captains believe that a given sergeant is not providing adequate supervision of officers, the point system may compensate for this weak supervision.

Disadvantages of supervision through point systems:

In addition to these strengths, it is important to recognize some disadvantages to point system supervision. One disadvantage arises from officer resistance to it. In recognizing this

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factor, we note that in many cases such resistance arises from officers who have been shirking work responsibilities; they resent the new demands and accountability represented by the point system. Of course, these are precisely the officers who most need to be held accountable; their resistance is precisely a mark of the success of the system: points provide a "floor" to their work performance.

However, resistance also arises from a very different group of officers: those who have been most dedicated to proactive policing due to their own professional ethics and personal responsibility. Many such officers exist, and they sustain their commitment in part precisely because they value their autonomy. When point systems are imposed in their squads, they chafe under the loss of autonomy, complain about feeling "treated like children," and may become demoralized and inclined to "get my points for the shift, and quit.". In these circumstances, the point system can become a "ceiling" on performance rather than a floor – thus reducing excellence rather than promoting it.

A second disadvantage arises if the list of activities and associated points is not crafted quite carefully and revised in light of evolving department priorities. Depending on how point-worthy activities are defined, how many points are associated with each activity, and what is included and emphasized on the list, the point system may refine or distort officer efforts, and thus serve to advance or undermine department priorities. Fine-tuning the point list thus becomes crucial. Two fine-tuning tasks are important: on one hand, listing activities and points to reflect important priorities linked to successfully reducing crime; on the other hand, being sure that the activities listed are defined clearly and understood by officers. Some supervisors have advanced quite far in the first task, having developed sophisticated point systems that reflect a broad array of activities under traditional and community policing models. Progress has been more limited on the second task: for example, the "problem-solving" or "POP track" category is widely used to cover a remarkable variety of activities, only a few of which represent true long-term solutions to the kinds of "problems" intended by the SARA model.

Alternatives: Staying the course and innovating

These advantages and disadvantages will balance out differently in different situations and under different supervisors. In some situations, the point system will be a valuable tool for supervisors. In other situations, adopting the point system may backfire. The underlying risk lies in encouraging officers to respond unthinkingly to a point chart, and lose any clear vision of the policing craft – or sense of themselves as excellent practitioners of it. Given these complexities, the Department's current practice of leaving the choice of supervisory system up to individual supervisors seems wise. This appears to be done most naturally at the lieutenant level. Where the point system is adopted, we suggest that commanders require at least twice-yearly review of what activities are listed and defined, how points are spread, and how officers are oriented to the activities. In addition, strong communication between supervisors and officers appears critical to the constructive implementation of the point system: Where supervisors have explained its purpose, for whom it is intended, and why it represents no criticism of dedicated officers, the point system's disadvantages have been less pronounced.

Finally, it may be worth experimenting with a more flexible implementation of the point system: rather than adopting it squad-, shift-, or area command-wide, supervisors might consider using it only with officers who have not been productive. An individual officer or group of officers could be placed on the point system for a defined period or until their work was up to

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expectations, then moved off the point system. This might strengthen the authority of sergeants and lieutenants over opportunistic officers, without alienating excellent officers. The decision regarding an individual officer might best be made by mutual agreement between his/her immediate sergeant and lieutenant, in order to protect against both arbitrary punishment and inadequate supervision.

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The "point system" approach to police supervision

APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration
May, 1999

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Disadvantages of supervision through point systems:

In addition to these strengths, it is important to recognize some disadvantages to point system supervision. One disadvantage arises from officer resistance to it. In recognizing this factor, we note that in many cases such resistance arises from officers who have been shirking work responsibilities; they resent the new demands and accountability represented by the point system. Of course, these are precisely the officers who most need to be held accountable; their resistance is precisely a mark of the success of the system: points provide a "floor" to their work performance.

However, resistance also arises from a very different group of officers: those who have been most dedicated to proactive policing due to their own professional ethics and personal responsibility. Many such officers exist, and they sustain their commitment in part precisely because they value their autonomy. When point systems are imposed in their squads, they chafe under the loss of autonomy, complain about feeling "treated like children," and may become demoralized and inclined to "get my points for the shift, and quit.". In these circumstances, the point system can become a "ceiling" on performance rather than a floor – thus reducing excellence rather than promoting it.

A second disadvantage arises if the list of activities and associated points is not crafted quite carefully and revised in light of evolving department priorities. Depending on how point-worthy activities are defined, how many points are associated with each activity, and what is included and emphasized on the

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list, the point system may refine or distort officer efforts, and thus serve to advance or undermine department priorities. Fine-tuning the point list thus becomes crucial. Two fine-tuning tasks are important: on one hand, listing activities and points to reflect important priorities linked to successfully reducing crime; on the other hand, being sure that the activities listed are defined clearly and understood by officers. Some supervisors have advanced quite far in the first task, having developed sophisticated point systems that reflect a broad array of activities under traditional and community policing models. Progress has been more limited on the second task: for example, the "problem-solving" or "POP track" category is widely used to cover a remarkable variety of activities, only a few of which represent true long-term solutions to the kinds of "problems" intended by the SARA model.

Alternatives: Staying the course and innovating

These advantages and disadvantages will balance out differently in different situations and under different supervisors. In some situations, the point system will be a valuable tool for supervisors. In other situations, adopting the point system may backfire. The underlying risk lies in encouraging officers to respond unthinkingly to a point chart, and lose any clear vision of the policing craft – or sense of themselves as excellent practitioners of it. Given these complexities, the Department's current practice of leaving the choice of supervisory system up to individual supervisors seems wise. This appears to be done most naturally at the lieutenant level. Where the point system is adopted, we suggest that commanders require at least twice-yearly review of what activities are listed and defined, how points are spread, and how officers are oriented to the activities. In addition, strong communication between supervisors and officers appears critical to the constructive implementation of the point system: Where supervisors have explained its purpose, for whom it is intended, and why it represents no criticism of dedicated officers, the point system's disadvantages have been less pronounced.

Finally, it may be worth experimenting with a more flexible implementation of the point system: rather than adopting it squad-, shift-, or area command-wide, supervisors might consider using it only with officers who have not been productive. An individual officer or group of officers could be placed on the point system for a defined period or until their work was up to expectations, then moved off the point system. This might strengthen the authority of sergeants and lieutenants over opportunistic officers, without alienating excellent officers. The decision regarding an individual officer might best be made by mutual agreement between his/her immediate sergeant and lieutenant, in order to protect against both arbitrary punishment and inadequate supervision.

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INSTITUTE for SOCIAL RESEARCH

APD and Community Oriented Policing
APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration[1]
April 1999

APD officially adopted community oriented policing as its operating philosophy in 1994, and in 1995 began a process of strategic planning and department re-organization to reinforce this commitment. In early 1997, APD was introducing significant organizational changes while attempting to overcome technological and organizational difficulties. By mid-1998, new organizational changes designed to further the community policing initiative – primarily departmental decentralization, better departmental communication, and more generalized (less specialized) patrol work – were introduced into the department. By early 1999, CompStat was being used extensively as a management tool in the department with an intention to provide greater accountability within a continuing policy of community policing. But, as documented in our longer report *Policing in Transition*,[2] throughout this process most patrol officers continued to say that community policing had never been explained to them in a way that made clear how it would make their work different. Even many of those in supervisory positions say they do not know much about how community policing is different from traditional policing – and those who do often express differing and sometimes contradictory understandings of it

Many factors contributed to this lack of clarity about community policing. COP was implemented during a period of severe budget constraints, and political pressures forced the department to spend money on infrastructure needs that officers felt should not have been a priority. In addition, the department failed to communicate a clear vision of what it meant by "community policing as a philosophy," which was compounded by opposition or misunderstanding of community policing among command-level personnel. We discuss these in some detail in the longer report. Here, the key point is that, if APD wishes to unify its strategic direction under the rubric of community policing, it must create a clearer understanding of what COP is. Of course, understanding community-oriented policing does not necessarily mean supporting it – but APD personnel will be able to argue about it more productively if they share some common understanding of what community policing is.

Defining community-oriented policing (COP) is no straightforward task. In consulting multiple sources of information about COP (law enforcement literature, police managers, politicians, citizens' and officers' personal experiences and other accounts of community policing in action), one comes away with diverse and contradictory understandings about what community

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[1] This brief report is one of a series to emerge from two years of research with the Albuquerque Police Department. Each is designed for distribution to APD personnel for their comments and discussion. The research has been funded by the National Institute of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice) award #96-IJ-CX-0068 and grant #98-IJ-CX-0073. The authors gratefully acknowledge this support and the partnership of the Albuquerque Police Department in carrying out this research. For more information on the APD-UNM Research Partnership, please contact Dr. Richard Wood or Mariah Davis at 505-277-4257 (rlwood@unm.edu), or Chief Gerald Galvin or Director of Planning Roy Turpen at 768-2200

[2] The longer report provides much further information on the political background of community policing in Albuquerque, the important precursors to COP in APD (including crime prevention programs), APD's implementation of COP, and the current status of COP in Albuquerque. It is available upon request.

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oriented policing is supposed to be. This is normal in a still-emerging concept, especially one that attempts to understand and ultimately alter the day-to-day activities in the complex world of law enforcement. As one academy instructor said, "I have been to all of the classes on COP, heard at least five different experts give their opinions on what it is all about. And each expert gave a different opinion, and every book I have read has said something else completely. So I guess even I can't define it. It is kind of like obscenity, you can't really define it but you sure know when you see it." The trouble is that most APD officers do not feel they know it or have seen it.

To understand COP, it is best **not** to assume that everything written, said, built, implemented or altered under the label "community-oriented policing" is truly a COP initiative. COP has been such a buzzword in recent years in police management that virtually everything has been justified by saying it is part of community policing. One goal of this paper is to help APD personnel discern what **really** is community policing when they see it, and what is not. The most realistic stance is to assume that some actions labeled as community policing efforts may prove to be valuable additions to the repertoire of officers, community members, and police departments, and other elements might prove to be less than valuable or even counterproductive.

So what is "community oriented policing"? APD uses the following definition:

> "Community policing is a philosophy, management style, and organizational strategy that promotes pro-active problem-solving and police-community partnerships to address the causes of crime and fear as well as other community issues."

Implied by this definition, but often missed by those new to the concept, is that ***community policing represents a comprehensive, organization-wide effort to strengthen the fight against crime, reduce public disorder and the fear of crime, and minimize other causes of crime by building stronger ties among law enforcement agencies, community members, and other government institutions.*** That is, community policing is about reducing crime – it simply brings to that task new policing tools and new understanding of what generates crime.

Proponents of COP argue that rising crime rates have led American police departments to emphasize reacting to crime and calls for service to the detriment of real crime prevention. An important clarification must be made here. Police officers have always prevented crime, but in recent decades have primarily done so by arresting those who have already committed crimes and thus might commit future crimes. To the extent that these arrests get future criminals off the streets and deter others from committing crimes, this modus operandi indeed prevents crime. In this sense, "crime prevention" is nothing new.

But COP promotes a rather different kind of crime prevention in the day-to-day work of officers. COP seeks to use the authority of the police as a "magnet", bringing other types of authority together to fight crime. Thus, COP works to increase the informal authority at work in the community by creating collaborative relationships between the police, community, and other agencies of the government that can effectively fight crime. Community oriented policing attempts to use these ties to heighten social authority: making police authority more relationally-grounded within the community; focusing governmental and private services on environmental and social problems that lead to crime; and empowering the citizens and organizations who exert informal social authority in the community.

COP also suggests that officers need new (or at least rediscovered) tools in their fight against crime. Primary among these tools are stronger relationships with people in the

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neighborhoods they patrol and fuller access to the resources of city government. In part, COP seeks to bring greater human and material resources to bear against crime and disorder. However, those resources must be brought to bear not only by officers, but also by community organizations with continual presence in neighborhoods. COP strives to further empower officers in their fight against crime by allowing police better access to information from the community, more social support in confronting criminals, and more legitimacy in the eyes of society. The combined focus on solving the problems that generate crime, reducing public disorder, and enhancing social authority is what sets COP apart from other approaches to policing.

COP does not place the sole burden of community policing on officers, but rather emphasizes policing as a shared responsibility. Increasing public safety through community policing becomes the task, not of police in isolation, but also of community members and other government agencies in collaboration. Thus, "community partnership" is one of the core components of community oriented policing. This partnership combined with the other components of problem solving and beat integrity are often cited as the "definition" of community oriented policing. But to properly understand community policing it is crucial to see this trinity of components within the broader framework of enhancing social authority and reducing the underlying causes of crime. Other components seen as elements within the broader COP initiative are: decentralization (done intelligently and within limits, not blindly), de-specialization of officer responsibilities, empowerment of street-level officers and increased reliance upon officer discretion, finding substitutes for heavy-handed administrative surveillance and rule-orientation as the primary means of controlling officer behavior, etc.

Ideally, the components of COP that prove valuable will become working parts of every officer's toolkit and day-to-day practices, used in conjunction with, and potentially transforming, the many other tools of policing. This is not just a pipe dream. Current research, including the best-designed study of the impact of community policing (Skogan 1997), documents that, if it is done correctly, properly conceived community policing can have a significant impact on crime, disorder, fear of crime, officer morale, and police-community relations. However, the same research shows that implementing community policing successfully is a difficult task requiring time, sustained organizational focus, and constant refinement by trial-and-error. If that trial-and-error process is to help APD learn what elements of community policing are most valuable in the fight against crime, police personnel must be able to operate on a shared understanding of what community policing is. It is indeed community partnerships, problem solving, and assertive patrol practices – but it is these things done constantly with an eye toward cultivating legitimate police authority, enhancing the informal social authority at work in neighborhoods, and reducing disorderly conditions in public spaces. This will only happen through continued discussion and debate among APD personnel about how this can best be applied in Albuquerque, and who is responsible for making it happen.

As always, we thank all the APD civilian and sworn personnel who collaborate in this project, and the National Institute of Justice and its staff for continued support.

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Problem-solving in APD
APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration
May 1999

[Note: This is another short update to our report. Each update discusses some emerging issue within APD, which we believe important enough to merit broader discussion among formal and informal leaders in the Department. We see these short sections as part of our "strategic feedback" role -- providing grist for continuing departmental discussion and decision-making. Comments welcome: please page me at 540-4693]

During 1996-97, the Albuquerque Police Department invested a considerable amount of time and money to train all sworn and civilian employees in Problem Oriented Policing (POP). The POP class was designed to give employees the training they needed to begin to address their job in a problem-solving mode, as well as to communicate to the employees of APD that problem solving activities would be both encouraged and rewarded.

In one sense, the training was a success. Anonymous comment cards gathered at the end of each class, and feedback we heard informally from officers, suggest that most of those who attended felt the training was valuable and interesting. Other officers commented that "this was the first training I didn't cut out early from". Several civilian employees said that although it felt "strange working in a class with sworn officers", they believed it was a "good experience".

Unfortunately, the nearly unanimous opinion of those in the training as well as many of the trainers was that there was little actual support for problem solving in APD administration. "I feel bad, standing up there. Because when they ask me if I really think their sergeant is going to let them spend two hours on a simple call so they can 'problem solve' when there are eight other calls holding...I can't lie to them. We want to cut our response times, so we have got to get them to go 10-8 faster, so we can't let them spend a long time on most calls," said one POP trainer.

APD mid-level supervisors echo this sentiment of being asked to do too much with too little. Many sergeants complain of being forced to write two "POP plans" each month, and say that they often end up writing simple TAC plans with no true long-term problem-solving involved. "I don't want to write a real quote unquote POP plan," said one sergeant. "I know that I don't have the resources I need to really do it right and I could never do it as long term as a real POP plan requires, and I don't ever want to be in some meeting having to explain why I didn't do the POP plan I wrote. So I write simple little TAC plans that I know my squad can handle in a day or two."

The overall sentiment expressed by "rank and file" APD personnel has been that they are unable to engage in POP activities for several reasons, the most prevalent being an overwhelming work load with little available time for long-term POP activities. Whether or not lack of time constitutes a problem on any given shift varies: Officers run call to call on some days on some shifts, while at other times most shifts have considerable time that could be used for long-term problem-solving activities. A few officers do so to a significant degree, but three factors appear to keep the vast majority from doing real problem-solving: First, the unpredictable flow of police work creates uncertainty regarding how long free time will last, and pressure to stay in-service in case a priority call comes in. Second, the notion of "problem" as intended under the problem-solving model has not been internalized by most officers; instead, virtually anything can be identified as a "problem," and virtually any traditional police response counted as a solution. Third, the Department has not succeeded in convincing officers and their supervisors that the CompStat management process is intended in part to focus their attention on long-term problem-solving. Instead, they mostly see it as holding them accountable to short-term crime and clearance rates.

As a result of all three factors, relatively few officers claim to have made extensive use of

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the POP training they received, and far fewer still appear to have done so in a way that addresses fundamental problems and strives to resolve them in the long-term ways envisioned under SARA. Instead, they mostly respond to calls and pursue other traditional policing tasks, or engage in short-term "POP tracks" in order to fulfill monthly demands in this regard. This isn't to say that problem-solving is not occurring within APD at present. Clearly, some is – the primary challenge is promoting it more systematically, providing improved quality control on the problem-solving that does occur, and re-focusing officer attention away from the minute-to-minute flow of calls toward the underlying problems generating those calls. Of course this is difficult during periods of high call volume, but failure will mean that little will change in how police work is done – and will force the Department to play an eternal losing game of catching up with ever-expanding calls for service.

A new project, currently being planned by Officer George Wood, APD Planner Karen Fischer, and other members of the APD POP Committee, attempts to address some of these issues by creating a "Field POP Team." This team, composed of one officer from every area command, would be responsible for helping officers fulfill many of the long-term obligations of a true POP project. The team would serve under the direction of an officer implementing a POP project, and would be responsible for many of the day to day contacts and activities that the officer is unable to be present for due to days off, court, etc. This effort at providing continuity in the POP process may provide the support for POP activities that officers feel is currently lacking. In addition, the effort is designed to leave field officers in control of their own POP projects, with the Field POP Team serving as a resource to them rather than becoming an elite group. Finally, the Field Pop Team and the POP Committee would serve to help officers refine their understanding of what constitute real problems and potential long-term solutions under the SARA model.

In any case, the important challenge facing the department in this area remains getting officers to utilize the problem-solving skills to which they were exposed in the POP training, with enough mentoring to deepen their understanding of the SARA process and its focus on true underlying "problems."

