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Evaluation of Community Policing in Tempe, Arizona

Final Report

October 31, 2000

Prepared for
National Institute of Justice

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Executive Summary

Purpose of the Report

The overall purpose of this report is to explain the Tempe, Arizona, Police Department's transition to community policing by addressing questions of primary concern to policing professionals: What barriers were faced along the way and how were they overcome? How did community policing move from implementation by special team to department-wide geographic deployment? What difference has community policing made for citizens? How has it changed the officer's work day?

This report is the final product of grant funding by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) to evaluate community policing in Tempe. The first Tempe evaluation grant was awarded in 1993, and a second grant in 1995 extended the evaluation period through 1997.

Overview of Community Policing Evolution in Tempe

Like many policing organizations, the Tempe Police Department (TPD) first experimented with community policing before implementing a department-wide approach. Tempe was also flexible in testing different ideas to help officers perform community policing activities. This approach worked well for TPD for several reasons. First, TPD hired a new chief in 1988 who was quite open to experimenting with community policing. Also, the community and the department itself were ready for a change from traditional policing methods and wanted a more open organization. Finally, on a national level, community policing was rather new; no one was really sure how to go about implementing community policing.

It is useful to think of community policing in Tempe as having evolved in three phases: (1) the early planning phase, which began in the late 1980s; (2) the start-up phase, which encompassed the Beat 16 experiment conducted in the early 1990s; and (3) department-wide implementation, which was launched after the Beat 16 project ended and, with substantial refinements, continues today.
Although TPD worked through a number of challenges along the way, the department evolved into a different and, in our view, more responsive police department in its delivery of service to Tempe’s citizens. It changed from a reactive operational mode to a proactive mode with problem solving; from an entirely centralized operation to a decentralized operation; from a department with minimal contact with the public to outreach to the public; from decision making based on subjective judgment to decisions based on analysis; and from strict control of sworn personnel to flexibility and support for decision making.

This transition took place over a 12-year period and is not complete even to this day. The lesson learned is that changing to community policing requires time and patience because of the radical changes that it imposes on a police department previously accustomed to a professional style of policing.

Study Methodology

The ILJ staff conducted over 25 separate site visits from 1991-1997. During ILJ’s site visits, interviews and focus groups were conducted with department management, patrol supervisors, and officers as well as community members. Overall, ILJ conducted more than 300 interviews. In addition, ILJ hired and trained three graduate students to conduct extensive “ride-along” observations with patrol officers.

From 1993 through 1996, ILJ also conducted telephone surveys with 1,000 citizens each year. ILJ also collected and analyzed a variety of quantitative data to measure police activities, including calls for service, reported crimes, and more.

Beat 16 Project

In 1990, the police department began its initial experiment in community policing by assigning a lieutenant, sergeant, and six officers to Beat 16. Four additional officers were added later. This team was responsible for delivering community policing to the entire beat 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The team was responsible for community outreach and problem solving, as well as responding to calls for service.

The Beat 16 project was considered successful in many ways both within the department and in the community. The Beat 16 team officers felt that the project worked well. In fact, one of the things they liked most was their regular beat assignment, which allowed them to become
more familiar with the neighborhood and the people living there. The community members liked seeing the same officers in their neighborhood, and also felt that more was being done to correct neighborhood problems. Residents also reported getting more involved in the community by joining neighborhood or homeowners' associations.

The lessons learned by the police department from the Beat 16 project included: officers could be assigned to geographic areas and maintain beat integrity (stay in the beat); beat officers could manage to answer calls for service and still perform some degree of problem solving and community outreach (the officers did have difficulty conceptualizing and documenting problem solving); and crime analysts were helpful in providing direction for problem solving. The department built on these lessons.

Organizational Change

The TPD, like most departments, did not create a formal strategic plan when it initiated community policing; however, the police chief (Dave Brown) and command staff did have a vision of how they wanted to implement community policing and how they wanted the department to operate under the philosophy. An important first step was to clearly state the department's commitment to community policing. TPD began by evaluating and revising the department's mission statement and values to support the overall goals of community policing. These new statements clearly showed the department's emphasis on openness, community-police partnerships, and problem solving.

The TPD adopted the community policing tenet that advocates flattening ranks as an important way to bring the decision makers closer to the field. Between 1988 and 1993, TPD changed its rank structure and flattened it from eight ranks to five. The department discontinued the ranks of senior detective and corporal; the ranks of captain and major were combined to form the rank of commander; and two assistant chief positions were eliminated. While this flattening was not part of a written community policing plan in Tempe, it certainly had a positive impact and further promoted the department's move to community policing. The lines of communication in the patrol division, after the changes, went from officer to sergeant to lieutenant to commander. Sergeants and lieutenants, middle-management, now had one decision maker to go to and were able to receive quicker answers and relay those back to patrol officers.
The TPD was also committed to decentralizing the department. To start, TPD realigned all of its beats, which facilitated officers' ability to identify neighborhood resources. It also added a cohesiveness to the neighborhoods, in that individuals, neighborhood groups, organizations (e.g., schools), and businesses could expect to interact with the same officers on a daily basis.

With the re-alignment of beats came a department-wide movement toward enabling patrol officers to not only spend more time in their neighborhoods, but to work there as teams. TPD's approach was to use the concept of self directed work teams (SDWTs). Tempe's plan to implement SDWTs department-wide proceeded in three phases (described by the department as pre-alignment, alignment, and assignment phases) over a two-year period. From July 1992 through 1993, the TPD continued to experiment with community policing and developed a sense of what community policing meant in terms of operational changes. For patrol, this meant that a lieutenant, sergeant, and officers were all assigned to one beat area where they focused on answering calls for service, conducting community policing activities, and actively engaging in problem solving with the community.

The pre-alignment phase from July through December 1992 focused on the assignment and role of sergeants. Lieutenants were relieved of their shift responsibilities and given geographic assignments, with one lieutenant assigned to each quadrant. Patrol sergeants were asked to provide a list of their top three choices for beats. The department's crime analyst was asked to develop data on calls with a view toward developing new beat configurations within each quadrant. Finally, sergeants received training during the pre-alignment phase on community policing.

The alignment phase, covering the first six months of 1993, continued the efforts with sergeants and beat configurations. Sergeants were selected, assigned to new beats, and given responsibility for developing work schedules for their officers. Officers then bid for beats, and their assignments were made based on the officers' preferences.

The assignment phase occurred on July 1, 1993, with the assignment of officers to beats. Tempe's implementation involved the use of the SDWTs. The TPD deployed SDWTs to each

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1 The city was divided into four geographical areas (quadrants), with each containing the same number of officers. Each quadrant contained five to six police beats.
beat, and the assignment was supposed to be for a two-year period. Each of these patrol service teams was led by a sergeant. Each SDWT responded to calls for service, participated in community policing activities, proactively solved problems, and handled other policing services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Furthermore, each team was responsible for its own work schedule (based on calls for service and other factors) and was empowered to deliver services with minimal direction from management.

Sergeants had very flexible schedules under this geographic deployment model. Since they had supervisory responsibility for eight to ten officers who worked seven days a week, 24 hours a day, sergeants had to split their shifts. For example, they might work one day on the day shift, two days on the evening shift, and one day on the midnight shift.

Another important change was that squad roll calls were eliminated and replaced with periodic team meetings. One reason for this change was that the different schedules for officers and supervisors within a team, made it difficult to hold roll calls. Another reason was an underlying belief among command personnel that roll calls were not effective in achieving their aims of communicating announcements and assignments.

The concept of SDWTs did not work as smoothly as originally envisioned. While lessons from the private sector were valuable in setting up the ideas behind SDWTs, the experiences of the TPD quickly showed that the SDWT was not easily transferred to policing. Perhaps the greatest underlying problem is that officers are not interchangeable within a team. They bring different skills to the same job and different approaches to aspects of policing such as problem solving. An officer may not be able to take over all the activities of another officer who is absent for a day.

Moreover, the TPD found itself stretched thin under the staffing plan. Adequate officer and supervisory staffing for 15 teams exceeded what the TPD could provide. As a consequence, within the assignment phase the department began receiving complaints from the field involving workload, lack of supervision, and lost camaraderie. This comment was typical of those made by officers who were dissatisfied with the new plan:

When you have 20 different beats trying to combat a problem 20 different ways with limited resources, I think it's a wasted effort.
Because of these issues, the department established a Patrol Workload Team to review what had occurred under geographic deployment. The 20-member team was comprised of commanders, sergeants, lieutenants, and officers from patrol. At its first meeting, the team agreed on the following expectations from their efforts:

- Identify and discuss problems in deployment and work.
- Identify and discuss the positive aspects of deployment and work.
- Distinguish real from perceived problems.
- Identify and clarify roles of sergeants and lieutenants.
- Make recommendations for changes.

The Patrol Workload Team held 15 meetings over a four-month period to discuss what, if any, changes needed to be made to their geographic deployment plan. The team identified the positive and negative aspects of the deployment model, as summarized below.

### Key Positive and Negative Aspects of Geographic Deployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge of beat has increased</td>
<td>None expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens are more comfortable with officers</td>
<td>Sometimes too comfortable—“personal officer”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally better service</td>
<td>Adds to sergeant’s workload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers feel empowered to take on projects</td>
<td>Some citizens waiting longer for response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors have better scheduling flexibility</td>
<td>Flexibility requires more coordination of scheduling within the quadrant and division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of personnel has negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisors do not see all personnel on a regular basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More team focus within beats</td>
<td>Lack of cohesiveness from beat to beat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less cohesive with others who work their same hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beat offices</td>
<td>Can be a problem if on private property (e.g., apartment complex)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closer relationships with schools, businesses, and apartment complexes</td>
<td>None expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better decision making process with flattened organizational structure</td>
<td>More responsibilities for sergeants and other ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No re-definition of roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher morale in patrol</td>
<td>Not necessarily for sergeants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In December 1994, the Patrol Workload Team submitted a report with specific recommendations for improving geographic deployment:

- Establish a unified set of shifts for both North and South Patrol areas.
- Allocate Patrol Officers (slots) to beats based on proportion of calls for service.
- Beat Sergeants in conjunction with Squad Sergeants will deploy slots to squads to meet the needs of the beat.
- Officers will bid for specific Beat/Squad slots.
- Squads will report together on each of their four work days, under the 4/10 work plan.
- Officers with a Beat Sergeant will make up a Beat Team and will meet bi-weekly to work on Beat specific issues and problem solving.
- Beat and Squad sergeants will cooperate to address problems.
- Sergeants will be aligned with and evaluated by Quadrant Lieutenants

Technology Support

Part of Tempe's efforts to increase communication with the public centered on developing the capability to capture and share (e.g., on the TPD web site, at community forums) up-to-date information on crime at the neighborhood level. The demand on officers to identify, analyze, and address problems requires access to more data, and different types of data, than they have traditionally had. Moreover, community policing has been an impetus for the growth of crime analysis and increasing use of geographic information systems (GIS) in policing agencies. In Tempe, call for service and crime information was used regularly to identify hot spots and trends and portray them graphically. Combined with rich information gathered through citizen surveys, focus groups, and officer observations, these data informed the development of valuable beat profiles.

Over the years of this evaluation, the TPD made significant strides in developing its technology for support of community policing. In 1989, the TPD had one crime analyst whose primary responsibilities were preparing summary reports about crime and providing crime-related information to police personnel. The analyst used a computer database called ALERT that contained crime records. No analysis of calls for service was performed at that time.

Later, crime analysts were able to capture and portray calls for service and reported crime data at the level of "reporting districts," with a total of 407 of these districts for the city. These
data were also made easily accessible through the TPD web site in the form of maps, tables, and reports, including specialized reports on crime in multi-family housing areas and mobile home parks, and on specific crime types (e.g., auto thefts). TPD crime analysts were also available at both the North and South division stations to handle requests for reports from officers, detectives, and managers. At the end of our study period, Tempe crime analysts were using MapInfo software for GIS analysis of call and crime information, but had not yet included data from other sources (e.g., city planning, utilities, business sources, schools, etc.).

The most significant information technology change in the department was the continual shift of analysis from crime to more databases, such as data from the TPD’s CAD system. In fact, by the end of the evaluation, officers would frequently request analysis based on CAD data, rather than just crimes. The CAD data offered a richer information source for support of community policing. The TPD remained up-to-date technologically by periodically upgrading its CAD system.

Another major crime analysis function in Tempe was to support resource allocation planning. Crime analysts and patrol management in Tempe factored in calls for service, average response time, miles patrolled, and other data to develop schedules for officers. In Tempe as in other departments, there was always the potential that limited time between calls for service and other demands on officers’ time (court appearances, paperwork) might reduce the time available for proactive work in the community. Technology was invaluable in keeping Tempe on track, with about 33 percent of patrol officer time available for community activities and problem solving.

Another major change in the TPD was the use of laptops by officers for completing reports in the field. Laptops were issued when an officer was a recruit, and training was provided on the department’s specially-developed input program. The program prompted the officer for information needed on each field report, and the responses were automatically stored in the laptop. The reports were then transferred to a central database for crime reporting and analysis.
Engaging the Community

The TPD encouraged its officers to be more available to residents and more involved in neighborhood activities. Once lines of communication between police and residents were opened, community members' expectations of the police department rose. To them, officers were now available to listen and respond to all of their problems, many of which were very specific (e.g., a broken street light, or loud neighbors). It was often the case that officers took on more problems than they could handle. This would happen especially during neighborhood meetings where an officer would leave with a somewhat lengthy "to do" list from the community members. When busy police officers achieved little or no results on citizen complaints of this nature, community members began to lose faith in the department's community policing plan and complained to city council members.

The TPD also briefly experimented with having patrol officers give citizens their direct numbers on pagers and cell phones. This also resulted in officers being overwhelmed with citizen requests. These were often not police-related (e.g., "Can I trim my next door neighbor's tree that hangs over into my yard?"), but rather were for information or special services (e.g., "Please check on my cats at my house while I am on vacation."). When officers were off for three days and did not return calls promptly, citizens became dissatisfied and complained.

The TPD, however, remained committed to engaging the citizenry in their community policing efforts. The department actively solicited help from community members through a number of working groups and activities.

Workload and Community Policing

It has become clear after studying community policing over the long term in Tempe and in other agencies that a department must be fully staffed (with both sworn and non-sworn personnel) in order to effectively conduct community policing activities. Over-hiring may be one option for a department, but it is also possible to make better use of various existing resources. For example, the duties of some non-sworn personnel such as community service officers (CSOs) may be expanded so that patrol officers can spend more time on problem solving, as well as activities that require a sworn response. Some departments, including Tempe and San Diego, have made extensive use of volunteers.
In addition, community policing’s survival may hinge on a department’s ability to make accurate workload projections. Over the past decade alone, the city of Tempe has seen significant changes, including growth and diversity in the population, an increase in downtown businesses with over 50 employees, sponsorship of numerous special events (including professional sporting events), and a larger tourist population. All of these changes show that Tempe is a larger and more active community than it has ever been before. This has a direct impact on workload and resource allocation in the Tempe Police Department. In order to adequately handle the increased need for law enforcement services—including crime investigations, crowd control, and traffic enforcement, as well as community policing—TPD needed to re-evaluate how to handle their workload and how to better allocate their resources.

There is a distinction between "authorized" and "actual" staffing for police officers (including officers assigned to patrol, investigations, traffic, and other assignments). The TPD, like departments in many other cities, receives its authorized staffing annually from the city. However, the authorized staffing is never the actual staffing. Due to turnover (retirements, people quitting) and sick leave (officers injured on duty), the actual number of people working every day was often far below what was authorized. In 1997, the TPD was authorized 220 officers but had only 194 in a working status. This is a 12 percent difference. In 1998, the city council, for the first time, granted the TPD authority to overhire—to hire 10-15 officers more than they needed to compensate for attrition.

In 1990, Tempe officers were spending about 44 percent of their shifts on citizen calls for service. Recommendations were made to increase the number of patrol officers so that the percent of time spent on calls would be reduced to about 33 percent. The reduction would allow more time for community policing activities. Over the ensuing years, the TPD did, in fact, obtain increases in authorized strength with the result that the percent of time on calls was reduced. The evolving patrol planning strategy by the TPD was to divide officers' time among calls for service (33 percent), community policing (33 percent), and administrative duties (33 percent). By 1998, officers had successfully decreased their time on calls for service and increased their time on community policing activities.

In addition, the TPD also created the position of Community Service Officer (CSO) to help relieve patrol of non-emergency workload (e.g., CSOs responded to minor calls for service,
handled non-injury traffic accidents, took telephone report calls, and more). As of 1997, the authorized strength of CSOs in TPD was 10. At that time, CSOs were handling between 15-19 percent of citizen calls (the total number of calls was approximately 102,765). This is in sharp contrast to the 6.6 percent of calls handled by four CSOs in 1992.

**Human Resources**

The TPD realized early on that to successfully implement community policing, they would have to make changes in the way officers were recruited, selected, trained, evaluated, and promoted in the department. Although some agencies have made changes in these areas, it appears that the majority have not. For example, in 1998, ILJ surveyed 337 law enforcement agencies that said they were implementing community policing. Most agencies reported making a considerable investment in community policing training, but only about 36 percent said they had revised job descriptions, the promotional process, and other personnel policies as a result of community policing; and only 13 percent reported that these revisions were extensive.

The TPD began by revising its selection criteria to attract employees with specific abilities and personal characteristics related to community policing. TPD was looking for a new kind of recruit who was creative, had critical thinking skills, could solve problems, and had a mix of education and real world experience. These qualifying factors were first used to fashion a new job description for entry-level officers. Eventually, all job descriptions were changed to support a department-wide community policing effort. After several years of experience with community policing department-wide, a common theme heard among patrol officers was that, "Community policing requires strong people-oriented skills."

Altogether, the TPD revised its selection process twice—once in 1990, which included the revisions to entry-level officer job descriptions, and again in 1996. In 1996, the TPD decided to raise the educational requirement for recruits to 60 hours of college credit or an Associates degree. Prior to this time, a recruit was required to have only a high school diploma.

