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Report on the Third International Law Enforcement Forum

MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

and Less-Lethal Technologies

3–5 February 2004

April 2004
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Acknowledgement

The delegates of the 2004 International Law Enforcement Forum wish to thank Brian Coleman OBE, Director of the Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB), and all of his staff particularly, Graham Smith and Christine Hussain, for the use of their facilities and all of the coordination and support provided culminating in a very useful and productive workshop and conference. We would also like to extend our gratitude to Robin Masefield, Colin Ashe and the entire Northern Ireland Office (NIO) Patten Action Team for their support in making this conference possible and the activities of Day Three.

The Third International Law Enforcement Forum on Minimal Force Options was hosted by the Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch and held at its facilities in Langhurst, Sussex, on February 3 & 4. Delegates also participated in a follow-on conference with human rights groups, non-governmental organizations, and other interest groups. The theme of the follow-on conference was Article 2 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms which places obligations on governments and law enforcement agencies to research and develop less-lethal options. This event, enabling constructive exchange and consultation, was organized by the Northern Ireland Office at the Royal Society of the Arts in London on February 5, 2004 and included an international delegation of speakers.

The need exists for effective and safe policing techniques that can deal with belligerent crowds and individuals who are a threat to public order and may exploit innocent bystanders for concealment or hold them hostage. In fact, with a growing peacekeeping role around the world, it could be argued that this same need exists for our deployed military forces, often working with police officers deployed internationally in such roles. Our aim is to provide a sound, scientific basis for understanding the options, technologies, and tactics being contemplated. In this regard, we endeavor to develop accepted standards for developing and testing such technologies, and for the training of personnel in associated employment methods. It is our view that the pursuit of minimal force options, the policy and legal aspects of developing and employing such technology, and the surrounding debates, should be conducted on the basis of existing facts from scientific literature and the wisdom gained from collective professional experience.

The content of this report is not intended to represent any policy and/or official position of The Pennsylvania State University, the governments of the delegates in attendance, or any of their affiliated agencies.

Although the conclusions and recommendations are based upon a general consensus of the participants, they do not necessarily reflect the views of all of the participants and/or the agencies they represent.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to the Director, Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, Applied Research Laboratory, The Pennsylvania State University, P.O. Box 30, State College, PA 16804-0030 or email: inldt@psu.edu.

April 2004
Preface

The first two meetings of the International Law Enforcement Forum (ILEF) on Minimal Force Options held at The Pennsylvania State University in April 2001 and October 2002 were extremely successful in focusing on less-lethal and minimal force concepts, technologies, and deployment at the expert practitioner level. The Police Scientific Development Branch of the United Kingdom’s Home Office generously hosted this year’s International Forum which focused on moving forward with the development of accepted international standards for development, testing, and training.

Participation in the forums has been by invitation and has assembled internationally recognized subject matter experts from law enforcement together with technical and medical experts and those with specific interest in policy development from the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. This year’s forum included law enforcement representatives from the Republic of Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and New Zealand. Additionally, the Forum participated in a conference on day three, which sought to engage with human rights and other non-governmental organizations on the use of force in situations involving violent individuals, crowd disorder, and issues with human rights principles and accountability.

The 2004 International Law Enforcement Forum was hosted by Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) of the Home Office and opened by its Director, Brian Coleman OBE. The Forum was co-chaired by Assistant Chief Constable Ian Arundale, Association of Chief Police Officers, and Colonel (USMC Retired) Andrew Mazzara of The Pennsylvania State University's Applied Research Laboratory.

This report is a summary of the Forum discussions and the associated conclusions derived by the sessions. The forum makes recommendations for further work, specifically in relation to database development, information sharing, international development of Operational Requirements, optimization of tactics, terminology clarification, injury modeling and the development of standards.

This year’s forum included law enforcement representatives from the Republic of Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and New Zealand.
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2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for
MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS
Executive Summary

The ability of police officers to manage conflict, whether dealing with violent individuals or crowds, continues to be an essential aspect of maintaining public safety and good order. The approaches taken and the manner in which forcible interventions take place can either assist in resolving conflict with support of the international and often local communities or it can appear oppressive disproportionate and result in the eroding public support for the forces of law and order. In the developing regions of the world, peace and stability are often placed at risk because the competencies, knowledge, skills, systems and equipment required are not available to those charged with maintaining order.