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The "point system" approach to police supervision

APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration
May, 1999

[Note: This is one of several short sections that update our report to the present. Each section discusses some emerging issue within APD, which we believe important enough to merit broader discussion among formal and informal leaders in the Department. We see these short sections as part of our "strategic feedback" role – providing grist for continuing departmental discussion and decision-making. If you would like to participate with other APD personnel in a small group discussion of these issues, please contact Katie Owens or Mariah Davis at 277-4257 or page Wood at 540-4693]

One important practice emerging within the Albuquerque Police Department is the use of some variety of a "point system" to motivate officers and hold them accountable for their work productivity. This represents one of several approaches to officer supervision now being used, with the choice of approach usually left up to the discretion of individual supervisors. That discretion is usually exercised at the lieutenant level, and occasionally at the sergeant or Area Commander level. On one level, supervision through a point system represents a logic similar to that of "mandatory minimums" (usually 2 DUIs and 20 traffic citations per month): Both systems try to elevate officer productivity by holding them responsible for sustaining a minimum level of activity. The key difference with the "point system" lies in the nature of the activities for which officers can gain points: the extensive list of activities and associated points now in use rewards officers for a wide range of activities, as opposed to the more narrow range of activities rewarded under most mandatory minimum systems.

Advantages of supervision through point systems:

The key advantage of the point system is that it allows supervisors to have some meaningful and comparable measurement of their patrol officers' activity levels. This has always been a key challenge of police management, since most officers work far away from any direct supervision. Tracking points allows supervisors to demand some significant work output from all officers, particularly those engaged in opportunistic evasion of work responsibilities that other officers must therefore perform (or responsibilities such as problem-solving which can be avoided altogether, even if they are important for fighting crime). In this way, the point system defines a minimum acceptable work level, allows some flexibility of officer priorities, can encourage a broad police function, and provides at least the appearance of comparability across shifts, squads, and area commands. Finally, when lieutenants or captains believe that a given sergeant is not providing adequate supervision of officers, the point system may compensate for this weak supervision.

Disadvantages of supervision through point systems:

In addition to these strengths, it is important to recognize some disadvantages to point system supervision. One disadvantage arises from officer resistance to it. In recognizing this factor, we note that in many cases such resistance arises from officers who have been shirking work responsibilities; they resent the new demands and accountability represented by the point system. Of course, these are precisely the officers who most need to be held accountable; their resistance is precisely a mark of the success of the system: points provide a "floor" to their work performance.

However, resistance also arises from a very different group of officers: those who have been most dedicated to proactive policing due to their own professional ethics and personal responsibility. Many such officers exist, and they sustain their commitment in part precisely because they value their autonomy. When point systems are imposed in their squads, they chafe under the loss of autonomy, complain about feeling "treated like children," and may become demoralized and inclined to "get my points for the shift, and quit.". In these circumstances, the point system can become a "ceiling" on performance rather than a floor – thus reducing excellence rather than promoting it.

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list, the point system may refine or distort officer efforts, and thus serve to advance or undermine department priorities. Fine-tuning the point list thus becomes crucial. Two fine-tuning tasks are important: on one hand, listing activities and points to reflect important priorities linked to successfully reducing crime; on the other hand, being sure that the activities listed are defined clearly and understood by officers. Some supervisors have advanced quite far in the first task, having developed sophisticated point systems that reflect a broad array of activities under traditional and community policing models. Progress has been more limited on the second task: for example, the "problem-solving" or "POP track" category is widely used to cover a remarkable variety of activities, only a few of which represent true long-term solutions to the kinds of "problems" intended by the SARA model.

Alternatives: Staying the course and innovating

These advantages and disadvantages will balance out differently in different situations and under different supervisors. In some situations, the point system will be a valuable tool for supervisors. In other situations, adopting the point system may backfire. The underlying risk lies in encouraging officers to respond unthinkingly to a point chart, and lose any clear vision of the policing craft – or sense of themselves as excellent practitioners of it. Given these complexities, the Department's current practice of leaving the choice of supervisory system up to individual supervisors seems wise. This appears to be done most naturally at the lieutenant level. Where the point system is adopted, we suggest that commanders require at least twice-yearly review of what activities are listed and defined, how points are spread, and how officers are oriented to the activities. In addition, strong communication between supervisors and officers appears critical to the constructive implementation of the point system: Where supervisors have explained its purpose, for whom it is intended, and why it represents no criticism of dedicated officers, the point system's disadvantages have been less pronounced.

Finally, it may be worth experimenting with a more flexible implementation of the point system: rather than adopting it squad-, shift-, or area command-wide, supervisors might consider using it only with officers who have not been productive. An individual officer or group of officers could be placed on the point system for a defined period or until their work was up to expectations, then moved off the point system. This might strengthen the authority of sergeants and lieutenants over opportunistic officers, without alienating excellent officers. The decision regarding an individual officer might best be made by mutual agreement between his/her immediate sergeant and lieutenant, in order to protect against both arbitrary punishment and inadequate supervision.

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Management via CompStat
APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration

[Comments welcome: please page Richard Wood at 540-4693 or call Mariah Davis at 280-2814]

In late 1998 and early 1999, the Albuquerque Police Department introduced the "CompStat" (or "CommStat") management approach for evaluating supervisors' work. CompStat stands for Computerized Statistics. Developed by the New York Police Department in the early- to mid-1990s, CompStat essentially involves two key steps: First, accelerating the process of recording and analyzing victimization, UCR, call-for-service, or other information so that police commanders can see and respond to emerging patterns immediately (in New York, the system has been automated so commanders can receive such information within days). Second, CompStat as a management strategy uses this up-to-the-minute information to hold supervisors at all levels more accountable for the impact of their units' work on reported crime and on clearance rates for criminal cases.

It is important to recognize that CompStat is a management tool for holding police supervisors accountable for their work, **not** a policing strategy or a model of policing in the way that traditional policing or community policing are intended to be. In New York, CompStat has been implemented in connection with a "zero tolerance" strategy of confronting disorder. This link has generated a highly paramilitary style of policing on the streets, which in turn has produced the current controversy regarding abuse of citizens' civil rights by NYPD. But CompStat need not be wedded to this approach. In principle, it may be used as a supervisory tool by managers embracing other policing models. This has been APD's intention: to use CompStat to hold supervisors more accountable, even as the department strives to continue the transition toward community policing.

From the point of view of APD supervisors of the patrol and criminal investigations functions, CompStat represents one of the most prominent changes in APD in recent years. It has focused their attention on the work productivity of their subordinates, and on "improving the numbers" (i.e. reducing reported crime and increasing clearance rates) from month to month. The increased focus and accountability this has brought to supervisors may yield significant benefits for the department's effectiveness in reducing crime.

At the same time, the CompStat process has raised some questions worthy of the department's continuing attention. Foremost among these is the way CompStat has also narrowed the focus of supervisors at various levels to short-term progress on month-to-month "numbers." While recent research suggests that problem-solving and decreasing community disorder are the most effective ways to improve crime patterns over the long term, many supervisors have responded – given the pressure to improve numbers immediately – by increasing short-term "TAC plans" and other traditional police responses. Some innovative problem-solving has also occurred, but the much more typical response has been short-term enforcement activity (perhaps labeled as problem solving, but without addressing the long-term patterns producing disorder or criminal activity).

Similarly, many upper- and mid-level APD personnel see the CompStat initiative as in competition with the Department's community policing emphasis, and in fact as having displaced community policing as an organizational priority. This perception seriously contradicts the Department's intention to implement both in tandem, but is sufficiently widespread to be a serious organizational problem. We do not think the solution to this problem lies in de-emphasizing accountability or improvement in the crime numbers, but rather in shifting the focus from short-term to long-term improvement. One way to think about this might be emphasizing patrol supervisors' **immediate accountability** for taking steps toward the **problem-solving, community partnerships, and proactive police work** that will bring **long-term improvement in crime numbers**. On the criminal investigations side, the focus on immediate clearance rates may be appropriate, or similar refinement of the CompStat focus may be needed. This could be a productive topic for internal department discussion.

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An additional issue that has arisen in conjunction with CompStat is the climate of insecurity it has bred among supervisors. On one hand, this insecurity is intentional, for the underlying premise of accountability is 'produce results, or this job will go to somebody who will.' Accountability will inherently produce discomfort at first, as supervisors adjust to new expectations and have to learn new skills to meet them. On the other hand, if sustained perpetually, an organizational climate of extreme insecurity can undermine participants' sense of commitment and enthusiasm for their work, and lead to decreased dedication and the temptation to "cook the books." In the foreseeable future, the Department will need to pay attention to balancing accountability and security: accountability to the organization for preventing, reducing, and solving crime, and security for supervisors – as long as they function effectively.

Routes forward:

If the Department wishes to continue the transition towards community policing as its underlying premise and operating orientation, and at the same time to take full advantage of the improvements in focus and accountability that the CompStat process tries to create, the following steps appear to be crucial:

- *Tie CompStat to problem-solving.* A key question wherever crime patterns appear to be emerging ought to be "what underlying problems are generating this pattern?" As we suggest elsewhere, the understanding of "problems" within the Department needs to be refined, to focus attention on the kinds of underlying patterns of disorder, victimization, and social setting that produce environments conducive to crime. Likewise, the Department can promote more innovative, long-term thinking about solutions to such problems, rather than responses that produce only short-term improvements in numbers. This is **not** to say that strong law enforcement tactics will not be required – they will be, but should be linked to other, longer-term strategies that remain in place after police attention is necessarily focused elsewhere.
- *Tie CompStat to police-community partnerships.* Another key question wherever crime patterns are emerging should be "what are you doing to build ties into this community?" A number of APD area commands have significant experience in developing such partnerships. At their best, these are not dependent on any one commanders' personality or commitment, but rather are institutionalized relationships between area commands and neighborhood associations, merchant groups, community organizations, etc. Ideally, sufficient trust should be built so that police and community members can act as partners in diagnosing problems and devising responses, **without** police feeling like they are either carrying the whole burden **or** being dictated to by community members. Connected to this is the question of who should serve as the APD liaison in these partnerships. Community organizations often want high-ranking sworn officers to serve in this role, to an extent that this can become an untenable burden. Sometimes, area commanders are indeed the appropriate APD representatives, but at other times it will be civilian crime prevention specialists, lieutenants, sergeants, or officers who can best "partner" with a given association. APD personnel at all these levels should be encouraged in such partnerships, and extensively coached by supervisors more experienced in this role. Supervisory personnel may need training in the strategic purpose of such partnerships: Simply ordering supervisors to attend will not produce the focus on problem-solving, enhancing police legitimacy, or building community authority in neighborhoods that police-community collaboration is intended to provide.
- *Tie CompStat to proactive policing.* Again, an important question to ask in response to emerging crime is "what are our officers doing to initiate contact with neighborhood residents, possible perpetrators, crime victims, and sources of disorder in that community?" This proactive focus should also be applied to potentially-problematic neighborhoods that have **not yet** attracted emerging crime. Such neighborhoods include areas bordering high-crime neighborhoods and those undergoing rapid turnover of residents. By initiating such contact, APD may be able to help prevent spreading crime and disorder. The intention here is to keep officers engaged and proactive, with a constructive sense of their role in reducing crime through broad policing activity.

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- *Tie CompStat to longer-term outcomes*. APD rightly focuses its attention on same-month comparisons of this year to last year. But most supervisors interpret this to put them under pressure to produce better numbers next month. This immediate focus inevitably produces pressure for short-term solutions. APD might be able to find ways to use year-to-year comparisons to identify problem areas or problem shifts, and then demand evidence of immediate steps (problem-solving, partnerships, proactive policing) to redress these problems with concrete results expected in crime reduction at a later day (say 6 months later). This might allow the best of both worlds: accountability of supervisors for immediate action, and strong community policing implementation.
- *Improved data analysis*.[1] This is a difficult area for improvement: On one hand, area commanders and shift supervisors say that the crime data available to them are not sufficiently up-to-the-minute to be truly useful in their day-to-day allocation of resources. On the other hand, the Department's crime analysis and technical personnel already are pushing current capacity to the limit to produce the data for the CompStat process. APD crime analysis can now produce useful data based on crime reports about a week old. But actual data analysis occupies less than two days of this; most of the delay enters the process during report collection, review, correction, and entry. Further improvement in this area without additional funding and personnel may be impossible. Such resources could allow fully automated capture of KDT data, crime reports, and ultimately perhaps neighborhood-identified disorder problems. Combined with enhanced crime analysis capability, this could make possible the nearly real-time identification of emerging problems – of extraordinary potential value in fighting crime. In-house estimates put the cost of doing so at nearly $10 million – a daunting sum in the current funding environment, but a conceivable long-term objective. In the meantime, the Department will need to focus on making the most effective use of data available through current capabilities.

CompStat and community policing:

The benefits of up-to-the-minute crime information are many, and would allow APD to respond more immediately to emerging trends in crime and disorder. Pursuing funding to make this possible is a worthwhile long-term goal. However, the other CompStat initiatives outlined above are long-term investments that do not require such funding or state-of-the-art data. Week-old information is adequate for informing sophisticated problem-solving, partnerships, and proactive policing if officers and supervisors are convinced that these efforts can reduce crime. Evidence from other cities shows they can.

If APD wishes to combine the best elements of traditional and innovative strategies of policing under a strong model of community policing, CompStat may well be an important tool for doing so. But the message that CompStat represents one element of this broader initiative will need to reach down into the Department more fully than it has at present. Equally important, the accountability brought to bear by CompStat must be made more consistent with the overall, long-term strategic focus of the department. **What is counted** and **what is emphasized** within CompStat will matter enormously in this regard.

Albuquerque's efforts to integrate community policing and CompStat represent a truly innovative effort on the national scene: in a sense, APD is seeking to combine two competing models of how policing in urban America can move forward. New York represents one extreme, combining CompStat with traditional and paramilitary policing strategies. Chicago, San Diego, and other cities represent the other model: successful implementations of strong community policing on a large scale. APD's efforts lie at the intersection of both tendencies; if successful, it may focus attention on how this can best be done. But, to be successful, it will require ongoing reworking and the consistent message that both are to be emphasized.

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[1] APD Technical Director John Logothetis provided extensive information for this section; he is an excellent source for information on improving APD data capture capabilities.

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APD and Community Oriented Policing

APD-UNM Research Partnership

An NIJ-funded collaboration

[Comments welcome: please page Richard Wood at 540-4693 or call Mariah Davis at 280-2814; to sign up to participate with other APD personnel in a small group discussion of these issues, call Mariah at 280-2814 or Katie Owens at 277-4257]

APD officially adopted community oriented policing as its operating philosophy in 1994, and in 1995 began a process of strategic planning and department re-organization to reinforce this commitment. In early 1997, APD was introducing significant organizational changes while attempting to overcome technological and organizational difficulties. By mid-1998, new organizational changes designed to further the community policing initiative – primarily departmental decentralization, better departmental communication, and more generalized (less specialized) patrol work – were introduced into the department. By early 1999, CompStat was being used extensively as a management tool in the department with an intention to provide greater accountability within a continuing policy of community policing. But, as documented in our longer report *Policing in Transition*,[1] throughout this process most patrol officers continued to say that community policing had never been explained to them in a way that made clear how it would make their work different. Even many of those in supervisory positions say they do not know much about how community policing is different from traditional policing – and those who do often express differing and sometimes contradictory understandings of it

Many factors contributed to this lack of clarity about community policing. COP was implemented during a period of severe budget constraints, and political pressures forced the department to spend money on infrastructure needs that officers felt should not have been a priority. In addition, the department failed to communicate a clear vision of what it meant by "community policing as a philosophy," which was compounded by opposition or misunderstanding of community policing among command-level personnel. We discuss these in some detail in the longer report. Here, the key point is that, if APD wishes to unify its strategic direction under the rubric of community policing, it must create a clearer understanding of what COP is. Of course, understanding community-oriented policing does not necessarily mean supporting it – but APD personnel will be able to argue about it more productively if they share some common understanding of what community policing is.

Defining community-oriented policing (COP) is no straightforward task. In consulting multiple sources of information about COP (law enforcement literature, police managers, politicians, citizens' and officers' personal experiences and other accounts of community policing in action), one comes away with diverse and contradictory understandings about what community oriented policing is supposed to be. This is normal in a still-emerging concept, especially one that attempts to understand and ultimately alter the day-to-day activities in the complex world of law enforcement. As one academy instructor said, "I have been to all of the classes on COP, heard at least five different experts give their opinions on what it is all about. And each expert gave a different opinion, and every book I have read has said something else completely. So I guess even I can't define it. It is kind of like obscenity, you can't really define it but you sure know when you see it." The trouble is that most APD officers do <u>not</u> feel they know it or have seen it.

To understand COP, it is best not to assume that everything written, said, built,

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[1] The longer report provides much further information on the political background of community policing in Albuquerque, the important precursors to COP in APD (including crime prevention programs), APD's implementation of COP, and the current status of COP in Albuquerque. It is available upon request.

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implemented or altered under the label "community-oriented policing" is truly a COP initiative. COP has been such a buzzword in recent years in police management that virtually everything has been justified by saying it is part of community policing. One goal of this paper is to help APD personnel discern what really is community policing when they see it, and what is not. The most realistic stance is to assume that some actions labeled as community policing efforts may prove to be valuable additions to the repertoire of officers, community members, and police departments, and other elements might prove to be less than valuable or even counterproductive.

So what is "community oriented policing"? Fundamentally, ***COP is a comprehensive strategy to strengthen the fight against crime, reduce public disorder, and minimize other causes of crime by building stronger ties among law enforcement agencies, community members, and other government institutions.***

Proponents of COP argue that rising crime rates have led American police departments to emphasize reacting to crime and calls for service to the detriment of real crime prevention. An important clarification must be made here. Police officers have always prevented crime, but in recent decades have primarily done so by arresting those who have already committed crimes and thus might commit future crimes. To the extent that these arrests get future criminals off the streets and deter others from committing crimes, this modus operandi indeed prevents crime. In this sense, "crime prevention" is nothing new.

But COP promotes a rather different kind of crime prevention in the day-to-day work of officers. COP seeks to use the authority of the police as a "magnet", joining other, less formal, types of authorities together to fight crime. Thus, COP works to increase the informal authority at work in the community by creating collaborative relationships between the police, community, and other agencies of the government that can effectively fight crime. Community oriented policing attempts to use these ties to heighten social authority: making police authority more relationally-grounded within the community; focusing governmental and private services on environmental and social problems that lead to crime; and empowering the citizens and organizations who exert informal social authority in the community.

