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The Deterrent Effect of Curfew Enforcement: Operation Nightwatch in St. Louis

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the curfew check program in St. Louis, Missouri, known as Nightwatch, to determine whether the program meets its stated goals of reducing recidivism and victimization, as well as the mechanism by which this is accomplished. The rationale behind the program is that the threat of formal controls by way of home visits and sanctions will elicit compliance with curfew and increase the perception of certainty of punishment, and that juveniles who must remain at home will have fewer opportunities for crime and victimization experiences. Perceptual deterrence and lifestyle and routine activity theories were used to test this rationale.

The research design consists of a pre test with multiple post tests. A purposive sample of 118 offenders recently referred to the juvenile court for an official charge was selected and surveys administered. The experimental group consists of juveniles who received Nightwatch visits, the comparison group consists of juveniles with comparable demographic and offense characteristics, who did not receive visits.

Results of the process evaluation reveal that the program functions well in terms of execution of home visits, but that record keeping and number of visits are inconsistent with stated procedures. The outcome evaluation revealed that between Time 1 and Time 2 the experimental group had significantly fewer self-report delinquency and victimization incidents. The comparison group had significantly more victimization experiences between these two time points. The mechanism for the reduction in delinquency appears to be opportunity rather than a change in perceptions. Thus, the juveniles apparently changed their behavior but not their perceptions of certainty of punishment. Several policy and research implications are presented.

This study should not be generalized directly to other sites, given the small sample size, high rate of attrition, and that it is limited to only one study site. Jurisdictions considering a curfew check program such as Nightwatch must carefully consider budgetary, logistic, and feasibility issues prior to considering implementation.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1899, the juvenile justice system in the United States has experienced significant changes. Variations in demographics, population density, and social issues have prompted changes in the court's penal philosophy through time. Increasing juvenile crime and violence combined with calls for offender accountability and a balanced approach to juvenile justice have forced courts across the country to adopt new programs to deal with juvenile offenders. One program adopted in several cities across the country involves the monitoring of court-ordered curfew for juveniles on probation.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the curfew check program in St. Louis, Missouri, known as Nightwatch, to determine whether the program meets its stated goals of reducing recidivism and victimization, as well as the mechanism by which this is accomplished. The program was implemented to address the issue of high rates of juvenile crime, including significant gang activity, in the city. Court, law enforcement, and city leaders took advantage of a new federal funding source to introduce several strategies for combating the problem. Nightwatch was one of these strategies, presented

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with several stated goals and objectives, among them to reduce crime, reduce recidivism, and increase community safety through the enforcement of court-ordered curfew of juveniles on probation. Crews of police and deputy juvenile officers (DJOs) conduct home visits to check the curfew of juveniles, prompting sanctions for violations and rewards for compliance. The rationale behind these curfew checks is that the threat of formal controls by way of home visits and sanctions will elicit compliance with curfew and increase the perception of certainty of punishment, and that juveniles who must remain at home will have fewer opportunities for crime and victimization experiences. This rationale can be explained using two criminological theories, perceptual deterrence and lifestyle/routine activities, respectively. These theories will be used to frame the current evaluation, in order to theoretically link the stated program goals with written program operations.

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess not only whether Nightwatch meets its stated goals of reducing recidivism and victimization of program participants, but also the process by which this is attempted. A key component of the evaluation is the process by which juveniles move through the program. This is actually the first issue that must be addressed. A program that has written guidelines but does not actually deliver services, or delivers them at a significantly different level than intended, may not support an outcome evaluation. Information was collected for individuals assigned to the program regarding the number of visits they received, any violations recorded, as well as subsequent sanctions or rewards given. This information was compared to written and stated policies and procedures, to determine whether Nightwatch is functioning according to its design.

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Once it is determined that the program is viable, an outcome evaluation can be pursued. The central question to this evaluation is whether Nightwatch meets its stated goals. Therefore, the first research question is: Does Nightwatch reduce recidivism and victimization for juveniles who are assigned to it? If the answer to this question is “yes,” then the second question can be asked: “how?” Identifying a program that reduces recidivism is useful, identifying the mechanism by which this reduction occurs is even more useful, to create the most effective, theoretically based policies. Outcomes were evaluated to estimate whether the program goals of reduced recidivism and reduced victimization are achieved, and what role the program plays in any reductions. In order to strengthen evaluation results, these outcomes were compared to a group of juveniles with similar offending histories, but who did not receive Nightwatch visits.

An evaluation of this type is important in several ways. First, evaluating how well the program meets its stated goals can determine if it is worthy of public funding. Several approaches have been offered over time to reduce recidivism for juvenile offenders, and information regarding which of these approaches best meets this goal will assist in the efficient allocation of public funds. Second, evaluating how well the program works for specific individuals can insure that program operations are maximized by targeting youth that will benefit most from such an intervention. By assessing individual perceptions of specific juvenile justice interventions, a link can be established between individuals and programs. Often programs are assumed to have a particular effect for all juveniles. Information regarding program details on individual perceptions and subsequent behavior may assist in providing the most appropriate intervention for each individual, and subsequently result in a more efficient use of program funds. Third,

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an evaluation that is theoretically based may provide a contribution to theory as well as to policy. Theoretical assumptions can be tested and previous methods replicated, with results ideally contributing to the literature and informing future research.

Nightwatch can be placed in a much broader context in regards to the juvenile justice system in general, and previous attempts at juvenile program interventions in particular. The current juvenile justice system, including sentencing practices and program implementation has been influenced by changes in the structure and function of the court over time. This chapter will provide background information about the origins of the juvenile court, trends in juvenile justice sentencing and probation through time, and how these philosophies relate to St. Louis and the Nightwatch program. In addition, information regarding the generalizability of the present study will be presented, as well as an overview of subsequent chapters.

ORIGINS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

The idea of a separate court system for juvenile offenders in the United States developed in the early 1800s out of a number of complex issues. Judges were faced with the choice of sentencing a child to the adult penitentiary or releasing him with no sanction whatsoever (Mack, 1909; Feld, 1999b; Bernard, 1992). In addition, Progressive reformers recognized that many youthful offenders came from poor, immigrant families, and were optimistic that a positive change in the child's environment would eliminate any future offending (Mack, 1909; Bernard, 1992). These dual concerns with public safety and care for the underprivileged prompted the creation of the first juvenile court in Chicago, Illinois in 1899 (Bernard, 1992; Platt, 1977). The legal basis of the new juvenile system was *parens patriae*, which empowered the court to have jurisdiction over

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all dependent, neglected and delinquent youth, under the assumption that the court was looking out for the “best interests” of the child. These interests were evident in procedures used by the first court to differentiate juvenile from adult proceedings. Wording was changed, procedures emphasized informality, and the stated mission changed from punishing to helping (Bernard, 1992). The idea of a separate juvenile justice system spread quickly across the country and became well established (Moore and Wakeling, 1997). The Missouri State Legislature established a juvenile court system in 1903, founded on the same principles of *parens patriae* recognized by previous juvenile courts (St. Louis City Family Court, 2001).

The circumstances surrounding the emergence of the juvenile court are complex and related to important social dynamics present at the time. The late 1800s and early 1900s were a time of great economic and social change for the country, with the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution and a flood of immigrants, particularly from Europe. Capitalism flourished, and middle and upper classes of businessmen and industrialists became well established in this booming new economy. Conversely, European immigrants provided the means of manual labor, with conflicting cultural norms from the capitalist elite (Feld, 1999a; Platt, 1977). These differences in social class and culture set the stage for the emergence of the first juvenile institutions in the United States.

The rise of capitalism created both economic and social circumstances to which American society was not accustomed. The rise of industrialism focused labor in the big cities rather than on labor-intensive rural farms. The factory created divisions in the day not found on the farm, and introduced the concept of leisure time (Feld, 1999a). Changes

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in work patterns also affected the roles of family members. Even very young children helped with the many daily tasks required to meet basic needs in rural areas, but in the cities children were no longer this labor to be exploited (Feld, 1999a). Children no longer contributed to family income but remained dependent for longer periods of time. This alteration in children's roles created a new social category called adolescence (Feld, 1999a; Bernard, 1992; Platt, 1977). Individuals too young to work in the factories but too old to be considered children were placed into a new category that the middle and upper classes sought to control. The introduction of this new class of adolescents raised issues of how to handle their misbehavior.

Prior to the introduction of the juvenile court, juveniles were subjected to the same criminal proceedings as adults. Sentences to the adult penitentiary were not uncommon, and this harsh and unbalanced treatment came to the attention of reformers. The only choices available to the criminal court were to sentence the juvenile to the adult prison or release them without any sanction whatsoever (Mack, 1909; Feld, 1993; Bernard, 1992). Judges and other reformers saw the need for an intermediate step, whereby adolescents would be held accountable for their actions but not excessively punished (Bernard, 1992; Platt, 1977).

In addition to advances in business and economy, this was also a period of intellectual growth and development. For most of the nineteenth century, criminological thought was dominated by the idea that certain groups of people were less human than others, and this was the cause of crime in these individuals (Lombroso-Ferrero, 1911). Criminals were considered dangerous and a separate social class that threatened the rest of society (Platt, 1977). Throughout this time social researchers had been seeking clues

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to the causes of crime, and early in the nineteenth century a new rationale for dealing with deviants emerged. By examining the social history of offenders, it was determined that offenders, both children and adults, were victims of their upbringing. Inattentive or inefficient parents were usually to blame, failing to protect their family from the corruptions of drinking and other vices. Crime was blamed solely on the environment; therefore reformers believed that if a deviant was removed from the sinful environment and placed in an institution that focused on discipline, the individual would be healed and could be returned to society (Rothman, 1971; Pisciotta, 1994; Platt, 1977). The advance of the social work movement encouraged the idea that environment and parental involvement played a key role in behavior. This idea that environment influences behavior became one of the leading rationales of the Progressive movement, with the assumption that removing a child from a bad environment would reshape his behavior (Rothman, 1971; Bernard, 1992; Platt, 1977). During this period, conditions of all kinds were considered curable. Almshouses were designed to cure the poor, insane asylums cured the mentally ill, and the House of Refuge cured juvenile delinquents (Pisciotta, 1994). Armed with a vision that a juvenile will behave properly in the proper environment and the knowledge that fear of crime was increasing, reformers set the wheels of establishing a juvenile institution in motion.

A precursor to the juvenile court was the House of Refuge opened in New York in 1825. The opening of this institution led to issues that would later be significant in beginning the separate justice system for adolescents. The House of Refuge was also founded on the principles of environmental influence and social class, particularly the problem of the chronic poor, or paupers (Rothman, 1971). The middle and upper classes

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saw paupers as lazy and undeserving of assistance, but excluded children from responsibility for their lot in life, by admitting them to the House of Refuge where a proper work ethic could be taught (Rothman, 1971; Bernard, 1992). Admissions criteria for the House of Refuge were very flexible, so that judges, parents, or other concerned parties could remove the child from a corrupt environment (Rothman 1971), even if the child had not committed any offense (Bernard, 1992). Legal issues concerning due process called attention to the arbitrary nature by which children were admitted to the institution. Administrators claimed the purpose of the institution was to treat children rather than punish them, so due process protections were unnecessary (Bernard, 1992). The United States Supreme Court disagreed, and ruled that it was illegal to send a child to reform school without committing a felony offense (Bernard, 1992). Supporters still felt that children needed to be handled differently from adults, however, so the middle and upper classes redefined the admissions procedures to officially establish the first separate juvenile court system.

The rationale for creating a separate court system for adolescents was based on the differentiation between children and adults, as well as the moral superiority of the reformers themselves. Adolescents were seen as not capable of forming intent for criminal action, as well as being malleable and amenable to reform with the proper treatment and intervention (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999a). The middle and upper classes dictated what this proper treatment would be. Reformers were optimistic that treating poor immigrant children would decrease their chances of becoming criminals, and justified creating the separate court based on these benevolent motives. The new court was based on the concept of *parens patriae*, whereby the state could intervene and act in

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the best interests of the child if the natural parents were incapable or unwilling (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999a; Platt, 1977). Unlike the adult criminal court, the new juvenile court was focused on treating the child and improving his environment, rather than on punishment. This rehabilitative ideal remained the basis for the court's actions until the 1960s when legal challenges involving due process procedures surfaced.

During the first half of the twentieth century the structure of the new court stabilized, but opinions about the actual performance of the juvenile court fluctuated. Assessment of court performance raised doubts as to the treatment benefits of the separate juvenile system. Actual court practices did not reflect treatment of problems, but punishment for offenses. This raised legal issues regarding due process rights for juveniles. Until legal challenges began in the 1960s, juvenile court clients were not afforded any rights similar to those for adults who are subjected to punishment by the state. One major case was *In re Gault* (1967), whereby juveniles were provided the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Feld, 1999a; Bernard, 1992). This addressed six specific Constitutional rights, of which the United States Supreme Court ruled on four: the right to notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Another major contention related to due process involved the idea of trial by a jury of peers. In 1971 *McKeiver v. Pennsylvania* established that a jury trial is not required in juvenile adjudications (Feld, 1999a; Bernard, 1992). The protection of jury trial was reserved for those individuals (adults) who may need protection from state abuses of power. Juveniles were not as susceptible to such abuses, and a jury would disturb the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court (Bernard 1992). These changes to

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the scope of the juvenile court shifted emphasis from treatment toward the punitive nature of proceedings that persists today.

The introduction of a separate court system for juveniles came about because of social and economic changes present in American society. The middle and upper classes sought to control lower class immigrants and their children, and insure they positively contributed to the blossoming capitalist economy (Rothman, 1971; Platt, 1977). The original philosophy of the court was to treat the child and prevent future criminal offending, by focusing on negative influences in the child's environment. Intended and actual outcomes proved to be different, however, with the actual function of the court proving to be that of punishment rather than treatment. This prompted the introduction of legal protections for juveniles that were not present at the original inception of the court, and shifted the focus toward the punitive nature of court proceedings. Current juvenile justice practice is both similar to and different from the original directive for the "best interests" of the child. The current juvenile court has evolved as a result of political and public pressures, with individual jurisdictions responding in unique ways.

TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SENTENCING

Just as the structure and function of the juvenile court changed through time, so did sentencing practices, dependent upon whether the treatment or punishment model dominated decision making. Under the original rationale for the court, the treatment of each individual juvenile was indeterminate, as the amount of time needed for rehabilitation was unknown (Mack, 1909; Feld, 1999a, 1998). Judges held vast amounts of discretion over the sentencing of an offender, with decisions rooted in the rehabilitative ideal, and focused on the best interests of the child. Sentencing was

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concerned primarily with the real needs of the child, and the actual offense was seen as secondary (Feld, 1999b). These original plans became confused with actual practices, however, and disillusionment about the actual functioning of the court has caused significant changes in sentencing practices over time.

Sentencing trends. A fundamental shift in sentencing practices has taken place in the United States since this original idea of rehabilitation and the best interests of the child. The original philosophy of the court was to treat each child individually, but beginning in the 1960s the focus of juvenile sentencing became the offense rather than the offender. The goal changed from identification of needs to accountability for transgressions. Instead of concentrating on how best to rehabilitate the young offender, courts used the current offense, age of the offender, and prior record to determine what sentence to impose (Feld, 1999a, 1999b, 1998; Ainsworth, 1993). Concern for the juvenile was directed not on his future and how to prevent further offending, but on his past and how to punish inappropriate behavior. This shift occurred because of a lack of faith in rehabilitation, prompted by a realization that the juvenile court was not functioning according to its original plan (Feld, 1999a, 1999b; Moore and Wakeling, 1997, Ashworth, 1992). The original goals of healing the offender and returning him to society went unfulfilled, and legal challenges to the lack of procedural safeguards began to arise.

As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court decisions involving *Gault* and *McKeiver* proved to be a turning point for the American juvenile justice system. While *Gault* provided some protections for juvenile offenders, such as the rights to notice of the charges and counsel, *McKeiver* failed to provide juveniles with the right to a jury trial

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comparable to adults (Feld, 1999a; 1999b, 1998). These legal decisions caused a change in focus from informal treatment to formal legal procedures, and transformed the original intent of the court. Rather than concentrate on the real needs of the child, sentencing procedures became preoccupied with the offense that had been committed (Feld, 1993, 1998, 1999a; Ainsworth, 1993). This shift in sentencing philosophy highlights two important issues, the conflict between punishment and treatment, and the different types of juvenile offenders in society.

The conflict between the treatment and punishment perspectives has played a continuous role in sentencing young offenders through time. The juvenile court was originally founded on its ability to treat young offenders rather than punish (Platt, 1977; Feld, 1999a), and important decisions were formulated on this assumption. The *McKeiver* decision was based on the notion that the juvenile court's function was treatment, thereby rendering the protection of a trial by jury unnecessary (Feld, 1998; 1999b). Treatment and punishment are fundamentally two separate functions, but within the juvenile court it is difficult to differentiate the two (Feld, 1993, 1998). When treatment includes a sentence to a detention facility or coercive enrollment in substance abuse counseling, the line between treatment and punishment becomes blurred. Throughout its existence, the rhetoric that founded the court has supported rehabilitation, while the reality of such treatment has become increasingly punitive (Urban, St. Cyr, and Decker, 2003). This reality is easily illustrated by the contrasting characteristics of juvenile offenders in American society.

Serious offenders. The image of the juvenile offender has changed considerably since the inception of the juvenile court. Originally children were seen as unable to form

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criminal intent (Ainsworth, 1993), and victims of the culture conflict between the capitalist elite and immigrant labor (Platt, 1977). As formal legal procedures became the focus of sentencing practices, the role of the juvenile offender was changed. Fear of crime and particularly fear of juvenile crime fueled by extraordinary and graphic media accounts produced an image of juvenile offenders as extremely violent (Singer, 1996). Television and newspaper stories relating the victimization of the elderly and other innocents prompted a public response to increase the accountability of such offenders. The 1970s saw an increase in the demands for juvenile offender accountability and more punitive sentences (Feld, 1993; Ainsworth, 1993), supported by politicians as well as the general public (Singer, 1996). This demand for accountability was focused on those juveniles who had committed violent crimes. Serious juvenile offenders were considered to be more sophisticated than the typical child, diminishing the idea that youth must be treated differently in a separate justice system (Singer, 1996; Feld, 1999a; Bishop, 2000). Laws in many states were changed during the 1970s and 1980s to focus on the “just desserts” of the offender, highlighting punishment for the current offense rather than treatment of the real needs of the child (Feld, 1993, 1998, 1999a; Ainsworth, 1993). Increases in crime and the fear of crime, combined with the emphasis on formal legal proceedings, resulted in increased punitiveness for juveniles committing serious crimes, but this philosophy was not compatible with those juveniles committing non-criminal, or status offenses.

Status offenders. During the 1960s sentencing procedures for serious juvenile offenders were becoming more punitive, while a move to reform the sentencing of status offenders was underway at the same time. Status offenses are those behaviors that would

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not be considered criminal if committed by an adult, for example incorrigibility or truancy. The 1960s saw an increase in support for labeling theory (Becker, 1963), which focused on the effect a deviant label has on the individual. Concerned legislators and court personnel began to worry that harsh treatment for non-criminal offenses may negatively affect the juvenile, particularly through this stigma and labeling as a criminal (Emerson, 1974). Three alternatives were implemented to handle status offenders in a less punitive manner: diversion, to redirect young status offenders away from the formal court system, decriminalization, which reassigns status behaviors from the delinquent to the non-delinquent category, and deinstitutionalization, which reduces the use of incarceration. Each of these options has the goal of removing status offenders from secure detention facilities, as was mandated by the Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Feld, 1993).

TRENDS IN PROBATION

A key component to both adult and juvenile sentencing structure is probation. Juvenile probation programs involve monitoring offenders in the community, and fall within one of two categories: rehabilitative (the original goal of the court) or punitive (the recent trend toward “just desserts”). The presence of both types of programs within the juvenile system demonstrates the constant struggle the court faces regarding its true role. Should juveniles be offered rehabilitative programs that treat individual problems, or punitive programs that increase surveillance and punish technical violations? The history of probation programs in the United States is closely related to the evolution of sentencing policy, and is particularly relevant to juvenile offenders. Just as the juvenile justice system experiences cycles of rehabilitative and punitive support, so the idea of

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probation cycles in and out of favor. As a result, both rehabilitative and punitive probation programs have been the subjects of much scrutiny over the years, and both approaches have supporters and opponents.

History of probation. The concept of probation for juveniles has been in existence nearly as long as the juvenile court itself, with programs flourishing for both adults and juveniles during the late 1800s and early 1900s (Dean-Myrda and Cullen, 1998; Sieh, 1993). The idea of probation fit well into the original indeterminate sentencing framework, as it kept the juvenile offender out of adult correctional facilities and focused on treatment to prevent recidivism (Dean-Myrda and Cullen, 1998). Probation officers were originally citizens who volunteered to supervise offenders in the community, but as time passed, jurisdictions formalized probation into a state run institution with salaried officers (Sieh, 1993). This concept quickly spread, and by 1920 every state in the country had a juvenile probation component in place (Dean-Myrda and Cullen, 1998). As with the structure of the court, no significant changes occurred with probation until the 1960s.

Attitudes and events that affected adult sentencing policy and programs ultimately affected juvenile programs as well. Disillusionment with the effectiveness of incarceration in the 1960s prompted an overwhelming interest in alternative sentences that were community based (Dean-Myrda and Cullen, 1998). The treatment model was popular, and probation was seen as the cure for the nation's crime problems, with the ability to provide services and support needed to rehabilitate offenders. There are indications that enforcement for such programs was lax, however, and infractions went unanswered (Langan, 1994; Maloney, Romig and Armstrong, 1988). Thus, the

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expectation of “curing” the crime problem went unfulfilled, and this solution was quickly replaced with the attitude that probation programs did not provide enough accountability for offenders. Those who supported “get tough” legislation in the 1970s encouraged a more punitive response, but for most states the only available punishment was incarceration (Tonry, 1998), and jail and prison admissions began to rise substantially (Dean-Myrda and Cullen, 1998). The extensive use of incarceration as a response to crime created yet another policy problem: American correctional facilities, for both adults and juveniles, became excessively overcrowded. Courts needed an approach that held offenders more accountable than regular probation, but did not include incarceration. Again, community corrections were offered as the solution, and the concept of intermediate sanctioning was created, with programs less restrictive than incarceration but more intensive than regular probation. The main goal of such programs was not rehabilitation, however, but to lower costs to the justice system by reducing prison use, while satisfying the public that appropriate punishment was being administered (Tonry, 1998; Langan, 1994).

Current practices. The juvenile justice system has been influenced by these policy shifts, especially in regards to taking more punitive action against serious offenders. Juvenile probation today involves procedures very similar to those used for adults. For those juveniles facing a formal charge, probation involves official monitoring by an officer of the court, and non-compliance with conditions of probation can result in return to detention (Clear and Dammer, 2000). In keeping with the original mandate of the court, however, juvenile probation is seen as more compatible with rehabilitation than adult probation, and juvenile probationers are frequently offered treatment options in

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addition to increased surveillance (Clear and Dammer, 2000). Drug treatment, anger management, counseling, life skills training, community service, electronic and curfew (i.e. Nightwatch) monitoring are just a few of the possibilities for a juvenile on probation today. As noted above, some of these programs are rehabilitative, focusing on treatment, and some are punitive, focusing on increased surveillance, and often a juvenile may participate in both simultaneously.

A NEW PARADIGM

A recurrent problem for the juvenile court is the disparity between stated goals and objectives and actual practices. Reform of the court and its practices has occurred several times since its inception in response to this disillusionment (Feld, 1999a; Singer, 1996; Bernard, 1992; Moore and Wakeling, 1997). A recent trend in juvenile sentencing has been to integrate the concepts of accountability and reduced punitiveness. Programs based on the concept of restorative justice have been introduced to focus on accountability of the offender and repairing harm done to the victim, while reducing the punitive aspects of punishment (Braithwaite, 1989), specifically the implementation of Balanced and Restorative Justice (BARJ) techniques (Bazemore and Umbreit, 1999).

The main goal of the restorative model is to achieve a more balanced approach to justice. Rather than being offender-focused, the BARJ approach seeks a balance between offender, victim, and community (Bazemore and Umbreit, 1995, 1999; National Institute of Corrections, 2001). Strict punishment of the offender is not the main focus, but repairing the harm caused by crime. The main objective is to restore victims, restore offenders, and restore the community, in a way that is beneficial to all stakeholders harmed by the crime (Bazemore and Umbreit, 1995; Braithwaite, 1999). As a result,

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individual victims as well as communities are given a much larger role than in traditional criminal justice settings. Victims are given more opportunities to express the impact of the crime on their lives, and the community is empowered to address local issues and provide strong role models for reintegrating youthful offenders (Bazemore and Umbreit, 1999; National Institute of Corrections, 2001). In addition, offenders are held accountable to the people they have harmed (rather than a judge or prosecutor) and must take responsibility for their actions.

The philosophy of the juvenile court has changed dramatically through time, with opinions about proper handling of juvenile offenders constantly changing. This shifting of opinions creates an environment well suited for uncertainty. Modifications in penal philosophy have led to changes in programs, policies, and procedures for juvenile courts across the country. Over time, the philosophy behind the juvenile court swings from the treatment model to the punitive model, and back again. When the juvenile court first began, organizers and the public were optimistic about the possibility of stopping juvenile delinquency by treating poor, underclass children in the work houses (Bernard, 1992; Feld, 1999; Platt, 1977). As time passed and juvenile delinquency remained, the pendulum shifted to a more punitive response to juvenile misbehavior. Treatment appeared too soft, and the court began to “get tough” on criminal behavior. Recently the pendulum has begun to swing back, after acknowledgment that punitive techniques fail to produce the desired results. This realization that current punitive practices lack effectiveness has caused juvenile courts across the country to re-examine current practices and search for promising alternatives, such as restorative justice.

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JUVENILE JUSTICE IN ST. LOUIS

Missouri in general and St. Louis in particular were not immune to these shifts in opinion about the juvenile justice system. When Missouri first implemented a juvenile justice system, the treatment philosophy drove decision-making, just as in other jurisdictions around the country (St. Louis City Family Court, 2001). St. Louis was forced to answer the legislative challenges that arose in the 1960s and 1970s, similar to other jurisdictions that also struggled with the conflict between treatment and punishment. Problems with juvenile crime and violence arose in St. Louis as in other parts of the country, and a response by the juvenile court was needed. The St. Louis City Family Court responded with a purpose clause that stated the purpose of the Juvenile Division is to “facilitate the care, protection and discipline of children who come within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court” (St Louis City Family Court, 1988). This mission statement is not overly harsh, but places the focus on discipline for offenders rather than rehabilitation. The court unveiled a new mission and vision statement in November 2004, which states the “mission of the City of St. Louis Family Court—Juvenile Division is to administer justice with compassion, dignity and respect and in a manner that promotes child protection, safe communities, and juvenile competency through holding juveniles accountable, repairing harm to victims, and strengthening families” (Family Court, 2004). This statement aligns more closely with the restorative paradigm, by including victims and the community into the plan. The mission is still to make juveniles accountable for their actions, but the court recognizes the underlying problems of weak families and communities, and its vision is to provide assistance for these key correlates of delinquency.

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Thus, the court in St. Louis has experienced the same tensions between treatment and punishment regarding juvenile sentencing policy as many jurisdictions across the nation. The St. Louis Family Court is no exception when it comes to offering both rehabilitative and punitive programming for its clients on probation, and the jurisdiction struggles with its own goals for juveniles in the city. This tension is particularly pronounced in light of the serious nature of some of the juvenile crime in the city. A strict response is needed for youth immersed in gang and drug related violent crimes, in order to protect citizens. Many youth that come into contact with the court, however, are first (and only) offenders, that would benefit from treatment programs such as tutoring and job readiness programs. The problems that plague St. Louis, whether from violence or difficulty in getting services to those who need them, are the same problems that exist in many other cities across the country. In this way, any conclusions that may be drawn from this study of Nightwatch may be useful to other jurisdictions.

GENERALIZABILITY

Research involving individuals in a specific jurisdiction is often limited in its generalizability to other jurisdictions. The current research is no exception, but can still be useful when discussing general program issues. Identifying obstacles to implementation and pitfalls to communication can assist other jurisdictions in formulating a successful plan to realize expected results. Conversely, recognizing elements of implementation that are successful can provide guides for design or organization.

Other generalizations may be made based on the theories tested. This study can be compared to prior research, and some general conclusions may emerge. A support of

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previously tested theoretical assumptions may provide general support for program components or methods.

PLAN OF THE STUDY

This dissertation is organized into segments designed to provide relevant information, research plans, analysis, and reporting of research findings. The first chapter has placed the current research in historical context and introduced the theoretical basis for the evaluation of Nightwatch outcomes. Critical components of an evaluation include a statement of the problem, description of the program (including goals and objectives, and activities to reach those goals), the rationale behind such activities (why it is expected to work), the expected results, and measurement and analysis of actual results. The following chapters will address these components. Chapters Two through Four provide background information to place this research in its proper perspective. Chapter Two presents the statement of the problem, and describes the program, its goals, origins, and current practices. Nightwatch was implemented with new ideas and procedures, rather than absorbing systems already in place. Significant changes occurred from initial ideas to current operations. Chapter Three summarizes the major criminological theories that represent the rationale behind the program. The principal components of restorative justice will be explained, as the St. Louis City Family Court has adopted a restorative philosophy to guide court programs and functioning. Nightwatch was designed to keep juveniles off the street through enforcement of court ordered curfew, and the pertinent theories used to evaluate program outcomes address deterrence and opportunity. Chapter Four reviews current literature relevant not only to the implementation of the program, but to pertinent criminological theories as well.

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Juvenile justice interventions have received significant notice and will be reviewed, specifically in the areas of probation and curfew ordinances. In addition, developments in deterrence and lifestyle/routine activity theories are documented, particularly a review of previous research. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven provide the details regarding the measurement and analysis of actual results. Chapter Five outlines the methods used for the current study. Sample selection, data collection, measurement of key variables, statistical techniques, and data analysis are all included. Chapter Six presents results of the process evaluation, as well as details of the study sample, including demographic and offense characteristics. Chapter Seven reports bivariate correlations of pertinent variables, as well as multivariate findings. Chapter Eight ends with discussion and conclusions, and offers several policy and research implications. References and Appendices are supplied following Chapter Eight.

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PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

The Nightwatch program emerged in St. Louis as a result of several opportunities and experiences. High levels of juvenile crime, including gang-related crime, provided the motivation, funding available through the federal Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants (JAIBG) Program provided resources, and the SafeFutures program already in existence provided a guide for operations. Each of these factors will be explained, and a detailed narrative of the program, its goals, challenges to implementation, and operations will be provided.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

St. Louis leaders identified two major problems in the city, involving levels of crime and disproportionate minority confinement. Similar to the rest of the nation (Tonry and Moore, 1998), St. Louis experienced high levels of youth violence, particularly gang and firearm violence, in the early 1990s. A large proportion of the juvenile population (roughly 20%) had been referred to the court, and approximately one third of the juveniles who were referred for delinquency could be classified as chronic offenders (Decker and Curry, 2001a). In addition, an examination of St. Louis Metropolitan Police

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Department and St. Louis City Family Court records found that black males were in fact disproportionately represented in the St. Louis juvenile justice system (St. Cyr, Decker, and Curry, 2002). Black males were an overwhelming and disproportionate majority at both the arrest and detention stages. The court, police, and city officials were anxious to identify programs that could be funded through JAIBG and address the city's juvenile crime problems in an equitable manner.

JAIBG ORIGINS

The federal government enacted legislation and federal agencies provided the framework necessary to implement accountability-based programs across the country. In 1997 Congress passed the Appropriations Act, which allotted over \$200 million for the JAIBG program. The new block grant program was administered by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), with funds available beginning in fiscal year 1998. OJJDP is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, within the U.S. Department of Justice. This agency awarded local block grants to individual jurisdictions, each selecting how to allocate funding according to their unique circumstances. Funds were earmarked to provide needed improvements in the juvenile justice system infrastructure as well as programs for dealing with offenders.

Accountability is the main focus for JAIBG. Not only are juvenile offenders accountable for their actions, but juveniles, families, and the juvenile justice system are all accountable for creating strong communities (Danneger, Cohen, Hayes, and Holden, 1999). Eligibility for funding was contingent upon several legislative and utilization criteria.

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States were required to revise policies, procedures or laws that did not conform to JAIBG mandates. Each state was compelled to meet four areas of certification in order to be eligible for JAIBG funds (Dannegger et al., 1999):

- 1) Juveniles age 15 or over who are alleged to have committed a “serious violent crime” are subject to criminal prosecution by operation of law or prosecutor direct file;
- 2) Sanctions are imposed on juvenile offenders for every delinquent act, including probation violation, and sanctions escalate for each subsequent more serious offense or probation violation;
- 3) Establish a system of juvenile delinquency records that subjects juvenile felony offenders who have a prior delinquency adjudication to having their records treated in a manner equivalent to adult records, including submission of such records to the FBI; and
- 4) Ensure that State law does not prohibit juvenile court judges from issuing court orders requiring parental supervision of a juvenile offender and from imposing sanctions for violations of such orders.

In addition, a policy of testing for use of controlled substances for an appropriate category of juveniles within the juvenile justice system must be implemented by January 1, 1999 (Albert, 1998; Danegger et al., 1999). States that had or were willing to adopt such policies were qualified to receive a portion of the newly allocated federal monies.

In addition to legislative changes, states were subject to other program requirements. OJJDP originally specified twelve purpose areas for which funds would be awarded (Danegger et al., 1999):

- Construction of juvenile detention or correctional facilities, including training of personnel.
- Accountability-based sanctions programs.
- Hiring of judges, probation officers, and public defenders; funding of pretrial services.
- Hiring of prosecutors.
- Funding of prosecutor-led drug, gang, and violence programs.
- Provision of technology, equipment, and training programs for prosecutors.
- Probation programs.
- Gun courts.
- Drug courts.
- Information sharing systems.

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- Accountability-based programs for law enforcement referrals or those that are designed to protect students and school personnel from drug, gang, and youth violence.
- Controlled substance testing (including interventions) for juveniles in the juvenile justice system.

The percentage of funds spent in each of the purpose areas is prescribed in the Appropriations Act, and in certain instances States must provide matching funds (Albert, 1998; Danegger, et al. 1999).

Guidelines were provided by OJJDP to assist in identifying appropriate purpose areas for individual jurisdictions. Agencies were encouraged to use a results-based approach to decide which programs and strategies would be appropriate for their specific needs. A Coordinated Enforcement Plan (CEP) must be formulated, utilizing input from a variety of law enforcement and social service agencies. Police, prosecutors, probation, juvenile court, schools, businesses, and religious, nonprofit, or other social service agencies are recommended to participate. The CEP is an overall plan for using JAIBG funds to reduce juvenile crime, improve the juvenile justice system, and increase accountability of juvenile offenders (Danneger et al., 1999).

Changes to the JAIBG program occurred beginning in fiscal year 2004. The most obvious change being in the name of the program, which was changed to the Juvenile Accountability Block Grants (JABG) program. Accountability was still the driving force behind the purpose areas, with four new areas and new provisions for funding, eligibility, and reporting (Andrews and Marble, 2003). The four new purpose areas consisted of new additions as well as the revision of existing areas. New areas introduced included the development and implementation of graduated sanctions, training for law enforcement, court, and detention personnel, establishment of risk and needs assessments,

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establishment of juvenile records systems, and the institution of restorative justice programs (Andrews and Marble, 2003). Revisions to the original purpose areas included combining the areas related to funding for prosecutors, as well as reworking the specifics related to school safety, gun courts, and court staffing and services (Andrews and Marble, 2003).

Other important provisions regarding funding, eligibility, and reporting were also implemented under JABG. Funding levels were reduced, not only for specific components such as research and evaluation, but for the overall funding level approved by Congress (Andrews and Marble, 2003). Eligibility requirements were relaxed, however, with states no longer subject to the mandates such as juvenile certification as listed above. A new provision designed to monitor grant expenditures and effectiveness requires states to submit annual reports. A summary of grant activities and expenditures is mandatory, with results compiled by OJJDP and presented to Congress (Andrews and Marble, 2003).

JAIBG AND JUVENILE JUSTICE

The criteria and mandates required to obtain JAIBG funding are an example of the shift in the American juvenile justice system away from treatment and toward accountability of the offender. Eligibility for funding rests on compliance with the areas of certification mentioned above. Three out of four of those certification areas deal with stricter punitive consequences for juveniles as well as their parents. Transfer to adult court for any juvenile age 15 or over for certain crimes and mandatory graduated sanctioning for every misdeed affect the juvenile, while court orders requiring supervision affect parents. In addition, nearly all of the purpose areas identified for

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funding either mention accountability specifically or include court-based personnel and programs. Accountability is addressed generally through mandatory graduated sanctioning, as well as specifically in relation to schools and drug, gang, and youth violence. Other purpose areas focus on the role of the state in dealing with juvenile offenders, by funding prosecutors, judges, and probation officers, as well as specific court programs such as gun or drug courts. The first purpose area listed for funding involves the expansion of juvenile detention facilities, highlighting a “just desserts” handling of juvenile offenders.

The reformulation of JABG indicates an interest in programs that operate under the restorative justice umbrella, again highlighting the shifting nature of juvenile justice policy. Many of the original JAIBG directives do not coincide with the alternative paradigm of restorative justice, because of the focus on court-based accountability. Both the original JAIBG directives and restorative justice focus on offender accountability, but the restorative approach emphasizes accountability toward victims and communities, rather than the state (Bazemore and Umbreit, 1995).

JAIBG IN ST. LOUIS

Several circumstances within St. Louis motivated local leaders to find and implement new strategies for dealing with juvenile offenders that could be funded through JAIBG. High levels of youth violence, recognition of disproportionate minority confinement, the lessons learned from project SafeFutures, and the introduction of the restorative justice paradigm all played a role in the search for new programs. The problems of high juvenile crime and disproportionate minority confinement were already noted, and the court sought programs and policies that would provide a uniform

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application of accountability for all offenders under its jurisdiction. Nightwatch fit these criteria, as its goals address the issue of community safety, and all juveniles who come into contact with the court are eligible to be assigned.

Prior to the availability of JAIBG funds, the St. Louis Family Court sought to ease the problem of juvenile crime with the SafeFutures project, which was in effect from 1991 to 1994. The goal of SafeFutures was to provide a continuum of services that addresses multiple needs of offenders and their families. This coordinated effort helped lay the groundwork for programs under JAIBG. Evaluation of the SafeFutures and Comprehensive Communities programs indicated that programs effective at reducing juvenile delinquency must hold juveniles accountable, require strong and graduated sanctions for delinquency, provide a comprehensive and integrated network of services, and involve active participation from both police and community groups (Decker, 2000; Decker and Curry, 2001a). The court took these recommendations into consideration when suggesting programs to fund under JAIBG.

The introduction of the restorative paradigm at the St. Louis Family Court required an examination of court policies and practices to assess the restorative content. While the restorative philosophy is not a comfortable fit with JAIBG purpose areas, the court attempted to implement programs and procedures that integrate the two. The St. Louis City Family Court has struggled to mesh the philosophy of restorative justice with some of the more punitive components involved in maintaining JAIBG funding.

Initial stages. The state of Missouri and the jurisdiction of the St. Louis City Family Court—Juvenile Division chose to make the necessary legislative and policy changes in order to receive JAIBG funding in 1998. This includes following the

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suggestions derived from the results-based decision making of the CEP, creating a matrix of graduated sanctions, and providing approval for the hiring of proper personnel.

In order to take advantage of the newly created block grant, a Juvenile Crime Enforcement Coalition (JCEC) was formed to identify the city's needs and recommend programs to be funded. The coalition consisted of several organizations and agencies that considered themselves stakeholders in the safety and welfare of St. Louis. Among the agencies comprising the initial JCEC were St. Louis City Family Court personnel and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers, who represented the formal law enforcement component in the city. The Office of Neighborhood Stabilization (ONS) and the Department of Human Services from the Mayor's office were also included, representing city government. The community was represented by administrators from the St. Louis Public School system, the faith-based community and local social service and child advocacy agencies. Researchers from the University of Missouri—St. Louis were also included, providing theoretical and practical knowledge about promising programs, as well as evaluation of the programs chosen. The JCEC met several times in early 1999 to discuss the needs of each organization as well as St. Louis as a whole, and a Coordinated Enforcement Plan was developed. Agencies were given the opportunity to suggest programs and ideas that could be funded through the new JAIBG grant. Each organization was queried regarding existing programs that would fall under the JAIBG umbrella and be eligible for grant funds, as well as informed about promising new interventions. Several recommendations were made, and in 1999 the committee chose to implement seven programs, including Nightwatch. The program had a projected start-up date of October 1999, but did not actually get underway until March 2000. The St. Louis

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City Family Court—Juvenile Division was designated to oversee the program, as participants were referred to the program via the court system. Several aspects of the JAIBG grant generally and program and agency details specifically have changed significantly since initial introduction.

Implementation. The implementation of new programs is often a slow and highly unpredictable endeavor. Programs are designed and implemented, only to experience logistic and communication dilemmas as the agency adapts to new procedures (Gottfredson, 1998; Decker and Curry, 2001b). The St. Louis City Family Court—Juvenile Division was no exception as new programs were implemented and a new paradigm for dealing with offenders was adopted. Implementation problems affected the programs eligible for funding, and changes in cooperating agencies affected the original structure of the grant. In addition, the court was introducing the new paradigm of restorative justice, which created its own uncertainties.

After the first grant year, decisions were made regarding which programs to continue funding for the second fiscal year. Two programs were eliminated, and others continued with minor improvements, including Nightwatch. By the third year, only four remained: Multisystemic Therapy (MST), for intensive in-home treatment; Juveniles and the Law, to educate juveniles of their responsibilities under the law; Mentoring, Instruction, Nutrition, and Education (MINE), teaching life skills; and Nightwatch. These programs were able to survive because of successful collaboration with outside agencies, as well as evidence of success in meeting stated goals.

Not only were there changes in the programs funded by JAIBG, there were changes in the agencies involved in the JCEC. Originally the St. Louis City Public

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Schools were seen as a key component to the program, but were unable to sustain the infrastructure needed to remain a part of the design. In addition to the schools, other service agencies were also eliminated from the JCEC after the first year. Delays in implementation of programs caused certain agencies to be ineligible for funding after the first year, as proper documentation of program success was not available. Many key agencies have remained strong participants within the JCEC, however, most notably the Office of Neighborhood Stabilization, the St. Louis City Metropolitan Police Department, and the University of Missouri—St. Louis.

These challenges in program implementation were a result of problems that arose through court collaboration with other agencies. The court, police, and other social service agencies all had the same goal of providing services to help the children and neighborhoods of St. Louis, but collaborating proved difficult. The court had done business the same way for the past one hundred years since its inception, and asking staff to alter these traditions proved difficult. Court personnel were accustomed to handling cases without much assistance from police or other social service agencies, but the shift toward restorative justice caused this to change. Using a restorative and holistic approach to dealing with offenders required court staff to refer juveniles on their caseload not only to other court programs but to outside agencies as well. Unfortunately, there was little communication about services available or how to accomplish referrals, causing confusion and a lack of support for the new procedures. This disorganization affected not only the Court but the entire original JAIBG structure.

The original JAIBG proposal was structured to provide services to juveniles who came into contact with the court, whether within the court system or from other local

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social service agencies. There was no central organization, however, which meant no monitoring of effectiveness or case flow. Local service providers were prepared and anxious to receive referrals from the court, but referrals were slow in coming. There was no oversight of the local agencies, and thus no information about referral numbers or types. Thus, what began as a multi-agency collaboration between the Juvenile Court, police, schools, and local service agencies became more focused in the court, to accomplish the tasks of oversight and information management.

The biggest change for the court was implementing restorative justice practices. Even though the court's purpose clause did not include punishment or retribution, the sentencing trends since the 1970s still affected how the court treated juveniles under its control. After years of punitive sanctions, the concepts behind restorative justice were difficult to convey to court staff. Many court workers were confused about the differences between punitive and reparative sanctions (terms they had never heard before), so rather than try something new and confusing, they deferred to what was familiar. As programs have been established and court personnel have seen promising results, the support for the new programs has grown. Referrals to restorative programs have increased gradually, emphasizing that systemic change is slow and difficult. For the most part restorative practices are the exception rather than the rule, and restorative programs such as Victim/Offender Mediation and Neighborhood Accountability Boards are seen as separate programs, rather than an integrated approach in how to deal with youthful offenders. This systemic change from punitive to restorative justice has been difficult for court staff, but the St. Louis City Family Court—Juvenile Division has made

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significant strides and will continue to support the shift toward restorative justice in St. Louis.

The St. Louis City Family Court has encountered many challenges to the successful implementation of JAIBG. The original plans for specific programs were changed due to lack of external agency support, or underuse by court staff. The idea of multi-agency collaboration and restorative justice were new to the court, and communicating these ideas to court staff proved difficult. This funding source was successfully implemented, however, due to strong support from court and city staff.

Sustainability. Credit for the successful implementation and sustainability of the JAIBG grant in general as well as that of specific programs can be attributed to both court and city administrators. The Administrative Judge and Juvenile Court Administrator fully supported the implementation of new programs and encouraged court staff to make the proper referrals. This support insured that the programs would be consistently delivered, and would be sustained over time. Because of this judicial and administrative support, programs can run more smoothly and deputy juvenile officers (DJOs) can be more confident in their decisions. Recommendations can be given regarding juvenile offenders with the knowledge that the judge will support and uphold the action when the juvenile appears in court.