Minimal force options and less lethal technologies expand the number of choices available to law enforcement agencies confronting situations in which the use of deadly force would be considered to escalate the situation. This third ILEF has demonstrated the extent to which the law enforcement agencies from the countries represented are all adopting broadly similar approaches in the weapons and technologies they are using or trialing. There are however differences to the approaches to testing, evaluation and system selection. This is one of the areas that ILEF intends to address.

The 2004 Forum addressed many issues related to less-lethal concepts, technologies, and deployment. The delegates explored less-lethal weapons (LLW) database development and resource sharing; effectiveness and injury potential; tactics and use; and common standards for development, testing, training, and operational use. There are many similarities to law enforcement agencies from the countries represented. All are adopting broadly similar approaches in the weapons and technologies they are using or trialing. Many of these agencies were equipping –

- **Routine operational patrol officers with:**
  - Modern extendable straight or side handled batons;
  - Incapacitant sprays (CS or OC); and
  - TASER® Devices (patrol and specialist officers).

- **Specialist tactical units (Firearms and Public Order) with:**
  - Kinetic energy projectiles (12 gauge, 37 mm and/or 40 mm);
  - Weapon launched discriminating chemical filled projectiles (OC/CS);
  - Distraction Flash-bang grenades;
  - Chemical (CS/OC) devices for use in hostage/barricade suspect situations;
  - Chemical tear smoke CS/OC- weapon launched/ hand thrown and canister;
  - Water cannon; and
  - Police dogs.
Another similarity is the extent to which agency training packages require officers to train, qualify, and regularly re-qualify. The extent to which accreditation was also being extended to those charged with commanding critical incidents was also addressed. There were some differences noted in the approach to technical research, medical evaluation, weapon selection, testing, and post use evaluation, but all countries shared a common concern for understanding the impact of using these technologies. These points of commonality and difference are explained within the substance of the report together with recommendations as to a more corporate approach.

The presentations and the Syndicate Sessions are detailed in the following text. The major recommendations are:

1. **Development of Agreed Operational Requirements.** The work on developing Operational Requirements for less-lethal weapons, and consensus across the international law enforcement community, is considered a high priority. The work initiated by the Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG) following ILEF 2002 should continue. The group should also address issues associated with measurements of effectiveness.

2. **Articulate Operational Requirements to Manufacturers.** There is a need to create a mechanism to communicate the agreed international Operational Requirements being developed by EORG to bodies such as the International Chiefs of Police and particularly with manufacturers. One option was for ILEF to harness the support of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. It would then be able to articulate and communicate the 'model' international law enforcement operational requirements to manufacturers and suppliers and for law enforcement to begin to drive technology development in this field.

3. **Terminology Standardization.** That the EORG develop standard definitions for life threatening, serious injury, and other less-lethal medical terminology.

4. **ILEF Standards.** That the EORG (Electronic Operational Requirements Group) develop a comprehensive set of standards for review by all ILEF members, then, publish these documents for external/peer review by practitioners, industry, and professional organizations. These standards should consider including levels of incapacitation in some form and establishing or defining levels of effectiveness, recognizing that human variability will always be a challenge.

5. **Identify Desired Effects and Outcomes.** There is a need to formulate an operational statement of desired effects/outcomes of less-lethal weapons. There should be as much clarity as possible as to what a particular device does, or does not do. There is a need to appreciate that there are different interpretations influenced often by departmental doctrine and historical issues. This is work that could be developed by EORG.
6. **Describe and Provide Measures of Effectiveness.** There is a need to link descriptions of effectiveness with measures of effectiveness. The group was made aware of work commenced in the UK under the auspices of the Patten/ACPO Steering Group to identify effectiveness criteria for less-lethal devices. A summary of the emerging approach is provided in the Steering Groups Phase 4 Report (see http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf, page 18). The integration of these descriptions with the type of measures described by Syndicate 2 (Determining Effectiveness and Injury Potential) could enable effectiveness criteria to be better articulated and measured.