COP also suggests that officers need new (or at least rediscovered) tools in their fight against crime. Primary among these tools are stronger relationships with people in the neighborhoods they patrol and fuller access to the resources of city government. In part, COP seeks to bring greater human and material resources to bear against crime and disorder. However, those resources must be brought to bear not only by officers, but also by community organizations with continual presence in neighborhoods. COP strives to further empower officers in their fight against crime by allowing police better access to information from the community, more social support in confronting criminals, and more legitimacy in the eyes of society. The combined focus on solving the problems that generate crime, reducing public disorder, and enhancing social authority is what sets COP apart from other approaches to policing.

COP does not place the sole burden of community policing on officers, but rather emphasizes policing as a shared responsibility. Increasing public safety through community policing becomes the task, not of police in isolation, but also of community members and other government agencies in collaboration. Thus, "community partnership" is one of the core components of community oriented policing. This partnership combined with the other components of problem solving and beat integrity are often cited as the "definition" of community oriented policing. But to properly understand community policing it is crucial to see this trinity of components within the broader framework of enhancing social authority and reducing the underlying causes of crime. Other components seen as elements within the broader COP initiative are: decentralization (done intelligently and within limits, not blindly), de-specialization of officer responsibilities, empowerment of street-level officers and increased reliance upon officer discretion,

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finding substitutes for heavy-handed administrative surveillance and rule-orientation as the primary means of controlling officer behavior, etc.

Ideally, the components of COP that prove valuable will become working parts of every officer's toolkit and day-to-day practices, used in conjunction with, and potentially transforming, the many other tools of policing. This is not just a pipe dream. Current research, including the best-designed study of the impact of community policing (Skogan 1997), documents that, if it is done correctly, properly conceived community policing can have a significant impact on crime, disorder, fear of crime, officer morale, and police-community relations. However, the same research shows that implementing community policing successfully is a difficult task requiring time, sustained organizational focus, and constant refinement by trial-and-error. If that trial-and-error process is to help APD learn what elements of community policing are most valuable in the fight against crime, police personnel must be able to operate on a shared understanding of what community policing is. It is indeed community partnerships, problem solving, and assertive patrol practices – but it is these things done constantly with an eye toward cultivating legitimate police authority, enhancing the informal social authority at work in neighborhoods, and reducing disorderly conditions in public spaces. This will only happen through continued discussion and debate among APD personnel about how this can best be applied in Albuquerque, and who is responsible for making it happen.

As always, we thank all the APD civilian and sworn personnel who collaborate in this project, and the National Institute of Justice and its staff for continued support.

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Table I: APD Organizational Subcultures

Subculture	Mission	Beliefs	Practices	Ethos
TRADITIONAL SUBCULTURE	Protect & Serve Fight Crime	➢ Autonomy of Police ➢ Loose hierarchy ➢ Us vs. Them ➢ Police as brotherhood	➢ Routinized call response ➢ Car patrol ➢ Chief serves as political buffer	"Crime Fighters" Insulated professionals
PARAMILITARY SUBCULTURE	Fight Crime Protect society from scumbags	➢ Specialized units as elites ➢ Tight hierarchy ➢ Elite Us vs. scumbag Them ➢ Military as model ➢ Political system as threat	➢ Aggressive ➢ Proactive ➢ Cultivate political support against political threat	➢ Competitive soldiers ➢ Self-betterment ➢ High energy
OPPORTUNISTIC SUBCULTURE	Organizationally: none Individually: ➢ self-preservation or ➢ self-promotion	➢ Me first ➢ Me vs. them ➢ Hierarchy exists to do me favors ➢ Only politics is internal politics of self-interest	➢ Shirking ➢ Preserve stability, avoid demands OR ➢ adopt flavor of the month but do not commit. ➢ Climb ladder OR ➢ Abuse status for gratuities, power.	Collapse into raw self-interest: ➢ Careerism ➢ Narcissism
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBCULTURE	Protect & Serve in a legally & fiscally efficient manner	➢ Policing exists in political, legal economic context ➢ Priority: line officers or managers	➢ Routinization ➢ Accountability ➢ Organizational learning OR supervisory unreasonableness	Bureaucratic ethos: ➢ Pragmatic ➢ Negative
CIVILIAN SUBCULTURE	Reflects wider police culture: ➢ Fight crime ➢ Protect & serve ➢ Public safety	➢ Civilians crucial contributors to the department ➢ Civilians not fully accepted in policing ➢ Need for greater sworn-civilian teamwork	➢ Vary greatly 3 relational practices: ➢ Accept Status quo ➢ Reform organization ➢ Resists Status quo	Unequal partnership in context of: ➢ Acceptance ➢ Reform ➢ Resistance
COP SUBCULTURE	Official community policing statements	➢ COP as best policing model ➢ Together we can make this work ➢ Open boundaries ➢ Community as a resource ➢ From hierarchy toward de-centralization ➢ Political system as a resource	➢ Problem solving ➢ Community collaboration ➢ Beat integrity ➢ Build ties to city agencies	➢ Institutional reform ➢ Collaborative empowerment ➢ Activist/teacher

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APD ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Much writing on policing has focused on identifying the characteristics of police culture or of a "police identity" (Reuss-Ianni 1983; Skolnick 1994, 1996). While police may have shared such a unified organizational culture in the past, in the Albuquerque Police Department they no longer do. Several factors have combined to create multiple and sometimes competing factions, or subcultures, within modern police departments: changing city demographics, increasing ethnic diversity among police officers and supervisors, reform-minded politicians and police managers, and popular pressure from residents who are placing new demands on police agencies. Understanding the current organizational dynamics of policing requires insight into these subcultures; the heart of this report identifies the key contemporary police subcultures in Albuquerque and how police leaders at all levels can draw on them strategically.

Some core characteristics of being a police officer continue to be shared by most police officers. Together, these make up what we call the "archetypal police culture" — what might be thought of as the foundation of police identity that underlie the other subcultures. We first describe this foundation culture of policing, then move on to a discussion of subcultures in APD. Note that, while some APD personnel operate exclusively within one subculture, others operate at the intersection of two or more of these subcultures.

Archetypal Police Culture

"A cop is a cop is a cop. Some are better than others, some a worse. But, we are all made out of pretty much the same stuff."

The archetypal police culture consists of those characteristics that transcend time and geographic boundaries, and are shared by the majority of police officers (Wilson 1968). We cannot create an exhaustive list of such characteristics, but such a list would include:

First, among police officers there is a strong sense of being on the side of justice, right, or some conceptualization of "being one of the good guys". As such, law enforcement agents place a high value on the shared experiences acquired during a career in policing such as the unknown feeling when searching a dark building, the adrenaline of a foot pursuit, the horror of seeing a dead child, and the mourning of an officer killed in the line of duty. Second, officers also share a strong awareness of personal safety in their daily lives, which causes them to be careful about where they eat, drink, and seek recreation. This can be seen adopt in tell tale behaviors such as preferring to sit with their backs to the wall in restaurants; unbuckling seatbelts before their vehicle is actually stopped, etc.

Many officers also admit to being "control freaks", only feeling comfortable when they are in control of situations and personal interactions both on and off duty. Officers also said that they were 'adrenaline junkies', loving and sometimes needing the excitement derived from 'hot calls' and other intense situations. Finally, most officers said that the development and appreciation of a morbid sense of humor is a defining

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characteristic of being a cop.

Though by no means do all officers exhibit all these characteristics, in our observation very many do. More importantly, these qualities of the archetypal police culture constitute the shared ground on which policing occurs, meaning even those officers who do not share them end up dealing very regularly with a majority of officers who do. The existence of such an archetypal culture can be debated. For example, many officers interviewed denied that the traditional "brotherhood of blue" still exists. Yet these same officers often spoke at length about the "bond" that they automatically feel with other officers. In the words of one officer, "I'm not really sure why, but there is just that something about being a cop. It's like any place you go in the world, any person that you meet...once you know he is a cop, it just changes things. You treat him differently, trust him more than you would just Joe Schmo citizen. Just because you know he has probably suffered through a police academy, knows what it feels like to search a building, see a dead body, shoot a gun. Because he is a cop, I automatically know something about him."

Most police officers share characteristics rooted in this type of archetypal police culture, no matter what their organizational subculture. The subcultures discussed in the next section are characterized by their shared perceptions of the APD mission, their beliefs and practices, and the general feeling, or ethos, of their work world.

Traditional Subculture

"I became a police officer to catch the bad guys. Not to be a god damned social worker." Patrol officer, 7 years

Among front line officers, the predominant subculture embodies the remnants of the traditional model of policing, as characterized in the standard literature on police culture (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993; Baker 1985, Skolnick , 1966, 1994; Van Maanen 1978; Manning and Van Maanen 1978; and Wilson 1968). Its influence is rooted in the legitimacy of its long tradition and acceptance among many officers. This subculture is the one most often represented in society and media, and provides the basis from which most citizens typify police officers.

The officer that subscribes to this subculture typically stated he became an officer to "catch bad guys." Many officers further clarifed this by explaining that they had joined the police force to protect and to serve, or to simply fight crime. When asked how they intended to fight crime, officers explained that they would do so by "catching the bad guys." A few officers further explained that they would "catch the bad guys" by "doing patrol" or investigating crimes.

The belief system of traditional police culture is reflected in most made-for-television police dramas. The officers have a strong identification with the "brotherhood" of police officers, but usually limit that identification to exclude officers that are corrupt and/or extremely lazy. Some traditional officers actively seek

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to keep that brotherhood by purposefully engaging in traditional police activities such as "choir practice"; a long practiced custom of officers drinking together after work. "I try to get my guys together once every few months," said one sergeant. "After all, they spend more time together on the job than they ever do with their families. Getting together to play every once in a while lets them blow off some steam."

These officers also view autonomy as a necessity to function in their line of work, and lack of autonomy leads to frustration. These officers believe that they are trained to do a job, and should therefore be left alone by the administration, as well as by the community, when doing that job. "They give me a badge and a gun, and trust me to decide when it's appropriate to take someone's life...but they don't trust me enough to decide whether or not I should give someone a ticket or a warning," commented one officer after a briefing instructing his squad to meet a minimum monthly performance standard of written citations.

Along with a desire for autonomy comes the attitude that police administration is a necessary evil. These officers feel that the role of the Chief should be to provide a buffer between them and external political pressures. Officers of this subculture see police managers as functionaries different from themselves, and often state that most administrative officers may wear a badge but that "they are no longer real cops." Obviously there are exceptions to this rule, particularly seen in the relationships between some sergeants and their squads. "Sergeants are really the last of the real police officers in an administration. They still get to get out and do real police work every once in a while. But after that, you just get too political. I'll test for sergeant some day, but I never want to get any higher. My nose just isn't brown enough," said one rookie officer.

Traditional subculture officers often complain that they would like to feel less isolated from the 5th floor. In contrast, they feel that some separation between officers and the communities they serve is necessary. Thus, when talking about the community, these officers automatically divide citizens into the "scumbags" and the "good citizens". It is the scumbags that the traditional police officer hates, and fears. Yet, fundamental to the traditional subculture is an us vs. them worldview with "us" being limited to other sworn officers. "I have always said that cops should get minority rights. I mean, we get treated the same as any other minority, only worse. Because we are a cop, we have to worry about scumbags shooting at us, spitting in our food," one officer explained. "Certain people won't hang out with us, we get treated as lepers. We always worry about our cars being scratched up, our kids being bullied....just because the color of our skin happens to be blue."

The day to day practices of the traditional officer revolve around responding to calls for service, writing reports and citations, and randomized patrol. The patrol function is very important to these officers because it allows them to "investigate anything that looks hinky", or suspicious. These investigations lead to citations and arrests, two ways of "getting the bad guys". These practices also allow them a great deal of autonomous control over their own time, within the constraints of responding to calls for service. That control is a highly valued commodity in this subculture.

These officers feel that "changing times" are threatening their police culture. Officers see threats

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stemming from several sources: a more "touchy feely" type of officer being hired and trained, departmental promotions being tied to buy-in of the "flavor of the month" policing style, and increasing reliance of the department on community feedback and approval. This vague sense of threat is most frequently expressed as a concern of the eroding solidarity among officers. As one officer with 19 years on the force said, "It used to be that I would know everybody who wore a uniform. We would all know each other's families, have a beer after work, hang out together. But it just isn't like that anymore. We are losing our sense of family."

Finally, the ethos within the traditional subculture is one of officers who consider themselves to be professionals and who should be insulated from the demands of the surrounding community. This ethos might be summed up as one of "crime fighters" operating with as much autonomy – from the community and from supervisors – as they can manage.

Paramilitary Subculture

"We are who the police call when they need help, the last resort when everything has gone to shit." APD SWAT officer.

The paramilitary subculture is perhaps the most controversial subculture found in a police agency, the culture most revered and reviled. As with the traditional subculture, the ultimate mission of paramilitary officers is to fight crime. But the paramilitary style of officer adds a razor edge to their mission statement: they intend to vigorously protect society from scumbags, and believe that their duty to protect and serve is a "righteous war". The ethos within the paramilitary subculture can best be described as that of "competitive soldiers", with officers bringing a high-energy focus and a dedication to self-betterment to that war. "The way I figure it, we are the last line of defense. We try to keep the scumbags from hurting the normal, honest citizens any way we can," said one officer with 12 years on the job.

In accomplishing this mission, the paramilitary officer engages in a series of complex and often grueling practices with the ultimate goal of being the best possible officer he can be (Auten 1981; Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Chambliss 1994; NY Times 3/1/99). These officers are usually the most physically fit on the department, spending hours each day at the gym and often taking a multitude of vitamins and supplements to increase physical size, strength, or overall health. The high physical standards of the paramilitary officer enhance the "hard hitting" work ethic of the officer, characterized by a 'kick ass, take names" policing style. These officers are typically known for their on the job energy as well as their abilities to shoot, fight, or engage in a multitude of other high intensity police related activities. As officers, they often have the highest arrest and self initiated action statistics. This desire to be where the action is results in these officers working areas known for their violent crimes and "scumbag" populations. The majority of the paramilitary style officers want to eventually work in an elite specialized unit (typically SWAT) that is comprised of officers like themselves and offers recognition for their abilities and actions. The paramilitary officers already in specialized units often feel

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that they have finally found a "home" in their unit, because they are surrounded by other officers who have similar world views and work ethics. It is in their specialized units that many of the paramilitary officers begin to accept their job as a lifestyle, if not almost a calling. Thus, the feeling these officers carry of being somewhat "elite" is nurtured and reinforced as they become more and more specialized in their jobs.

The practices of paramilitary policing reflect this sense of mission and these beliefs. When critical incidents in the community confront police, these officers tend to adopt relatively aggressive tactics in the belief that only such tactics are adequate to the task. During more routine activities, their practices tend toward quite proactive policing – initiating car stops; doing assertive foot, bicycle, or horse patrol; engaging suspected gang members – focused on establishing contact with suspicious persons. This gives these officers the opportunity to assess the person, ask for identification, check for warrants, and possibly locate weapons or drugs.

The paramilitary subculture shares with the traditional subculture a certain us-versus-them orientation, the "them", however, is more focused on those drawn together under the label "scumbag" or similar terms: criminals, those living parasitically off the wider society, etc. Other key beliefs include: First, a sense of paramilitary officers as a kind of fraternity within policing, dedicated to the true vision of what policing is about. Second, a perception of the political system as a threat to that vision, due to suspicion that politicians do not understand the value or necessity of their working methods.

Although these officers are often considered elite and are sometimes perceived as "arrogant" and "stand-offish" by other officers, among their peers it is rare that they behave as prima donnas. A crucial tenet of the paramilitary subculture is that of teamwork. Each officer recognizes that his ability to do his job effectively, if not his very life, depends on the officer standing next to him. Thus, it is in the paramilitary subculture that the greatest support for officer's immediate hierarchy (supervisors) can be found. Officers in this culture at least understand, if they do not fully support, the need for a chain of command. Although they hope for true "leaders" as their immediate supervisors, they accept that often they have to settle for a "manager" who has "hard stripes" and thus deserves, if not respect, obedience. Paramilitary style officers often hold their superiors (especially first line sergeants) to the same high standards they hold for themselves. When these standards are not met (lack of physical ability, low shooting qualification scores, dishonesty or corruption), the officers generally do not publicly challenge their superior. Instead, they simply treated the superior as an outsider, and looked to the leaders in their squad for advice and encouragement.

Opportunistic Subculture

"I wanted to go somewhere where I could study. So, that was the carrot my supervisors held in front of me...if I go to 'Shitsville'" beat and take care of problems and square that place away, then I was allowed to come up here where the call load is less. So I am hanging out up here where the only thing that is going

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on is rabbits fucking." APD Patrol officer, 8 years.

Fragmentation and self-interest define the opportunistic subculture. The mission statement for these officers is either self-preservation or self-promotion, taken to a degree that is far beyond that of the average officer. For these individuals, any attention to the common good of their squad, area command, department, or community is secondary to good that they can do for themselves. Because these officers are usually "looking out for number one", their organizational mission is dependent upon what they feel will increase and protect their power within the department. These officers learn to "play the system", using their supervisors to enable their actions. They also learn to play the community, always knowing and using all of the perks provided to them by their position -- and then some.

Opportunistic officers will often try to align themselves with other cultures to gain popularity, but they are not eagerly embraced. The actions (or lack there of) of the opportunistic officer angers some other officers, as they are forced to pick up the slack left by the opportunistic officer. It is these officers that both the traditional and paramilitary officer say give "all officers a bad name". It is important to note that the opportunistic officer is not necessarily lazy. Rather, two versions of the opportunistic subculture produce two very different kinds of officers. Those of the "careerist" variety may in fact work hard, saying or doing whatever is necessary to climb the ranks of the department, and avoid actions or situations that would hurt their chances of promotion. This happens, however, with remarkably little concern for whether their work contributes to improving the department or the community.

Another more narcissistic variety of officer may be the most egregious manifestation of the opportunistic subculture, the "corrupt" officer. This officer feels that society owes him, and therefore demands the many perks that carrying a badge may offer. "I had this supervisor once, and he used to really lean on people. I mean, it's all right to get discounts at meals and free coffee and such, but this guy…he went too far. He would go into a business, any business, pick up an item and ask them how much it costs. If the price they gave him was the full price, then he would tell them that they must have misunderstood. Then he would take out his badge, and say 'No, I meant how much is this for a cop?'"