The City Office of Neighborhood Stabilization also played a key role in the success of JAIBG programs. This office supervised the administration of the grant and assisted with crucial coordination and logistic issues. The Office of Neighborhood Stabilization provided essential administrative support, while the Administrative Judge

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and Juvenile Court Administrator provided daily support to court staff apprehensive about how to implement these new programs.

The biggest challenges for the court came from attempting to implement new programs and a new paradigm without a central supervisor. The court addressed these issues by creating a Special Services Department in 2001, to centralize JAIBG activities. This centralization of the procedures significantly improved service delivery, and insured sustainability through standardization and increased monitoring of procedures.

Initial efforts to implement new programs funded by JAIBG within the city of St. Louis were disorganized and struggled to introduce changes in policies and procedures. Some of the stumbling blocks included a lack of communication of new ideas, and difficulty in collaboration between agencies. A lack of communication and clear understanding of JAIBG purposes slowed the realization of goals, because those in charge of creating the new programs were not necessarily those in charge of implementing them. Court staff were unsure of exactly what was expected of them, as the court was changing procedures that had been in place for a very long time. Court staff were struggling with new ideas as well as new procedures. Court staff that were unaware or unwilling to refer juveniles to outside agencies underutilized this component of the initial plan, and as a result nearly all of these programs were discontinued. The original formulation of the program called for services to be spread over a large number of agencies, but the lack of referrals to the outside resulted in a concentration of services within the court. The keys to success and sustainability came from the administrative level. The support of the Administrative Judge and upper administration insured that

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utilizing new programs and procedures would be encouraged. The centralization of operations insured stability and consistency in program practices.

THE PROGRAM

Nightwatch is not an extension of existing practices, but the creation of new policies and procedures to address youth violence and crime in St. Louis. Organizational meetings between St. Louis City Family Court—Juvenile Division personnel, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), other agencies as mentioned above, and academics finalized details and put the program in place. Program goals and operations were determined, as well as logistics and funding, and implementation was monitored to ascertain if changes were needed. The program is a collaborative effort between the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, the St. Louis City Family Court—Juvenile Division, and the University of Missouri—St. Louis. Juveniles are assessed for risk factors, randomly selected to be visited in their homes to check curfew compliance, and followed up with additional action if necessary.

The purpose of Nightwatch is to check the court ordered curfew of juveniles on probation. By communicating to juveniles the possibility of a Nightwatch crew visiting their home and checking on their compliance, the goal of the program is to deter curfew-violating behavior, which will affect other factors indirectly. Enforcing curfew can incidentally affect many others beyond the juvenile, including family, neighbors, and schools. This section will address such intended outcomes, challenges encountered during implementation, as well as profile how the program operates, and changes put in place to deal with such issues.

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Goals and intended outcomes. The goals of Nightwatch have direct and indirect outcomes on juveniles and others in the community. The stated goals and intended outcomes of the program are:

- To check the Court ordered curfew of juveniles on probation
- To increase community safety
- To hold juvenile offenders accountable for their actions
- To prevent crime/reduce recidivism
- To improve school attendance and performance

The main goal of Nightwatch is to enforce the court ordered curfew of juveniles under court supervision. Juveniles assigned to Nightwatch include both official and unofficial referrals. All juveniles under official court supervision for which a petition has been filed are eligible for the program. These juveniles were placed in detention upon referral to the court, and one of the stipulations of their release is to participate in Nightwatch, with a specific curfew time noted. Enforcement of any graduated sanctions can be facilitated through court order, and any violation of the release can result in return of the juvenile to detention, if necessary. In addition, juveniles with unofficial or truancy referrals may also be included at the discretion of their assigned DJO. For these juveniles, participation is not court-ordered and thus return to detention is not a sanction option, but supervision is increased and graduated sanctions are still applied for violations.

Other goals of the Nightwatch program identify the expected results. The program seeks not only to make the community a safer place, but also provide benefits to the juveniles who are assigned to it. Juveniles assigned to the program can benefit through reduced recidivism, reduced victimization, and increased school attendance and performance. A reduction in recidivism can be beneficial to the juvenile by way of fewer

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court referrals and less court contact. The reduction in victimization is not a stated goal in and of itself on written lists of intended outcomes, but is repeatedly mentioned when discussing the program with court staff. The benefit of less victimization is obvious, in that the juvenile will have more personal safety. Finally, another benefit to the juvenile is improved school attendance and performance. A student who must be home by 7:00 p.m. is more likely (although not guaranteed) to be well rested and at school on time than a student who is not home until midnight. Moreover, positive school experiences can prevent dropouts and increase future employment opportunities for young adults.

Challenges to implementation. The Nightwatch program was based on the collaboration between police and court personnel taken from other jurisdictions such as Massachusetts and Indianapolis, but St. Louis experienced several challenges unique to the city, its services and population. Many difficulties experienced for JAIBG in general also applied specifically to Nightwatch. The directives included in the JAIBG certification areas involved concepts and procedures that were completely new to court staff. The most significant challenges emerged from the need to alter sanctioning practices, and the lack of a central supervisor.

Nightwatch presented new challenges for staff, not only because every violation of curfew must result in a sanction, but also due to the nature of those sanctions. First, Court staff were not accustomed to handing out immediate consequences for every violation. The JAIBG certification areas specified that the juvenile must be accountable for every violation of probation, including curfew. Sanctioning every Nightwatch violation involved a systemic change to the way cases were handled by the court. In the past, many probation violations were ignored, and sanctions only imposed for a referral

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for a new offense. The concept of imposing a sanction for every transgression was new and difficult to get into practice. Second, the types of sanctions needed for Nightwatch violations were new and unclear for court staff. The system of graduated sanctions was a new concept, and finding a sufficient number of reparative sanctions under the new restorative paradigm was challenging. Initially sanctions were far from reparative (cleaning unit offices), and graduated sanctions included punitive measures as well. A first Nightwatch violation resulted in calling the juvenile to reprimand, second violation resulted in an extra office visit, and a third violation resulted in detention. Not only were these sanctions punitive, they were taxing on court and police resources. Over time, DJOs have begun to use more restorative and more varied sanctions, but the concept of using a progressively harsher sanction for each new violation is still not accepted court-wide. Not only did these daily aspects of sanctioning change, but the supervision of the program changed as well. The organizational structure that oversees the program has become more centralized, and this has affected all aspects of the program.

When Nightwatch was initially put into operation, no central supervision existed to monitor implementation and functioning. The Delinquency section of the Family Court was divided into three field Units: A, B, and Intensive Supervision (ISU). These field units provided services to juveniles in satellite offices at city locations south (Unit A), north (Unit B), and central (Intensive Supervision). The ISU was disbanded in 2002, a result of the organizational shift toward restorative programming. In its place two Informal Treatment and Diversion Units (ITDU) were formed. Implementation of the new curfew check program was left to the discretion of the individual field unit supervisors, who themselves only had a vague idea of the program and JAIBG goals.

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There was some collaboration among field unit supervisors, but overall the initial realization of the program was haphazard and specific to each field unit. The creation of the Special Services Department organized the units and provided a central base for questions about any grant-funded programs. This department continually offers advice to the units regarding sanctioning, both in terms of immediate consequences for all violations, as well as ideas for more reparative sanctioning. A 2004 restructuring of the court placed the field units under the direct supervision of the Special Services Manager. This increased the consistency in approach to all aspects of juvenile court supervision, and created a more direct link between some of the JABG program supervisors and line staff.

Just as the JAIBG grant in general experienced challenges to implementation, Nightwatch in particular did as well. The move toward restorative justice affected all court staff in all programs, and details regarding sanctioning practices were particularly problematic for staff with clients assigned to Nightwatch. Many challenges for Nightwatch were resolved with the introduction of centralized supervision through the Special Services Unit. Nightwatch has experienced changes in all aspects, from the general points mentioned above to the specifics of program activities, including case selection, home visits, and follow-up procedures.

Program Activities. The original Nightwatch plan called for cases to be selected randomly each night based solely on the risk assessment for the juvenile. The court uses a standardized checklist (Appendix A) to establish the risk score for a juvenile, which ascertains the child's risk of re-offending and need for social services. The assigned DJO fills out the assessment, and many of the questions are somewhat subjective in nature. In

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this way, different officers may answer a given question differently. For example, one officer may find a parent effective in their parenting style, while another finds it lacking and rate the juvenile with a higher risk score. Nonetheless, the assessment has been tested and accepted by all juvenile justice systems across the state. Some answers may elicit a response with a negative number, such as school behavior. If a juvenile is assessed to have positive school behavior, the score is -1. This method of scoring explains any juveniles with a negative score. The assessment assigns a risk score for the juvenile, as well as denotes the level of risk, either “low,” “moderate,” or “high.” The computer program designates any negative number through 0 as “low,” 1 through 7 as “moderate,” and 8 and above as “high.”

Originally, high-risk juveniles were to be seen three times per week, while low risk individuals were to receive one visit. Small numbers of cases in the program caused problems with this approach early in implementation. Only a few juveniles were assigned to Nightwatch, so the same individuals were put into the pool for randomization each evening, causing low risk juveniles to be seen just as frequently as high risk juveniles. Over time this criterion has been relaxed, and other factors have become important in case selection each evening.

The risk assessment is intended to be a determining factor to establish the frequency of Nightwatch visits, but other issues are also involved. Variables deciding case selection can come from the juvenile, DJO, or may involve logistic issues. The juvenile may be employed or have an activity that requires them to be away from home past the appointed curfew time, in which case they are removed from the pool of possible contacts for that evening. The juvenile’s assigned DJO may also influence the evening’s

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pool, and can make multiple requests regarding Nightwatch participation. This includes whether more frequent, less frequent, or “double-back” visits are required. Finally, logistic variables play a role in how cases are selected each evening. Each crew is assigned an area, approximately one-third of the city. Crews are reluctant to spend excessive time between stops, going from the extreme northern portion of the area to the extreme southern portion and back again. Thus, every attempt is made to cluster visits each night by zip code to insure maximum efficiency. The original structure of Nightwatch called for randomized visits based solely on the risk assessment tool. Small numbers of cases and logistic problems led to the adoption of multiple factors as criteria for selection on a given evening. Once a juvenile is randomly selected or requested via DJO for a visit, the Nightwatch crew takes over.

A Nightwatch home visit entails a face-to-face check that the juvenile is at home by the assigned crew. Procedures outlined in the original proposal have more or less remained the same throughout implementation. The original plan called for three crews consisting of a St. Louis MPD Officer and a St. Louis City Family Court DJO visit up to twenty homes each night, Sunday through Thursday. The Nightwatch DJO differs from the assigned DJO in that only a report regarding the home visit is made. The responsibility to follow up rests with the assigned DJO.

While the Nightwatch DJO is not necessarily the juvenile’s assigned DJO, several strategies are used to maintain consistency and communication within units. In some cases, the Nightwatch DJO *is* the assigned DJO, and every attempt is made to designate court staff to the crew that will visit juveniles on their own caseload. This allows for an extra, unannounced visit between the juvenile’s family and the DJO. If the assigned DJO

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is not available, often a DJO or supervisor from the same field unit be on the crew, and that individual will have at least a rudimentary knowledge of and familiarity with the juvenile through seeing them at the unit office.

Police and court employees volunteer for overtime hours (paid by the JAIBG grant), with shifts lasting from 6:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. The Nightwatch crew is furnished with names, addresses, and photos of the juveniles to be visited for the evening. For each individual, a Nightwatch case contact is completed (Appendix B). Information is recorded regarding whether or not the child was at home, and any problems the parents may be experiencing with the child's behavior. Any juvenile who is not home and does not have a valid excuse will be considered in violation and invoke a sanction.

Overall, the procedures for home visits have remained the same throughout program implementation. One change that has occurred is the introduction of "double-back" visits. A juvenile suspected of leaving the house after curfew check is recommended for a double-back visit, and receives two visits in one night. The recommendation can come from the assigned DJO, parents, or the Nightwatch crew if they suspect the juvenile will leave after the curfew check is complete. Another recent change in operations is a reduction in the number of evenings crews are on the street. Because of budgetary cuts in fiscal year 2004, the court and police have chosen to reduce the number of Nightwatch evenings to four. Rather than a set Sunday through Thursday schedule, crews conduct home visits on four of the five evenings, chosen at random. This strategy will reduce costs for the agencies while maintaining a high level of supervision. Following each Nightwatch visit, information that is collected is relayed to a number of individuals for further action.

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Data are utilized by a number of groups to follow up on each evening's visits. A copy of the case contact sheet is forwarded to the assigned DJO, and any sanctions or rewards earned are documented. Every violation earns a sanction, and the number of successful visits to earn a reward has changed through time. At the beginning of the program, any juvenile who was at home for five successive visits earned a small reward, typically fast-food gift certificates. In October 2003 this procedure was changed to a reward every eight successful visits, due to the decreased budget to purchase rewards.

The information collected at each visit is also entered into a Nightwatch database. Originally this task was performed by field unit secretaries, but later fell under the duties of the JAIBG liaison. This staff position created in 2001 orchestrates the program, including scheduling of juveniles and crews, monitoring sanctions required, and maintaining the database. This is a specific example of increased efficiency and standardization due to a centralization of procedures within the Special Services Department. Information collected for the database includes whether or not the juvenile was in compliance with curfew and any sanctions applied. This information is forwarded the morning after the visit to the University of Missouri—St. Louis for analysis and feedback. University researchers assess the percentage of juveniles in compliance with their curfew, controlling for risk score. These results are shared during monthly JAIBG meetings at the court, to supply ongoing feedback to the program supervisors. This aspect of data collection for juvenile participation was consistently collected, and has remained fairly stable throughout the program implementation. Other forms of data collection experienced significant changes through time, however.

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The Family Court—Juvenile Division is constantly assessing its programs in an attempt to improve service delivery. The court utilizes “satisfaction surveys” from clients to inquire about a broad range of topics, from courteousness of court staff to usefulness of court programs. In addition to collecting information regarding the juvenile and curfew compliance, the court asks parents for their feedback concerning Nightwatch. The compilation of this information was not as consistent or methodical as that for the juveniles, however. Initially, parent satisfaction surveys (Appendix C) were distributed by police officers on the night of the visit. Parents are asked about the visit, including the behavior and demeanor of the crew, and any suggestions they may have for the program. In the beginning such information was collected haphazardly, without a central collection point. In September 2000 improvements were attempted, by mailing questionnaires to families following a Nightwatch visit. Again, this technique lacked consistency. In September 2002 the task of collecting follow-up information fell to the Nightwatch supervisors. These individuals are supervisors from other units at the court, who volunteer for overtime and work on a rotating schedule. The evening following the home visit, the parents of the juvenile are contacted by telephone to complete a survey. Parents are asked about several topics, including the demeanor of the Nightwatch crew and any comments they have regarding the program. If no contact can be made the evening immediately following the visit, no further attempts are made until the juvenile is selected for another visit. This provides the advantage that the memory of the visit is fresh, and specific incidents can be recalled. Over time, the collection of information using the parent satisfaction surveys has become more centralized and consistent. The comments from parents are used by the court to assess the usefulness of the program for clients and

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whether or not Nightwatch crews are meeting the goal of presenting a respectful and courteous face to the public. Satisfaction surveys can provide information about overall court performance as well as specific crews, and are an important component to the program.

Changes in the organizational structure of the court have significantly impacted the Nightwatch program throughout its implementation. Case selection and follow up procedures have become more centralized and more efficient. Consistency in procedures for home visits has been the strength of the program. Each Nightwatch visit provides the opportunity for a face-to-face meeting with the juvenile and his parents, to assess the behavior of the child as well as the services of the court.

CONCLUSION

Nightwatch visits are a collaboration between the St. Louis MPD, the St. Louis City Family Court, and the University of Missouri—St. Louis. Each organization provides a unique capacity to serve the citizens of St. Louis and insure that the programs offered are of high quality. This cooperation achieves a number of goals, including a face-to-face visit with each juvenile, collecting valuable data, and analyzing that data to evaluate program effectiveness. Procedures associated with the program have fluctuated considerably during implementation, but the desire to continue this successful collaboration and assist the youth of St. Louis has tolerated such changes.

The sustainability of the Nightwatch program can be attributed to strong support from a number of groups and individuals. Administrative support from the Office of Neighborhood Stabilization provided much needed logistic support, and strong judicial and administrative support from the Family Court provided much needed practical

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support. The centralization of program procedures within the Special Services Department provided crucial stability and organization, but the key to the program's success is the willingness and ability of the court and police personnel to cooperate and maintain this partnership.

Chapter Three Theory

Chapter Three

THEORY

Nightwatch is designed to reduce crime, reduce recidivism, and increase community safety through the enforcement of court-ordered curfew for juveniles on probation. The description of the program was presented in the previous chapter, including its goals and the activities used to reach those goals. This chapter will explain the rationale behind the program activities through deterrence and rational choice theories. The rationale of the program follows from the logic that juveniles who obey their court ordered curfew will be rewarded, while those who do not comply will be sanctioned, and compliance is monitored by random visits from the Nightwatch crew. This threat of sanction qualifies Nightwatch as a program that utilizes specific as well as general deterrence as a means of controlling the juveniles under its jurisdiction. The knowledge that an unpleasant consequence will result from failure to obey curfew will deter the juvenile, in theory, from staying out on the street, and encourage him to stay home. In addition, if a juvenile is at home, there is less opportunity for crime or victimization, and community safety is thus increased.

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DETERRENCE/RATIONAL CHOICE

Theoretical background. The original concept of deterrence is rooted in classical criminology. Early proponents of deterrence argued that current punishments were cruel and entirely discretionary, and the criminal justice system must be amended. Bentham (1962) and Beccaria, (1963) assumed that humans are endowed with free will and are rational beings, capable of calculating the costs of their behavior. The high amount of discretion within the old system did not allow individuals to calculate the costs of their behavior, and thus the threat of punishment had no deterrent effect, as it was completely unstable. Deterrence predicted that individuals aware of the costs (risk of punishment) of their behavior would choose to be law abiding (Bentham, 1962; Beccaria 1963).

Deterrence theory focuses on the costs of behavior, while rational choice theory includes both benefits and costs as elements of decision making (Liska and Messner, 1999; Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, and Matsueda, 1986). The risk of unpleasant consequences is the cost, and the individual will weigh these costs against any pleasures or benefits when choosing a path of behavior (Liska and Messner, 1999; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Three dimensions of deterrence affect the cost to the individual: severity, certainty, and celerity (swiftness) (Bentham, 1962; Liska and Messner, 1999; Gibbs, 1975). When the unpleasant consequences of behavior are strict, sure to happen, and occur soon after the act, the individual is more likely to be deterred from that behavior. Deterrence theory is commonly divided into two aspects, general and specific deterrence. General deterrence refers to the deterrent impact a law or punishment will have on society overall, while specific deterrence seeks to explain the deterrent impact of personal

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experience with law and punishment on an individual. These early notions provided the basis for current formulations of deterrence/rational choice theory, which include these concepts of calculating costs and benefits, but have expanded to address criticisms and further clarify the theory.

More recent examinations of deterrence theory have sought to define the concept in more detail and reveal contingencies that may affect the deterrability and decision making of individuals. Attempts to test deterrence illuminated many flaws and highlighted this need for a more specified model. Criticism of the theory pointed to the fact that deterrence is inherently unobservable, and thus not directly testable nor definable (Gibbs, 1975). Without concrete assumptions and hypotheses to test, the possibility of attributing spurious results to deterrence was high. Without a formal theory to indicate the deterrent role of particular situations, individuals, crimes, and punishments, tests of deterrence are of little value (Gibbs, 1975). Bentham's calculation of costs and benefits failed to specify under which conditions punishment would deter the individual (Gibbs, 1975), and failed to encompass other possible deterrent effects (or lack of such effects). In addition to general and specific deterrence, other explanations for decision-making have since been offered. The threat of punishment may have no deterrent effect on an individual because the behavior is not an act they would have considered committing anyway (Gibbs, 1975 refers to this as "absolute" deterrence; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973), or the threat may encourage deviant behavior through rebellion against the threat (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). In addition, the threat of punishment for one behavior may be perceived as too high for the individual, and cause displacement to another that is perceived to be less risky (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).

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Pogarsky (2002) formalized these deterrent effects into three offending patterns: acute conformist (those who are restrained by morals and not deterrence), incorrigible (those who are not affected by deterrence and will be deviant anyway), and those who are deterrable. Thus, formulations of deterrence theory have shifted their focus away from general social concepts and toward a more individualized examination of the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment.

Perceptual deterrence. Researchers and theorists realized that deterrence depends not only on rationality, but on how moral and personal views, and the perception of threats and punishments affect decision making. The existence of a punishment is not sufficient to assume it deters all individuals in the same manner. Every individual has a unique, subjective interpretation of a particular situation and its possible consequences, based on three factors: the communication of the threat, how the individual perceives the certainty and severity of the threat, and how the individual responds to the knowledge of the threat (Waldo and Chiricos, 1972; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980).

Communication of the threat is essential, whereby information about a given threat and its possible consequences must be clearly conveyed. Not only must the individuals be aware that a particular behavior is prohibited and will be punished, but perceptions must also exist about differences in punishments and rates of detection (Beccaria, 1963; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Gibbs, 1975). Individuals cannot be deterred from behavior if they are unaware of any negative consequences of such behavior. In addition, information can be used to interpret a given situation to the offender (Kennedy, 1997). Police or other authorities can clearly state why a particular

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sanction was given, eliminating any confusion or claims of harassment, and clarifying what the unacceptable behavior is.

The perception of the severity and certainty of the threat will differ between individuals, and will be based on prior experiences of the individual (Saltzman, Paternoster, Waldo, and Chiricos, 1982; Decker, Wright and Logie, 1993), as well as the contingencies detailed below. Different individuals will perceive the certainty and severity of a threat differently, and envision different consequences. The existence of a threat is not sufficient in and of itself, as the threat is not equally severe or certain for all individuals.

Therefore, once a threat is communicated and the individual perceives possible consequences of his actions, it is assumed that the behavior of both offenders and non-offenders will be based on such knowledge and perceptions (Waldo and Chiricos, 1972). An individual will weigh his perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the threat, the certainty and severity of consequences for non-compliance, and choose his behavior accordingly.

Deterrence and crime control. Several approaches that utilize specific deterrence have been offered as possible methods to reduce crime. In each case, a specific group is targeted to receive extra attention and surveillance in order to reduce the occurrence of criminal activity. Three examples of such targeting are directed police patrols, the “broken windows” strategy, and the “pulling levers” strategy. Each of these approaches involves different participants and has different objectives. Each will be discussed, and related to the current research.

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Directed patrols originate within the police department, involve local police personnel, and seek to reduce or prevent various types of crime. Areas of high crime are identified by local authorities and targeted for more intense surveillance. This may include particular street corners or areas well known for robbery incidents. Officers are placed on special assignment, to devote all of their time on the street to the targeted area. In this way, officers are not diverted by calls for service, but may fully patrol the problem area. The rationale behind directed patrol involves the relationship between police surveillance and crime. It is assumed that heightened surveillance and a greater police presence will lower violent crime (Marvell and Moody, 1996). Programs differ in specifics of operation, but a common strategy is to utilize patrol or traffic stops in order to search for illegal weapons and reduce firearms violence (Sherman and Rogan, 1995; McGarrell, Chermak, Weiss, and Wilson, 2001), or to monitor hot spots and decrease crime in general (Cordner, 1981; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). Nightwatch can be considered a form of directed patrol, but the police work in concert with DJOs rather than alone. Police vehicles are used, and are exempt from calls for service while assigned as part of a Nightwatch crew. Any illegal activity that would occur or be suspected during a home visit could be addressed by the police officer and proper action taken.

The second strategy, the “broken windows” approach, is based within the probation component of the system. Rather than a policing tactic, it is a strategy to handle both adults and juveniles on probation in an effective manner that reduces reoffending behavior. The most important characteristic of the model is the focus on the community (Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2000). Deputy juvenile officers must interact with clients *in the community* and have extensive support networks

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available within the community to assist clients with their needs. This includes participating in community events, developing strong community relationships, and closely supervising clients to insure accountability and cooperation. Nightwatch could be considered to follow the “broken windows” model by interacting with juveniles in the community as well as holding offenders accountable for their court-ordered curfew, but other jurisdictions have placed curfew check programs within yet another model.

The “pulling levers” approach to crime control represents a collaboration between directed police patrols and the “broken windows” model. While directed police patrol utilizes police officers and the “broken windows” model utilizes DJOs, the “pulling levers” model utilizes both in a cooperative effort. Thus, a multi-agency approach is used to deal with offenders. Specific crime problems in a city are identified, and mutual associations made among agencies that can have an impact, such as local and federal police and court officials (Kennedy, Braga, Piehl, and Waring, 2001). The “pulling levers” model is a form of specific deterrence aimed at offenders and designed to take advantage of their patterns of behavior (Kennedy, 1997). Rather than target all youth in a city, the “pulling levers” approach targets only those youth most involved in serious, violent crime. In most cases, these youth are gang-involved (Kennedy, 1997; Corbett, Fitzgerald, and Jordan, 1996; Kennedy and Braga, 1998; Tita, Riley and Greenwood, 2003; McGarrell and Chermak, 2003), and participate in several behaviors that make them vulnerable to police and court intervention. It is the “pulling levers” approach that was instrumental in designing several crime control programs, including the model on which Nightwatch is based. These programs will be described and results of outcome evaluations presented in Chapter Four.

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Several strategies have been introduced by various agencies to control criminal activity through specific deterrence. The Nightwatch program utilizes the “pulling levers” method that targets only juveniles on probation, and is a collaboration between police and court officials. In order for such programs to be successful, they must include certain required components.

Required components. One required component of deterrence is communication, and was discussed earlier. The Nightwatch program fulfills this requirement by issuing a contract (see Appendix D) to both parent and child, specifying each individual’s responsibilities in the program. Parents are required to cooperate with Nightwatch staff and insure their child is home, and the juvenile is required to be home on time and cooperate with all court staff. In addition, the consequences of failure to obey curfew are spelled out. Juveniles are informed of how frequently they may expect home visits, and that a sanction will be imposed for each unexcused violation of curfew. In order for deterrence to be effective, the target audience must not only be aware that a behavior is punishable, but must have details about such punishment. Nightwatch satisfies this requirement with a behavior contract signed by both juvenile and parent upon referral to the program that communicates expectations and consequences.

Another required component of deterrence is credibility. If a threat is in no way credible, it will never produce deterrence (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Kennedy, 1997). Credibility can be tied to a particular threat, such as consequences for breaking curfew, or the issuing agent, such as the probation officer. Frequently in criminal justice situations one or both of these factors lacks credibility (Kennedy, 1997; Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, 2000). Enforcement of a given law, such as illegal parking or curfew

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violation, can never reach one hundred percent. The credibility of the threat of punishment can be increased, however, through the communication of consequences and the actual application of such consequences. In addition, agencies can increase credibility through realistic goals and procedures. One example of this is when police or other agencies promise to eradicate the existence of gangs. This goal is simply not credible (Kennedy, 1997), and the image of the police department often suffers as a consequence of this unrealistic policy. In order to be an effective deterrent, a threat must be believable to the target audience. Nightwatch is based on realistic goals and expectations, increasing its credibility for those juveniles who are assigned to it. The program is not designed to check on every juvenile every night, but only a few times a week. If this practice actually occurs, juveniles will believe the threat and may be deterred from curfew-violating behavior.

Thus far the concept of deterrence has been focused on programs and strategies that utilize the threat of punishment and what they must contain in order to be successful. The final portion of this section will explain individual contingencies that may affect perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment, and thus whether or not an individual is deterred by a particular strategy.

Contingencies. In simple terms deterrence is the weighing of costs and benefits when considering a deviant act. Several contingencies exist, however, which make the concept of deterrence much more complex (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Andenaes, 1974). The central issue is not whether punishment itself deters crime, but whether the threat of punishment is effective (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973), and under what conditions such deterrence is achieved (Andenaes, 1974). Each potential delinquent act

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includes factors unique to the situation and the individual, which may affect whether or not the individual will be deterred from a particular behavior. These include, but are not limited to, moral views, types of individuals, and the fear of shame (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Andenaes, 1974; Gibbs, 1975; Pogarsky, 2002). Any or all of these aspects may influence an individual's perceptions when weighing the costs and benefits of whether to commit a delinquent act. Each of these contingencies can affect how an individual perceives the certainty, severity, and celerity of formal punishment.

Moral view. Moral view describes those behaviors and attitudes an individual already holds as a result of their education (both formal and informal) and social participation. Individuals learn rules for proper behavior not only from formal institutions, such as police, but from informal settings within the family or other intimate groups. It is this interaction with others that determines the extent of participation in society, and thus how committed an individual is to societal norms. These views will be a stable feature of the individual, and a basis for nearly all decisions, not merely those that may involve delinquency. Two categories of moral view that may affect the mechanism of deterrence are socialization and attitude toward authority. Socialization refers to the extent to which an individual engages in and is committed to the norms of society (Hirschi, 1969; Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). These norms are communicated through personal relationships (Hirschi, 1969) as well as the criminal law (Andenaes, 1974). Juveniles are educated to these societal norms by parents, family, teachers, and other adults. Such socializing influences will communicate that some behaviors are not only wrong but involve a penalty if carried out (Andenaes, 1974). An individual's commitment to these group norms will affect the role of punishment and deterrence.

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Zimring and Hawkins (1973) refer to these as “barriers”, those thoughts and values that will influence an individual’s behavior regardless of any threat of formal sanction. When an individual has a strong moral view that an act is wrong, the threat of punishment is not necessary, as he would not commit the act anyway. A juvenile who believes breaking curfew is morally wrong will stay home regardless of the threat of a home visit by the Nightwatch crew or a formal sanction. Pogarsky (2002) categorizes such an individual as “acute conformist.” Moral views are not uniform throughout society, however, as socialization is not uniform throughout society (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Hirschi, 1969). The number and impact of socializing influences varies between individuals, and will affect many decisions and attitudes. Those individuals with strong attachments to parents, school, and conventional peers will be well socialized and adhere to societal norms of conduct, while those without these attachments will fail to adhere to norms and are more likely to participate in deviant behavior (Hirschi, 1969).

Attitude toward authority refers to an individual’s mind-set toward those in positions of power. An individual with an authoritarian personality will obey authority figures purely out of an inner need to do so (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Such individuals are highly respectful of authority and base decisions on directives from above. Some authoritarian decisions are based on a person in authority, while others are based on the law itself. Certain individuals will obey a law or order, not because they agree with it, but because of a respect for the law in and of itself (Andenaes, 1974). This attitude affects punishment and deterrence by again influencing decision-making. An individual who obeys laws purely for their own sake will not need a heavy threat of punishment. The anti-authoritarian personality would be the opposite of an authoritarian

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personality. Such individuals reject existing social institutions and view prohibitions as invitations for deviant behavior (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Rather than obey a law or order out of respect in and of itself, the anti-authoritarian will disobey a law or order out of disrespect for the commanding party. An anti-authoritarian may not be easily deterred by formal threats of punishment, as such threats would be issued by some form of authority and thus be automatically discounted. Such an individual would be classified as “incorrigible” (Pogarsky, 2002). Again, the individual’s decision making will be influenced by factors other than the purely deterrent effect of the formal threat of punishment itself. Thus, a juvenile assigned to Nightwatch may make the decision to stay home out of respect for the authority of the court, or may intentionally break curfew to rebel against such authority.

Type of individual. Just as different types of crimes may affect deterrability and decision making, different types of individuals may possibly affect deterrence as well. Research regarding human personality is extensive (see Moffitt, Avshalom, Rutter, and Silva, 2001; Agnew et al., 2002), and an exhaustive examination would be inappropriate here. Some human traits have repeatedly shown up in delinquency research, however, and serve as contingencies to examining deterrent effects. How an individual weighs the costs and benefits of a particular behavior may depend upon certain personality traits. The possible number of personality traits that could be examined is nearly limitless, so the discussion here will be limited to characteristics that are relevant to deterrence research and may be measured using standard survey techniques, namely age, sex, and impulsivity.

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The traditional age-crime curve, in which delinquency peaks at about age 17 and then steadily declines, is generally accepted by criminologists. The mechanisms for this curve are not agreed upon, however. Considerable literature exists in support of the idea of stable life behaviors (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1987), as well as in support of behavioral changes throughout life (Sampson and Laub, 1993). The focus of the debate is on whether personality traits are stable through time or whether traits change as an individual ages. The important aspect of this debate for the present study is whether or not the variables involved in perceptual deterrence are affected by age. That is, whether there is a difference in perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment for older or younger juveniles.

Differences in gender identification are achieved through role-taking and function to regulate behavior in the same way that attitudes, such as moral views, regulate behavior (Heimer, 1996). Particular behaviors are labeled as “male” or “female,” and individuals tend to act accordingly. Gender has become a significant subject of empirical study, as researchers have come to realize that the experiences, attitudes, and perceptions of males and females are in fact different (Koita and Triplett, 1998; Heimer and DeCoster, 1999). This study examines the variable of sex and whether differences exist among males and females regarding their perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment.

A personality trait that has repeatedly shown a correlation to delinquency is impulsivity (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). Those individuals who are impulsive, or lack self-control, are more likely to be involved in delinquent behaviors (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). The theory behind this argument

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is based upon the characteristics of crime itself. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) have linked the characteristics of crime with the characteristic of low self-control. They highlight that most crimes provide immediate gratification, are simple and require no special capabilities to carry out, are exciting, and provide few long-term benefits. These characteristics are compatible with the idea that delinquent activities will be appealing to individuals with low self-control. Individuals who enjoy risk-taking, are short-sighted, and prefer physical over mental action, will have a tendency to not only commit delinquent acts, but be involved in other risky activities such as smoking, alcohol use, and accidents (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Thus, those individuals who are more impulsive may choose to stay out with friends or run a quick errand rather than stay home and observe curfew.

The number of personality traits that could be examined in relation to the perceptions of certainty and severity of formal punishment is nearly limitless. The variables of age, sex, and impulsivity have been chosen for their extensive representation in criminological literature in general, and in deterrence studies in particular.

Fear of shame and embarrassment. Fear of shame and embarrassment directly addresses the differentiation between formal and informal sanction threats. Formal threats are those punishments that the authorities can hand out, whether a citation by the police or a sanction by an assigned DJO. Informal sanctions are those punishments that are handed out by the self (shame) or by significant others such as family or friends (embarrassment) (Grasmick, Bursik and Arneklev, 1993). The fear of shame and embarrassment are important contingencies to deterrent behavior, as it may be the anxiety and loss of respect of loved ones that inhibits behavior, rather than the threat of formal

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punishment (Braithwaite, 1989; Grasmick et al., 1993). In fact, it is suggested that informal controls are stronger deterrents than formal controls, because there are more actors involved, the relationship is more intimate, and the response is immediate. Compared to sanctioning by the formal system, the experience of informal shame or embarrassment involves a large number of actors (Braithwaite, 1989). Rather than just receiving a written assignment from the assigned DJO, a juvenile's entire family as well as those at church or school may discover a violation and express their disapproval. In addition, the relationships involved in the process are more intimate (Braithwaite, 1989). A juvenile may only see his DJO once a month, while family and friends are daily contacts. Those individuals that maintain closer relationships are those whose respect and approval we desire. The threat of losing this respect can be more influential than the threat of formal punishment (Braithwaite, 1989). Finally, a shame response to a delinquent act will be immediate, unlike a formal justice response (Braithwaite, 1989). A juvenile who breaks the law and is affected by the threat of informal sanction by family and friends will immediately feel shame, without any intervention from a formal court agent. Thus, while the threat of formal sanction can be an important deterrent to behavior, the threat of informal sanction can be just as powerful. In fact, informal sanctions can be considered deterrents in and of themselves, not merely contingencies.

The deterrent effects of informal sanctions have the same characteristics as deterrent effects of formal sanctions. Just as formal sanctions can have both general and specific deterrent effects, so too can informal sanctions (Braithwaite, 1989). A juvenile who experiences shame and embarrassment for violating curfew will be deterred from future indiscretions, as well as his neighbor or cousin who learned of the embarrassment

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and desires to avoid it. Thus, anything that restrains the individual from crime can be considered a deterrent, including informal sanctions (Grasmick et al., 1993). In the same way that individuals hold perceptions regarding the certainty and severity of formal sanctions, perceptions of informal sanctions can also be assessed (Grasmick et al., 1993). A juvenile may weigh the certainty of getting caught breaking curfew by the Nightwatch crew, but may also weigh the certainty of informal sanctions by family or friends. The penalty from the assigned DJO may be perceived as less painful than the penalty from a respected intimate. Finally, compliance with formal rules may be influenced by an increase in the perceived certainty or severity of informal sanctions (Grasmick, et al., 1993). Increases in the perceived threat of shame and embarrassment may result in increased compliance with the law. If trouble with the court now carries negative interpersonal consequences, a juvenile may be more likely to adhere to the rules.

The threat of informal sanctions is an important component in deterrence research for several reasons. First, the relationships involved in informal sanctioning are more intimate and more influential than formal police or court relationships. Second, informal sanctions provide the same perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment, and can influence decision making in and of themselves. Finally, as the threat of informal punishment increases, compliance with the formal rules may increase as well.

Severity of punishment. The discussion of severity of punishment also relies heavily on individual perceptions. Different individuals will view different punishments as more or less severe, depending on personal situations and preferences. Economic punishments such as fines will be viewed differently by individuals based on their personal resources and the value placed on money (Newman, 1983). The same can be

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said for social or mental punishments, as different individuals may view aspects of each as more severe and undesirable. Even for physical punishment, individuals may perceive details of the punishment differently and base their decision-making on such perceptions. Thus, a particular punishment will not be perceived by all individuals as equally severe. This fact has plagued the justice system in its search for sanctions that hold offenders accountable without the expense of incarceration. A recent development to address the problem of appropriate sanctions involves the idea of tipping models. The main point of tipping models is that punishment does not need to be severe, but it must be certain and swift (Kleiman, unpublished). A punishment that is nearly certain but relatively benign is calculated as less desirable than a vaguely certain punishment that is extremely harsh. An individual will seek to avoid the risk of a certain punishment, even if it is mild, but will take more risk with an uncertain punishment, even if it is more severe (Kleiman, unpublished).

The court can impose a variety of sanctions on juvenile offenders, which may be perceived differently by different individuals. Sanctions for a Nightwatch violation may include a parent/child conference with the DJO, a written assignment, community service, or detention. Juveniles may weigh their decision to obey or violate their curfew on how severe they perceive the punishment to be from the formal agents of the court.

These contingencies and attention to perceptions provide a basis on which to develop constructive deterrence research. Prior criticisms of the deterrence approach have made clear that any examination of deterrence must reach beyond a simple calculation of costs and benefits. These contingencies identify a minimum of controls and contributing factors that must be addressed when assessing perceptions of certainty,

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severity, and celerity. To form conclusions about the Nightwatch program and the deterrent effect of sanctioning each of these issues will be included in the analysis models in Chapter Seven.

LIFESTYLE/ROUTINE ACTIVITIES

Lifestyle and routine activity theories are based on the situations surrounding criminal and victimization experiences. These theories are appropriate to evaluate the Nightwatch program, as curfew enforcement seeks to control the situations that juveniles find themselves in each evening. The rationale behind Nightwatch suggests that juveniles who are at home will have reduced opportunities for crime and victimization, and thus reduced criminal and victimization experiences. It is assumed that a reduction in crime and victimization will create a more secure environment, not only for the juveniles in the program, but for the entire community. Thus, a reduction in opportunities for crime and victimization should result in the realization of the program goals of reduced crime, reduced victimization, and increased community safety. This section will explain pertinent theories related to the routine activities tradition. The first formulations of the theory came from patterns of victimization, and subsequent developments in the theory have focused on crime rate trends, the motivation of the offender, and the role of peer groups. In addition to theories that focus on the accidental patterns of everyday life, situational prevention will also be discussed, which focuses on intentional choices to reduce victimization experiences.

Lifestyle. The lifestyle theory of victimization emerged from the analysis of an early victimization survey, which identified several characteristics common to victims. Prior to the 1970s, victimization data was scant and research relied on official police

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records that were vague or incomplete (Hindelang, Gottfredson and Garofalo, 1978). The inception of national surveys such as the LEAA National Crime Survey (NCS) that asked respondents about victimization experiences significantly contributed to this line of study. Analysis of such study results encouraged theory-building based on the findings. Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) formulated a lifestyle theory that sought to explain the variation in risk of personal victimization by identifying characteristics of particular situations and individuals that were correlated to victimization. The theory argues that increased exposure to certain situations increases the risk of victimization. Those who spend more time in public places and with non-family members increase their likelihood of personal victimization. Lifestyle characteristics determine what situations in which an individual will find himself. Factors such as age, sex, and marital status will influence an individual's behavior and thus his probability of being victimized. For example, adolescents tend to spend more time away from home in the evenings compared to married adults, and females tend to be under more strict parental supervision than males. In addition, individuals tend to associate with those who share similar characteristics: adolescents with adolescents, adults with adults, and of the same age and marital status. Thus, the more situational traits an individual shares with an offender, the more likely he will be in the same setting with an offender, and the more likely he will become a victim (Hindelang, et al., 1978).

Through time, this lifestyle theory has undergone significant developments and refinements, but several key concepts have remained an integral part of the theory. A basic premise is that in order for crime to occur, there must be a convergence in space and time of a likely offender, a suitable target, and the absence of capable guardians

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(Hindelang, et al., 1978; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Felson and Clark, 1995; Osgood, Wilson, O'Malley, Bachman, and Johnston, 1996). Subsequent adaptations of the theory have maintained this basic premise, but offered new perspective, in terms of crime rates, individual behavior, and the motivation of the offender.

Routine activities. One use of routine activity theory has been to explain crime rate trends in the United States. Cohen and Felson (1979) propose that increases in reported crime in the United States after 1960 can be attributed to changes in the routine activities of citizens. The structure of society shifted out of the home and toward work, school, and other leisure activities, which simultaneously reduced guardianship and increased target attractiveness. Homes are left unattended during the day containing moveable items such as televisions, and individuals are spending more time away from home, which increases the risk of personal victimization. Thus, the overall routine activity pattern of society increased the probability of the convergence of a motivated offender, suitable target, and reduced guardianship, and increased overall reported crime rates (Cohen and Felson, 1979).

The previous formulations of routine activities and lifestyle have focused on victimization, predatory crimes, and aggregate crime rate trends. Osgood and colleagues (1996) expanded on the theory by examining the behavior of offenders, and broadening the range of deviant behaviors considered. One requirement in routine activities theory is the presence of a motivated offender, but previous efforts did not specify this condition any further. The motivation to offend was linked to deviant behavior itself, and aspects of the unique situation. In particular, the absence of capable guardians and unstructured peer activities provide an ideal situation to motivate offending (Osgood et al., 1996).

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Individuals who find themselves in such a situation, such as hanging out on the street corner with friends in the evening, will have more opportunities to participate in deviant behaviors.

The final elaboration of routine activities theory to be presented here extends the concept of motivation even further, and ties lifestyle and routine activities together. Bernburg and Thorlindsson (2001) use concepts from social bonding and differential association theories to place routine activities into the larger social context. Earlier formulations addressed personal traits (Hindelang, et al., 1978) and situations (Osgood et al., 1996) that are conducive to victimization and deviance, but did not address the interaction between the individual and other actors in that situation. The degree of attachment to conventional others, as well as the beliefs and practices held by the social group will highly influence the routine activities of the group. Peers that value thrills and reject authority will be in a social context that presents more opportunity for deviance than a group that does not value such things. Thus, the values held by the individual will be influenced by the larger social context, and affect the routine activities of that individual (Bernburg and Thorlindsson, 2001).

Lifestyle and routine activities theories offer a promising strategy for reducing crime and victimization. By reducing the opportunities to interact with deviant individuals, the risk of both crime and victimization can be lessened. These approaches treat routine activities as situations that are not intentionally manipulated by the individual to prevent crime or victimization, but are by-products of the individual's everyday life (Felson and Clarke, 1995). Another approach that is significant to this

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discussion is the theory of situational prevention, as it involves altering behavior in order to avoid victimization.

Situational prevention. The premise behind situational prevention is that systematic ways can be found to reduce the opportunity for specific crimes (Felson and Clarke, 1995). The focus is typically at the business and organization level, rather than on steps an individual can take to reduce personal chances of harm. Situational prevention draws on routine activities and rational choice theories to advocate a method of overall crime reduction that is low cost, simple, and will systematically reduce crime opportunities (Felson and Clarke, 1995). The combination of these two theories emphasizes the choices available when dealing with situations that present opportunities for offending or victimization. Routine activities point out that certain situations in everyday life create conditions that are ripe for criminal activity, while situational prevention identifies the conscious effort to prevent crime in vulnerable situations (Felson and Clarke, 1995).

One advantage of situational prevention is that it pursues practical applications based on criminological theory. The aim of the theory is to present tangible suggestions based on both research and experience that prevent crime or victimization (Felson and Clarke, 1995). This focus on practical application makes situational prevention an appropriate theory for examining the usefulness of the Nightwatch program. The goals of achieving low cost, simple, systematic programs will be related specifically to Nightwatch. An aspiration of every program is to achieve the maximum benefit for the lowest cost. The idea behind Nightwatch is simple: enforce the court ordered curfew of juvenile probationers. The actual operation of the program is quite complex, however,

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considering the tasks of scheduling for both juveniles and crews, follow up surveys, and other details. The public image of the program, though, is simple in that it consists of a short visit with a DJO and a police officer to check on the juvenile and his family. This system of random home visits meets the criteria of situational prevention, and this study aims to determine whether or not Nightwatch provides a means for a reduction of criminal opportunities. There is a subtle difference between juveniles who are off the street because they must be and those who are off the street because they choose to be, even though both may benefit from a reduction in victimization through such a reduction in risk.