7. **Incorporate Psychological Criteria into Operational Requirements.** There is a need to identify and understand the psychological elements of aggressive behavior in conflict situations and ensure that the development of less-lethal weapons includes design factors intended to operate on both the physical and psychological level. It was evident that the use of the aiming laser on the TASER® was in itself resolving many situations without resort to discharge of the weapon. Similarly, it was evident that the often intended deterrent effect of a show of force capability could either diffuse or incite a crowd. There is a need to gain a clearer understanding of how different options are likely to be interpreted by groups.

8. **Sharing of Information & Data Exchange.** There is a need to encourage the sharing of information between military and law enforcement agencies and across international boundaries. The database should leverage the abundance of open source data that is available on the internet. Through the professional organizations, ILEF should strive to identify and solicit support from key representatives in each country to advocate the Forum, and its data sharing initiatives, within that country. Release and open exchange of related medical, operational, and test data would facilitate understanding of these concepts and technologies and perhaps permit the development of systems that will ultimately provide law enforcement with better options without placing officers, subjects, and the public at risk of death or serious injury. The database, in conjunction with the existing website (and its discussion board and project tools), could become a virtual form of ILEF workshop to further develop our role, maintain our work, and sustain important relationships. It was also recognized that there is a need for marketing in some fashion in order to fund aspects of the forum. This might also be considered an aspect of strategic planning and accomplished within the framework of the ILEF website as a project.

9. **Notification of Program Testing and Sharing Information on Operational Trials.** It is important for the professional user community to endeavor to ensure that colleagues are aware of ongoing and future conflict management tests and experimentation. This will reduce the duplicative efforts and perhaps encourage a wider acceptance of developed solutions through open and ongoing peer review. There should be a mechanism to notify other departments and jurisdictions of structured force-wide or national operational trails. It would be useful if there was a wider source of information for such trails. One suggestion was that these could be stored on the International database being discussed by Syndicate 1 (Developing and Populating Less-Lethal Weapons Database).
10. Medical Data Access. Conduct an investigation into, and seek support for, appropriate methods to obtain accurate and comprehensive medical data related to less-lethal effects and injuries. Consider an approach that might include a “firewall” that provides researchers only anonymous identifiers. There is some precedent for this in the area of corrections (prisons).

11. Literature Review. That members of ILEF (perhaps as a continued EORG task) conduct a literature review to compile a comprehensive international terminology list, identify new terms (e.g., pain compliance), and address/resolve discrepancies with regard to definitions so that a common vernacular for discussing less-lethal systems could be progressed. Consideration should be given to collaborative arrangements with other research programs or seeking out opportunities for international funding to advance this work.

12. Develop/Adapt Injury Model. Conduct a thorough literature review to identify potential models and their characteristics which make them appropriate for less-lethal injuries. Select a number of these and validate them with actual injury data. Over time, these models could be modified to better suit less-lethal systems.

13. Conflict Management. The concept of conflict management as being advanced within the UK is indicative of the importance of this topic. It should be used to complement the work being developed by ILEF, and law enforcement agencies internationally, in respect of less-lethal options and technologies. Conflict Management should be viewed holistically rather than in a manner that isolates segments independently for examination or application. This includes developing a greater understanding of what causes individuals or crowds to react in particular ways. There is a need for a greater understanding of the parameters and range options – from brawls outside a pub through to full public disorder situation as well as encounters with emotionally disturbed individuals to determined armed criminals or terrorists groups. Each aspect of conflict management – be it pre-event planning, negotiation, less-lethal technologies, or lethal force – should be viewed as a component that must consider the potential contribution of the other components to best address a particular situation. Desired outcome should be determined then appropriate conflict management options should be selected to reach the desired end state. These decisions should consider the human rights of all those who will be affected by the police action. Sometimes less-lethal technologies are just one contribution and not an entire effect for resolution itself.