Superficially, it may be the opportunistic officer who responds most positively to change. When confronted with a change, these officers immediately ask, "how is this going to affect me?" Opportunistic officers concerned with promotion will embrace the change if they feel someone who has sufficient power to affect his career is pushing it. Other opportunistic officers will avoid conflict by giving lip service to any mandate while minimizing any impact the mandate would have on him, by shirking work, "milking" calls for service, etc.

The ethos of this subculture involves a collapse into one-dimensional self-interest. This can take two rather different forms: a "careerism" superficially devoted to the department's interests, and a "narcissism" that

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more blatantly pursues only individual benefits.

Administrative Subculture

"The guys still in the field, I know they say 'he doesn't remember what it is like to be a real cop and take calls' or that my common sense is fried from breathing the paint in the Main for too long. I know they say that, and, yeah, it bothers me some. But I still think that the job I do is important. For them to do their job, they need people like me. I make it possible for them to do their job."

Sworn and civilian members of the administrative subculture may embrace the sense of police mission of any of the other subcultures, but they emphasize doing so in a "legally and fiscally efficient manner". Officers in this culture recognize that police work does not exist in a vacuum, but rather in important political, legal, and economic contexts. It is within those contexts that these officers must operate, regardless of how he or she is perceived by others in the department.

Those in the administrative subculture realize that it is sometimes necessary to "play politics" to accomplish their jobs. Sometimes, however, even these officers feel that the politics and bureaucracy work against the fundamental mission of the police department. They resent having to enforce rules and procedures that seem to be written with little thought as to their consequences. "I find my job....disturbing. Before I got promoted, my job was fun. My squad was great, we worked hard but also screwed around a bunch. I was very proud of being a cop. But now, I sit up here and read some of the stuff that this department actually puts in writing, and I am trying to explain it to my people, trying to make it sound like it is not the most asinine thing I have ever read. Ever. And sometimes I just can't."

It is important to note that those who subscribe to the administrative subculture may not necessarily hold a position in the department's administration. But those who did end up in actual administrative positions seemed almost surprised to have found themselves there. "I became a police officer so I could work outdoors...and I like adventure and excitement. I never wanted to sit behind a desk (officer bangs hand on desk), wear a tie (officer pulls on the tie he is wearing), answer a phone (officer taps his phone) or do paperwork (officer picks up one of twenty files on his desk). But I just kept getting promoted (officer picks up his beeper). The day I retire, I am going to drive to the edge of a river, and the minute somebody beeps me, I'm going to toss this over. Think that's a good idea? asked the officer with a grin."

Many of those in the administrative subculture said that the hardest part of their job is the "separateness" that they feel from the rest of the sworn officers. "I know some of the guys I use to work with in the field think I am just slacking now, pushing papers so I can have a 9 to 5 (workday), with weekends off. And maybe when I came to the 5th floor, that was part of the reason. Then, I had no idea of the amount of paperwork it takes to run this department. How many problems an organization of this size has to try to handle.

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I sometimes envy the guys I used to work with. At least when they go home at the end of their shift, they have everything done. There is nothing hanging over their heads, no deadlines they have to meet or anything. Me...I go home with a pile of papers, knowing that this stack has to be read by the morning, this memo answered by Friday. I don't even feel like a real cop anymore. I am a secretary with a badge."

The practices of the administrative subculture are based in accountability. These officers tend to be record keepers, either by innate nature or by the necessity of their position. They gravitate towards positions with administrative responsibilities that require them to track expenditures, resources, and time. This tracking is obviously necessary, and can lead to greater efficiency in an organization. It can also lead to supervisory unreasonableness, or "bean counting".

Much depends on where individual members of the administrative subculture place their priorities in their work. Does the work of administration exist to serve managers, or to make the organization – and especially the front-line officers and civilians – as effective as possible in enhancing public safety? When they do so, the administrative subculture can bring important routinization and accountability to the department, and allow it to improve its work through systematic organizational learning. When administrators lose sight of this goal, supervisory unreasonableness is virtually inevitable.

The resulting ethos takes two forms: a negative bureaucratic ethos centered on the needs and priorities of administration for its own sake, and a positive pragmatic ethos centered on making policing work within its current political, legal, and economic contexts. Of course, both are bureaucratic – the department could not function without a working bureaucracy.

Civilian Subculture

"'A lieutenant once said that, "You see these people (civilian employees)? These people are the backbone of this department, our civilian staff is the backbone. If it wasn't for our civilian staff, we would be lost. If you respect these people, there is nothing they won't do for you. You disrespect them, they will treat you like hell.' And he was right, because I took two days to give an officer who was a jerk the information he needed, and I had it right there. And when he said, 'You disrespect these people, and you will get nothing.' it made me feel good."

Civilians employees provide the vital services that allow a department to function, whether offering legal advice, dictating the appropriation of vehicles and equipment, prioritizing and dispatching calls for service, or coordinating the organizational planning of the entire agency,. "We are the first contact that any citizen has with the department. When somebody needs help, they call 911. If they don't call us, they don't get an officer...and we also have the greatest impact on what happens to that person. If they had a call, the officer wrote the report, but the report doesn't get typed in, or we lose it...well, that is the end of their case.

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Whoever that officer arrested, without the report, it is thrown out of court."

In APD, civilians have a fairly distinct organizational subculture. Although civilians may be part of the other subcultures, the very nature of their functions in the department and their relationship to sworn officers delineates them as a separate organizational subculture.

One element was uniformly widespread in the civilian subculture: Most civilians identify quite strongly with the department's overall mission, centered around the work of controlling crime and promoting public safety. One hears little antagonism — and often real respect — toward the fundamental role of sworn police officers. Civilians are often proud of their own role in supporting that work and being part of that mission. As one high level civilian manager noted: It's rewarding for me to work on something that in an indirect way makes the city safer for some little kid riding his bike down the street, you know. We played a role in that, and that really makes me feel good. It's being able to see something that I've had a part in make Albuquerque better."

This fundamental buy-in to the department's organizational mission, and pride at being part of it, was held widely among civilian APD employees at all levels. The terms in which they understood that mission varied, usually reflecting the individual's position in the APD structure: Those in rank-and-file positions expressed the department's mission in traditional terms, as "to protect and serve the community" or "to fight crime." Those in managerial positions often expressed the department's mission either in broader terms such as "promoting public safety at all levels" or in terms drawn from the administrative or community policing subcultures. The key point here is that civilians embrace essentially the same spectrum of organizational missions as sworn officers.

Certain beliefs also unite the civilians in the police department. The most central shared belief is that the work done by civilians is crucial to the success of the department, rather than peripheral. Connected to this, many civilians believe that sworn members of the department generally fail to recognize this. Civilians thus thirst for such recognition, as reflected in the quote that opened this section.

It is in the sharing of this departmental mission that many civilian and sworn employees find common ground, as they engage in similar practices that stem from simply working for a law enforcement agency. One manager, when asked whether working for a police department is primarily a positive or negative experience, replied "I think for me, it s overwhelmingly positive. But I also think that to be associated with a police department, civilian or sworn, you pay a price. You lose your naiveté early on. You develop a paranoia just like the cops have about where's safe and whats not safe...looking over your shoulder all the time. And you deal with other people's trauma and tragedy all the time, and I think you pay a price there. It takes a toll."

So civilians both embrace the police mission and feel they are not accepted as equals within it. This produced a certain ambivalence among many civilian employees at all levels: on one hand they like their work and feel they contribute, on the other hand they must struggle to sustain their morale. This ambivalence was

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expressed by one supervisor when asked whether working as a civilian in APD was generally positive or negative: "I'd say generally positive, but with a real concern about not being peers, and not communicating the way that communication should be done in the department. That's what I see generally as the issue between sworn and civilian."

But civilian employees respond to this situation in quite diverse ways. Among civilian managers and supervisors, there often exists a strong sense of being excluded. This leads to conflict over how their authority, resources, or expertise should be used, and often to a sense that they are taken less seriously than sworn officers (regardless of their expertise). This exchange between civilian managers in a focus group illustrates their frustration:

> Manager 1: [Officer attitudes toward civilians] relate to the brotherhood of the officers. Officers feel like, "If you haven't gone through what I've gone through, then don't tell me what to do."
>
> Manager 2: Exactly, I think that's it. I have heard it time and time again... It's exactly that: we are not of the cloth. We haven't been through the Academy, the baptism by fire. We haven't gone out and arrested people, or as Chief Joe used to say, we haven't ever gone through a door with him. There's always a tacit reminder that we're just not of the cloth.

This feeling was by no means universal. Some civilian managers reported a high degree of acceptance by sworn officers. Civilian APD employees tend to divide starkly between those who identify strongly with the sworn-dominated culture of the department, and those who are quite critical of it. In our focus groups, identifying strongly and uncritically with sworn officers predominated among those managers on whom sworn personnel depend directly for expertise or resources, and rank-and-file civilian employees. In the latter group, this strong identification thrived in spite of frequent tension between field officers, communications personnel, and records personnel regarding dispatch priorities, report standards, and other factors.

The key practices of civilians vary enormously, depending upon their jobs. It is thus difficult to identify concrete practices that they share. This in itself reduces the bonds of solidarity felt among civilian employees compared to sworn officers, who generally perform similar work tasks. Beyond this, however, key patterns are discernible in civilians' interactions with sworn officers. First, some civilians operate on the periphery of the sworn culture, recognizing their integral role in APD but accepting the centrality of the sworn culture. Second, like some sworn officers, some civilians adopt a stance of being active agents of change within APD, striving to move the organization forward toward better civilian-sworn relations, more effective policing, etc. As in any organization, these "reformers" must find networks of support to sustain their sense of direction and effectiveness. Ideally, that network of support includes both sworn and civilian colleagues. Third, another segment of civilians become beaten down by the frustrations of their position in the agency and tire of their

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sense of powerlessness. Unless they can find a positive place within APD's organizational culture, they become alienated from their work and become resentful of the status quo.

The overall ethos of the civilian subculture might be best described as being one of "unequal partnership." But it plays out differently in these three groups, and thus the civilian and sworn relationships fall along three lines: those accepting of the status quo, those attempting to reform the status quo and those that actively resent the nature of the relationship between the civilians and the sworn.

Community Oriented Policing Subculture

"I think our mission now is to be problem solvers and to involve the community in solving those problems. Five years ago our mission was to make arrests and get criminals off the streets. But now that simply isn't enough. So we have had to change our thinking."

In recent years, as APD strove to implement community policing, some officers and civilians identified with COP so strongly that they reorganized themselves and their work around the practices and beliefs of community policing. These officers and civilians from many levels of the department have either invested considerable effort in researching and learning about community policing or its elements, or have adopted it as their primary police role after being convinced of its value through APD training sessions.

The people in this COP subculture serve as local experts on community policing, both formally and informally. Some serve in formal roles on APD's POP Committee or COPS Steering Committee, or train other APD personnel in problem-solving techniques. Others serve informally as informational resources for officers trying to understand how the department wants them to incorporate community policing into their work. Their sense of the police mission often reflects official statements of community policing, whether from APD's mission statement, national COPS materials, Robert Trojanowicz's "9 Ps" of policing, or other COP literature. Their beliefs about policing often revolve around a sense that by working together police and community members can make the community policing work to lower crime rates. They also favor opening up police boundaries to community input and participation; and share a commitment to decentralizing the policing structure. These COP "experts" view local government and media attention as potential resources for generating more effective policing and they attempt to cultivate positive ties with those organizations.

The key practices engaged in by members of this subcultures are the classic elements of community policing: problem solving, attending community meetings, trying to keep officers in assigned neighborhoods, and building ties to other city agencies potentially useful in crime prevention. Their problem solving entails sophisticated attention to underlying crime-generating problems and the creative marshalling of solutions to these problems. Likewise, these officers do not simply attend community meetings passively; they use their authority to draw community members into more active collaboration in taking responsibility for their

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neighborhoods, defining their problems, and devising effective solutions.

The ethos operative within this part of the COP subculture centers around institutional reform – that is, personal commitment to trying to move APD toward being more effective in its work through community oriented policing. At its best, this ethos carries a spirit of collaborative empowerment as people work together to exert constructive and effective influence in moving the department in the direction of community policing. The members of the expert COP group are the activists, teachers, and mentors promoting community policing within the department.

The future of the community oriented policing subculture, like the future direction of policing itself, is an open question. Because the subculture of "COP expertise" is both new and has few ardent subscribers, it is still possible for it to be absorbed into the more established subcultures. Conversely, this nascent subculture may thrive as it fights for hegemony in the organizational culture of APD. The future organizational culture of the department will be shaped by the ongoing dynamics among all of the subcultures present there. Table I on the next page summarizes the mission, beliefs, practices, and ethos of all these subcultures.

Finally, a kind of **phantom subculture** plays an important role for those officers and supervisors fundamentally *opposed* to community policing. We call this the "weak COP" subculture. Here, the mission of policing is reduced to customer service alone; its fundamental beliefs revolve around community policing as "being nice to the community" and the idea that police "should do what the community wants." The policing practices emphasized in the weak COP subculture are those of "Officer Friendly": glad-handing citizens, doing public relations work, being a positive presence in the community. Note that these beliefs and practices might indeed have a role in a strong policing model – the key here is that they are seen as **all** that community policing is about. This is a "weak COP" subculture in that it reduces the complex and multifaceted tasks of policing to this one dimension.

Whether a weak COP subculture actually exists, in the sense of officers who embrace this vision of policing, is debatable. If such officers exist, they are a tiny minority. At least in an urban police department with serious crime and gang problems, this subculture holds remarkably little appeal to the vast majority of officers. It certainly holds little promise of becoming the dominant model of policing in such a setting. Indeed, it carries no true ethos for urban policing; it can exist only at the margins of the department, in isolated individuals or small units carrying out specialized functions.

Yet this phantom subculture plays a vital role in the organizational culture of policing. It serves as a caricature used to undermine the notion that community policing has anything to offer contemporary urban policing. Thus, those opposed to community policing seek to identify it with this weak COP caricature, and to emasculate community policing advocates as "empty holster cops." When successful, this strategy effectively undermines any effort to implement community policing, or even to incorporate its best insights into police practices generally.

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If, on the other hand, the best aspects of community policing are to gain significant influence in police culture, community policing must escape from the clutches of the phantom weak COP officer depicted in this stereotype. In the grassroots police world of APD, it has not fully done so.

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Management via CompStat
APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration

[Comments welcome: please page Richard Wood at 540-4693 or call Mariah Davis at 280-2814]

In late 1998 and early 1999, the Albuquerque Police Department introduced the "CompStat" (or "CommStat") management approach for evaluating supervisors' work. CompStat stands for Computerized Statistics. Developed by the New York Police Department in the early- to mid-1990s, CompStat essentially involves two key steps: First, accelerating the process of recording and analyzing victimization, UCR, call-for-service, or other information so that police commanders can see and respond to emerging patterns immediately (in New York, the system has been automated so commanders can receive such information within days). Second, CompStat as a management strategy uses this up-to-the-minute information to hold supervisors at all levels more accountable for the impact of their units' work on reported crime and on clearance rates for criminal cases.

It is important to recognize that CompStat is a management tool for holding police supervisors accountable for their work, **not** a policing strategy or a model of policing in the way that traditional policing or community policing are intended to be. In New York, CompStat has been implemented in connection with a "zero tolerance" strategy of confronting disorder. This link has generated a highly paramilitary style of policing on the streets, which in turn has produced the current controversy regarding abuse of citizens' civil rights by NYPD. But CompStat need not be wedded to this approach. In principle, it may be used as a supervisory tool by managers embracing other policing models. This has been APD's intention: to use CompStat to hold supervisors more accountable, even as the department strives to continue the transition toward community policing.

From the point of view of APD supervisors of the patrol and criminal investigations functions, CompStat represents one of the most prominent changes in APD in recent years. It has focused their attention on the work productivity of their subordinates, and on "improving the numbers" (i.e. reducing reported crime and increasing clearance rates) from month to month. The increased focus and accountability this has brought to supervisors may yield significant benefits for the department's effectiveness in reducing crime.

At the same time, the CompStat process has raised some questions worthy of the department's continuing attention. Foremost among these is the way CompStat has also narrowed the focus of supervisors at various levels to short-term progress on month-to-month "numbers." While recent research suggests that problem-solving and decreasing community disorder are the most effective ways to improve crime patterns over the long term, many supervisors have responded – given the pressure to improve numbers immediately – by increasing short-term "TAC plans" and other traditional police responses. Some innovative problem-solving has also occurred, but the much more typical response has been short-term enforcement activity (perhaps labeled as problem solving, but without addressing the long-term patterns producing disorder or criminal activity).

Similarly, many upper- and mid-level APD personnel see the CompStat initiative as in competition with the Department's community policing emphasis, and in fact as having displaced community policing as an organizational priority. This perception seriously contradicts the Department's intention to implement both in tandem, but is sufficiently widespread to be a serious organizational problem. We do not think the solution to this problem lies in de-emphasizing accountability or improvement in the crime numbers, but rather in shifting the focus from short-term to long-term improvement. One way to think about this might be emphasizing patrol supervisors' **immediate accountability** for taking steps toward the **problem-solving, community partnerships, and proactive police work** that will bring **long-term improvement in crime numbers**. On the criminal investigations side, the focus on immediate clearance rates may be appropriate, or similar refinement of the CompStat focus may be needed. This could be a productive topic for internal department discussion.

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An additional issue that has arisen in conjunction with CompStat is the climate of insecurity it has bred among supervisors. On one hand, this insecurity is intentional, for the underlying premise of accountability is 'produce results, or this job will go to somebody who will.' Accountability will inherently produce discomfort at first, as supervisors adjust to new expectations and have to learn new skills to meet them. On the other hand, if sustained perpetually, an organizational climate of extreme insecurity can undermine participants' sense of commitment and enthusiasm for their work, and lead to decreased dedication and the temptation to "cook the books." In the foreseeable future, the Department will need to pay attention to balancing accountability and security: accountability to the organization for preventing, reducing, and solving crime, and security for supervisors – as long as they function effectively.