With all of these efforts, TPD still experienced some difficulty in attracting and retaining officers. A strong economic climate afforded both applicants and officers with many options; moreover, the TPD had a reputation for excellence, which helped make some of its best officers attractive to employers offering higher paying positions. To help counteract this, the TPD
became more aggressive in its recruitment efforts. For example, the department moved to a flexible testing system, which Tempe gave particularly qualified individuals an opportunity to take the exam immediately rather than waiting for a pre-determined test date.

Because Arizona offers a state-wide training program for officers (Arizona POST), departments that want community policing training tailored to their own departmental values and community problems need to use or develop additional resources. While community policing eventually became a part of the state's basic training program for new officers, it remained only a small part of officers' overall training. As a result, TPD implemented its own "post academy." This academy worked to introduce a Tempe culture by trying to re-orient officers to TPD both philosophically and procedurally. The academy also worked to further train new officers in community policing and problem solving. Community policing training was also reinforced in the field through the department's Field Training Officer (FTO) program. FTOs were trained to improve mentoring of new officers in problem solving and community policing. TPD reinforced its initial community policing training by providing related in-service training for all department members.

TPD also expected that all employees would be held accountable for their participation (or lack of participation) in community policing and problem solving. TPD integrated community policing measures into its performance evaluation criteria in the mid-1990s, and also introduced community policing activities into its career counseling program. In other words, officers had a greater chance of advancing in the department if they participated in community policing and problem solving.

TPD also changed its promotional process to encourage community engagement and problem solving. The process was multi-dimensional and required a formal test, an examination of prior performance, recommendations from supervisors, and a meeting of the command staff. TPD began to implement changes in 1991 with the inclusion of questions specific to community policing and problem solving on the written exam and during the oral review board process. For example, officers were asked to discuss their approaches to possible community policing scenarios or community problems. Consideration was also given to an officer's level of commitment to and participation in community policing and problem solving activities as recorded in their files and reported by their supervisors. Moreover, community members sit on
the promotional review board. This held officers accountable not only to the department, but also to people in the neighborhoods they patrolled.

Citizen Involvement

Beyond the changes police make within their organization (policies, procedures, personnel), they must also become adept at interacting with the community. In Tempe, methods for involving residents included operating police beat offices, supporting neighborhood watch programs, police participation in neighborhood and homeowners’ association meetings and in various special events, operating citizens police academies, and developing volunteer programs. Citizens have also become more directly involved in providing services (e.g., by assisting crime victims, as part of Tempe’s CARE 7 program).

In addition, ILJ collaborated with TPD in conducting annual telephone surveys of citizens from 1993 through 1996. The objective of the surveys was to determine residents’ satisfaction with police, their concerns about their neighborhoods, and their awareness of community policing. Citizens were asked whether crime and quality of life had changed in the past year. Survey results showed some improvement over the years—more people thought crime decreased and that their quality of life had improved. However, the percentage of citizens being aware of community policing decreased over the years. The fact that only about 25 percent of respondents knew about community policing was a discouraging finding, given that the department had been making its transition for several years. It did not, however, seek out publicity on its efforts, and many of the changes were internal organizational efforts rather than outreach efforts to citizens. The consequence was that many citizens may not have realized that policing was being done in a different manner. Another influence may be the relatively short period of time that respondents had lived in Tempe (on average, six years).

Mobilizing the Community

The police department not only worked with community members and organizations to educate them about community policing, it also worked to mobilize residents into action to begin to do community policing. Vehicles for this included the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Crime Free Multi-Housing programs, crime prevention “night out” programs, a citizens police academy, and developing better relationships with the media.
TPD trained some officers on CPTED, and with their support, ordinances were put in place to provide guidelines for building and remodeling in the city. These ordinances were finalized through a citizen's focus group and are now institutionalized in the city and readily recognized by residents.

Tempe discovered that calls for service from multi-housing properties were proportionately higher than those for single family housing units. In early 1994, a community service officer (CSO) was assigned to develop and head a CFMH training program. The CSO started by establishing a planning group consisting of key personnel from field operations, the city's legal office, fire department, and other affected agencies.

The program was designed to be implemented in three phases. The first phase involved a two-day workshop, which was open to property managers, property owners, maintenance staff, and others concerned with keeping illegal activity out of rental properties. The two-day workshop touched on a number of topics including: working with the police; community policing; liability; identifying gang and narcotic activity; victims for lease violations; screening tenants and employees; and revising rental agreements.

The second phase of the program was a security evaluation by TPD's Crime Prevention Division. The manager of a complex received the results of the survey and a checklist detailing the changes that should be made to conform with TPD's CPTED requirements. After the complex remedied all of the items on the checklist, the property manager received a certificate of completion. The final phase of the program was called "building the community environment." The goal was to get as many residents as possible to attend a function sponsored by the complex's management. The residents were oriented to the purpose and results of the CFMH program and educated on the role they could play in maintaining a crime free environment.

After phase three had been completed, each complex received their CFMH signs, which were posted throughout the complex. Each complex also received an annual audit by the police department, and if they passed, they were entitled to receive yearly permits for the CFMH signs.

This program was quite successful in Tempe. As of July 1997, 126 properties had been represented at the CFMH training. The attendees from these properties represented 15,989 different units throughout the city, which, at the time, was three-fourths of the city's total multi-housing units. The majority of the 126 properties were working on CPTED improvements. Four
properties had completed all the stages and received CFMH signage. Those properties varied in location, size, and demographics of residents.

**Strategic Planning**

Although TPD did not begin community policing with a formal strategic plan, the upper command staff did have a vision of how they would like community policing to work in Tempe. This vision meshed well with other factors, including a new chief with a management style that could help push community policing to the foreground in Tempe. By the mid-1990s, the TPD began placing a great deal more emphasis on formal strategic planning.

In 1995, a Strategic Issues Group was convened. This group identified six priority issues in the department and began a process of recommending strategies and objectives to address them. The issues were accountability, juveniles and gangs, drugs and alcohol, employee development, basic services, and problem solving and crime prevention. Just two years later, the department along with other city agencies created a document outlining all of their respective strategic issues. In addition, Tempe developed a “Management Services IT Strategy Plan, 1998-2001.”

As Tempe illustrated, strategic planning for community policing is not essential to begin the implementation process. However, there does need to be a vision from which to work so that personnel are able to articulate what they are working toward.

In retrospect, TPD management might have fared better in several respects if they had taken the time and effort up front to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for community policing. First, by involving more department personnel in the planning process, management might have been able to convince more mid-level managers and supervisors that community policing was the next evolution in policing, thereby ensuring a smoother implementation of geographic deployment. Second, by taking more time and thinking through more implementation issues, management might have been able to anticipate and overcome more technical and practical problems, such as the impact on supervisors of eliminating roll calls in the geographic deployment model. Third, management could have engaged the public in a comprehensive strategic planning process and gained more support for community policing,
which would have helped gain needed support for more resources in the early stages of the community policing process.

A final reason for strategic planning relates to turnover within managerial ranks in the department. The effort put into a strategic plan provides continual support and education to new managers in a department. Moreover, updating a strategic plan on an annual basis provides an opportunity to reinforce the general philosophy of community policing to all managers.

**Leadership**

The lessons learned regarding leadership and inter-agency cooperation are obvious and have appeared in almost every major study on community policing. There must be strong leadership from top management in order to implement any major change in a police organization. This is especially true with community policing, which changes the direction that has been taught and practiced for over 20 years in most organizations.

Three general conclusions can be reached on the basis of the experiences in the TPD. First, to the credit of the top management, a consistent message was delivered during the years of the evaluation. That message was that community policing was here to stay and was to be practiced both in the strategic planning of the department and in day-to-day operations. The key point is that the general message stayed the same even with turnover in top management.

Second, the experiences at the TPD show that consistent reinforcement is needed on the message of community policing as the policing approach in the department. For a variety of reasons, top management had to continually instill the basic tenets of community policing to subordinates. In this way, policy turned into practice. Finally, the leadership of the TPD retooled its thinking about many of its existing activities. For example, the crime analysis function expanded into more analysis of calls for service in support of problem solving efforts and providing more information to citizens on police workload. The volunteer program was viewed as part of the community policing effort because it increased the involvement of citizens with the TPD and improved communications between police and residents.
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Tempe Final Report • 1

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Chapter 1

Background on the Study and the Report

The Tempe, Arizona, Police Department acquired its first police car in 1938 (the siren was added two years later). At least another 30 years passed before the department took its first call through a 911 system. Over the next 20 years, the town continued to become a city, and the chief whose tenure spanned that time ran an efficient but militaristic, closed organization. By the late 1980s, many Tempe citizens and department members alike were ready for a change. Throughout the country, problem solving and community policing concepts had captured the interest of policing scholars and a growing number of chiefs who were willing to push their organizations out of their comfort zones. A new chief came on board in Tempe, hired in part to do just that. Twelve years later, community policing in Tempe has moved well beyond special team status to become a way of doing business.

Purpose of the Report

The overall purpose of this report is to explain Tempe’s transition to community policing by addressing questions of primary concern to policing professionals: What barriers were faced along the way and how were they overcome? How did community policing move from implementation by special team to department-wide geographic deployment? What difference has community policing made for citizens? How has it changed the officer’s work day? What effect has it had on crime and related problems?

This report is the final product of grant funding by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to the Institute for Law and Justice (ILJ) to evaluate community policing in Tempe, Arizona. The first Tempe evaluation grant was awarded in 1993, and a second grant in 1995 extended the evaluation period through 1997.

ILJ’s involvement with community policing in Tempe, however, has covered a period of more than ten years. In 1989, ILJ conducted an organization and management study of the Tempe Police Department (TPD) under a contract with the city of Tempe. ILJ also evaluated TPD’s community policing efforts in the early 1990s under INOP (the Innovative Neighborhood
Oriented Policing Program, sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Assistance). In addition, after the NIJ evaluation period ended, ILJ and others continued to study Tempe with respect to staffing (ILJ, 1998); organizational transformation (Connors, et al, 2000); and information technology (Webb et al., 1999).

These projects have afforded ILJ a unique opportunity to examine community policing over the long term, starting when the TPD was just beginning to explore the approach, through various planning and testing phases, and for some years after a new deployment plan was implemented. During this period, city government made a concerted effort to help neighborhoods organize; and the city itself enjoyed a period of substantial growth, straining the department’s ability to continue community policing with existing resources.

The TPD experience as a whole offers many lessons of practical value to policing agencies throughout the country. It would be a missed opportunity to focus narrowly in this report on only the 1993-1997 evaluation period. The evaluation results are featured in the report, but we also draw on our earlier and subsequent involvement in Tempe to provide a more complete picture. The evaluation methodology is discussed, but a greater emphasis is placed on how community policing evolved, including the conditions in the department and city that enabled this change, the barriers, and the lessons learned.

**Report Organization**

The rest of this chapter provides a context for the work in Tempe by discussing influential research that has shaped community policing. Additional references to relevant literature are also included within other chapters of the report.

Chapter 2 provides an overview of how community policing evolved in Tempe. The chapter includes a chronology and brief discussion of milestones from 1988 to the present. Chapter 3 reviews the study methodology. Chapter 4 provides a separate discussion of the INOP project in TPD’s Beat 16. This was Tempe’s first effort to implement community policing in a targeted area, and the experience had a significant influence on the TPD’s plans for deployment department wide.

The remaining chapters are organized as follows around the following components of community policing:
Review of Literature

Many authors have discussed community policing as the culmination of several progressively more complex models of policing in America (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Reiss, 1992; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994). The story is familiar by now, and some of its themes are reflected in the brief description of policing in Tempe that introduces this report. The “watchman” and political models are described as emphasizing community service, but also facilitating favoritism and corruption. The more professional model that ensued was both enhanced by and driven by technology—patrol cars, 911 telephone systems, computers (Sparrow, 1993; Maguire, 1997). It became possible to react more swiftly to crime, but patrol cars and 911 demands, as well as racism and excessive force (Williams and Murphy, 1990), alienated police from many communities. In terms of organization, the professional model is described as closed and militaristic or hierarchical. Still very much in evidence today (Wilkenson and Rosenbaum, 1994; Bayley, 1994), this structure is often believed to be necessary to control employees and manage the deployment and supervision of officers responding to calls. In this model, investigations and other specialized functions—including the “softer” functions like crime prevention and community relations—are primarily the responsibility of separate units.

Of course, this broad-brush description does not apply to police agencies across the board (Weisheit, et al, 1994; Walker, 1995; Strecher, 1995), and there is no single reason why so many police agencies across the country have embraced community policing. In some communities, scandals and misconduct have provided impetus for change (Bailey, 1988; Pelfrey and Greene, 1997), but in many others (including Tempe) this was not the case. Rather, there appears to have been a convergence of factors, some more important than others depending on the jurisdiction. Among them are increases in violent crime and street-level drug crime; economic decline in inner cities (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994); demands for equality of service (Williams and
Moreover, the results of several influential experiments in the 1970s and early 1980s in effect argued against feeding traditional policing methods with more money and personnel. It became clear that rapid response did not help solve crimes in the majority of cases, and that random patrols were neither efficient nor effective as a routine tactic (Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown, 1974; Kansas City Police Department, 1980; Farmer, 1981). In addition, citizens were willing to accept any number of alternatives (in non-emergency situations) to immediate response by a patrol car, including telephone reports, delayed response, community service officer (CSO) response, and others (McEwen et al, 1986). Calls for service and hot spots analysis confirmed what most police officers would say they knew all along—that they were often called to the same addresses over and over again for the same types of problems.

Not only the cost but the wisdom of incident-driven policing was called into question (Goldstein, 1979, 1990), and the implications for police operations of a more analytical, problem-oriented focus were widely debated. Some focused their arguments on addressing neighborhood deterioration (“broken windows”) and minor disturbances before they became open invitations to drug dealers and other criminals (Wilson and Kelling, 1989). Others advocated for a much stronger crime prevention focus (Bayley, 1994).

While many of policing’s problems were systemic, most efforts to address them were largely programmatic—foot patrols (Pate, et.al, 1986; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990), special squads such as COPE in Baltimore County and CPOP in New York City, community relations units, and others. These efforts were not necessarily failures, but they did not constitute structural change and were no match for a resistant organizational culture. For those reasons, they had much in common with earlier team policing experiments, which were abandoned in many cases because the teams were set apart and lacked organizational support (for example, from dispatchers) (Sherman, et al., 1973; Bloch and Specht, 1973; Rosenbaum, 1994).

Despite these lessons, community policing for the most part has been launched in traditional agencies by special program, team, or squad (Brown, 1993; Roth and Ryan, 2000). This is understandable in terms of cost and logistics. Nevertheless, without strong messages that the small start is the beginning of organizational change, community policing can be easily
dismissed by skeptics as just another “program du jour” and does not inspire much change in the organizational culture (Van Maanen, 1978; Walker, 1995; Greene, 2000). Organization-wide change to community policing, on the other hand, offers promise as a systemic solution to systemic problems, but with enormous implications for organizational restructuring; a broadening of police functions (Kelling and Moore, 1988; Kennedy, 1993; Cordner, 1997), and a loss of control (if citizens truly became partners in setting police priorities).

How community policing is interpreted is still largely a local matter, although many have proposed definitions, frameworks, and lists of assumptions. To give just a few examples, various papers developed by members of NIJ’s Executive Sessions on Policing at Harvard’s Kennedy School challenged readers to think of community policing in terms of organizational transformation; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) outlined nine “P’s” of community policing; the framework published by the Community Policing Consortium (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994) centered around community partnership and problem solving as two core components; Oettmeier and Wycoff (1997) offer 22 “assumptions associated with community policing;” Cordner (1997) has framed community policing in terms of three “dimensions,” with related community policing elements discussed in practical terms; and Dunworth et al (2000), focusing specifically on information technology, offer seven “key information domains” for community policing.

The Crime Act of 1994 tied significant federal funding for police hiring, as well as technology enhancements, to a requirement to move forward with community policing. The Act, and the framework developed by the Community Policing Consortium, left room for community policing via special program, acknowledging that while some departments were moving toward department-wide change, many were just beginning to explore how community policing concepts could be applied locally.

It remains true that no single definition of community policing satisfies everyone, nor do all “community policing departments” implement a universally accepted set of program elements. Even agencies considered among the most advanced in community policing have not

1 “Community policing is a philosophy of full service personalized policing, where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place, working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify and solve problems.”

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yet reached a level of proficiency in all dimensions considered important for department-wide change (Fleissner, 1997); and national conferences on community policing feature segments on everything from Neighborhood Watch to problem solving to CompStat. However, as Greene (2000) points out, this does not mean that community policing has no common elements, or that no progress has been made. Since 1995, NIJ and the COPS Office have invested in a number of research projects focused specifically on organizational change in policing agencies. Many of these are looking at some of the largest agencies (e.g., Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Philadelphia), where achieving the type of geographic accountability, decentralization, flattening, and other organizational change that many have argued for convincingly is perhaps especially difficult to do.

It has also been difficult in Tempe, but as several researchers in big city departments readily concede, the organization's size, history, culture, and leadership do matter (NIJ, 2000). Departments like Tempe, St. Petersburg, Newport News, and others offer lessons that may be especially relevant to medium-sized jurisdictions. Tempe does indeed represent a "second generation COP department [where] COP appears to be ingrained in the department and is practiced as part of the way in which the department conducts business" (Webb et al., 1999).
Overview of Community Policing Evolution in Tempe

Introduction

The city of Tempe, Arizona, located adjacent to Phoenix, has grown rapidly in the past 20 years. The population, approximately 145,000 when the evaluation began in 1993, was estimated at 162,000 by 1999. The racial composition is about 75 percent white, 15 percent Hispanic, and 10 percent other (Asian, African-American). The city's current land area is 40 square miles, making Tempe the most densely populated city in the state. Tempe is also home to Arizona State University (ASU), with a local student enrollment that exceeds 20,000; and it hosts the annual Fiesta Bowl, ASU sporting events, several major league baseball teams for spring training, and many other special events. The growing population, extensive development, high volume of tourism due to the climate, vast student population, and wealth of special events that bring out the public, place a strain on police services to provide safety and security 24 hours a day.

As of July 1999, the Tempe Police Department had 466 employees (351 sworn, 115 civilians) and 128 volunteers contributing an average of ten hours a month each.