14. Develop and promote ILEF. The Forum requires some strategic planning and funding arrangements to ensure that it continues to provide a mechanism not only for sharing information but promoting concepts, requirements and best practice in relation to less-lethal options to the international law enforcement community. One of the first steps in this process is the development of a collective vision for the Forum, crafting a concise mission statement, and outlining clear and obtainable objectives. This might be accomplished within the framework of the protected side of the ILEF website as a project.
Introduction

Background

Global population growth and migration have resulted in increased urbanization, not only in the west, but also in many undeveloped and developing societies. Urbanization in many crisis-prone regions of the world creates the potential for varying degrees of social unrest. This unrest often results in large, vulnerable groups of civilians caught up in confrontations involving lawful authority and lawbreakers. When police encounter unduly aggressive individuals, the use of deadly force is considered the last resort. This often places both innocent bystanders and law enforcement officers at risk. Minimal force options provide law enforcement officers flexibility by allowing them to apply appropriate force in such a manner as to provide protection of the public and safely effect compliance whether dealing with individuals or managing crowds. They bring into balance the sometimes competing requirements of public order, public protection, and police safety.

Penn State’s Applied Research Laboratory (ARL) has been helping U.S. law enforcement and military agencies develop an information base on which to make decisions about minimal force options for conflict resolution since 1997. In January 2001, Penn State’s Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies (INLDT) published its Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP) report on Crowd Behavior, Crowd Control, and the Use of Non-Lethal Weapons. This report summarized the myths and facts of crowd behavior and outlined a decision-making guideline for crowd control that emphasizes prevention rather than confrontation. The report also reviewed education and training guidelines for crowd control. The Institute (INLDT) published its widely distributed report The Attribute-Based Evaluation (ABE) of Less-Than-Lethal, Extended-Range, Impact Munitions in February 2001. This report was a collaborative effort with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD) to characterize blunt impact munitions with regard to accuracy and imparted momentum. The report has since served as an independent preliminary evaluation allowing law enforcement officials to make more informed decisions about appropriate less-lethal munitions.

In 1999, Penn State and the LASD hosted the United Kingdom’s International Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland in Los Angeles. The Commission was chaired by Mr. Chris Patten. The Commission reviewed the less-lethal programs and activities of LASD and Penn State, including the opportunity to fire a variety of less-lethal weapons. The implementation of the Patten recommendations in Northern Ireland, together with the desire by Government and the police services across the United Kingdom to research less-lethal weapons as part of a co-ordinated and structured approach to the management of conflict has been central to the development of the International Law Enforcement Forum (ILEF) on Minimal Force Options.
The first meeting conducted at the Pennsylvania State University in April of 2001 served to define principles for use of minimal force options and to capture operational needs.

The second ILEF meeting, conducted in October 2002, identified a number of issues that required some action. The more urgent of these included the development of a less-lethal weapon/technology database, the development of an injury database, the characterization of operational needs, and the development of standards for development, testing, and training. Shortly after this second meeting of ILEF, the Steering Group led by the Northern Ireland Office, in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers, issued its Phase 3 Report (December 2002) on Patten Commission Recommendations 69 and 70, relating to public order equipment. This report included a summary of the ILEF meeting and its recommendations. The Phase 4 Report (published January 2004) likewise referenced ILEF and its ongoing work to develop international standards for testing and training.

There has been a growing level of violence associated with the anti-globalization protests and the war on terrorism. These, coupled with the growth of military involvement in multinational peacekeeping missions worldwide, provide a more immediate sense of urgency for identifying broadly accepted (international) approaches for minimal force options.

Proceedings

The 2004 International Law Enforcement Forum on Minimal Force Options brought together senior and internationally recognized law enforcement representatives from the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), Canada, the Republic of Ireland, New Zealand, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. The participants included policy-makers, researchers, and medical experts versed in various aspects of less-lethal technologies, their applications and their effects. The delegates examined gaps in capabilities and medical assessments, information sharing, and the development of common standards for less-lethal weapons development, testing, training, and use. The specific objectives of the 2004 Forum were to:

- Continue international dialogue on public order and public safety;
- Validate previous work by the Forum and its Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG) on operational needs;
- Examine the developing Less-Lethal Database and provide feedback for further development, population, and distribution;
- Recommend ways to further the understanding of human effects and injury potential;
- Examine international tactics and accompanying training in use;
- Recommend ways to further the understanding of conflict management, minimal force options, and less-lethal weapons through common vernacular, international standards, and test protocols.
Workshop Presentations

The workshop was conducted at the Police Scientific Development Branch of the Home Office at their Langhurst Facility on 3 and 4 February 2004. The workshop began with introductory remarks and a keynote address from Paul Acres QPM, Chair of Association of Chief Police Officers’ Conflict Management Portfolio. The group was then updated on less-lethal weapon initiatives by all of the delegate countries. The keynote address and these presentations appear in their entirety in Section 2 of this report.