Each of the theories presented above highlights that for crime and victimization to occur, there must be a convergence of a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a proper guardian. Nightwatch seeks to disrupt this convergence by eliminating the presence of the offender, as well as the target. In addition to reducing opportunities for crime and victimization, the program seeks to deter curfew and other law violating behavior through home visits and the formal sanctioning of violations.

CONCLUSION

Many theories have been offered to explain delinquent behavior, but the theories expressed here have been selected for a particular purpose. After determining whether Nightwatch meets its stated goals of reducing recidivism and victimization, the focus of this study is on assessing the mechanism by which these goals are achieved. Through a test of deterrence theory, it can be evaluated whether Nightwatch elicits a deterrent effect in juveniles through the imposition of sanctions for curfew violations. Through a test of lifestyle/routine activity theories, it can be assessed as to whether Nightwatch restricts

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opportunities for crime and victimization. In other words, the goal here is not to theorize about the cause of the original delinquency for which the juvenile was referred to the program, but to test the rationale of the program activities.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Specific juvenile court practices can be placed within the larger framework of the probation system, and significant research has been conducted into the effectiveness of such methods. Multiple studies address the broader issue of intensive supervision probation, as well as the more specific components of probation programs. Nightwatch is a component of official probation, and provides extra supervision for juveniles who are assigned to it, making a comparison to intensive supervision programs appropriate. In addition, characteristics of successful programs can be identified and it can be determined if Nightwatch shares the qualities of successful probation programs.

Thus far, information has been provided regarding program activities and the rationale behind these activities. This chapter reviews the relevant literature in regards to probation programs in general, in addition to the theories that explain the rationale for Nightwatch activities. Considerable prior research has been conducted to identify successful probation components, as well as test the theories of deterrence and routine activities.

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PROBATION

Intensive supervision programs. Prior research regarding probation in general and intensive supervision in particular has not provided any definitive conclusions regarding their effectiveness. Several studies have been completed for both juvenile and adult populations, with contradictory conclusions. For example, Krisberg, Currie, and Onek (1995) support community based programs as cost effective and safe alternatives to incarceration, while Geerkin and Hayes (1993) report that failure rates are unacceptably high and revocation of probation and parole programs would significantly reduce the overall crime rate. A review of the relevant literature finds much variation in research subjects, design, and outcome measures, but a few generalizations can be made.

Two related outcomes that garner a significant amount of attention are offender recidivism and community safety. Intuitively, a reduction in recidivism means an increase in community safety, so probation programs that indicate a reduction in criminal behavior are seen as beneficial not only for the individual but for the community as well. Most, if not all, justice system programs have the stated goal of reducing re-offending behavior, which in the case of intermediate sanctions, is sought through more intensive supervision of those on probation. Early studies of intensive supervision programs did indeed show positive results in terms of lower recidivism for program participants (Erwin, 1986; Pearson, 1987). Subsequent, more stringent, studies have produced significantly more diverse results, however.

Several research studies have been conducted on intensive supervision programs, utilizing a number of different comparison groups (mostly adults) and methodologies. A number of studies have shown that individuals placed under intensive supervision

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programs (ISP) have recidivism records no different from individuals released from prison (Langan, 1994; Tonry, 1998; Petersilia, Turner, and Peterson, 1986, Petersilia and Turner, 1993; Turner and Petersilia, 1995, see also Sherman et al., 1997). Several studies did find indications of reduced recidivism for ISP participants when weighed against a comparison group (Byrne and Kelly, 1989; Moon and Latessa, 1993). Conversely, other studies found that those individuals placed on intensive supervision actually had increased rates of recidivism in relation to a comparison group (Langan, 1994; Latessa, 1993b; Jolin and Stipack, 1991; see also Sherman, et al., 1997), while Petersilia and Turner (1993) reported that ISPs produced higher recidivism rates in certain jurisdictions, and lower rates in others. Moreover, many studies revealed different outcomes for different offenses and different combinations of additional treatments or services. Those ISPs that also included drug or sex offender treatment suggest lower recidivism rates for participants (Moon and Latessa, 1993; Latessa 1993a; Sherman et al., 1997). In this fashion, several researchers identify that any supervision program must provide rehabilitation components to be successful (Gendreau, Cullen and Bontal, 1994; Maloney, et al., 1988; Krisberg et al., 1995; Sherman et al., 1997; Altschuler, 1999; Gendreau and Ross, 1987).

Several studies specifically targeted juvenile offenders, and whether ISP is an effective intervention for this group. Unfortunately, the results regarding juveniles are similar to those for adults. Early research involved poorly designed studies, and program philosophies changed dramatically during the punitive 1980s, resulting in tenuous conclusions (Barton and Butts, 1990; Wiebush, 1993). Overall, studies regarding juvenile ISPs drew similar conclusions as for adults, with some studies reporting no

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difference between ISP participants and those in secure institutions (Empey and Lubeck, 1971; Palmer 1974), while others reported negative effects of program participation (Lerman, 1975; Murray and Cox, 1979). Two more recent studies found that ISP for juveniles was just as effective as secure placement, at a lower cost (Barton and Butts, 1990; Wiebush, 1993). Thus, it can be argued that juvenile ISPs are a worthwhile endeavor, but this conclusion must be undertaken with caution.

Consequently, for intensive supervision in general research is inconclusive, and no firm conclusions can be drawn. The existing literature suggests that ISPs may be just as effective as secure confinement at a lower cost, depending upon jurisdiction and program particulars. This conclusion can also tentatively be drawn for juveniles in ISPs. The following sections will address specific programs available to both adults and juveniles while assigned to regular or intensive supervision, in an attempt to identify the most beneficial components of a probation strategy.

Treatment/Rehabilitation programs. The perception of success regarding the treatment and rehabilitation of offenders has fluctuated tremendously since the beginning of the juvenile court. For both adults and juveniles, confidence in treatment and rehabilitation began high, but unintended outcomes and a subsequent lack of faith in the system prompted critics to pronounce, “nothing works” (Martinson, 1974). Not all researchers accepted this proclamation, however, and several studies have shown that under the correct conditions, treatment and rehabilitation can have positive effects on reducing delinquency (Lipsey, 1992; Izzo and Ross, 1990; Gendreau and Ross, 1987; Garrett, 1985). Research has identified several of these conditions that provide effective treatment of juveniles, with ensuing reductions in violence and delinquency.

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One component that is repeatedly identified with successful rehabilitative programs is the presence of a cognitive/behavioral element. Several literature reviews and meta-analyses draw this conclusion, stating that a change in the offender's thinking must take place for behavior change to occur (Greenwood, 2002; Mihalic, Irwin, Elliott, Fagan, and Hansen, 2001; MacKenzie, 2000; Izzo and Ross, 1990; Gendreau and Andrews 1990, Ross and Fabiano, 1985; Garrett, 1985). In several cases this conclusion is quite strong, for example, Izzo and Ross (1990) found that programs containing a cognitive element were twice as effective as those that did not. Ross and Fabiano (1985) discovered that of the 16 cognitive programs examined, 15 achieved significant long-term success, while only 10 of the 34 noncognitive programs did so. Finally, Ross, Fabiano, and Ewles (1988) determined that a group of juveniles randomly assigned to a comprehensive cognitive program recidivated at a much lower rate than those juveniles assigned to regular probation. After nine months, the cognitive group had a reconviction rate of 18%, while the group on regular probation had a reconviction rate of 70%. Thus, the presence of a cognitive/behavioral element has emerged as an element of successful juvenile rehabilitation programs.

While the cognitive/behavioral component has been strongly identified with successful programs, other characteristics have also surfaced as significant. One key component to any rehabilitation program is the location of services. Determining whether treatment services are best delivered in a secure institution or a community setting is an important task, relevant to both offender rehabilitation as well as community safety. Several studies indicate treatment in a community setting is more desirable than treatment in an institutional setting (Greenwood, 2002; Krisberg, et al., 1995; Lipsey,

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1992; Izzo and Ross, 1990; Gendreau and Ross, 1987). The meta analyses conducted by Lipsey (1992) and Garrett (1985) both note the success of community based treatment. Lipsey (1992) reports that positive effects were larger when juveniles were in a community rather than institutional setting. Garrett (1985) found that both institutional and community settings yielded positive outcomes. MacKenzie (2000) discovered that specifically for sex offenders, treatment was most successful when delivered outside of prison. Indirect support of community intervention comes from the examination of several institutional treatment programs by Quay (1987). This study revealed poor outcomes for the institutional settings in terms of later rearrest rates, but lacked a comparison to similar community programs. These examples show the positive effects of community treatment, but not all studies concur. A meta analysis by Gottschalk, Davidson, Gensheimer, and Mayer (1987) concluded that treatment in a community setting had little or no effect on subsequent recidivism, and they were unable to reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect. In addition, MacKenzie and Hickman (1998) reported little support for community based outpatient drug therapy. Thus, several attempts have been made to identify the most successful treatment setting. Results have been mixed, but a majority of information supports the conclusion that the community setting is the most beneficial for the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders (Greenwood, 2002; Krisberg, et al., 1995).

Two more elements of rehabilitative programs that appear to be significant involve the intensity and range of treatment. Intensity of treatment indicates the “dose” of treatment the juvenile receives. Gendreau, Cullen and Bonta (1994) found that the most successful programs take up 40-70% of the juvenile’s activities, and last for 3 to 9

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months. Those programs that offer only sporadic interventions for small periods of time are not seen as successful (Gottfredson, 1997; Lorion, Tolan and Wahler, 1987; Quay, 1987; Lipsey, 1992; Sherman et al., 1997). Along these same lines, juveniles identified as high risk are shown to profit most from treatment interventions (Gendreau, et al., 1994; Langan, 1994). Juveniles who are low risk and do not truly need services tend not to benefit as much from exposure to them. Range of treatment addresses what types of interventions the juvenile receives. Several researchers have concluded that programs that offer multiple services, rather than focusing on only one area of treatment, are the most successful (Greenwood, 2002; Krisberg, et al., 1995; Gendreau et al., 1994). These studies indicate that those juveniles with the most risk of reoffending may benefit the most from multiple services that provide intensive treatment.

Overall, there is support for the idea that rehabilitation of juvenile offenders is possible. Much work has gone into identifying key elements of successful rehabilitation and prevention programs, and several characteristics have been consistently identified as contributing to reductions in delinquency and violence. Several characteristics that are common to effective programs are those that are compatible with the idea of probation and monitoring offenders in the community. These findings support the original assumption of the juvenile court's founders, that juvenile behavior and thinking can be changed to reduce future delinquency.

Punitive programs. While cognitive/behavioral programs focus on offender rehabilitation, punitive programs seek to deter the individual from future delinquent behavior, often by using punishment-oriented tactics. Two popular programs that fall under this category are Scared Straight prison programs, and Boot Camps.

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Existing literature presents a fairly consistent view regarding programs such as Scared Straight. These prison-based programs use intensive confrontation sessions between juveniles and prison inmates in an attempt to “scare” juveniles away from any future delinquent activity (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Buehler, 2003). One of the first Scared Straight programs took place in Rahway prison in 1977 (Lundman, 2001). Juveniles who participated in the program were given surveys to assess whether their perceptions about the severity of punishment had changed due to what they had experienced at the prison. In addition, they were monitored for six months to document any subsequent delinquent activity. Results indicated that there were no changes in juvenile perceptions of severity of punishment, and the reoffense rate for participant juveniles was 41%, while a control group receiving no visits recidivated at 11% (Lundman, 2001). Similar results were obtained by Finckenauer (1982) for a New Jersey program, whereby juveniles who attended the prison sessions were again more likely to reoffend than their comparison group counterparts. In addition, a meta-analysis conducted by Petrosino and colleagues (2003) concluded that on average this type of intervention is *more* harmful than if the juveniles receive no treatment whatsoever. Conversely, there have been positive reports regarding these programs, with claims of reduced recidivism. The United Community Action Network (U-CAN) provides a program that locks juveniles in a cell with 4 or 5 parolees for more than an hour. This agency reports that the rearrest rate for juveniles that have participated is only about 3% (Petrosino et al., 2003). Despite these limited positive results, the University of Maryland Research Report identifies Scared Straight as a program that does not work (Sherman et al., 1997; Petrosino et al., 2003).

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Boot camps are another popular program, for both adults and juveniles. The premise is similar to Scared Straight, in that both programs are often referred to as “shock incarceration,” but boot camps emphasize military-style drill and discipline. The physical and mental challenges intrinsic to the program are theorized to specifically deter the participants from future offending (Sherman, et al., 1997). Boot camps began for adults in 1983, have spread across the country, and expanded to include juveniles as well (MacKenzie, 1990; MacKenzie and Parent, 1991). Results for adult boot camps are similar to those for other intensive programs, in that conclusions are mixed, and vary when additional treatments are included. A number of studies report that there was no difference between individuals that participated in boot camp and individuals who received another sentence, such as probation or prison (The Florida Department of Corrections, 1990; MacKenzie, Shaw, and Gowdy, 1993; MacKenzie and Shaw, 1993; Flowers, Carr and Ruback, 1991). In some instances, program participants did have lower recidivism rates than comparison groups (MacKenzie, Brame, MacDowall, and Souryal, 1995; New York Department of Correctional Services, 1993), particularly when the program devoted more time to therapeutic activities and increased follow-up (MacKenzie et al., 1995). The picture for juveniles is similar. Several randomized studies report that there are no significant differences between boot camp participants and control groups on recidivism (Peters, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Bottcher, Isorena, and Belnas, 1996). These studies indicate that there is no strong evidence to identify boot camps as a successful crime control technique for either adults or juveniles.

The previous two sections have outlined several specific interventions available to juveniles on probation, both rehabilitative and punitive in nature. Overall,

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cognitive/behavioral treatments produce the most consistent results in the rehabilitative category. Both Scared Straight and boot camps are based on deterrence theory, and neither has exhibited clear success for the punitive category.

Classifying Nightwatch. According to its program description, Nightwatch must be classified as a punitive program. The main purpose of the program is to deter curfew and other law-violating behavior through enhanced supervision. Additionally, accountability-based sanctions are applied for violations, which may range from a writing assignment to an overnight stay in detention.

Despite its punitive appearance, Nightwatch is compatible with many characteristics of successful treatment options. First, it must be kept in mind that Nightwatch is used as one component of a multimodal approach to preventing juvenile recidivism. In addition to the enhanced supervision, juveniles are eligible for a wide variety of interventions, including tutoring, family or individual therapy, and life skills training. Second, the program enables juveniles to remain in the community rather than be sentenced to residential facilities. This allows the juvenile to continue to participate in other cognitive/behavioral court programs that more directly address their needs and/or risk of future offending. Third, it is the juvenile's risk of reoffending that prescribes the intensity of the intervention. Juveniles classified as the highest risk are assigned the highest level of enhanced supervision. Finally, the accountability-based sanctions frequently involve community service or restorative justice groups, which encourage the juvenile to consider how their behavior affects those around them. Thus, Nightwatch adheres to several of the characteristics inherent in successful probation programs, even though it is based on the deterrence model. The premise behind juvenile curfews is not

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unanimously embraced, however, and some of the controversies surrounding this type of intervention are reviewed in the following section.

CURFEW

The idea of a general curfew for juveniles has been in existence in the United States for nearly 200 years. Curfew ordinances are typically local legislation that identifies a particular time in the evening after which minors are not allowed on the street. In general, curfews seek to reduce juvenile crime and victimization, and empower parents to help control children's behavior (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1997; Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995; McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema, 2000; Bilchik, 1996). The assumption behind curfew legislation is that individuals who are at home or under adult supervision are less likely to be involved in criminal activity, either as a perpetrator or a victim. Similar to probation practices, the use of general curfews across the country has paralleled trends in juvenile justice sentencing policy. Curfews have again become popular in recent years as a response to increased juvenile crime and violence, but research on their effectiveness is mixed. There is little research available on what juveniles think about curfews and how the rules actually affect their lives (Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995), and criticisms of unconstitutionality threaten their very existence.

History of curfew ordinances. As with probation practices, the origin of curfew ordinances is closely tied to the origin of the juvenile court itself. The rationale for the introduction of the juvenile court included controlling the behavior of adolescents in the immigrant underclass. The implementation of a curfew fit well with this rationale (Marketos, 1995). Requiring juveniles to be off the street by a certain time in the evening allowed the upper classes to maintain some control over behavior. Curfews are highly

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variable between jurisdictions (Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995; Bilchik, 1996), as well as differentially enforced (McDowall et al., 2000), but some generalizations can be made about their use through time in the United States. Times of increased juvenile crime are typically times of increased interest in curfew ordinances and their enforcement. Both the 1950s and 1990s are examples of this (Marketos, 1995). The “get tough” rationale of the 1990s called for increased accountability of offenders, and restricting juvenile’s access to the streets was adopted as a promising strategy (Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995). Some jurisdictions revised long-standing curfew ordinances, while others created ordinances for the first time (Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995). Curfew violations are usually considered status offenses, which would indicate a less serious response from the formal criminal justice system. The number of juveniles arrested for curfew, however, is a substantial proportion of arrests (Maguire and Pastore, 1994). Considering the number of juveniles that come to the attention of police and the courts because of curfew violations, information regarding the effectiveness of ordinances is essential.

Evaluation of curfew. Contemporary general curfew ordinances are highly variable across the country and receive a significant amount of both support and criticism. Supporters of juvenile curfews cite drops in juvenile crime rates and support from residents as grounds to maintain youth curfews. Opponents cite constitutional issues, discriminatory enforcement, and a drain on resources as reasons that curfews should be abolished. Opinions are specific to each jurisdiction, for example police in one jurisdiction may support curfew enforcement (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1998), while officers elsewhere may find it a burden (Watzman, 1994).

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Most support for curfew enforcement comes from individual jurisdiction evaluations. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) collected information about specific curfew programs throughout the country and reported results for seven cities (Bilchik, 1996). In general, programs that are collaborative and include multiple components obtain the best results. For example, New Orleans enlisted the support of government, religious, and medical personnel to staff a Central Curfew Center (CCC) that provided counseling and other services to juveniles in violation of curfew. Police and Juvenile Bureau staff were also on site to assist in providing services. In addition, summer employment and recreation programs supplied prosocial activities for youth, and proved to be a key component to the program. A comparison of juvenile crime rates between 1993 and 1994 showed a 27% reduction in juvenile crime overall, with a 33% decline in armed robbery and a 42% drop in auto theft during curfew hours (Bilchik, 1996). Such a collaborative effort not only addresses the issue of curfew violation, but strengthens community ties and provides skill building opportunities for juveniles. These examples show support for curfew ordinances through decreased juvenile involvement in crime. The subject of juvenile curfews is highly controversial, however, and unwavering support is difficult to find.

The U.S. Conference of Mayors (1999) surveyed 347 cities and gathered information about crime rates and attitudes toward youth curfews. Twenty-six cities provided information about juvenile crime rates before and after curfew implementation. Individual results were highly variable, but the average reduction in juvenile crime was 21%. Six cities reported initial crime increases, however. This survey also uncovered several attitudes toward curfew enforcement. Those in support of curfew enforcement

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mentioned empowerment of parents and police. By supplying a specific reason that juveniles must remain home, parents can control their children's behavior more effectively, and police are supplied with a means of intervention before serious problems erupt (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1999). Not all attitudes towards curfew were favorable, however.

Additional research regarding curfew ordinances has been conducted on individual jurisdictions, as well as using panel data. Hunt and Weiner (1977) analyzed data from Detroit to determine if an increase in publicity and enforcement of the youth curfew affected crime rates. Results indicated that crime rates during curfew time did in fact decline, but crime rates increased in the early afternoon. This displacement of crime to another time of day is of significant concern to a number of jurisdictions (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1999), and an important factor when a city is determining whether or not to enforce youth curfew. Studies using panel data are no more definitive. McDowell, Loftin, and Wiersema (2000) used panel data from 57 cities with a population of 250,000 or more. Data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) was analyzed to assess the impact of youth curfew ordinances. For certain types of crimes and in certain situations, the existence of curfew appears to be beneficial. Burglary, larceny, and simple assaults perpetrated by juveniles declined, but only for those jurisdictions that revised curfew ordinances, not for those who initiated ordinances for the first time. In addition, homicide victimization was examined, with the existence of a curfew law having no effect whatsoever (McDowell et al., 2000). Thus, curfew ordinances appear to affect only a few minor crimes, and only in areas where curfew ordinances have been previously established.

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Opponents of juvenile curfew cite such evaluation inconsistencies, combined with other concerns as reasons to abolish such ordinances. One of the most serious criticisms of juvenile curfew ordinances alleges that they are unconstitutional. Challenges to such regulations contend that curfew infringes on the basic First Amendment rights of individuals (Horowitz, 1991; Marketos, 1995; Hemmens and Bennett, 1999). Curfew in general restricts the movement and privacy of individuals, and has been deemed unconstitutional for adults except in cases of extreme emergency, such as following a natural disaster (Horowitz, 1991). The issue for juveniles becomes whether or not they are afforded all of the constitutional rights of adults. Recall that these same concerns surfaced in conjunction with the functioning of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court ruled that juveniles did not need all the protections afforded adults because of the motivation of the court, and similar rulings have governed the question of juvenile curfew. A pivotal court ruling was handed down regarding the role of children in 1979. In *Bellotti v. Baird* the Supreme Court ruled that children are not constitutionally equal to adults for three reasons: children are exceptionally vulnerable, children are unable to make critical decisions, and the importance of parents in child rearing (Hemmens and Bennett, 1999; Marketos, 1995). These three criteria became the test for subsequent rulings that involve the rights of juveniles.

Thus, general juvenile curfews are highly controversial, and their implementation is highly individualized among jurisdictions. Reports on the success of curfew programs are also highly variable, with both supporters and opponents. There is evidence that curfews can be successful, but there is also evidence that crime is merely displaced to an earlier time of day. St. Louis has a general curfew in effect for all juveniles in the city,

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but Nightwatch affects only those individuals already in contact with the juvenile court.

The more stringent court-ordered curfew carries stricter penalties than a general curfew ordinance, and involves personalized home visits to insure compliance.

DETERRENCE/RATIONAL CHOICE

Early deterrence research. Deterrence research has amassed a large amount of literature, with significant conceptual and methodological changes over time. The earliest deterrence research focused on capital punishment and the role of formal legal threats (for example Schuessler, 1952; Savitz, 1958; Phillips, 1980). This line of research stemmed from the original formulations of deterrence theory. Beccaria (1963) focused on formal legal punishment, arguing that individuals will choose to be law abiding when the certainty, severity, and celerity of a (legal) punishment is known. Such studies produced highly variable results, however, many with serious methodological flaws (Phillips, 1980). Thus, no definitive conclusions were drawn regarding the existence of a deterrent effect, and interest in deterrence research waned until researchers began to examine aggregate crime rates and other factors beyond capital punishment.

Prior to the 1960s, much work on deterrence was philosophical rather than empirical (Tittle, 1969; Waldo and Chiricos, 1972), and a few scholars reconsidered the subject of deterrence by conducting aggregate level empirical studies. Tittle (1969) used aggregate measures at the state level to attempt to uncover a deterrent effect of legal sanctions. Number of prison admissions was used to measure certainty, while mean length of time served was used to measure severity for seven crimes. The results indicate that certainty of punishment does have a general deterrent effect, but the severity of punishment is not significant, except in the case of homicide (Tittle, 1969). These results

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replicated an earlier study by Gibbs (1968) that also used aggregate measures at the state level, but focused only on homicide. Results indicated that homicide was inversely related to the certainty and severity of punishment, evidence of a deterrent effect. These aggregate studies were extremely important in that they caused scholars to examine the concept of deterrence more carefully. Researchers realized that the existence of punishment was not sufficient, that different individuals perceive the certainty and severity of punishment differently. This focus on perceptions became the key component to deterrence research.

Perceptual deterrence. This application of perceptions to the deterrence framework caused a renewed interest in research on the subject. Research during the 1970s expanded to include not only perceptions of individuals, but the influence of informal as well as formal sanctions. Studies began to include individual perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment on official and self-reported crimes. In general it was supported that increased certainty of punishment resulted in decreased criminal behavior (Jensen, 1969; Waldo and Chiricos, 1974; Silberman, 1976; Erickson, Gibbs, and Jensen, 1977), although this conclusion was not universal (Meier and Johnson, 1977). These studies also indicated that perceived severity of punishment did not play a significant role in deterrence. Grasmick and Bryjak (1980) reported a relationship in the form of an interaction effect between perceived certainty and severity, however. When the perceived certainty of punishment was high, individuals would take the severity of the punishment into account when choosing whether or not to commit criminal behaviors (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980). In addition to individual perceptions of certainty and

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severity, studies in the 1970s also focused on the difference between formal and informal sanctions.

Deterrence researchers became concerned with the conditions surrounding deterrence, and the examination of extralegal factors became a key component. These early studies indicated that informal sanctions played a more important role in deterrence than formal legal sanctions (Meier and Johnson, 1977; Jensen and Erickson, 1978), and laid the groundwork for much subsequent deterrence research. These studies introduced several important contingencies to the study of deterrence, as well as helped formalize deterrence theory, but all contained a major methodological flaw.

In 1982 Saltzman, Paternoster, Waldo, and Chiricos introduced the experiential effect into deterrence research. The experiential effect directly addresses causal ordering, and how past behaviors and experiences affect current perceptions of the certainty and severity of sanctions. This was the first longitudinal perceptual deterrence study, and directly addressed the issue of causal ordering. The problem with cross-sectional research designs when examining deterrent effects is that past behavior and current perceptions are measured at the same time. This fails to account for the fact that current perceptions of certainty and severity may be influenced by past experiences with formal and informal sanctions (Saltzman, et al., 1982). An individual who broke the law once and was caught and punished will have different perceptions on certainty and severity than someone who repeatedly breaks the law and suffers no negative consequences. A replication of the Saltzman, et al. (1982) research confirmed these findings as well as noted that perceptions are unstable and experiential effects cannot serve as a proxy for deterrent effects (Minor and Harry, 1982). Thus, the results of past research were put

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into question, and requirements for future research involved taking the experiential effect into account and using more sophisticated longitudinal designs (Saltzman, et al., 1982; Minor and Harry, 1982; Paternoster, 1987). This study addresses this issue by selecting experimental and comparison samples that have no previous Nightwatch experience, and thus no experience with the certainty or severity of punishment in relation to breaking court-ordered curfew. In addition, information was collected at multiple time periods to track individual changes over time.

Research since the 1980s has attempted to clarify and refine deterrence theory by examining the role of perceptions of certainty and severity of formal punishments, as well as using contingencies such as informal sanctions and moral beliefs to create more specified causal models. Subsequent research has covered a wide variety of methods, including replications of previous studies and inclusion of various offending populations.

Since the acknowledgement of the experiential effect and the need for more stringent research methods, several deterrence studies have attempted to clarify the role of certainty and severity of formal sanctions. In general, recent studies follow the same trend as earlier work, and report a negative association between perceived certainty and severity of punishment and offending behavior (Nagin, 1998). Those individuals that perceive the risk of detection and severity of the punishment as high will be less likely to offend. This association tends to hold whether the sample consists of active offenders (Decker, et al., 1993; Horney and Marshall, 1992) or students (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; Pogarsky, 2002). In addition, past experiences tend to influence perceptions. Prior history of offending tends to lower perceptions of risk and severity (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986), but if past experiences include formal sanctioning, perceptions of

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certainty increase (Horney and Marshall, 1992). Horney and Marshall (1992) have found perceptions to be offense-specific, and a key component is the ratio of offenses committed to the number of times the offender was caught. A large number of arrests did not necessarily increase perceptions of risk, but was dependent on the ratio of total offenses to arrests (Horney and Marshall, 1992). Not all research supports this framework, however. Piliavin and colleagues (1986) found no support for deterrence, as there was no relationship between perceptions of certainty of formal sanctions and offending.

Offending likelihood. A recent development in deterrence theory again puts prior studies into question. Pogarsky (2002) argues that individuals can be divided into three categories, acute conformists, deterrable, and incorrigible, and that each category will have unique qualities that affect deterrence research results. Acute conformists have consistently higher perceptions of certainty of punishment, which suggests that including them in with an entire sample, as past research has done, will skew the results and lessen the effect of certainty of punishment (Pogarsky, 2002). This finding has potentially far-reaching consequences, as prior research may come into question, not to mention that identifying individuals who already have a high perception of certainty of punishment and a low risk of recidivism may affect court policies. This study addresses this methodological issue by attempting to replicate the previous study, and categorize juveniles into the three offending likelihood categories.

Rational choice. Rational choice theory highlights the role of rewards in decision-making, and there is some research support for this position as well. Piliavin, et al. (1986) found support for the reward component of rational choice based on type of

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income and opportunity. Individuals who believed they could make more money illegally and reported more opportunities for criminal involvement were more likely to offend. Decker, Wright, and Logie (1993) also reported a reward component, based on the relative amount of the expected gain. Active residential burglars offered an offense scenario were more likely to report that they would commit an offense when the risk and severity of punishment were perceived to be low, especially when the gain was more than initially assumed. Thus, the reward aspect of rational choice theory is supported by research on individuals with active or past offending experiences. A component of the Nightwatch program involves rewarding juveniles for eight consecutive successful home visits, and determining if this aspect of the program in fact influences juvenile behavior will prove useful for program operations.

The earliest perceptual deterrence studies helped to highlight the importance of perceptions and informal sanctioning agents, but suffered from methodological problems due to the focus on cross sectional research designs. Subsequent research addressed this experiential effect, but most studies have used samples of college students or adults. This leaves a gap in the literature not only in terms of offending populations in general, but for juvenile offenders in particular. This research will significantly add to the perceptual deterrence literature by using a sample of active juvenile offenders. Judging from previous research, the current study may not yield strong deterrent effects. Measuring the perceptions of juveniles on the certainty and severity of graduated sanctions will still prove useful for policy, and assist in evaluating programs that rely on formal sanctioning.

Theory to policy. Deterrence theory has been the basis for numerous crime control policies across the nation and throughout history. The threat of punishment for a

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particular activity has frequently been used by police or court officials in an attempt to curb criminal or delinquent activity. A number of these programs are targeted at juveniles, particularly those involved in gang or other serious crime. The “pulling levers” model of crime control was presented above, and this section will present information regarding the effectiveness of programs based on this approach. This idea of multiple agencies working together to impact criminal activity has gained momentum across the country, and programs that utilize this component have increased. Some of the first collaborative programs began in Boston, and extensive information regarding these programs will be presented first, followed by information regarding subsequent programs and their effectiveness.

Nightlight and Ceasefire. The “pulling levers” approach is the basis for the implementation of two programs in Boston, Massachusetts that appear to be effective and have been replicated in other jurisdictions across the country. The Nightlight and Ceasefire programs both began in response to the serious youth violence in the city, mostly concerning gang involved offenders (Corbett et al., 1996; Kennedy et al. 2001). The programs began at different times, and had slightly different goals, but both sought to address the historically high levels of homicide and violence in the city.

Nightlight was implemented in 1992 and focused on enforcing the terms of probation for high-risk youth (Corbett et al., 1996; Boston Police Department and Partners, 1997). Much of the rationale and procedures for the program came from examining the characteristics of homicide incidents in the city. Roughly a quarter of homicide perpetrators were identified as being on probation at the time of the incident, with a significant history of police and court contacts (Boston Police Department and

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Partners, 1997). In addition, police and probation officers came to the realization that the juveniles in most frequent contact with the police were also those in most frequent contact with probation officials (Corbett et al., 1996). These observations led to the implementation of a system of home visits for juveniles on probation that utilized a collaboration between police and probation departments.

Nightlight was structured to give probation officers the resources they needed to monitor juveniles in the community and insure compliance with the terms of their probation. Police officers in unmarked cars and plain clothes were paired with probation officers in order to visit the homes of selected juveniles on their caseload, and check compliance with curfew and other behaviors (Corbett et al., 1996). This system of community visits and strict enforcement of probation conditions impacted the city in several ways. First, the probation department gained credibility through the directed enforcement (Corbett et al., 1996). Youth on probation were more certain that they would be responsible for the conditions of their supervision and more certain those conditions would be enforced. Subsequently, court personnel reported an increase in compliance and a reduction in offending behavior (Corbett et al., 1996). A second impact for the city came in the form of crime reduction. Those working closely with the program report a 13% reduction in crime between 1992 and 1995, and strongly believe the Nightlight program contributed to these figures (Corbett et al., 1996). Nightlight involved local police and probation officers, and focused on juveniles on probation and insuring those juveniles complied with their terms of supervision, including curfew monitoring. Another program in Boston also used focused interventions, but involved state and federal officials as well.

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Ceasefire began in Boston in 1996 with the goal of stemming firearm violence through order maintenance, targeted prosecution, and disruption of firearms trafficking (Boston Police Department and Partners, 1997). Firearm violence was suppressed by concentrating on gang-controlled hot spots and using all means available to hinder offenders. Frequently, offenders participate in many activities that warrant sanctioning, and the pulling levers strategy enforces each of these transgressions. The Boston Police Department collaborated with probation, prosecution, and federal agencies to enforce any and all violations (Kennedy et al., 2001; Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001). This targeted response came from police and court officials only after eruptions of gang firearm violence. The strategy was similar to earlier crackdowns and sweeps, but in this case the causes and consequences were well communicated to the offending group (Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy et al., 2001; Braga et al., 2001). The approach is apparently successful, as there was a significant drop in homicides in Boston between 1995 and 1996 (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy et al., 2001).

Ceasefire differed from other interventions in that it used strategies to increase the credibility of the program. Communicating with the target population was a key component. Police and court personnel conducted public meetings to inform gang members of exactly what was happening, why it was happening, and what would make it stop (Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy et al., 2001). In addition, the goals of the program were realistic and obtainable. The goal was not the eradication of gangs, but the reduction of violence (Kennedy et al., 2001), which was not only much more realistic, but was apparently obtainable.

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Neither of these programs was offered as a single solution to the complex problems facing Boston. While these targeted supervision and surveillance tactics suppressed negative behavior, other programs focused on increasing skills and providing needed treatment. Educational, recreational, and community building projects were offered to address the social needs of gang members, as well as various substance abuse treatment programs (Boston Police Department and Partners, 1997; Kennedy et al., 2001). Both Ceasefire and Nightlight originated out of a need to address the extreme youth violence in Boston. Both programs utilized a problem-solving approach to identify major problems and suggest specific plans of action.

Subsequent collaborative programs. The pulling levers strategy relies on multi-agency collaboration, and this concept has become the basis of several crime control strategies around the country. While the majority of these programs are targeted at gang and violent offenders, the success of this model has led to programs that include other types of offenders as well. Collaborative programs are relatively new, and many more programs exist than evaluations of their effectiveness. For example, Los Angeles (Tita, Riley and Green, 2003), Minneapolis (Minneapolis AntiViolence Initiative), and New Haven, Connecticut (Project One Voice) (Parent and Snyder, 1999) each have collaborative, enhanced supervision programs implemented, but final evaluations are not yet available. Other programs have reached the stage that initial results have been published.

Indianapolis is one example of a city that attempted to replicate what had happened in Boston. Citing a similar increase in homicide in the mid 1990s, officials in Indianapolis adopted the problem-solving approach and developed their own lever-

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pulling strategy in 1997, known as the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP) (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003). Indianapolis used the same collaborative framework as Boston, utilizing multiple agencies and targeted enforcement. Again, special meetings were used to inform high-risk groups that violence in Indianapolis would not be tolerated, and to specify the consequences (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003). One advantage Indianapolis had over other sites is that it also participated in the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) program. This participation allowed for a more in-depth collection of information from offenders regarding their knowledge of the new lever-pulling program as well as their perceptions of the criminal justice system. McGarrell and Chermak (2003) report that significantly more individuals who attended IVRP meetings knew about the program, and that their perceptions about the effectiveness of the criminal justice system fluctuated dramatically over time. One explanation for this change in perceptions was that data collection occurred shortly following a major crackdown, indicating that, at least for a short time, perceptions of certainty of punishment were increased by the lever-pulling techniques (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003). Thus, similar to Boston, there is evidence that this type of collaborative, targeted effort is somewhat effective in dealing with high-risk offenders, with both jurisdictions recognizing the need for further research and assessment of long term results.

Multiple evaluations of high-risk, gang-involved juveniles are underway, but less information is available regarding lower-risk offenders. Two programs have produced initial results involving a broad population of juvenile offenders, one in San Diego and one in Anchorage. Both sites utilize a collaborative effort between police

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officers and probation officials to enhance the supervision of juveniles on probation.

Unlike Nightlight however, police officers contact juveniles individually, and report back to the juvenile probation office. Police officers are assigned one or two juveniles with whom they are to have random personal contact with throughout the month, document any such interactions, and forward the information and any requests for services on to the probation officer (Giblin, 2002). Results from San Diego indicate a significant reduction in recidivism for juveniles assigned to this program (O'Rourke, Scott, Lance and Evans, 1998). For the Anchorage site, results indicate that program participants committed fewer new offenses but had a greater number of technical violations than the control group. The results are not statistically significant, however (Giblin, 2002). Thus, there is again a suggestion that police-corrections partnerships are helpful in managing less serious offenders, but further research is required before firm conclusions can be drawn.

Programs that enjoy apparent success are frequently replicated in other jurisdictions, with the hopes of also replicating the positive results. Boston's Nightlight and Ceasefire programs have inspired multiple replications across the country, some dealing with serious, gang-involved offenders, others, like Nightwatch, to deal with a broader population. Many of these programs are in the process of completing formal evaluations to assess their effectiveness, with encouraging preliminary results. This research seeks to significantly add to the current literature by reporting on the effectiveness of a police-corrections collaboration for less serious juvenile offenders. By evaluating the performance of Nightwatch, successful aspects of the program can be identified, and assist other jurisdictions in making informed choices about the programs to implement that will be most beneficial to the clients they serve.

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CONTINGENCIES

Attempts to refine deterrence theory have resulted in studies that pay particular attention to the contingencies highlighted in Chapter Three. As noted earlier, these contingencies can be divided into those that involve conformity, those that involve personal characteristics of the offender, and those that involve severity of punishment. Numerous studies have been completed that examine these contingencies, based on deterrence theory as well as other criminological theories. The studies chosen to be included here are those that focus on deterrence, in order to relate them to the current study.

Conformity. The contingencies that are related to conformity are moral view and fear of shame and embarrassment. Once researchers realized that different individuals perceive things differently, the role of moral views began to be included in tests of deterrence. Subsequent studies showed that moral beliefs were positively related to certainty of punishment (Jensen, 1969; Silberman, 1976), and more strongly related to criminal behavior than the fear of formal sanctions (Meier and Johnson, 1977; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986). Those with high moral commitment tended to perceive high rates of certainty of punishment, and these commitments affected behavior more than the threat of formal punishment. Decker, Wright, and Logie (1993) conducted research using an experimental sample of active residential burglars, and a control group of individuals with no history of burglary offenses. Using the offense scenario method, individuals in the control group were unwilling to offend in nearly all circumstances (Decker, et al., 1993). The mechanism by which the controls were unwilling to offend

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was not speculated on, but could be interpreted that some informal mechanism of conformity, whether moral view or fear of shame and embarrassment, was at work.

The differentiation between formal and informal sanctions was introduced early in deterrence research (Tittle, 1969), and several studies have shown that informal sanctions related to the fear of shame and embarrassment play a significant role in determining behavior. The source of these sanctions can be the individual themselves (Grasmick, et al., 1993), or significant others such as parents or employers (Jensen and Erickson, 1978; Meier and Johnson, 1977).

Characteristics of the individual. The contingencies that are related to characteristics of the individual are sex, age, and impulsivity. Few studies of deterrence have addressed the role of sex or age on perceptions of certainty or severity of punishment. Studies that have included the variable of sex in the analysis have reported mixed findings. Silberman (1976) reported significant differences among males and females in regards to the deterrent effect of threat of punishment. Males were shown to be significantly deterred, while females appeared to be undeterred by the threat of formal punishment. Not surprisingly, males were shown to have significantly more participation in criminal activity than females (Silberman, 1976). Jensen and Erickson (1978) found the opposite to be true, in that females were highly deterred by the threat of informal punishment. Females perceived costs to be much higher than males, particularly for informal sanction threats, particularly in regards to fear of parental disapproval and loss of self-respect (Jensen and Erickson, 1978). Decker, Wright, and Logie (1993) found no difference between males and females, however. Males were no more willing to offend than females, but the research sample contained a very small number of female

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respondents, indicative of the lower offending rates of females (Decker et al., 1993).

Thus, each of these studies has presented different conclusions regarding the effect of sex on the perceived certainty and severity of punishment. One problem in interpreting the results is that each study utilized different measures of punishment. Silberman (1976) only asked respondents about possible formal punishments, while Jensen and Erickson (1978) included both formal and informal sanction threats. Thus, more research directed at explaining the effect of sex on the certainty and severity of both formal and informal sanction threats will be useful.

The variable of age has also produced mixed results within the deterrence literature. Significant information has been compiled regarding the offending and victimization frequencies of juveniles (Blumstein, 2000; Fox, 2000; Hindelang, et al., 1978; Lauritsen, 2001), but fewer studies of deterrence have included the variable of age when examining perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment. The studies that have included this variable in the analysis have produced mixed results. Early studies of deterrence supported the conclusion that younger individuals tended to perceive the certainty and severity of punishment as high, whether for formal (Jensen, 1969) or informal (Jensen and Erickson, 1978) sanctions. More recent research has contradicted these early findings. Horney and Marshall (1992) report that younger respondents perceived the certainty of arrest to be lower than older offenders, and Decker, Wright, and Logie (1993) report no differences based on age. The explanation for these differences may lie in the composition of the sample. The earlier studies used high school students, while the later studies were conducted on active offenders. The current research will examine active juvenile offenders, and may help clarify this point.

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Similar to sex and age, there is much extant research on the individual trait of impulsivity, but only a few studies specific to deterrence. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) developed their general theory of crime to explain how low self-control lends itself to offending behavior, and numerous studies have subsequently supported their point (for example, Evans, Cullen, Burton, Dunaway, and Benson, 1997; Longshore, Turner, and Stein, 1996). Only a few researchers have included impulsivity in the analysis of the perception of certainty and severity of punishment on offending, however. Nagin and Paternoster (1994) found that those individuals with less self-control had fewer attachments to society and were thus less deterred by the perceived risk of punishment. Pogarsky (2002) found support that “incorrigible” offenders were in fact the most impulsive, and thus impervious to the deterrent effects of certainty and severity of formal punishment.

Severity of punishment. The nature of the punishment can be interpreted as the severity of the consequence for a given offense. The role of severity of punishment has not shown consistent influence on an offender’s decisions to commit criminal acts (Decker, et al., 1993), but Nightwatch offers a unique sanctioning situation. This research will be able to assess how the use of graduated sanctioning affects juvenile’s perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment, and whether different formal punishments invoke different perceptions.

LIFESTYLE/ROUTINE ACTIVITIES

The first formulations of lifestyle theory were based upon an inductive examination of victimization data (Hindelang, et al., 1978). The purpose was to devise a theory of victimization that could explain the patterns evident in a given sample. Many

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patterns that gave rise to the theory have been replicated repeatedly and provided significant insight into victimization and offending behavior. Recent research has offered several conclusions in regards to victim and offender characteristics, as well as individual and contextual risk factors for victimization that bear directly on this study.

Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978) reported that the highest predictors of victimization were age, sex, and marital status. These conclusions have received solid support in subsequent studies. It has been shown in a variety of samples that victims are overwhelmingly young, between 12 and 19 years of age (Lauritsen, Sampson, and Laub, 1991; Lauritsen, 2001; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Cohen, Kluegel, and Land, 1981), unmarried (Lauritsen et al., 1991; Lauritsen, 2001; Cohen and Felson, 1979), and male (Lauritsen et al., 1991; Lauritsen, 2001). There is also an indication that victimization is not distributed evenly throughout the population. Certain individuals appear to be “victim-prone” and sustain multiple victimizations for all crimes, including household and personal crimes (Hindelang, et al., 1978; Lauritsen and Davis-Quinet, 1995). In addition, it should be noted that the characteristics that predict victimization are also those that tend to predict offending (Wolfgang, 1958; Hindelang, 1976). Individuals that share certain characteristics tend to have the same daily routine activities, and share the same spaces and places.

Individual level risk factors for both victims and offenders also tend to be similar. Time spent with peers in unstructured, delinquent activities presents the highest risk of victimization as well as offending. The routine activities that prove to be the highest risk for victims include having a delinquent lifestyle (Lauritsen, et al., 1991; Lauritsen, Laub and Sampson, 1992), and being out the house alone (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Those

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Individuals who associate with delinquent peers and participate in activities such as alcohol and marijuana consumption are more likely to be victims of personal crime than those who do not. In fact, Lauritsen and colleagues (1991) revealed that of individuals reporting delinquent behavior, 45% also reported being the victim of an assault. In addition, lone individuals are more likely to be victimized than those in a group setting. These same risk factors and routine activities have been associated with offenders. Spending time in unstructured settings away from authority figures (Osgood, et al., 1996; Osgood and Anderson, 2004), and interacting with others who hold delinquent attitudes (Bernburg and Thorlindsson, 2001) are closely related to delinquent behavior. Thus, the characteristics that put individuals most at risk for victimization are also those that predict offending.

The study of victimization is relatively new to the field of criminology. Not until the 1970s did broad surveys include information about criminal victimization (Hindelang, et al., 1978). Over time, survey instruments and methods have improved and made victimization information somewhat more available. This information tends to be restricted to large surveys with samples of the general public such as the NCVS, however. This study focuses on a specific group of active juvenile offenders. Identifying the victimization experiences of such individuals will add to the victimization literature by illuminating the number and type of victimization experiences for this high-risk group.