Like many policing organizations, the Tempe Police Department (TPD) first experimented with community policing before implementing a department-wide approach. Tempe was also flexible in testing different ideas to help officers perform community policing activities. This approach worked well for TPD for several reasons. First, TPD hired a new chief in 1988 who was quite open to experimenting with community policing. Also, the community and the department itself were ready for a change from traditional policing methods and wanted a more open organization. Finally, on a national level, community policing was rather new; no one was really sure how to go about implementing community policing.

It was in this very interesting atmosphere (both in the department and in the larger policing community) that TPD explored how to adapt community policing concepts to meet its internal objectives and those of the citizens of Tempe. The TPD, along with many other
departments experimenting at the time, had both positive and negative experiences with its initial community policing efforts. However, Tempe was able to build upon the lessons learned and successfully implement community policing throughout patrol.

**ILJ Research and Evaluation in Tempe**

This report is the final product of NIJ-supported research to evaluate community policing in Tempe. However, ILJ’s long relationship with the Tempe Police Department pre-dates the NIJ-sponsored research, and ILJ continued to work with the city of Tempe and Tempe Police Department after the evaluation was completed. Thus, while the report focuses on the evaluation results, we also draw upon our work on several other Tempe projects to lend context and depth to the analysis.

ILJ’s relationship with Tempe began in 1989 when we conducted a management study of the department under a contract with the city. ILJ’s recommendations at the end of that study included specific suggestions for moving the department toward a community policing approach. This spurred TPD to submit a proposal to the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in 1990 to implement an Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing (INOP) project, which soon became known in Tempe as the Beat 16 experiment.

INOP was a national demonstration project involving eight sites in addition to Tempe. Although each project differed, they all had objectives under INOP to apply community policing principles and techniques specifically to drug-related problems. The TPD included ILJ in its Beat 16 project to assist in the development of project activities and to conduct a process and impact evaluation.

The INOP Beat 16 experiment technically concluded in 1992, and the department gradually expanded its efforts to citywide implementation in July 1993 in patrol operations. ILJ continued to evaluate Tempe’s progress under a 1993 grant from the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and the evaluation was extended under another grant from NIJ in 1995. NIJ also funded

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several projects in other police agencies in 1995 that were designed to examine community policing over the long term.

Tempe offered a unique opportunity to assess a community policing effort that encompassed an entire city. Evaluation issues centered on how a department changes, adapts, and sustains community policing over time. Later, the city of Tempe awarded a contract to ILJ to conduct a staffing study of the Tempe Police Department (ILJ, 1998). Major objectives of that study were to determine whether the department was appropriately staffed for community policing and to estimate staffing needs for patrol and community service officers (CSOs) for the next five years. Also, from 1997-1999, Tempe assisted ILJ in a multi-site study of organizational transformation to community policing. That study included a national survey and other case studies in Portland, Oregon; St. Petersburg, Florida; and San Diego, California.

Three Phases of Community Policing Implementation

It is useful to think of community policing in Tempe as having evolved in three phases: (1) the early planning phase, which began in the late 1980s; (2) the start-up phase, which encompassed the Beat 16 experiment conducted in the early 1990s; and (3) department-wide implementation, which was launched after the Beat 16 project ended and, with substantial refinements, continues today. Exhibit 1 provides a chronology of community policing’s evolution in Tempe. This is followed by a brief explanation of the milestones listed in the exhibit.
### Exhibit 1: Chronology of Important Events in the Tempe Police Department's Evolution to Community Policing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase I: Planning</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>City of Tempe Neighborhood Assistance Program Began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Dave Brown Appointed as Chief of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Volunteers in Policing (VIP) Program Began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Citizen's Police Academy Held First Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988-1993</td>
<td>Command Streamlined from Eight to Five Ranks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 (January)</td>
<td>CALEA Accreditation Received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>City-Funded TPD Organization and Management Study Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase II: Start-Up</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Tempe Selected as One of Eight INOP Sites; Beat 16 Experiment Began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (July)</td>
<td>Recruit Selection Process Revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 (February)</td>
<td>Beat 16 Baseline Citizen Survey Conducted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 (April)</td>
<td>Tempe's First Full Community Policing Training Session Held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (Mid-summer)</td>
<td>Crime Analyst Assigned to Beat 16 Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 (September)</td>
<td>Adopt-A-School Program Began</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase III: Implementation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (May)</td>
<td>Staff Study of &quot;Implementing Self-Directed Work Teams in TPD&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (July)</td>
<td>Geographic Deployment in Patrol Throughout the City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (November)</td>
<td>Department Mission and Values Statement Revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 (March)</td>
<td>Crime-Free Multi-Housing Pilot Team Established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (January)</td>
<td>Ron Burns Appointed Chief of Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (August)</td>
<td>Strategic Issues Identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 (December)</td>
<td>Police Substation Opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Patrol Workload Team Recommends Changes in Deployment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 (May)</td>
<td>City of Tempe Centralizes All Departments' IT Units into One IT Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 (September)</td>
<td>City-Funded TPD Staffing Study Completed by ILJ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Phase I: Planning

Prior to 1988, the TPD was led by a chief who had been in that position for nearly 20 years. While he helped to make TPD a professional and well-respected department, his management style was described as being authoritarian, militaristic, and strict.

In 1988, TPD appointed a new chief (Dave Brown) whose management style was quite different from his predecessor’s. Briefly, his background was that he started as a patrol officer with the TPD and moved up through the ranks of the department. He then left the TPD to become chief in another Arizona city, and returned to the TPD as chief in 1988. His experience with another police department was invaluable in shaping his approach to new forms of policing at the TPD. At the TPD, Chief Brown became known as a "free spirit" who was willing to try non-traditional policing activities. He was also comfortable talking to the media and community groups and initiated several outreach programs (e.g., a citizen’s police academy and a Volunteers in Policing (VIP) program).

The shift to community policing began with Chief Brown’s appointment in 1988. As he stated,

“It started out of a sense of frustration. We were a very professional organization, efficient, with a lot of support from the community and elected officials and a lot of respect from other law-enforcement agencies. We had all the bells and whistles: computers in the cars, brand-new police station, but there was a frustration that we weren’t really accomplishing anything. We were locking up more people but with little impact. We were just treading water.”

While Chief Brown and other upper command staff knew the department was ready for a change, the logistics and the details of that change were not readily apparent. It was at that time (1989) that the city contracted with ILJ to conduct a comprehensive management study of the police department. One objective of the study was to recommend direction for the department's change toward community policing.

During the study, all members of the police department, the department’s management, city manager, and city council were asked to help develop a vision of community policing in Tempe. At the completion of the study, Tempe had a better sense of how to begin work toward implementing community policing.
Tempe's early planning for community policing included researching how the concept was being implemented in other departments; participation at outside conferences and training sessions; a visit to NIJ to discuss relevant research; and site visits to other departments to observe community policing efforts first hand and discuss obstacles encountered by others. Particularly valuable for Tempe was a site visit by 10 department members to the San Diego Police Department, which was already nationally known for its problem oriented policing efforts.

Also during this period, the department applied for and was awarded a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance to implement an Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing (INOP) project.

**Phase II: Start-Up**

Community policing implementation in Tempe began with the INOP (Beat 16) project, which involved a team of officers charged with identifying, analyzing, and responding to crime and other problems in a target area. In line with INOP grant requirements, Beat 16 was selected largely because it was the site of much of Tempe's drug-related crime and problems (Escalante neighborhood). The department's objectives (as explained in their grant application) included (1) developing and demonstrating innovative community policing programs that would target drug demand reduction; and (2) delivering public safety through partnerships at a neighborhood level (e.g., with neighborhood associations, businesses, schools, etc.). This project, which ran from November 1990 to April 1992, was quite extensive and successful in its community policing efforts. The ILJ evaluation of Beat 16 included citizen surveys, interviews with officers, and an assessment of problem solving processes in the beat. Because the lessons learned from this experiment greatly influenced subsequent community policing development, we have devoted a separate chapter (Chapter 4) to describing the Beat 16 experiment in greater detail.

**Phase III: Department-Wide Implementation**

Department-wide community policing involved three distinct periods that the department described as "pre-alignment, alignment, and assignment." Pre-alignment (from July through December 1992) focused on the assignment and role of sergeants and lieutenants; analyzing call for service data and developing new beat configurations within each quadrant; and training. The
alignment phase continued and expanded upon these efforts; and in the assignment period, patrol officers were assigned to their beats and the new deployment plan went into effect.

Department-wide implementation also involved using self directed work teams. The purpose of these teams was to work together on a day-to-day basis and to develop and implement ways to accomplish their goals (Tempe Police Department, 1993). As discussed later in the report, self directed work teams have a number of unique characteristics that distinguish them from other types of teams, and the TPD took specific steps toward giving sergeants and officers the authority and support they needed to develop solutions to problems. At the same time, geographic deployment kept traditional elements of patrol by having the team members continue to respond to citizen calls for service in their beats. During this period, the department received two grants under Title I of the Crime Act for a total of 13 new positions. These grants enabled the department to continue with its implementation of community policing.

After citywide implementation in patrol was in place, the department began to consider how to decentralize investigative functions; launched a citywide crime-free multi-housing program under community policing; and made significant changes in hiring, training, and other human resources policies. Adjustments were also made in the geographic deployment of sergeants and lieutenants to address some of the difficulties they encountered in the shift from temporal to geographic accountability. The department also underwent several personnel changes in top management positions, including the appointment of Ron Burns as Chief of Police in January 1995. The position had been vacated because Dave Brown accepted a position as assistant city manager with Tempe. His new position included oversight of the police, fire, and emergency management services.

Like the majority of policing agencies, Tempe did not go through a formal strategic planning process to develop community policing. However, one of Chief Burns’ first efforts was to develop a planning model to support community policing as it continued to evolve.

**Summary of Organizational Changes**

Although TPD worked through a number of challenges along with way, the department evolved into a different and, in our view, more responsive police department in its delivery of service to Tempe’s citizens. It changed from a reactive operational mode to a proactive mode
with problem solving; from an entirely centralized operation to a decentralized operation; from a department with minimal contact with the public to outreach to the public; from decision making based on subjective judgment to decisions based on analysis; and from strict control of sworn personnel to flexibility and support for decision making.

This transition took place over a 12-year period and is not complete even to this day. The lesson learned is that changing to community policing requires time and patience because of the radical changes that it imposes on a police department previously accustomed to a professional style of policing.

This chapter only touches on some of the events that have made up TPD's change to community policing. Details on how TPD changed its organizational structure, human resources policies, and other key elements of community policing are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 through 11.
Chapter 3

Methodology

Data collection methods for the evaluation included personal interviews at all levels of the police organization and with key city government and community leaders; focus group interviews with selected groups (e.g., patrol officers, supervisors, commanders, community members); observations of community policing activities (ride-alongs with patrol, community meetings); a review of policies, reports, other documents; and analysis of available data (e.g., levels and types of calls for service). Officer surveys were developed, and four years of citizen surveys were conducted.

Site Visits, Interviews, and Focus Groups

The Institute for Law and Justice staff conducted over 25 separate site visits from 1991-1997. During ILJ's site visits, interviews and focus groups were conducted with department management, patrol supervisors, and officers as well as community members. Overall, ILJ conducted more than 300 interviews.

Observations and Ride-Alongs

ILJ staff enjoyed tremendous cooperation from TPD members and Tempe citizens, and was able to observe community policing activities first hand by attending patrol meetings, observing problem solving and other field activities, and attending meetings with community groups. In addition, ILJ contracted with three graduate students from Arizona State University to participate in ride-alongs with Tempe police officers. The students were trained to record information about how the officers handled different types of calls for service. This information could encompass response time, interpersonal interaction with the parties involved, relationships with other officers on the scene, and other shift activities.

The graduate students also conducted interviews with their ride-along officers. The purpose of these interviews was to gauge the officers' attitudes about Tempe's commitment to community policing. It was also an opportunity for the students to inquire about the officers'
understanding of community policing as well as the importance officers placed on doing community policing in their job.

Citizen Surveys

Citizen surveys were an integral part of ILJ’s evaluation of Tempe’s community policing implementation. These surveys were conducted annually from 1993 through 1996. Crime analysts in the TPD assisted in the planning and execution of each survey. As discussed later in this report, approximately 1,000 citizens were surveyed each year and responded to a series of questions about perceived safety in the neighborhood, awareness of community policing, and other issues. The telephone numbers for the surveys were obtained from the local telephone company, which provided randomly selected numbers each year for the effort. Callers consisted of civilian personnel from the TPD and graduate students from Arizona State University. The surveys were conducted in October or November each year.

Unfortunately, surveys were not conducted in 1997 and 1998 because of a shortage of personnel in crime analysis. A key crime analyst left the department in early 1997, and the other analyst was unable to keep up with current workload and also plan the citizen surveys for these two years.

Analysis of Crime, Call for Service, and Resource Allocation Data

ILJ collected a variety of quantitative data to measure police activities. Some descriptive department information was collected first, and included the number of sworn and non-sworn personnel, the number of calls for service, number of Part I crimes, and the percent of an officer’s time spent answering calls for service.

Finally, the Institute for Law and Justice collected some demographic information on the city of Tempe including population growth and diversification, business growth, and even the number of major events (e.g., professional football games, university events, etc.) taking place in the city. This information was used to indicate the growth of the city and its evolution from a throughway to a final destination.
Beat 16 Project

As noted in Chapter 2, the Beat 16 project was Tempe’s first effort at implementing a community oriented style of policing. The Beat 16 team was responsible for community outreach and problem solving in addition to responding to calls for service, performing enforcement duties, and focusing on drug-related crime and problems in the beat. In 1990, TPD assigned a lieutenant, a sergeant, and six officers to Beat 16. Four additional officers were added to the Beat 16 team in 1992.

Training, Planning, and Community Outreach

At the beginning of the project, several steps were taken to prepare the Beat 16 officers for the changes they were expected to make. First, all team members received training on community and problem oriented policing. Training sessions focused on crime prevention, cultural sensitivity, drug recognition, gangs, landlord-tenant issues, building safety, code enforcement, and sanitation ordinances. The team also held weekly project coordination meetings for in-service training, coordination, and group problem solving.

An important first step for the Beat 16 team was to conduct a door-to-door community survey. The survey results were valuable in creating a community profile of Beat 16. By developing this profile, officers were able to learn more about the people and premises in the beat, identify problems and possible solutions, and take a systematic look at various strengths and weaknesses in the beat.

In addition, the Beat 16 team opened an office in Escalante Park. They bought a previously owned mobile home and renovated it. They located the Beat 16 office on the edge of the park next to the regional social services office. The officers also formed a Community Coordinating Committee with local neighborhood and homeowners’ associations to help mobilize support for community policing. Other outreach activities throughout the project included sponsoring community clean-ups and graffiti paint-overs, participating in neighborhood...
sporting events (basketball and softball games), and supporting high achievement in school with police-sponsored awards.

Problem Solving

Problem solving activities were somewhat of an issue for the Beat 16 team. In fact, many team members felt uncomfortable participating in problem solving activities. They had received special training that explained a successful problem solving approach as one where officers work with residents on identifying persistent problems, analyze these problems, and meet with residents or other stakeholders to develop acceptable solutions. However, having been trained in a more traditional approach to policing, they were used to immediate requests for service and immediate resolution of problems. Furthermore, they were trained to make efficient use of their time so that they could be free to move on to the next call for service.

It was difficult for the officers to move past this more traditional approach to police work. Although some drug-related problems were addressed, not many other recurrent problems were resolved in the Beat 16 area through a structured problem solving process. An additional issue was that even when officers were doing problem solving, they often did not even recognize it. Moreover, there was significant resistance to taking the time to record problem solving on a special log. An example might be illustrative. A Beat 16 officer was taking a coffee break at the local Thew Elementary School. Officers were encouraged by the principal to stop by and talk with teachers and students in the cafeteria. While there, the officer was told by the principal about a young girl who had not been in school for over five days. This girl, a new immigrant from Mexico, had just started at the school a few weeks before. The principal was concerned about the girl and asked the officer to check on her. That day, the officer went to the girl's home. Since the officer was fluent in Spanish, he spoke to the mother and girl about her absence from school. After much coaxing, the story finally came out. The girl had very few dresses to wear to school. She was being teased by the other children for wearing the same clothes day after day. She was hurt and embarrassed by the teasing, so she stopped going to school.

The next day, the officer went to the Salvation Army store and another second-hand clothing store, and, spending some of his own money, obtained a number of dresses and other clothes for the girl. He delivered them to the home, and the girl started attending school again.
Over the next few days, the officer continued to stop by the school to check on her progress and welfare.

In relating this incident to ILJ staff, the officer and supervisor felt that it was not problem solving because it was not complicated enough and did not involve data analysis.

**Calls for Service and Enforcement**

The Beat 16 officers were successful in their law enforcement activities. They were involved in joint undercover drug operations, handled local gang activity, and obtained and acted on tips from neighborhood residents. As noted earlier, they continued to respond to calls for service throughout the project and, except in cases of emergencies, were dispatched only to calls generated in Beat 16. In some instances, officers from neighboring beats handled calls for service in Beat 16; however, dispatchers were encouraged to hold non-emergency calls for the Beat 16 team officers until they were available.

**Officer and Citizen Assessment of Beat 16 Project**

The Beat 16 project was considered successful in many ways both within the department and in the community. During the course of this project, ILJ staff spent a total of more than 600 hours (spread over the project) observing the project, riding with officers, interviewing officers and citizens, and collecting data. The Beat 16 team officers felt that the project worked well. In fact, one of the things they liked most was their regular beat assignment, which allowed them to become more familiar with the neighborhood and the people living there. The community members liked seeing the same officers in their neighborhood, and also felt that more was being done to correct neighborhood problems. Residents also reported getting more involved in the community by joining neighborhood or homeowners' associations.

**Lessons Learned**

Several important lessons learned through the Beat 16 experiment helped the TPD make the transition to geographic deployment department wide in patrol.