Routes forward:

If the Department wishes to continue the transition towards community policing as its underlying premise and operating orientation, and at the same time to take full advantage of the improvements in focus and accountability that the CompStat process tries to create, the following steps appear to be crucial:

- *Tie CompStat to problem-solving.* A key question wherever crime patterns appear to be emerging ought to be "what underlying problems are generating this pattern?" As we suggest elsewhere, the understanding of "problems" within the Department needs to be refined, to focus attention on the kinds of underlying patterns of disorder, victimization, and social setting that produce environments conducive to crime. Likewise, the Department can promote more innovative, long-term thinking about solutions to such problems, rather than responses that produce only short-term improvements in numbers. This is not to say that strong law enforcement tactics will not be required – they will be, but should be linked to other, longer-term strategies that remain in place after police attention is necessarily focused elsewhere.
- *Tie CompStat to police-community partnerships.* Another key question wherever crime patterns are emerging should be "what are you doing to build ties into this community?" A number of APD area commands have significant experience in developing such partnerships. At their best, these are not dependent on any one commanders' personality or commitment, but rather are institutionalized relationships between area commands and neighborhood associations, merchant groups, community organizations, etc. Ideally, sufficient trust should be built so that police and community members can act as partners in diagnosing problems and devising responses, without police feeling like they are either carrying the whole burden or being dictated to by community members. Connected to this is the question of who should serve as the APD liaison in these partnerships. Community organizations often want high-ranking sworn officers to serve in this role, to an extent that this can become an untenable burden. Sometimes, area commanders are indeed the appropriate APD representatives, but at other times it will be civilian crime prevention specialists, lieutenants, sergeants, or officers who can best "partner" with a given association. APD personnel at all these levels should be encouraged in such partnerships, and extensively coached by supervisors more experienced in this role. Supervisory personnel may need training in the strategic purpose of such partnerships: Simply ordering supervisors to attend will not produce the focus on problem-solving, enhancing police legitimacy, or building community authority in neighborhoods that police-community collaboration is intended to provide.
- *Tie CompStat to proactive policing.* Again, an important question to ask in response to emerging crime is "what are our officers doing to initiate contact with neighborhood residents, possible perpetrators, crime victims, and sources of disorder in that community?" This proactive focus should also be applied to potentially-problematic neighborhoods that have not yet attracted emerging crime. Such neighborhoods include areas bordering high-crime neighborhoods and those undergoing rapid turnover of residents. By initiating such contact, APD may be able to help prevent spreading crime and disorder. The intention here is to keep officers engaged and proactive, with a constructive sense of their role in reducing crime through broad policing activity.

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- *Tie CompStat to longer-term outcomes*. APD rightly focuses its attention on same-month comparisons of this year to last year. But most supervisors interpret this to put them under pressure to produce better numbers next month. This immediate focus inevitably produces pressure for short-term solutions. APD might be able to find ways to use year-to-year comparisons to identify problem areas or problem shifts, and then demand evidence of immediate steps (problem-solving, partnerships, proactive policing) to redress these problems with concrete results expected in crime reduction at a later day (say 6 months later). This might allow the best of both worlds: accountability of supervisors for immediate action, and strong community policing implementation.
- *Improved data analysis*.[1] This is a difficult area for improvement: On one hand, area commanders and shift supervisors say that the crime data available to them are not sufficiently up-to-the-minute to be truly useful in their day-to-day allocation of resources. On the other hand, the Department's crime analysis and technical personnel already are pushing current capacity to the limit to produce the data for the CompStat process. APD crime analysis can now produce useful data based on crime reports about a week old. But actual data analysis occupies less than two days of this; most of the delay enters the process during report collection, review, correction, and entry. Further improvement in this area without additional funding and personnel may be impossible. Such resources could allow fully automated capture of KDT data, crime reports, and ultimately perhaps neighborhood-identified disorder problems. Combined with enhanced crime analysis capability, this could make possible the nearly real-time identification of emerging problems – of extraordinary potential value in fighting crime. In-house estimates put the cost of doing so at nearly $10 million – a daunting sum in the current funding environment, but a conceivable long-term objective. In the meantime, the Department will need to focus on making the most effective use of data available through current capabilities.

CompStat and community policing:

The benefits of up-to-the-minute crime information are many, and would allow APD to respond more immediately to emerging trends in crime and disorder. Pursuing funding to make this possible is a worthwhile long-term goal. However, the other CompStat initiatives outlined above are long-term investments that do not require such funding or state-of-the-art data. Week-old information is adequate for informing sophisticated problem-solving, partnerships, and proactive policing if officers and supervisors are convinced that these efforts can reduce crime. Evidence from other cities shows they can.

If APD wishes to combine the best elements of traditional and innovative strategies of policing under a strong model of community policing, CompStat may well be an important tool for doing so. But the message that CompStat represents one element of this broader initiative will need to reach down into the Department more fully than it has at present. Equally important, the accountability brought to bear by CompStat must be made more consistent with the overall, long-term strategic focus of the department. **What is counted and what is emphasized** within CompStat will matter enormously in this regard.

Albuquerque's efforts to integrate community policing and CompStat represent a truly innovative effort on the national scene: in a sense, APD is seeking to combine two competing models of how policing in urban America can move forward. New York represents one extreme, combining CompStat with traditional and paramilitary policing strategies. Chicago, San Diego, and other cities represent the other model: successful implementations of strong community policing on a large scale. APD's efforts lie at the intersection of both tendencies; if successful, it may focus attention on how this can best be done. But, to be successful, it will require ongoing reworking and the consistent message that both are to be emphasized.

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[1] APD Technical Director John Logothetis provided extensive information for this section; he is an excellent source for information on improving APD data capture capabilities.

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LEADERSHIP IN THE ALBUQUERQUE POLICE DEPARTMENT

November 1999

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INTRODUCTION

The Albuquerque Police Department confronts many external challenges: resolving budgetary and personnel constraints, building positive relationships and effective problem-solving and crime-fighting partnerships with community groups, collaborating with city government and other city agencies, and avoiding the lawsuit pitfalls of a litigation-prone society, to name a few. The Department's success in resolving these external issues will depend greatly on its ability to confront a key internal challenge: Cultivating the right kind of leadership among its own personnel.

This report will provide an overview of the state of leadership within the Albuquerque Police Department, often doing so in the words of APD employees, both civilian and sworn. Leadership issues will be addressed at the levels of the sworn and civilian rank and file, mid-level supervisors, and upper level management. Finally, the report will address possible avenues of change for the department, both theoretical and practical.

DEFINING LEADERSHIP

It is quite easy for a department to decide that "leadership" is a desired quality that is lacking among its personnel. What is much more difficult is for that department to define the characteristics of leadership that are desired, and then incorporate those characteristics into tangible operational procedures that influence the day to day activities of the agency. One way to define leadership is as the ability to move an organization (or a sub-unit within an organization) from where it is now to where it needs to go in order to successfully meet present and future challenges. Being a leader requires acknowledging where an organization has been in the past, with all its strengths and weaknesses, *and* understanding the ways in which that past has become an obstacle to successfully confronting the challenges presented by a new environment. The external challenges presented above are part of the "new environment" of policing; other aspects of that new environment include new ideas and research on effective policing, greater inclination on the part of city government to be involved in police affairs, and new expectations among citizens regarding the role of police. The police leaders of the present, as well as those to emerge in the future, will be those APD personnel who help inspire others to *proactively* adapt to this new environment.[1]

Note that this definition of organizational leadership includes a role for people at all levels within the Department. Everyone has a potential role in moving the organization forward, and no one is excused from the need to make it more effective.

In discussing leadership, APD personnel were quite articulate. Said one officer, "One aspect of leadership is 'institutional courage. We don't have that anymore, the courage to correct people when needed and to stand up for people when needed." Other officers added that "institutional courage" was a characteristic only possible when you knew that, as long as you made every effort to "do the right thing," your agency would stand behind you. "It is the courage, the guts, the balls or whatever that comes from knowing that we are on the side of angels and that even when we screw up, we screw up trying to do what is right. It is a moral courage." When defining leadership, other APD personnel added the following characteristics:

> "Real leaders who happen to be supervisors know their people and work for their people first. They know every strength and weakness of their guys, and know who is going through what crisis or whatever in their personal life. Then, once they know all this, they lead by showing their guys that even though life may suck, we have a job to do and do well. They care, but it is a tough love."

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[1] See *Organizational Culture and Leadership* by Edgar H. Schein (Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988).

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"Leaders have to be competent at the job they do. An officer can't be a leader in any situation if he always has to wonder whether or not his skills are up to par. And supervisors certainly can't lead if they aren't able to do the job they are supposed to lead others to do."

"A leader can't be afraid to fail. A leader will fail, because a leader has to stick his neck out. Also, others will fail that leader, so a leader has to accept that disappointment will be a part of life. But a true leader leads anyway."

"A leader has to have good moral character. They try to be above reproach, but then accept reproach with an open ear. They learn from other people's criticism."

"A leader has to have perspective. And a sense of humor. A leader will recognize that it is not one instance that will make this job worth doing, but it is what the job looks like when it is done that matters. A leader will laugh, and will make those around him laugh too. That will give them all perspective."

"A leader is loyal. Loyal to his people, loyal to his department. A leader would recognize the shortcomings of others and of APD, and would never stop trying to right them. But he would take this department to heart, protect its reputation always, and do the best job he could do with what he had."

Obviously, APD personnel have at least a general idea of what true leadership could look like in their department. But many officers and civilian employee say that they feel a lack of leadership is the biggest obstacle facing their department. "I think that this department has a lot of little problems like no money, cars, and there aren't enough officers. But what worries me the most is that we are lacking leadership. We are like a ship, just wandering about at sea. Everyone has different ideas about where we are going, but whoever is steering the ship isn't telling us the destination," said one APD supervisor. Likewise, a surprising number of employees in units where civilians are concentrated complained bitterly about lack of effective leadership or supervision from front-line supervisors. Said one civilian employee:

"What I wish is that a manager would take an individual that's not doing their job, take 'em to the back, reprimand 'em, and if they continue, give 'em days off. Make a point. But they don't. Some can get away with things and never be told anything. They're never reprimanded, never called in the office... There's too much favoritism. If I do something wrong, yeah, you should get on me, I'm no better than anybody else. But if someone else is committing the same thing, then you do the same as you did to me. You know, it is too much favoritism."

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THE CURRENT PICTURE OF LEADERSHIP AMONG APD RANK AND FILE

A Recognized Void

Thus, APD is currently in a quandary. The department, from the rank and file to the 5th floor, admits that "leadership" is a necessary quality in persons at all levels of the agency. APD personnel can define and describe leadership, name virtually identical lists of persons in the department whom they consider "good leaders", and most say that they themselves either currently possess or would like to learn leadership qualities. But at the same time, APD personnel express a sense of panic over an apparent lack of leadership at all levels of their department. It is not an exaggeration to say that the future of APD is dependent upon how the department responds to the leadership void it recognizes within itself.

At this point in time, this project has done numerous individual and group interviews with civilian and sworn employees at every level of the Albuquerque Police Department. Remarkably, people at every level of the department say that they do not have the "power" to truly act as leaders in their organization. Each and every rank has stated that it is a different rank/position/person that holds the "magic keys" needed to open the door to organizational leadership. Each and every rank has stated that their ability to act as a leader--whether it is in their beat, support unit, or squad; or over an entire division or area command--is dependent upon the actions of another person in the organization.

The Effects of Lack of Leadership

This long-festering lack of leadership has now become self-fulfilling: Given the scarcity of effective leaders, management is wary of trusting that supervisors will in fact lead responsibly, and thus resists empowering supervisors below the level of captain: As one mid-level supervisor noted: "The department wants leaders, but they don't know how to trust us. They don't trust us enough to do the job, and they don't trust us to make decisions. They should trust us until we give them a reason not to." We suggest below that the best way out of this vicious cycle is a combination of heightened empowerment **and** strong accountability of low- and mid-level supervisors, both sworn and civilian.

Many of those who recognized a "lack of leadership" in APD did so by identifying specific problems caused by that lack. "Well, I can tell that we have a lack of leadership in this department just because if my life depended on it, I couldn't tell you who I am following," said one supervisor. "I don't feel like anyone is giving me any direction. I think I am trying to be a leader, but I can't very well lead if I don't know who I am following." This sense of "lack of direction" is dangerous, as APD employees will create their own direction if there is a void. The best employees do so creatively and responsibly, drawing on their work experience, leadership role models, and new ideas received from training or reading to lead quite effectively. The worst employees do so much more destructively: striking out in opportunistic directions to promote their own narrow advancement or to escape any real work responsibilities, or using their police duties to enact their own biases against specific groups. Only effective leadership from top to bottom can control this kind of opportunism and bias.

The Role of Discipline

Both sworn and civilian employees agreed that "departmental discipline", whether it was believed to be too severe or simply not applied uniformly across the board, was their single greatest obstacle when they tried to act as a leader. As one officer noted:

"It is just that it is much easier not to lead. The department rewards the cops who don't

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make waves, who don't get into any trouble, who never get complaints. But if you are really being a leader, you do make waves. Some people aren't going to be happy with what you do, that is just part of leading. I work with officers that don't do anything but take the calls they are dispatched to. And once they are there, they get rid of the call as quickly as possible without arresting anyone because they don't want a complaint. So they never get complaints and everyone thinks they are this really great officer. You know, if an officer never gets a complaint he isn't doing much work."

Further discussion about the role that discipline played when trying to promote leadership included the following:

"Really, they just have to be willing to let us make mistakes. It isn't that complicated. As long as an officer is trying to do his job and do it well, and there isn't an intent to cause harm or violate the SOP, he should not be disciplined. After all, discipline and punishment are two different things. Right now, APD is punishing officers, not disciplining them."

"I think APD manages to weed out the true leaders through discipline. This is why: an officer screws up, he is going to get done. Ok, that isn't right, but we can all live with that. But do we give him his discipline and then let him get on with his job? No. We hold it over him for months while IA investigates, then maybe for years while he appeals the discipline given to him. So when the discipline is finally reduced or taken away, because we give way too much discipline for minor, petty things, what is left is not a leader but a beaten down officer. And he is bitter, and angry. And we do this over and over and over, and then wonder why our officers refuse to lead."

Civilian rank-and-file employees agreed that discipline issues also prevent them from wanting to be "leaders" in their positions.

"On the civilian side, it is a little different. I wish we had a problem with excessive discipline. We just don't have any discipline, period. I mean, if you know the right person and are friends or whatever...well, you can pretty much get away with anything. We desperately need a chart of sanctions, but I guess it would have to be followed in order to work."

Low-level civilian employees said because there was no correction for employees and supervisors who did not have the leadership skills necessary to perform their work, there was a sense of "peer pressure" to keep performance down to a minimum in order to make all employees appear equal.

Many civilian and sworn employees disagreed with the assumption that the supervisors in APD really wanted to see leadership in the rank and file of the department. "I think it is just politically correct to say that APD wants 'leadership'. APD does not want to see leadership. APD wants to see foot soldiers. Good little boys and girls who do exactly what they are told. If they wanted leaders, they would make every effort to give us information, equipment, and support when we did try to lead." Interestingly enough, a few employees said that they didn't think people in their position should be given the opportunity to be leaders.

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"I honestly don't want my peers having any more power and freedom and authority than they have now. Most of them are morons. I mean, 'leadership' sounds like a great plan and everything until you think of some of the people that would be 'empowered' to lead. It is scary." Further discussion generated a conclusion that if leadership was to be promoted and encouraged by the department, it must also be followed with correction for those who abuse the power they have.

THE CURRENT PICTURE OF LEADERSHIP AMONG APD SUPERVISORS

While the Albuquerque Police Department has many talented supervisory leaders, there is no question that some people who hold positions of power within the department are seen as not having the ability to be leaders, or as lacking desire to do so. A general consensus seems to exist at all levels of the department that what they see as the longstanding APD practice of simply ignoring problem supervisors is not productive. "Right now, I could list ten supervisors that every single person on this department knows should not be in any position of authority. But they will continue to get promoted, because no one ever does anything about them and there is no record of how misfit they really are." There **are** strong and effective leaders throughout APD; but both civilians and sworn officers say these are the minority. Clearly, APD has many positions that are meant to provide the leadership officers and civilian employees claim they are craving. But, as with any large organization, managers—people who have the technical skills and brains to do the job they are tasked to do, and the authority via their position to get others to do their jobs as well—often fill these positions. But without that elusive quality of leadership, these persons become *mere* managers. "I want to work for someone who I would follow into a gun battle. It sounds kind of 'mom and apple pie,' but someone who is a hero. They would know their troops, and always try to do what is best for their troops. Someone who can make decisions, and sticks with their word. Someone who isn't afraid to yell at us when we need it, but always gives us a pat on the back also," said one officer.

Clearly, being an effective manager is one aspect of holding a position of responsibility within a police department, whether as a civilian or sworn. But managers who lack leadership abilities quickly lose the allegiance of those who work for them. Providing such leadership is complicated by several factors: First, the management role always includes asking employees to do things the employees would prefer not to do. Second, the current liability pressures on police departments create a constant pressure to avoid mistakes, traditionally by punishing those who make them. Third, the current scarcity of both sworn and civilian personnel creates multiple leadership difficulties. We recognize these limitations on leadership, but also note that they make effective leadership at all levels even more important.

The sergeants we interviewed seemed particularly frustrated. Some expressed frustration at the fact that they wanted to lead their officers, but didn't feel like they were given the tools to do so. "We (sergeants) would love to be able to lead our troops. But we can't. We have no power, no authority. In the old days, if one of my guys screwed up I would call him into my office and give him an ass chewing."

All of the above confirms the crucial role of low- and mid-level supervisors in promoting effective policing, sustaining morale and commitment among civilian and sworn employees, and helping them see the value of new police tools of problem solving and community partnerships.

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THE CURRENT PICTURE OF LEADERSHIP AMONG APD MANAGERS

Police managers everywhere struggle to provide fair discipline in circumstances of huge liability risks, to open their agencies up to democratic accountability while still protecting police professionalism, and to lead law enforcement personnel despite the gulf that "street cops" typically see separating them from "management cops" and "civilian managers." This latter division is particularly troublesome, because it undermines every attempt by sworn and civilian managers to lead policing forward. As of November 1999, sworn and civilian APD employees see APD managers as a mixed group: some are seen as highly qualified, others as highly suspect. The positive perceptions have been bolstered by efforts to hold managers accountable for their performance and to decentralize authority out to them, particularly to area commanders. This represents significant progress in both the reality and internal perception of management focus on the tasks and challenges faced by the department.