Research regarding victimization using the lifestyle and routine activity theories is particularly relevant to the current study. All study participants are in the age range most frequently victimized, as well as the age range most indicated in offending behavior. In addition, Nightwatch seeks to reduce recidivism and victimization behavior by enforcing

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curfew restrictions and keeping juveniles at home, thereby reducing the opportunity to interact with unstructured delinquent peer groups.

CONCLUSION

Previous research regarding perceptual deterrence and opportunity theories indicates several points that may be clarified with the present research. Perceptual deterrence theory has been refined and methodological issues uncovered, which helps to focus this study of court-ordered curfew. The classification of individuals into three offending types is a significant development, in that each group may be influenced by different contingencies. In addition, much previous research was conducted on samples of high school or college students, or adults with no true experience with the criminal justice system. Studies using samples of active offenders indicate the use of offending populations for deterrence research is crucial (Decker et al., 1993; Horney and Marshall, 1992).

Lifestyle and routine activities theories have repeatedly shown that juveniles who are offenders are often also victims. Much previous research was conducted on large national samples, with relatively low numbers of offenders and victims. This research seeks to verify this relationship between offenders and victims, using a sample of active offenders.

Prior studies were consulted to assess the proper methods for tests of deterrence and lifestyle and routine activity theories. Several methodological concerns have been raised regarding deterrence theory, including the experiential effect and the presence of fundamental differences between individuals. This study was designed to take these concerns into account.

Chapter Five

METHODOLOGY

Prior research has utilized a wide variety of different techniques to measure constructs such as recidivism, victimization, and perceptions. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the methods used for this study, as well as identify the final variable compositions. This chapter will begin with an explanation of the research design and process, including sampling strategy and data collection methods. The measurement of key variables will then be presented, stating how raw data were coded and measured. The analysis plan will then detail the final variables used in subsequent analyses, how they were constructed, and the rationale for doing so. The chapter concludes with a discussion of threats to validity and reliability encountered during the study.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCESS

This study employs a quasi-experimental design using non-equivalent comparison groups, with a pre-test and multiple post-tests. A randomized experiment is usually preferable to insure the selection of non-biased samples, but the Nightwatch program has been operational since 2000, and randomization of procedures was not feasible. Juveniles included in the study fall into one of three groups: those on official court

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supervision that receive Nightwatch visits, those on official court supervision that do not receive Nightwatch visits, and those who participate in Victim/Offender Mediation (VOM). Juveniles in the first group constitute the experimental group, while those in the remaining two groups constitute the comparison group.

Participant Population. The participant population is a purposive sample of juvenile offenders recently referred to the court for official delinquency with no prior participation in the Nightwatch program. Court records were examined daily during the study period, and juveniles admitted to the detention center were screened for inclusion in the study. In this way, it is a convenience sample, in that juveniles chosen for the study are those who happened to offend during the study period. This is not a cohort sample, but rather a tracking of particular individuals during their time in contact with the court. Time 1 surveys were administered to 118 juveniles, which is roughly a 10% sampling of juvenile court referrals. In 2002, the St. Louis City Family Court received 1008 felony referrals, a number that has been on the decline for the last several years (City of St. Louis Family Court, 2003). Therefore, this sample has both benefits and drawbacks. The sample contains active juvenile offenders, which will provide unique knowledge of their perceptions and experiences, but the sample size for this study is small and far from inclusive of all court-involved youth in St. Louis.

The experimental group of 55 juveniles received Nightwatch visits according to their court order issued by the judge. The comparison group of 24 juveniles did not receive Nightwatch visits, and there are several reasons why this occurred, including residing outside the city, participating in the Victim/Offender Mediation program, and being assigned to the program after the Time 2 survey was administered. Juvenile

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referrals are handled by the court where the juvenile resides, rather than the location of the offense. In some instances, an offender may live outside the city limits while the court retains jurisdiction over the referral. This is a discretionary decision, made by either the warrant officer (whether to retain legal jurisdiction), or the deputy juvenile officer (whether to allow the juvenile to reside with a non-parent guardian outside the city). Juveniles that participate in VOM were not assigned to Nightwatch during the study period. A founding premise of VOM in St. Louis was that it was a diversion program to handle juvenile offenders in an informal manner, with as little court contact as possible. Finally, some juveniles were not assigned to Nightwatch until after their adjudication, and thus after Time 2. Again, this may be a discretionary case management decision made by the DJO, or may be the result of participation in specific programs, such as inpatient drug treatment. A handful of juveniles were included in the comparison group because the referral that made them eligible for the study was dismissed or transferred, but a new charge brought them back before the court. Thus, they had not participated in Nightwatch, but were still eligible and willing to participate in the research study.

Pre and post testing. The only selection criterion for inclusion in the study was that subjects have no prior Nightwatch participation, to avoid any experiential effects (Saltzman, et al., 1982). Thus, juveniles were given a pre-test prior to their assignment to Nightwatch to establish a basis for their perceptions of certainty of punishment, as well as measure their out-of-home activities. Two post-tests were administered, with a target interval of roughly two months, to measure any changes in perceptions or opportunities over time.

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The design of the current study was heavily influenced by prior research endeavors at the Family Court. The ongoing relationship between researchers and court personnel had provided several previous research opportunities, and the successful (and unsuccessful) aspects of these attempts assisted in designing the current study. While the overall attitude at the court is cooperative toward research, logistic and communication issues often made the actual execution of a study difficult. For example, in the summer of 2003 the University of Missouri at St. Louis attempted to collect survey information from juveniles and their parents for a Mental Health Initiative project. The research plan included contacting the deputy juvenile officer for a specific juvenile, and requesting that a member of the research staff be notified when the juvenile's next scheduled office visit occurred. The intent was for research staff to be present at a time when the juvenile was scheduled to have an office visit, not for special visits to be arranged or for the juvenile to travel to a different location to complete a survey. It was soon discovered that this research plan was challenging to carry out. Contacting a DJO by telephone proved to be difficult, as it is the nature of the job to be out in the community, at school or home visits, not to mention required court appearances. Many officers believed they needed to arrange a special office visit with the juvenile, rather than take advantage of the next regularly scheduled visit. This may have been a communication problem, but since the parent was also needed to complete a survey, may have identified a gap in researcher knowledge regarding actual court practices. For the most part, juveniles often appear for weekly office visits alone, without a parent. Therefore, in order for the parent to be present, a special visit was indeed needed. These difficulties heavily impacted how the current study was designed. Times and locations for survey administrations were

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carefully chosen in an attempt to assure success. As will be noted below, even with a broad knowledge of actual court practices and fourteen months of data collection, the gathering of survey data was still somewhat elusive.

Pre-testing occurred as soon as possible after informed consent was obtained. For a vast majority this was later the same day or the next day, with all pre-tests completed within four days of obtaining informed consent. With the exception of five juveniles who were interviewed at the VOM office, all juveniles were given the Time 1 pre test while in the detention center. Not all VOM participants were interviewed outside of detention, however. In some instances, informed consent was obtained and the juvenile given the Time 1 survey prior to the decision to participate in VOM. Overall there appeared to be no difference between juveniles interviewed in detention or in the VOM office. Often juveniles in detention learned about the possibility of their participation in VOM, as well as in other court programs, from other court staff. Juveniles interviewed outside of detention may have had slightly different perceptions about some questionnaire items, but it is impossible to ascertain unequivocally. The atmosphere of being detained may have influenced answers regarding detention specifically, and the knowledge that one is most likely being assigned (or not) to Nightwatch may have influenced answers regarding curfew.

The Time 1 investigator-administered questionnaires took about 10 to 15 minutes to complete, depending upon the individual and how talkative he or she chose to be. For the most part, the juveniles were cooperative and polite, and a majority agreed to complete the pre-test. Only 14 juveniles declined to participate after informed consent was obtained. T-tests indicate that the juveniles who declined the Time 1 survey were no

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different ($p < .05$) from juveniles who completed the survey, on the basis of sex, race, or current charge. Data was unavailable to compare the age of the groups. Of the remaining juveniles, 3 were discovered to have had prior Nightwatch participation and were excluded, and 11 were released prior to the administration of the Time 1 survey. Table 5.1 provides a view of the final sample.

Table 5.1

Final Sample Composition

Eligible	344
Parent Visited	178
Decline/No Contact	32
Parent Permission	146
Released	11
Declined	14
Discovered Ineligible	3
Total	118

Post-testing for juveniles under official court supervision occurred at variable points, and took advantage of times when the juvenile must come to the court on official business. This two month post test target coincides with the court's policy that every juvenile on official court supervision have a review hearing every sixty days. While this was the plan, many factors influence the scheduling of hearings, including court functions or family emergencies, and sometimes families would forget or fail to appear. Thus, the time between each juvenile's post tests was variable. Table 5.2 shows the average number of street days each juvenile was available between survey administrations, along with the standard deviation and range. Seventy-eight juveniles completed surveys at Time 2, with an average of 72 days between Time 1 and Time 2. Only 37 juveniles

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completed Time 3 surveys, with an average of 96 days between Time 2 and Time 3, and an average of 155 days to complete all three surveys, between Time 1 and Time 3.

Table 5.2

Juvenile Time Available Between Survey Administrations

Time	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range (days)
Between Release and Time 2 (N = 77)	72.34	49.44	240
Between Time 2 and Time 3 (N = 37)	96.43	36.14	159
Between Release and Time 3 (N = 37)	155.81	50.69	190

The rationale for selecting official court business for the venue of survey completion is the issue of attrition. As learned in the summer of 2003, it is difficult to schedule special office visits to complete surveys. The notion that a juvenile would be more likely to appear for an official court hearing seemed logical, and proved (for the most part) to be accurate and an effective means of data collection.

This strategy for post-testing was easy to carry out, as the court publishes a calendar to easily track when a juvenile has a hearing. All persons entering the court must undergo security screening and register at the front desk. I would alert the desk security officer that I was waiting for a particular family, and he would in turn direct them to me when they arrived. Another venue that was useful for obtaining Time 2 or Time 3 information was the Community Service Restitution (CSR) program. A majority of juveniles are ordered to Community Service, some in order to repay a victim, others merely for the service to society. It was possible to identify which juveniles were ordered to Community Service through the court database, as well as determine when they would be at the court to meet with CSR staff. All juveniles were required to participate in an

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orientation session prior to beginning work, to inform them of their work site and the expectations of the program. It was at this orientation meeting that I was able to contact several juveniles and complete questionnaires.

Post-testing for the VOM members of the comparison group was slightly different. Juveniles participating in VOM are not required to attend status conferences, and there is no adjudication. Thus, post-testing took advantage of how the program operates. Juvenile offenders are pre-screened by VOM staff prior to the mediation taking place. This pre-screening involves the VOM staff personally interviewing the juvenile regarding the offense, explaining how the program operates, and providing other services as needed. This meeting is scheduled between the DJO (or practicum student) and the juvenile at a time that is convenient for both. In addition, official cases that participate in VOM are required to check in via telephone call with staff on a weekly basis. VOM staff agreed to arrange extra office visits as needed to complete post-tests.

This research design was chosen and implemented in an attempt to maintain contact with as many participants as possible. Even though many families and court workers were extremely cooperative, several juveniles dropped out of the study. Figure 5.1 presents a flowchart of attrition throughout the study. At Time 1, 118 juveniles completed surveys, a majority in the detention center. At Time 2, 78 juveniles completed surveys. A number of scenarios caused attrition at Time 2, including case dismissal (17 juveniles), no contact with the juvenile or the juvenile declined (11 juveniles), transfer to the Division of Youth Services (DYS) without leaving detention (5 juveniles), transfer to another jurisdiction (4 juveniles), or the juvenile was discharged from court supervision (3 juveniles). Only 4 juveniles declined the Time 2 survey, thus a majority of juveniles

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that dropped out of the study did so because of a decision made by the court. Juveniles for whom there was “no contact” are individuals who had scheduled court activities; however either the juvenile or the investigator was unable to attend. Often other attempts were made for alternate contact, such as through Community Service Restitution, but these were unsuccessful. This flowchart highlights the logistic difficulty in conducting research with a group of active offenders. The principal investigator had full access to court scheduling and other documents, and was physically present at the court an average of 20 hours per week between November 2003 and January 2005, yet a significant number of juveniles did not complete surveys at all time points.

Figure 5.1 about here

Reasons for attrition at Time 3 were similar to those at Time 2. Of the 78 juveniles who completed a survey at Time 2, only 37 completed Time 3 surveys. Again, the majority was unavailable due to some court related decision. At Time 3, 12 juveniles had no contact, 8 were transferred to DYS, 7 were discharged, 6 had their case dismissed, and in 4 cases someone declined the survey, whether the juvenile (2), parent (1), or attorney (1). Thus, both at Time 2 and Time 3, the majority of juveniles who dropped out of the study did so because of a legal decision related to their case, rather than a personal decision not to participate. These results indicate that a non-trivial number of respondents failed to complete Time 2 surveys. There is concern that the respondents who remain in the study at Time 2 or Time 3 are somehow different from the original sample (Miller and Wright, 1995; Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). This possibility of an attrition bias will be discussed with the other threats to validity later in this chapter.

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DATA COLLECTION

Access to study participants. The principal method used to collect information about sanction perceptions is investigator-administered questionnaires completed by the juveniles, which presents the considerable problem of access to study participants. The St. Louis City Family Court consistently expresses an interest in evaluating court programs and practices in order to provide quality services for juveniles as well as for taxpayers, and are very cooperative with research efforts. The Court currently collaborates with the University of Missouri at St. Louis as well as other agencies on a number of projects, including monitoring of the Nightwatch program. This study is an extension of that collaboration.

Permission to conduct the study at the court regarding the Nightwatch program was obtained from the Special Services Manager, the direct supervisor of the program. This individual was made aware of and approved the research design, and was constantly updated as to the progress of the project. Additional permission for the release of information was required from the Administrative Judge, via court order. The Special Services Manager served as the sponsor for the request, and the order was drafted without delay. The reputation of the University of Missouri at St. Louis and the ongoing partnership between the university and the court also assisted greatly in the granting of consent for the project. Several court staff members who were leery of my interaction with their clients were visibly relaxed when they learned the project was associated with the university. The Special Services Manager maintains close communication with the University of Missouri at St. Louis, and I was introduced through this contact. In addition, I accepted a practicum student position within the Victim/Offender Mediation

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(VOM) program, another program under the supervision of the Special Services Manager, which provided invaluable experience.

While a practicum student for the court, I obtained valuable insights about court procedures as well as developed professional relationships. This position involved activities that would be performed by a deputy juvenile officer, such as client interactions and case management. Duties included scheduling and conducting screening interviews with victims and offenders, to assess appropriateness for VOM. Case files were maintained from assignment through closing, including proper organization and monthly reports. Other responsibilities included screening official and unofficial cases to determine which would be accepted into VOM, directing cases to the proper individual or department, and attending hearings to update the judge on case progress. These experiences provided insight into the workings of the court and actual disposition of cases, as well as how court staff and departments interact with one another. Knowledge of the internal operations of the court was extremely helpful in crafting a viable research design. Understanding types of referrals, hearing procedures, and case processing insured the proposed research design was realistic and feasible.

Interaction between the Victim/Offender unit and other departments provided a large number of contacts throughout the court that proved useful once data collection was begun. Through daily contact with employees from other departments, professional relationships were fostered and several court employees offered assistance with the project. For example, intake officers in the detention center provided information about procedures in their unit, as well as offered assistance in coordinating opportunities to survey juveniles. Deputy juvenile officers with whom I interacted on VOM business

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were often very helpful when one of the research participants was on their caseload. Staff for the VOM and Community Service Restitution programs were also helpful in scheduling data collection. Juveniles who did not appear for their scheduled court hearings sometimes appeared for office visits with one of these programs, and staff were always willing to allow completion of a survey. VOM supervisors were perhaps the most helpful of all, as the decision was made to begin placing VOM participants on Nightwatch, but staff agreed to postpone implementation until after research interviews were complete. Several other individuals around the court showed interest in the project and were always willing to assist, including security officers and detention staff. The experience of participating at such a close level with the juvenile court provided experiences and opportunities that were indispensable as the research project progressed. The court as a whole is very interested in whether or not it is providing high quality services for clients and taxpayers, and collaborates with several other agencies to assess its performance. Court staff would most likely have been cooperative with any evaluator, but my detailed experience with the court has enriched the data collection, and increased the chances that data would be collected successfully.

Informed consent. The State of Missouri and the University of Missouri's Institutional Review Board (IRB) require informed consent by parents for their child to be included in a research study. This study was consistent with the guidelines set forth by these agencies. Parental consent and pre-testing of all juveniles occurred after booking and prior to the juvenile's first Nightwatch visit. A useful opportunity to accomplish this was during the period that the juvenile was in detention, awaiting the detention hearing. The rationale for using this venue is the existence of a face-to-face

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contact prior to the juvenile being included in Nightwatch. To avoid experiential effects, the pre-test had to be administered prior to any Nightwatch contact, yet a juvenile could theoretically be assigned and receive Nightwatch visits the day after their detention hearing and release. Approaching parents who visited while their child was still in detention was a logical and feasible choice, which provided an informal meeting with parents in order to explain the consent form. Thus, when parents came to detention to visit their child, they were approached and consent was sought. In a few instances, parents who had not visited their child in detention were contacted immediately prior to or after the detention hearing in the main court building.

The court offers visiting hours in the detention center three times a week, and these times are the only opportunities for parents to see their child. Parents must check in with detention staff and security personnel, and may not carry any personal items into the detention center. It was at this security check-in point the parents of juveniles appropriate for the study were identified and permission sought. The consent form was read out loud to the parent, and any questions or concerns addressed. Both the parent and I signed two copies, so the parent could receive a copy immediately.

Confidentiality. Any research that involves interaction with human participants, particularly when the participants are a protected group such as juveniles, must address the issue of confidentiality. The current research has followed all protocols for providing and maintaining confidentiality of participant's identity. First, the Institutional Review Board at the University of Missouri at St. Louis was petitioned to approve a full review of the research proposal. Final approval was given for a period of one year, and an extension was requested and granted in order to complete data collection.

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In addition to the university, approval for the project was also received from the St. Louis City Family Court. In order to release confidential information, a court order was issued from the Administrative Judge, authorizing contact with juveniles and access to court records for research purposes. Court staff are extremely vigilant regarding the confidentiality of court proceedings, and the presentation of the court order gave credibility to the study.

The main strategy for maintaining confidentiality was maintaining all records and files at the St. Louis City Family Court. As a practicum student, I was furnished an office, equipped with locked cabinets, and a computer, equipped with password protections, that provided sufficient security for all study-related materials. All information regarding juveniles was obtained through the secure court intranet, and no documents or completed questionnaires were shared with other court staff. Upon inclusion in the study, each juvenile was assigned an arbitrary number. This number was the only identifier used on questionnaires to distinguish the individual. The spreadsheet that contained the name/number code was maintained at the court in my personal computer drive. No documents containing individual identifiers, such as names, left the court building. At the conclusion of the study, all documents with individual names attached will be left at the court or destroyed, and all other study-related materials will be maintained in locked containers in the personal possession of the investigator.

Participant selection. The majority of juveniles assigned to Nightwatch are official delinquency cases, whereby a formal petition has been filed. Figure 5.2 represents how such cases flow through the St. Louis Family Court. For referrals of this

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type, juveniles are booked and held in detention pending a detention hearing. The detention hearing occurs on the third business day following intake. All juveniles with an

Figure 5.2 about here

official charge will be assigned to Nightwatch unless they fall into one of the categories mentioned above. Unofficial cases can be assigned to Nightwatch as well, at the discretion of the juvenile's assigned DJO. Many of the unofficial referrals to Nightwatch initiate from the Truancy Unit, as the goals of both programs are to increase school attendance and performance.

Intra-court documents provided the means for screening official cases and identifying appropriate participants. The court publishes a daily intake log (Appendix E) via intranet that lists each juvenile brought to the detention center in the past twenty-four hours. Juveniles charged with crimes are detained, juveniles brought to the center for abuse or neglect reasons are not held, but their contact with the court is noted on the log. This daily intake log was used to screen cases for inclusion in the present study. The log contains several pieces of information, including name, case number (unique referral identification number), reason for contact (delinquency, abuse, neglect), booking status, number of prior referrals, and the name of the DJO already assigned to the juvenile, if applicable. The information provided on the log can be used to search for the juvenile in the court's computer database, which provides more detailed information regarding previous court referrals. A new updated database that is linked to the state juvenile court system now also documents all referrals, all programs a juvenile has participated in, as well as scheduling and case note (case management) information.

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For official referrals, no previous participation in Nightwatch was the only criterion used to screen possible participants. Other variables including age, sex, and offense type did not play a role in determining sample selection. This insured that a wide variety of demographics and offenses were available for analyses, as well as assisted in obtaining the largest sample size possible to increase statistical strength.

Comparison group. The comparison group for testing perceptual deterrence consists of juveniles recently referred to the court for delinquency, who were not assigned to Nightwatch. At the beginning of the study it was assumed that only those juveniles who participated in VOM would comprise the comparison group. As the study progressed and surveys were completed, however, it was learned that several more juveniles were not receiving Nightwatch visits, for the reasons outlined above.

Victim/Offender Mediation provides a unique court experience for juveniles in this study, as they were excluded not only from Nightwatch, but from official court supervision as well. Figure 5.3 outlines how cases are screened and flow through the VOM program.

Figure 5.3 about here

The mission of VOM is to provide specially trained mediators to bring juvenile offenders together with their victims in a face to face meeting for the purpose of sharing feelings, repairing harm, discussing the facts of the offense and to develop restitution and restoration agreements (St. Louis City Family Court, 2002). Screening procedures to determine which cases are appropriate for VOM are similar to those employed for research participants, with more stringent criteria for inclusion. Cases appropriate for VOM are those that involve a situation that can be mediated, such as burglary,

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trespassing, assault, or tampering. Offenses excluded from VOM include those that are victimless, such as weapons offenses, or are extremely violent or sexual in nature.

Juveniles participating in VOM were selected as the comparison group for several reasons. First, juveniles who are eligible for VOM must have limited previous contact with the court and no prior adjudications, which assumes no prior Nightwatch participation. Second, juveniles who participate in VOM were not assigned to Nightwatch when the study began. Thus, the two groups are similar in their prior court contacts, but one group receives Nightwatch contacts, while the other does not.

Data sources. Information for the current study was gathered via participant observation, investigator-administered questionnaire, and official court records. Each of these sources will be explained, and the specific data collected from each source will be identified.

Specific information to clarify program operation and history was collected through participant observation. Court staff provided intra-court documents to outline program goals and detail the history and evolution of the program specifically and the JAIBG grant process in general. Gaps in researcher knowledge were filled through personal communication with the Special Services Manager and other court staff. In addition, I participated in a “ride-along” of the Nightwatch program, accompanying the crew on their nightly rounds. The crew was observed during their regular duty shift, and information that was collected assisted in the process evaluation of the program. Another venue that provided a variety of observations was the admissions office of the detention center. I was present in the office for one and one half hours on visitation days, which provided me with numerous opportunities to observe staff interactions with juveniles,

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with other staff, and with other units. My presence at the court as a practicum student allowed me to observe court workers in their daily routine, and allowed the transfer of information, whether via electronic mail, copies of court documents, or personal communication.

Information regarding individual perceptions, recidivism, and victimization was obtained using investigator-administered questionnaires (Appendix F) completed by juvenile participants. The use of the questionnaire format is a logical method when attempting to determine individual perceptions, as this information cannot be obtained through official records or other objective means. Face to face interviews would also be feasible, but would require more of the participant's time. This would not present a problem for the Time 1 interview conducted in the detention center, but would not be feasible for Time 2 or 3. Juveniles were approached while at the court on official business for Time 2 and 3, and frequently families did not arrive until immediately prior to their appointed time. In some instances securing the five minutes needed to conduct the Time 2 or 3 survey was extremely difficult, due to other staff desiring to talk to the juvenile or their presence required in the courtroom. Telephone interviews would be another option, but the population in St. Louis is highly mobile and telephone surveying may have become problematic in regards to disconnected or changed telephone numbers. Thus, the selection of the short investigator-administered questionnaire format was the most logical and feasible for this study.

A significant amount of information was supplied by the St. Louis City Family Court—Juvenile Division via official court records. The process used to screen current cases for inclusion in the study, as detailed above, used documents and electronic

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information maintained by the court. In addition, the evaluation of the program goal of reduced recidivism relied on information regarding any subsequent referrals as noted in the court database. Data regarding juveniles assigned to Nightwatch was also obtained from the court. Copies of the Nightwatch case contact sheets were made available by the JAIBG liaison, to monitor juvenile compliance with curfew. Whether or not the juvenile was in compliance with curfew, as well as any reports about other behaviors were noted from this source. Information regarding the relationship between sanctions assigned and sanctions actually applied were also obtained through this source. The assigned deputy juvenile officer is notified by the JAIBG liaison when a sanction is required, and the DJO responds with the sanction that is appropriate. All information concerning sanctions, the required completion date, and actual completion date was obtained from the juvenile's Nightwatch file. The court also provides information electronically via spreadsheet to UM—St. Louis on a daily basis, including the juvenile's name, party identification number, offense history, compliance with Nightwatch curfew, and sanctions applied. This source provides specific information about Nightwatch participants in an efficient format.

MEASUREMENT OF KEY VARIABLES

Dependent variables. The major research question for this evaluation is whether inclusion in Nightwatch reduced recidivism in program participants. The dependent variable for this portion of the outcome evaluation is the amount of *subsequent offending* by the juvenile. This will be measured using official court documents as well as self-report information.

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Subsequent official recidivism is signified as any subsequent referral to the court by the juvenile. The court database was used to identify any such activity. All referrals were included, regardless of whether or not they were acted upon by the court. The use of any referral brought before the court fits well with perceptual deterrence theory. Perceptual deterrence is contingent upon the individual's particular circumstances and experiences. A juvenile who has come into contact many times with the police and the court has not taken any action will perceive the certainty and severity of formal punishments differently than a juvenile who was in contact with the police one time and ended up in detention. Specific information regarding each referral was recorded, but the final measure used for analysis was dichotomous, and coded as 0 = none and 1 = 1 or more subsequent official referrals.

In addition to official records, information was also collected regarding *self-reported delinquency*. Juveniles were asked about their delinquent behavior during questionnaire administration. They were asked about a variety of behaviors, not all of which are law violations. Activities asked about included: skipping school, breaking curfew, purposely damaging property, carrying a hidden weapon, vandalism (spray painting), stealing less than \$50, stealing more than \$50, stealing or trying to steal a motor vehicle, simple assault (hitting someone to hurt them), aggravated assault (using a weapon on someone), and selling marijuana (University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995). At Time 1 juveniles were asked if they had ever engaged in the activity (yes/no), and whether they had engaged in the activity recently, within the last two months. If they had participated in the activity recently, additional information was sought regarding the number of times the act was committed, as well as the time of day it occurred. At Time 2

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and Time 3 juveniles were asked whether or not they had engaged in the activity since the previous survey (yes/no). If the response was positive, additional information regarding the actual number of events and time of day was again sought. Yes/no responses were coded as 0 = no or 1 = yes. At Time 1 the number of recent incidents was totaled and recorded, at Time 2 and Time 3 the number of incidents reported were totaled and recorded.

The other outcome variable to be examined is *victimization*. This variable was measured by the number of victimizations as collected on the self-report surveys. The questionnaire format is the same as for self reported delinquency. Respondents were asked at Time 1 if they were ever the victim of a particular crime, and whether or not the victimization occurred recently, within the last two months. Again, additional information was solicited regarding the number of recent incidents and the time of day they occurred, and responses were totaled and recorded. Juveniles were asked: 1) have you been hit by someone trying to hurt you (simple assault), 2) has someone used a weapon to get money or things from you (robbery), 3) has someone attacked you with a weapon (aggravated assault), and 4) have you had any of your things stolen from you (theft) (University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995). The procedure for Time 2 and Time 3 victimization reporting was also identical to the Time 2 and Time 3 procedure for self reported delinquency.

Independent variables. The primary research question asks whether Nightwatch reduces offending and victimization experiences for juveniles who are assigned. The second question to be answered deals with the mechanism by which these reductions may

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take place, based on the rationale behind program operations. The main independent variables examined here will test these rationales.

Deterrence theory posits that an individual will weigh the costs of committing a particular act based on the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment. The perceptions of juveniles in regards to the *certainty* of punishment were assessed using the survey format. Juveniles were asked how likely would it be that they would get caught breaking the law? This general question was asked, as well as whether they would get caught committing specific acts. The specific acts are many of the same activities included in the self report delinquency portion of the questionnaire: skipping school, breaking curfew, hitting someone to hurt them (simple assault), stealing less than \$50, stealing more than \$50, stealing or trying to steal a motor vehicle, and using a weapon on someone (aggravated assault). Scale choices were 1) “very unlikely,” 2) “somewhat unlikely,” 3) “somewhat likely,” and 4) “very likely” (Grasmick, Bursik, and Arneklev, 1993). Thus, the higher the score, the higher the perceived certainty of the juvenile that he would get caught breaking the law, either generally or for a specific activity. A scale was established using these questions for later analysis (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986).

It was clear from the first survey administrations that the juveniles did not fully understand some of the wording or the abstract ideas behind the questions. Therefore, additional comments were provided for certain sections of the questionnaire. Equality among respondents is of major concern during survey administration, therefore any additional comments were established early on and were maintained without change for the remainder of the study period. This discovery that the wording for the questionnaires was not well-matched with the survey population left the choice of explaining difficult

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words or abandoning the project altogether. As there was only one survey administrator, questionnaires were presented in an equitable fashion. All examples of such additional comments are presented in Appendix G.

A pre-test of the questionnaire may have been appropriate for this study. Testing the investigator-administered format on a small group of juveniles prior to the start of the study period may have detected the problems in wording, and Appendix G would have been unnecessary (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). There was no outstanding basis to believe this would become a problem, however. All questions, formats, scales and indices were used verbatim or adapted to be Nightwatch specific from prior research (University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995; Silberman, 1976; Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; Osgood, et al., 1986; Pogarsky, 2002), with no indications from these or other sources that these components would be inappropriate for active juvenile offenders.

Punishment can originate from formal as well as informal entities. For a juvenile, the formal controls of the police, courts, and a deputy juvenile officer can mete out formal punishments such as detention, probation, or other sanctions. Informal punishment by way of parents, peers, teachers, and employers can also affect a juvenile's behavior. Information regarding the respondent's perception of the severity of punishment from both formal and informal entities was collected using the investigator-administered questionnaire.

Perceptions of *formal severity* were assessed by asking juveniles to suppose they broke the law and were caught and punished, and how much of a problem would that punishment create in their life (Grasmick et al., 1993). Responses included 1) "no

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problem at all,” 2) “hardly a problem,” 3) “a little bit of a problem,” and 4) “a very big problem.” This general question does not specify a punishment, but allows the juvenile to subjectively think about what the severity of punishment may be (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Grasmick et al., 1993). The same question was repeated with specific Nightwatch sanctions included as the “punishment,” including attendance at a meeting with other juveniles (restorative conference), writing a book report, picking up trash around the court, and a 24-hour sentence to the detention center, to record juvenile’s perceptions of these specific activities. Juveniles reported how much of a problem each of these activities would create in their lives, using the “no problem at all” to “a very big problem” scale. The higher the score, the greater the problem the juvenile perceived the activity to cause, and thus the greater their perception of the severity of (formal) punishment.

Information regarding *informal severity* was not as specific. Juveniles were asked to suppose they were caught and punished for breaking the law; how much of a problem would that create with 1) parents 2) friends 3) teachers, and 4) getting a good job (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990)? Responses were coded exactly the same as responses for the formal punishment questions, again with a higher score indicating a higher perception of the severity of (informal) punishment.

Offending likelihood. Prior perceptual deterrence work included all respondents in the final analyses, but Pogarsky (2002) argues that individuals should be placed into categories based on their *offending likelihood*, to make the analysis more meaningful. This study seeks to identify juveniles as acute conformists, deterrable, or incorrigible by replicating and extending Pogarsky’s work. This study follows the original work for the

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most part, with slight differences in method and variables. This study uses a questionnaire format, while the original study used a scenario format. Both studies use informal measures adapted from Grasmick and Bursik (1990), but this study also asks questions about moral views. The impulsivity questions are identical for both studies (see below). Analyses from the original study were replicated, with alternative regression methods presented as well. The first step in categorizing individuals into the three categories is to calculate the offending likelihood (OL). Offending likelihood is determined by the difference in the juvenile's response to the questions regarding how likely it is they will break the law in the future (OL1) and how likely it is they will break the law if guaranteed not to get caught (OL2). Choices for respondents include 1) "very unlikely," 2) "somewhat unlikely," 3) "somewhat likely," and 4) "very likely." Thus, the higher the response, the higher the juvenile's perception that he will offend in the future, whether he thinks he will get caught or not.

Acute conformists will not break the law even if guaranteed not to get caught ($OL1 = OL2 = 1$). Deterrable respondents will present an offending likelihood that is reduced by threat of punishment ($OL1 < OL2$), while incorrigible respondents will show no difference in regards to threat of punishment ($OL1 = OL2 > \text{"somewhat likely"}$). Pogarsky recommends analyzing certainty and severity measures separately for each of these groups. The perceptions of the severity and certainty of punishment can be determined for conformist, deterrable, and incorrigible groups, and whether this affects law-violating behavior.

Perceptual deterrence research recognizes that many factors can influence an individual's decision making, and *moral view* is one such contingency selected for further

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examination during the current study. Juveniles were asked in Section D of the questionnaire how “wrong” they believed certain activities were. The activities in this section were again similar to the activities presented in the self-report delinquency section of the survey. Respondents were asked “how wrong is it” to: skip school without an excuse, lie or talk back to adults like parents or teachers, break curfew, skip an appointment with your DJO, purposely damage or destroy property that doesn’t belong to you, steal something worth less than \$50, steal something worth more than \$50, steal or try to steal a car, and hit someone with the idea of hurting them (University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995). Possible answers were “not at all wrong,” “sometimes wrong,” “usually wrong,” or “always wrong.” Answers were combined into an index of moral view, with a higher score indicating a higher internalization of pro-social thoughts and a higher “moral view.”

Levels of *shame* were assessed in Section E of the questionnaire, asking juveniles how they would feel about breaking the law, even if they weren’t caught (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990). Scale choices included 1) “not guilty at all” 2) “somewhat guilty” 3) “a little guilty” and 4) “very guilty.” The higher the score, the more shame perceived by the individual. *Embarrassment* was assessed by asking juveniles that if they did feel guilty about breaking the law and not getting caught, how much of a problem would that feeling of guilt cause in their lives. Again, responses were scaled from “no problem at all” to “a very big problem” (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990), with a higher score indicating a higher level of embarrassment for the juvenile.

An individual trait frequently examined in criminological research is *impulsivity*. Juveniles were asked several questions to assess their level of impulsivity, and a scale

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was constructed for analysis. Section F of the questionnaire asked how well the juvenile agreed with six statements to create an impulsivity score: 1) I act on impulse, 2) I often do things on the spur of the moment, 3) I always consider the consequences before I take action, 4) I rarely make hasty decisions, 5) sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret, and 6) Occasionally I act first and think later. Possible responses are “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree” (Pogarsky, 2002). Questions 3 and 4 were reverse coded, resulting in a final total that signifies the higher the score the higher the individual’s level of impulsivity.

Opportunity was measured using questions that asked juveniles how many times in a typical week they find things to do away from home. The general question is asked, as well as questions about nights spent occupied with specific activities: watching TV, reading or doing homework, riding around in a car for fun, going to parties, hanging out with friends, shopping, and engaged in church or community activities (Osgood, et al., 1996). Possible responses included “none,” “1 or 2,” “2 to 4,” or “five or more,” and were coded 1 through 4, respectively. Thus, the higher the score, the more the juvenile participated in the particular activity. These questions were placed into an index for further analysis.

Prior referrals were documented in a similar manner as subsequent official referrals. As with subsequent referrals, all contact with the court was recorded, regardless of whether or not the court took any action. Each specific prior referral was recorded, as well as a composite score that indicated the total number of prior referrals accumulated by the juvenile. A dichotomous variable was created for use in analyses, with 0 = none and 1 = 1 or more.

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The *number of sanctions* for curfew violations that a juvenile accumulates identifies a specific type of offending behavior. The number of sanctions ordered for the juvenile depicts the number of violations documented by the crew. The crux of the program is that juveniles receive sanctions for unexcused absences, and one key aspect of the program is how well the juvenile adhered to the curfew that was court ordered. Nightwatch case contact sheets were examined for a number of pieces of information. Each contact sheet was checked, with the risk score for the juvenile, original curfew time, assigned DJO, and length of visit noted. Each contact sheet was coded (no = 0, yes = 1, and no answer = 2) to identify whether the juvenile was in compliance with their curfew at any given visit. Additionally, a composite score was tabulated for each juvenile, with the total number of missed visits represented. Any instances of the juvenile not being home were evaluated by the JAIBG liaison, and a sanction was ordered if the absence was deemed unexcused. The records were also examined for the sanction that was completed, and the date of completion. Most of this information, along with the number of visits the juvenile received each week and the number of rewards received, will be presented in the process evaluation section in Chapter Six.

Several demographic variables were collected for each juvenile. Section A of the survey contained questions about background information, such as sex, age, race, neighborhood of residence, and household composition. Court records were also used to verify or supplement information provided by the respondents.

Juveniles self identified their *sex* as male or female, coded 1 or 0, respectively. Juveniles wrote in their *age* on the questionnaire, and their date of birth was obtained from the computer database. Respondents were asked to declare what *race* or ethnicity

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they considered themselves: White/Anglo, Black/African American, Hispanic/Latino, American Indian/Native American, Asian/Pacific Islander, or Other. Only three categories elicited responses and were coded as follows: 0 = Black/African American, 1 = White, 2 = Other/Mixed (all respondents who identified themselves as mixed identified African American and another ethnicity, such as Cherokee).

Juveniles were asked to fill in the name of their *neighborhood*, but a majority of respondents could not identify the formal neighborhood name. A computer mapping program was utilized to identify each juvenile's neighborhood using their street address. The court database was used to obtain the juvenile's street address to enter into the mapping software.

Juveniles were asked on the questionnaire what adults *live with* them at their house: 1) both mother and father, 2) father only, 3) mother only, 4) other. The "other" response required the juvenile to write in the relationship of the individual. Thus, a lower score for the juvenile indicates they live with at least one biological parent. The lowest score of 1 indicates living with both parents, while scores above 4 indicate the juvenile lives with someone other than parents, such as grandparents, other family members, or foster care.

ANALYSIS PLAN

Recidivism. Subsequent official charges for the juvenile were originally measured as a sum of all incidents for each juvenile. Analysis indicated this was far from a normal distribution, however, sharing skew characteristics common in many criminological and psychiatric studies (Farrington and Loeber, 2000; Osgood, McMorris, and Potenza, 2002). A majority of juveniles recorded no subsequent charges, and some categories

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contained only one juvenile. Consequently, the variable was recoded into a new variable that divided the juveniles into two categories, 0 = no subsequent referrals, and 1 = 1 or more subsequent referrals. This measure was used as a dependent variable for the outcome evaluation. Dichotomizing the dependent variables was a logical choice for many reasons, based upon the nature of the data as well as the nature of the study.

Several characteristics of the data for this study made logistic regression the appropriate choice for analyses. First, many of the variables and their distributions violate the assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002). OLS assumes that variables have a normal and linear distribution, and the variables in the present study do not meet this assumption. A majority of the variables, both dependent and independent, in the current study fail to meet the assumption of a normal distribution, and many were highly skewed. This situation was addressed by dividing each distribution into “high,” “medium,” and “low” categories to divide the range of answers into more or less equal proportions. This reduced the skew of the distribution while maintaining the unique distribution for this sample (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002; Farrington and Loeber, 2000). In addition, the variables in this study were not well suited to testing the assumption of linear association. Many variables are ordinal, asking respondents “how likely” it is they would be caught or how often they spend time out of the house, and the Pearson coefficient (r) is more appropriate for interval or ratio level variables (Bachman and Paternoster, 1997). Thus, using logistic regression is logical for these data, as the strict assumptions for normal and linear distribution are not required (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002).

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Another advantage to using dichotomous variables is that the results are easily interpreted by a large audience (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). The current study is an evaluation of an active juvenile court program, and the audience interested in the results includes academics, St. Louis court staff, court staff in other jurisdictions, as well as the funding agency. Not all of these groups are familiar with complex statistical explanations, such as logarithms or scale creations, for correcting the skew of the sample (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). While other options would be acceptable for this data set, using a simple yes/no format for the dependent variables will assist in clearly conveying the results, and their implications, to the broad audience.

Dichotomizing variables also has many disadvantages, one of the most important being the loss of information. It would be useful to assess the difference between individuals who did not reoffend at all, those who reoffended “a little,” perhaps up to five times, and those who were the chronic, serious offenders with multiple subsequent referrals. Given the small sample size of the current study, using dichotomized dependent variables is quite logical (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). As noted earlier, when using the total number of offenses by each juvenile, many categories contained only one juvenile, lacking sufficient statistical power.

An important consideration to dichotomization is how the sample is split (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). Creating a yes/no measure for delinquency or victimization treats all juveniles with one or more incidents equally, which may not be the most accurate or informative. However, for this study, the question is whether juveniles who are assigned to Nightwatch have subsequent delinquency or victimization

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problems of any kind. In addition, the distance between surveys is relatively short, and juveniles who reoffend quickly may be essentially different than those who do not.

In addition to subsequent official referrals, other measures of delinquency were recoded to improve the skew as well as create the best measures for analysis. *Self-report* delinquency was measured several ways, with some variables divided according to the possible range of responses, while others use dichotomous measures. All self-report measures resulted in distributions that were highly skewed, which is not unexpected, given prior research (Farrington and Loeber, 2000; Osgood et al., 2002). At Time 1 the *total* number of activities a juvenile had “ever” participated in was measured. Possible scores could range from 0 to 11. The measure was a near normal distribution, but was highly positively skewed. By dividing the measure into “none,” “1 to 5,” and “6 or more,” the distribution was improved to a slight positive skew (see Mertler and Vannatta, 2002). Dividing the sample into these three categories differentiates juveniles who have never committed a self-reported act from those who have committed at least one, as well as differentiating between those who report ever participating in a few incidents compared to those who admit to a majority that were presented on the survey. This measure was used in the analyses for offending likelihood, but not as a dependent variable for the outcome evaluation.

For the Time 1 *recent* self-reported incidents, as well as at Time 2 and Time 3, a large proportion of juveniles report no delinquency whatsoever, and only one or a few individuals at any given offending frequency. In addition, one juvenile self-reported 112 recent incidents at Time 1, an obvious outlier. This made for very high skews, all over 1. To improve the distribution, recent self-report delinquency was recoded as a dichotomous

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variable, for the reasons noted above. The self-report delinquency variables at each time point were recoded as 0 = none, and 1 = 1 or more, and this variable was used as a dependent variable for the outcome evaluation.

Victimization. Analysis of victimizations resulted in low frequencies of events, similar to delinquency, and not altogether surprising (Farrington and Loeber, 2000; Osgood et al., 2002). Consequently, new variables were created to generate a more normal distribution of responses. At Time 1 the *total* number of victimizations in a juvenile's past was measured. This variable coincides with the questions regarding whether a juvenile had ever experienced a particular event, with the responses coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. These questions were totaled, with a possible range of values from 0 to 4. This did not yield a completely normal distribution, but the skew was near zero. This measure was not used for the outcome evaluation, but to assess differences between the sample groups (not shown). Additionally, juveniles were asked about *recent* victimizations at Time 1. Again, the results were highly skewed, and a dichotomous variable was adopted (1 = yes and 0 = no), for the same reasons as stated for the delinquency measures. For Time 2 and Time 3 similar recoding was necessary, as again a large proportion of juveniles reported no victimization experiences whatsoever. This dichotomous variable for recent victimizations was used for the outcome evaluation.

Several items on the questionnaire involved multiple questions seeking to address a single construct or issue. These items were placed into a scale or index and identified as a single variable, in order to include them in subsequent multivariate analyses. For the scale measures, factor analysis was also performed to corroborate the scale alpha measure.

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Theoretical variables. Each of the theoretical variables for certainty of punishment and severity of punishment were established as scales. This was done in order to offer a clearer presentation of the results, and to utilize the variables in later multivariate analyses, and follows prior research (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986). A scale was created for *certainty* of punishment by using questions 14 through 20 in section E of the questionnaire at Time 1. These questions asked about the juvenile's perception of how likely they would be caught if they participated in a number of activities. A scale reliability analysis revealed an alpha of .85. No items were identified as significantly increasing the alpha if excluded. The scale was included in the data set as a new certainty variable. This scale was recreated for each time point. The new certainty scale mean at Time 1 was 21.57, with a standard deviation of 5.68. Factor analysis was conducted to support the scale reliability finding. The initial analysis retained only one component, which was retained by the criteria of eigenvalue (3.694). Component loadings are presented in Table 5.3, and show that all loadings are of sufficient magnitude, greater than .64.