**Beat Integrity.** One reason team policing failed in the 1970s in some cities was dispatchers' unwillingness or inability to keep out-of-beat dispatches to a minimum (Sherman *et al.*, 1973; Rosenbaum, 1994). The Beat 16 experiment managed to avoid this pitfall; however,
when officers from other beats were asked their opinions, many said the Beat 16 officers were not helping out enough because the communications center had been instructed not to send Beat 16 officers out of their beat. Many also saw the project as a special grant that would end after the funding ended. Similarly, the Beat 16 officers felt that officers from other beats were reluctant to help out in Beat 16. Thus, while it was possible for communications to keep out-of-beat dispatches to a minimum, the Beat 16 experiment brought to light issues of organizational culture that are typically associated with community policing as a special project. Moreover, it suggested that officers would need time to adjust to new expectations for handling calls for service.

**Broadened Function.** Beat 16 officers were able to wear several hats. They could handle emergency calls for service, address drug problems effectively, and still reach out to residents through a variety of community events. However, the Beat 16 team also identified several weaknesses related to decentralization and their responsibilities for new functions. Some believed that not all officers on the team were "pulling their own weight," that the officers needed more training, and that things were moving too fast at times. Beat 16 officers’ difficulties with conceptualizing and documenting problem solving pointed to areas that would need continuing work. Officers also were unhappy about only meeting on a weekly basis instead of the more traditional daily roll calls.

**Neighborhood-level Data and Information.** The process of developing a beat profile aided officers in becoming familiar with resources and problems in their beat. The crime analyst was able to contribute to this process, and the potential for crime analysis to aid in developing a department-wide deployment scheme was demonstrated.

**Job Satisfaction.** Despite some lack of clarity with respect to expectations for problem solving, most Beat 16 officers appreciated having an opportunity to work with residents and truly get to know their beats.
Organizational Change

Many departments have adopted new mission statements that espouse a department-wide philosophy of the police and the community working together to prevent crime, address community problems, and better the quality of life in their neighborhoods (Alpert and Moore, 1993; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1994; Skogan and Hartnett, 1997). Turning this into a reality throughout the organization, however, requires a transformation. This chapter describes organizational change in Tempe with respect to committing to a new mission; flattening the rank structure; implementing a plan for beat integrity, decentralization, and geographic deployment; and establishing offices in nearly all of its 15 beats. The chapter concludes by reviewing lessons learned with respect to accomplishing these changes and empowering officers to make more decisions about police work in their beats.

Mission Statement, Values, and Vision for the Department

The TPD, like most departments, did not create a formal strategic plan when it initiated community policing; however, the police chief (Dave Brown) and command staff did have a vision of how they wanted to implement community policing and how they wanted the department to operate under the philosophy. An important first step was to clearly state the department's commitment to community policing. TPD began by evaluating and revising the department's mission statement and values to support the overall goals of community policing. The current version of the mission statement and departmental values (see Exhibit 2) clearly shows the department's emphasis on openness, community-police partnerships, and problem solving.

The development of the new mission statement involved some input from the ranks, but it was mostly a top-down creation. One of the characteristics of Chief Brown was that he had a lot of ideas and expected staff to develop the details. Chief Brown viewed the development of the new mission statement as a management activity. In contrast, some agencies (Portland, Oregon) spent several years of department-wide and community meetings attempting to work out
philosophical and definitional differences (and, hopefully gain more buy-in) in crafting new community policing mission statements.

**Exhibit 2: Mission Statement and Organizational Values**

**Mission Statement:**

*The Tempe Police Department in partnership with the citizens of Tempe is committed to improving the quality of life in our city by identifying and resolving public safety concerns.*

**Organizational Values**

- Professional commitment and loyalty to fellow employees, the Tempe Police Department, and the people of Tempe.
- Constant striving towards excellence.
- Openness and honesty within the department and community.
- Dedication to the delivery of effective and efficient police services.
- Working with the community to focus on solving public safety problems.
- Continuous recognition of the value and worth of each individual employee in the accomplishment of the department's mission.
- An accommodation of personal and professional differences which do not preclude mission accomplishment.
- Consistency in the interpretation and application of our organizational values and management principles.

Moreover, as discussed later in the chapter on leadership, Chief Brown was determined that the new community orientation be known, and then implemented, within the department and community, not simply remain a statement in a frame.
Flattening of Ranks

The community policing philosophy calls for a breaking down of communication barriers between employees (e.g., patrol officers and detectives, patrol officers on different shifts) and between those who make policy and those who provide service. One way to achieve this is by flattening the rank structure, which is seen as not only fostering better communication, but also as giving line officers and supervisors more responsibility, more decision making authority, and more autonomy in their positions.

Over the years, some police agencies have reduced the number of ranks in their departments; however, a recent survey indicates that most of this flattening was not directly related to community policing (ILJ, 1999).

Between 1988 and 1993, TPD changed its rank structure and flattened it from eight ranks to five. The department discontinued the ranks of senior detective and corporal; the ranks of captain and major were combined to form the rank of commander; and two assistant chief positions were eliminated. While this flattening was not part of a written community policing plan in Tempe, it certainly had a positive impact and further promoted the department's move to community policing. The lines of communication in the patrol division, after the changes, went from officer to sergeant to lieutenant to commander. Sergeants and lieutenants, middle-management, now had one decision maker to go to and were able to receive quicker answers and relay those back to patrol officers.

Beat Integrity and Empowerment

During implementation of the Beat 16 experiment, the TPD gave the assigned lieutenant, sergeant, and officers the authority to make more decisions in the field than they had in the past. In fact, the chief encouraged them to take on community policing and problem solving on their own—to be proactive.

Similarly, with geographic deployment throughout patrol, community policing in Tempe called for increased activity with community members, and officers were expected to work independently and autonomously in their beat. In addition to community outreach and problem solving activities, officers continued to answer calls for service within their beats and spent a significant amount of time patrolling without much direction or supervision from upper
management. This not only helped officers get to know the neighborhoods and the people who lived there, but it also gave them a personal stake in what happened in their beat.

As discussed later, with this geographic responsibility and autonomy came an increase in responsibility especially for sergeants, who became responsible for their beats 24 hours a day. This also meant that each sergeant had to schedule their officers' time to ensure continuous beat coverage.

**Decentralization**

Decentralizing a police department is often described as essential for implementing a community policing model. Ideally, staff should physically spend more time in the community, have the authority to identify and work on solving problems, and generally become more familiar with their beats. It also pushes operational and tactical decision making down to the line officer (Meese, 1993), places more responsibility on middle level management, and requires an unusual level of trust between management and neighborhood officers, who are expected to work with little direction from management. Decentralization also creates new roles for sergeants, which Walsh (1995: 148) describes as a tall order, where "line supervisors whom for the majority of their careers have operated as reactive problem solvers in control-oriented bureaucratic organizations become proactive leaders of innovation."

In short, there are dual expectations that decentralization will lead both to more efficient handling of crime situations, and to the resolution of other community problems. All must share a conviction that a high degree of centralized control is unnecessary for productivity, or for the protection of the public. In fact, decentralization has the potential to empower not only officers, but also community members, as officers increasingly come to view citizens as customers of police services. Citizens' priorities may differ from those of beat officers and the department; however, these priorities must be identified, given credence, and addressed.

The Tempe Police Department was committed to decentralizing the department. To start, TPD realigned all of its beats, which facilitated officers' ability to identify neighborhood resources. It also added a cohesiveness to the neighborhoods, in that individuals, neighborhood groups, organizations (e.g., schools), and businesses could expect to interact with the same officers on a daily basis.
Geographic Deployment

With the re-alignment of beats came a department-wide movement toward enabling patrol officers to not only spend more time in their neighborhoods, but to work there as teams. TPD's approach was to use the concept of self directed work teams (SDWTs). Exhibit 3 outlines the definitional components of these teams. The idea of SDWTs in the TPD derives from research conducted by staff members on the use of these teams in private industry (Wellins, 1992; Geber, 1992). A typical definition is as follows (Wellins, 1992):

SDWTs are small groups of employees who have day-to-day responsibility for managing themselves and their work. Members of SDWTs typically handle job assignments, plan and schedule work, make production-related decisions, and take action on problems. SDWTs require minimal direct supervision.

As envisioned by the TPD, the SDWTs were to perform as follows:

- Each of the city's 15 patrol beats would be staffed by a sergeant and patrol service team (5 to 13 officers depending on type of beat). These SDWTs would handle all calls for service, community policing activities, problem solving, and any other police service needed by residents in the beat.
- Sergeants and officers would commit to working in the same SDWT and beat for two years.
- Each SDWT would be empowered to deliver community policing with minimal direction (or interference) from management. For example, the SDWTs would set their own work schedules in the beat (which could include flexible hours), with the requirement that they match these schedules with workload and anticipated community policing and problem solving activities. Each SDWT would have its own budget for overtime.
- Each SDWT would determine its own capabilities to deliver "generalist" police services, given its resources, time, and skill levels. For example, in some SDWTs, patrol officers with prior training and experience could conduct some narcotics or follow-up investigations, while other SDWTs might need to call in specialists in these areas.

Tempe's plan to implement SDWTs department-wide proceeded in three phases (described by the department as pre-alignment, alignment, and assignment phases) over a two-year period. From July 1992 through 1993, the TPD continued to experiment with community policing and developed a sense of what community policing meant in terms of operational changes. For patrol, this meant that a lieutenant, sergeant, and officers were all assigned to one
beat area where they focused on answering calls for service, conducting community policing activities, and actively engaging in problem solving with the community.

Exhibit 3: Self Directed Work Teams

- Comprised of an intact team of employees who work together on an ongoing, day-to-day basis and are responsible for a "whole" work process or segment
- Assume "ownership" of a product of service and are empowered to share management and leadership functions
- Are limited to a particular work unit
- Function semi-autonomously with responsibility for controlling the physical and functional boundaries of their work
- Cross trained in a variety of work skills
- Team members have equal input regarding decisions
- Work together to improve operations, handle day-to-day problems, and plan and control work
- Coordinate work with other units
- Responsible for acquiring new training and maintaining on-the-job training
- Monitor and review overall process performance

The pre-alignment phase from July through December 1992 focused on the assignment and role of sergeants. Lieutenants were relieved of their shift responsibilities and given geographic assignments, with one lieutenant assigned to each quadrant. Patrol sergeants were asked to provide a list of their top three choices for beats. The department’s crime analyst was asked to develop data on calls with a view toward developing new beat configurations within each quadrant. Finally, sergeants received training during the pre-alignment phase on community policing.

The alignment phase, covering the first six months of 1993, continued the efforts with sergeants and beat configurations. Sergeants were selected, assigned to new beats, and given

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3 The city was divided into four geographical areas (quadrants), with each containing the same number of officers. Each quadrant contained five to six police beats.
responsibility for developing work schedules for their officers. Officers then bid for beats, and their assignments were made based on the officers' preferences.

The assignment phase occurred on July 1, 1993, with the assignment of officers to beats. Tempe's implementation involved the use of the SDWTs. The TPD deployed SDWTs to each beat, and the assignment was supposed to be for a two-year period. The teams consisted of a patrol service team that was led by a sergeant. Each SDWT responded to calls for service, participated in community policing activities, proactively solved problems, and handled other policing services 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Furthermore, each team was responsible for its own work schedule (based on calls for service and other factors) and was empowered to deliver services with minimal direction from management.

Sergeants had very flexible schedules under this geographic deployment model. Since they had supervisory responsibility for eight to ten officers who worked seven days a week, 24 hours a day, sergeants had to split their shifts. For example, work one day on the day shift, two days on the evening shift, and one day on the midnight shift.

Another important change was that squad roll calls were eliminated and replaced with periodic team meetings. The reason for this change was in part because of the different schedules for officers and supervisors within a team, making it difficult to hold roll calls. Another reason was an underlying belief among command personnel that roll calls were not effective in achieving their aims of communicating announcements and assignments.

The concept of SDWTs did not work as smoothly as originally envisioned. While the lessons from the private sector were valuable in setting up the ideas behind SDWTs, the experiences of the TPD quickly showed that the SDWT was not easily transferred to policing. Perhaps the greatest underlying problem was that officers were not interchangeable within a team. They brought different skills to the same job and different approaches to aspects of policing such as problem solving. One officer might not be able to take over all the activities of another officer who was absent for a day.

Moreover, the TPD found itself stretched thin under the staffing plan. Adequate officer and supervisory staffing for 15 teams exceeded what the TPD could provide. As a consequence, within the assignment phase, the department began receiving complaints from the field involving
workload, lack of supervision, and lost camaraderie. This comment was typical of those made by officers who were dissatisfied with the new plan:

When you have 20 different beats trying to combat a problem 20 different ways with limited resources, I think it’s a wasted effort.

Because of these issues, the department established a Patrol Workload Team to review what had occurred under geographic deployment. The 20-member team was comprised of commanders, sergeants, lieutenants, and officers from patrol. At its first meeting, the team agreed on the following expectations from their efforts:

- Identify and discuss problems in deployment and work.
- Identify and discuss the positive aspects of deployment and work.
- Distinguish real from perceived problems.
- Identify and clarify roles of sergeants and lieutenants.
- Make recommendations for changes.

The Patrol Workload Team held 15 meetings over a four-month period to discuss what, if any, changes needed to be made to their geographic deployment plan. Two commanders facilitated the meetings. The team identified the positive and negative aspects of the deployment model, as summarized in Exhibit 4.

**Exhibit 4: Key Positive and Negative Aspects of Geographic Deployment in 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer knowledge of beat has increased</td>
<td>None expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens are more comfortable with officers</td>
<td>Sometimes too comfortable—“personal officer”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally better service</td>
<td>Adds to sergeant’s workload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some citizens waiting longer for response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers feel empowered to take on projects</td>
<td>None expressed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors have better scheduling flexibility</td>
<td>Flexibility requires more coordination of scheduling within the quadrant and division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of personnel has negative impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supervisors do not see all personnel on a regular basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More team focus within beats</td>
<td>Lack of cohesiveness from beat to beat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less cohesive with others who work their same hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beat offices</td>
<td>Can be a problem if on private property (e.g., apartment complex)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In December 1994, the Patrol Workload Team then submitted a report containing the following specific recommendations for improving geographic deployment:

- Establish a unified set of shifts for both North and South Patrol areas.
- Allocate Patrol Officers (slots) to beats based on proportion of calls for service.
- Beat Sergeants in conjunction with Squad Sergeants will deploy slots to squads to meet the needs of the beat.
- Officers will bid for specific Beat/Squad slots.
- Squads will report together on each of their four work days, under the 4/10 work plan.
- Officers with a Beat Sergeant will make up a Beat Team and will meet bi-weekly to work on Beat specific issues and problem solving.
- Beat and Squad sergeants will cooperate to address problems.
- Sergeants will be aligned with and evaluated by Quadrant Lieutenants.

**Beat Offices**

An important part of decentralization in Tempe was the establishment of beat offices. The Beat 16 team was the first to establish a beat office in the neighborhood. It was staffed by a receptionist during the day and served as a place for community members to make a complaint or request information. It also served as a place for officers to go for meetings or breaks. Once geographic deployment had been implemented department-wide, beat offices were established all over the city (e.g., in apartment complexes or office buildings), especially in places that had been identified as having crime and disorder problems. Beat offices were instrumental in demonstrating to residents that the police were close by and readily available. Moreover, it was common to hear officers say, "I like people knowing me in the beat."

As noted above, however, some members of the Patrol Workload Team raised concerns about beat offices located on private properties. In almost all instances, the owners and managers of the apartment complexes welcomed the presence of police at their location and readily agreed to provide them with space. The advantage was that tenants felt safer and
occupancy rates increased. The obvious difficulty was that not every apartment complex in the city could be provided with a beat office. In total, however, the beat offices were a positive feature of geographic deployment.

Lessons Learned

Revised Mission and Organizational Flattening. In the process of implementing community policing, TPD found that a revised mission statement, which emphasized the importance of community policing, was a good first step in reconstructing the department's philosophy of police work.

In retrospect, TPD management probably should have spent more time and involved more department personnel of all ranks in the development of the community policing mission statement. This might have been an opportunity to win over more "converts" to community policing. The lack of support at the supervisory level really showed in the backlash to the geographic deployment model.

By flattening the rank structure, the department was able to create shorter and clearer lines of communication between those who make policy and those who implement it. This was especially important when the department assigned its officers to specific beats and encouraged them to proactively participate in their neighborhoods with minimal direction from management.

Geographic Deployment. Decentralization also posed a problem for the police department in many respects. Street supervision was more difficult under geographic deployment because the beat sergeant obviously could not supervise 24 hours a day, seven days a week. To alleviate the problem, other "roving sergeants" were assigned at the quadrant level to ensure constant supervision. These sergeants generally had no responsibilities for problem solving activities or other community policing efforts, but instead were tasked with making sure that supervision was adequate in the field and that calls for service from citizens were appropriately handled. In this respect, they provided a needed service to the geographic deployment effort. Sergeants' response to their increase in responsibility and flexibility was generally negative. Some responded enthusiastically to community policing, while most were concerned about a lack of supervision in the field, perceived loss of camaraderie, and the time requirements for their additional duties.
Most sergeants felt that they were being given more responsibility, which many liked, but less control. They felt that, with a young officer corps, the officers would make many mistakes and develop bad habits (and possible unethical behavior) without close, daily supervision. Most sergeants singly could not adjust to the elimination of daily roll calls. Management had not really thought this through and had not developed accommodating and acceptable substitutes (other than a weekly meeting).

**Bid Process for Geographic Deployment.** Some of the discontent expressed by sergeants went back to the way in which geographic deployment was implemented. As previously noted, sergeants and lieutenants were assigned to their beats several weeks prior to the officers' bid date for transfers. This procedure allowed officers to find sergeants whom they liked and put in bids for those beats. In reverse fashion, some sergeants contacted officers prior to the bid process and encouraged them to bid for their beats. The end result was that some teams consisted of sergeants and officers who had worked together in the past, while others were thrown together. As a generalization, the teams that had worked together tended to like geographic deployment and did not advocate many changes, while the other teams expressed more discontent.

