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Felons Who Attempt to Purchase Guns: A Study of Prior and Subsequent Criminal Involvements

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Ours is a nation awash with guns. Roughly, one in two households owns a gun, and many gun-owning households own more than one gun. Statistics kept by the federal government indicate that over the 94 years from 1899 to 1993 about 223 million guns became available in the United States. In addition, the number of guns keeps growing every year. In 1993, for example, about five and a half million guns were manufactured for domestic consumption, and an additional six million guns were imported.

Guns can affect peoples' lives in both positive and negative ways. Throughout our country's history, guns were important tools for survival. They were used to hunt for food and to protect from animal predators and criminals. Although we now have other means for meeting these functions (e.g., supermarkets and police forces), guns continue to be used in these ways. For example, the National Crime Survey indicates that from 1987 to 1990 guns were used in self-defense over 250,000 times. Other estimates place the defensive use of guns as high as 2.5 million incidents a year. Finally, guns also played an important role in our political history, being used to overthrow tyrannical government and to bring law and order to new settlements and communities. Thus, there is fear among many that restricting gun ownership will concentrate power in hands of few and that such power eventually will be abused.

Guns also are used to commit crime. In 1993, the victim was confronted with a gun in 1.3 million criminal victimizations. Homicide statistics show that 7 out of 10 murders involve the use of guns. One study found that
roughly one out of two male inmates reported that they carried a gun all or
most of the time just prior to entering prison, while roughly one out of three
male students carried a gun now and then or more frequently.8

Given the ubiquity and versatility of guns, attempts to regulate their sale,
possession and use are highly controversial. The challenge is to find ways to
keep guns out of the hands of criminals, while allowing law-abiding citizens
relatively unfettered access to them. Among the various strategies used, one
concentrates on manufacturing and distribution channels. For example,
federally licensed firearms dealers are required to keep paperwork on gun
transactions. In recent years, license fees have risen and dealers have been
subject to greater scrutiny as a way of bringing distribution channels under
greater control.9 For the most part, these measures are relatively unobtrusive
from the gun purchaser's point of view.

A widespread and highly visible effort to control gun distribution at the
point of sale is requiring background checks on gun purchasers.10 This
legislation, passed in 1994, is popularly known as the "Brady Bill," named after
James Brady, Ronald Regan's press secretary who was wounded in a
presidential assassination attempt. Since 1968, it has been illegal for
convicted felons to purchase guns from licensed firearms dealers.11 In 1994,
the Brady Bill provided a nationwide mechanism for enforcement of this law.
At the time it was passed, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act applied
to 26 states. This is because 24 states already had Brady-like provisions in
effect and thus they were exempt from the legislation.
Key elements of the Brady Bill include a five-day waiting period during which time law enforcement officials are to conduct a background check on the prospective gun purchaser. Eventually the waiting period is to be eliminated, when a system that allows for instant point-of-sale background checks is implemented. If the background check reveals that the purchaser falls in any of seven categories, the sale is to be denied. The categories are: (1) convicted of or under indictment for a crime punishable by more than 1 year in prison, (2) fugitive from justice, (3) illegal drug user or addict, (4) adjudicated as mentally defective or committed to a mental institution, (5) illegal alien, (6) dishonorably discharged from armed forces, and (7) renounced US citizenship. 

Subsequently, an eighth category was added to include person under court order to restrain from behavior that places partner or child in reasonable fear of bodily injury.

The Brady Bill was controversial on several counts. Some argued that the federal government had usurped the state’s power and thus violated the tenth amendment. More generally, the bill was criticized as an unfunded mandate that imposed substantial costs on local government. Some also feared that the legislation could be used to create a national registry of gun owners. Still others argued that the waiting period imposed an undue burden on legitimate gun purchasers.

Perhaps the most trenchant criticism of the Brady Bill is the argument that it is ineffective in keeping guns out of the hands of criminals. Critics point to well-established research findings on gun acquisition showing that offenders
have relatively easy access to guns, that they obtained firearms through a variety of channels, and that purchase from a store is not the primary channel. For example, seventy percent of inmates and forty-one percent of high school students said that it would be "no trouble at all" to obtain a firearm. When offenders are asked how they would obtain a gun, the most common answers given is that, they would borrow or buy one from a family member or friend or would get one from off the street, perhaps from a drug dealer or addict.