Table 5.3

Component Loadings—Certainty of Punishment

	<u>Loading</u>
Component 1: Certainty of Punishment	
How likely you will be caught:	
Stealing more than \$50	.79
Stealing less than \$50	.77
Using a weapon on someone	.75
If hit someone trying to hurt them	.74
Stealing or trying to steal a car	.72
Skipping school	.68
Breaking curfew	.64

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The distribution of the certainty variable at all time points was highly skewed, however, with a majority of respondents reporting at the high end of the continuum. The distribution was examined and revealed that each level of certainty typically contained one or only a few individuals. Thus, the scale was recoded into three levels: low (7 –13), medium (14 – 20), and high (21 and above). This categorization resulted in three groups with a roughly equivalent range of responses in each. These same levels were used at all three time points for consistency. The rationale for this categorization is to reduce the skew of the distribution (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002) while maintaining the distinctive qualities of the sample (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). These new variables were used in subsequent analyses to identify the level of perception of certainty of punishment for each individual.

A significant problem when using multiple questions to create a scale or index is whether or not respondents answer all of the pertinent questions. If there is significant missing data, the final sum or scale will not properly represent the underlying construct (Shadish, et al., 2002; Mertler and Vannatta, 2002). Due to the nature of the current research design, missing data is not a significant problem for this study. Since many of the scale or index items were collected at Time 1 while the juvenile was detained, completion rates are very close to 100%. The investigator and juvenile were allowed as much time as needed to complete surveys, and the surveys were conducted at the juvenile's pace. Since questionnaires were conducted in this one-on-one format, response rates were generally quite high. Problems with non-response at Time 2 and Time 3 were often connected to time constraints. Questionnaires were administered in court offices or waiting rooms, without the luxury of unlimited time and seclusion. Thus,

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there are no significant problems with missing values for the scale and index items, as most of them were collected at Time 1, and overall response rates were quite high at all time points.

The scale reliability results for the juvenile's perception of the *severity of formal* punishment were not as strong, yet factor analysis supported the scale construct. For severity of formal punishment, questions 2 through 5 of section E of the questionnaire at Time 1 were utilized to create the scale. These questions asked how big of a problem it would be for the juvenile to receive a certain punishment if they were to break the law and be caught. Each of these questions was based on an actual sanction given for Nightwatch violations, and follows prior research. A scale reliability analysis revealed a standardized item alpha of .54. No items were identified as significantly increasing the alpha if excluded. The scale was included in the data set as a new variable for formal severity. This variable was also recreated for times 2 and 3. Due to the low alpha, other combinations of questions were attempted to create a more robust scale, such as including all severity questions (both formal and informal) and attempting different combinations of the formal sanctions. The strongest alpha was achieved by using the questions indicated. The mean for formal severity was 9.14, with a standard deviation of 2.80. Factor analysis was conducted to bolster the scale reliability finding, using the same variables. Principal components analysis was conducted, and one component was retained by the criteria of eigenvalue (1.687). Component loadings are presented in Table 5.4, and indicate that, while the reliability estimate for the scale is low, the loadings all show sufficient magnitude, over .50. The use of a scale with such a low alpha is

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questionable, however the procedure used here follows prior research (Grasmick and Bryjak, 1980; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986).

Table 5.4

Component Loadings—Formal Severity

	Loading
Component 1: Severity of Formal Punishment	
If you broke the law and were caught and punished, how much of a problem would it be to:	
Pick up trash around the court	.74
Attend a meeting with other juveniles	.67
Read a book and write a book report	.65
Spend one night in the detention center	.50

The use of scale analysis appears to be inappropriate for *severity of informal* punishment, however. For this construct, questions 6 through 9 in section E of the questionnaire at Time 1 were used. These questions asked how much of a problem it would create with parents, friends, teachers, or employers if the juvenile was caught and punished after breaking the law. A scale reliability analysis produced a standardized item alpha of .48, too low to provide adequate proof of a single construct. No items were identified as significantly increasing the alpha if excluded. Thus, a more appropriate technique would be to include the items in a summary index. Responses were summed and included as a new informal severity variable. Factor analysis was conducted to test the validity of the scale in order to determine which technique was appropriate. Principal components analysis was conducted, and the initial analysis retained only one component, by the criteria of eigenvalue (1.576). Component loadings are presented in

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Table 5.5, which show only moderate magnitudes. This, combined with the low alpha indicates that the index measure is most appropriate for this variable.

Table 5.5

Component Loadings—Informal Severity

	Loading
Component 1: Severity of Informal Punishment	
Suppose you broke the law and were caught and punished. How much of a problem would that create with:	
Teachers	.67
Parents	.67
Employers	.62
Friends	.54

The distributions for the formal and informal severity scales were also quite skewed and required recoding (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002). Both formal and informal severity were recoded into the low, medium, and high categories, due to the occurrence of a low number of individuals at each severity level. For formal severity, the categories were separated as follows: low 4 – 7, medium 8 – 11, and high 12 and above. These same cutoffs were used at all subsequent time points for consistency, and served the same purpose as earlier measurements, by dividing the responses into three roughly equal proportions. The procedure was similar for informal severity. The categories again were labeled low (4 – 9), medium (10 – 13), and high (14 and above). These new variables were used in subsequent analyses to identify the level of perception of severity of punishment for each individual.

For opportunity, an index of out-of-home activities was created for inclusion in later analyses. To examine *opportunity*, questions 2 through 8 in section C of the

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questionnaire at Time 1 were used. These questions asked about how often the juvenile participates in specific activities, both in and out of the home. Questions could be divided into activities out of the home and unstructured (Group A), out of the home and more structured (Group B), and in the home (Group C). Table 5.6 identifies which activities were included in each group.

Table 5.6

Opportunities by Group

Group	Activity
Group A	Joyriding Going to parties Hanging out with friends
Group B	Comm, Church, Volunteer Shopping
Group C	Reading/Homework Watching TV

As Nightwatch seeks to limit unstructured, out-of-home activity, the activities in Group A were selected for further analysis and were computed into a new variable, to measure such out-of-home opportunity. Again this index was recreated at Time 2 and Time 3. As with the previous theoretical variables, the distribution of opportunity was skewed and required recoding. A few of the categories approached a normal distribution, however, other categories contained few individuals and were severely skewed. The sample was separated into low (3 – 5), medium (6 – 8), and high (9 and above) opportunity levels, with these values used at Time 2 and Time 3 as well. Again, this division of the sample resulted in three groups containing approximately the same range of responses, and these same divisions were used at all time points for consistency.

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These new variables were used in later analyses, to identify the level of unstructured, out-of-home activities for each juvenile.

Contingencies. The contingencies of moral view and impulsivity were also established as index measures. For *moral view*, questions 1 through 9 in Section D of the Time 1 questionnaire were included. These questions asked the juvenile how “wrong” they believed certain activities to be (Silberman, 1976; University of Nebraska Omaha, 1995). A new variable was created to represent the index by summing the responses to this set of questions.

The distribution of moral view was quite skewed, with a large variety of individuals per level. Some levels contained only one individual, while others contained over 40, with a near normal distribution. Several of the levels did not contain enough individuals to compute the skew and kurtosis statistics, and many had values far exceeding 1. Even after breaking the scale into the low, medium, high designations, the skew and kurtosis statistics could not be calculated for the “low” level due to the small number of individuals in that category. To maintain consistency with other variables and measures, this technique was retained however, and the index was divided into low (9 – 20), medium (21 – 28), and high (29 and above) values. This division follows prior rationale for dividing the responses into roughly equal ranges, with an overrepresentation of lower values due to the small number of respondents at that level. Thus a new variable was created to designate the low, medium, or high level of moral view.

Impulsivity was measured using questions 1 through 6 in Section F of the Time 1 questionnaire. These questions asked the juvenile how much they agreed with certain statements about how they behave. The responses were summed, with proper reverse

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coding adjustments, to indicate that juveniles with a higher score have higher levels of impulsivity.

The distribution for impulsivity was also slightly skewed, and dividing the scale into the low, medium, and high categories improved the skew statistic (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002). Using these same categories maintains consistency with other variables throughout the analyses, as well. The ranges for impulsivity are low (6 –15), medium (16 – 21), and high (22 and above), and a new variable was created to identify the impulsivity level of the individual.

Offending likelihood. This research seeks to replicate and extend the work of Pogarsky (2002), by identifying individuals as acute conformists, incorrigibles, or deterrable, but using a sample of active juvenile offenders. The formula for separating individuals into groups was presented above, and each juvenile was classified as 1) acute conformist, 2) deterrable, 3) incorrigible, or 4) unclassified based upon that formula. The offending likelihood classification was entered at Time 1 as a new variable, by which individuals were separated into groups and analyses completed. This variable corresponds with the *offending likelihood* variable in Pogarsky's (2002) work. This classification was calculated at each time point, to determine if the offending likelihood was stable, or whether it fluctuated over time.

This study had a significant number of individuals who were unclassified based upon their responses. At Time 1, 29 juveniles responded to the combination of questions in a way that was not classifiable by the formula listed above, which constitutes 24% of the sample. Two individuals failed to answer one of the questions, making classification impossible. Of the remaining 27, 13 juveniles answered both questions the same at the

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level of “somewhat unlikely,” indicating they were not committed to delinquency, but were not willing to state they would never commit an offense. These individuals were consistent in their answers, similar to a conformist or incorrigible, but not at a level that would place them in either of those categories. Fourteen individuals answered that they were *less* likely to offend in the absence of getting caught. This is opposite of the expected scenario, when a juvenile would be *more* likely to offend in the absence of getting caught. Subsequently, additional analyses were conducted to determine if these “somewhat unlikely” individuals affected the results if included.

Other variables. Upon examination, several other variables were discovered to have skewed distributions, resulting in recoding. The distribution for *prior referrals* was similar to that for subsequent official referrals. A majority of participants had no prior referrals, the range for the variable was 7, and many levels contained only a few juveniles. Therefore, prior referrals was recoded in the same manner as subsequent referrals, in the “zero” or “one or more” format. This variable was used mainly to assess any differences between the sample groups.

The Nightwatch variables that counted visits required recoding for the same reasons as prior referrals. For the *total visits* a juvenile received, the original range was between 1 and 50, with only one or a few juveniles at each level. With this distribution, skew and kurtosis statistics could not be calculated for a majority of levels (Mertler and Vanatta, 2002). Thus, a new variable was created that divided the number of visits into the following categories: 5 or less, 6 to 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, and 41 to 50. These levels of division assisted in differentiating between juveniles who received very few visits, and those who remained in the program for longer periods of time. Identifying

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several levels of involvement provided more detailed information regarding the sample. Dividing the sample allowed for the calculation of skew, which was still pronounced at several levels, but the distributions were nearer to normal (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002). This variable was used as an independent variable in the outcome evaluation models.

For each juvenile that received Nightwatch visits, the number of visits was recorded *between surveys*. Again, only a few juveniles appeared at each specific level, and visits were divided into the same categories as for total visits, to maintain consistency. A new variable was created for this adjusted number of visits between surveys, and was similarly constructed at all time periods. This adjusted variable was also used as an independent variable in the outcome evaluation models.

The *number of sanctions* received by a juvenile was also recoded due to a non-normal distribution. The number of sanctions received for juveniles in this study ranged from zero to 13. In several cases the categories were not overly skewed, but the small number of juveniles per category caused several to be omitted from the output. The modal number of sanctions was zero ($N = 23$), with a majority of juveniles receiving less than 5 ($N = 43$). Recoding the number of sanctions received into “none,” “less than 5,” “6 to 10,” and “11 or more” slightly improved the distribution. The rationale for these particular categorizations is consistent with prior variables, in that the range of possible responses was divided into groups with a roughly equivalent range of scores. In addition, this structure differentiates between those juveniles with no sanctions whatsoever, and those that are “chronic” violators.

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THREATS

Any research involving the collection of information from human participants faces innumerable threats to validity, whether internal, external, or from the building of constructs. The current research is no exception, particularly given the facts that the participants are juveniles, from a limited educational environment, and the research involves delinquency, which is shown to be influenced by countless risk and protective factors. Attempts were made to design the study to limit the number of threats, but elimination of all threats is impossible. This section outlines some of these possible threats, and how the research design addressed them.

Internal Threats. Internal validity addresses whether the relationship between two variables is causal in nature (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, 2002). The research design addressed the key issue of causal ordering by insuring that no juveniles had experience with Nightwatch prior to the pre-test administration. The design was not able to eliminate all other causes of the outcome, however, as the court provides multiple treatment options for all juveniles that are referred for delinquency. Nightwatch is merely one component in a myriad of services available. The specific threats that will be addressed here are selection, maturation, attrition, and testing.

The policy of the court is that all juveniles referred for official delinquency are assigned to Nightwatch. As stated above, those juveniles on Official Court Supervision but not assigned to Nightwatch do not self-select not to participate, but rather are excluded based on geography or other program participation. In this way, there is no selection bias for the sample regarding Nightwatch participation. Selection bias may have occurred, however, in obtaining informed consent. Only parents who come to

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detention to visit their child are approached for consent, and it is quite feasible that there is a significant difference in parents that visit their children and those who do not. An alternative to eliminate this selection bias would have been to visit each family at their home, which was not an acceptable option from a safety standpoint. Therefore, even though a selection bias may have occurred in gaining informed consent, the strategy used was the most appropriate for this population and study.

Maturation addresses the normal changes that occur in an individual, even when no treatment is administered (Shadish, et al., 2002). This is particularly relevant in looking at juvenile delinquency, as delinquent behavior typically diminishes as a juvenile ages. Maturation is a significant issue when research studies cover large amounts of time and the juvenile experiences multiple physical and emotional changes. For this study, juveniles were monitored for less than one year, reducing the possibility of major maturation effects.

Attrition focuses on the fact that not all research participants complete the entire study (Shadish, et al., 2002; Miller and Wright, 1995). Attrition is an internal threat when the composition of the experimental and control groups is altered (Shadish, et al., 2002; Harris, 1998). Attrition is a problem in any longitudinal research, and is documented in several fields ranging from clinical medical trials to educational or drug treatment settings. Much prior research focuses on individuals leaving a particular setting, such as dropping out of school or drug treatment (Harris, 1998). In these situations, the individuals in the study were able to choose whether or not they participated in the program or treatment under examination. This study differs in that juveniles cannot self-select whether they are included in Nightwatch, as the decision rests

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with their deputy juvenile officer. In addition, a juvenile cannot self-select to no longer participate in the juvenile court system, as that decision rests with the judge overseeing the case. As shown in Figure 5.1, however, this research was no exception to this threat. Pre-tests were administered to 118 juveniles, but only 84 completed a Time 2 survey, and only 37 completed a Time 3 survey. The composition of these groups did in fact change as the study progressed, but again, not due to juvenile decisions, but rather due to case processing decisions. Several juveniles at Time 2 had not yet been assigned to Nightwatch, and by Time 3 they were receiving visits. This change resulted from a case management decision made by the assigned DJO. This reassignment of juveniles to the experimental category resulted in only 3 juveniles remaining in the comparison group at Time 3, a number too small to be of use in statistical analyses. Comparisons can be made between the experimental and dismissed individuals at Time 3, however, and independent t-tests reveal no major differences between the two groups. At the $p < .05$ level, no differences existed between experimental and dismissed juveniles on age, sex, whom they live with, neighborhood, or impulsivity at Time 3.

Attrition can also be a threat to external validity when those who drop out of the study differ from those who stay (Miller and Wright, 1995; Campbell and Stanley, 1966). Thus, the main issue for this study is the number of juveniles who completed a Time 1 survey but failed to complete a Time 2 survey, and whether there was a significant difference between the experimental, comparison, and nonresponder groups (Miller and Wright, 1995). Several juveniles (31) were placed in the “dismissed” category at Time 2, which includes juveniles whose case was transferred to another jurisdiction, juveniles whose case was dismissed, and juveniles who declined a Time 2

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survey. For a majority of the category, the juvenile did not self-select to withdraw from the study, but it was a court processing decision. T-tests indicated no difference in age, sex, whom they live with, neighborhood, or impulsivity between the dismissed group and the other study groups that completed the Time 2 survey, as shown in Chapter Six. Thus, while roughly a quarter of the original sample did not go on to complete subsequent surveys, there is no significant difference between those who completed Time 2 surveys and those who did not.

As mentioned above, there may exist a difference between those juveniles who were eligible for inclusion, but whose parents failed to visit the detention center and thus were never approached for informed consent. Skager and Austin (1997) found significant differences in families that returned informed consent paperwork compared to those who did not. There were also significant numbers of families that did not directly decline, but failed to respond at all. This could be comparable to families that do not appear for visitation at the detention center. If the parents had appeared, they may have given their consent, but the opportunity was never presented. The handful of parents that were approached at hearings or in other settings were cooperative and agreed to participate, but this is far from proof that no difference exists between parents who visit in detention and those who do not. For the current study, no data is available regarding whether juveniles who were eligible but did not participate are significantly different from those who completed surveys. Skagin and Austin (1997) suggest that requiring informed consent greatly reduces the number of research participants (which was observed in the current study), which changes the nature of survey research and negatively impacts the generalizability of results.

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The largest problem for this study regarding attrition is the loss of statistical power (Harris, 1998). A power analysis was conducted prior to data collection that indicated a sample size of approximately 100 would be sufficient at the $p < .05$ level. This analysis was based on typical attrition rates of 20% (Mason, 1999); however the current study experienced an attrition rate of 33% between Time 1 and Time 2. Examples exist of studies with even higher attrition levels, however. Salzman and colleagues succeeded in collecting Time 1 and Time 2 data from only 51% of their sample, and collection efforts were plagued by “no contact” issues similar to the current study. Several authors suggest attrition prevention strategies, such as offering cash incentives, maintaining current records to contact participants outside of the treatment location, and to track participants outside of the treatment location (Mason, 1999). Unfortunately for the current study these suggestions were not feasible due to a lack of resources and safety issues. No resources were allocated to provide participants with incentives of any kind, whether cash payments or gift cards of some type. Addresses were easily obtained from court records, but with only one investigator, tracking every juvenile and visiting their homes for follow up survey administration was not only logistically impossible but inherently unsafe. The high attrition rate was the main contributor to the greatly reduced sample sizes at Time 2 and Time 3. This in turn greatly reduced the statistical strength of the data, as well as limited the choices for statistical analysis. A larger sample size may have supported a path analysis or more informative ordinal regression. Thus, the unusually high level of attrition can be attributed to legal decisions that removed the juvenile from the court setting, and the lack of resources to implement attrition reduction strategies.

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The threat of testing recognizes that an individual may be influenced at Time 2 by the test at Time 1 (Shadish, et al., 2002). The individual may change their behavior or responses in reaction to having taken the test in the past. This is particularly relevant to this research, as the variables being measured involve the juvenile's perceptions and delinquent activities, rather than uncontrollable measures such as height. In addition, the same constructs were used for all three time points, and familiarity with the questions may have been a factor. Each juvenile was told at Time 2 and Time 3 that the questions were the same as last time, but not to try and remember what they responded last time, to state how they feel today. As the surveys were administered at fairly close intervals, this threat was quite valid and of great concern. Some of this concern subsided, however, when several juveniles did not remember speaking with me at Time 1, and only after showing them the questionnaire did they remember the study. On the other hand, several juveniles declined Time 3 surveys because they "didn't feel like it," which could indicate they were tired of answering the same questions. Although the testing threat was concerning, the research sought to track the juvenile's perceptions in relation to their participation in Nightwatch. This mandated that the testing intervals be fairly close together, and that the same constructs be used to assess those perceptions.

External Threats. External validity involves whether or not the research results can be generalized to other places and populations (Shadish et al., 2002). This research attempted to make the results as valid as possible by including all offenses, both male and female subjects, and both self-report and official delinquency measures. Not surprisingly, several external threats were still present. This section will address the

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threats of interaction of the causal relationship with units, over treatment variation, and with outcomes.

An interaction of the causal relationship with units identifies that an effect may be found with one particular group, but not others (Shadish et al., 2002). The current study was designed to include as many different groups as possible for analysis. Recall the only criterion for inclusion in the study was no prior Nightwatch participation. Thus, this research includes many different groups: males and females, all types of offenses, and different age groups. While these categories are not exhaustive of the limitless group situations, they provide useful information regarding the most common groups in juvenile delinquency research.

An interaction of the causal relationship over treatment variations recognizes that a treatment may not be as effective if the treatment is varied in some way, or when it is combined with other treatments or factors (Shadish et al., 2002). This threat is particularly relevant to the current research, as Nightwatch is not a stand-alone treatment, but is one of many services offered by the Family Court. Perhaps it is not Nightwatch alone, but when it is combined with Community Service Restitution, increased office visits, or Drug Treatment that it is most effective. Perhaps Nightwatch is most effective when sanctions are swift and most severe for violations. This threat was acknowledged through the collection of information regarding all other programs a juvenile is involved in, as well as their Nightwatch contact record.

The interaction of causal relationship with outcomes distinguishes between outcome observations; that observations using one outcome measure may not remain significant if alternate outcome observations are used (Shadish et al., 2002). Outcomes

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for juvenile delinquency can be measured in several ways: self reported delinquency, police contact, any subsequent referral, only subsequent referrals that result in court contact, only subsequent adjudications, referrals involving probation violations, and on and on. The current research uses any subsequent self-report or any subsequent referral as the unit of measurement. These measurements may produce different results than if the measure was more stringent, such as subsequent adjudications. The research design provided for the collection of this more detailed information, and using a different and more stringent measurement can always be substituted and examined in the analyses to test the presence of this threat.

Construct threats. Construct validity refers to how well the research actually captures the underlying concept being studied, as it is typically something that is not directly quantifiable (Shadish et al., 2002). This issue is again particularly relevant to the current study, as juvenile perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment are the underlying concepts, and are certainly subjective measures. In this sense, even the outcome measures can fall into this predicament. For self reported delinquency juveniles were asked about different behaviors, but some of them were open to interpretation as to whether or not they should be classified as delinquency. One example is the question of simple assault. More than one juvenile identified hitting a sibling and asked if that “counted”. I stated it was up to them whether or not to report it as a qualifying incident. One juvenile did not report it as a delinquent activity, while the other did. Results are only as valid as the constructs used to attain them, and several threats to construct validity exist. This section will address the problems of inadequate explication of constructs and reactivity to the experimental situation.

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Inadequate explication of constructs indicates that failing to sufficiently clarify a construct may lead to incorrect results (Shadish et al., 2002). Problems with constructs can be that they are underrepresented, by not including sufficient information, or overrepresented, by containing unnecessary information. One way to avoid possible problems is to use constructs that have already been tested and found to be valid. The current research has incorporated this strategy by using constructs adapted or directly reproduced from extant literature. As noted above, the alpha for some of the scale constructs was not extremely high, indicating a poor reliability for the construct. This may be due to the questions used on the survey tool, or the population to which the survey was given. Much prior research has been carried out on samples of college freshmen, while the current study uses a sample of active juvenile offenders from an economically and educationally disadvantaged urban area. The juveniles in the current study have significantly different life experiences and life trajectories than the college freshmen of prior studies, which may lead to different results when it comes to scale reliability. Some of the fault may lie in the survey tool, if the proper items were not included to create a given scale, the reliability will be poor. But as noted, all questions were drawn from previous studies to avoid this problem.

Another threat is reactivity to the experimental situation. This implies that the research participants may be affected by their perceptions of the experimental situation, which may in turn affect their responses (Shadish et al., 2002). This threat is pertinent to the current research, as a significant number of juveniles were familiar with the Nightwatch program, without having ever been personally assigned to it. They had perceptions of what the program was all about, and many were concerned when they

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learned they might be assigned. In addition, more than one parent declined to give informed consent with the comment that “my child doesn’t need that,” even though agreeing to participate in the research did not automatically include the juvenile in the program. Many juveniles asked if they would be assigned, but were told it was not my decision to make. Some made comments during questionnaire administration, however, that indicated they were already thinking about the future and what Nightwatch participation may entail. In particular, questions regarding likelihood of getting caught breaking curfew drew comments regarding Nightwatch and that, if assigned, they were sure they would get caught if they broke curfew. Only a few juveniles made such comments, but they still raise the issue that juveniles may have been influenced in their responses by what they thought may happen to them if they actually participated in the program.

No research is without threats to validity, and the current research is no exception. Some threats were foreseen, such as internal and external threats, and actions taken in the study design to alleviate any adverse effects. Others were not so easily predicted or controllable, such as the reactivity to the experimental situation. Even with the presence of these threats, the current research provides solid results to inform both theory and policy regarding juvenile delinquency.

Figure 5.1

Time Line Flowchart Showing Participant Attrition




Figure 5.2

Disposition of Juvenile Referrals From Police Contact Through Case Closing St. Louis City Family Court--Juvenile Division





Figure 5.3



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Chapter Six

PROCESS EVALUATION

The purpose of the process evaluation is to assess what actually happens within the program. The first step to assessing what actually happens is to identify what is supposed to happen. Written procedures were obtained from court personnel in order to answer a number of important questions. The general question is: Does the program function daily as the original plan specified? Determining whether actual practices are consistent with written procedures is the focus. Details of this daily functioning are numerous and complex, and involve all aspects of the program, including juvenile assignment, number of visits, home visit structure, and consequent rewards and sanctions. Each of these details will be presented individually below, as different aspects of the program have their own written policies in place. This section will assess who is assigned to the program and how, how many visits are received once they are assigned, what happens at a home visit, whether rewards and sanctions are ordered as required, and whether each of these aspects adheres to the written policies regarding it.

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ASSIGNMENT

The court has very few written guidelines regarding the assignment of juveniles to the program. Individual units may have different directives, but the policy issued from Nightwatch is addressed here. The first question is: who gets assigned? Procedures for referral to Nightwatch state that any juvenile in contact with the court is eligible for the program, including those on official court supervision, those on conditional release from detention, and those with informal cases. Therefore, any juvenile in contact with the court may be assigned, regardless of the seriousness of the charge. Truants and shoplifters can be assigned, as well as burglars and car thieves. This language indicates that the ultimate decision to place a juvenile into the program rests with the assigned DJO, that participants are eligible rather than mandated.

The procedure also states that three types of juveniles are excluded from Nightwatch participation: those in residential treatment facilities, those in residential foster care, and those who have turned 17 years of age. For the first two groups, the residential facility provides a secure setting and further supervision is redundant. For juveniles that turn 17, general curfew is no longer a valid legal issue, and therefore they are removed from the program. Juveniles who are 17 may still be under court supervision, depending upon the circumstances of the case.

To ascertain who gets assigned to Nightwatch, characteristics of the research sample were examined, as well as information provided from the Nightwatch database. All of the research participants had official charges, as this was the design of the study. Therefore, no individuals with unofficial referrals are included in the study group. For the entire Nightwatch program, the number of unofficial participants is quite low.

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Examination of Nightwatch files revealed that no research participants in a residential treatment facility received visits, consistent with program procedures. In addition, several research participants stopped receiving home visits because they had turned 17. In one case, special permission was sought to allow visits to continue, but the uncooperativeness of the juvenile led to the closing of the Nightwatch file. Thus, who gets assigned to the program follows the written procedure. A large majority of juveniles assigned to Nightwatch are official cases, which would correspond with the idea that higher-risk juveniles are most in need of services. In addition, services are not wasted on juveniles in residential facilities or those for whom curfew is no longer a legal issue.

The second question is: How do juveniles get assigned? The procedure states that for all juveniles assigned to the program, the first step is to provide the parent/guardian and juvenile a copy of the Nightwatch guidelines and explain them thoroughly. The second step is to photograph the juvenile, then a copy of the photograph and the juvenile's summary paper are forwarded to the JAIBG liaison. The summary form must document the juvenile's risk score, curfew time, and whether the juvenile is charged with a crime against a person. Finally, the referral must be documented in the JIS computer system.

Not all of these steps can be evaluated with the information that has been collected. Case contact sheets and juvenile summaries do not indicate whether or not the juvenile and parent were given a copy of the Nightwatch guidelines. As notification of the threat is a necessary condition to achieve deterrence, this is a key step to the process, and needs further investigation. There is also no indication from either of these sources whether or not the juvenile has been photographed. It must be assumed that any juvenile

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who received Nightwatch visits was photographed and the proper summary information provided to the JAIBG liaison. There may be juveniles who were eligible for the program but did not get assigned, and several possible explanations. In fact, for the study sample, 9 juveniles of the 78 that were eligible did not receive visits. First, there may be no current photograph of the juvenile. The policy of the court is to photograph every juvenile that comes to the intake office, however, and a database of photographs exists on the court intranet. A photograph should be included in the social file of any juvenile, but if not, a color copy can be requested. If the photograph is not included or the copy is not provided, this may offer an explanation. Another possibility is DJO discretion. Program participation is not mandatory, nor are there specific procedures regarding the timing of assignment. One officer may choose to assign juveniles upon release from detention, while another waits until after adjudication, and both would be adhering to court policy. In fact, both of these situations occur when examining research participants' Nightwatch files. There is no way to verify either of these situations using the case contact sheets or juvenile summaries, however. There is no way to identify what, if any, failure of procedure caused a juvenile not to receive visits, if it was DJO discretion, or some other reason.

It is possible to use the juvenile summary to track whether computer entries were made as required. The program procedure calls for the referral to be documented in the case management notes for the juvenile. This information does not appear on the juvenile summary, however, which is used as a single sheet reference for all juveniles. The juvenile summary notes all programs or services a juvenile receives through the court, along with start dates, end dates, and the outcome for each (i.e. successfully

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completed, incomplete, participation ended). In order for the order to appear on the juvenile summary, a separate data entry screen must be used.

Juvenile summaries for research participants that received Nightwatch visits were examined to determine if computer entries were made as required. The timeline regarding release from detention, assignment to Nightwatch, and first Nightwatch visit could be assessed for 72 juveniles. The remaining 7 were unable to be assessed due to some type of omission, whereby dates could not be determined. Of those that could be assessed, 28 were assigned “on time,” that is, their first Nightwatch visit was within 2 weeks of the order date on the juvenile summary. This two-week window is arbitrary and chosen because it would indicate juveniles are assigned quickly after release from detention. There is no rule in the procedure as to when a juvenile should be assigned. Fifteen juveniles had the interesting situation of receiving visits *before* the order date listed. In some cases, the order date was significantly later than the first visit, up to a few months. This shows that the paperwork and proper referrals were made to the program, but the proper computer entries were not made. Sixteen individuals were assigned more than two weeks after their order date, but a majority of these cases received their first visit within three weeks. Again, with no rule regarding timing of assignment, this item cannot be assessed for adherence to court standards. For 13 juveniles who received Nightwatch visits, there was no order date listed on the summary. In most of these cases, however, the first Nightwatch visit occurred within two weeks of release from detention. Yet again, a situation where the juveniles were referred to the program properly, but computer entries were lacking. The 9 juveniles identified that “should have” received visits, but did not were released from detention, awaiting adjudication, when the case was

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dismissed. The time between release and adjudication was at least three weeks, ample time for visits to be conducted. These could be cases where the DJO chose to wait until after adjudication to make the referral to the program, or they could have been participating in a program such as inpatient drug treatment that did not appear on the summary. Without a rule regarding when juveniles should be assigned, this item cannot be assessed for acceptability, either. Thus, while computer record keeping shows a lack of consistency, juveniles are entering the program and receiving visits with no significant delays.

The Nightwatch program does well in adhering to written procedures regarding who gets assigned to the program, and how this is accomplished. The program is open to all juveniles, with a majority of participants on official court supervision or on conditional release from detention. No evidence exists to suggest that resources are used for those in residential settings or over the legal age for curfew violations. This indicates the program is being used for juveniles who would benefit the most from the intervention. The only aspect that shows a clear lack of reliability is computer data entries. All court staff utilize the juvenile summary to assess the offending and treatment history of a juvenile, and these entries must be up to date. Records must be accurate to make informed decisions at all levels.

NUMBER OF VISITS

Currently, there is no written policy the JAIBG liaison follows to assign the number of visits received, therefore an evaluation of this process is not directly possible. Much information was shared verbally, and this information is presented as procedure here. Without knowing what the program is supposed to do, it cannot be determined

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whether or not the program follows procedures. What is actually happening with the program can be documented, but no conclusions can be drawn. On this subject, the case contacts provide a wealth of information.

When the program began, procedures were set so that high risk juveniles were to be seen three times as often as low risk juveniles, as often as three times per week. This strategy did not work out as well as planned, and new strategies were put in place. Now the rule of thumb is that high-risk juveniles are seen “more than” low risk, and that all juveniles be seen at least once a week. Basically the JAIBG liaison examines the Nightwatch files and uses a number of criteria to select the evening’s route. The criteria are risk score, nights available, and juvenile behavior. Risk score is the only criteria that can be assessed using the data that was collected, and will be explored in much greater detail below.

Specific nights the juvenile may be away from home at drug treatment, church or sports functions are not listed on the juvenile summary, and are not readily observed. Any evening a juvenile has a legitimate activity, the DJO will be notified, who in turn notifies the liaison, and the juvenile will not be placed into the rotation for that evening. The rationale ensues that if it is already known the juvenile will not be home, the visit will be wasted. Such justifications are restricted to activities such as drug treatment or other court programs, special family gatherings such as funerals, church or other organized social activities, sports, and employment. Several case contact sheets revealed that such information is not always forwarded to the liaison in a timely manner. The crew will arrive at the home only to be told the juvenile is at drug treatment, which will be verified the next day, and appropriate changes to the juveniles’ schedule made.

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Juvenile behavior is assessed by the liaison based upon past Nightwatch violations or compliance, and is a subjective measure. The liaison will note a juvenile's past Nightwatch compliance, and if the juvenile has failed to be at home by the appointed time, more visits will be made. Conversely, a juvenile who has shown a consistent successful record will be placed into the rotation on fewer evenings, perhaps as seldom as once a month. There is no official formula to "randomize" the evenings that a juvenile is seen. Examination of the Nightwatch file will suggest whether a juvenile will be placed into the rotation, and the liaison arbitrarily will choose when visits occur. Visits two nights in a row or more frequent than normal will be "thrown in" using personal discretion.

Nightwatch follows these same guidelines. It is evident from the table that a large majority of juveniles are categorized as moderate risk. For the study sample, 10 juveniles were assigned low status, 61 were assigned medium status, and 8 were assigned high status. In looking at the table above, these totals do not quite match with the frequencies given. There are only 7 juveniles who have a risk score of 8 or higher, indicating only 7 juveniles should be assigned to high status. Closer examination reveals a juvenile with a risk score of 7 who was included in the high category. This may have occurred at DJO request, or have been a decision made by another court worker. Possible explanations may have been prior referrals (this juvenile had 5, one of which was a tampering that was handled through VOM), or current charge (this juvenile presented to the court for tampering again).

This suggests that the risk assessment tool may not capture all items that should go into such a decision. The risk assessment tool is provided as Appendix A, and a

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Table 6.1

Risk Score by Study Participant That Received Nightwatch Visits

Risk Score	Frequency N = 79	Percent
-2	1	1.3
-1	3	3.8
0	6	7.6
1	9	11.4
2	8	10.1
3	6	7.6
4	6	7.6
5	11	13.9
6	10	12.7
7	12	15.2
8	2	2.5
9	3	3.8
10	2	2.5

significant omission is any assessment of gang affiliation. This risk factor is highly related to delinquency, and often gang affiliation cannot be assessed without asking the juvenile outright. In addition, this is another example of questionable comprehension on the part of the juvenile and their family. When asked about school behavior, a positive response may be given, but the juvenile may fail to mention that they actually have been suspended for the last 3 months. The court must use a standardized format to avoid any disproportionate and unfair decisions, and many of the items currently on the assessment are extremely valuable and theory-based, such as peer influence and abuse/neglect

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history. A major reorganization of the tool is not needed, but a reassessment to insure all pertinent risk factors for St. Louis are addressed may be in order.

The main reason for assessing the juvenile’s risk in relation to Nightwatch is to insure that high-risk juveniles are seen more frequently than low-risk. The case contact sheets were examined and several pieces of information obtained from them to examine this facet of the program. Table 6.2 shows the number of visits received by juveniles, as well as the number of doublebacks for each group. The means are presented, along with standard deviations and minimum and maximum values.

Table 6.2

Number of Visits by Risk Category

	Risk Category												
	Low N = 10				Medium N = 61				High N = 8				
	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max		M	SD	Min	Max
No. of visits	26.00	11.51	8	47	25.00	14.24	1	50		11.50 ^a	8.96	1	30
No. of dblebacks	.30	.95	0	3	.75	1.12	0	4		.13 ^b	.35	0	1

M = Mean

SD = Standard Deviation

^a $p < .01$ comparing the high and low groups, and the high and medium groups

^b $p < .01$ comparing the high and medium groups

Number of visits identifies the average number of total visits received by juveniles in that risk category. The low and medium risk categories receive roughly the same number of visits, and the range is comparable. The high-risk category is significantly different from both the low and medium groups, but in that they receive

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fewer visits than either of the other groups. The range is comparable to the other two groups, indicating that some juveniles receive a relatively high number of visits, but the average number of visits per juvenile is significantly lower. The intended procedure is that high-risk juveniles receive more Nightwatch visits than low risk individuals. The findings here reveal that the intended goal regarding number of visits is not accomplished.

Number of doublebacks refers to the average number of doubleback visits recorded for juveniles in that category. This is the only aspect of number of visits that is addressed in the Nightwatch guidelines for home visits, which are presented in greater detail below. The guidelines state that doubleback visits should be conducted every evening, but no instruction is present regarding whether one risk group should receive more doublebacks than another, or that a minimum number per juvenile is required. Table 6.1 shows that few doublebacks were conducted for this sample of juveniles. For all risk categories the minimum is zero, and the maximum number of doublebacks received by any one juvenile was four. In comparing the groups, the high-risk group is significantly different from the medium-risk group, again in that they received *fewer* doubleback visits. The purpose of doublebacks is to add extra visits for juveniles suspected of leaving the house after the initial check. Intuitively it would be juveniles in the high-risk category that would be most likely to leave after the first visit, and thus more likely to be the subjects of doublebacks, but the findings here do not support this presumption.

The results for number of visits and number of doublebacks do not fit with stated procedures, even using the more relaxed measure of high-risk juveniles receiving “more”

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visits than low-risk. One explanation for this discrepancy may be in the juveniles themselves. High-risk juveniles are exactly that, at higher risk of reoffending. Recidivism or lack of compliance with curfew may have resulted in return to detention or removal from the program. Any subsequent official charge would have returned the juvenile to detention, and from there most likely to the Division of Youth Services (DYS) custody, at which time they would no longer be assigned to the program. One of the unwritten policies of Nightwatch is that any juvenile that has three attempted visits with no contact will be removed from the rotation until the DJO can confirm what the problem is. If the family has moved or there are exclusionary dates for visits, this information is collected in order to increase the likelihood a visit will be successful. If the juvenile's whereabouts were unknown and the visits were violations, an apprehension order may be issued. Juveniles with apprehension orders are not placed into the rotation for visits. The rationale for this is explained in the section pertaining to safety during home visits below. This situation is documented for a high risk juvenile in the research study. Six home visits were attempted, three violations were noted, and an apprehension order was issued for the juvenile. The juvenile was subsequently detained. Thus, the reason for the lack of visits was the juvenile's own behavior in non-compliance with curfew.

One method to examine this explanation is by comparing sanctions received and subsequent referrals across risk categories. If high-risk juveniles are reoffending and receiving more sanctions than the other two groups, it may explain why the total number of visits for the high-risk group is so low. Table 6.3 presents these results, including mean number of sanctions or subsequent official referrals for each group, along with standard deviations, and minimum and maximum frequencies for comparison.

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Table 6.3

Sanctions and Subsequent Referrals by Risk Category

		Risk Category											
		Low N = 10				Medium N =61				High N =8			
	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max	M	SD	Min	Max	
Sanctions	1.10	1.45	0	4	2.59	2.96	0	13	2.00	1.20	0	4	
Referrals	.10 ^a	.32	0	1	1.02 ^b	1.32	0	6	2.13 ^c	1.36	0	4	

a = $p < .005$ between the low and high categories

b = $p < .05$ between the low and medium categories

c = $p < .05$ between the medium and high categories

“Sanctions” refers to the total number of Nightwatch sanctions ordered for juveniles in that category. There are no significant differences across groups for this variable. Thus, the assumption that high-risk juveniles incur more sanctions than other groups is not correct. In fact, the juvenile with the largest number of sanctions (13) is in the medium risk category.

“Referrals” corresponds to the total number of subsequent official referrals of the juveniles in each group. Recall that this measurement is any subsequent referral, whether or not the court took action, and also includes probation violations. Results here are significant for all groups. Every group is significantly different on subsequent referrals from all others, and all in the expected directions. The low-risk group is expected to have the lowest number of subsequent referrals, and does. The high-risk group is expected to have the highest number of subsequent referrals, and this is in fact the case. This finding supports the assumption that juveniles who are reoffending are receiving fewer visits, most likely because they have been detained or transferred to another agency.

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Another unwritten policy of the program is that all juveniles be seen at least once a week. Results presented above indicate that high-risk juveniles do not receive as many total Nightwatch visits as lower risk juveniles. A more precise measure is how many visits each juvenile receives in a given week. Table 6.4 depicts the number of visits that

Table 6.4

	Number of Visits Per Week by Risk Category					
	Risk Category					
	Low N = 188		Medium N = 1130		High N = 68	
	N	%	N	%	N	%*
One Visit Per Week	124	66	794	70	45	66
Two Visits Per Week	61	32	286	25	22	32
Three Visits Per Week	3	2	50	4	1	1

*Percentages do not total to 100 due to rounding

were received per week for each risk category. A calendar was consulted to determine how many visits each juvenile received per calendar week. The week was considered Sunday through Thursday. Doubleback visits were considered two visits, as the crew was at the house on two separate occasions, and missing either of the visits would result in a sanction (conversely, two notations of being at home would count toward a reward). The unit of measurement is weeks available, that is, the number of weeks a juvenile received a visit. This is not necessarily the same number of weeks a juvenile was assigned to the program, as there were often gaps of weeks or months between visits, but this occurrence will be discussed below. Table 6.4 shows that a majority of juveniles receive one visit per week, regardless of their risk status. For low risk juveniles, out of

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188 weeks available, 124 of those weeks contained one visit, or 66%. The same can be said for high-risk juveniles. Out of 68 weeks that a visit was made, 45 of those weeks contained one visit. Thus, these results indicate that if the goal of the program is to visit juveniles once a week, it is succeeding.

During the calendar examination, however, several instances were noted when juveniles had gaps in visits. Often it was a week or two when visits were not received, but sometimes gaps were for much longer periods of time, up to a few months. Several factors may cause such gaps, in addition to the recidivism explanations listed above. Family vacations, attendance at court programs such as drug treatment, or a change in address may all account for a gap in service. The exact reasons for such gaps cannot be determined from the data collected. Case contact sheets and juvenile summaries do not contain any details regarding weeks for which no visits were received. One circumstance can be explained, however. During the last two weeks of September 2004 the JAIBG grant manager determined that remaining funds were not sufficient to continue the program through the end of the fiscal year. No visits were conducted between approximately September 15, 2004 and October 2, 2004 due to a lack of funding. Therefore, any juvenile assigned to the program during this timeframe will note a gap in service. Visits were resumed under their usual guidelines after October 1, 2004, the beginning of the fiscal year. Table 6.5 shows the distribution of the number of breaks in service for the entire research sample that received Nightwatch visits. This does not measure the length of the break, no determination can be made as to the cause of the break, and it does not take the length of time assigned to the program into account. For

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some juveniles, it may be that their compliance rate was good and they received a “free” week. Also, as this includes the entire sample, juveniles who were only assigned for a

Table 6.5

Breaks in Service (Entire Sample, N = 79)

Number Breaks	Frequency (N = 79)	Percent
0	23	29.1
1	9	11.4
2	14	17.7
3	13	16.5
4	8	10.1
5	7	8.9
6	2	2.5
7	3	3.8

few weeks may not have experienced any breaks. Results show that a majority of juveniles did receive at least one break in service. While no conclusions can be drawn as the causes of the breaks, it does indicate that not all juveniles are receiving visits every week. If the goal of the program is to visit every juvenile every week, there should be fewer breaks in service. Too much is unknown about the breaks to draw any inferences regarding number of visits per week from this measure. A significant number of alternate explanations exist, such as treatment participation or return to detention, but further investigation of the nature of the breaks may lead to improved service delivery.

As there is no written guideline that is followed to determine the number of visits each juvenile receives, no conclusions can be drawn as to whether the program is functioning according to such guidelines. It can be said that juveniles are divided into

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risk categories using the assessment tool, but that the tool may need to be fine-tuned to address all of the important issues for the population in St. Louis. Several conclusions can be made regarding Nightwatch visits. First, information sharing could be improved so that no visits are made to homes where the juvenile is away at an appropriate activity. Some of this responsibility falls to the parents, however, as a DJO cannot pass on information that is not known. Second, it can be said that high-risk juveniles receive fewer Nightwatch visits and fewer doubleback visits than the other two risk categories, which does not correspond with the written and unwritten guidelines. When testing the assumption that high-risk juveniles are receiving more Nightwatch sanctions and are reoffending at a higher rate, only the subsequent offending was significant. This indicates that while high-risk juveniles are breaking other rules, they are home when the Nightwatch crew comes.

HOME VISITS

Nightwatch program guidelines regarding home visits were established early in implementation, and were reassessed and revised for fiscal year four of the program, in September 2003. These revised guidelines will be examined here, as they were in effect during the study period. The guidelines and procedures lay out a number of policies relative to how nightly visits will be conducted. These procedures are distributed to deputy juvenile officers and supervisors assigned to participate in home visits. The policies fall under eight main categories and are presented in the order in which they appear:

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- Attire
- Schedule of activities
- Conducting quality curfew checks
- Emergency situations
- Safety issues
- Shift assignments/scheduling
- Program application
- Removal from the program

Attire addresses proper clothing and accessories for Nightwatch officers.