**Patrol Workload Team.** The creation of the Patrol Workload Team addressed a significant organizational problem for medium and small police departments under community policing. The organizational problem is created by the paradox of decentralizing operations and encouraging empowerment versus the need for addressing systemic problems throughout the organization. The TPD made a genuine effort to transition to community policing with its geographic deployment scheme, including considerable decentralization and autonomy for the teams. As problems began to develop under geographic deployment, the top management faced a dilemma on what process to use to address the problems. If the chief and other headquarters command dictated solutions to the problems, they would be accused of going against the basic tenets of decentralization and empowerment. On the other hand, it was not feasible to have the 15 teams address their problems individually since that might create large differences in policing procedures across the city.

The Patrol Workload Team was a solution to the problem. By bringing different ranks together to address the issues, the department was able to maintain the ideas behind
decentralization and empowerment while making positive steps to improve deployment. On the whole, the efforts of the Patrol Workload Team were successful. Certainly, geographic deployment improved as a result of their efforts. The two commanders who facilitated the meetings were evenhanded in their efforts to lay out the issues and develop solutions. Within the meetings, rank was set aside so that everyone would feel free to express their thoughts. There were, however, two downsides to the team. First, the group divided into two camps of thought—those who were happy with geographic deployment and thought that few changes were needed, and those who wanted to revamp the entire deployment process. The eventual recommendations of the team represented compromises between these two groups. Second, the team process took a considerable amount of time both in the sense of calendar time for the series of 15 meetings and personnel time on the part of the participants. There is probably no effective way of getting around this problem should another department want to try this approach. On the other hand, the amount of time was worthwhile because of the positive changes that occurred as a result. The TPD subsequently used similar teams for other planning in the department, including changes in its communications center and establishment of a crime free multi-housing pilot project.
Chapter 6

Policing Methods

Unlike traditional law enforcement, community policing requires far more activity on the part of a police department to not only answer calls for service, but to also interact with the community and proactively solve problems. The diversity of responsibilities placed on an officer significantly expands the definition of what constitutes police work (Silverman, 1995; Cordner, 1997). That is, new and different methods to perform one’s job are vitally important to successfully engaging in community policing. As discussed later, this has major implications for officer selection, training, and other human resources policies.

This chapter takes a more detailed look at Tempe’s changes in police methods in four major areas: problem solving; technology and crime analysis; the use of teams and committees; and methods to engage the community.

Problem Solving

There has long been debate about differences and linkages between community policing and problem oriented policing. Earlier in the discussion of community policing principles, some emphasized that the two are clearly distinct from one another (Eck and Spelman, 1987; Goldstein, 1990), while some considered the differences primarily a matter of semantics (Kratcoski and Blair, 1995). In fact, certain distinctions remain important to some agencies—for example, San Diego. However, over the 20 years since Goldstein (1979) argued persuasively for a problem-oriented, rather than incident-driven, approach to police work, most law enforcement agencies have come to consider problem solving as a defining component of community policing (Cordner, 1997; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994).

Early experiments in problem solving (for example, Newport News) took models that were widely used in corporations and adapted them to meet police and community needs. The resulting SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) (Eck and Spellman, 1987) has
undergone refinements, but it still represents the heart of most problem solving training for police.

The problem solving process envisions officers and community members working together to identify, analyze, and solve crime-related problems, and to prevent crime by addressing conditions (junk cars, abandoned buildings, etc.) that may facilitate crime. This type of public cooperation, including partnerships with other agencies, is seen as essential because police can not address the scope of these problems alone (Trojanowicz, 1994; Greene, et al, 1994).

Although these premises are widely accepted, problem solving has been difficult to implement in some departments for several reasons. Despite explanations that it is not intended as a replacement for various enforcement and investigative functions, it does require a marked change in the culture of the organization; employees must change the way they visualize their work. Many must develop new skills to be successful at it. The truth is that any change is often contested in a rigid organization such as a police department; but the emphasis on problem solving, or what some officers term "soft" policing, may garner even more resistance than other types of changes.

Furthermore, problem solving requires significant blocks of time to identify, analyze, and address pressing community issues. If officers are running from call to call, these blocks of time are simply not available. As one officer expressed it, under community policing

> You have to move beyond that one minimum thing [answering calls] in order to get your job done.

Not only does problem solving require cultural change and alternative call handling methods to free up time (discussed in the next chapter), it also requires the structure of an organization to change. Some departments like Tempe have addressed this by geographically deploying their patrol officers to permanent beats (usually assignments of one to two years) and limiting the number of calls they are dispatched to outside of their beats.

When the Tempe Police Department began to move away from the traditional policing model and implement community policing, problem solving activities were an integral part of the plan. In fact, the goal of the department was to see problem solving as not just another form to fill out, but as the culture of the organization. Beginning with the Beat 16 project, problem
solving activities were expected of all team officers. This posed a variety of problems to the officers, the department, and the community.

Officers who were part of the original Beat 16 experiment were the first to be asked to define and measure problems in their neighborhoods. In the beginning of the Beat 16 project, the officers indicated that they did not have enough time to devote to problem solving. Their time was being spent on handling citizen calls and on-view violations. After six months, the officers finally began to feel that they had time to spend on problem solving. Crime and calls became more manageable, and the Beat 16 officers were rarely sent out of their beat.

However, as noted earlier, the problem solving aspects of the Beat 16 project did not work as well as planned. In fact, most of the Beat 16 team officers felt much less comfortable with problem solving than with traditional law enforcement activities. Officers also had difficulty defining what problem solving activities were supposed to be, although they had received training in community policing and problem solving. Because of this, they sometimes did not “get credit” for solving certain types of problems. For example, the officer’s initiative in finding clothing for the truant school girl went a long way toward solving the problem, but this type of work was seldom written up in reports on problem solving activities.

Problem solving was always a part of community policing in the TPD, but emphasis rose and fell over the years and among the beat teams. Nevertheless, numerous examples of effective problem solving were documented as part of the evaluation process. These included the following illustrative examples of what the TPD accomplished.

Location of Beat Offices. As previously indicated, most teams established beat offices in their areas. In many instances, these offices were in apartment complexes or other locations that have been identified as having crime and disorder problems. That is, the teams intentionally selected problem locations for their offices. As an example, one office was in an apartment complex that had generated more citizen calls for service than any other address in the beat. After the office opened, the number of citizen calls and the amount of crime dropped considerably. The address continued to generate a considerable amount of activity for officers, but the residents knew the police were there, and police-citizen relationships showed a marked improvement.
Another beat office was located in a classroom at a local high school. The classroom was actually one of the trailers that the school had acquired to handle enrollment that exceeded the school’s capacity. Prior to the office, the trailers and school had been the target of drive-by shootings, and the school had experienced problems in the hallways with disturbances and fights. As a result of police presence, the shootings completely stopped, and the problems in the hallways virtually disappeared. Moreover, the officers spent time in the school working on underlying problems that may have caused the random shootings. In particular, drug problems were addressed by the team.

An interesting reaction to the beat offices was that citizens in these areas began calling the substation directly with problems. Because offices were sometimes empty, each acquired a call answering machine that allowed callers to leave messages. In one office in an apartment complex, the drug selling problems were virtually eliminated and undesirable tenants were removed, but calls for domestic disputes and other problems increased beyond the number of calls formerly received for drug selling.

**Drug Enforcement.** A renter in an apartment complex complained to the Narcotics Division about suspected drug selling from an apartment across the hall. The complaint was passed on to the beat team for investigation. To resolve the problem, an officer on the team who had previously been a narcotics investigator developed a novel idea. He placed plastic trash bags on the doors of all the apartments in the building with a flyer that stated, “A Free gift from the East Valley Kids: Please use your ‘East Valley Kids’ bags to keep your neighborhood clean... East Valley Kids is an after school, drug free, activity program, please help.” All the units received white plastic bags except for the suspected apartment, which received a blue bag.

For several weeks afterwards, the officer checked the apartment complex’s large trash container for the blue bag. When it appeared, he inspected it and found drug paraphernalia. On the basis of the citizen’s complaint and the bag’s contents, a search warrant was obtained and arrests were subsequently made of the apartment’s residents. The complaining citizen was quite surprised and pleased with the response of the beat team, as were the other residents of the apartment building. These efforts resulted in citizen support for community policing.

**Burglary Operation.** In a garden apartment complex, a series of burglaries were occurring with a common feature that they took place during the day while occupants were at
work. Investigation by beat officers placed suspicion on a maintenance worker who resided on the premises. The beat sergeant asked permission from one of the victims to use their apartment for observation of the maintenance worker’s apartment, which was in direct sight from the victim’s apartment. Over a two-week period, beat officers rotated the observation duties. The end result was that teenagers were observed carrying property (televisions, stereos, etc.) into the worker’s apartment. With this information, the maintenance worker and three teenagers were arrested.

The interesting feature of this problem was that the sergeant and officers decided to make this rash of burglaries a priority. They agreed to stretch their resources between the surveillance and other beat duties. As with the previous example, the successful result gained the support of the victims and other residents in the complex. For several months after the arrest, no burglaries were reported from the complex.

Counseling Neighbors. This problem centered on an argument between two neighbors extending over a three-year period. S. worked as an accountant out of her home office. She frequently observed J. with heavy landscaping equipment on his property. J. lived approximately across the street three houses down and operated a small landscaping company. S. called the police on numerous occasions saying that J. should be cited for violation of local ordinances. The police did, in fact, cite J. several times, but problems continued to occur. Over a course of three years, she made her complaints know to officers, sergeants, area lieutenant, deputy chief, chief of police, and city manager. A newly assigned sergeant met with J. and S. individually but was still unsuccessful in resolving the problem. J. stated that he felt the citations were unwarranted and that he no longer had equipment on the premises. S. continued to call the police.

After considerable discussion, the sergeant asked J. and S. if they would be willing to attend a counseling session to discuss the problem. They agreed, and a counselor was obtained through the city’s human development agency. At the counseling session were the two disputants with their spouses, the sergeant, his lieutenant, and the counselor. Surprisingly, the meeting was the first time that J. and S. had been in the same room to discuss their problems. After an hour of discussion, the two reached agreement. J. stated that he would use his business
location to park all his equipment; S. agreed to stop calling the police. The couples also agreed to work together to landscape vacant properties in the neighborhood.

**Graffiti.** While on patrol, an officer observed gang graffiti on the sidewalk and concrete walls of a building. He immediately called a city agency to arrange for removal of the graffiti. Moreover, because he was familiar with his area, he recognized the graffiti and went to talk to known gang members about it. The interesting point of this episode was that the officer knew exactly what to do and acted accordingly. It was, in effect, a “routine activity” under his shift.

In spite of these isolated successes, the implementation of problem solving in the TPD floundered throughout the entire period of this evaluation. Two specific problems occurred. First, the TPD never formalized the definition of “problem.” Some defined a problem as a group of similar incidents or crimes; other felt that only major crime problems should be addressed; others said a problem could be a single complaint from a citizen; and others said problems should be identified at beat meetings between officers and citizens. A second problem was that the TPD never established a procedure for documenting the efforts put toward problems. In our site visits, we generally found out about problem solving efforts through discussions with field personnel—lieutenants, sergeants, and officers. On almost every ride along, an officer would volunteer information about problems that had been addressed recently in the beat. At one point, the TPD developed a procedure to assign an identifying number to each problem addressed by officers and capture time spent on the problem through the department’s computer aided dispatch (CAD) system. This would have been a reasonable solution for capturing time information, since the CAD data could be analyzed to determine the total amount of time. Moreover, the process have been a starting point for following up on the outcomes of problems that were addressed. Unfortunately, the procedure was never implemented. After the close of this evaluation, in early 1999, the department was developing new forms to record time and activities on problem solving (Webb et al., 1999; Burns, 1999).

**Technology Support**

Part of Tempe’s efforts to increase communication with the public centered on developing the capability to capture and share (e.g., on the TPD web site, at community forums) up-to-date information on crime at the neighborhood level. The demand on officers to identify, analyze, and address problems required access to more data, and different types of data, than
they traditionally had. Moreover, community policing has been an impetus for the growth of crime analysis and increasing use of geographic information systems (GIS) in many other policing agencies (Dunworth, 2000). In Tempe, call for service and crime information was used regularly to identify hot spots and trends and portray them graphically. Combined with rich information gathered through citizen surveys, focus groups, and officer observations, these data informed the development of valuable beat profiles.

Over the years of this evaluation, the TPD made significant strides in developing its technology for support of community policing. In 1989, the TPD had one crime analyst whose primary responsibilities were preparing summary reports about crime and providing crime-related information to police personnel. The analyst used a computer database called ALERT that contained crime records. No analysis of calls for service was performed at that time.

Later, crime analysts in Tempe were able to capture and portray calls for service and reported crime data at the level of “reporting districts,” with a current total of 407 of these districts for the city. These data became easily accessible through the TPD web site in the form of maps (see, e.g., Exhibits 5 and 6), tables, and reports, including specialized reports on crime in multi-family housing areas and mobile home parks, and on specific crime types (e.g., auto thefts). TPD crime analysts were also placed at both the North and South division stations to handle requests for reports from officers, detectives, and managers. At the end of our study period, Tempe crime analysts were using MapInfo software for GIS analysis of call and crime information, but had not yet included data from other sources (e.g., city planning, utilities, business sources, schools, etc.).

The most significant information technology change in the department was the continual shift of analysis from crime to more databases, such as data from the TPD’s CAD system. In fact, by the end of the evaluation, officers would frequently request analysis based on CAD data, rather than just crimes. The CAD data offer a richer information source for support of community policing. The TPD remained up-to-date technologically by periodically upgrading its CAD system.

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4 This figure includes five new reporting districts in the Northwest corner of Beat 16, which were added in December 1999, after that area was annexed by the city.
Another major crime analysis function in Tempe was to support resource allocation planning. Crime analysts and patrol management in Tempe factored in calls for service, average response time, miles patrolled, and other data to develop draft schedules for officers. In Tempe as in other departments, there was always the potential that limited time between calls for service and other demands on officers’ time (court appearances, paperwork) might reduce the time available for proactive work in the community. Technology was invaluable in keeping Tempe on track, and the department was able to make about 33 percent of patrol officer time available for community activities and problem solving.

Another major change in the TPD was the use of laptops by officers for completing reports in the field. All officers had laptops, which were issued when officers were recruited; and training was provided on the department’s specially developed input program. The program prompts the officer for information needed on each field report, and the responses were automatically stored in the laptop. The reports were then transferred to a central database for crime reporting and analysis.

A number of officers noted how laptops helped free up time; for example:

[Laptops] automatically provide me more time to do all of those things that community policing entails.

In May 1998, the city of Tempe centralized all departments’ IT units (including four TPD civilian IT specialists) into one city IT Division to coordinate various systems and negotiate for better prices.
Exhibit 5: Tempe Police Department Beat Map
Engaging the Community

In order for a police department to implement community policing successfully, it must establish strong bonds with the community it serves. One challenge is to find a way to encourage residents to be proactive in helping police reduce and prevent crime. This may be especially difficult in neighborhoods that are not well organized to begin with; and there is considerable debate about the role of police as neighborhood organizers. Not only must strong bonds be formed with individual residents and community groups, but also with public and private city agencies within and outside of the criminal justice system. Interviews with officers during the evaluation revealed considerable support for the concept of engaging the community; for example:
The community and the police get more accomplished instead of working against each other or just doing their own separate things.

A somewhat unanticipated result of implementing community policing in Tempe had to do with community involvement. The TPD encouraged its officers to be more available to residents and more involved in neighborhood activities. Once lines of communication between police and residents were opened, community members' expectations of the police department rose. To them, officers were now available to listen and respond to all of their problems, many of which were very specific (e.g., a broken street light, or loud neighbors). It was often the case that officers took on more problems than they could handle. This would happen especially during neighborhood meetings where an officer would leave with a somewhat lengthy "to do" list from the community members. When busy police officers achieved little or no results on citizen complaints of this nature, community members began to lose faith in the department's community policing plan and complained to city council members.

The TPD also briefly experimented with having patrol officers give citizens their direct numbers on pagers and cell phones. This also resulted in officers being overwhelmed with citizen requests. These were often not police-related (e.g., "Can I trim my next door neighbor's tree that hangs over into my yard?"), but rather were for information or special services (e.g., "Please check on my cats at my house while I am on vacation."). When officers were off for three days and did not return calls promptly, citizens became dissatisfied and complained.

The TPD, however, remained committed to engaging the citizenry in their community policing efforts. The department actively solicited help from community members through a number of working groups and activities. Citizen involvement in community policing, including participation in an active volunteer program, will be discussed in more detail later in the report.

Lessons Learned

Problem Solving. The problem solving efforts in the TPD over the period of the evaluation were not conducted using a planned and organized approach. Problem solving did occur and with many officers became a routine activity of their policing. The evaluation team documented numerous successful problem solving efforts over the years but discovered these efforts only through ride-alongs and interviews with field personnel. The TPD never decided on
a consistent definition of a “problem” and did not implement formal procedures for documenting their problem solving efforts.

**Community Engagement.** Officers not only needed to interact with citizens, they also needed to encourage community members to get involved in addressing their own neighborhood problems. Once community members realized the importance of their role in preventing crime, then combined police-community efforts became successful in addressing problems.

TPD management probably should have anticipated that officers would become overwhelmed with citizens’ "to do" lists. The department needed to develop a better education and outreach program on community policing and problem solving that provided realistic limitations on what the police alone could do. To do this effectively, however, the department needed political support from the city manager, mayor, and council. Most politicians do not like to define the limitations of taxpayer supported services.
Chapter 7

Workload and Resources

It has become clear after studying community policing over the long term in Tempe and in other agencies that a department must be fully staffed (with both sworn and non-sworn personnel) in order to effectively conduct community policing activities. Over-hiring may be one option for a department, but it is also possible to make better use of various existing resources. For example, the duties of some non-sworn personnel such as community service officers (CSOs) may be expanded so that patrol officers can spend more time on problem solving, as well as activities that require a sworn response. Some departments, including Tempe and San Diego (Kessler and Wartell, 1996) have made extensive use of volunteers. As noted earlier, a number of experiments and field tests in the 1970s and 1980s supported the use of call handling techniques such as CSOs, delayed response, and telephone report units for non-emergencies. However, less than 10 years ago, many departments indicated that they still needed assistance in developing such alternatives (McEwen, 1994); and the potential for filing reports and conducting other business with police over the Internet is just beginning to come of age.