More problematic is a certain divisiveness and uncertainty among APD managers. Management accountability, important as it is, has helped foster this divisiveness and uncertainty by placing managers in competition with one another. Even the best of intentions to work together in a team spirit break down under this competitive pressure, as managers compete for approval and see that they look better when others are not as successful. There is a delicate balance between individual accountability and team collaboration, a difficult balance to sustain. We do not claim any vast expertise in this regard, but rather point out that in our perception, and in the experience of many managers, that balance currently undermines management confidence, focus, and collaboration as individuals pursue their own advancement. This may in the medium to long term undermine departmental effectiveness. Re-orienting the CommStat process, management meetings, and staff meetings to emphasize more shared solving of specific problems and generating creative responses to departmental challenges – perhaps in smaller groups, in which teamwork may be more possible – might help right this balance. All three of these (CommStat, management meetings, and staff meetings) are important forums for the Department, but all might serve management more effectively if they promote shared leadership rather than competition – or at least, a more even balance between the two.

Styles of Leadership

The styles of supervisorial leadership seen in APD today can be divided into the authoritative and non-authoritative styles of leadership. The *authoritative leader* is the supervisor most officers say they wish to work for: a supervisor who operates upon a solid basis of authority that has been earned by example rather than simple promotion. As one veteran officer said:

> "I love my sergeant. He comes to my calls, but not just the hot ones so he can stand there and make sure that I don't screw anything up. He shows up at those, of course, but he also comes to the nothing ones. Just comes and hangs out, jokes around with us, but if we need anything he is there. So because we are so used to seeing him at everything, we don't get all stressed when he comes to kind of a cluster scene. And my squad always gets held over on late calls. But every time I have been stuck on something past the 19, he stops by to visit. He doesn't sit there and hold my hand or anything, but he stops by at least and sees if I need him or want him to hang out or whatever. And I know he doesn't put in for overtime for most of that."

Different mid-level supervisors, whether civilian or sworn, provide this authoritative leadership in different ways. Some are "take-charge" leaders, inspiring confidence by taking over situations when it is

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necessary and showing how things can be done right. These tend to have a talkative, up-front style that makes them the obvious center of attention. Others carry their authority more quietly, instilling confidence through their presence, support for those below them, and clear disposition to correct and criticize when necessary. Still others are inspirational leaders – but the best of them inspire not by befriending their employees or by giving "cheerleading" speeches and memos. Rather, they inspire those below them by having "been there and done that," having earned a reputation and learned some expertise in a variety of arenas. Finally, some provide authoritative leadership by acquiring expert knowledge in a specific area and making this knowledge useful to others. Such expert knowledge might focus on use of force, investigations, scientific evidence, problem solving, tactical operations, working with the community, proactive patrol, processing records or calls or personnel matters effectively, or even departmental politics – the key lies in making such knowledge truly useful for the core tasks facing AP.

Unfortunately, it is the *non-authoritative leaders* that officers and civilians claim hold the majority of supervisory positions, whether in low-, mid-, or upper-level management positions. This type of leadership is actually defined by its lack of leadership. Although such supervisors have positions of power in APD, they manage, as opposed to leading, the resources under their control. These supervisors may have excellent intentions, but their attempts to be "friends to all" undermine their credibility, and the less motivated or more opportunistic officers and employees take him advantage of them. Or, these supervisors may be "minimalists," using their positions and departmental time for their own pursuits, shirking real leadership and responsibility. But perhaps most commonly seen, these type of non-leaders act as "place holders. They are on the job, physically. But they take no initiative, avoid all controversy, and do not try to lead the way forward. They simply don't want to stick their necks out or rock the boat, even in order to make the department more effective. Among civilians, they put pressure on employees to get the work done, but little real leadership to make sure work is spread evenly and employees are treated fairly. Among sworn personnel, they believe that if their guys don't call for them on the air, then they aren't needed. Admittedly, some officers prefer this kind of supervisor. As one noted, "I bid for this chain of command on purpose. A lot of guys hate it here, but it is what I want. I never have to deal with my sergeant; he is one of those 'coffee shop commandos' [and my lieutenant and captain are never around.] That is the way it should be. As long as I do my job and stay out of trouble, they leave me alone." But such lack of supervision has great costs, both in the quality of work done by the weaker officers and civilians, the morale of all employees, and in the long-term direction of the Department.

THE NEXT STEPS: FOSTERING LEADERSHIP THROUGHOUT THE DEPARTMENT

A fascinating pattern emerged in our discussions with sworn and civilian APD employees: Nearly universally, they saw an unwillingness or inability to lead as a fundamental problem facing the Department; yet nearly all saw this failure of leadership occurring *somewhere else* in the organization, not at their own level. Rather than engaging in this tendency to "pin the blame" somewhere, we suggest that the Department has, over the course of many years, developed an incentive structure and organizational culture that is dysfunctional around the issue of leadership at all levels in the Department. That is, the APD organizational culture has taken a form in which exceptional personalities do indeed exert effective leadership, but such leadership is not cultivated, expected, and rewarded as a routine part of work. So creating a more effective culture of leadership will require simultaneous work by rank and file officers, sergeants and lieutenants, civilian supervisors, and management; we address each in turn, starting with rank and file officers.

Among the Civilian and Sworn Rank and File

The greatest obstacle to rank and file civilian and sworn employees taking on leadership roles lies

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in their sense that to take initiative amounts to exposing one's own neck to disciplinary processes they experience as arbitrary. Improvement here can come in at least two ways: through providing the right information to officers and tracking the right information about their work; and through the disciplinary process itself.

The information component is straightforward: a clear message must be sent to both officers and low-level civilian employees regarding what kinds of initiative they are encouraged to take. Among officers, this means communicating to them that initiative in the direction of responsible proactive policing, fundamental problem solving, and working partnerships with community organizations are desirable; strong-arm intimidation tactics divorced from identified problem solving initiatives policing are not. Making this clear to officers will give them greater confidence about when they can exert leadership.

At the same time, tracking the right information can encourage, or at least not discourage, leadership. A key example of how current information-tracking punishes leadership is the following:

"This department promotes laziness, not leadership. The more proactive you are, the more complaints you generate. The more citations you write, the more days in court you have, which increases your chance of missing court. But we get disciplined if we miss court, and it is the same discipline if I miss one of 60 appearances I have every month or if Officer Do-Nothing misses one of the two appearances he had." Of course, it is possible to be proactive without generating complaints, but the officer is fundamentally right: the more contact with community members an officer initiates, the more opportunities there are to provoke a complaint. And certainly, more proactive policing is likely to generate more court dates, vastly increasing the probability of missing court occasionally. One solution to this situation would be to structure court discipline based on a *percentage* of scheduled appearances that are missed by an officer, rather than by the raw *number* of missed appearances. Likewise, having performance evaluations that estimate how proactively an officer initiates contact with citizens, and interpreting complaint records in light of that information, would reduce the disincentive to patrol proactively.

Similarly, finding ways of recognizing the reality of *discretion* (especially among radio operators, dispatch, and patrol officers) and rewarding appropriate exercise of discretion will allow greater leadership to flourish; indeed, any effort to eliminate discretion flies in the face of encouraging leadership. Much of the recent writing on policing suggests that, far from being the enemy of good law enforcement, appropriate exercise of discretion may be a necessary ingredient for it --- especially under community policing models. As one officer said: "They never take into account the good done from talking or just giving a warning instead of a ticket. They don't take into account the intangibles. They want stats at the end of the month, and don't give credit for anything else. So even if you believe you have the solution to a problem in front of you, you can only use that solution if it can be counted in some way." Two ways to make appropriate discretion "count" are, first, to highlight and reward real problem-solving activities, and, second, to track long-term reductions in crime, disorder, and calls for service at specific locations where officers claim to be using discretion creatively.

The Albuquerque Police Department is continuing to address the issue of departmental discipline, but sworn and civilian rank and file employees worry that it will be too little, too late. "They keep telling us that they are working on it, that they are looking at the disciplinary process and making changes. But what they don't realize is that they are losing officer after officer to a disciplinary process that continues to be out of control." The same general pattern holds among low-level civilian employees in the less technically sophisticated specialties, but with a somewhat different complaint: many believe that supervisors simply fail to discipline employees adequately, or hand out discipline arbitrarily or based on favoritism. The result is the same: frustration and high turnover among low-level employees. We do not have any magic bullets to offer in the way of improving the disciplinary process, which inherently is complicated by liability problems,

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important employee rights, department-union relations, political pressures, and the tendency of work associates to protect one another. But anything the Department can do to make discipline quicker, more standardized, and less alienating for civilian and sworn employees will encourage greater initiative and leadership among them. In addition, better training and selection of supervisors (see below) will aid in this regard.

Fostering Leadership among Sworn Supervisors

It will be impossible for APD to foster any type of leadership qualities in its rank and file employees without those same qualities existing in the department's supervisors. APD has already begun to take steps to empower supervisors to become true leaders, particularly by de-centralizing authority and resources out to area commands. But a great deal remains to be done to push this authority down to lower-level supervisors of all kinds. By attempting to vest greater departmental authority in low-level supervisors, the department can structure the resources for leadership *into the position of supervisor*, rather than leadership depending so completely on the personalities of whatever individuals happen to occupy these positions. Of course, effective leadership depends partly on personality, but by vesting greater institutional authority in front line supervisors, more of them will be able to exert effective leadership. Likewise, simply *expecting* leadership from supervisors, and clearly communicating that expectation to them, will lead more supervisors to take the risks and find the rewards associated with leading.

Focus group discussions reiterated time and again that employees at all levels of the department feel that the departmental *promotional process* must be altered in order to make leadership ability a prerequisite for being a supervisor. Specifically, employees said that the promotional process must be revised to test for the actual abilities needed in the new position. "I'm not sitting here telling you that our promotional process is great, or even good...and I helped create it," said one high-ranking supervisor. "It is kind of like we all look at it and say 'Yeah, it sucks...but at least we won't get sued.' That isn't good, but it is reality." This highlights the fact that any new promotional process must be fair to employees **and** stand up when challenged in court. This does limit departmental flexibility in responding to the need for change in the promotions process, but does not reduce the need for real change. As two different supervisors noted:

> "The process measures only my test taking ability. If I can read and memorize, and I don't make a total buffoon out of myself in the interview, then I get promoted. If they really wanted to know if I had the ability to be a supervisor, they could give me a hundred little scenarios that would test whether or not I could actually do the job. Give me a critical incident, and make me assign resources. Or, set up a scenario with an unhappy citizen and see if I could handle it. Make me make a speech to a community group, or give me a situation where I have to decide whether or not to break down a door and enter a house. Hell, make me read what is written in the blotter to a roomful of officers and try to keep a straight face. That would be the ultimate test. But why make me memorize the entire SOP?"

> "We should trust the military on this one. When the military promotes someone, it is almost always to a position that they have massive experience with. That way, they can actually do the job that they are supposed to lead others to do. That gives them credibility. Before a supervisor is allowed to lead a bunch of tanks into battle, he has been in the position of the lowly tank operator and knows that job inside and out. Before he is promoted, he has to demonstrate that he is capable of filling every position that is to be under him, if need be. But here, we promote people into positions when they have no clue how to do the job they are asking their people to do. 'So you have been in the field for your entire career, well...go supervise narcotics. Or if you have spent all of your time in narcotics, you could be sent to be the commander of Impact. It is insane."

One solution discussed in focus groups is to have short "addendum" tests as either part of the

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original promotional process or as a requirement to fill a specific promotion opening when it becomes available. Thus, an employee would take the basic promotional examination, and then would have the option of taking "qualifying exams" for specific positions. If the employee did not pass the qualifying exam for a specific position, he would remain on the list until a position he is qualified for becomes available.

In addition, discussions with APD personnel focused on the fact that even if the department does manage to correct the process involved in choosing who gets promoted, the department needs to make a priory of *training* that person to do the job he or she will be given to do:

> "It blows my mind that we don't have a sit down classroom type of training for a person before they get promoted to any new position. There should be a mini-academy for them, with tests and scenarios, which they have to pass in order to get to go to their new position. That way, if someone really incompetent happens to make it through the promotional process, they will get weeded out in that training."

> "There also needs to be some form of "on-the job" training, just like after you got out of your first academy. And you need to have a training officer, who grades you, corrects you, and possibly fails you. Nowadays we are supposed to do some sort of OJT, but with me they just had me cover the shift of a sergeant who took a bunch of comp time. It wasn't like I had anyone to watch or learn from."

> "Train, train, train. For some reason, when we talk about improving the leadership in this department, we talk about starting to train the next group that gets promoted. We need to train those that are already promoted first, because those are who our next group will be learning from."

Once a supervisor is adequately trained and promoted, steps have to be taken to insure that leadership is encouraged, while correcting mediocre or, in extreme cases, negligent supervisors. This requires that the department clearly define expectations for supervisors, give continual feedback as to how that supervisor is meeting the expectations, and reward or correct the supervisor's behavior accordingly. Both civilian and sworn employees spoke of the need for a better performance evaluation system to achieve this. Specifically, mid-level supervisors expressed frustration at the performance evaluation system, which requires a lengthy evaluation only once a year. Suggestions for improving the process included a request by several sergeants for a one or two page weekly evaluation form, thus allowing employees to improve performance in an immediate and traceable fashion. Mandatory verbal evaluations and brief monthly performance evaluations, given by the supervisor's immediate superior, are one method of guaranteeing continual feedback, both positive and negative. In our focus groups, supervisors often speak strongly of the need to evaluate performance as part of the promotional process:

> "Performance reviews need to be some part of the process. I could have been a worthless piece of shit of an officer and have gotten 60 days off for cowardice or something a couple years before I decide to test, but that won't even be taken into consideration. Or I could have been a hard charger of an officer, super squared away, but it counts for nothing. That makes no sense."

> "If they can't be trained, and their shortcomings can't be improved upon, then the Chief has to be willing to make an example. I don't mean he should be really harsh on some and not

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on others. But he needs to figure out which supervisors in this department just absolutely suck (and we all know who they are) and then he needs to try to fix them. And when they won't fix, he needs to start progressively disciplining them until he eventually takes away their stripes. And that will teach everyone that there are consequences to not doing your job well."

"We have to be willing to admit we made a mistake in promoting someone. We have a probation period, but I have never heard of anyone being taken out during that time. So that sends the message that as long as you are a warm body, we will allow you to be a supervisor."

"We need to learn how to use peer pressure. If you have a bad sergeant, make him supervise (while being shadowed by their normal sergeant) the best kick ass squad this department has. And make him ride with every officer in that squad, one at a time. See who breaks whom first. I guarantee that the sergeant will raise his level of operations so that he will fit in."

"Other supervisors should be putting pressure on the bad supervisors to improve. If we could somehow manage to make being a supervisor in this department something really special, something that was earned...the good ones wouldn't let the bad ones tarnish their image. Being 'elite' can sometimes be a good thing."

We recognize the inherent difficulties in evaluating performance of supervisors. Some creative thinking will be required to devise ways of doing this that are efficient and minimally bureaucratic; the key point here is that some form of evaluation can help focus attention on continually improving the quality of leadership among supervisors.

Among Civilian Supervisors

Essentially the same approach can foster leadership among civilian supervisors, but attention to different dynamics will be important. At lower levels in the department, the problem at times is similar to that common among sworn personnel, essentially a failure to really supervise and lead employees. But more often, civilian employees complain of their superiors supervising them unfairly, with undue favoritism for some employees over others. Thus, superiors of civilian supervisors will need to pay attention to both these things, and encourage supervisors to be even-handed in their approach and discipline of employees.

At higher levels in the department, where civilian supervisors and managers often supervise sworn officers or interact with sworn supervisors as peers, one of the primary impediments to leadership comes from the continuing refusal of some sworn officers to accept leadership from civilians. This appears to have improved significantly in recent years, but remains a long-term struggle. The Department can assist in this regard by continually reinforcing the leadership role of civilians when they lead well, maintaining high standards of professionalism from civilian supervisors, establishing work groups in which civilian and sworn supervisors jointly solve internal Department problems, and pushing sworn personnel to accept partnership with and leadership from civilians.

Among Upper Level Management

Interestingly enough, upper management in the department see themselves affected by a departmental "lack of leadership" the greatest. "We aren't the leaders of this department, the officers are.

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I mean, there are only so many people up here on the 5th floor, but there are 850 rank and file officers out there in the public. Their actions lead the direction this department is heading."

This is an area in which the alienation between street cops and management cops, and between civilian workers and managers, truly becomes an obstacle to effective policing. This alienation can be seen in the comments of one low-level supervisor, who noted, "If the powers that be here want us to be leaders, they are going to have to lead. And that means they are actually going to have to stand up for what is right once in a while, and not just worry about the next promotion they are trying to get, or not being in good graces with somebody. They are going to have to develop some guts."

Recent efforts to empower departmental heads to be responsible for, and control the resources of, their departments represent positive steps in the right direction in this regard. Likewise, efforts by department heads and area commanders to spend time out among their front-line personnel aid greatly in reducing alienation, and giving managers a more hands-on picture of departmental reality.

But the environment of competitiveness and uncertainty among upper management makes it difficult to stick one's neck out and lead – there is always the possibility of becoming a scapegoat for bearing bad news, or of being undermined by other managers as they promote their own interests. Some of this, of course, is inevitable departmental politics. But re-tilting the organizational environment toward confidence, collaboration, and teamwork can help bolster the hands of those inclined to take the lead in promoting the broad interests of the department.

THE NEXT STEPS: REWARDING LEADERSHIP

Focus group discussions made clear the fact that APD employees didn't care so much about actually being *rewarded* for their leadership in the department so much as they simply wished to not be *punished* for doing so. However, a variety of ideas regarding "leadership rewards or incentives" were given, including the following:

> "I think we need a 'supervisor of the month' thing. We have an officer of the month, a civilian of the month, why don't we recognize supervisors... It is a little cheesy, I know. But I bet you would see the same supervisors nominated over and over."

> "If we ever got the performance evaluation thing down to where it was fair or consistent, we could give the supervisors that ranked the highest some extra paid vacation days, or comp time or something. Or maybe let them pick a training they want to go to, then send them."

> "The biggest reward I think we could give a supervisor is give them some credit for the positions they held and some clue how to get to the positions where they want to be. We need a type of career track that they can follow, one that gives them credit for the knowledge they have and then considers their expertise when we get ready to promote them to another position."