Furthermore, offenders tend to acquire guns through illegal means. Among a group of persons arrested, 45% indicated that they had obtained a gun illegally.

It is important to note, however, that research also indicates that retail gun sales are a noteworthy source of firearms for offenders. For example, 12% of inmates and 28% percent of students said that if they need a gun they would buy one from a gun shop. More pertinent, is the fact that seven percent of the inmates and eleven percent of the students said that their most recent handgun was purchased from a store. In addition, research indicates that ten percent of federal offenders whose conviction offense involved use of a weapon were prohibited from using firearms at the time of the offense. Thus, while research indicates that store purchases are not the sole, nor even the primary, means by which offenders acquire guns, they are a non-trivial source of gun acquisition. Although enforcement of gun purchase regulations may not dramatically change the availability of guns to offenders, they should have an impact on the problem.
Although the primary orientation of gun purchase regulations is preventive, that is, keeping firearms out of hands of criminals, violations of these laws present opportunities for criminal prosecution. Falsifying documents used in a gun purchase is punishable by up to ten years in federal prison. Criminal history background checks, as a matter of course, bring these offenses to the attention of law enforcement officials. An argument often made by opponents of new gun control laws is that the laws on the books are sufficient and we need to concentrate on enforcing these laws rather than enact new laws.

For example, on November 30, 1998, instant criminal history background checks came into effect. In roughly the first six weeks of operation, about 13,000 gun purchases were denied. About 2,200 of these events were forwarded to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), but no further action was taken owing to a lack of time and staff. A spokesperson for the National Rifle Association (NRA) described the situation as "a major national scandal." One year after the implementation of the instant check system, roughly 115,000 gun purchases were refused because of criminal history, leading to 50 arrests and 29 convictions nationwide.

Violations of gun purchase laws by offenders are situations in which known criminals attempt to acquire a gun. While these acts are punishable by imprisonment, support for increasing the federal prison population by over 100,000 inmates a year for these offenses probably is not strong. As a practical matter, selective enforcement will continue to operate. Research can
contribute to discussions regarding how aggressive law enforcement officials should be in these matters and the criteria on which they should base their selectivity. How many of these offenders go on to commit crimes? How many crimes could be prevented if these offenders were arrested shortly after the attempted purchase? Can we identify which offenders pose the greatest risk of future criminal behavior, so we can concentrate enforcement efforts on this group?

Evidence on the Effectiveness of Criminal History Background Checks

There is little empirical evidence that bears directly on the effectiveness of gun purchase regulations. In 1996, the General Accounting Office studied the implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. The project compiled statistics from 20 jurisdictions, representing a mix of states, counties, and cities, over a one-year period beginning February 28, 1994. The data showed considerable variation in the number of purchase applications and in the number of denials. For example, the following statewide statistics were reported:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Applications and Denials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>40,185 applications and 928 denials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>27,993 applications and 377 denials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>69,420 applications and 2,045 denials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>38,719 applications and 531 denials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>67,101 applications and 406 denials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>62,812 applications and 1,980 denials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>30,577 applications and 219 denials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The study reported that the overall denial rate across the 20 jurisdictions was 4.3 percent, with roughly half (48.7%) of the denials based on criminal history.22

Beyond presenting these general statistics, the GAO could not evaluate the operation of the law. "Comprehensive data on the number of handgun purchase application denials under Brady were not available. Brady contains no reporting requirements, so neither gun dealers nor law enforcement officers are required to accumulate and report statistics on the number of handgun purchase applications processed or denied."23 In other words, "No data were available that would allow for monitoring trends in handgun purchases and denials or otherwise judge the impact of Brady."24

A reason for the lack of statistical reporting requirements is the fear that a national registry of gun owners might be created. In view of this concern, it is unlikely that a detailed picture of the operation of federal gun purchase regulations will be forthcoming. As a way of addressing this situation, we might turn to statistics on the operation of state gun purchase regulations. These regulations typically were implemented prior to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act and are not subject to Brady's prohibitions on statistical reporting.