In addition, community policing’s survival may hinge on a department’s ability to make accurate workload projections. Over the past decade alone, the city of Tempe saw significant changes, including growth and diversity in the population, an increase in downtown businesses with over 50 employees, sponsorship of numerous special events (including professional sporting events), and a larger tourist population. Exhibit 7 shows population changes over 10. All of these changes indicated that Tempe had become a larger and more active community than ever before. This had a direct impact on workload and resource allocation in the Tempe Police Department. In order to adequately handle the increased need for law enforcement services—including crime investigations, crowd control, and traffic enforcement, as well as community policing—TPD needed to re-evaluate how to handle their workload and how to better allocate their resources.

Exhibit 8: Authorized and Actual Numbers of Police Officers (1995-1998)
Exhibit 8 shows the distinction between "authorized" and "actual" staffing for police officers (including officers assigned to patrol, investigations, traffic, and other assignments). The TPD, like departments in many other cities, received its authorized staffing annually from the city. However, the authorized staffing was never the actual staffing. Due to turnover (retirements, people quitting) and sick leave (officers injured on duty), the actual number of people working every day was often far below what had been authorized. As Exhibit 8 shows, in July 1997, the TPD was authorized 220 officers but had only 194 in a working status. This was a 12 percent difference. In 1998, the city council, for the first time, granted the TPD authority to overhire—to hire 10-15 officers more than they needed to compensate for attrition.

Exhibit 9 shows the Part I crimes reported to the TPD over a nine-year period (1989-1998). Despite all of these increases, the TPD managed to keep pace (ILJ, 1998). The top portion of Exhibit 10 shows the changes in citizen calls for service into the TPD. The pattern is very interesting and parallels the TPD's effort on geographic deployment. Calls were relatively steady from 1989 through 1993, then jumped 16 percent in 1994 over the previous years, and jumped another 8.4 percent in 1995. After 1995, the calls settled down somewhat in 1996 and 1997, then decreased in 1998.
In its initial management study, ILJ found that officers were spending about 44 percent of their shifts on citizen calls for service. Recommendations were made to increase the number of patrol officers so that the percent of time spent on calls would be reduced to about 33 percent, allowing more time for community policing activities. Over the ensuing years, the TPD did, in fact, obtain increases in authorized strength, with the result that the percent of time on calls was reduced.

The patrol planning strategy by the TPD was to divide officers' time among calls for service (33 percent), community policing (33 percent), and administrative duties (33 percent). As seen in the bottom portion of Exhibit 10, in 1990, officers in Tempe spent a great deal of time on citizen calls for service (40 percent). By 1998, officers had successfully decreased their time on calls for service and increased their time on community policing activities.

Exhibit 10: Calls for Service and Percent of Officer's Time Spent on Calls
As explained below, TPD also made better use of non-sworn employees (CSOs) and volunteers.

**Community Service Officers**

Community Service Officers (CSOs) in Tempe were uniformed civilians trained to handle non-emergency calls for service (e.g., cold burglaries, traffic accidents, thefts, auto thefts, etc.). Using CSOs was expected to result in more time for officers to do community policing and problem solving. At first, the utility of CSOs was not readily apparent to sworn personnel in the department; however, that changed with time. Eventually, CSOs took on a number of responsibilities including:

- Responding to computerized and walk-in reports from citizens concerning non-violent crimes;
- Responding to radio calls for service;
- Conducting call-backs to citizens reporting non-violent crimes and completing the appropriate incident report;
- Providing follow-up field assistance to victims reporting minor crimes;
- Assisting in traffic and crowd control;
- Responding to non-injury accident calls;
- Issuing citations and tickets; and
- Testifying in court.

As of fiscal year 1996-1997, the authorized strength of CSOs in the TPD was 10. At that time, CSOs were handling between 15-19 percent of citizen calls (the total number of calls was approximately 102,765). This was a sharp contrast to the 6.6 percent of calls handled by four CSOs in fiscal year 1991-1992.

Volunteers

The TPD developed an excellent volunteer program headed by a full-time coordinator in the department, who was with the program since its inception in 1988 and was the driving force behind its growth to an average of about 105 volunteers at any one time. Since 1988, the volunteer program performed a wide variety of services for the police department. These included administrative assistance for gang/warrant details, assistance in the preparation of cases for prosecution, librarian for the department, neighborhood watch assistant, newsletter editor, records assistant, tour guides, and others. As an example of its effectiveness, the volunteer coordinator documented over 100,000 hours of volunteer assistance to the department in one year.

A very successful component of the volunteer program at TPD was the Victim's Assistance Program. This was staffed by trained volunteers who helped with crisis intervention training and were available for call-outs by police. While the program began as a service to the police department, it eventually expanded when the program participants developed partnerships with other city agencies, such as the fire department and social service agencies. The Victim Assistance Program then became known as CARE 7. With this increased participation and support, the volunteers became available 24 hours a day for call-out and were able to be dispatched to crime scenes. CARE 7 was nationally recognized as an award winning program.

Lessons Learned

**Time For Community Policing.** Over the duration of the evaluation, the TPD made a concerted effort to field enough officers so that at least 33 percent of their time could be devoted to community policing activities, with the remainder evenly divided between responding to
citizen calls and administrative activities. This approach differed from other police departments that established special units to perform community policing, with the rest of the officers devoted entirely to responding to citizen calls. In Tempe, the aim was to get every officer involved in community policing. Overall, the aim of having enough time for community policing activities was achieved in Tempe. However, there were periods of time in which shortages of officers created problems in having enough time for community policing. As reflected in Exhibit 8, from January 1995 through mid-1998, there was a major difference between authorized and actual strength. The difference was caused partially by an increase in authorized strength and the failure of the TPD to staff the increased authorization.

CSOs and Volunteers. These two programs in the TPD greatly assisted in allowing officers to have more time for community policing. The CSO program handled 15 to 19 percent of citizen calls, thus relieving officers of these responsibilities. The volunteer program supported the TPD, including its field operations, in a variety of ways, thereby also saving time for officers.

Other agencies intending to implement department-wide community policing, and aggressively engage in problem solving with the community, will need to carefully project the need for additional staffing. In addition, they will need to evaluate how to use a full range of call handling alternatives, and to develop resource allocation plans for the next five to ten years.
Chapter 8

Human Resources

The Tempe Police Department realized early on that to successfully implement community policing, they would have to make changes in the way officers were recruited, selected, trained, evaluated, and promoted in the department. Although some have addressed the importance of developing human resource policies that support community policing (Oettmeir and Wycoff, 1997; Walsh, 1995; Carter, 1995; Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1994), significant changes will be needed if community engagement and problem solving are to become a permanent part of the way police do their jobs.

For example, in 1998, ILJ surveyed 337 law enforcement agencies that said they were implementing community policing. Most agencies reported making a considerable investment in community policing training, but only about 36 percent said they had revised job descriptions, the promotional process, and other personnel policies as a result of community policing; and only 13 percent reported that these revisions were extensive. About 30 percent indicated that they had revised the recruit selection process because of community policing (ILJ, 1999).

Finally, although a full discussion of training issues is beyond the scope of this report, early experiences with training in problem solving have resulted in several important lessons. First, there is a need to move away from the theoretical to the practical (what, exactly, are officers and line supervisors in this department expected to do?) (Walsh, 1995; Silverman, 1995; Cordner, 1997). Interactive, adult learning methods featuring credible instructors and real, local examples are also especially valuable. In addition, many training directors emphasize the need to train managers and top command first (McEwen and Pandey, 1997).

Recruitment and Selection Process

The TPD began by revising its selection criteria to attract employees with specific abilities and personal characteristics related to community policing. TPD was looking for a new kind of recruit who was creative, had critical thinking skills, could solve problems, and had a mix of education and real world experience. These qualifying factors were first used to fashion a
new job description for entry-level officers. Eventually, all job descriptions were changed to support a department-wide community policing effort. After several years of experience with community policing department-wide, a common theme heard among patrol officers was that, "Community policing requires strong people-oriented skills."

Altogether, the TPD revised its selection process twice—once in 1990, which included revisions to entry-level officer job descriptions, and again in 1996. In 1996, the TPD decided to raise the educational requirement for recruits to 60 hours of college credit or an Associates degree. Prior to this time, a recruit was required to have only a high school diploma.

With all of these efforts, TPD still experienced some difficulty in attracting and retaining officers. A strong economic climate afforded both applicants and officers with many options; moreover, the TPD had a reputation for excellence, which helped make some of its best officers attractive to employers offering higher paying positions. To help counteract this, the TPD became more aggressive in its recruitment efforts.

For example, the department moved to a flexible testing system. TPD had been losing qualified applicants who were unable or unwilling to wait for the entrance exam, which was scheduled at specific times of the year. Tempe changed the testing process so that particularly qualified individuals would have an opportunity to take the exam immediately rather than waiting for the pre-determined test date. This appeared to be especially beneficial to minority recruits, as they were most often the ones to take advantage of this opportunity.

The TPD also became more selective and competitive by changing how they chose new recruits who had passed the entrance exam. Prior to 1996, TPD would exhaust a list of candidates who had successfully passed the entrance exam before scheduling another test. This meant that Tempe was accepting individuals with passing but wide-ranging scores on the exam. Scheduling the exam regularly afforded TPD the opportunity to choose only the highest scoring candidates.

Training

Because Arizona offers a state-wide training program for officers (Arizona POST), departments that want community policing training tailored to their own departmental values and community problems need to use or develop additional resources. While community policing
eventually became a part of the state’s basic training program for new officers, it remained only a small part of officers' overall training. As a result, TPD implemented its own "post academy." This academy introduced a Tempe culture by trying to re-orient officers to TPD both philosophically and procedurally. The academy also worked to further train new officers in community policing and problem solving. Community policing training was also reinforced in the field through the department's Field Training Officer (FTO) program. FTOs were trained to improve mentoring of new officers in problem solving and community policing.

As noted earlier, experience with community policing across the country has shown that training for officers and line supervisors needs to emphasize the “nuts and bolts” of community policing; that is, expectations for implementing and documenting community policing and problem solving should be specific to the officer’s own department and community. This comment is typical of those offered by many Tempe officers on the subject of training:

... on a departmental basis, we need to have more training in how they want us to fulfill community policing.

TPD reinforced its initial community policing training by providing related in-service training for all department members. TPD also sent employees to outside training and conferences, such as the national Problem Oriented Policing (POP) workshop in San Diego. More recently, the Arizona Community Policing Institute (a Regional Community Policing Institute) became another training resource for the TPD.

Evaluations and Promotions

TPD expected that all employees would not only be trained in community policing and problem solving, but that they would also be held accountable for their participation (or lack of participation) in these activities. TPD integrated community policing measures into its performance evaluation criteria in the mid-1990s, and also introduced community policing activities into its career counseling program. In other words, officers had a greater chance of advancing in the department if they participated in community policing and problem solving activities. One officer’s comment on this change follows:

Now, with community based policing, it's not numbers, it's team and squad efforts. It's quality more than quantity.
TPD also changed its promotional process to encourage community engagement and problem solving. The process was multi-dimensional and required a formal test, an examination of prior performance, recommendations from supervisors, and a meeting of the command staff. TPD began to implement changes in 1991 with the inclusion of questions specific to community policing and problem solving on the written exam and during the oral review board process. For example, officers were asked to discuss their approaches to possible community policing scenarios or community problems. Consideration was also given to an officer's level of commitment to and participation in community policing and problem solving activities as recorded in their files and reported by their supervisors.

The community also became involved in the department's promotional process by having community members sit on the promotional review board. This held officers accountable not only to the department, but also to people in the neighborhoods they patrolled.

The department further encouraged employees' participation through a monetary incentive program. At first, TPD implemented a pay-for-performance program; however, it was seen as unfair and divisive among the officers. This was replaced by an Advance/Master Officer Program. The purpose of this program was to encourage growth (including formal education) and to reward patrol officers' involvement in both the department and the community.

Each level (Master and Advanced) had minimum requirements and a point system on which officers were graded. The point system was based on formal education, experience in the department (on different assignments), involvement in the department and in the community, and achievements in evaluations (annual evaluations and the annual firearms evaluation). Both levels of the program required an application process and renewal after one year. Each level also received some type of monetary compensation. Unfortunately, while this program was created to reward patrol officers, many of the candidates granted certification were detectives and other specialists. This reinforced for patrol officers that the way to get ahead in the organization was to get out of patrol.

**Personnel Turnover**

One of the interesting features of observing the TPD over a long period is the change in personnel that occurred. The TPD had a steady authorization of about 16 command personnel...
positions (lieutenants and above) during the period of evaluation. As might be expected, however, the personnel in these positions in the initial management study in 1989 were not there when the evaluation was completed in 1997. Every one had changed as a result of retirements, resignations, promotions, or other reasons. In this respect, the TPD was probably no different than other police departments of its size, since turnover in positions is a natural occurrence. The fact is that within the TPD, the average time in a managerial position was about two years during the course of the evaluation.

Our evaluation of TPD’s transition to community policing shows that the changes in managers over the years continually affected the specific, but not the general, direction that community policing took. This result was most prevalent in the four area commanders for field operations, which were always headed by lieutenants. Each new lieutenant brought his or her background, skills, and education to community policing in the commanded area. For example, the lieutenant assigned to one of the areas had an outgoing personality and enjoyed interaction with the community. About 18 months later, that commander was replaced by a lieutenant who possessed good managerial skills with officers, but disliked community policing. The result was a shift in how community policing activities were delivered in the area—fewer community meetings but more team efforts against crime. In another instance, the newly assigned lieutenant came with a strong background in CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design), having, in fact, headed a statewide association of police personnel in this approach. Community policing in his mind always equated to CPTED, and problem solving meant finding a CPTED solution to the problem.

The general direction of community policing, however, remained relatively steady even with the changes in managerial personnel. Top management stayed the course in regard to the overall mission of community policing and the basic tenets that governed the department’s approach. What changed over time were the tactics by which community policing got translated into action.

Turnover also occurred at the patrol officer level. Over the six-year period from Fiscal Year 1992 through Fiscal Year 1997, the TPD lost a total of 89 officers through retirements, resignations, or other reasons. During this same period, the actual number of officers averaged about 200 per year. The picture was not quite as bleak as it may appear because the TPD
constantly hired new officers each year to compensate for the losses. However, the average time in grade for officers was about six years in the TPD. This picture became slightly more complicated because of the increases in authorized strength over the years. In 1989, the authorized strength of the TPD was 229 sworn personnel (officers through chief positions) and 96 civilian personnel; by 1998, these numbers had changed to 275 sworn and 120 civilian personnel, respectively.

Lessons Learned

**Selection.** To attract qualified, knowledgeable recruits, a department should begin by reviewing and revising its job descriptions and interview questions in the selection process. The criteria should support the department’s plans for or commitment to community policing (e.g., aptitude for problem solving). In this way, departments can be more confident that the individuals hired are at least aware of the department’s goals and general expectations regarding community policing.

**Training.** Just as the tenets of community policing need to be reinforced throughout every aspect of an organization, they also need to be the founding principles of a recruit’s training. Too often, community policing is treated as a module within a larger training program. If it is treated as such, then officers will be less likely to understand and accept community policing as a way of life in the department. Rather, they will most likely treat it as a module within their job.

**Performance Evaluations and Promotions.** If a department is serious about mobilizing the entire department toward a goal of community policing, evaluations and promotions should reward officers’ contributions toward this goal. That is, positive evaluations and promotional opportunities should mirror the principles of community policing.

Moreover, community policing directly involves the citizens of the community; as customers of police services, they should have input into who is providing the service. TPD’s involvement of community members was quite successful, and in fact kept expanding. The residents of Tempe became more and more embedded in the decision making, operation, and support of the police department.
**Effects of Turnover.** Personnel changes within a police department are inevitable. Retirements, resignations, and transfers are always occurring in the best of organizations. The challenge is to put community policing on a firm footing to alleviate the impact of turnover. That starts with an agreed upon mission statement for community policing and the installation of basic tenets of policing in line with the mission statement. The aim should always be for personnel to adhere to these tenets. At the same time, community policing allows more flexibility in how commanders and officers go about the job of policing the community and performing problem solving activities. Variations in delivery have to be expected as personnel move into vacated positions, and both the top management of a department and the community have to tolerate these changes.
Chapter 9

Citizen Involvement

Community policing efforts cannot be fully realized until community members know that they, too, are responsible for crime prevention in their neighborhoods. However, departments are responsible for advertising and selling their community policing approach to residents.

Beyond the changes police make within their organization (policies, procedures, personnel), they must also become adept at interacting with the community. Depending upon how community policing is defined, a police department may include a wide array of community activities under its umbrella. Methods for involving residents may include operating police sub stations/mini stations, supporting neighborhood watch programs, police participation in neighborhood or homeowner association meetings and in various special events, operating citizens police academies, and developing volunteer programs. In some communities, citizens have become more directly involved in providing services (e.g., by assisting crime victims, as in Tempe’s CARE 7 program); and in training (e.g., by developing and acting in scenarios with police to enhance training on domestic violence, cultural diversity, ethics, and other topics).

Efforts such as these have proved valuable in terms of disseminating information; achieving a more open, accessible organization; and in some cases, reducing police workload and improving the quality of training or service. They may or may not be products of a department’s community policing plan (McEwen and Pandey, 1997; Gaines and Swanson, 1997; Silverman, 1995).

Direct involvement of citizens in setting organizational priorities or making decisions with respect to human resources is much more rare. Recent studies of organizational transformation to community policing, however, do provide examples, such as the Portland Police Bureau’s extensive strategic planning process (Connors, et al., 2000), the active participation of residents in beat meetings and data collection efforts in Chicago (Skogan, 1999); or the all-citizen complaint review board in Minneapolis.
An important first step in understanding public expectations of the police is to analyze calls for service. In Tempe, for example, only about 15 percent of calls related to crimes or in-progress situations requiring an immediate in-person response. False burglar alarms and reports relating to junk cars, noise, and other quality of life issues made up a significant portion of calls, as they do in most departments. Given that calls for service do not represent the universe of problems or crime, it is also important to ask citizens directly—for example, through citizen surveys—about the issues they feel are important for police, as well as their knowledge of and satisfaction with police services.