Bulletproof vests and flashlights are listed as mandatory items, and dress should follow the business casual format. The only direct observation data for this item comes from one ridealong observation. All members of the crews were observed to wear their vests, and I was issued a vest as well. The emphasis placed on this detail by the crew and supervisors indicates that this is an important issue to them, and most likely adhered to. Flashlights are included in their crew bag, and all crew were dressed appropriately during my observation. Instructions by court staff prior to the ridealong included, “wear your vest,” “wear something comfortable,” and “wear shoes you can run in.”

Schedule of activities presents the timeline for a typical evening. The guidelines state that both police and deputy juvenile officers arrive at 6:30 p.m., and begin to plan the evening’s route that has been prepared by the JAIBG liaison. The room in which the crews congregate contains a large wall map of the city, so that officers can research any address that is uncertain. The police officers were most helpful with this aspect. One officer was so well known for his knowledge of the city streets he was chided by his colleagues for consulting the map. Crews begin to depart at 6:45 p.m. to arrive at the first scheduled stop soon after 7:00 p.m. Checks conclude at 10:00 p.m. and crews complete the necessary paperwork and time sheet information. These procedures are consistent with my observation and with anecdotes from staff. Negative comments result if the

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crew you are a part of stays out too late. The crew I observed was constantly aware of the time and diligent in completing necessary paperwork.

Conducting quality curfew checks identifies the behaviors and procedures that are to be followed at every home visit. A main goal of the court is for clients to be treated respectfully and with dignity, and this is emphasized in the guidelines. Again, only one observation provides information regarding this item, but the crew I interacted with was consistently polite and respectful toward all families.

Detailed instructions regarding the execution of the visit, from knocking on the door, to identifying the crew and the purpose, and completing necessary paperwork, are included in the procedures for conducting quality curfew checks. The crew must knock or ring the bell, and announce who they are. As parents and juveniles have signed the Nightwatch contract and may have had previous visits, the announcement of “Nightwatch” should be understood. Procedures dictate that all members of the crew exit the vehicle and have contact with the family. In addition, if no one answers the door, a note is to be left indicating that the crew had attempted a visit, and the assigned DJO must be contacted the next day.

My observation revealed the crew to follow this procedure at every home and make every effort to make contact with the family. The crew I observed was conscientious regarding the necessary paperwork, and this can be said indirectly regarding other crews upon examination of case contact sheets. As the sheets are hand written, sometimes it was difficult to decipher what the writer actually intended, mostly in terms of numbers for dates or times. Only in a handful of circumstances was the

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information completely illegible or missing, indicating a high level of quality in completion of forms by the Nightwatch DJOs.

Doubleback visits are mentioned in this section of the procedures, with the statement that such visits should occur every shift. For the research sample, only 50 doubleback visits were completed out of the 1, 877 visits conducted, equaling two percent. For the individuals, this intuitively seems too small a percentage to indicate that such visits are taking place every night, however, the study sample is quite small compared to the total number of juveniles assigned to the program. Thus, further inquiry into the frequency of doublebacks and whether they are being utilized according to court procedure is needed.

The guidelines state that quality is the focus of curfew checks. The crew should address concerns based on individual circumstances, and should intervene as deemed appropriate. While the schedule is always full on any given evening, the guidelines stress that the goal is to conduct *quality* visits. The procedures do not specify any minimum or maximum time that must be spent at each home. In my observation, many interactions depended upon the juvenile's family. If they were talkative, the crew would respond sociably. Some just came to the door, said "I'm home" and walked away, making it clear they had no need or desire to discuss anything further with the crew. Reviewing Nightwatch case contact sheets provided some insight into this aspect of visits as well. Concerns by family were often noted on the contact sheet, such as desire to find employment for the juvenile or expressing concern over drug use. In some cases the crew could offer helpful advice, such as working in the neighborhood garden for

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community service hours, but at the very least the assigned DJO would receive the contact sheet the next day and be aware of the concern.

Emergency situations identifies more detailed procedures for dealing with parent complaints, abuse/neglect situations that may be encountered, or unforeseen events. For parent complaints, the policy specifies that any such problems be documented on the case contact sheet. As noted in the previous section, this is seen consistently in examining case contacts, and can be a good source of information not only for the assigned DJO but for future crews. Abuse/neglect issues are addressed in the procedure as well. Since home visits are random in nature, families may be caught in an unexpected situation. The policy is to follow normal police and court procedures, notifying the proper police and Children's Division personnel, and deferring to the judgment of the police officer should the situation become unsafe. I did not observe any situation that would fall under this category, and found no indication of this type of serious situation in the case contacts that I examined. Officers would document situations that were questionable but not worthy of a referral on case contacts, however, such as hearing individuals yelling at each other or homes that were unclean.

Unforeseen events involve situations such as illness and vehicle accidents. The procedure states that in the event either crewmember becomes ill, the shift is to be terminated and proper supervisors notified. The same is understood for vehicle accidents, and that normal police procedures should be followed, as the vehicles all operate out of that department. No observations or notations on case contact sheets indicate a situation such as this occurring.

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Safety issues addresses the general concept of safety for the crew and proper documentation of any unsafe situations. The first statement in the procedure is to use common sense, followed by constantly being aware of your surroundings. It is no secret that St. Louis has some serious gang and crime problems, and crews are going out at a time of day that much crime is committed. The requirement of bulletproof vests and the recommendation of shoes you can run in directly address this concern. No incidents occurred during my observation, but the crew relayed personal experiences of “close calls,” whereby immediately after conducting a visit a radio call announced “shots fired” at the address they had just left.

Safety is a primary reason why the police department was included in this collaboration. It is the reasoning behind all members of the crew exiting the police vehicle at every home. The police are more familiar with activities that occur on particular streets, as well as how to handle unsafe situations when they occur. In addition, DJOs do not carry firearms. As the crew is visiting a known offender in their home, an officer in full uniform provides added safety. During my observation, the police officer pointed out several safety-related situations, such as how the street cleared once everyone figured out we were the Nightwatch crew, and the tell-tale signs of a home that had been the subject of a past police raid.

One of the safety procedures is to document any situations or incidents that are unsafe, in order to pass them along to the assigned DJO, as well as other crews. Several examples of this can be found upon examining case contact sheets. Some examples involve potentially dangerous situations, such as large dogs in the yard or a juvenile wearing gang affiliated clothing. This information is then added to the contact sheet, so

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that any crew that visits the home will be aware of the possibility of an unsafe situation. Crewmembers also use this tactic to pass along helpful information, not necessarily involving a safety issue. For example, at a home visit the family notified the crew they would be moving soon, and provided the new address and telephone number. This not only helps the assigned DJO keep track of the family, but will assist in future visits, as the JAIBG liaison will have a current address. A visit will not be wasted on a family that no longer lives at that address. Crews will also give helpful hints regarding the home or surroundings, such as “knock hard,” or “use the left door.” This insures that contact will be made with the family at every attempt. Thus, the case contact sheets are consistently used to pass along important information to assist with safety issues as well as insure visits are successfully completed.

One specific safety issue that is mentioned in the procedures is the execution of apprehension orders. The policy clearly states that apprehension orders are not to be affected by the Nightwatch crew. A juvenile is issued an apprehension order for a variety of different reasons, but basically because they are not following some aspect of their supervision. Multiple missed Nightwatch or office visits may be the catalyst for issuing an apprehension. It is not mentioned in these procedures, but any juvenile who is on apprehension status is not placed into the rotation for Nightwatch, precisely for this safety reason. Executing the apprehension will result in the juvenile being returned to detention, and a juvenile who wants to avoid this situation may act in an irrational or unpredictable manner. Removing the juvenile from the rotation eliminates this possibly unsafe situation.

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Shift assignments/scheduling, Program application, and Removal from the program are all sections of the procedure that deal with the administrative aspects of the program, and were not directly observed. These sections detail the procedures for scheduling, missed shifts, incomplete paperwork, how to apply to participate as a crewmember, what types of actions may cause your removal from a crew, and the like. Nightwatch presents a more strict scheduling situation than other court proceedings. During regular business hours another DJO can fill in for a court hearing or other event, but curfew checks occur after normal business hours when no immediate replacements are available. In addition, the procedures stress the accurate collection of information from juveniles, the verification of crew activities, and the adherence to court conduct policies. The only criteria for applying to the program are that the DJO have a current satisfactory performance evaluation, and that there are available slots. Nightwatch case contact sheets provide some information here, as the DJO must sign each sheet. Crewmembers consist of DJOs from all units of the court, including comprehensive study, the specialized drug and gun courts, each of the field units, and the abuse/neglect section. Crews include both line staff and supervisors.

The above policies and procedures are directed at court staff members that are responsible for conducting home visits. The procedures specify how staff should conduct themselves, from how to dress, to how to interact with families, and how to document their activities. The opportunity arose for only one direct observation during the study period, and is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions. Obviously, multiple direct observations would have strengthened the results in this section. While direct observation would be required regarding such items as attire, indirect evidence can be

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found of other items, collected from case contact sheets or by examining parent satisfaction surveys. As only one observation accounts for these tentative conclusions, the possibility of an “observer effect” may have been present, with crewmembers on their “best behavior.” All crewmembers I observed were relaxed and comfortable with their actions, indicating their activities were routine rather than for my benefit, however. Observation as well as the examination of case contact sheets supports the knowledge that quality home visits are conducted, and that safety is a main priority for all crewmembers. Participation as a crewmember is voluntary, which may provide some explanation for the high quality of visits. If a crewmember is unhappy with the tasks, they can remove themselves from the assignment. Conclusions cannot be drawn regarding emergency situations or the administrative aspects of the program, as these were not observed nor documented on case contact sheets.

REWARDS AND SANCTIONS

The core of Nightwatch is that juveniles who are not at home receive sanctions and those who are at home receive rewards. Similar to procedures for number of visits, however, no written guidelines were produced for the allocation of such items. As with the discussion regarding number of visits, any procedures were verbally stated. Again the case contact sheets and Nightwatch files provided a large amount of information, but no conclusions in regards to adherence to written guidelines is possible. The Nightwatch files provide information regarding the frequency of rewards, while both the files and case contact sheets offer insights to the number of sanctions, whether sanctions were completed on time, and whether sanctioning adheres to the court’s restorative justice philosophy.

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The reward and sanctioning system has undergone changes since the beginning of the program, similar to other aspects. At first, juveniles who were home five times in a row received a reward. A reduction in budget led to the change in October 2003 to a reward for every eight successful visits. Any visit that does not result in the crew seeing the juvenile stops the count and it returns to zero. This may include a violation or a visit when no contact was made at all.

In terms of sanctions, it has always been one sanction for one violation. At first, the timeframe was immediate for the completion of the sanction. The DJO was given only a few days to get the sanction completed. Current practice gives the juvenile two weeks to fulfill any sanction requirements. Sanctions are affected when the juvenile is not at home and unexcused for a Nightwatch check. The crew documents that the juvenile was not at home, and the liaison follows up the next day with the assigned DJO. If no valid excuse can be given (with a parent, at a funeral, at work), a sanction is ordered. It is solely the decision of the liaison whether to issue a sanction, and thus a consistent process, as only one decision-maker is involved. The assigned DJO is able to validate an excuse and null a sanction, however. A recent amendment in policy has changed the definition of an excuse, with important results. In the past, juveniles who were visited but reportedly out of the home with a parent were excused, and no sanction given. Beginning in October 2004, these situations now invoke sanctioning. The juvenile must be at home when the crew arrives or a sanction is given. This practice did not go into full effect until January 2005, so the impact on this research is not as pronounced. After reviewing Nightwatch files, several juveniles escaped sanctioning in the past by the

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excuse that they were with a parent. It is a strong assumption that more sanctions will now be issued as a result of this change in policy.

The general question of whether or not juveniles are receiving rewards and sanctions is fairly easy to answer. Assessing details and whether such rewards and sanctions are completed in a timely manner is slightly more difficult. Table 6.6 shows the number of rewards given for the entire sample of research participants assigned to Nightwatch.

Table 6.6

Rewards Received by Research Participants that Received Nightwatch Visits

Number Rewards	Frequency N = 79	Percent
0	40	50.6
1	22	27.8
2	12	15.2
3	3	3.8
4	1	1.3
5	1	1.3

It is evident that few rewards are handed out. Over fifty percent of the sample never received a reward. Examination of the Nightwatch file shows that those juveniles who were home eight times in a row did receive a reward. The JAIBG liaison carefully monitors the juvenile's visits, and when a reward is earned it is forwarded to the assigned DJO. The DJO is responsible for seeing that the juvenile receives it, and there are no written guidelines regarding this aspect. As rewards are an integral part of the program, it was expected to see more juveniles receiving them. One of the possible explanations

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for the low frequency of rewards is that juveniles were not assigned to the program long enough. About 20% of the sample received less than eight visits, which means they were not assigned long enough to earn a reward. Another explanation is that juveniles were just not staying in the house. This would indicate that the promise of receiving a reward was not a powerful influence for remaining at home, as evidenced by juveniles who were home for seven visits but failed to stay home for the one that would earn the reward.

The procedure for examining sanctions can be examined in a little more detail. The policy states that sanctions are to be completed within two weeks of the violation. The research participants accrued a total of 185 sanctions, 105 of which were completed on time, or 56%. If the sanction given was an apprehension order and the juvenile was not detained by the due date, the sanction is counted as not on time. This is a lower than expected compliance rate for a program that has been in existence for nearly five years. Even though not in writing, procedures are well known through word of mouth, and due dates are clearly noted on the case contact sheets.

Another policy of the court is for graduated and restorative sanctions to be used for Nightwatch violations. This means that the first violation should be handled with a parent/child conference to reiterate the Nightwatch guidelines, followed by graduated responses thereafter, with detention used as a last resort. A sanction matrix is published by the court and distributed to all staff to assist with sanction decision-making. Table 6.7 shows the distribution of the first sanction given to each juvenile. According to policy, a majority of first sanctions should be parent conferences, which is indeed the case. Over 40% of all first sanctions are parent/child conferences, by far the largest category. In six cases the first sanction was detention (an overnight stay) or the filing of a probation

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violation or apprehension order (which means the child will be detained for at least three days). The remaining first sanctions consist of other graduated choices. Juveniles may be required to view a pro-social video, such as gang avoidance or self esteem for African American youth. Often videos are accompanied by a writing assignment or conference

Table 6.7

First Sanction by Research Participants that Received Nightwatch Visits

Sanction	Frequency N = 57	Percent
Parent/Child Conference	24	42.1
View Video	4	7.0
Writing Assignment	4	7.0
Community Service	5	8.8
Extra Office Visit	4	7.0
Attend Another Program	1	1.8
Detention	3	5.3
Probation Violation/Apprehension	3	5.3
Violation Excused	7	12.3
None in File	2	3.5

time with the assigned DJO to discuss the video’s content. A writing assignment may also be given on its own, and may include writing sentences or an apology letter.

Community service often involves cleaning, either unit offices or weeding the court flower garden. Juveniles may be required to attend one or more extra office visits with the assigned DJO, or be referred to another court program, such as the “juvenile justice

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project” or MINE to fulfill a sanction order. In a few cases, the violation was ordered by the liaison but was excused by the DJO. This type of situation occurs when the crew documents that the juvenile’s whereabouts are unknown, but in speaking with the DJO it is discovered that the juvenile was actually at an acceptable activity. For two juveniles no record of a sanction was found in the file. It should be noted that 22 juveniles assigned to the program did not receive any sanctions whatsoever.

As a majority of juveniles in the research study have few prior offenses, along with the fact that it has already been shown that most of the juveniles in the research sample are of low to moderate risk, and given the court’s stance of implementing restorative justice techniques, it is expected to see a large majority of minor sanctions and few to none that involve detention. The overwhelming choice of first sanction is parent conference, which follows court policy. Alas, the juveniles that were detained for their first sanction have not fulfilled the goals for graduated, restorative sanctioning.

It is apparent that juveniles assigned to Nightwatch receive rewards and sanctions, and for the most part in accordance with court policy. Rewards are distributed when earned, although the frequency of securing one is low. Sanctioning has been a hurdle at the court, while court staff adjust to the restorative philosophy. Progress can be seen, as only a few cases that earned sanctions did not accomplish one, and the majority of first sanctions were appropriately graduated. The number of sanctions completed in a timely manner should be higher, however, given the age and establishment of the program.

CONCLUSIONS

Does Nightwatch function according to its written guidelines? The answer is, yes and no. In terms of the execution of the program, the answer is yes. In terms of dosage,

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the answer is no. It is clear that referrals are made and juveniles are visited in their homes according to written policy. Even though computer entries are not made accurately, the juvenile still begins to receive visits, which would be the more important of these two events for program success. The court has made all juveniles eligible for the program, rather than limiting participation to serious violent offenders. This goal is clearly met, and details regarding the current offense and other demographic characteristics of the research sample will be discussed in the next section. Crews operate like clock work, with high levels of accuracy in completing paperwork and sharing information. Without precise documentation of each visit, decisions regarding sanctioning or rewards would be impossible.

All aspects of the program would benefit from more concise written procedures, particularly those dealing with dosage. In this way, all court personnel, as well as outside observers or those who wish to replicate the program, will be aware of expectations and logistics. A formal procedure for scheduling visits may prove too tedious, but at the least some general guidelines are needed. Written instructions may assist in delivering services at the intended levels. The results here show that high-risk juveniles are visited in their homes less than low or moderate risk youth, which is not the intended procedure. This is counter-intuitive as well as inconsistent with best practices (see Sherman, et al., 1997). Programs should target high-risk juveniles so that they receive the most services, but that is not the case with this sample. A majority of juveniles at all risk levels receive one visit per week, and considering it is mostly low to moderate risk juveniles who are receiving these visits, this is more consistent with best practices.

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Juveniles assigned to Nightwatch must sign a contract so that they understand they may be sanctioned for violations and rewarded for compliance. These sanctions and rewards are distributed as intended for the most part, but there is room for improvement. One of the tenants of deterrence theory is that sanctions must be swift. The court has identified a two-week window for violations to be addressed, in order to satisfy this component. Only about 50% of sanctions for the research group were completed within this timeframe, which does not support the goal of swift punishment. Strides have been made to establish a restorative sanctioning framework, but several punitive sanctions remain in use. Cleaning unit offices or detention do not address the harm caused by a curfew violation, whereby a conference with a parent or DJO may assist the juvenile in identifying such harms, like a parent's worry or the possibility of victimization (see Bazemore and Umbreit, 1995).

Thus, the Nightwatch program is currently functioning close to its original design, and in accordance with deterrence theory. Juveniles are visited in their homes, visits are documented, and juveniles who are not home and not excused receive sanctions. The first step in deterrence is communicating the threat, which is fulfilled through the Nightwatch contract. While every juvenile may not be seen every week, crews are seen on the street several nights per week, increasing juvenile and community perceptions of certainty of a visit. Now that juveniles cannot be out of the home at all, even with a parent, perceptions of certainty of punishment may increase even further. The purpose of sanctioning is not severity in and of itself, but to make the juvenile accountable, and relates to the concept of tipping models (Kleiman, unpublished). It is not always the most severe punishments that invoke the greatest dread, but often those that are merely

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inconvenient and repetitive (Petersilia and Piper-Deschenes, 1994). Nightwatch seeks to have the severity of the punishment fit the severity of the offense, and with a restorative focus on repairing harm. Finally, the punishment must be swift. The court has a timeline in place for completing sanctions swiftly, but higher compliance is needed to make this an effective deterrence component.

Were this not the case, an outcome evaluation would not be necessary, as there would be nothing to evaluate. As it stands, there are several aspects of the program that can assist in determining whether the program meets its stated goals and objectives of reducing recidivism and victimization. Information regarding the juvenile's risk score, number of home visits, and number of sanctions and rewards will be combined with the perceptual deterrence and opportunity measures collected from the questionnaires to evaluate whether Nightwatch participation affects future offending behavior. First, descriptive information will be provided about the research sample. It has been shown that the program executes visits well, and juveniles will receive rewards or sanctions when they have earned them. Some necessary information is required about who is receiving these visits. It has been established that low to moderate risk juveniles receive the most visits, but who are these juveniles and how did they come into contact with the court?

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS

Nightwatch was designed to be an intervention for all juveniles who come into contact with the St. Louis City Juvenile Court, rather than only those adjudicated on the most serious gun and/or gang offenses. This characteristic presumes the population of

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juveniles on Nightwatch will be significantly different from juveniles assigned to similar programs across the country, such as Nightlight or the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP).

Demographics. Demographic characteristics for all of the juveniles included in the study are presented in Table 6.8. Males constitute 80.5 percent of the total sample, 90.7 percent identified themselves as being Black/African American, and the mean age for the referral that included them in the research study was 14.5. Only 22.9 percent of

Table 6.8

Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group (Demographics)

Variable	Total Sample N = 118		Program Participant N = 55		Non Participant N = 24		Dismissed N = 39	
	Mean	S. D.	Mean	S. D.	Mean	S. D.	Mean	S. D.
Male	.81	.40	.82	.39	.79	.42	.79	.41
Black	.15	.53	.05*	.30	.33	.87	.18	.51
Age at Referral	14.52	1.22	14.35	1.14	14.71	1.33	14.64	1.25
Two Parent	2.78	1.49	2.56	1.14	2.96	2.42	2.97	1.16

* $p < .05$ comparing the experimental and comparison groups

the sample identified living with both natural parents.

Examining the groups separately yields similar findings. The “program participant” group consists of those juveniles who received Nightwatch visits and

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completed at least two surveys. The “non participant,” or comparison, group consists of those juveniles who did not receive Nightwatch visits for the study period, and completed at least two surveys. Some of these juveniles were included in Nightwatch after completing surveys, and their Nightwatch visit information was included in the process evaluation. The “dismissed” category includes juveniles who did not complete at least two surveys. The Time 1 survey was completed, but then the case was dismissed, the juvenile declined, or there was no further contact with the juvenile to obtain further survey information. The Nightwatch files for these juveniles were examined, and the information included in the process evaluation, if applicable. Independent samples t-tests indicated no significant differences between the study groups on these demographic variables. Race appears as statistically significant between the experimental and comparison groups with equal variances assumed, however the race distribution was not a normal distribution, with only a very small percentage of juveniles identifying themselves as something other than African American. Thus, this variable was not useful for inclusion in subsequent analyses. While a randomized experiment would have been ideal, the current research design revealed no significant differences between study groups on these demographic variables, signifying that this sample meets acceptable criteria to continue with further analyses.

There are expected similarities and differences in the sample composition of the IVRP (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003) and the research sample of Nightwatch participants. Using the “program participants” for comparison, both Nightwatch and the IVRP reveal the majority of offenders are male, 82% and 90%, respectively. Both also identify the majority of those in contact with the court are African American (96% for

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Nightwatch, 72% for IVRP). Indianapolis reports a much larger number of whites involved in offending, most likely due to population composition differences between the two cities. Both of these findings are supported in numerous other studies, and are expected. The two studies differ on other characteristics, which is expected, given the different criteria used for inclusion in each program. Number of prior referrals shows that 75% of IVRP participants had prior arrests, with an average of 5.5 juvenile arrests. The Nightwatch sample had 51% of participants with prior referrals, and an average of 1.1 prior referrals. In regards to age, IVRP reports suspects ranging in age from 16 to 32. The age for Nightwatch participants is much lower, ranging from 12 to 16 for the program participant group. Nightwatch is available to all juveniles, but limited to those involved in the Juvenile Court, which explains some of the difference in age range compared to IVRP. The IVRP only included juveniles with a current arrest for homicide, which suggests a more high-risk group of individuals.

It was speculated that participants in Nightwatch would have different characteristics than those involved in a program such as IVRP. This speculation is correct, particularly regarding the characteristics of current offense, prior referrals, and age. Nightwatch juveniles present with a variety of offenses, many non-violent, Nightwatch juveniles have fewer and less serious prior referrals, and Nightwatch juveniles are much younger than IVRP participants. Subsequent analyses will reveal whether a program such as Nightwatch is effective on this different type of population.

Offense characteristics. In addition to demographic variables, study groups were compared on such characteristics as current and prior offending (both official and unofficial). Table 6.9 presents current offenses by study group. The most prominent

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current offense involves stolen vehicles. Tampering 1st and tampering 2nd combine to account for over fifty percent of the current charges for the total sample and comparison groups, and over sixty percent for the program participant group. Independent samples

Table 6.9

Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group (Current Offense)

Adjusted Charge	Total Sample N = 118 % (N)	Program Participant N = 55 % (N)	Non Participant N = 24 % (N)	Dismissed N = 39 % (N)
Tampering 1 st	41.5 (49)	45.5 (25)	41.7 (10)	35.9 (14)
Tampering 2 nd	17.8 (21)	20.0 (11)	16.7 (4)	15.4 (6)
Assault 1 st /2 nd	9.3 (11)	3.6 (2)	12.5 (3)	15.4 (6)
Assault 3 rd	9.3 (11)	10.9 (6)	8.3 (2)	7.7 (3)
Burglary	5.1 (6)	5.5 (3)	4.2 (1)	5.1 (2)
Sex Crime	4.2 (5)	1.8 (1)	4.2 (1)	7.7 (3)
UUW	4.2 (5)	3.6 (2)	8.3 (2)	2.6 (1)
Drug	3.4 (4)	5.5 (3)	0.0 (0)	2.6 (1)
Robbery	2.5 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	7.7 (3)
Prop Damage	1.7 (2)	3.6 (2)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Stealing	.8 (1)	0.0 (0)	4.2 (1)	0.0 (0)

t-tests revealed no significant differences between any groups on the current charge variable. It should be noted that the differences between groups at this point are typically not attributable to any decision made by the juvenile. Thus, the hypothesis that juveniles included in Nightwatch come into contact with the court on a variety of charges (not just violent offenses) is correct. In fact, the majority of juveniles have a current offense that is non-violent and involves car theft.

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A significant number of the most violent cases were dismissed. Over half of the assault 1st/assault 2nd cases are in the dismissed category, and all of the robbery cases ended up in this category. For the robbery cases, two were dismissed and one juvenile was sent directly from detention to the Division of Youth Services. One reason for this may be that court policy requires victim participation. Beginning in the spring of 2004, an in-person interview with the victim must be completed at the court within 24 hours of the offense. The case will be dismissed if the victim does not comply. Additionally, the court policy has always stated that if the victim fails to appear for the scheduled court hearing, the case will be dismissed. Therefore, while it was expected to obtain a sample with a large variety of offenses, the most violent cases were either dismissed or the juvenile was never assigned to Nightwatch, leaving a large proportion of property crimes, particularly car theft. This sets Nightwatch significantly apart from other curfew-check programs that focus on violent, gang, or gun related offenses.

Information regarding the juvenile's prior offending was collected using official and self report information. Table 6.10 presents the means and standard deviations for both official (priors) and self-report delinquent activities. The self-report total refers to the number of incidents the juvenile admitted to ever having done (maximum score possible is 11). Self report recent incidents are those the juvenile admitted to within the last 60 days, and are totaled as incidents. The difference in self reported recent offending for the experimental and comparison groups is statistically significant at the .05 level. One explanation for this may be that juveniles screened for inclusion in VOM are selected for precisely that reason, that they have had no or limited court contact in the past. It can be noted that there is no difference between any of the groups on the self-

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report total, however, that significant differences pertain only to incidents occurring recently.

Table 6.10

Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group (Prior Delinquency)

Variable	Total Sample N = 118		Program Participant N = 55		Non Participant N = 24		Dismissed N = 39	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Priors (official)	1.0	1.6	1.1	1.6	.9	1.6	1.0	1.5
Self Report (total)	3.1	2.0	3.4	2.3	2.5	1.6	2.9	1.6
Self Report (recent)	4.7	8.8	6.1*	11.0	2.9	6.0	3.7	6.5

* $p < .05$ between the experimental and comparison groups

It would be expected that juveniles who have never been assigned to Nightwatch would have few prior official court contacts. Any juvenile on official court supervision is eligible for the program, and the process evaluation showed that a majority of these cases are in fact assigned to receive visits. Thus, juveniles who have not been assigned to Nightwatch in the past are likely those juveniles who have not been eligible for supervision. Table 6.11 shows more specific information regarding official prior referrals. The modal number of prior court referrals is zero, with over fifty percent of the juveniles in the study having no prior official contact with the court. Juveniles with two or fewer prior court referrals account for 86.4 percent of the total sample. Thus, the results correspond with the expectation that research participants would have a low

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Table 6.11

Frequency of Prior Official Delinquency

Number of Referrals	Number of Juveniles N = 118	Percent*
0	64	54.2
1	26	22.0
2	12	10.2
3	7	5.9
4	5	4.2
6	1	.8
7	3	2.5

*Percentages do not total to 100 due to rounding

Mean = 1.0

Mode = 0

Standard Deviation = 1.6

Range = 7

frequency of prior official court contact, and leads to the conclusion that they are not violent and chronic offenders.

Self-report measures of recent activities yielded much more variable results. For Table 6.12, the frequency of reported incidents is shown, along with the number of juveniles reporting at each level. Frequencies of self-reported delinquency are significantly higher than the official prior frequencies, supporting the literature that reports official referrals undercount the amount of actual offending (for example, Decker et al., 1993). It must be kept in mind that some activities on the questionnaire would not necessarily result in a court referral, however, such as skipping school or breaking curfew. Nonetheless, the modal category for self-reports was zero, indicating

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Table 6.12

Frequency of Recent Self Reported Delinquency

Number of Incidents	Number of Juveniles N = 118	Percent*
0	41	34.7
1	21	17.8
2	9	7.6
3	13	11.0
4	4	3.4
5	9	7.6
6	4	3.4
7	3	2.5
9	1	.8
12	1	.8
14	1	.8
19	1	.8
20	1	.8
21	1	.8
27	2	1.7
30	1	.8
31	1	.8
38	2	1.7
39	1	.8
112	1	.8

*Percentages do not total to 100 due to rounding

Mean = 5.26

Mode = 0

Standard Deviation = 12.9

Range = 112

that the largest proportion of juveniles did not have a significant history with any kind of delinquent behavior.

THEORETICAL VARIABLES

Many of the theoretical variables were placed into scales or indices in order to be utilized more fully in the multivariate analysis. This section will highlight some descriptive information about the theoretical variables of certainty of punishment,

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severity of punishment, opportunity, moral view, impulsivity, parental supervision, and offending likelihood. The main question to be addressed in this section is whether there is a difference between sample groups at Time 1 regarding these variables, and whether the quasi-experimental design was adequate in selecting unbiased groups.

Each of the theoretical variables was compared by using independent samples t-tests across the sample groups. The means for all theoretical variables by sample group are presented in Table 6.13, along with standard deviations. Certainty of punishment involves a scale of how likely the juvenile thought they would get caught doing a variety of activities. It would be expected that juveniles with a more serious current charge or more prior referrals would have a lower perception of certainty of punishment (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; Andenaes, 1974). A significant difference emerged between the non-participant (comparison) group and the dismissed group for certainty, but not in the expected direction. The results indicate the comparison group had a significantly lower perception of certainty of getting caught than the dismissed group at Time 1. This finding is opposite of the expected, given that Table 6.10 identifies the comparison group as having significantly *fewer* self-reported offenses. As a possible explanation, comparisons were made between the groups on any prior court programming, yet no significant results emerged (not shown). Juveniles who had previous contact with the court may perceive the certainty of punishment as lower (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986), but this does not appear to be the case here.

Severity of punishment was divided into two dimensions, one for formal sanctions, and one for informal relationships. No severity group showed any significant difference from another regarding the scales for the perception of the severity of

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Table 6.13

Descriptive Statistics by Sample Group (Theoretical Variables)

Scale Variable	Total Sample N = 118		Program Participant N = 55		Non Participant N = 24		Dismissed N = 39	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Certainty	1.50	.69	1.47	.72	1.30	.82	1.67**	.53
Formal Severity	.92	.72	.82	.67	1.00	.72	1.00	.80
Informal Severity	1.26	.62	1.25	.65	1.13	.54	1.36	.63
Moral View	1.91	.35	1.93	.26	1.86	.47	1.90	.38
Impulsivity	1.91	.63	1.93	.63	1.88	.68	1.90	.60
Opportunity	.91	.72	.93	.72	1.04	.75	.79	.70

** $p < .05$ between the non-participant and dismissed groups

punishment, in fact there were no significant differences for any of the variables of opportunity, moral view, or impulsivity (see Table 6.13). Again, this indicates the quasi-experimental design was adequate at choosing sample groups for comparison, and that no attrition bias is present.

Offending likelihood. Results for the Offending Likelihood are presented in two stages (see Pogarsky, 2002). The first phase consists of a test for differences in explanatory measures across the three profiles, which will be shown here. Bivariate correlations for all offending likelihood variables are presented in Table 6.14. The second phase consists of multivariate analysis of each profile, and will be presented in Chapter Seven.

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Using the formula presented in Chapter Five, the juveniles could be classified into the three subject profiles of incorrigible, deterrable, or acute conformist. For this sample of juveniles, 19% (N = 23) were classified as acute conformist, 51% (N = 60) were

Table 6.14 about here

classified as deterrable, 5% (N = 6) were incorrigible, and 24% (N = 29) were unclassified. The large percentage of unclassified individuals led to further analyses to determine whether a different formula should be used for classification. Two additional analyses were conducted, whereby the individuals who consistently reported they were “somewhat unlikely” to offend were included with either the conformists or the incorrigibles to assess any significance in relationships. Including the individuals with the acute conformists caused significant relationships in the original analysis to disappear. This indicates that, while they are consistent in their responses, they are not similar to acute conformists on the other measures. Including them with the incorrigibles revealed no significant relationships among any of the groups or variables. Therefore, the original classification was maintained.

Several differences emerged between this sample of active offenders and Pogarsky’s sample of college students. The sample sizes were quite different, but the percentages of individuals in each category were comparable. Pogarsky surveyed 412 students, with 21% conformist, 62% deterrable, and 8% incorrigible. This study surveyed 118 juvenile offenders and found similar proportions. One large difference is the number of unclassified individuals. Pogarsky’s sample contained only 8%, whereas this study identified 24%. The number of respondents giving “illogical” responses involving lower perceived offending with less certainty comprised 11% of this study,

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while Pogarsky only reported a handful of such individuals. One explanation for this may be the nature of the questions. As stated earlier, it was clear that some juveniles had difficulty with the abstract nature of the question, not to mention the significant difference in population type between juvenile offenders in St. Louis and college students.

Table 6.15 presents descriptive statistics by subject profile, including means and standard deviations. All means are differentiated at the .10 level, indicating the relationships in this study are not as strong as those in Pogarsky's study, which were distinguished at the .05 level.

Several differences between the groups were significant, but not all in the expected directions. The deterrable group demonstrates a significantly higher perception of certainty of punishment than the other two groups. This is not consistent with the theoretical expectations that the acute conformists should have the highest perception of certainty.

Proceeding down the table, no significant relationships are present between any of the groups for severity (formal or informal), age, sex, or embarrassment. For formal severity and age, this is the same result reached by Pogarsky, that these variables show no difference between the profiles. Pogarsky's social disapproval measure is similar to the informal severity measure used here. It would be expected to find a significant relationship between the groups on informal disapproval, given that conformists are theoretically highly attached to informal control mechanisms. The 2002 study did note significant differences between males and females, consistent with previous research (Heimer and DeCoster, 1999; Silberman, 1976) and the lack of significance here may

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Table 6.15

Variable Means by Offending Likelihood Profile

	Acute Conformist OL = OL2 = 1 N = 23		Deterrable OL < OL2 N = 60		Incorrigible OL = OL2 > 3 N = 6		Total Sample N = 118	
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Certainty	1.35	.78	1.64 ^a	.58	1.17	.98	1.50	.69
Formal Severity	1.0	.74	.92	.72	1.17	.75	.90	.77
Informal Severity	1.17	.58	1.32	.62	1.33	.82	1.26	.62
Age	14.35	1.07	14.57	1.16	14.00	1.41	14.52	1.22
Sex	.74	.45	.82	.39	.67	.52	.81	.40
Embarrassment	3.39	.89	3.35	.88	3.17	.98	3.31	.85
Guilt	3.52 ^b	.85	3.12	1.04	2.67	1.51	3.09	1.06
Impulsivity	1.87	.55	2.00	.65	2.17	.75	1.91	.63
Moral View	1.87	.46	1.93 ^c	.31	1.67	.52	1.91	.35
Self Report Total	2.17 ^b	1.53	3.18	2.10	4.00	3.16	3.05	1.97

29 subjects were not classified ($0 < OL = OL 2 < 3$)

a = $p < .10$ between the deterrable and both the acute conformist and incorrigible groups

b = $p < .10$ between the acute conformist and both the deterrable and incorrigible groups

c = $p < .10$ between the deterrable and incorrigible groups

involve the types of females questioned. Again, a group of college ladies is much different culturally than a group of teenage offenders from St. Louis. Additionally, the college ladies were asked about drinking and driving, while the offenders were in detention for being in stolen cars and assaults. Finally, this study found no significant

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differences between groups on embarrassment, but Pogarsky did report differences between the conformists and the other two groups on this measure. It would be expected to find such differences, given that internal controls have consistently been found to be stronger than formal punishments (Grasmick, et al., 1993, Meier and Johnson, 1977), and conformists are defined as being influenced most by extralegal internal factors (Pogarsky, 2002).

Embarrassment indicates a measure of social disapproval, while guilt indicates self-disapproval. Acute conformists are significantly different from the other two groups in regards to guilt. This is consistent with Pogarsky's results, supporting the influence of extralegal factors on acute conformists.

Moral view is another internal control measure. Pogarsky does not include a specific measure for moral view, but it is presumed to have similar findings to other informal controls. Again, it is the deterrable group that is significantly different from the other two groups on this measure. Deterrable individuals show a higher level of moral view and internal controls than other individuals in the study. Even though it is predicted that the acute conformists would be the significant group, this finding is supportive of other deterrence research. Individuals with a high moral view will have a high perception of certainty of punishment (Jensen, 1969; Meier and Johnson, 1977), which is indeed the case for the deterrable group.

A major finding by Pogarsky was that incorrigibles were the most impulsive, and significantly so. This study finds no support whatsoever for this hypothesis. In fact, the deterrable group shows a higher level of impulsivity than either of the other groups, but not at significant levels.

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Finally, the measure of self reported delinquency is consistent across studies, and in the expected direction. Pogarsky's conformists had the lowest reports of ever having driven drunk, and the juvenile conformists had the lowest self-reported delinquency totals. Thus, even though the acute conformists do not have the highest measures of social disapproval, they still report the lowest frequency of offending. In addition, the deterrable group with the highest levels of moral view and perceptions of certainty of punishment were not the lowest reported offenders. This implies that another extralegal factor may account for the low offending rate, such as opportunity.

Thus, a group of active juvenile offenders was divided into the three offending categories of acute conformist, deterrable, and incorrigible, but a large number of juveniles were not classified. Not all results corroborated the original study by Pogarsky, but some interesting interactions are illuminated. Pogarsky showed that acute conformists refrain from offending because of high levels of internal controls, as well as high levels of fear of social disapproval. This study shows that acute conformists do have the lowest offending levels, but do not have the highest perceptions of internal controls. Acute conformists do have significantly higher levels of guilt than the other two groups, but deterrable offenders showed higher levels of certainty and moral views. Pogarsky states that conformists and incorrigibles are impervious to legal sanction threats because of other extralegal influences, such as internal controls or impulsivity. Neither study, nor any of the groups showed significance for the formal severity measure, however, which indicates it is the extralegal factors that are influencing behavior for these individuals. Severity of formal punishment does not appear to influence anyone, not even the deterrable group. As the internal control variables are split between the conformists and

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deterrables, this would indicate that some other extralegal factor is associated with low levels of offending, such as parental supervision or time spent away from home.

Table 6.14

Correlations Between All Variables for Offending Likelihood in Sample

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.
1. Offending Likelihood	1.0											
2. Baseline (OL2)	-.02	1.0										
3. Certainty	.05	.24*	1.0									
4. Formal Severity	.01	.00	-.05	1.0								
5. Informal Severity	-.04	.15	.10	.11	1.0							
6. Age	.10	.01	-.03	-.03	.01	1.0						
7. Sex	.06	.04	-.05	.03	-.07	-.06	1.0					
8. Self Report Total	-.03	.18	-.22*	-.12	-.03	.05	.17	1.0				
9. Guilt	-.12	-.04	.33**	-.02	.25*	-.23*	-.08	-.24**	1.0			
10. Embarrassment	-.04	.10	.25**	.06	.31*	-.27**	-.10	-.28**	.54**	1.0		
11. Impulsivity	.10	.07	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.13	-.25**	.20**	-.09	-.09	1.0	
12. Moral View	-.06	.02	.02	-.24*	.12	-.12	.18	-.04	.26**	.19*	-.20*	1.0

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Chapter Seven

RESULTS

The process evaluation presented in Chapter Six indicates that, for the most part, Nightwatch operates according to its design, and in accordance with the tenets of deterrence theory. Juveniles can be reasonably certain they will receive visits, and reasonably certain they will receive a punishment if not at home.

Descriptive statistics identify a sample that is, unfortunately, typical. Young, black males comprise a majority of the sample, but the most frequent referrals to the court involve first time offenders in stolen cars rather than chronic, violent offenders. This distribution can be said for both the experimental and comparison groups, with no major offense or offender characteristics that would bias results. In addition, the sample was divided into three offending categories of acute conformist, deterrable, and incorrigible, but not all descriptive results supported what was anticipated. These unexpected results identify that further investigation is needed into the theoretical variables.

BIVARIATE RESULTS

Prior to building the multivariate models, bivariate correlations were calculated to address a number of issues. First, the need is apparent to assess any relationships among

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the variables. Since not all descriptive analyses produced the expected results, an examination of the relationship of all relevant variables is warranted. Second, the issue of multicollinearity must be addressed. The bivariate correlations will offer a first look at which independent variables are at risk for this condition. A matrix that includes all study variables proved to be too large and cumbersome to be included as one table here, so multiple tables will be presented and explained.

Table 7.1 presents the major theoretical variables at Time 1. The variables included here were selected based upon previous perceptual deterrence research (Saltzman, et al., 1982, Minor and Harry, 1982; Grasmick et al., 1993; Pogarsky, 2002; Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; Paternoster, 1987). Past research has shown that the proper causal ordering is to examine past perceptions on current behavior to control for experiential effects (Saltzman et al. 1982). This procedure was followed here.

Table 7.1 about here

Several variables and groups of variables show significance, all in the expected directions. The theoretical variables can be divided into those related to offending and those related to informal controls. Looking at row M (prior referrals), several relationships are significant at the .05 level or better. The strongest correlation is between prior referrals and opportunity at Time 1. This indicates that juveniles who reported they spent more time out of the home had more prior official referrals, which would be expected according to routine activities theory (Osgood et al., 1996). Number of street days is also significant, but this relationship is not explanatory, as the measure for street days is between release from detention after Time 1 and the survey at Time 2, and the measure for prior referrals is for before Time 1. Row M also reveals that age is

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related to offending, showing that older juveniles have more prior official court contact, again an expected result.

Looking across row O (self reported delinquency at Time 2), several significant relationships appear. First, males are more likely to report delinquent activity than females at Time 2. This is consistent with prior evidence, and not unexpected. Second, the street days measure is also significant here, but is more intuitive. The more days the juvenile was on the street, the more likely they would report participating in delinquent activities. Another correlation relative to this relationship is the significance between opportunity at Time 1 and subsequent offending. Those juveniles who are out of the house more often are accumulating more subsequent official referrals. Again, both of these results are expected according to routine activities theory (Osgood et al., 1996). Third, there is a relationship between self-reports and official referrals at Time 2. Those juveniles who self-reported participating in delinquent activities were also referred to the court in some manner, whether for the same or different incidents. This is a beneficial correlation, as it shows that juveniles are in fact self-reporting delinquent activities fairly consistently with official records. Finally, the relationship between self-report delinquency at Time 2 and victimization is quite solid and in the positive direction, supporting much previous research (Wolfgang, 1958; Hindelang, 1976; Lauritsen, 1990; Lauritsen et al., 1992). Juveniles who self report more delinquency incidents also report more victimization incidents. It can also be noted that males report significantly more victimization experiences at Time 2 than females.

Thus, several correlations regarding offending are evident here and supportive of prior theoretical research. Opportunity is significantly related to both prior and

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subsequent offending, as would be expected. Those juveniles spending more time outside the house are accruing more official referrals. Victimization shows a strong correlation with self reported offending, confirming prior research and offering support for the idea that preventing victimization may well prevent offending.

Another group of variables showing significance in Table 7.1 are related to informal controls. A good place to begin is to look across rows F (embarrassment) and G (guilt). Both measures are significantly positively related to informal severity, moral view, and each other. This would indicate that juveniles are consistently responding to survey questions regarding such informal controls. The correlations of most interest are between guilt, embarrassment, and certainty of punishment. Both variables show a positive significant relationship, indicating that juveniles with high levels of internal controls also have high levels of certainty of punishment. This finding is consistent with prior research that indicates it is informal rather than formal punishment that most influences perceptions of certainty of punishment (Meier and Johnson, 1977; Jensen and Erickson, 1978; Grasmick, et al., 1993). Interestingly, the relationship between age and these informal controls is also significant. Younger juveniles are more likely to have these high levels of informal control, which would be more supportive of Jensen (1969).