For example, Wintemute (1998) was able to use California's records on handgun purchases to conduct a longitudinal study of persons who legally purchased a handgun in 1977. Different sampling ratios were used to produce two groups: 6,800 people with no criminal history at the time of
purchase and 2,800 people with a criminal history at the time of purchase. Criminal history records were used to compare the criminal activity of the two groups over 15 years (i.e., through 1991). Analyses indicated that within one year of purchase 13% of those with a criminal history were arrested compared to less than 2% of those without a criminal history. By the end of the follow-up period, almost 38% of those with a criminal history were arrested compared to less than 10% of those without a criminal history. When factors influencing subsequent arrest were examined, it was found that age was associated with the rate of subsequent offending. Number of prior offenses and type of prior offenses, in particular, firearms offenses and violent offenses, were associated with the probability of arrest. This study is important because it shows that a significant proportion of offenders who acquired guns through legal channels go on to commit crimes. The findings, however, are of limited relevance to today's situation by virtue of the historical period being investigated, that is, gun purchases made in 1977.

**Methodology**

The data for this study came from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). Florida has an “instant” background check system for firearm purchases. FDLE made available a data file on prospective purchasers who were rejected based on criminal history. The file included basic demographic information on the prospective purchaser (e.g., gender, race, date of birth) and on the attempted purchase (e.g., date, county). A separate file contained information on the criminal histories of the purchasers. Use of an
arbitrary, unique identifier maintained the confidentiality of individuals while allowing the files to be cross-referenced. Criminal history information was current as of a fixed date, so the length of the follow-up period varied with the date of attempted purchase. In the analyses, several fixed-length follow-up periods are examined using variable numbers of subjects for whom data are available.

Findings

Figure 1 shows the number of attempted gun purchasers by offenders in Florida from 1991 to 1996. The raw number of attempted purchases over the 6-year study period is considerable. Criminal history background checks prevented 25,919 attempted gun purchases in Florida. On average, about 4,300 gun purchases by offenders were denied each year. The data indicates that during the first three years (1991-1994) the number of attempted gun purchases remained relatively constant at about 4,700 per year. In subsequent years, the number of attempted purchases trailed off, so that in 1996 there were about 3,500 attempted purchases. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that after some “break-in” or “learning period” offenders adapt their behavior to legislation. In this case, it may be that ex-offenders looking to purchase guns realize that they will be identified as ineligible and denied the purchase. The data do not speak to the issue of whether they search out alternative sources for guns.
Figure 2 shows the number of attempted purchases by month. Although the graph shows considerable fluctuation, the general trend is downward. The solid diagonal line, which shows the linear trend as determined through multiple regression analysis, illustrates more clearly the downward pattern observed previously in the annual data. The data also show evidence of seasonality. The number of attempted gun purchases is greatest in December and smallest in July. December typically is the month with the largest volume of gun sales, thus offenders appear to be behaving as average consumers making gift purchases for themselves and others. However, it may also be that offenders hope to capitalize on the large volume of sales and slip through the system.

To what extent do offenders test the system again after being denied a purchase? In Figure 3, we find the proportion of multiple attempts to purchase a firearm. We see that the vast majority of offenders (90%) attempted only one purchase during the study period. It is interesting to note, however, that one out of ten offenders made a second attempt to purchase a gun, while the number of offenders, making three or more attempts is very small.

Figure 4 displays the age of the offenders at the time of the attempted gun purchase. The youngest offender is 18 years while the oldest is 75 years. Most of the offenders are in the 20's and 30's age range. The median age is 33 years, while the inter-quartile range is 27 years and 42 years. Other
demographic data not shown in this figure indicates that 93% of the offenders are male, while 29% are black and 70% are white.\textsuperscript{25}

Figure 5 shows the number of prior arrests at the time of the attempted purchase. By definition, all of the offenders in the sample have at least one arrest, which makes it unsurprising that the modal or largest category is one arrest, representing 5326 out of 20844 offenders or roughly 13%. Nonetheless, the data indicate that the group is active in terms of criminal arrests. The mean number of arrests is 4.4, while the median is 4.0. Offenders with very extensive arrest histories, meaning ten or more arrests, represent about 10% of the sample. Thus, the data show the offenders in this group to be active in terms of criminal behavior. In addition, a significant proportion could be characterized as chronic offenders based on extensive criminal arrest histories (ten or more arrests).

Figure 6 shows the percentage of offenders who are arrested within one year after the attempted purchase. Overall, 16% or roughly one out of seven offenders are arrested subsequent to the attempted gun purchase.