Citizen Surveys

ILJ collaborated with TPD in conducting annual telephone surveys of citizens from 1993 through 1996. The objective of the surveys was to determine residents' satisfaction with police, their concerns about their neighborhoods, and their awareness of community policing. The surveys were conducted in October and November of each year with randomly selected samples of approximately 1,000 citizens (over 17 years old) in each survey. Numbers for the survey were obtained from the telephone company. This approach had the advantage of assuring that selected numbers were within the boundaries of the city limits. In actuality, the TPD purchased 2,000 randomly selected telephone numbers from the telephone company and used these numbers until approximately 1,000 surveys were completed.

The TPD also developed an input program to enter the results of each survey. Each person making calls was provided a laptop computer with the input program and entered the results of the surveys directly into a database system. As a result, the data were immediately available for analysis at the completion of the survey. Most people conducting the survey were Arizona State University graduate students under the direction of the TPD crime analysts. Each annual survey took about two weeks to complete using a pool of about 12 callers. Calls were typically made between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m., including weekends.

One drawback to the above approach was that unlisted telephone numbers were not included in the sample. The telephone company reported that only about 5 percent of Tempe's residents had unlisted numbers. The problem could have been overcome by conducting random digit dialing surveys, but this approach was deemed to be too costly. Moreover, telephone area...
codes overlapped Tempe boundaries, which would have made it more difficult to ensure that respondents lived within the city limits.

Unfortunately, the TPD decided not to conduct telephone surveys in 1997 and 1998 because of staffing shortages with the crime analysts. The following discussion therefore provides results for the four years during which surveys were conducted.

**Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

Exhibit 11 shows the demographic characteristics of respondents for all four years. Overall four surveys, 51 percent of respondents were female and 49 percent were male. About 85 percent were white. The average age of respondents was 38.9 years and average time living in Tempe was 10.1 years. Interestingly, the percentiles (25th, 50th, and 75th) means for age were 26 years, 35 years, and 49 years, respectively; and the percentiles for years living in Tempe were 2 years, 6 years, and 15 years. The fact that 25 percent of respondents had been in Tempe for 2 years or less is significant in explaining some of the results later in the survey.

**Exhibit 11: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number Surveyed</td>
<td>1,001</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>1,002</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Years in Tempe</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Overall median age was 35 and median number of years living in Tempe was 6. The 25th percentiles were 26 years old and 2 years in Tempe.
Perceptions of Crime and Quality of Life

Citizens were asked whether crime and quality of life had changed during the year in their neighborhoods. Exhibit 12 shows that citizens felt crime increased in 1994, but improved in the next two years. Of particular interest was the increase to 13.1 percent saying that crime had decreased in 1996 and 73.0 percent saying crime had stayed at about the same level. These figures were significantly better than the three prior years. The same trend was reflected in the question about quality of life in the neighborhood. In 1996, 13.4 percent of respondents said that the quality of life had improved, which was about the same as prior years; but the percent saying it had stayed the same increased to almost 80 percent.

Exhibit 12: Perceptions of Crime and Quality of Life in Neighborhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the Same</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the Same</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsened</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen in Exhibit 13, about 7.4 percent of respondents overall believed their chances were high or very high of becoming a victim of a violent crime in the city. However, as with other results, the percentage was lower in 1996 compared to the prior surveys. Stated conversely, about 67 percent of 1996 respondents rated their chances as low or very low, compared to less than 60 percent in prior years. Even these figures were, of course, disproportional to reality, as the actual chances of becoming a victim of a violent crime are much less.

Perceptions of citizens about burglaries were more pessimistic, as reflected in the bottom portion of Exhibit 13. Overall, about 11.5 percent of respondents believed their chances of being a victim of burglary were high or very high. However, the 1996 percent is 9.1 compared to 13.4, 10.0, and 13.4 for the prior three years, respectively.
Exhibit 13: Perceptions of Becoming a Crime Victim

What are your chances of becoming a victim of a violent crime in Tempe?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50/50</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What are the chances of someone breaking into your home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50/50</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Low</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all surveys, respondents were asked to give their two most important concerns regarding their neighborhoods. The three greatest concerns (see Exhibit 14) were consistently personal safety, traffic, and theft/burglary. Over the years, differences of order occurred with, for example, traffic concerns rated highest in 1995 but in second place in other years. Interestingly, gangs were mentioned less in 1996 than in prior years.

While respondents had concerns about personal safety and crime, they were not participating in community activities that might prevent crimes. Across the four years, between 84 and 87 percent of respondents said they were not members of a crime watch organization.
Exhibit 14: Primary Concerns in the Neighborhood

What are the two most important concerns you have regarding your neighborhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal safety</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft/Burglary</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleanliness</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community programs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs/alcohol</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighting</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidewalks</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,169</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1,173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awareness of Community Policing

For purposes of the evaluation, one of the key areas of the survey asked about respondents’ awareness of community policing. As reflected in Exhibit 15, the percent of positive responses was highest in 1993 at 30.3 percent, probably because the department’s efforts received considerable media attention at that time. For the last three years, the percentage dropped to the low twenties.

The bottom portion of the exhibit shows how respondents acquired their information about community policing.

Exhibit 15: Awareness of Community Policing

Do you know what community policing is?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>75.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How did you learn about community policing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>1993 (n=282)</th>
<th>1994 (n=196)</th>
<th>1995 (n=239)</th>
<th>1996 (n=215)</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From officer</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beat forum</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At School</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A follow-up question to those who knew about community policing asked where they acquired their knowledge. The bottom portion of Exhibit 15 gives the results and shows that newspapers were the most frequent source (35 percent overall) followed by “other sources,” primarily word of mouth or uncertain where they heard about community policing.

The fact that only about 25 percent of respondents knew about community policing was a discouraging finding, given that the department had been making its transition for several years. It did not, however, seek out publicity on its efforts, and many of the changes were internal organizational efforts rather than outreach efforts to citizens. The consequence was that many citizens may not have realized that policing was being done in a different manner.

Another influence may have been the relatively short period of time that respondents had lived in Tempe. As previously stated, about 25 percent of respondents had been in the city for less than two years. To explore these differences more explicitly, Exhibit 16 shows community policing awareness against several demographic variables. The exhibit gives the following results:

- Males were more likely than females to know about community policing.
- Whites were more likely than non-whites to know about community policing.
- Knowledge of community policing varied by age groups, with respondents ages 35 to 54 more likely than younger or older respondents to be aware.
- Respondents who were buying their homes were more likely than renters to know about community policing.

All results are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Two variables found not to be significant were whether respondents were attending college (23.1 percent of those attending
college and 25.2 percent of those not attending knew about community policing) and whether the respondents had a family (i.e., had children), with 26.0 percent of those with children and 24.0 percent of those without children knowing about community policing).

### Exhibit 16: Community Policing Awareness and Demographic Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Percent Aware of Community Policing</th>
<th>Percent Not Aware of Community Policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>79.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age Group</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>80.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 or over</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Home Ownership</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Organizing and Communicating

Prior to 1989 and Chief Brown's administration in the department, TPD did not have any community involvement in police activities. In fact, any and all community involvement had been discouraged by the previous chief. Additionally, community groups were few and far between. For example, when the Beat 16 project began, there were only a few neighborhood associations and one business association in the Beat 16 area.

The Tempe city council passed an ordinance in the late 1980s creating the Office of Neighborhood Services (ONS). This organization, headed by a neighborhood coordinator, served as a parent organization to smaller, neighborhood committees and organizations committed to bettering their communities. The ONS aided the smaller community groups, in
part by offering to cover the expense of copying and mailing their newsletters; and it gave
impetus to the formation of many more organizations in the city of Tempe. Not only did this get
community members more involved in their neighborhoods, it also created a strong foundation
for the police department to work from when beginning to implement community policing. This
was a pool of active, interested residents that the department could tap for resources and
mobilization on projects.

One of the newly created neighborhood organizations was the Escalante Neighborhood
Association (ENA) located in Beat 16. The ENA served as an anchor association in the Beat 16
area and helped to form a Community Coordinating Committee (CCC), which worked with the
TPD on the Innovative Neighborhood Oriented Policing (INOP) project. The committee
included Beat 16 residents as well as individuals representing different city agencies (e.g.,
building safety, zoning, community redevelopment, etc.).

The TPD met with community members and city agency representatives prior to the
actual start of the CCC to discuss a number of issues, including:

- objectives of the INOP project;
- the target neighborhood (Beat 16);
- decision making on neighborhood needs;
- working with other neighbors and city agencies;
- controlling disorder; and
- city agencies' resources

The CCC met monthly for about a year to discuss neighborhood needs, and in the process
created a vision statement (see Exhibit 17) for their neighborhood (Beat 16). After a year, the
committee disbanded, and the responsibility for working with the TPD on the INOP project
rested with the ENA.
Exhibit 17: Vision Statement for Beat 16 from the Community Coordinating Committee

The Beat 16 Coordinating Committee envisions their community to be:

- Clean, well kept, and safe
- Drug free, gang free, and crime free
- A desirable area for people to live and work
- A place with close relationships amongst neighbors, community members, schools, churches, businesses, city services, and other resources and communities within the city of Tempe

This is to be accomplished by all members of the community working together towards this vision, while at the same time being responsive to the basic human needs of their neighbors, and respecting and preserving the cultural diversity of this community.

Homeowners' associations in Tempe worked closely with neighborhood associations, and were also a resource for TPD's community policing implementation. The police department experimented with regularly scheduled beat forums as well as yearly meetings with homeowners' and neighborhood associations. Beat forums were open to all community members and were held every six months for a period of two years. They were eventually discontinued because they were not well attended. Other ways of engaging residents were needed. As one officer observed:

Part of community policing means we have to go out of our way a lot to keep people participating.

However, annual meetings of city homeowners' and neighborhood associations continued and often had several hundred people in attendance. Officers and community members were able to interact at these meetings and discuss community problems.

At first, officers left these meetings with a somewhat lengthy "to do" list from the residents. To alleviate some of the pressure on the officers, TPD implemented a system where meeting attendees were asked to write down community problems on a 3x5 index card. The
community members were also asked to include suggestions as to how they themselves could help in tackling some of those issues. These meetings remained popular and important to the community. In fact, officers sometimes received complaints for not attending them.

A perplexing problem for TPD (and many other police agencies) centered on the fact that a major university, Arizona State University (ASU), is located in the city near the downtown area. ASU had a local enrollment of over 20,000. From a policing viewpoint, the Tempe students were an ever-changing group, with an influx of freshmen each year and an average stay in the city of three to four years. The organizational question was how to address this group in regard to community policing. Two factors influenced TPD’s approach to ASU students. One is that the university had its own police force that patrolled the campus, but generally called on the TPD for investigation of any major offenses that occurred on campus. Over the years of the evaluation, some contact between the TPD and campus police occurred, although joint community policing operations were rare. The more difficult problem for TPD to address was that most students lived off campus in apartment complexes throughout the city and were therefore a part of the citizenry affected by community policing. This circumstance created pressure on the TPD to have a continual education program about community policing that reached these students. In reality, such a program existed only loosely within the TPD, as the student population was not a major focus for the department.

Neighborhood or Block Watch organizations also cropped up in Tempe and have continued to grow. These organizations worked well with the community policing efforts of TPD because they fit into the neighborhood and homeowners associations' goals to identify and resolve issues that affect safety. Although the need for and popularity of these groups varied depending upon the current issues in a community (greater support in the wake of an incident, and lack of involvement in times of relative stability), the police department ensured regular participation by requiring the groups to meet at least annually in order to keep their signage in the neighborhood.

Finally, another way in which the TPD brought community support into the department was through their Citizen Review Board. This Board was convened for internal investigations involving the use of excessive force or serious injury, and to review cases where citizens felt the
police investigation was inadequate. As mentioned earlier, community members were also present for interview panels for new recruits and review panels for promotional opportunities.

Mobilizing

The police department not only worked with community members and organizations to educate them about community policing, it also worked to mobilize residents into action to begin to do community policing. Vehicles for this included the Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design and Crime Free Multi-Housing programs, crime prevention “night out” programs, a citizens academy, and efforts to develop better relationships with the media.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design

An important program that supports community policing and problem solving efforts in many jurisdictions is Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED). CPTED is one way to discourage criminal activity by improving or modifying the environmental design of an area. For example, CPTED may involve trimming hedges, adding more lighting, controlling access to a property, or properly maintaining the appearance of a property. TPD trained some officers on CPTED, and with their support, ordinances were put in place to provide guidelines for building and remodeling in the city. These ordinances were finalized through a citizen's focus group and became institutionalized in the city and readily recognized by residents.

Crime Free Multi-Housing

In conjunction with the CPTED philosophy, the TPD mobilized resources to create a Crime Free Multi-Housing (CRMH) program to educate tenants, landlords, and property managers on how to work with the police department to address crime in their communities. Tempe discovered that calls for service from multi-housing properties were proportionately higher than those for single family housing units. In early 1994, a community service officer (CSO) was assigned to develop and head a CFMH training program. The CSO started by establishing a planning group consisting of key personnel from field operations, the city’s legal office, fire department, and other affected agencies. Because other cities across the country already had similar programs, they did not have to start from scratch, but instead gathered
information from these cities on training curricula and legal approaches. However, even with this information, it took several months to formulate the program.

Some officers interviewed during ride-alongs easily saw the connection between the CFMH program and TPD’s community policing objectives. As one noted:

Crime-free multi-housing is the best example of long-term problem solving] I can think of.

The program was designed to be implemented in three phases (see Exhibit 18). The first phase involved a two-day workshop, which was open to property managers, property owners, maintenance staff, and others concerned with keeping illegal activity out of rental properties. The two-day workshop touched on a number of topics including:

- working with the police;
- community policing;
- liability;
- identifying gang activity;
- identifying narcotics activity;
- evictions for lease violations;
- screening tenants and employees; and
- revising rental agreements and creating a lease addendum.

The second phase of the program was a security evaluation by TPD’s Crime Prevention Division. The evaluation results were compiled on a security survey that the CFMH coordinator used to assess the property. The manager of a complex received the results of the survey and a checklist detailing the changes that should be made to conform with TPD’s CPTED requirements. After the complex remedied all of the items on the checklist, the property manager received a certificate of completion.

The final phase of the program was called "building the community environment." The goal was to get as many residents as possible to attend a function sponsored by the complex’s management. The residents were oriented to the purpose and results of the CFMH program and educated on the role they could play in maintaining a crime free environment. After phase three had been completed, each complex received their CFMH signs, which were posted throughout
the complex. Each complex also received an annual audit by the police department, and if they passed, they were entitled to receive yearly permits for the CFMH signs.

Exhibit 18: Crime Free Multi-Housing Program

| Phase I   | Two-day workshop  
|           | Crime Free Multi-Housing book  
|           | Certificate of completion  
| Phase II  | Security evaluation  
|           | Checklist of items for CPTED improvements  
|           | Certificate of completion  
| Phase III | Educate residents about CFMH and their role in maintaining a crime-free environment  
|           | Receive CFMH signs  
| Annual Audit | Must pass the annual audit in order to keep CFMH signs  

Success of the Program

This program was quite successful in Tempe. As of July 1997, 126 properties had been represented at the CFMH training. The attendees from these properties represented 15,989 different units throughout the city, which, at the time, was three-fourths of the city's total multi-housing units. The majority of the 126 properties were working on CPTED improvements. Four properties had completed all the stages and received CFMH signage. Those properties varied in location, size, and demographics of residents.

ILJ followed the progress of four multi-housing communities for the first year of the program. The four study sites were selected from those that had representatives attending the first training on March 29-30, 1995. Only one of the four study sites had completed all the stages and received the signs.
Tempe Apartments

Tempe Apartments was a Housing and Urban Development property with 90 units. They were rented as either Section 8 or basic market apartments. The property was 22 years old at the time of this evaluation, was located in the highest crime beat of Tempe, and had a high percentage of residents who were children. According to the manager of this property, the training opened her eyes to ways to deter and prevent crime. Tempe Apartments, after attending the CFMH training, immediately purchased wide angle peepholes, striker plates for the door jambs, and longer screws for the lock holds. These were all essential to making the CPTED changes necessary for passing the third phase of the program. The four-person staff also removed “river rocks” from the complex. These are small rocks that are commonly used to break windows for access to the units. The manager at Tempe Apartments also believed in living on site. She felt that “you lose control if you live off of the property.”

This community was the first to go through all parts of the CFMH program, which culminated with a Phase III Halloween party. Tempe Apartments was given two large signs to display around the community. At the time, they were only one of four communities in the city to make it all the way through, and they were the only study site that had done so.

Sierra Vista

This community of 238 units was formerly known as Las Casitas. However, the association it had with the police department in the past resulted in the nickname “Lost Cause.” When the building came under new ownership, the owners sent the property manager and a sales manager to the first CFMH training and changed the name of the property to Sierra Vista. The owners were willing to spend a lot of money on renovations, which included completely redoing the interiors, the parking lots, the front office, and the laundry rooms. After discovering that nearby apartment properties also had high crime rates, the owners of Sierra Vista bought those properties. As a result of the massive interior changes and renovations to the property, rent increased substantially in the early part of 1995. Interestingly, resident surveys indicated a very low level of dissatisfaction with the increases. The results showed a much lower level of fear of crime than in previous surveys. Occupancy at Sierra Vista also increased to 80 percent by November 1995, up from 64 percent during the summer of 1995. The results of this survey were
conveyed to ILJ by the manager. Results of these surveys were not provided to ILJ by the owners of the property.

At the time of the study, the community had not completed all of the requirements for certification. This was due in large part to other CPTED details that needed to be addressed. For example, new doors needed to be added, and they were being put in as tenants left. The community had three managers during the time of this study. The last manager believed that the owners were seeing a drop in calls for service and an increase in tenant satisfaction without making all the changes required by the CFMH program. Furthermore, with the continuous changing of staff, the property was forced to send people over and over to the training sessions just to stay current in Phase I.