Guilt proves to be an important variable for this correlation, as it is significantly related to the other informal controls, as well as to prior offending. Row M indicates that guilt is negatively correlated to prior offending, signaling that juveniles with higher levels of guilt have lower levels of prior offending. Guilt creates a link between certainty of punishment and offending behavior. Guilt is positively related to certainty of punishment and negatively related to prior offending, indicating that juveniles with high levels of

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guilt and thus certainty of punishment have lower levels of prior offending. This is supportive of other work regarding perceptual deterrence theory, as prior offending is shown to be negatively associated with perceptions of certainty of punishment (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986). Individuals with lower levels of prior offending will have higher levels of certainty of punishment. It is important to note that no relationships regarding the severity of formal punishment were significant for any variables in the matrix. This is actually supportive of much previous perceptual deterrence work, that has also failed to find a significant relationship between severity of punishment and subsequent offending behavior (Waldo and Chiricos, 1974; Erickson et al., 1977; Jensen, 1969).

These informal measures are so strongly correlated that the concern of multicollinearity is paramount. All variables in this correlation were entered to assess multicollinearity. No evidence exists, however, as tolerance levels for all variables exceeded .52, and no VIF was greater than 1.92. Thus, these bivariate findings point out that significant, theoretically expected relationships exist between the variables in the matrix. Multivariate models will provide even more information regarding which of the theoretical variables predict subsequent official and self-report offending.

Table 7.2 presents bivariate correlations for Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3 major theoretical variables. Past perceptual deterrence research indicates that perceptions are unstable and change over time (Minor and Harry, 1982). Looking at the upper left corner of the table, it is evident that the perception of certainty of punishment is positively correlated to itself over time. This indicates that a juvenile with a high certainty of punishment at Time 1 will continue to have high levels of perceptions of certainty at

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other time points as well. This does not support the previous research, but these are only zero order correlations, and closer examination is necessary. The same can

Table 7.2 about here

be said for informal severity. Juveniles who think informal controls are a big problem at Time 1 will continue to perceive they are a big problem at later time points. Opportunity also follows this pattern. Those juveniles reporting spending many nights away from home at Time 1 are continuing to report many nights away from home at Time 2 and Time 3. To some extent, these findings indicate that involvement with the court does not change any perceptions or behaviors of the juveniles it serves. Again, these are only bivariate correlations, and more complex analyses are needed. One variable does not follow this pattern, and that is perception of formal severity. Perceptions are correlated at Time 1 and Time 2, and between Time 2 and Time 3, but the relationship between Time 1 and Time 3 is no longer significant, as it was with the other variables. This indicates that perceptions of formal severity may have changed over time, but does not give any clue as to why. It must be kept in mind that the number of juveniles in each group may influence these results. The number of participants fell to 78 for Time 2 and 37 at Time 3, which may have an effect on the correlation results. These results are not supportive of past deterrence research regarding the stability of perceptions (Minor and Harry, 1982), but these zero order correlations do not offer much depth of analysis. Further explanations will be pursued in the multivariate findings section below.

Not unexpectedly, a significant amount of multicollinearity was discovered between the theoretical variables across the different time points. The variables for certainty, severity (both formal and informal) and opportunity at each time point were

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entered, and significant multicollinearity issues were uncovered. Tolerance levels for the 12 theoretical variables ranged from .25 to .62, and VIF values ranged from 1.62 to 3.98, with 7 variables attaining a score over 2. Given that each of the variables is measuring the same constructs at a different time point, these findings are not surprising. Care must be taken in constructing subsequent multivariate models, to insure multicollinearity is not present.

In Table 7.1, the major theoretical variables were presented, but no measures of Nightwatch participation were included. Table 7.3 adds such variables as number of visits, number of rewards and sanctions, and risk score to a correlation with the significant theoretical variables. Some correlations are repeated from Table 7.1, such as offending and victimization, and do not need to be addressed again here. The correlations from Table 7.3 can also be divided, here into offending and program groups. A good place to begin is by looking across row G (risk score). Positive correlations exist between risk score and both subsequent official and self reported delinquency at Time 2.

Table 7.3 about here

Juveniles with a high risk score are more likely to commit both official and unofficial delinquency. Since the two offending measures are correlated this finding is no surprise. It does indicate that the risk assessment instrument is a good predictor of risk, as these juveniles are in fact offending more, at both official and unofficial levels. Self-reports are correlated with two other variables, but these must be interpreted with caution. Looking down row B (self report delinquency Time 2), both certainty of punishment at Time 2 and opportunity at Time 2 are significant. Certainty of punishment at Time 2 shows a negative correlation with self-reports, however, this is an example of variables

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measuring the experiential effect rather than a deterrent effect. Both variables are measured at Time 2, indicating that this correlation is not appropriate for examining deterrent effects (Salzman et al., 1982; Minor and Harry, 1982). These variables were included in this correlation to establish whether any relationships exist with the program variables, which they do not. Self-reports and opportunity at Time 2 is an appropriate measure for analysis, however, as it is not a deterrence measure, and the goal is to assess whether opportunities and delinquency are correlated during the study period. Results show that self-report offending and opportunity at Time 2 are significantly positively related. Juveniles who report being out of the home more also report more delinquent activities, an expected result (Osgood, et al., 1996). Neither of these measures is significant with any of the program variables, however.

Program variables show no correlations with the deterrence variables, but some relationships exist across program variables. One program variable that shows multiple significant relationships is rewards. Looking across row J (rewards) it is seen that rewards are significant with subsequent offending, risk score, and number of visits. The relationship with subsequent offending and risk score is negative, indicating juveniles who reoffend more and have a higher risk score receive fewer rewards. This is intuitively what is expected. Juveniles earning rewards are complying with curfew by being at home when the crew comes for a home visit. Juveniles with a high-risk score, however, have been shown to be reoffending, which is correlated with being out of the house. Rewards are positively correlated with number of visits between survey administrations. This indicates that juveniles that receive more visits receive more rewards. This must be the case, in that a juvenile must be home eight times to receive a reward. Receiving

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multiple rewards indicates the juvenile has had numerous visits, and has been home for a majority of them.

These offending and program variables have shown significant correlations, but few between the two types. Offending is significant with risk, and rewards are significant with visits, but no other deterrence variables proved significant. Deterrence theory would predict that as the number of visits increased, so would the certainty of punishment, but this is not the case (Kleiman, unpublished). It is also predicted that an increase in sanctions would increase the perceptions of certainty and severity of punishment, but again this is not the case (Horney and Marshall, 1992).

The correlations presented here support previous deterrence research in that informal controls play a role in certainty of punishment (Grasmick et al., 1993; Jensen and Erickson, 1978; Meier and Johnson, 1977). In addition, opportunity research has shown that juveniles out of the house in unstructured settings are not only more likely to commit delinquent acts (Osgood et al., 1996), but are more likely to become victims (Lauritsen, 1990; Lauritsen et al., 1991; Cohen and Felson, 1979). The next step is to place these variables into multivariate models to uncover more detailed information about what is predicting subsequent offending for the juveniles in this study, and specifically, the role of Nightwatch.

WITHIN-GROUP DIFFERENCES

The primary research question is whether or not Nightwatch reduces recidivism and victimization experiences for juveniles who are assigned. This section will answer this question by comparing the experimental (program participant) and comparison (non-participant) groups, for significant differences between time points. The rationale for

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administering surveys at multiple time points was to assess whether juvenile experiences, perceptions of certainty and severity, or opportunities changed after participation in Nightwatch. Paired samples t-tests were conducted to determine whether there were changes within the groups between surveys. This method was selected as the samples are not independent, but test whether a juvenile's perceptions and activities changed during program participation. The Time 1 and Time 2 survey response for each juvenile creates a pair of observations for comparison. Table 7.4 shows the mean and standard deviation for each variable at Time 1 and Time 2 for both the program participant and comparison groups. Differences in the number of individuals included for each variable can be explained in terms of survey administration. If the juvenile was interrupted while completing a survey, questions regarding opportunity may have been completed, while those regarding certainty came later in the survey and may not have been answered.

Results indicate that some perceptions and opportunities did in fact change over time, but not all. Beginning at the top of the table, it is evident that certainty of punishment did not change considerably for either group. This implies that contact with the court in general, not just in terms of Nightwatch participation, had little effect on perceptions of certainty of punishment. This finding actually supports the literature that suggests the most important controls are not formal but informal (Grasmick et al., 1993, Meier and Johnson, 1977). It could also be taken to support prior studies that found no evidence of a deterrent effect based on certainty of punishment (Piliavin, et al., 1986).

The scale measure of certainty of punishment takes all activities into account, however, not just the activity of violating curfew. It is feasible to speculate that juvenile perceptions regarding being caught violating curfew may increase between the two time

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Table 7.4
Within-Group Differences Between Time 1 and Time 2

Variable	Experimental Group (Program Participant)				Comparison Group (Non Participant)			
	Time 1		Time 2		Time 1		Time 2	
	Mean (S.D.)	N	Mean (S.D.)	N	Mean (S.D.)	N	Mean (S.D.)	N
Certainty of Punishment	1.42 (.72)	48	1.40 (.78)	48	1.30 (.82)	23	1.43 (.77)	23
Formal Severity of Punishment	.79 (.66)	53	.94 (.75)	53	1.00* (.72)	24	.79 (.83)	24
Informal Severity of Punishment	1.27*** (.66)	52	.46 (.50)	52	1.13*** (.54)	23	.48 (.51)	23
Opportunity	.94*** (.72)	53	.51 (.61)	53	1.04 (.75)	24	.79 (.66)	24
Official Delinquency	1.05 (1.58)	55	.87 (1.28)	55	.92 (1.64)	24	1.17 (1.13)	24
Self Report Delinquency	6.52* (11.40)	50	2.98 (7.39)	50	2.92 (5.99)	24	3.38 (6.88)	24
Victimization	2.55** (5.19)	49	.88 (1.52)	49	.33** (.64)	24	1.13 (1.87)	24

Note: S.D. represents Standard Deviation
 Experimental and control groups are significantly different at
 * $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .001$

points in response to program participation. Additional paired t-tests reveal that this is not the case, however. The mean between Time 1 and Time 2 changed very little for either the experimental group (3.06 and 3.00, respectively) or the comparison group (2.83 and 2.88, respectively). These results indicate that Nightwatch apparently does not change the perceptions of certainty of punishment for juveniles, either in a general capacity or for the specific activity of curfew. Formal severity of punishment only shows a significant change for the comparison group. Between Time 1 and Time 2 perceptions of formal severity actually decreased for the comparison group. As this

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group had less contact with official court agents, it is expected that their perceptions of formal punishment would in fact be lower. This is consistent with perceptual deterrence literature that indicates that individuals with prior offending will have lower perceptions of severity of punishment (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986). The juveniles in the comparison group were arrested, but for those in Victim/Offender Mediation or whose case was dismissed, nothing “happened” to them, which theoretically lowers their perceptions of severity of punishment.

For both groups, their perceptions of informal punishments decreased significantly between Time 1 and Time 2. It would be expected that informal severity might increase, due to increased supervision or disapproval from informal agents in the juvenile’s life. This result appears initially counter-intuitive, but may be explained by other experiences. Many juveniles were first time offenders, and at Time 1 may have felt friends or teachers would be very upset with their behavior. If no negative feedback was received, the juvenile may have answered that it was “no problem” with these informal agents at Time 2. An alternate but related explanation could entail labeling theory (Becker, 1963). Rather than receiving no negative feedback from informal agents, the juvenile could have received significant negative feedback, and their attachment to these informal agents could have lessened. Also, the informal agents in a juvenile’s life may have changed between Time 1 and Time 2. Frequently, and depending upon the charge, juveniles are suspended from school when they come into contact with the court. They often go to an alternative school, with different teachers and different friends. If the juvenile does not feel as attached to the alternative school teachers as they did to their regular teachers, this may lower their perceptions of informal severity. One final

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explanation for this difference cannot be ascertained from the current data. It is possible that those juveniles with the highest measures of informal severity were no longer in the study at Time 2.

Opportunity shows a significant change between Time 1 and Time 2 for the experimental group. These juveniles spend significantly less time at Time 2 hanging out with friends and at parties than they did at Time 1. This finding is expected and supportive of the program's goals. One of the primary aims of Nightwatch is to keep juveniles off of the street by enforcing their court ordered curfew. According to these results, this program is somewhat successful in reaching this goal. This result may be at least partially attributed to the program, as the comparison group shows no change between survey administrations on this measure.

Official delinquency shows no significant changes for either group between the two time points. The experimental group shows a slight decrease, and the comparison group shows a slight increase, but neither is significant. It would be expected for juveniles in the experimental group to have fewer subsequent referrals due to the increased supervision. However, as they are under more supervision, they are more likely to incur a probation violation (Petersilia and Turner, 1993; O'Rourke et al., 1998), which scores as a subsequent official referral.

Self-report delinquency shows a significant difference between Time 1 and Time 2 for the experimental group, but not the comparison group. The experimental group reports significantly less recidivism at Time 2, an extremely important result. This finding supports the goal that juveniles assigned to Nightwatch are reoffending at a lower rate, which provides some support for the program. This result is predicted according to

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the program goals, and is expected. Keep in mind that at Time 1, the comparison group had significantly *less* self-report offending than the experimental group. These results show that the comparison group had more self-report experiences at Time 2, showing that the experimental group went from significantly higher levels of delinquency to a lower level of delinquency than the comparison group, seemingly as a result of Nightwatch participation.

Finally, victimization is shown to change significantly for both groups. For the experimental group, victimization is significantly lower at Time 2 than at Time 1. Unfortunately for the comparison group, their victimization experiences are significantly higher between the two time points. Again this result is predicted and expected. One of the Nightwatch goals is to reduce victimization experiences for court clients. This goal predicts that program participants will have fewer victimizations than juveniles who do not participate. It is expected to see reductions in victimization if there are reductions in offending behavior. This study as well as many others (Lauritsen, et al. 1991; Lauritsen et al. 1992) has shown the correlation between victims and offenders. In looking at Table 7.4, it is consistent with prior literature to see significant reductions in both offending and victimization between the two time points.

Comparisons within groups at Time 3 proved to be quite different from comparisons for Time 2. Attrition through case dismissal resulted in the loss of several research participants, and several juveniles who were in the comparison group at Time 2 were in the experimental group at Time 3. This resulted in only three juveniles comprising the Time 3 comparison group, and such a small number is not useful for analysis. Thus, Table 7.5 shows the means and standard deviations for the juveniles in

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the experimental group between Time 2 and Time 3, that is, those who were classified as participants at Time 3. Similar to the previous time points, no significant difference is evident in regards to certainty of punishment or formal severity of punishment for juveniles assigned to Nightwatch. Unlike the previous table, there is no difference between Time 2 and Time 3 in regards to perceptions of informal punishment.

Table 7.5

Within-Group Differences Between Time 2 and Time 3

Experimental (Program Participant) Group

	Time 2			Time 3		
	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Certainty of Punishment	1.42	.81	31	1.39	.84	31
Formal Severity of Punishment	1.06	.79	33	.97	.73	33
Informal Severity of Punishment	.39	.49	33	.45	.51	33
Opportunity	.50	.57	34	.65	.65	34
Self-Report Delinquency	2.74	8.28	31	2.06	3.51	31
Victimization	.77	1.31	31	.74	1.34	31

Note: Time 2 and Time 3 responses were not significantly different at any level.

This merely indicates that juvenile perceptions are stable during this time, and that the changes between Time 1 and Time 2 could have resulted from novel behaviors or attitudes expressed by informal agents toward the juveniles. This stability in perceptions is not consistent with some prior research, that reports perceptions are highly flexible and

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will change with every new situation the individual experiences (Saltzman, et al., 1982; Minor and Harry, 1982). While these studies point out that perceptions change over time, they do not give any clues as to which activities, at what level, or what the timeframe is for perceptual change. It could be assumed that situations that are significantly different or of high importance will change perceptions. It is also feasible that a new activity will change perceptions initially, but this change will moderate as time goes by. It may be that this group of active juvenile offenders has not encountered a situation that is sufficient to change their perceptions of their certainty or severity of punishment. It may also indicate that initial contact with the court changes some relationships and perceptions, but that these changes diminish over time.

Again the question is present as to whether juvenile perceptions of the sole activity of violating curfew are affected between Time 2 and Time 3. Again, there is no significant difference between the two time points, with very little difference in the means (3.00 and 3.08, respectively)

Some of the differences between Tables 7.4 and 7.5 may be explained because of sample differences between the two time points. Some juveniles were not included into the experimental group until after Time 2, so the juveniles at Time 2 are not necessarily the same ones included at Time 3. Table 7.6 shows the results from paired t-tests conducted between Time 1 and Time 3. Again, only the experimental group results are shown, as the number of juveniles participating in the comparison group at Time 3 is statistically insignificant.

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Table 7.6

Within-Group Differences Between Time 1 and Time 3

Experimental (Program Participant) Group

	Time 1			Time 3		
	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	N
Certainty of Punishment	1.50	.73	30	1.37	.85	30
Formal Severity of Punishment	.97	.64	33	.97	.73	33
Informal Severity of Punishment	1.33**	.60	33	.45	.51	33
Opportunity	.88*	.69	34	.65	.65	34
Self Report Delinquency	3.87	7.15	31	2.06	3.51	31
Victimization	.84	1.29	31	.74	1.34	31

Note: Time 1 and Time 3 responses are significantly different at * $p < .05$ ** $p < .001$

Consistent with earlier tests, certainty of punishment and formal severity do not show significant differences between Time 1 and Time 3. There is a significant decline in the severity of informal punishment between the two time points, as seen in prior comparisons. These results show no decline in delinquency or victimization between Time 1 and Time 3 for these juveniles, however.

This raises the question as to exactly how much delinquency and victimization Nightwatch may prevent. The assumption of the program is that it keeps juveniles off the street during the most crime-prone hours of the evening. Juveniles self-reported 149 delinquency and victimization incidents for which they identified the time of day the

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to understand the mechanism by which this is accomplished, in order to design more effective programs and to serve court clients more efficiently.

Subsequent official referrals. The first dependent variable to be examined is subsequent official referrals. Table 7.8 shows the results from a series of logistic regression equations estimated for the analysis of the dichotomous measure of subsequent official referrals. Several demographic variables were not significant in earlier bivariate correlations, and will not be included in the models here. Preliminary analyses revealed none to be significant in the logistic models, thus to improve the parsimony and strength of the models, they were excluded. Race proved to exhibit an extremely skewed distribution, and this lack of variation precludes its use. Over 90% of the entire sample identified themselves as African American, with few whites and no other minorities. Neighborhood showed significant variation, but this variable does not directly address any theoretical construct examined here. Neighborhood may prove a useful category in future research. Age also had sufficient variation, but did not add to any of the models. Examining the model with age either included or excluded revealed no change in model fit or variable significance. Sex and whom the juvenile lives with were included in the final models, as these two variables exhibited sufficient variation, and were significant in the bivariate correlations.

Table 7.8 about here

Model 1 presents the results of entering certainty and severity of punishment from Time 1 (both formal and informal), along with the contingencies of guilt, embarrassment, impulsivity and moral view into a logistic regression with the demographic variables. Data screening led to the elimination of three outliers based on their Mahalanobis

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distance, combined with five missing cases, left 110 cases in the analysis. The overall model proved a poor fit, and was not statistically significant ($-2 \log \text{likelihood} = 143.26$). The model correctly classified 62.7% of cases. Regression coefficients indicate that each of these variables has little influence on predicting future official referrals. Tests of multicollinearity revealed that this is not a problem with this model. All tolerance values were greater than .62 and no VIF value exceeded 1.62, both within acceptable parameters. It would not be surprising for age or sex to be significant, given that prior research has found it is consistently young males who commit large amounts of delinquency. In this case, the dichotomous measure of the dependent variable divided the sample into fairly equal groups. A roughly comparable proportion of juveniles had no subsequent official referrals compared to those that had one or more. Deterrence theory predicts that the certainty and severity of punishment would influence later offending, in that those with higher perceptions of certainty and severity would have fewer subsequent referrals. Prior bivariate results indicated that it was internal controls, such as informal punishment, guilt, or moral view that were more strongly related to subsequent offending. None of these expectations reached statistical significance in this model, however.

The next variable to be entered into the model was opportunity. The measure of opportunity at Time 2 was used, to coincide with program variables that were added in Model 3. Using variables from different time points is necessary for theoretical testing, however it creates the undesirable situation of reducing the number of cases available for analysis. Thus, the number of cases for each analysis varies, but a substantial majority of this variation can be attributed to those juveniles who did not complete a survey at that time point. In Model 2, adding the opportunity measure to all of the other variables failed

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to improve the model fit or predictive power. Data screening lead to the elimination of four cases based on the Mahalanobis distance, which left a sample of 69 for analysis. The chi square value was 7.39 (10 df), and the Nagelkerke R^2 (.13) and Cox and Snell R^2 (.10) indicate that this model explains a limited amount of the variance. Multicollinearity is not a problem with this combination of variables, as the tolerance levels are all above .58, and all VIF values are less than 1.71. Entering the opportunity variable individually produced similar results. When opportunity at Time 2 is entered into a logistic regression with only sex and whom the juvenile lives with, the model still fails to reach significance or be a strong predictor (Nagelkerke R^2 .05, Cox and Snell R^2 .04). It would be expected for how many nights a juvenile spends away from home to predict subsequent official referrals, based both on prior research (Osgood et al., 1996) and prior bivariate analysis of this data. This model does not support this expectation, however.

The demographic and theoretical variables failed to be strong predictors of subsequent official referrals. The next model adds the Nightwatch program variables to assess whether program variables are better predictors of subsequent recidivism. Model 3 includes individual level program variables such as risk score and program category, as well as number of visits received, and sanctions and rewards received. Program category indicates whether the juvenile was included in the experimental (0) or comparison (1) group for Time 2. Number of visits between Time 1 and Time 2 measures the number of visits the juvenile received, and represents the “certainty” deterrence variable. Number of sanctions represents not only the “severity” variable, but “certainty” as well. Juveniles are threatened with a punishment for not being home, and sanctions record that a

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punishment was actually meted out. Number of rewards addresses the rational choice idea of weighing benefits as well as punishment.

These variables were entered into a logistic regression, and the model proved to be significant. Data screening found one outlier, which resulted in a sample of 60. Collinearity statistics revealed that the tolerance for these variables was over .67, with VIF values all under 1.49. Regression results indicate the model was significant (chi square 31.51 and 12 degrees of freedom, $p < .01$). The model correctly classified 83.3% of the cases, with moderate values for the Nagelkerke R^2 (.55) and Cox and Snell R^2 (.41). The coefficients indicate that guilt, opportunity, program category, and risk score all moderately predict subsequent official referrals. Juveniles with higher levels of guilt are more likely to have subsequent referrals. This is not expected and counter-intuitive, but this result is weak, and loses significance when different combinations of variables are used. Guilt fails to reach significance after removing certainty of punishment, formal severity of punishment, and the program variables of number of visits, rewards and sanctions. Juveniles who reported spending more nights in unstructured activities are also more likely to have a subsequent official referral. This is expected and supportive of prior research (Osgood et al., 1996) as well as the earlier bivariate correlations. Having a high risk score and being a program participant also predict subsequent official referrals. It is expected for juveniles with a high risk score to have higher subsequent offending, based on the earlier bivariate correlations. Whether or not juveniles in the experimental category are offending less than those in the comparison group is precisely the question this study was designed to answer. Juveniles in the comparison category are almost

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twelve times more likely than the experimental group to record subsequent official referrals. This supports the Nightwatch goal of reducing subsequent recidivism.

Some important theoretical variables did not reach significance, however. The program operates on the deterrence theory assumption that home visits and the threat of sanctioning will keep juveniles from reoffending. Certainty and formal severity of punishment do not reach significance, indicating that these variables are not helpful in predicting subsequent official referrals for this sample.

All of the models in Table 7.8 contain a large number of variables relative to the sample size included in the calculations. Regression analysis is recommended to include one variable per every fifteen cases (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002), and Model 3 exceeds this recommendation. In an attempt to make the model more parsimonious and strengthen the model, multiple additional calculations were conducted, to assess if removing any variables substantially improved the model, or altered any significant relationships. Several internal control variables were removed for the regression in Model 3. More than one variable measured the internal control construct, and several were significantly correlated. Guilt was chosen because it had shown the greatest significance during bivariate analysis. Alternate regressions revealed that no other internal control variable appreciably affected the model fit or significance. Other variables were removed based on their relative significance to the model, as well as their theoretical significance. Removing sanctions, rewards, number of visits, certainty, or severity had little effect on the model. In fact, if risk score, program category, and opportunity were examined as a separate model, the fit and significance were still comparable to the full model (-2 Log Likelihood 60.24, Nagelkerke R^2 .45, Cox and Snell

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R^2 .34), and standard error scores were much improved. Thus, it is risk score, program category, and opportunity that appear to be most influencing Model 3.

The variables that have been shown to have the most effect on subsequent official referrals are program category, risk score, and opportunity. It has been shown that program participants are significantly less likely to have a subsequent official referral than juveniles who do not participate. This is one of the main goals of the program, and this result indicates the program is succeeding in this objective. A juvenile with a high risk score is also more likely to have a subsequent referral, but not at nearly as high a probability. Finally, opportunity appears to be the aspect of the program that is influencing juvenile behavior. None of the perceptual deterrence variables that address formal punishment as measured on the survey achieved significance, but evidence of program juveniles offending less does exist. Thus, something other than fear of formal punishment is affecting juvenile behavior. Juveniles who are out of the home more are over eight times more likely to have a subsequent referral, which is not only intuitive but supports routine activities theory.

Self-report delinquency. Another dependent variable that addresses subsequent recidivism comes from self-report measures. Table 7.9 presents the results of several logistic regression equations estimating the likelihood of subsequent self-report offending. As with earlier models involving subsequent official referrals, certain demographic variables were excluded after analyses revealed no contribution to the model. Age and neighborhood made no difference in the model if included or excluded. Thus, Model 1 includes the demographic variables of sex and whom the juvenile lives with, along with all perceptual deterrence variables entered into a logistic regression.

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Data screening identified three outliers based on their Mahalanobis distance, which resulted in a sample of 67. The overall model was not significant (chi square 15.08, 9 df), but did account for a modest amount of the variance (Nagelkerke $R^2 = .27$ and Cox and Snell $R^2 = .20$), and correctly classified 70.1% of cases. Multicollinearity was not an issue for this group of variables, as all tolerance values exceeded .58, and all VIF values were less than 1.70. Regression results indicate that only one variable was a significant predictor of self-report delinquency. Males were over seven times more likely to report a delinquent activity than females, which is expected not only from prior research (for example Osgood et al., 1996), but from the prior bivariate correlations as well. These

Table 7.9 about here

results are similar to the earlier findings regarding official recidivism, in terms of model significance. Neither model including demographic and perceptual deterrence variables proved significant, but for self-report delinquency being male proved a significant predictor, and explained a non-trivial amount of the variance.

Model 2 follows the previous procedure of adding opportunity to the variables from Model 1. Again the Time 2 measure of opportunity is used to correspond with the use of program variables in Model 3. Similar to results for subsequent official referrals, the model for subsequent self-report offending also fails to reach significance. Data screening once more led to the elimination of four outliers based on their Mahalanobis distance, which left 66 in the analysis. Including opportunity in the model failed to produce a significant model (chi square 16.89, 10 df), but did correctly classify 75.8% of cases and had modest Nagelkerke $R^2 (.31)$ and Cox and Snell $R^2 (.23)$ values. Collinearity statistics reveal that again multicollinearity is not a problem, with all

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tolerance values above .55 and all VIF values under 1.80, within acceptable limits.

Regression coefficients reveal yet again that sex is a predictor of self-report delinquency, although the effect is weaker in this model. A key concern with this model is the number of variables included, as the ratio of variables to subjects exceeds recommended levels (Mertler and Vannatta, 2002).

To address this concern, opportunity was entered into a logistic regression with only the demographic variables, as it was in the models involving subsequent official recidivism. Unlike the previous attempt, for self-reported delinquency, the smaller model proved significant. The model itself was significant (chi square 9.86, 3 df, $p < .05$), and correctly classified over half of the cases (63.4%), but lacked power. The Nagelkerke R^2 (.17) and Cox and Snell R^2 (.13) indicate that a relatively small amount of the variance is explained by this model, in fact less than when the larger model was used. In addition, the model fit was modest, with a -2 Log Likelihood of 86.86. Unlike the larger model presented in Table 7.9, this small opportunity model revealed that opportunity ($p < .05$) and sex ($p < .10$) were both significant predictors of self-report delinquency. The log odds indicate that males and individuals who spend larger amounts of time outside the home are more than twice as likely to report participating in delinquent activity. This result is expected and intuitive, consistent with the prior bivariate correlations as well as prior research (Osgood et al., 1996). However, as evidenced by Model 2, opportunity does not retain this significance when included in the larger model.

Finally, program variables are added to the equation in Model 3. Significant similarities and differences emerge between variables that predict official delinquency and those that predict self-report incidents. A number of regressions were conducted in

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search of a significant model with the best fit for these variables. The search began with all demographic, perceptual deterrence, opportunity, and program variables. Not surprisingly, this model was too large to obtain significance, but opportunity ($p < .10$) and risk score ($p < .05$) did predict later self-report delinquency. This result is expected, given the previous bivariate correlations and official delinquency regression. Variables were removed based on theoretical relevance and significance levels. As with official referrals, internal control variables were reduced to guilt. No other variables significantly improved the model if included; in fact, including moral view in the equation caused the significance of guilt to disappear.

Eliminating some of the internal control variables was useful, but the remaining model was still not significant. This is contrary to what occurred with the official regression, which retained all of the program variables. Eliminating number of visits, rewards, and sanctions resulted in a significant model, shown in Table 7.9 (Model 3). Data screening had identified three outliers based on their Mahalanobis distance, which resulted in 55 cases for analysis. The additional missing cases here can be attributed to juveniles who did not have a risk score listed on their juvenile summary. The model is weak, but significant (chi square 15.12, 9 df, $p < .10$), and correctly classified 70.9% of the cases. Multicollinearity was not a problem, as all tolerance values were above .72 and all VIF values were less than 1.38, well within acceptable parameters. Regression coefficients reveal that opportunity, guilt, and risk score all successfully predict later self-report delinquency. Juveniles who spend more time out of the home are over five times more likely to report involvement in delinquency. As shown previously, this result is expected when compared with prior research as well as the bivariate correlations. The log

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odds are not quite as strong for guilt (2.52) and risk score (1.39). The coefficients indicate that juveniles with higher levels of guilt are more likely to engage in delinquency, which is counter-intuitive and not consistent with previous literature (Grasmick et al., 1993). The results regarding risk score are intuitive and consistent with the earlier bivariate correlations, which indicate a high risk score predicts subsequent self-report delinquency. Unlike the regressions pertaining to official delinquency, program category is not significant in this model ($p < .98$). In fact, removing program category does not notably affect the significance or predictive power of the model.

Victimization. The final dependent variable to be examined is victimization. Table 7.10 shows the results of a series of logistic regression models estimating the likelihood of victimization. All demographic variables were considered in the building of Model 1. Age and sex were considered, as both had sufficient variability and theoretical substance that they may be indicative of victimization experiences. Older juveniles are assumed to have more opportunities outside the home, and males are assumed to be victimized more frequently than females, considering the close link between victimization and offending. Who the juvenile lives with is also considered an opportunity variable, as more parent supervision may indicate less time available on the street for victimization experiences. Neighborhood was considered for the model, as the juvenile's neighborhood is associated with lifestyle/routine activities theory. Juveniles who live in more crime-prone neighborhoods may be more likely to be victimized, and this may appear as a predictor. Again, race was excluded from analyses due to the invariability of the sample.

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Several logistic regressions were completed to determine which of these demographic variables created the model with the greatest explanatory power and prediction strength. The variables chosen were sex and who the juvenile lives with, and were entered into a logistic regression. Further consideration included self-report delinquency in Model 1, as it showed a significant relationship to victimization in the bivariate correlations. Adding self-report delinquency to sex and whom the juvenile lives with increased the predictive power and strength of the model considerably. The model proved to be significant (chi square 19.70, 3 df, $p < .001$), and correctly classified 67.6% of the cases. Nagelkerke R^2 (.33) and Cox and Snell R^2 (.24) were both moderate, and the strongest of all models considered. Data screening identified two outliers based on their Mahalanobis distance, along with 45 cases that lacked Time 2 data, resulting in a sample of 71. Multicollinearity was not a problem for any of the demographic variables, as tolerance values were all above .92, and all VIF values were below 1.09, well within acceptable parameters. Regression results indicate that sex strongly predicts victimization at Time 2, in that males are over 10 times more likely than females to be victimized. This is consistent with the earlier assumption, and an expected outcome. Self-report delinquency is also expected to be a significant predictor of victimization, based on prior research (Lauritsen et al., 1991) as well as earlier bivariate correlations. Self-report delinquency does prove to be a predictor of victimization, but not as strong as sex. Juveniles who self-report high levels of delinquent activity are more than three times as likely to be victimized as juveniles who report no victimization.

The deterrence theory variables are not included in these models, as they do not bear on the issue of victimization. Opportunity and program variables may very well

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impact victimization, and were thus included in subsequent models. Model 2 in Table 7.9 shows the results of adding the opportunity variable to Model 1. Data screening

Table 7.10 about here

indicated the presence of two outliers based on their Mahalanobis distance, which resulted in a sample of 71. Collinearity statistics reveal that multicollinearity is not a problem for these variables (all tolerance values above .80, and all VIF values below 1.25). Regression results indicate the model is significant, but that opportunity does not contribute to the model. The model correctly classified 69.0% of the cases, with a chi square of 19.72 (4 df), $p < .001$, and identical Nagelkerke R^2 and Cox and Snell R^2 values as Model 1. Sex and self-report offending remain significant in Model 2 with similar values for the coefficients, standard errors, and significance, as expected. Opportunity is hypothesized to affect victimization, in that juveniles who are at home cannot become suitable targets for crime. This variable fails to achieve significance, however, and fails to contribute to the overall model.

Program variables were then added to create Model 3. As with prior models, multiple attempts were made to discover the model that was the most parsimonious, with the strongest predictive power. The model chosen mimics the final model in the earlier logistic regression involving subsequent official referrals. As with the earlier model, the variables of rewards, sanctions, and number of visits could be removed, which actually improved the model fit and strength for the victimization model. For the earlier model, the variables of risk score and program category were the best predictors of subsequent official referrals, and as offending is correlated with victimization, these were logical choices for inclusion in the victimization model.

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All of the variables from Model 2 along with risk score and program category were entered into a logistic regression, and the model proved to be significant. Data screening indicated two outliers based on their Mahalanobis distance, which resulted in a sample of 57 for analysis. Multicollinearity is not a problem for this combination of variables, as the tolerance values for all variables exceed .63, and VIF values are all under 1.58. Regression results indicate the model is significant, with a chi square of 17.01 (6 df), and $p < .01$. The model correctly classified 73.7% of the cases, with modest Nagelkerke R^2 (.35) and Cox and Snell R^2 (.26) values. The coefficients indicate that in the final model, sex is the only variable that predicts victimization. Unlike prior offending models, opportunity, risk score, and program category are not successful predictors of victimization, which is unexpected given the high correlation between offending and victimization. In addition, these variables explain some of the self-report delinquency effect, as it is reduced to non-significance in the final model. This may indicate that a majority of victimization experiences occur during the day and are not affected by program participation. As noted earlier, a majority of the victimization and self-report offending incidents (for which a time of day was identified) occurred at a time of day that would not be affected by Nightwatch participation. Thus, these models have shown that the most consistent, strongest predictor of victimization for this sample is being male.

Offending likelihood. The final multivariate models will complete the second stage of attempting to replicate Pogarsky's (2002) offending likelihood study. The models presented here were initially reproduced exactly as in the original study. If results were not consistent with the original study or not significant, other models were

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considered. The original study used a regression with a Tobit correction for the full and deterrable samples, as many respondents indicated an offending likelihood of zero. For incorrigibles, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used in the original study. Answers for this study ranged from one to four, so the Tobit was not necessary. Table 7.11 presents regressions estimating the deterrent effects of certainty and severity. The first step is to regress the offending likelihood (OL) against the perceptual deterrence variables using the entire sample (Model 1). To refresh, the OL is the question that asks how likely the juvenile will break the law, with the prospect of some kind of punishment present. The model does obtain significance, indicating these variables represent a linear relationship. For the most part, the multiple correlation values are fairly low, however, indicating these variables do not predict offending likelihood as well as those in the original study. Multicollinearity is not an issue with this model, as tolerance values are all over .76 and VIF values are all under 1.31. Unlike Pogarsky's results, neither certainty nor severity of punishment is significant in this model. This result is not surprising for this sample, however, given the results of previous logistic regressions and paired t-tests. In fact, several variables in the original study proved to be significant predictors of offending likelihood, but that is not the case with the current sample. Guilt is the only variable that obtains significance, and this finding is consistent with Pogarsky's results. The coefficient is negative, indicating that juveniles with high guilt scores are reporting a low offending likelihood.

Table 7.11 about here

Model 2 analyzes only those individuals classified as deterrable. This separates out the acute conformists, who theoretically have a higher perception of certainty of

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punishment. Recall from the earlier comparisons by profile that deterrable offenders had the highest certainty, while acute conformists had the highest levels of guilt. This model fails to achieve significance. Again the multiple correlation values are relatively low, indicating these variables are not good predictors of offending likelihood.

Multicollinearity was again not a problem, as all tolerance values exceed .75, and all VIF values are less than 1.32. Again, in the original study several variables proved to be significant, but that is not the case here. No variables prove to be significant for the deterrable group. This is not surprising, given the earlier discovery that the acute conformist group exhibited the highest levels of guilt, and removing them from the analysis removed the significance of this variable from the model. The deterrable group exhibited the highest levels of certainty, but for Model 2 this variable did not significantly predict offending likelihood. Overall, the regression results do not support the original study, but the samples were comprised of significantly different individuals, and were significantly different in size.¹

CONCLUSIONS

Analysis of data from this sample has revealed several important results, both expected and unexpected. In many ways this sample is comparable to other research

¹ These analyses are based on Pogarsky's (2002) original study, but an alternate method may be more appropriate for these data. As the dependent variable is ordinal, an ordered regression model may be more suitable. The use of linear regression assumes the distance between categories is equal, and if this assumption is not correct for the data, the results may be unreliable (Long, 1997). Attempts at constructing an ordinal regression model revealed over 70% of the cells contained zero frequencies, however. This indicates that the current sample is too small to obtain statistical significance using this technique. Pogarsky's (2002) original sample was much larger, and an ordinal regression may prove valuable when applied to that data set.

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groups, and has produced several expected correlations. Relationships between prior and subsequent offending, victimization and offending, opportunity and offending, and the importance of informal controls have been firmly established in prior research, and have received support here. Several other relationships demonstrated in prior research have not been reproduced, however. Elements of deterrence such as certainty and severity of formal punishment did not produce results consistent with earlier studies. It would be assumed that juveniles participating in a court-ordered program who are receiving sanctions for curfew violations would have an increased perception of certainty of punishment, however this was not shown to be the case. In addition, prior studies have shown that perceptions are unstable and change over time, a result that was not replicated here. Perceptions are inherently difficult to measure, however, and some differences in results may be attributed to sample composition or methods.

Limitations of the sample and the method of analysis may have contributed to some of the anomalous results, in particular those dealing with the perception of the certainty of punishment. Many variables were significant in bivariate correlations or smaller models, but were not robust and failed to retain significance when combined with other variables. The bivariate results were often significant and supportive of theoretical suppositions, but multivariate analyses were inconsistent and there were not stable effects across the models (see Table 7.9). A major cause of this is the size of the sample. All multivariate models contained a large number of predictors, given the sample size, and this lack of statistical power may have masked certain effects or simply not provided enough cases to reach significance. Perhaps the greatest anomaly is for the deterrence variables, none of which were statistically significant. Another characteristic of the

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sample that may have contributed to the unexpected findings is that the sample consists of active juvenile offenders, with an average age of about 14. Many prior studies have surveyed using college students or other school-based samples with a higher average age (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; Pogarsky, 2002). Differences may exist in the cognitive development of these samples, and may have influenced individual responses, with a subsequent impact on the predictive ability of the variables. In addition, the life experiences of the current sample are somewhat different than those of previous studies. Juveniles who have broken the law and spent time in detention have different experiences on which to form their perceptions than college students. The overrepresentation of offenders in the current sample may have accounted for some of the unexpected results, as prior samples contained a smaller percentage of offenders.

The method of analysis may have contributed to the unanticipated results, as well. It can be argued that using a dichotomous measure for the dependent variable is problematic and that significant information is lost (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). As all dependent measures in this study are dichotomous, this is a potential explanation for the unusual results. For example, juveniles in this study recorded subsequent official referrals that ranged from shoplifting (for which no action was taken) to murder first degree. Using a dichotomous measure, these two incidents are not differentiated from each other on the basis of severity, which could possibly impact the results. The same point could be made regarding the division of the scales and indices into ordinal categories. By dividing the distribution, relationships between variables may be masked or fail to reach significance. There is no indication that the strength of associations is affected by dividing the distribution into ordinal categories, however. Reducing normally

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distributed, linearly related, continuous variables may reduce the correlation strength (Farrington and Loeber, 2000); however, the current data are not normally or linearly distributed. In addition, dividing variables into smaller categories does not necessarily reduce the amount of information that is included, and the results may be easier to interpret and convey (Farrington and Loeber, 2000). Again, these concerns can be addressed by a larger sample size, in that a larger sample would allow for more differentiation in both independent and dependent variables, and may provide better predictive power. For this study, the skewed distribution of the data, combined with the small number of cases per category, validates the use of dichotomous and ordinal measures, even though variation and the amount of information is reduced (Farrington and Loeber, 2000).