> "As a supervisor, the reward I want for doing my job well is more flexibility in how I do my job. I want to be able to earn more control, to have my chain of command watch and see how I do then give me additional responsibility. I don't mean to give me more work, I have plenty of that. But maybe they could give me control over a portion of the overtime budget, or let me decide how to disburse some extra equipment to my squad. They are little things, but they add up. And in my dreams, eventually I could earn the right to discipline my own

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squad as I saw fit, or grant training opportunities."

CONCLUSION

The Albuquerque Police Department has identified a need for new and/or improved leadership at all levels of the department. What is disheartening, however, because it points to the difficulty of change, is that in our focus groups every level of the organization identified a level other than their own as the "one" that needed to learn how to lead. Generally, the mid-level supervisors claimed that they could not "lead" unless their supervisors acted as true leaders; upper level supervisors claimed they could not lead unless the powers that be allowed them to do so, whether it be the Chief, Mayor, City Council, or community organizations; and those "powers that be" often feel their ability to lead limited by resistance from officers and mid-level supervisors in APD. All levels of the department articulated quite valid reasons as to why they were unable to be the leaders they desperately wanted to be.

We argue that true leadership, by definition, is not dependent upon persons or circumstances. Rather, day-to-day leadership must come from multiple scattered sources throughout the Department. Such leadership often entails risks, and sometimes opposition from others. But perhaps a true leader can be defined because they lead despite the consequences, and in the face of adversity.

One challenge presented here is for all those – civilian and sworn, ranking and non-ranking – who aspire to be part of a constantly-improving Department, to take part in actively building a culture of leadership at all levels, despite the risks and obstacles that come with that role. This is not to say that the APD administration is off the hook. They must set the vision toward which the Department is moving, and foster an organizational climate that cultivates leadership at all levels. Cultivating leadership will require new efforts to promote those with proven leadership potential, train them in the skills they will need, reward them for their leadership, and create an organizational environment in which leaders are confident in promoting new ideas and helping one another succeed. That is a big agenda, but one well within the Department's current capacity.

Contrary to the image quoted earlier, the Albuquerque Police Department is not a broken-down ship, without crew or captains, drifting at sea. Rather, APD continues to strive to meet the constant demands placed upon it in the ever-changing realm of law enforcement. Perhaps it is more accurate to compare the department to a ship which has drifted slightly off course, overwhelmed by a fog that stands between it and its ultimate destination: a safer community, arrived at through the prevention and suppression of criminal activity in collaboration with local community groups. APD must plot its course carefully as it navigates the tricky waters of policing practices and procedures in a complex and sometimes dysfunctional society. But leaders with ideas and clear vision can show others that the fog is not nearly as unmanageable as it seems, and will create and share the tools necessary to move through it.

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CompStat and Community Policing

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APD-UNM Research Partnership

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Introduction

In January 1997, a locally initiated policing research partnership funded by the National Institute of Justice was begun in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The purpose of the Albuquerque Police Department/ University of New Mexico Research Partnership was to examine the state of policing in a mid-sized, culturally diverse police department undergoing the transition to community policing. Under this project, researchers from the University of New Mexico collaborated with civilian and sworn law enforcement practitioners of the Albuquerque Police Department in an ethnographic examination of the culture of policing that defines the character of law enforcement in Albuquerque.

Thus, by May 1998 the APD-UNM Research Partnership was well positioned when a new chief, Gerald Galvin, was appointed as an outsider to lead the Albuquerque Police Department under a mayoral mandate for the "complete implementation of community oriented policing." Among the early innovations the new chief brought to the department was the full adoption of "CompStat" management approaches – the systematic use of "computerized statistics" to hold middle managers accountable for policing and investigative activities under their jurisdiction. APD's initial implementation of CompStat adopted much of the New York model. But in Albuquerque, CompStat was intended as a way of pushing middle managers toward more effective community policing. So for the last two years, Albuquerque has been an early innovator in combining two popular models of police reform, CompStat and community policing. This chapter discusses the Department's experience in pursuing this combination, the dilemmas it confronted in doing so, and the role of researchers and police personnel in the APD-UNM Research Partnership in resolving those dilemmas.

Background: The APD-UNM Locally Initiated Research Partnership

By the time the research partnership was launched, APD was well along in the process of strategically planning for the implementation of community policing. APD was introducing significant organizational changes while attempting to overcome technological and organizational difficulties. Thus, research was begun before community oriented policing implementation had reached patrol operations at any significant level, as well as during the course of that implementation. Since January 1997, researchers have accompanied sworn officers on police operations and have attended a variety of briefings, community/police functions (e.g., drug marches, Neighborhood Association meetings, etc.), and APD organizational meetings. Researchers have also interviewed leaders of various community organizations and city agencies who interact with APD; conducted focus groups with civilian APD personnel and managers; and observed the COP steering committee. Using some 160 interviews and nearly 3,00 hours of

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ethnographic data from these settings, we have been able to track the community policing implementation efforts (and, more recently, the CompStat implementation) by APD from the top-down (administratively) and from the bottom-up (officer and civilian perspectives).

Ground Zero: The state of community policing in Albuquerque, May 1998

The first phase of the project (January 1996-June 1998) was partially defined by APD's attempts to implement community oriented policing. This implementation in an already divided department resulted in a department-wide "hit and miss" acceptance of the community philosophy. Department-wide training was given in problem-oriented policing, and a "new and improved" dispatch system was implemented in an effort to increase officer beat integrity. A variety of other activities were begun under the guise of COP: the building of additional police substations, the creation of a quite successful Citizen's Police Academy, and officer attendance and participation at community meetings (some mandatory, some not).

Though most of these activities were a sincere effort by APD to fully integrate COP into the day to day activities of policing, project research shows that the attempted COP implementation had little impact on the day to-day-activities of law enforcement officers (Wood, Rouse, and Davis 1999). A combination of factors contributed to this, including the innate resistance to change found in many law enforcement subcultures. This gut resistance to COP, combined with the typical communication problems found in any large organization, resulted in community policing being lauded by many, berated by many more, but acted upon only by a very few. Community oriented policing, once an innovative concept for altering the world of policing, had quickly become a department joke. Those who originally blamed COP as a distraction from "real" police work felt vindicated as COP crumbled under the weight of departmental issues such as morale, equipment problems, and manpower shortages. Those who had truly believed in the power of community policing became both discouraged and isolated as their original efforts lost the financial and emotional support they had once been given by the department and the community.

It was into this climate that CompStat was introduced.

Pushing Ahead: Implementing CompStat

In late 1998 and early 1999, the Albuquerque Police Department introduced the "CompStat" management approach for evaluating supervisors' work. CompStat, short for Computerized Statistics, was developed by the New York Police Department in the early 1990s. CompStat essentially involves two key steps. First, CompStat as a process for emphasizing management data accelerates the analysis of victimization data, UCR statistics, calls-for-service, or other information so that police commanders can see and respond to emerging patterns immediately. Second, CompStat as a management strategy uses this

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up-to-the-minute information to hold supervisors at all levels more accountable for the impact of their units' work on reported crime rates and on clearance rates for criminal cases.

It is important to recognize that, *at its core*, CompStat is a management tool for holding police supervisors accountable for their work, **not** a policing strategy or a model of policing in the way that traditional policing or community policing are intended to be. In New York, CompStat has been implemented in connection with a "zero tolerance" strategy of confronting disorder. This link has generated a highly paramilitary style of policing on the streets, which in turn has produced the recent controversy regarding abuse of citizens' civil rights by NYPD. But CompStat need not be wedded to this approach. In principle, managers embracing other policing models may use it in any number of ways: as a supervisory tool, to manage resources, or to push supervisors toward whatever model of policing management wants adopted throughout the organization. APD's intention in adopting CompStat was to use it to hold supervisors more accountable to the Department's continuing transition toward community policing.

Initial Reception of a New Tool: CompStat *against* Community Policing

The initial reception of CompStat was marked by resistance and miscommunication. Although some sworn and civilian supervisors (particularly among the upper ranks) accepted the process as a possible tool to be used in the effort of lowering crime rates, the majority of the department reacted with either passive resistance or active hostility. To mid-level supervisors unused to having to defend their priorities, use of resources, or work performance, CompStat represented a rude awakening. But from an organizational point of view, this discomfort, while psychologically difficult, is the least problematic aspect of CompStat: Supervisors previously able to evade accountability to organizational priorities, and sometimes shirk work responsibilities, may be expected to be uncomfortable when their work performance comes under scrutiny. Indeed, the most enthusiastic support of CompStat among low- and mid-level supervisors and front line officers came from those who saw in it a tool to force their peers to work harder. Thus, departmental leadership stuck to its guns through the initial resistance.

Much more problematic from an organizational perspective was the fact that large numbers of officers and supervisors latched onto the term "CompStat" as proof that "COP" was merely a passing "flavor of the month." The belief that COP had been replaced by CompStat was echoed throughout the department among sworn and civilian personnel, including both opponents and strong proponents of community policing. "First it was 'Signature Service, then it was Community Oriented Policing, and now it is CompStat. And the next Chief that comes in will have some other bells and whistles he wants us to use. Who knows what will be packaged and sold to us next?" said one supervisor. Ironically, given the new chief's vocal advocacy of community policing, it was even verbalized at some community meetings as proof he had abandoned the COP philosophy.

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CompStat was seen as replacing Community Oriented Policing because the two were interpreted as opposing policing philosophies by a large portion of the department. Although, as we shall see, COP and CompStat can be understood as complementary, dual processes, they can also be interpreted as contradictory policies. The definition most commonly understood by both civilian and sworn employees left no room for dual processes. As one mid-level supervisor said:

> Community oriented policing, particularly problem solving, requires time and effort being put into long term problem solving. It requires officers to get inventive in how they handle crime and criminal activities, it steers officers away from the traditional policing activities of citations and arrests. CompStat does exactly the opposite: it judges the performance of an officer or supervisor by numbers. CompStat looks at the number of crimes, the number of arrests, and the number of citations written.. CompStat and COP are in direct contradiction of one another.

Early in the implementation process, during late 1998 and early 1999, the department's monthly CompStat meetings encouraged the view that CompStat required an absolute focus on lowering crime statistics. These meetings, held in a less confrontational version of the traditional New York model of CompStat, were seen by the Chief as a method of using CompStat to hold supervisors accountable for lowering the crime rate in their area command. Many supervisors, however, interpreted this pressure to lower crime statistics as a threat to their departmental position should they fail. Thus, supervisors put their best foot forward when presenting crime statistics, and often humorously criticized others' statistics. As a result, competition (as opposed to information sharing and cooperation) began to define the monthly CompStat meetings. Instead of these meetings being a chance to share concerns and engage in beneficial discussion about possible solutions, upper level supervisors reported "no one in their right mind would get in front of this group and point out their failures. If I did, some one with his nose up the Chief's ass would give this solution that his people did that worked so very well, and then ask why my people had taken so long to address this problem."

Many in APD felt that this effort to "look good" encouraged supervisors to use their resources for the sole function of "producing numbers." One squad bragged about having the highest arrest numbers in the department while working only half of a shift: the first few hours of a shift were spent writing the typical citations to a group of homeless or intoxicated persons. The next few hours of the shift were spent arresting the same people for not showing up to court for citations that had been issued a few weeks before. Officers complained about being forced to write tickets instead of being allowed to give either a verbal or written warning, because warnings were not counted as numbers in certain area commands. Many mid-level supervisors said they were under constant pressure to decrease crime statistics in their area command, and some complained they had been pressured to have their officers write up certain crimes as lesser

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offenses. Chief Galvin, aware of these tensions, made a vocal statement against doctoring numbers and warned supervisors of the consequences of doing so.

Thus, in the initial stages of implementation, the relationship between CompStat and community policing was problematic: CompStat *against* community policing, not in the intention of departmental leadership, but certainly in the reception CompStat received among most police personnel. It would take significant re-working of how the CompStat process was presented and run to change this.

Management strives to unify its message: CompStat *and* Community Policing

At this juncture, the Research Partnership provided feedback regarding CompStat directly back into the department. A series of meetings were held with administrators at all levels, resulting in a tangible effort being made to communicate the role of CompStat in aiding, rather than opposing, community policing activities. For example, Chief Galvin used the February 1999 CompStat meeting to direct the attention of police personnel to using neighborhood association meetings, business associations, and problem-solving activities to fight crime. But this was met with no little confusion among some personnel, who had come to think of the new focus on numbers and productivity as replacing the department's focus on such elements of community policing. They were now being told to combine them, but how?

During this period, a distinct effort was made by upper level management to emphasize the tennets of community policing along with the reduction of crime statistics. Chief Galvin, Deputy Chief Chris Padilla, Deputy Director Mary Molina-Mescal, and area commanders Paul Chavez, Rob Debuck, Craig Loy, Karl Ross, and later Gene Haliburton played key roles in this effort. Thus, police management strove to unify its message, in ways partially successful.

CompStat *alongside* Community Policing: Adjustments from the field

Despite these efforts, the majority of the department shifted its perspective only very slowly. They did so only as management forcefully reiterated its message that the two were to be combined. In part, this can be blamed on the inherent culture of police departments, or any large organization. It is simply much easier to voice the belief that something cannot work than it is to make the effort necessary for change. Furthermore, because officers and supervisors came under pressure to do both things, but held little understanding of how they might be integrated, they tended to pursue the two initiatives in isolation. That is, they pursued community policing to the same extent they had in the past --- in vigorous and intelligent ways in some cases, in quite rudimentary and superficial ways in the majority of cases. And they worked hard to "improve the numbers" for the CompStat meetings: Greater effort was put into solving key kinds of crimes, commanders felt pressure to keep close tabs on emerging events in their areas (in case they were put on the spot at staff meetings), and some officers felt pressured to place in less serious UCR categories

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any criminal events that seemed unlikely to be solved. The chief of the Department made strong statements against any such doctoring of the numbers, which put a lid on but did not eliminate the practice.

In a sense, the forceful message from management that CompStat was to be combined with, rather than replace, community policing thus succeeded in focusing employees' attention on both things. But this was success only in a limited sense: it produced CompStat *alongside* community policing, but no real integration of the two. Thus, when police personnel felt they had to prioritize their energies --- which in urban policing is most of the time --- they made a priority of the thing closest to their experience, and about which they felt most immediately accountable: they worked hard to improve the numbers. Since most did not understand how community policing initiatives hold promise for doing exactly this, such initiatives took a back burner, except among those already committed to some version of community policing: most area commanders, some supervisors, and occasional officers.

Note that there is nothing inherently contradictory about combining accountability – even numeric accountability – and community policing. But a great deal depends on what tools are given to officers and supervisors for linking CompStat to the core practical strategies of community policing: problem solving, community partnerships, and proactive police work. The Partnership thus went back to key leaders at all levels of the department to suggest re-tailoring the way that CompStat and community policing were being presented. They key point here was to link them together smartly, not just forcefully. Thus, in conversations between police leaders and researchers in the Partnership, the following emerged as key components of how APD could better combine the two initiatives (given below is the exact text of an APD-UNM position paper from May, 1999):

- *Tie CompStat to problem-solving.* A key question wherever crime patterns appear to be emerging ought to be "what underlying problems are generating this pattern?" As we suggest elsewhere, the understanding of "problems" within the Department needs to be refined, to focus attention on the kinds of underlying patterns of disorder, victimization, and social setting that produce environments conducive to crime. Likewise, the Department can promote more innovative, long-term thinking about solutions to such problems, rather than responses that produce only short-term improvements in numbers. This is not to say that strong law enforcement tactics will not be required – they will be, but should be linked to other, longer-term strategies that remain in place after police attention is necessarily focused elsewhere.
- *Tie CompStat to police-community partnerships.* Another key question wherever crime patterns are emerging should be "what are you doing to build ties into this community?" A number of APD area commands have significant experience in developing such partnerships. At their best, these are not dependent on any one commanders' personality or commitment, but rather are institutionalized relationships between area commands and neighborhood associations, merchant groups, community organizations, etc. Ideally, sufficient trust should be built so that police and community members can act as partners in diagnosing problems and devising responses, **without** police feeling like they are either carrying the whole burden or being dictated to by community members. Connected to this is the question of who should serve as the APD liaison in these partnerships. Community organizations often want high-ranking sworn officers to serve in this role, to an extent that this can become an untenable burden. Sometimes, area commanders are indeed the appropriate APD representatives, but at other times it will be civilian crime prevention specialists, lieutenants, sergeants, or officers who can best

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"partner" with a given association. APD personnel at all these levels should be encouraged in such partnerships, and extensively coached by supervisors more experienced in this role. Supervisory personnel may need training in the strategic purpose of such partnerships: Simply ordering supervisors to attend will not produce the focus on problem-solving, enhancing police legitimacy, or building community authority in neighborhoods that police-community collaboration is intended to provide.

- *Tie CompStat to proactive policing*. Again, an important question to ask in response to emerging crime is "what are our officers doing to initiate contact with neighborhood residents, possible perpetrators, crime victims, and sources of disorder in that community?" This proactive focus should also be applied to potentially-problematic neighborhoods that have **not yet** attracted emerging crime. Such neighborhoods include areas bordering high-crime neighborhoods and those undergoing rapid turnover of residents. By initiating such contact, APD may be able to help prevent spreading crime and disorder. The intention here is to keep officers engaged and proactive, with a constructive sense of their role in reducing crime through broad policing activity.
- *Tie CompStat to longer-term outcomes*. APD rightly focuses its attention on same-month comparisons of this year to last year. But most supervisors interpret this to put them under pressure to produce better numbers next month. This immediate focus inevitably produces pressure for short-term solutions. APD might be able to find ways to use year-to-year comparisons to identify problem areas or problem shifts, and then demand evidence of immediate steps (problem-solving, partnerships, proactive policing) to redress these problems with concrete results expected in crime reduction at a later day (say 6 months later). This might allow the best of both worlds: accountability of supervisors for immediate action, and strong community policing implementation.

CompStat *within* Community Policing: Struggling to get it right

Large police organizations are not easy to change, and of course none of these changes occurred overnight. But significant progress has been made, with initiative coming from the top of the Department, from key civilian and sworn leaders, and from ideas generated within the Partnership. For example, in a July 1999 APD management meeting, Chief Galvin noted:

> We need to work community policing into all our goals and objectives as a Department. This is not easy, and it's something [the APD-UNM Research Partnership] will be helping us with. I've not done a really good job communicating my vision of what community policing means for APD, but that's going to change...It's really far-reaching stuff, not just short-term. It has to do with our future, for my time here and for whoever comes after me. [The Research Partnership] has identified for us the whole question of conflicts between CommStat and community policing. I know some of you see a conflict, but I see CompStat helping us do community policing. We have lots of work to do on that, to tie problem-oriented policing into the whole CompStat process.