The Greenery

This was a 240 unit complex in a moderately high call for service area. At the time of the study, the property was up for sale. Although it had been on the market for over a year, there were no buyers. The manager at the time believed that the owner would not spend money to bring the complex in line with the CFMH program because of this. For example, the manager had told the owner that the access to the property from various roadways needed to be limited. According to the assessment by the CFMH coordinator, there were too many ways for a criminal to get quickly in and out. However, this would not only cost money but might look suspicious or unattractive to a potential buyer of the property. The manager had done a great deal of work in spite of the lack of budgetary assistance. Among other things, she had instituted background checks on both prospective tenants and employees and trimmed hedges and shrubbery to CPTED-recommended heights. There was also a period of time during the last part of 1994 when a Tempe police officer lived on the property. In a deal between the department and the community, the officer lived there with a reduced rent and patrolled the property in shifts as a courtesy patrol officer. The officer wore a uniform and carried a sidearm and radio. Calls for service dropped during this period. Interviews with residents showed a widespread feeling of improved safety. Most residents who were interviewed liked the idea of the courtesy patrol officer. One resident also stated that he noticed changes for the better "ever since they got the crime-free certificate [the certificate given by Tempe Police Department to all attendees of the CFMH workshop]."
Riviera Village

This community had 164 units and was sandwiched between two of Tempe’s main roads. Between the first and second visit by ILJ staff, much had improved. The property manager had raised a block wall that backed to an alley, removed river rock and replaced it with a fountain, and took out shrubs and bushes that were too high or bushy to be considered safe. The to-do list for this property remained long, with such items as remove a “swamp” that had grown in the middle of the property, install a basketball court, redo the lighting, and address other landscaping details. On subsequent visits, the property looked the same. On ILJ’s third visit, the property had a new manager who seemed committed to making the changes and stated that items like lighting were too expensive and were being added to the budget year by year.

During one visit by ILJ staff, Tempe police officers offered an evening training program on gangs and drug crime. The event was poorly attended, with only seven residents staying for the entire event. It was noted, however, that the area was not a particularly high gang-crime area.

Overall Evaluation

An analysis of calls for service (CFS) data for the four sites showed interesting results. The data were for the 15 months prior to the CFMH training session and the 15 months after the training. The Sierra Vista Apartments showed the greatest decrease in CFS, going from 591 to 286 calls. A monthly average for Sierra Vista showed a decrease from 39 calls per month to 19 calls per month. The Greenery Apartments also had a decrease, although a much smaller one. Calls per month went from 25 prior to the training to 22 after the training. Riviera Village had a slight increase in CFS, going from 232 to 275. This was a 16 calls-per-month average prior to training and an 18 calls-per-month average post-training. Ironically, the site where calls for service increased the most per month was Tempe Apartments, the only property to complete the program. They went from about 22 calls per month to almost 29 calls per month. Looking at CFS by year of training (1995) and year after training (1996), all four properties experienced a decrease.

It appears that perhaps the greatest effect the CFMH program had was in inspiring managers to do things that would help keep the property safe. The direct effect that the program had is immeasurable for several reasons.
1. Once the managers attended the training session, Phase 2 (CPTED improvements) was largely out of their control. The managers could make suggestions based on their training, but the owners still had to find the money for expensive changes and approve things such as lighting and access controls in the budget.

2. There were often other forces at work either simultaneously or as a result of the training that might have affected calls for service. The two properties where calls for service were reduced drastically were both experiencing other improvements. The Greenery had the courtesy resource officer and the Sierra Vista Apartments was making dramatic cosmetic and structural improvements to the property (also thought by management to have priced out potential criminal tenants).

3. Implementation of the CFMH program was predicated on a dedicated management team. Both Tempe Apartments and the Greenery had long-time managers that invested a lot of time with their properties. Riviera Village and Sierra Vista had a total of five managers in the two years of ILJ visits. Continuous turnover seemed to lead the property back to square one with each manager. Although new managers seemed eager to attend the training and make changes, they could not pick up where their predecessors left off and often were not aware of where the prior manager was in terms of making improvements.

Night Out Programs

TPD was also successful in mobilizing other members of the community to support proactive crime prevention. TPD was a strong supporter of and participant in National Night Out, a nationwide program designed to

- Heighten crime awareness in the community;
- Garner support and participation in local anti-crime efforts;
- Strengthen neighborhood support from the city and the police;
- Improve police-community relations; and
- Send a message to criminals that neighborhoods are organized and fighting back.

Eventually, Arizona police departments (including Tempe) created their own Night Out program—Getting Arizona Involved in Neighborhoods (GAIN). The purpose of this event was
similar to the National Night Out program; however, it was held in October rather than August because of the cooler temperatures and likelihood for a larger turnout. Tempe's program was quite successful and was nationally recognized for the level of participation at their annual event.

Citizens Academy

TPD also opened its doors to community members in the form of citizens' police academies. The department began by implementing a 30-hour training program for Tempe residents. The academy began in 1990 and was designed to increase awareness and understanding of the role of law enforcement in Tempe.

Some of the topics covered in the academy included an overview of police functions (from patrol to undercover work and SWAT), CPTED, and SARA. Among other things, participants were also able to tour police facilities, ride along with Tempe officers, role play scenarios, and collect fingerprints.

TPD also experimented with a youth academy for young adults ages 15 to 21. This was a 10-week course that met for one and one-half hours each week. Some of the topics covered included requirements to become a police officer, the law, defensive driving, crime investigation, and an overview of police functions. Youth academy students were also able to participate in ride-alongs, fingerprint collection, and role playing scenarios. Each student participated in a mentoring program and was put in contact with a role model in the police department.

The adult citizen academy, which received more participation and enjoyed some success, continued in the TPD. The program evolved over time and developed a greater focus on problem solving and community policing activities. Two to three classes were offered each year, each having about 50 participants. Some of the graduates enlisted in the department’s volunteer program and continued to support the TPD in that manner. Unfortunately, interest in the youth academy waned and it was eventually discontinued.

Media and Public Relations

Prior to 1988 and the initial move toward implementing community policing, the TPD lacked any kind of relationship with the local media. In fact, under Chief Dave Brown’s predecessor, the department discouraged interacting with the media. This was detrimental to the
department in several ways. The department was not readily available to the citizenry via the media; it was viewed as hostile and non-cooperative; and it was unable to promote positive stories about police activities.

It was not until Dave Brown took over as chief that media relations started to improve. A media field day was organized where representatives from all types of media were invited to learn about the police department. Also, resources were set aside for media and public relations, including the time of one officer who was devoted strictly to media duties. Finally, a call-in television show was created, which was taped once a month and aired daily on a local public station. As a recent media relations officer noted,

The media, I think, has helped us. When we contact the media and tell them a positive story, they broadcast [it].

In the subsequent five years or so, the department became more aggressive in working with the media. In fact, TPD was voted the most media-friendly department in the valley by the area print media. In addition, the TPD started a weekly half-hour program on a local cable station to inform the public about the department, discuss serious crime occurrences, and convey other information. Chief Ron Burns appeared frequently on this show.

Lessons Learned

Beat Forums and Other Community Groups. Based on the Beat 16 experience, the TPD felt that at the neighborhood level, meetings with neighborhood associations should happen on a monthly basis. If inclusion of other city agency resources seemed necessary to solve a problem, then that agency should be brought in on a case by case basis. A larger committee like the CCC might have some usefulness beyond the planning and organizing phase, but should only be convened on a quarterly basis.

The smaller beat forums held after community policing was implemented department-wide were not successful. There appear to be several reasons for this. In some neighborhoods, crime was not a concern for residents, either because there was a low crime rate, or because they were unaware of a serious crime problem. This poses a problem, in that it is difficult to garner support from community members on problems that they do not believe exist. A contrasting problem for police is gathering support from residents of neighborhoods with serious crime.
problems, especially if a neighborhood is not well organized, officers have negative attitudes about the neighborhood, or residents believe that officers are unable to control the crime problem.

By actively engaging community groups, police departments are able to at least garner support from organized groups. This is a good way to educate community members about crime in their neighborhoods and also begin building relationships with individual residents.

Crime Free Multi-Housing Program. This program was successful in the TPD but illustrated two organizational issues of possible interest for other police departments. The first was that a CSO spearheaded the planning efforts for the program. Virtually everyone else in the planning group had higher rank (and certainly more pay) than this individual. Her personal interest in the program and ability to work with the group were key factors in the planning effort.

The second point is more problematic and illustrates a dilemma in community policing between centralized and decentralized operations. On the one hand, the CSO headed the program and her office was in headquarters, while on the other hand, program activities required participation by field personnel assigned to the beats, as well as city personnel. For example, enforcement of nuisance abatement laws needed the assistance of a city attorney and patrol officers. A significant portion of the initial planning effort was devoted to working out the procedures between the CSO and field personnel. During implementation, problems sometimes occurred because of communication gaps between this office and the field. Over time, these problems were alleviated, primarily because of the enthusiasm and dedication of the CSO. This CSO eventually left the TPD to take a supervisory position in a neighboring police department. She was replaced by an equally enthusiastic person who had worked on the same type of program in another police department.

Public Information. TPD continually struggled to gain city-wide support for their community policing efforts. In fact, it seems that support was often concentrated in specific areas of the city. One way to begin to establish support in communities is by educating the public. Because people often get their information about crime and police from radio, television, or a newspaper, a positive relationship with the media is vital. Police departments should capitalize on a good relationship with the media to teach the public about crime incidences, crime prevention, police functions, and the community's role in helping the police (e.g., tip lines,
neighborhood watches, etc.). Police agencies should consider hiring experienced public relations/media relations specialists to professionalize their approach to marketing community policing to the public.
Chapter 10

Strategic Issues and Planning

It seems logical that a move to community policing might begin with a department creating a strategic plan, or blueprint of how to proceed. However, it is often the case that police departments do not develop detailed, long-range plans for implementing community policing. Rather, it is quite common to simply begin by experimenting in one beat, in one unit, or with one program. One national community policing survey (administered in the fall, 1996) asked police and sheriffs whether or not they had a “written plan to guide how community policing will be implemented in their agencies.” Nearly two-thirds of respondents (63.9 percent) said they had no written plan (McEwen and Pandey, 1997). A review of the nation’s smallest law enforcement agencies found that only 12 percent had a strategic plan for community policing (Maguire, Kuhns, et al., 1997).

Vision and Mission

Although TPD did not begin community policing with a formal strategic plan, the upper command staff did have a vision of how they would like community policing to work in Tempe. This vision meshed well with other factors, including a new chief with a management style that could help push community policing to the foreground in Tempe. Also, other police departments were talking about and implementing community policing concepts, and city leaders considered it a very modern and popular approach to policing at the time.

The Tempe Police Department began implementation by defining and communicating to the department what community policing is. Chief Brown defined it as follows:

A partnership between a police service agency and citizens to improve the quality of life in their community by jointly identifying and resolving public safety concerns.

As discussed earlier, the department also revised its mission statement and departmental values to support the philosophy of community policing. Later, TPD began experimenting with community policing in one beat (Beat 16) in the city.
Working from a vision had both positive and negative outcomes. Because community policing was new, there was not a lot of research or direction on how to implement it in a police department, and even less information on evaluation results. TPD was ripe for change, and with a new chief with a new management approach, the environment lent itself to experimentation. In fact, the command staff was so supportive of change they began implementing a wide array of new projects. If they were unsuccessful, they would be discarded and replaced with new projects. This allowed flexibility in the department and also helped TPD recognize and respond to immediate community needs. However, employees soon began to feel a lack of focus in the department. This led some officers to feel TPD was working with a "program du jour" mentality.

Strategic Planning and Priority Issues

In 1991, TPD produced a management manual that discussed community policing, organizational values, management principles, employees' roles and responsibilities, goals and objectives, and performance evaluations. By the mid-1990s, the TPD began placing a great deal more emphasis on formal strategic planning. Exhibit 19 shows a graphic display of TPD's final strategic planning model.
In 1995, the Strategic Issues Group was convened. This group identified six priority issues in the department and began a process of recommending strategies and objectives to address them. The issues were accountability, juveniles and gangs, drugs and alcohol, employee development, basic services, and problem solving and crime prevention. Exhibit 20 shows the priority issues and the objectives as outlined by the Group.
### Exhibit 20: Tempe's Priority Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Issue</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accountability</strong></td>
<td>- Change the organizational culture to improve performance and behavior.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Juveniles &amp; Gangs</strong></td>
<td>- Increase the awareness of juvenile and gang issues within the department.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Increase the effectiveness of prosecution efforts relating to violent juvenile or gang offenders.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide effective means to increase juvenile resiliency.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Drugs &amp; Alcohol</strong></td>
<td>- Impact DUI's.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Improve the overall quality and prosecutorial effectiveness of drug cases.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Use proactive approaches to DUI suppression.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Employee Development</strong></td>
<td>- Maintain and develop proficiency in basic skills, knowledge, and abilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Offer opportunities for advanced personal and professional development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Services</strong></td>
<td>- Respond quickly to emergency CFS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Respond appropriately to non-emergency CFS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provide quality investigation of crime.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reduce Tempe traffic accidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problem Solving &amp; Crime Prevention</strong></td>
<td>- Incorporate a crime prevention/problem solving philosophy department-wide</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just two years later, the department along with other city agencies created a document outlining all of their respective strategic issues. In addition, Tempe developed a “Management Services IT Strategy Plan, 1998-2001.”
Lessons Learned

Strategic Planning. As Tempe illustrated, strategic planning for community policing is not essential to begin the implementation process. However, there does need to be a vision from which to work so that personnel are able to articulate what they are working toward.

In retrospect, TPD management might have fared better in several respects if they had taken the time and effort up front to develop a comprehensive strategic plan for community policing. First, by involving more department personnel in the planning process, management might have been able to convince more mid-level managers and supervisors that community policing was the next evolution in policing, thereby ensuring a smoother implementation of geographic deployment. Second, by taking more time and thinking through more implementation issues, management might have been able to anticipate and overcome more technical and practical problems, such as the impact on supervisors of eliminating roll calls in the geographic deployment model. Third, management could have engaged the public in a comprehensive strategic planning process and gained more support for community policing, which would have helped gain needed support for more resources in the early stages of the community policing process.

A final reason for strategic planning relates to the earlier discussion about turnover within managerial ranks in the department. The effort put into a strategic plan provides continual support and education to new managers in a department. Moreover, updating a strategic plan on an annual basis provides an opportunity to reinforce the general philosophy of community policing to all managers.

Organizational Flexibility. TPD's organizational flexibility was both positive and negative in their process to implement community policing. Because of a new management style that supported change, the department was able to experiment in their early endeavors to begin community policing. However, TPD's personnel also felt that too much flexibility did not give much focus to the department's goals.
Leadership and Inter-Agency Cooperation

Leadership

A strong leader is essential for the major organizational change required to implement community policing (Wycoff and Skogan, 1994). That person should not only support and encourage a department's move to community policing, they should exemplify the objectives and values of community policing (Nowicki, 1997; Sparrow, 1988). In fact, strong leadership is often the impetus for change in an organization. This was certainly the case in Tempe.

It was only after hiring a new chief (Brown), who had a desire to explore and experiment, that the TPD began to change as an organization. As discussed earlier, the hiring of Dave Brown as chief represented a dramatic shift from a closed department known for its militaristic leadership style to a more open organization committed to community policing. In contrast to his predecessor, Brown communicated from the beginning that he placed a high value on streamlined communication, pushed down decision-making, and teamwork.

Following Brown in the position of chief was Ron Burns. While Brown was viewed by some as being too flexible, Burns was seen as somewhere in between. He desired a balance between traditional and community-oriented policing.

Support and Leadership from Other Agencies

Obviously, community policing cannot reach its potential without the support of other organizations and their executives as well. Partnerships (e.g., through task forces and memoranda of understanding) with various city agencies and private organizations is essential for solving problems, and may even result in more effective responses to crimes (e.g., joint police/victim service agency responses to domestic violence scenes). Moreover, one way police departments can relieve officer workload is to reach agreements that move certain functions (e.g., animal control, parking enforcement) to other appropriate agencies.
Tempe did see support for their community policing plan in the local government. The mayor, council, and city manager had been politically and financially supportive of the police department for a long time and stayed on board throughout the change process.

Despite the backing of the city manager and elected officials, other city agencies initially did not provide much support to the police department for community policing activities. Additionally, it also took time for police to get used to working with other city agencies. For example, the Beat 16 team met with frustration when they were delayed in setting up their neighborhood office (mobile home) because of permit and zoning restrictions.

However, two organizations/agencies, including their administrators, were especially supportive of the police department—the city's Neighborhood Program (Office of Neighborhood Services) and the local schools. The ONS was a driving force because of its role in creating and supporting neighborhood groups and associations. These groups contributed much work and support to the TPD in terms of getting community policing projects up and running.

Local schools were also very helpful. In 1975, well before community policing was introduced in Tempe, a school resource officer program was started. It was quite successful and was expanded when Tempe moved to community policing. The work between the police department and the schools fostered a strong relationship, including a great deal of support from the principals.

**Lessons Learned**

The lessons learned regarding leadership and inter-agency cooperation are obvious and have appeared in almost every major study on community policing. There must be strong leadership from top management in order to implement any major change in a police organization. This is especially true with community policing, which changes the direction that has been taught and practiced for over 20 years in most organizations.

Three general conclusions can be reached on the basis of the experiences in the TPD. First, to the credit of the top management, a consistent message was delivered during the years of the evaluation. That message was that community policing was here to stay and was to be practiced both in the strategic planning of the department and in day-to-day operations. The key point is that the general message stayed the same even with turnover in top management.
Second, the experiences at the TPD show that consistent reinforcement is needed on the message of community policing as the policing approach in the department. For a variety of reasons, top management had to continually instill the basic tenets of community policing to subordinates. In this way, policy turned into practice. Finally, the leadership of the TPD retooled its thinking about many of its existing activities. For example, the crime analysis function expanded into more analysis of calls for service in support of problem solving efforts and providing more information to citizens on police workload. The volunteer program was viewed as part of the community policing effort because it increased the involvement of citizens with the TPD and improved communications between police and residents.
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Tempe Police Department (May 1993). "Implementing Self Directed Work Teams in the Tempe Police Department."