Figure 7 shows how the percentage of offenders who are arrested changes with the length of the follow-up period. It is significant to note that roughly one out of ten offenders is arrested within six months of the attempted purchase. The percentage of offenders who are arrested increases most as we
move from a six-month to a one-year follow-up period. Moving beyond an eighteen-month follow-up period brings only small increases in the percent of offenders who are arrested. However, it should be noted that at two and a half years after the attempted purchase roughly one out of four offenders has been arrested.

Table 1 investigates how characteristics of the offender influence the chances of arrest within a year of the attempted gun purchase. We find that age is a strong correlate of arrest. Young offenders (under 25 years of age) are more than twice as likely to be arrested than older (36 years and older) offenders (24% v. 11%). This finding is not surprising, since age is a strong correlate of criminal behavior in general. Multiple attempt purchases do not have much of an effect on the probability of arrest. Thus, multiple attempts do not seem to reflect a strong motivation to commit crime. Number of prior arrests is a good indicator of the probability of subsequent arrests. Offenders with three or more prior arrests are twice as likely to be arrested after an attempted gun purchase compared to offenders with only one or two arrests.

Finally, in Figure 8 various factors related to the probability of arrest as found in Table 1, are combined to create a low-risk and a high-risk group of offenders. The low-risk group is defined as older offenders (36 years of age and older) with limited criminal histories (one or two prior arrests) that reflect seemingly out-of-date criminal behavior (arrests date back at least three years
prior to the attempted purchase). The high-risk group is defined as young offenders (25 years of age and younger) with relatively ample criminal histories (three or more arrests) that reflect contemporary behavior (at least one arrest within a year prior to the attempted purchase). As anticipated, the data indicate that the low-risk group has a low arrest rate subsequent to the attempted purchase, while the high risk group has a high arrest rate. What is significant about the findings, however, is the disproportion between the two groups and the rate of arrest for the high-risk group relative to the all offenders in the sample. Only one out of twenty offenders in the low-risk group were arrested, while one out of two offenders in the high-risk group were arrested, a ten-fold difference. Furthermore, the arrest rate for the high-risk group is more than three times greater than the overall arrest rate for this group of offenders.

Summary and Conclusions

This research investigates an aspect of our country’s gun control policy—criminal history background checks for persons wishing to purchase guns. This purpose of the policy is to keep firearms out of the hands of known criminals. The policy was made controversial by the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act for several reasons, including a five day waiting period and allegations that the legislation was an unfunded mandate illegally imposed by the federal government on the states. These issues have been resolved now that an “instant” backgrounds check system is in place and being operated by the federal government. Perhaps the most trenchant criticism of criminal
history background checks is that they are ineffective because, research shows that criminals have multiple ways of acquiring guns. Thus, the argument is that criminals simply pursue alternative avenues of gun acquisition when one is blocked.

Research also shows, however, that retail sales are a non-trivial source of firearms for offenders. Criminals are inclined to purchase guns in stores just as law-abiding citizens do, perhaps for matters of convenience and selection. Alternatively, perhaps they are looking for a gun that they are sure has not been used in a previous crime. Clearly, gun purchase regulations cannot be the sum total of our efforts to disarm criminals. The issue is whether criminal history background checks are a rational and sensible element in a multi-pronged strategy to restrict criminals access to firearms. In order to address this issue, data from Florida on the frequency with which criminals attempt to purchase guns was examined. This gives us an indication of the magnitude of the potential problem if we were to do away with criminal history background checks. Then, arrest histories both prior and subsequent to the attempted purchase were examined. This gives us an indication of the extent to which "serious" or "chronic" offenders, meaning those with extensive criminal histories, and "active" offenders, meaning those who continue their criminal career into the future, attempt to buy guns at retail outlets. Finally, characteristics associated with future criminal activity, as measured by arrest, were identified. This information can help form a basis for selective
enforcement strategies for gun purchase violations that focus on offenders with enhanced probabilities of future criminal activity.

The findings indicate a substantial number of persons with criminal histories attempt to purchase firearms, a finding that is supported by statistics on the operation of the “Brady” bill. In general, between 3,600 and 4,800 offenders annually attempt to purchase guns in Florida. The data indicate that over time the number of offenders who attempted to purchase guns declined. This finding suggests that offenders begin to understand that attempts at legal gun purchases will be stopped and adjust their behavior accordingly. Future research should focus on whether these offenders then acquire guns by other means. The data also indicate that only a small percentage of offenders tested the system more than once by attempting multiple purchases. Again, this finding is consistent with the notion that offenders adapt their behavior.