Table 7.1

Bivariate Correlations Between Major Theoretical Variables at Time 1

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
A	1.0															
B	-.06	1.0														
C	-.03	-.05	1.0													
D	-.03	.03	-.05	1.0												
E	.01	-.07	.10	.11	1.0											
F	-.27**	-.10	.25**	.06	.31**	1.0										
G	-.23*	-.08	.33**	-.02	.25**	.54**	1.0									
H	-.12	.18	.02	-.24*	.12	.19*	.26**	1.0								
I	-.13	-.25*	-.07	-.02	-.01	-.09	-.09	-.20*	1.0							
J	.04	-.06	-.12	-.10	-.00	-.16	-.12	-.04	.13	1.0						
K	-.05	.11	.08	-.06	.09	.03	.14	.08	-.02	-.08	1.0					
L	-.07	.14	.09	.02	-.09	.03	.02	-.11	.03	-.04	.42**	1.0				
M	.23*	-.02	-.12	-.01	.13	-.08	-.21*	-.10	-.08	.29**	.23*	-.08	1.0			
N	-.06	.02	-.01	-.13	.02	-.10	-.00	-.05	.14	.19*	.12	.00	.18	1.0		
O	-.17	.27*	-.15	-.09	-.04	-.18	-.01	-.00	.18	.19	.25*	.02	.04	.42**	1.0	
P	.01	-.36**	-.11	-.18	.10	-.03	-.12	-.00	-.02	.02	.08	.05	-.02	.19	.40**	1.0

Item identifications are: A = Age; B = Sex; C = Certainty Scale Time 1; D = Formal Severity Scale Time 1; E = Informal Severity Scale Time 1; F = Embarrassment; G = Guilt; H = Moral View Scale; I = Impulsivity Scale; J = Opportunity Scale Time 1; K = Street Days between T1 and T2; L = Number NW visits between T1 and T2 ; M = Prior Referrals (official); N = Subsequent Referrals (official); O = Recent Self Report Delinquency Time 2; P = Victimization Total Time 2

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

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Table 7.2

Bivariate Correlations Between Major Theoretical Variables, All Time Points

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
A	1.0											
B	.51**	1.0										
C	.58**	.56**	1.0									
D	-.05	-.18	-.43*	1.0								
E	.10	-.03	-.20	.37**	1.0							
F	-.03	.07	.07	.20	.41*	1.0						
G	.10	.16	.19	.11	.05	-.12	1.0					
H	.12	.19	.12	.04	.03	.20	.39**	1.0				
I	.13	.32	.12	.04	-.07	-.04	.45**	.38*	1.0			
J	-.13	-.11	.11	-.10	-.01	.12	-.01	.07	-.19	1.0		
K	.08	-.10	-.02	-.14	-.14	-.04	-.01	.04	.00	.24*	1.0	
L	.22	.16	.08	-.31	.02	.04	.08	.16	-.14	.42**	.61**	1.0

Item identifications are: A = Certainty Time 1; B = Certainty Time 2; C = Certainty Time 3; D = Formal Severity Time 1; E = Formal Severity Time 2; F = Formal Severity Time 3; G = Informal Severity Time 1; H = Informal Severity Time 2; I = Informal Severity Time 3; J = Opportunity Time 1; K = Opportunity Time 2; L = Opportunity Time 3

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

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Table 7.3

Bivariate Correlations Between Major Nightwatch Program Variables

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
A	1.0									
B	.42**	1.0								
C	.19	.40**	1.0							
D	-.01	-.15	-.11	1.0						
E	-.03	-.30**	-.14	.51**	1.0					
F	.17	.38**	.19	.08	-.10	1.0				
G	.33**	.35**	.12	-.13	-.08	.18	1.0			
H	.00	.02	.05	.09	.15	-.17	-.13	1.0		
I	.12	-.03	-.12	-.17	-.13	-.16	.19	.10	1.0	
J	-.25*	-.09	-.09	.11	.24	.05	-.30**	.25*	-.14	1.0

Item identifications are: A = Subsequent Referrals (official); B = Self Report Total Time 2; C = Victimization Time 2; D = Certainty Time 1; E = Certainty Time 2; F = Opportunity Time 2; G = Risk Score; H = Number Visits Between Time 1 and Time 2; I = Total Sanctions Ordered; J = Total Rewards Earned

* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed)

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Table 7.8 Logistic Regression Models: Impact of Theoretical and Program Variables on Subsequent Official Referrals

	Model 1 (N = 110)		Model 2 (N = 69)		Model 3 (N = 60)	
	Coeff.(SE)	Exp(B)	Coeff.(SE)	Exp (B)	Coeff.(SE)	Exp (B)
<u>Demographics</u>						
Sex	.59 (.56)	1.81	.82 (.77)	2.27	.59 (1.02)	1.80
Live with	-.27 (.17)	.76	-.04 (.21)	.96	-.43 (.34)	.65
<u>Perceptual Deterrence</u>						
Certainty of Punishment	-.16 (.32)	.98	-.02 (.38)	.98	-.49 (.60)	.61
Formal Severity	-.34 (.29)	.71	-.18 (.41)	.84	.57 (.76)	1.77
Informal Severity	.27 (.34)	1.31	.66 (.45)	1.93	.22 (.60)	1.24
Guilt	.09 (.24)	1.09	.15 (.33)	1.16	.92 *(.55)	2.50
Embarrassment	-.14 (.28)	.87	-.40 (.33)	.67		
Impulsivity	.58 (.36)	1.79	.36 (.47)	1.44		
Moral view	-.70 (.92)	.49	.52 (1.26)	1.68		
<u>Routine Activities</u>						
Opportunity			.37 (.47)	1.46	2.15 **(.94)	8.57
<u>Program Variables</u>						
Risk Score					.55** (.19)	1.74
Program Category					2.45**(1.26)	11.59
Number Visits					.15 (.45)	1.16
Sanctions					-.09 (.48)	.91
Rewards					-.22 (.39)	.80
Constant	.48 (2.07)	1.62	-2.17 (2.62)	.11	-2.61** (2.30)	.00
-2 Log Likelihood	143.26		88.13		51.60	
Nagelkerke R ²	.09		.13		.55	
Cox & Snell R ²	.07		.10		.41	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$

Table 7.9 Logistic Regression Models: Impact of Theoretical and Program Variables on Subsequent Self Report Delinquency

	Model 1 N = 67		Model 2 N = 66		Model 3 N = 55	
	Coeff (S.E.)	Exp (B)	Coeff (S.E.)	Exp (B)	Coeff (S.E.)	Exp (B)
<u>Demographics</u>						
Sex	2.05** (.88)	7.82	1.71** (.86)	5.54	.42 (.84)	1.52
Live with	-.01 (.24)	.99	.05 (.24)	1.05	-.14 (.29)	.87
<u>Perceptual Deterrence</u>						
Certainty of Punishment	-.58 (.45)	.55	-.67 (.46)	.51	-.86 (.54)	.43
Formal Severity	.25 (.43)	1.28	.26 (.46)	1.30	.66 (.58)	1.94
Informal Severity	-.03 (.51)	.97	-.11 (.53)	.89	-.66 (.57)	.52
Guilt	.39 (.36)	1.49	.41 (.38)	1.51	.92** (.43)	2.52
Embarrassment	-.44 (.36)	.64	-.37 (.38)	.68		
Impulsivity	.92 (.52)	2.51	.81 (.53)	2.24		
Moral View	1.26 (1.37)	3.54	1.12 (1.41)	3.07		
<u>Routine Activities</u>						
Opportunity			.76 (.59)	2.14	1.68** (.80)	5.37
<u>Program Variables</u>						
Risk score					.33** (.14)	1.39
Program Category					-.02 (.88)	.98
Number visits						
Sanctions						
Rewards						
Constant	-4.57 (2.99)	.01	-4.355 (3.00)	.01	-2.87* (1.78)	.06
-2 Log Likelihood	75.26		72.40		60.23	
Nagelkerke R ²	.27		.31		.32	
Cox & Snell R ²	.20		.23		.24	

* p < .10

**p < .05

Table 7.10 Logistic Regression Models: Impact of Theoretical and Program Variables on Victimization

	Model 1 (N = 71)		Model 2 (N = 71)		Model 3 (N = 57)	
	Coeff(SE)	Exp(B)	Coeff(SE)	Exp (B)	Coeff(SE)	Exp (B)
<u>Demographics</u>						
Sex	2.32*(1.10)	10.19	2.31* (1.09)	10.10	2.41* (1.13)	11.10
Live with	-.24 (.24)	.79	-.23 (.24)	.79	-.49 (.32)	.61
<u>Self Report Delinquency</u>	1.27** (.46)	3.54	1.24* (.50)	3.47	.63 (.57)	1.89
<u>Routine Activities</u>						
Opportunity			.06 (.47)	1.06	.65 (.61)	1.91
<u>Program Variables</u>						
Risk Score					.07 (.11)	1.07
Program Category					.08 (.82)	1.08
Constant	-2.65* (1.18)	.07	-2.67* (1.20)	.07	-2.24 (1.42)	.11
-2 Log Likelihood	77.02		76.99		60.59	
Nagelkerke R ²	.33		.33		.35	
Cox & Snell R ²	.24		.24		.26	

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

Table 7.11

OLS Regressions for Full and Reduced Sample:

Dependent Variable Is Offending Likelihood

("How likely is it that you would break the law?" 1 = very unlikely; 2 = somewhat unlikely; 3 = somewhat likely; 4 = very likely)

	Model 1 Full Sample N = 113			Model 2 Deterrable Only N = 58		
	B	S. E.	β	B	S.E.	β
Certainty of Punishment	4.31E-02	.12	.04	1.83E-02	.18	.09
Formal Severity of Punishment	3.63E-02	.11	.03	7.69E-02	.14	.58
Age	-.11	.07	-.16	-.12	.10	.23
Sex	.12	.21	.05	.32	.30	.30
Self Report Offending	6.82E-02	.04	.16	7.07E-02	.05	.19
Guilt	-.23**	.09	-.29	-.18	.11	.10
Impulsivity	9.36E-02	.14	.06	6.27E-02	.19	.75
Constant	3.13**	1.27		2.88	1.98	
R	.37			.44		
R ²	.14			.19		
Adjusted R ²	.07			.06		

Note: The constant is included in all models; * p < .10 ** p < .05

B represents the unstandardized regression coefficient

S.E. represents the standard error

β represents the standardized regression coefficient

The Model with incorrigibles only could not be calculated due to the small sample size (N = 6)

Chapter Eight

CONCLUSIONS

Does Nightwatch reduce recidivism? This is the major research question, and the purpose of this study. Through an examination of court records and self-reports, it was discovered that the answer is, tentatively, “yes.” As with many things, however, the results uncovered during this study go far beyond this simple answer. This chapter will answer the research questions presented in Chapter One, identify the lessons that Nightwatch has taught, and present several avenues for future policy and research projects.

RECIDIVISM

Juveniles assigned to Nightwatch were significantly less likely to have a subsequent official referral, and had significantly fewer self-report delinquent incidents between Time 1 and Time 2. This finding supports the program’s goals, and suggests that those goals are being met. These observations are far from definitive proof that a program such as Nightwatch will be effective for all juveniles in all situations, however. Many results from the current study are inconsistent with past research, and many issues remain unresolved.

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Several aspects about the program, and the results obtained here, are in fact consistent with prior research and expectations. Past experience has shown that deterrence-based programs are not highly effective at reducing delinquency, and in many cases actually increase it (Sherman et al., 1997, Petrosino et al., 2003). Neither Nightwatch nor Scared Straight changed the perceptions of certainty of punishment for participants (Lundman, 2001). Thus, the nature of the program does not predict its success. The fact that formal agents check on juveniles in their homes and provide sanctions for curfew violations does not apparently have any effect on the perceptions of certainty of punishment for these individuals. So how does Nightwatch achieve this reduction in recidivism?

Routine activities and perceptual deterrence theories were used in an attempt to identify the mechanism for reducing delinquency. For both subsequent official referrals and self-reported delinquency, a key predictor was opportunity. Juveniles who reported a lower frequency of joyriding, going to parties, and hanging out with their friends were much less likely to recidivate. This finding is consistent with prior research, in that unstructured socializing has been identified as a significant predictor of delinquency (Osgood, et al., 1986; Osgood and Anderson, 2004). This correlation indicates that how a juvenile spends his or her time will have a significant impact on delinquent experiences. For juveniles, the two main groups that occupy free time are peers and family. A key component to unstructured free time and delinquency is peer relationships. A juvenile that has many delinquent peers will tend to be delinquent themselves (Warr and Stafford, 1991; Warr, 1993). This is a significant variable in juvenile studies, but no data for this measure was collected for the current study. Given that other correlations such as

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offending and victimization are correlated for the current sample, it is reasonable to assume that the peer and delinquency correlation would be valid for this sample as well.

Another key component for juveniles is family, particularly parent attachment and parent supervision. The current study has no measures for parent attachment or time spent with parents, but information was collected regarding how much parental supervision was present. This variable did not prove significant in the analyses presented here, but future examination of the data may lead to additional conclusions regarding parent supervision of active offenders and delinquency. There is reason to believe that parent involvement may have affected the amount of opportunity present for at least some individuals in the study. Juveniles who have gotten into trouble with the court may also have gotten into trouble with their parents. A common “punishment” mentioned by juveniles is that, per their parents, they are not allowed to “be outside” of their home. This would indicate that parents have placed more strict guidelines on their recently delinquent child, restricting their movement and their ability to hang out with their friends or be in other unsupervised situations. Parents may be upset at the thought of having a child under court supervision, and more strict rules may result. There is evidence that juveniles with increased parent monitoring experience less unstructured socializing time, and thus less delinquent involvement (Osgood and Anderson, 2004). This might not be the case with every juvenile in the study, but it is a feasible cause of a reduction in opportunity. The lack of change in opportunity for the comparison group can be explained using the same argument. For a juvenile whose case is dismissed, a parent may feel the misbehavior has been resolved, and the need for more strict rules is

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not necessary. Thus, the juvenile will continue with regular behavior patterns, going to parties and hanging out with friends.

Nightwatch participants reported significant changes in behavior, with fewer nights out of the home than did non-participants between Time 1 and Time 2. The main reason for staying home was most likely not a fear of getting caught and punished by the court, as there was no increase in perceptions of certainty or severity of punishment. Some other entity must have influenced the choice to stay home. While there was actually a decrease in perceptions of informal severity of punishment during the study period (how big of a problem would it be with parents, teachers, friends if you were caught and punished), juveniles consistently responded that getting into trouble with the law caused a “very big problem” with their parents. This supports the idea that curfew ordinances can provide extra support for parents in enforcing rules (Ruefle and Reynolds, 1995; Bilchik, 1996). A juvenile assigned to the program who wanted to go out for the evening may have been reminded by a parent about the probability of Nightwatch coming for a visit. This informal support for their curfew may have influenced the juvenile to stay home. This parental influence was also present with non-participants, and their perceptions of informal severity were similar, however that group did not experience the drop in recidivism similar to the experimental group.

Perceptual deterrence theory did not fare nearly as well, and tests of this theory resulted in several unexpected results. At no time did the perceived certainty of punishment predict later delinquency; as a matter of fact, juvenile perceptions of certainty of punishment did not appreciably change at all during the course of the study. Juveniles did not experience a change in perceptions or thinking as a result of program

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participation, which indicates that, as predicted, the deterrence aspect of the program is ineffective.

The threat of a sanction for a curfew violation did not affect juvenile perceptions of getting caught for curfew, or for law violations in general. The fact that certainty of punishment was not at all predictive of offending behavior is not consistent with earlier studies, and requires further examination. Prior research suggests that deterrence may be offense-specific (Horney and Marshall, 1992), but no evidence for this exists with this sample. One reason for this may be the nature of the crime and punishment. Prior research focused on adult prison inmates, suggesting that those participants were involved in more serious crime. The current study involves juveniles mostly in trouble for stealing cars, and the offense-specific crime here is curfew violation, both significantly less serious in nature. In addition, there is the unmeasured quantity of “street knowledge” that exists about the program. There is evidence that individuals learn their true chances of getting caught and punished from peers and others who have offended (Pogarsky, Kim, and Paternoster, 2005). Since approximately 70% of this sample already knew another individual assigned to Nightwatch, they most likely had some established perceptions regarding the certainty of punishment for a curfew violation. Since there was already a working knowledge of the program for many participants, actual participation probably did not change their perceptions significantly. Therefore, the conclusion that must be drawn is that this study supports that of Piliavin and colleagues (1986), who found no evidence of a deterrent effect.

This study is also inconsistent with prior research in that it found no evidence that rewards affect perceptions or behavior in the deterrence models. Several other studies

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have found the existence of a reward component (Decker et al., 1993; Piliavin et al., 1986), but the prospect of receiving fast-food gift certificates did not affect the subsequent offending of the juveniles in the current study. The concept of reward was quite different in the prior studies, however, and not entirely comparable. The reward for Nightwatch is based on reward for refraining from a deviant behavior, while previous research focused on the reward component as a gain from an illegal activity, such as burglary.

Even though perceptions of certainty of punishment were not apparently affected, juveniles did experience changes in behavior. Parent involvement may explain this behavior shift, but other explanations are feasible as well. Another plausible explanation for how Nightwatch changes behavior is the tipping model. The idea of minor but certain sanctions can definitely be seen in program activities. Juveniles have no real fear of serious reprisal, but may stay home to avoid the nuisance of a sanction. Overall, juveniles reported that the formal sanctions given by the court were no problem, up to and including a stay in detention. However, even though watching a video or completing a writing assignment is “no problem,” it cuts into the juvenile’s schedule and is inconvenient. There is evidence that the program communicates the threat, and that punishment, although not necessarily severe, is a big enough problem that juveniles will seek to avoid it. While there was no real change in the perception or the problem that getting caught would create, juveniles changed their behavior to avoid the risk.

Unfortunately, these behavior effects are most likely short-lived. The weakness of deterrence is that without the threat, behavior will go back to pre-intervention standards. Several examples of this can be seen when examining the Nightwatch case

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contacts. Often a juvenile would get his curfew changed to a later time, but this information would not get communicated to the crew. When the crew would make the home visit at the original time, the juvenile was not home. A doubleback revealed the juvenile was home by the new time, however. Without the threat of the crew coming, this juvenile may not have been home at all. The same situation can occur when a case is dismissed. If the information does not get relayed quickly enough, the crew may visit a juvenile that is no longer assigned to the program. In a few cases this situation was documented, and the juvenile was not at home by the court-ordered (although no longer in effect) curfew time. This suggests that it may be a combination of court and informal supervision that makes Nightwatch successful. Each without the support of the other appears to have little influence over behavior, as neither formal nor informal agents changed juvenile perceptions of punishment for this study.

Best practices indicate that programs that contain a cognitive-behavioral element are those that achieve the highest success and behavioral change (Sherman, et al., 1997). Nightwatch does not have a cognitive/behavioral element, and perceptions of certainty of punishment were not altered. Changes in behavior were evident, however. These changes were most likely a result of the combination of increased formal and informal restraints. Pressure from court agents and parents convinced juveniles assigned to Nightwatch to remain at home, even though the perception of their chances of getting caught offending were unchanged. Warr and Stafford (1991) found similar results when examining the effect of peer attitudes and peer behavior on offending behavior. The behavior of peers was considerably more significant than the attitudes of peers in this study. It was shown that delinquency was affected mostly by the behavior of others,

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rather than merely attitudes (Warr and Stafford, 1991). Peers are a strong influence on juveniles, and pressure to behave according to group norms can sometimes cause juveniles to behave in ways contradictory to what they believe or perceive. Juveniles may know that a particular activity is unacceptable, but in the absence of parents and the presence of delinquent friends, they may find themselves committing delinquent acts (Warr, 1993). This indicates that changes in perceptions are not mandatory for changes in behavior, and this is the circumstance that the current study reveals. Juveniles do not believe they will get caught violating curfew or other rules, but alter their behavior to avoid the nuisance of formal or informal punishments.

VICTIMIZATION

Does Nightwatch reduce victimization experiences? This is a second important question that was posed, and again, examination of self-report surveys indicates that the answer is “yes.” Juveniles who participated in Nightwatch had significantly fewer victimization experiences between Time 1 and Time 2. In stark contrast, juveniles in the comparison group had significantly more victimization experiences between Time 1 and Time 2. This finding is consistent with the program’s goals and with prior research that suggests reducing offending will reduce victimization (Lauritsen et al., 1991).

As with recidivism, the next important question is, “how” does Nightwatch reduce victimization? For this outcome, only routine activities theory was used to answer this question. The result is not as clear-cut as expected, in that the direct predictors for both offending and victimization are not the same for this study, unlike previous research (Lauritsen, 2001). The key predictors of victimization proved to be self-report delinquency and being male. This is not surprising, given the repeated close correlations

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between these three variables (Lauritsen et al., 1991; Moffitt et al., 2001). Unlike recidivism, however, opportunity was not a direct predictor of victimization. Spending more time outside of the home was not related to such experiences. One reason for this may be the nature of the victimization; many juveniles identified siblings or other family members as the perpetrators of assaults or thefts. This finding is consistent with what Painter and Farrington (2001) discovered. A situational prevention study involving the use of improved street lighting revealed a decrease in crime in the experimental communities. Juveniles that experienced a reduction in delinquency did not necessarily have decreased victimization, however, and it was hypothesized that this difference was a result of the source of the victimization (Painter and Farrington, 2001). Thus, while victimization and offending are correlated, the exact circumstances of each activity are different. This would indicate that separate programs and policies could be pursued to address each issue separately.

Self-reported delinquency is the likely influence on victimization for this sample. The link between delinquency and victimization has been reported several times in prior research (Lauritsen et al., 1991; Lauritsen et al., 1992), and results here also support this correlation. Opportunity was identified as a predictor of self-report delinquency, which suggests an indirect effect on victimization. Nightwatch reduces juvenile opportunities, which reduces delinquency, and in the end reduces victimization.

LESSONS LEARNED

Several important lessons have been learned from this study, from the program perspective as well as from the research perspective. Examining the way Nightwatch functions in St. Louis has revealed a number of keys to program success. After all, if an

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agency cannot implement and sustain a program correctly, no benefits will be realized, and there will be no need for an outcome evaluation.

One of the most important lessons reveals that centralization of tasks is vital to successful program implementation and functioning. In the beginning, the program was haphazard and lacked credibility within the court, until duties were centralized and standardized. Without a central supervisor, staff were unsure of proper procedures and were not accountable for implementation. The fact that one person is in charge of routes, sanctions, and rewards, insures that procedures are completed in a consistent manner. This feature may aid the court in other areas of inconsistency. The process evaluation revealed many discrepancies in computer entries for juveniles. Dates for referral to Nightwatch and other programs were incorrect or missing, as well as other significant information such as risk scores. Centralizing some of these entries may increase reliability of information. The deputy juvenile officers obviously know that Nightwatch is available, and consistently refer juveniles to the program in high numbers. It is the documentation aspect of the task that is sometimes neglected. This documentation is essential to efficient court functioning, however. Multiple individuals and agencies rely on the information provided in the juvenile summary and other court documents when making decisions about a juvenile's case. Without consistent record keeping, fair and informed decisions cannot be made.

Success in implementation and functioning can also be seen when written policies are clear and concise. Nightwatch guidelines regarding home visits address key points of the visit and clearly convey expectations and procedures. It is easily evident from looking at the written procedures and the actual activities that staff are following the

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guidelines in a reliable manner. This should be the case for all aspects of not only this program, but all court programs. Those aspects that did not have clear written procedures did not meet program goals as reliably, for example, the number of visits a juvenile receives. It is desired that high-risk juveniles be seen more frequently than low-risk, however this is not the case. It is difficult to assess why actual practices do not meet expectations when no written procedure exists for comparison. This is not to say that procedures should be so detailed or rigid as to detract from the actual service delivery. For Nightwatch, scheduling is extremely complex and time-consuming, and too many procedures would invite failure. Perhaps a re-examination of what the program can realistically accomplish would help in this respect. If program goals and objectives are not realistically obtainable, the program will never reach its goals and will never appear successful. It was discovered that the goal of three visits per week was unfeasible, and the more relaxed goal of high-risk being seen “more than” low-risk was adopted. Perhaps this is also unfeasible, given the high recidivism rate of high-risk juveniles. If the goal of high-risk juveniles being seen more than low-risk juveniles is no longer important to the court or is not realistic, then program operations should be reevaluated and readjusted as necessary.

Another important lesson learned from the Nightwatch program is the value of collaboration. Neither police officers nor deputy juvenile officers can accomplish alone what the two agencies can accomplish together. Each agency brings a different perspective and different knowledge to the endeavor, and when used together, bring successful results. Police officers are on the streets of the city every day, and have a vast knowledge of how to travel efficiently and safely. Police officers also have updated

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information regarding offending at the city level, including the latest gang hot spots and clothing trends. Deputy juvenile officers can obtain more personal information about a juvenile, what the family dynamics are, and what underlying problems the family may be facing, such as unemployment or mental illness. Just as in Boston and Indianapolis, when multiple agencies work together and share the information that they have obtained, multiple solutions can be found. Agencies should seek assistance from others, whether they are working on a formal collaboration such as Nightwatch, or in their regular daily business.

The Family Court in St. Louis has shown that successful programs have centralized decision-making, clear written policies, and are collaborative. Problems nearly always arise when attempting to replicate a program in a different locale, or using different methods. Local differences can affect program implementation, for example agencies may be structured differently, or local populations may have unique problems and characteristics. The lessons presented here are general in nature, and are lessons that can be applied to any agency, with any problem, in any area of the country.

Another lesson that was learned from this study shows the link between research and practice. A juvenile's risk score is determined by using a theory-based rubric. Prior research has revealed that high-risk juveniles, by definition, have a higher probability of offending. This study has shown that for the most part the rubric is accurate, and that this theory is correct. Juveniles identified in this study as high-risk were more likely to incur a subsequent official referral than other juveniles. This example shows that theory, while correct, cannot stand on its own. From a social standpoint, merely identifying those who are high risk and watching while they recidivate is not beneficial. Treatment plans and

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services must be available to practitioners to assist those who are at high-risk. Programs based on best practices must be compatible and accessible to the clients who need them. Thus, we have learned that a juvenile's risk score can be accurately identified. We must also learn how to put that theory into practice in the most effective way. Several court and community programs exist in St. Louis to address a juvenile's risk factors, but given that the high-risk juveniles are still offending the most, more can be done.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

It has been shown that Nightwatch can accomplish a reduction in delinquency, and the possible mechanism by which this is accomplished has been identified. The next step is to make the program even more effective, and to put to use other knowledge that was gained through this project. This research has identified several policy implications, based on the theoretical findings as well as characteristics of the research participants.

It appears that opportunity plays a large role in delinquency. This creates a challenge: how to reduce juvenile opportunity without infringing on their constitutional rights. Curfew ordinances already have come under fire for curtailing movement and parental discretion (Marketos, 1995), but as Nightwatch has shown, there is some merit to keeping juveniles off the street. The logic behind curfew is the same logic that created the juvenile court: that children are unable to make rational complex decisions, and that they deserve special treatment (Hemmens and Bennett, 1999; Bernard, 1992). The answer lies somewhere between complete incapacitation and complete liberty. The key here is that it was unstructured, unsupervised, out-of-home activities that predicted recidivism. Providing juveniles with structured, supervised opportunities will reduce delinquency by reducing their amount of uncontrolled free time. Adding such activities

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is an example of situational prevention, which has been shown to be successful (Painter and Farrington, 2001), and further programs should be developed and tested. Such programs must be appropriate and accessible to local teens, however. For example, after school programs should provide age-appropriate activities that teens will find interesting, and community sports activities must be low or no cost and include juveniles of all talent and ability.

A key component to supervision, however, begins at home. Parents must take responsibility for insuring their children are supervised and participating in structured activities. This may be easier for some families than for others. Prior research indicates that visiting nurse programs significantly reduce subsequent risk factors and delinquency by improving parenting skills from birth through age two (Mihalic, et al., 2001). These programs are essential in getting high-risk children through their pre-school years, but the teenage years can be just as stressful, if not more so, for a parent. It is extremely common at the court for parents to make statements about “needing help” with how to handle their teen. The court offers a walk-in service, whereby a parent can bring an incorrigible or uncooperative child for an intake interview and assessment for services. This service is utilized nearly every day. Parents lack the skills to handle confrontations about school, chores, and attitude, and the court is their only place to turn. Often the outcome is referral to the informal treatment and diversion unit, where the juvenile may receive referrals for drug treatment, counseling, or other services as needed. Several programs are available to help parents survive the pre-school years successfully, complimentary programs to assist parents with the trials of the teenage years must be implemented and made available, as well.

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A final implication addresses both research and policy. The participants in this study were a sample of active juvenile offenders in an urban inner city. This is a far cry from college freshmen in a suburban area, which has been a common sample in prior perceptual deterrence work (Saltzman, et al., 1982; Silberman, 1976; Pogarsky, 2002). To say the least, it can be suggested that these two populations are “different.” They each have different backgrounds, different life trajectories, and different perceptions of the world. Unlike college freshmen, this sample contained individuals who could not spell their own name, much less that of their neighborhood. When asked about their neighborhood, they could only give the “gang” or the “hood” name. These outward indicators identify concrete ways in which these two samples differ, but it is impossible to definitively relate how the two groups perceive the world without direct comparison. It is impossible to say from the current study whether juveniles in St. Louis perceive things differently from college freshmen, but it is plausible to assume that significant differences exist.

This raises a significant and far-reaching question in terms of survey research. Can results obtained from college freshmen be generalized to a population of active juvenile offenders for whom policies are made? Results obtained here indicate the answer may be “no.” Drawing specifically from the offending likelihood results, juveniles could be categorized as conformists, deterrable, or incorrigible, but the extremely large number of unclassified individuals indicates that something is wide of the mark. A common occurrence during survey administration was that juveniles thought the question that asked about offending “if they knew for sure they would not get caught” was a trick. This indicates a different worldview than a group of college freshmen. The

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problem is not in understanding per se, but in understanding the intent of the question. In several instances the juvenile's perception of the question was different from the researcher's intent (hence the necessity for Appendix G). Keep in mind that nearly all of the questions were replicated from other published research, none of which identified this as a problem. In fact, some of the prior studies were conducted using school-based samples of juveniles (Paternoster and Iovanni, 1986; University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1995). Some researchers argue that if the participant does not comprehend the question, the question should be abandoned. If this is the case, then this study shows that research using active juvenile offenders should be abandoned, as they are different from many prior research samples. This is not a recommendation, however, as it is the active offenders for whom policies are created and enforced. Active juvenile offenders often have high risk factors; they may be at a lower educational level, and they may perceive abstract questions differently than college or other students. If active offenders do not perceive the intent of a graduate student's research questions, do they perceive the intent of policies such as Miranda warnings, or apprehension orders, or court-ordered curfew? Policymakers must take care that guidelines for crime control and other broad social policies are framed in a manner that is clear to the intended recipient. Further research is needed to assess to what degree the perceptions of active offenders differ from other members of the population. One study that addressed this issue found that most of the population refuses to break the law under any circumstances, while active burglars would break the law for a sufficient gain (Decker, et al., 1993). This supports the idea that active offenders perceive risks and benefits differently, and policies directed at active offenders must be tailored accordingly.

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Thus, this research has identified several avenues for future policy considerations. A population of juvenile offenders and their families in an urban area has different needs and perceptions than a population of suburban families. Providing appropriate supervision may be nearly impossible for families that do not have the resources or have different worldviews. Several parents complained at Nightwatch visits that they were unaware of when the crew was coming, or made excuses for the juvenile and stated they “had permission” to be gone from the house. Obviously, these parents did not understand the intent and the ramifications of a court-ordered program.

FUTURE RESEARCH

While Nightwatch shows tentative success in reaching its goals, this study has produced both expected and unexpected results that provide several avenues for future research. The correlation between delinquency and victimization was an expected result, but the predictors of victimization did not prove to be overly informative. The composition of this sample is different from what is usually used for victimization research, and finding any unique characteristics would have been insightful. The fact that opportunity was not a predictor of victimization indicates that juveniles are victimized in many different places at many different times, not just at night or in an unsupervised situation. Future victimization research on offenders may focus on this aspect of supervision, or compare home and street victimizations.

The correlation between opportunity and offending was also an expected result, but further research can assist in identifying whether formal or informal limits on opportunity are most effective. It has been suggested that teen parenting assistance may be a feasible avenue to increase parent skills and reduce unstructured juvenile activities.

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Warr (1993) found that juveniles who spend more time with their parents are less likely to engage in delinquent activities. No data were collected for this measure in the current study, and an assessment of how much time active juvenile offenders spend with their parents may prove insightful when predicting subsequent offending and in designing feasible intervention programs. Comparing school or community based activities with time spent with parents can also provide valuable information regarding which venue is most effective at reducing unsupervised juvenile time and involvement in delinquency.

Several unexpected findings also inform future research. While it is not uncommon for deterrence-based programs to be less than successful, nearly all prior perceptual deterrence research found some kind of relationship between the certainty of punishment and subsequent offending. Several explanations have been offered in an attempt to explain these uncommon findings, and all lead to possibilities for ongoing research.

A concept that deserves significant future attention is the idea of tipping models. If this in fact turns out to be a mechanism that is at work in a program such as Nightwatch, the repercussions could be profound. If the inconvenience of watching a video controls behavior better than the threat of detention, several policies and procedures of the juvenile court will need to be seriously reconsidered. The elimination of detention as a sanction would not only be feasible, but ethically mandated. It is merely speculation at this point, but further research is definitely warranted. The best research strategy to address this issue may be in collecting semi-structured interview data, so that juveniles can verbalize exactly what they are thinking and how specific sanctions affect their lives.

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While the replication of Pogarsky's (2002) study regarding offending likelihood did not fully support the concept of dividing individuals into different categories, this is still a feasible avenue for ongoing research. Not only could the original data be examined using an ordinal regression, but a larger study could be conducted using active offenders, to clarify all prior results. If active offenders can be categorized in the same manner as college students, the results could significantly impact juvenile justice policies. If established and utilized in an equitable manner, the division of juveniles into categories could improve service delivery and lower costs by providing incorrigible individuals with more services and conformists with fewer services.

This study has identified several pitfalls to conducting research on a sample of active juvenile offenders. The research design was extremely time-consuming in terms of obtaining informed consent and completing surveys. Access to participants was granted, however attrition of study participants was a serious problem due to case processing decisions. This was the most significant threat to the validity of the study, in that it greatly affected the statistical power of the data, and severely limited the range of appropriate data analysis techniques. The use of a full pre-test to assess the appropriateness of the investigator-administered questionnaire for these research participants may have greatly improved the quality of the data collected. The fact that the structure of the questionnaire may not have been ideal for this population highlights the importance of research conducted on active offenders. As policies and crime control decisions are made with offenders in mind, it is imperative that data regarding their perceptions, activities, and characteristics be collected and analyzed.

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These threats and unexpected results bring the generalizability of this study into question. The sample was purposive, not a systematic sampling of all juvenile court referrals, and is thus not necessarily representative of the court population. No significant differences were identified between the experimental and comparison groups, but any results must be interpreted with caution. In addition, there was no comparison city or comparison group of non-delinquent youth for this study. Osgood and Anderson (2004) identified that different schools had different levels of opportunity and thus different levels of delinquent involvement. This sample of St. Louis youth may have significantly different levels of opportunity, informal controls, or other variables than a different city or group of juveniles. A comparison city or group of non-delinquent youth would provide stronger results that would contain more generalizability than the current design. These concerns must be weighed carefully for any jurisdiction that is considering implementing a program such as Nightwatch. In addition, there are other concerns to keep in mind when deciding on an appropriate program.

Any jurisdiction considering the implementation of a curfew check program must take several key issues into account. First, the cost of the program must be carefully examined. Nightwatch is quite expensive, as all personnel are paid overtime for their participation in home visits. Three crews going out four nights a week can quickly deplete a budget. In addition, rewards and sanctions may require new expenditures. Rewards must be purchased as they are earned, and if videos or other graduated sanctioning tools must be purchased, these expenses must be allotted for. Second, there may be other programs that reduce unstructured socializing at a significantly lower cost. As the time of day was not apparently critical for offending and victimization

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experiences, after school or community programs may be exploited to reduce the occurrence of unsupervised youth. Collaboration with a community center or faith-based organization could be just as effective as home visits. One of the most valuable aspects of Nightwatch was the added face-to-face contact with the juvenile and the family. These short, informal contacts allowed for significant amounts of information to be shared, as well as rapport to be established between deputy juvenile officers and families. If this contact could be facilitated in another setting at a significantly reduced cost, with the same result of lowered recidivism, it would be worthwhile.

Several cities have adopted curfew check programs, and many have shown at least some success in reducing recidivism for court-involved youth. Boston and Indianapolis chose to target gang and gun offenders, while St. Louis chose to target all offenders. Each of these jurisdictions examined the unique characteristics of the area, population, and crime problem before choosing a strategy. Each jurisdiction utilized collaboration between several agencies, and took advantage of community-level relationships. Thus, while these cities used the same basic approach, individual procedures were tailored to their specific needs and resources.

Thus, Nightwatch shows signs of successfully reducing recidivism in juveniles who are assigned to it. In addition, it has been shown that it is possible to change juvenile behavior, and use situational prevention strategies to reduce crime. This indicates that curfew check programs are useful, but care must be taken when attempting to restrict juvenile opportunities. Nightwatch was successful by changing juvenile behavior rather than perceptions of certainty of punishment, which may indicate that juveniles assigned to the program calculate costs and benefits a little differently than

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previous deterrence research participants. Nightwatch is also successful in reducing victimization for juveniles who are assigned, creating a safer community environment. Best practices indicate the use of the most effective, least restrictive disposition for offenders, and further consideration should be given to tipping models and sanctions that are inconvenient rather than incapacitate. It is evident, at least in St. Louis, that policies must be in structured and presented to the public in a way that insures all citizens understand the intent of such policies and are served fairly.

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Appendix A RiskNeeds Assessment pg 1.pdf



Appendix A RiskNeeds Assessment pg 2.pdf



Appendix A RiskNeeds Assessment pg 3.pdf



Appendix B Nightwatch Case Contact.pdf



Appendix C Parent Satisfaction Survey pg 1.pdf



Appendix C Parent Satisfaction Survey pg 2.pdf

References

APPENDIX D

NIGHTWATCH GUIDELINES

A Nightwatch crew of a Deputy Juvenile Officer and a Police Officer will make random home visits to verify that your child is at home at the times established in agreement with the Court. The Nightwatch Police and Deputy Juvenile Officers will arrive at your home after your child's designated curfew. They will make every attempt to be as least intrusive as possible. They will come to your residence and ask to see your child. They will have a picture of your child with them. They will ask to see you also for any feedback or questions. They may return the same evening from time to time to ensure that your child does not leave the house after the crew departs. You may be contacted by phone by Program Supervisory staff to complete a "Satisfaction Survey". You will be asked to comment on the program and the crew. Please give us your feedback, so we can improve our services.

PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

It is your responsibility:

- in accordance with the informal adjustment contract and the Parental Responsibility law to ensure your child is at home by the time ordered by the court and that your child remain at home throughout the night and cannot leave until 5:30 a.m. the following morning;
- to notify your child's Deputy Juvenile Officer whenever your child leaves home after curfew. If you suspect that your child will leave after the Nightwatch crew departs please inform the officers of your concern;
- to notify your child's Deputy Juvenile Officer by 4 p.m. that day of any circumstances or reasons why your child will not be home by the established curfew time;
- to immediately notify your child's Deputy Juvenile Officer of any change of address or phone number;
- to inform your child's Deputy Juvenile Officer at this time and in the future of any job/employment, school activity, court program, organized sport activity or church activity that would conflict with the established curfew and;
- per the Informal adjustment contract to cooperate with the Deputy Juvenile Officer with any sanction deemed appropriate and necessary for any Nightwatch violation.

JUVENILE'S RESPONSIBILITY

It is your responsibility:

- to be home by _____ on Sunday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. On Friday and Saturday you have to be home by _____. If your parent wants you home earlier than the curfew set forth in agreement with this court you must obey your parent's curfew.

References

- to not leave your home after your curfew is checked. You are to remain in your home throughout the night and not leave before 5:30 a.m. the following morning and;
- to notify your assigned Deputy Juvenile Officer immediately of any job/employment, court program, organized sport activity, school activity or church activity that would conflict with your curfew.

I am hereby notified that I will be sanctioned for any Nightwatch violation. That sanction may include community service hours, additional office visits, written reports, attendance at a Restorative Sanction group, home detention, detainment at the Juvenile Detention Center, placement in a public or private institution if the Judge orders it, or any other sanction outlined by the assigned Deputy Juvenile Officer or Judge.

We are hereby notified that failure to comply with the Nightwatch Program may result in a parental appearance in City Court where the Judge may impose a fine, jail time, or other sentence.

Parent

Juvenile

Deputy Juvenile Officer

Date

Nightwatch is an anti-crime program operated by the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department and the Juvenile Division of the St. Louis City Family Court. The partnership is supported by state and federal funds from the Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grant, U.S. Department of Justice, OJJDP and the Missouri Department of Public Safety. The Program has been in existence since March of 2000.

References



Appendix E Intake Log.pdf

References

C. These are some questions about things you like to do. For each question think about how many times you do each thing in a typical week.

- 1) How many nights do you find things to do away from home?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 2) How many nights do you watch TV?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 3) How many nights do you ride around in a car just for fun?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 4) How many nights do you spend at community, church, or volunteer activities?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 5) How many nights do you hang out with friends?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 6) How many nights do you go shopping?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 7) How many nights do you spend reading or doing homework?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none
- 8) How many nights do you spend going to parties?
A. 5 or more B. 2 to 4 C. 1 or 2 D. none

D. Next we would like to ask your opinion about a number of different things.

How wrong do you think it is to...

- 1) Skip school without an excuse?
1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong
- 2) Lie, disobey or talk back to adults such as parents, teachers, or others?
1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong
- 3) Break curfew
1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

References

4) Skip an appointment with your DJO?

1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

5) Purposely damage or destroy property that did not belong to you?

1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

6) Steal something worth less than \$50?

1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

7) Steal something worth more than \$50?

1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

8) Steal or try to steal a motor vehicle?

1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

9) Hit someone with the idea of hurting them?

1. not at all wrong 2. sometimes wrong 3. usually wrong 4. always wrong

E. Next are some questions about what you think would happen to you in a certain situation.

1) Suppose you did something against the law and were caught and punished, how much of a problem would that punishment create in your life?

- 1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem

2) Suppose you did something against the law and were caught, and had to attend a meeting with other juveniles as a result. How much of a problem would attending that meeting create in your life?

- 1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem

3) Suppose you did something against the law and were caught, and had to read a book and write a book report about it as a result. How much of a problem would writing a report create in your life?

- 1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem

4) Suppose you did something against the law and were caught, and had to pick up trash around the court as a result. How much of a problem would picking up trash create in your life?

- 1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem

5) Suppose you did something against the law and were caught, and had to go to the detention center for one night as a result. How much of a problem would going to detention create in your life?

- 1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem

References

- 6) Suppose you broke the law and were caught and punished. How much of a problem would that create with your parents?
1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem
- 7) Suppose you broke the law and were caught and punished. How much of a problem would that create with your friends?
1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem
- 8) Suppose you broke the law and were caught and punished. How much of a problem would that create with your teachers?
1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem
- 9) Suppose you broke the law and were caught and punished. How much of a problem would that create in getting a good job?
1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem
- 10) Suppose you broke the law but didn't get caught. How guilty would you feel about it?
1. Not guilty at all 2. Somewhat guilty 3. A little guilty 4. Very guilty
- 11) If you did break the law but didn't get caught, and you did feel guilty, how much of a problem would that guilt create in your life?
1.No problem at all 2.Hardly a problem 3. A little bit of a problem 4. A very big problem
- 12) How likely is it you would break the law?
1. very unlikely 2.somewhat unlikely 3.somewhat likely 4.very likely
- 13) How likely is it that you would be caught breaking the law?
1. very unlikely 2.somewhat unlikely 3.somewhat likely 4.very likely
- 14) How likely is it you would be caught skipping school?
1. very unlikely 2.somewhat unlikely 3.somewhat likely 4.very likely
- 15) How likely is it you would be caught breaking curfew?
1. very unlikely 2.somewhat unlikely 3.somewhat likely 4.very likely
- 16) How likely is it you would be caught if you hit someone trying to hurt them?
1. very unlikely 2.somewhat unlikely 3.somewhat likely 4.very likely
- 17) How likely is it you would be caught if you stole something worth less than \$50?
1. very unlikely 2.somewhat unlikely 3.somewhat likely 4.very likely

References

18) How likely is it you would be caught if you stole something worth more than \$50?

1. very unlikely 2. somewhat unlikely 3. somewhat likely 4. very likely

19) How likely is it you would be caught if you stole or tried to steal a car?

1. very unlikely 2. somewhat unlikely 3. somewhat likely 4. very likely

20) How likely is it you would be caught if you attacked someone with a weapon?

1. very unlikely 2. somewhat unlikely 3. somewhat likely 4. very likely

21) How likely would it be for you to break the law, even if you knew for sure you would not get caught?

1. very unlikely 2. somewhat unlikely 3. somewhat likely 4. very likely

F. Think about how well the following statements apply to you and how you might act:

1. I act on impulse

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree or Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

2. I often do things on the spur of the moment.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree or Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

3. I always consider the consequences before I take action

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree or Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

4. I rarely make hasty decisions

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree or Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

5. Sometimes I do things on impulse that I later regret.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree or Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

6. Occasionally I act first and think later.

1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neither Agree or Disagree 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

References

G. Studies have found that everyone breaks the rules and laws some times. Have you ever done any of the following? If yes, please tell us how many times in the past month you have done each thing, and what time of day it was when you did it (morning, at school, after school, night, 7:00 pm, 10:00 pm, etc)

Have you ever.....	<u>Ever Done</u>		<u>If Yes, how many times in the past month</u>
<u>Time of day</u>			
1). Skipped class without an excuse?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
2). Stayed out past curfew without being with your parents?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
3). Purposely damaged or destroyed property that did not belong to you?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
4). Carried a hidden weapon for protection?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
5). Illegally spray painted a wall or a building?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
6). Stolen or tried to steal something worth <u>less</u> than \$50?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
7). Stolen or tried to steal something worth <u>more</u> than \$50?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
8). Stolen or tried to steal a motor vehicle?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
9). Hit someone with the idea of hurting them?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
10). Attacked someone with a weapon?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
11). Sold marijuana?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times

References

H. Have any of the following things ever happened to you? If yes, please tell us how many times in the last month, and what time of day it was when it happened (morning, at school, after school, night, 7:00 pm, 10:00 pm, etc)

Have you ever.....	<u>Ever Happened</u>		<u>If Yes, how many times in the past month</u>
<u>Time of day</u>			
1). Been hit by someone trying to hurt you?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
2). Had someone use a weapon or force to get money or things from you?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
3). Been attacked by someone with a weapon or by someone trying to seriously hurt or kill you?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times
4). Had some of your things stolen from you?	1. No	2. Yes	_____Times

I. Next are some questions about different court programs you may have been involved in.

1. Have you ever been assigned to Nightwatch? Yes No
 If yes, how many Nightwatch home visits have you had in the last month? _____
2. Do you know anyone (neighbor, relative) who has been assigned to Nightwatch? Yes No
3. Have you participated in Victim/Offender Mediation? Yes No
4. Have you participated in MINE? Yes No
5. Have you participated in family or individual therapy? Yes No
6. Have you been in contact with the court because of truancy? Yes No

Please list any other programs or DJOs you have had contact with at the court

Thank You very much for answering these questions. We really appreciate your help.

References

APPENDIX G

Additional comments made to respondents to clarify survey responses:

Section B. Parent Supervision

Question was read, administrator comment: “Do you agree that you call or leave them a note (point to Agree end of scale), or disagree that you don’t (point to disagree end of scale)

Section E. Certainty of Punishment

Question was read, administrator also stated: “IF you tried to (activity), how likely is it you would actually get caught doing it?” After the juvenile made their response, I would state what their response meant. So you are saying if you tried to skip school you would definitely get caught? Respondents were always aware they could change any answer to reflect what they intended.

After the question was read, answers were clarified: very unlikely—you never would, somewhat unlikely—you probably would not, somewhat likely—you probably would, or very likely—you most certainly would

Section F. Impulsivity

Similar to Section B, question was read, administrator commented: “Do you agree (point to agree end of scale) that you act like that, or disagree (point to disagree end of the scale) that you don’t?”

Any juvenile that did not understand the meaning of the word “impulse” was told, “It’s when you think of something and do it right away.”

For all sections, the question as well as the possible responses were read aloud to the juvenile, and pointed out by the administrator.

References

APPENDIX H List of Neighborhoods and Corresponding Number

Number	Neighborhood
1	Carondelet
2	Patch
5	Bevo
15	Tower Grove South
16	Dutchtown
17	Mt. Pleasant
19	Gravois Park
27	Shaw
28	McRee Town
29	Tiffany
31	Gate District
33	Peabody Darst Webbe
34	LaSalle Prk
35	Downtown
39	Forest Park Southeast
48	West End
49	Visitation Park
50	Wells Goodfellow
51	Academy
54	Lewis Place
55	Kingsway East
56	Greater Ville
57	Ville
58	Vandeventer
59	Jeff Vanderlou
60	St. Louis Place
62	O'Fallon
63	Old North St. Louis
65	Hyde Park
66	College Hill
67	Fairground
68	O' Fallon
69	Penrose
70	Mark Twain/I-70 Industrial
71	Mark Twain
72	Walnut Park East
74	Baden
76	Walnut Park West
77	Covenant Blu/Grand Center
78	Hamilton Heights

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