The Chief went on to tie together CompStat, community policing, the Department's training program, recruitment, organizational structure, budgetary priorities, and so on. Roy Turpen, director of the Planning Division, noted, "[The APD-UNM Research Partnership] will be helping us get where we want to go, figure out how to do this right. It's going to mean re-thinking how we do everything, real strategic planning."

From the point of view of APD supervisors of the patrol and criminal investigation functions, CompStat represented one of the most prominent changes in APD in recent years. It forcefully focused their attention on the work productivity of their subordinates, and on improving the numbers from month to

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month. The increased focus and accountability this has brought to supervisors may yield significant benefits for the department's effectiveness in reducing crime.

The Albuquerque Police Department continues to wrestle with tailoring its management and supervisory processes so that they effectively combine accountability via CompStat with smart community policing. But through the collaborative relationship between key civilian personnel in the APD Planning Division, sworn personnel in key leadership positions within the Department, a Chief willing to exert pressure from above, and outside researchers, the effort to make CompStat and community policing work together has progressed in recent months. CompStat meetings have been re-cast to allow them to dovetail more fully with the Department's community policing priority.

The most obvious change has been a shift of format. The monthly meetings used to be pressure-filled affairs, with all area commands and all divisions quickly reviewing their relevant data and being hurriedly questioned about any glaring anomalies. This time pressure ruled out any in-depth attention to emerging crime patterns, much less any joint strategizing on long-term solutions to crime trends. Today, meetings are still held monthly, but area commanders and division heads now report on a rotating basis rather than every month. This represents a small but important change, for it allows more consideration of the kinds of emerging and long-term trends that should be the focus of smart policing.

CompStat meetings now also include more attention to precisely those kinds of trends, and to efforts centered in the Area Commands to address them through innovative investigations and problem-oriented policing. This represents perhaps the most important shift in the CompStat process to date, for it means that APD is using its most high-profile management sessions to promote the kinds of smart policing that national research shows can be effective in "improving the numbers" (see especially Skogan and Hartnett 1997, 1999). Police personnel are notoriously skeptical of research not centered in their own jurisdiction, and one role of the Partnership has been to promote consumption of the strong research that has recently emerged on the new policing strategies. Equally important has been the role of civilian police personnel in the Planning Division, who have been key collaborators in the Partnership. They have strongly promoted awareness of problem-oriented strategies and encouraged key sworn personnel to attend national conferences focused on community policing. Both things have begun to bear fruit in the CompStat sessions: In recent months, police personnel have discussed innovative responses to crime and disorder issues, and at least the beginnings of a more collaborative, information-sharing approach has emerged.

Community Policing as the Vision and Operational Model:

Though it remains rare to hear the phrase "community oriented policing" from the majority of the department's rank and file, the leadership of the Albuquerque Police Department is continuing to operate with some version of community policing as its strategic vision as well as its operational model.

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Departmental reorganization and decentralization, the promotional process, and some department-wide classes and training have revolved around the basic tennets of community policing: ownership, partnership, and problem solving. Although an overall departmental buy-in to community policing has not been achieved, the leadership has made COP its priority, and APD has made significant advances in integrating the community into its police activities. Extending the reach of that vision so that it shapes the day-to-day activities of most officers remains a continuing challenge. But APD appears to have begun to communicate more clearly to its personnel that community policing will be the over-arching vision and operational model for the Department as a whole, not one element competing with everything else.

CompStat as one tool for moving toward this model:

CompStat or some management process like it is likely to be attractive for the foreseeable future. The benefits of up-to-the-minute crime information are many, and can allow a department to respond more immediately to emerging trends in crime and disorder. Although the technology for implementing state-of-the-art CompStat can be prohibitive, many of the CompStat components can be implemented without additional technology. Week-old information, though obviously not as useful as day old numbers, is adequate for informing sophisticated problem-solving, partnerships, and proactive policing if officers and supervisors are convinced that these efforts can reduce crime. Equally important, the accountability brought to bear by CompStat is quite useful to anyone striving to transform police organizations notoriously resistant to change.

But CompStat can play this role only if it is consistent with the overall, long-term strategic focus of the department. It must not be perceived as a replacement for that strategic focus. This will require leadership in any department striving to combine CompStat and community policing to constantly emphasize a consistent message: CompStat is a management tool for greater organizational accountability, one of many tools that we use as we promote and practice our core strategic commitment to community policing.

Lessons for the Future:

Albuquerque's effort to integrate community policing and CompStat represents a truly innovative effort on the national scene: in a sense, APD is seeking to combine two competing models of how policing in urban America can move forward. New York represents one extreme, combining CompStat with traditional and paramilitary policing strategies. Chicago, San Diego, and other cities represent the other model: relatively successful implementations of strong community policing on a large scale. APD's efforts, like those of a handful of other pioneering cities, lie at the intersection of both tendencies; if successful, it may focus attention on how this can best be done.

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But this is not an easy love story about the marriage of CompStat and community policing, for we have not yet found the perfect recipe. Thus, we do not close with a trite ending sharing such a recipe. Rather, it is a story about dedicated leadership, the role of ideas in policing, collaborative relationships across sworn-civilian and police-academic divides, and progress by trial-and-error --- and by then trying it again with new insight. But we do think it valuable to close with some of the insights gained through APD's experience in wedding these two approaches.

COP and CompStat: Competing models or complementary approaches?

The current environment for police managers combines a myriad of pressures, two of which are most relevant here. The first set arises externally, and pressures police leaders to adopt community policing as a guiding philosophy for law enforcement. It includes strong federal encouragement (through financial incentives and conference sponsorship) of communty policing, strong political support for community policing in many local jurisdictions, and research findings showing that community policing efforts can significantly reduce crime (when adopted systematically and vigorously). The second set arises mostly internally, from police managers desire for a stronger hand to guide and shape their departments and from their contacts with other managers who suggest the CompStat process provides a way of doing so. In this environment, more and more law enforcement agencies may be expected to try to combine CompStat and community policing. The Albuquerque experience suggests that their success will depend a great deal on how the two initiatives are presented. They can become competing models that divide a department, but need not be. CompStat can be used as a management tool precisely to focus a department's attention more firmly on the smartest and most effective aspects of community policing, and to institutionalize accountability to that model. To get that right, police leaders will need some patience and flexibility in building an interface between the two initiatives so that each reinforces the other, rather than undermining it or distracting attention from it.

Crime Mapping, CompStat, and Community Policing

The second insight from the Albuquerque experience concerns the possibility of doing CompStat right in a moderately large department facing significant budget constraints. For many such departments, the costs of state-of-the-art technology and expertise for both collecting and analyzing relevant data can be prohibitive. One one hand, the Albuquerque experience suggests this need not be an insurmountable barrier: by making relatively cost-effective modifications to its technological base, using available expertise, and streamlining its existing system of data collection, a body of statistical data of defensible quality and reasonable timeliness can inform the CompStat process. On the other hand, we have little doubt that, were significantly expanded (on the order of $8 million) funds and dedicated personnel available, the CompStat

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process could track data more precision-tailored to the needs of smart community policing as well as good police management generally. Funding for this kind of capability will be extraordinarily difficult for many jurisdictions to obtain locally, and federal support may be necessary.

Collaborative relationships in policing: Researchers/police and sworn/civilian

Finally, the development of CompStat and community policing in Albuquerque, and APD's effort to integrate problem-solving fully into the day-to-day work of policing, show how crucial collaborative relationships can be in fostering positive change in police organizations. The days of management-by-command in closed, centralized police bureaucracies that pretended to operate like military hierarchies are simply dead, at least in police departments exposed to the demographic, political, and liability pressures common in American cities. Firm police management will remain as critical as ever, but it will be leadership that draws insight and expertise from wherever it is available: sworn officers smart enough to know which ideas are promising and confident enough to experiment with them; civilian police personnel with the expertise and commitment to foster strategic organizational change; and outside researchers who can operate autonomously and draw new perspective from outside the organization. Such collaborative relationships across the long-impervious boundaries between sworn and civilian police personnel, and between police professionals and outside researchers, can help foster real change in police organizations, and help bring about the kind of policing worthy of a free and democratic society. The police leaders of the future will be those with the vision to enter into such partnerships.

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UNM Staff/Student Employee Time Slip 4R13

Project: SCCOPE II Name: [redacted]

Project: APD-UNM SSN: [redacted]

Day	Date	Time In	Time Out	Total	Project	Day	Date	Time In	Time Out	Total	Project
Sat	12/18/99					Sat	12/25/99				
Sun	12/19/99					Sun	12/26/99				
Mon	12/20/99	8:00	11:00	3	APD-UNM	Mon	12/27/99				
Tues	12/21/99	8:00	4:00	8	SCCOPE II	Tues	12/28/99				
Wed	12/22/99	8:00	4:00	8	SCCOPE II	Wed	12/29/99				
Thurs	12/23/99					Thurs	12/30/99				
Fri	12/24/99					Fri	12/31/99				

SUMMARY OF HOURS:
Project: APD-UNM Hours: 3

Project: SCCOPE II Hours: 16

Total Hours for Week 1: 19

Supervisor Signature Date

SUMMARY OF HOURS:
Project: _____ Hours: _____

Project: _____ Hours: _____

Total Hours for Week 2: _____

1-4-99
Student/Staff Signature Date

Total Hours for Both Weeks: 19

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APD's Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Training

APD-UNM Research Partnership
An NIJ-funded collaboration
Draft version: June 1999

Comments welcome: please call Richard Wood at 277-4257 or Mariah Davis at 280-2814
If you wish to participate in a small group discussion about this and other APD topics, please call Katie Owens at 277-4257

The Albuquerque Police Department, under the leadership of Sgt. Gene Pettit, has implemented a Crisis Intervention Team program to handle an ever-increasing number of calls for service from both the mentally disturbed and other persons in acute crisis. This program selects pre-screened/qualified field officers to receive intensive training in the issues of the mentally ill, crisis negotiations, and crisis intervention. Those accepted into the CIT program have to successfully complete one week of primary training, as well as regular advanced training, to be considered a CIT officer. Those certified as CIT officers receive an additional fifty dollars a month in hazard duty/ additional duty pay.

Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) is one of several APD training courses and/or programs that can be considered an overall success merely because it increases the tools available to an officer while policing. But CIT distinguishes itself from the majority of other training given in APD because it *utilizes the major components of Community Oriented Policing* (problem solving, police-community partnerships, and proactive police work) while simultaneously *gaining officer involvement and buy-in.*

We have noted since our research began in 1997 that many other efforts by the department to provide community policing skills have been poorly received by officers (an important exception to this being the department-wide problem solving training in 1997 and 1998, which some officers – though by no means all – found valuable). So an obvious question that must be addressed is why the CIT training has been so popular among officers. One answer might be that the officers were simply more receptive to the training because they were going to receive additional salary for being a CIT officer. But observation of the training, and conversations with officers in it, suggest a more complicated view: The training, and subsequent benefits of being a CIT officer, provide a much needed reward to officers who have previously felt that police work values physical force over verbal finesse.

The actual CIT training itself was begun by providing a clear definition of the "Crisis Intervention Team", and a justification for the necessity of CIT in modern day policing. "Since 1990, APD has had 52 police shootings. Forty to forty-five percent of these have involved people in some kind of "crisis", i.e. there was some kind of precipitating event that led to the crisis and ended in police involvement," explained Pettit.

Pettit explained why he got involved in the CIT program, then gave a clear explanation of the goals of CIT: "Our primary purpose is to minimize the use of force by the police when dealing with mentally ill citizens or citizens in crisis. We provide proactive intervention to deter future crises that might involve high levels of police force. In other words, we practice problem-solving for the long haul."

After the explanation of program goals, Pettit slowed down the pace of the introduction in order to emphasize a point that was stressed throughout the training: "The bottom line is that you are being trained in a safer way to do business. CIT training reduces the risk of injuries to law enforcement officers by establishing a strong partnership between mental health professionals and the police. CIT utilizes officers as case finders and monitors for the mental health system, then works with mental health workers to come up with long term solutions for our 'repeat customers'. CIT is the epitome of community oriented policing."

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Offering CIT as an example of Community Oriented Policing and problem solving takes courage in the face of the current anti-"flavor of the month" climate of the department. This training, however, avoided just using the rhetoric of COP and instead tied community policing to practical concerns of officers: officer safety, citizen well-being, and reducing problematic calls for service (especially those likely to escalate force levels). As a result, a genuine enthusiasm for partnerships and problem solving grew naturally out of officers' deep commitments. This was the sole mention of the label "community oriented policing"; done at a strategic moment during the opening of the training, it placed the entire course within the framework of APD's strategic vision and key officer concerns. But the course itself focused on simply building mutually beneficial relationships between the community, mental health and other service providers, and the police. In so doing, it made community policing clearly relevant to police work – something not all training manages to do. "These guys have a ton of information," said one officer after the training on homeless resources in the city. "I didn't know that all of these place had programs we could help people get into."

That same sentiment was echoed time and again by officers in the training, many of whom said their own policing efforts in the field had been marked by discouragement. "Until today, I never knew that there were all these places I could refer people to, or help them get connected with. It sucks being in the field, going to a call and knowing you aren't doing anything to solve any problems...but you really don't know what else you can do. At least now I have some ideas...and a bunch of numbers of people I can call to get me some help," said one officer.

Thus, the crisis intervention training was taught in a framework that seemed to simply "make sense" to those in the class. A clear **definition** of CIT concepts followed by an honest and **factual justification** of program need allowed officers to assess the concept being presented to them and adjust their level of buy-in appropriately. **A clear and concise explanation of goals** (both of the CIT program and of the training itself) provided the framework necessary for officers to "see the big picture". The **explanation of how this fits into overall department mission (COP, POP)** gave officers the reassurance they needed that this training was not merely a "flavor of the month" concept, but was actually supported throughout the department. Finally, CIT training worked because it was tailored to be **practical and to increase officer safety.** Although it may seem obvious that "our ultimate goal is to keep officers alive", CIT was taught in a way that continually emphasized this fact, thus reassuring officers that they weren't expected to give up tactical safety for "touchy feely" policing. Rather, it showed that, when done right, community policing, problem solving and tactical safety can go hand in hand.[1]

This framework, combined with the constant pressure of in-class, hands-on negotiating, made the CIT training a major success, by both written and verbal accounts. "This is one training that wasn't a skate. I had to study hard, because the next day I would be expected to negotiate someone (an actor) off a bridge or something," said one officer.

A small number of officers felt that having specialized CIT officers was an insult to the many officers who handle crisis situations every day. "I refuse to put in for CIT. I think it is an insult to every other officer I work with, if I get paid extra to do what they have to do every day." A different spin on this attitude is seen in the few circumstances that officers use not being CIT paid and trained as an excuse for not appropriately handling a crisis call. "F--- them," said one

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[1]The other key goal of community policing, often lost when it is presented as a new idea, is to **reduce crime**. Though less relevant to this particular training, this should be a key link made in every training relevant to community policing: like traditional policing, it strives to reduce crime – it just does so with a wider set of tools, a fuller understanding of what leads to crime, and a broader sense of what officers, civilian police employees, and citizens can do to intervene in the cycle of deterioration in neighborhoods.

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officer who had not been accepted into the CIT training. "If I go on a call, and the guy needs to be transported to mental health or something, I'll call for a CIT officer to do it because they are getting the extra money for it. If CIT is not available, then I will either take the guy to jail or he will have to figure out something else on his own. "Because in the eyes of this department, I am not qualified enough to deal with the situation. I haven't been trained."

Such resentment toward specialized CIT training, however, may ignore the fact that interpersonal communication is not be the strength of every officer. "There are officers who, although they do handle crises every day, just aren't very good at it. Those are the ones you hope to hell never show up on a call where there is a s--- load of emotions. And other officers just hate the emotional stuff, they don't want to have to sit there and listen as long as it takes. But I became a CIT officer because I like that kind of stuff, I think I am decent at it. And when I wear this (CIT) pin, I can do what I like to do and not get accused of milking the call when I spend extra time on it," said one CIT officer.

How to balance the advantages of specialized CIT training and the risks of alienating those officers who do not receive it is a decision for APD leaders to make. One future option may be to provide some version of crisis intervention and negotiation training to all sworn APD employees and those civilian employees who deal with citizens in crisis situations, and to have certified CIT officers continue to act as the primary officer taking calls requiring a high degree of crisis intervention training.

CIT appears to have gained significant respect among officers as well as the wider community.[2] This bodes well for the department's future handling of incidents involving mentally disturbed individuals, crisis negotiations, and other critical incidents. But CIT's success in this regard may hold other lessons if APD wishes to continue to promote the philosophy, strategic vision, and practices of community policing: First, training in officer safety, defensive tactics, administrative skills, and other traditional elements of policing will of course still be required, but should be presented within the overall philosophy and strategic vision of APD's commitment to community policing. Second, "community policing" should not be presented as something apart from and unrelated to other elements of officers' work; rather, it should be shown to permeate all aspects of police work. Third, training in community policing should be systematically linked to core officer concerns such as reducing crime, protecting officer safety, supporting citizen well-being, advancing an officers' career, raising children in a safe and pleasant community, etc. Fourth, preaching community policing as abstractly "better than" other forms of policing is not very convincing – it needs to be linked to officers' practical policing needs and commitments. Training should use the minimum amount of lecturing necessary and emphasize active engagement with the ideas and practical building of the skills of community policing.[3] APD already provides excellent training in many areas; incorporating these lessons from the CIT program may help the community policing initiative benefit more fully from this excellence.

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[2]As with any intensive operation, however, those actively involved in the day-to-day operations of CIT need to take care to avoid burnout. Currently, sworn personnel are handling a large number of CIT calls and doing the extensive and necessary follow up and intervention work without an administrative staff. One simple solution for lessening some of the administrative burden might be to provide a small civilian staff for the CIT office, particularly in the areas of data entry, secretarial work, etc.

[3] The recent advanced CIT training appeared to be less successful in engaging officers. But the reasons for this highlight these lessons: the outside speakers did not tie their presentations as successfully to core officer commitments, and the training did not rely as extensively on interactive, practical problem-solving.

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