The findings on criminal history are significant. Offenders who attempt to purchase a gun have, on average, four prior arrests. These are offenders with substantial criminal histories. Furthermore, a notable proportion of offenders, roughly ten percent, could be characterized as chronic offenders, meaning that they have ten or more arrests. One certainly has to question why such persons are looking to purchase a gun.

Roughly, one out of seven offenders who attempt to purchase a gun is later arrested within one year. This finding indicates that active offenders do attempt to acquire guns through retail channels. Several characteristics were associated with the chances of re-arrest within one year of the attempted
purchase. Most notable, youthfulness, a greater number of prior arrests and close proximity of the last arrest to the attempted purchases were associated with greater chances of arrest. Multiple purchase attempts, however, were not associated with a greater probability of future arrest. By taking into account three background characteristics, it is possible to identify a low-risk group of offenders that has a five percent chance of being arrested and a high-risk group that has a fifty percent chance of being arrested, a ten-fold difference between the two groups. Furthermore, the high risk group, which has a one out of two chance of committing an offense in the next year, provides a rational target for government attention.

These findings speak directly to ways in which a selective enforcement policy can be made more effective. Falsifying documents for handgun purchases is a crime, and these offenses are routinely brought to the attention of law enforcement officials. The volume of these transgressions makes it unlikely that law enforcement officials can pursue all violators. The findings indicate that an enforcement policy that concentrates on offenders who pose the greatest chances of violating the criminal law in the future is both efficient and manageable.
Figure 1. Number of Attempted Gun Purchases by Offenders in Florida, 1991-1996
Summary

Figure 2. Monthly Number of Attempted Gun Purchases by Offenders in Florida, Feb. 1991 - May 1996
Figure 3. Number of Attempted Gun Purchases by Individual Offenders in Florida, Feb. 1991 - May 1996

- 90% One
- 2% Two
- 8% Three or more
Figure 4. Age of Offenders Attempting to Purchase a Gin, Florida 1991 - 1996

Number of Offenders

Age

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

19 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74

Median = 33 years
Figure 5. Number of Prior Arrests for Offenders Attempting to Purchase a Gun, Florida 1991-1996

![Graph showing the number of prior arrests for offenders attempting to purchase a gun, Florida 1991-1996. The graph shows a decline in the number of offenders as the number of prior arrests increases. The mean is 4.4 and the median is 4.0.]
Figure 6. Offenders Arrested Within One Year of Attempting a Gun Purchase, Florida 1991-1995
Figure 7. Percent Arrested after Attempted Purchase by Time Period

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Table 1. Percent Arrested within 12 Months of Attempted Purchase By Demographic Characteristics and Criminal History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Characteristics</th>
<th>Arrest Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 Years</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 to 35 Years</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Years and Older</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Attempts To Purchase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests Prior to Attempted Purchase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One or Two</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or More</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Between Attempted Purchase and Last Arrest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Year or Less</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One to Two Years</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two to Three Years</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than Three Years</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 8. Percent Rearrested Within 12 Months for Low Risk and High Risk Offenders

Low Risk Offenders (n = 2214) - Offenders who are 36 years or older, have one or two prior arrests and whose last prior arrests was three or more years before the attempted gun purchase.

High Risk Offenders (n = 278) - Offenders who are 26 years or younger, have three or more prior arrests and whose last prior arrest was within one year of the attempted gun purchase.
Endnotes


6 Zawitz, Marianne W., 1996 (July), P. 1


10 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, PL 103-159.


12 Sheley and Wright, 1993.


15 Sheley and Wright, 1993.


17 Fields, Gary. "13,000 guns denied but one arrested." *USA Today,* January 21, 1999. As cited by the National Center for Policy Analysis (www.ncps.org/pi/crime/pd012199d.html).

18 National Center for Policy Analysis (www.ncps.org/pi/crime/pd012199d.html).


20 United States General Accounting Office, 1996.


22 United States General Accounting Office, 1996, p. 34.

23 United States General Accounting Office, 1996, p. 27.


25 A small number of, offenders, totaling around seven-tenths of a percent were American Indian, Asian, or of unknown race.