Keynote Address. The keynote address by Chief Constable Paul Acres discussed the ACPO Conflict Management Portfolio involvement in less-lethal work in the United Kingdom (complete remarks are found at Section 2).

He emphasized that the growing range of sophisticated weaponry of the criminal element mandates that we have the ability to respond to effectively remove that threat. In doing so, we must ensure the safety of our public and staff and reassure all that our use of force is proportionate. He emphasized that in resolving conflict at any level our aim is always to do so safely and without any use of force, but if necessary, then only the minimum amount of force required.

Mr. Acres also discussed the involvement of the ACPO in the development of less-lethal options for the police. The ACPO provided the basis for the prioritization and evaluations carried out by PSDB and DSTL where medical implications of the use of the more promising options are established. This approach has now been formalized in the Home Office Code of Practice on the Use of Firearms and less-lethal weapons, the first of its kind in the United Kingdom. For each of the technologies used in the UK, the ACPO has issued comprehensive guidance on use. The medical evaluation and statements that are made and laid before Parliament on these technologies have been, in part, based on the guidance issued as to how these technologies will be used.

Mr. Acres pointed out that significant improvements in accuracy and consistency of the L21A1 Baton Round System made it appropriate for use as a less-lethal option. After a long period of training, it is now in service with all forces in England and Wales and is being introduced as a less-lethal option to all forces in Scotland. The UK has also introduced the TASER® in a limited field trial.

United Kingdom. There was a series of presentations from the delegates of the United Kingdom. Robin Masefield CBE, Head of the Northern Ireland Office’s Patten Action Team, provided an update on the work of the UK Steering Group led by the Northern Ireland Office in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers, England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland (complete remarks are found at Section 2). The Steering Group is reviewing alternative approaches to the management of conflict. The work undertaken by the Steering Group includes a less-lethal research and development programme, which is one of the most comprehensive ever undertaken in policing. International input was an important element in the
program. Detailed updates were provided in the Group’s published reports. The fourth report covered ongoing research into an attenuating energy projectile (AEP) and a discriminating irritant projectile (DIP), both of which held considerable promise.

The Police Scientific Development Branch had prioritized its research and testing efforts into three categories. Category “A” devices are those which may be subject to immediate more in-depth research such as: kinetic energy rounds, chemical delivery devices, distraction devices, water cannon, and electrical devices. Category “B” devices are those warranting further research over a more extended time such as: tranquillisers and malodorants. Category “C” devices are those which presently do not require further research, such as stun grenades, smoke, acoustic devices, electromagnetic waves, nets and wire entanglement systems, glue, foam and grease.

The PSDB evaluated the TASER® devices. They found that TASERs® have a number of characteristics that may make them suitable for UK police. They found that for acceptable accuracy the range is really only 15ft (4.6m), not 21ft (6.4m). They also concluded that the weapon is not 100% reliant. However, it is often effective without the need to even fire the weapon (use of laser sight; sparking demonstration).

Delegates of the UK also presented information on the operational uses of both the TASER® and the L21A1 Baton Round. Although baton rounds had been used in Northern Ireland for many years prior to the introduction of the L21A1, the Home Office and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland authorized operational use of the L21A1 beginning 1 June 2001. The ACPO produced guidance for its use. While continuing to be used in Northern Ireland in public order scenarios, the first use in Great Britain was in North Wales on 27 February 2002. At the time of the conference the L21A1 had been used at 17 policing operations in Great Britain, most recently in Nottinghamshire on 5 January 2004.

The TASER® had been used at 47 policing operations since the start of the trial. It was first used in North Wales on 21 April 2003 and first fired in North Wales on 14 June 2003. There is an ongoing extended trial in five forces where officers are facing violence or threats of violence of such severity that their use of force is necessary to protect themselves or the public.

The Police Services Northern Ireland reported on the procurement of the water cannon. Cooperation between police in Northern Ireland and the Belgium Gendarmerie (now the federal police) led to an agreement whereby the police in Northern Ireland borrowed two “Mol MSB18” water cannons each summer from 1999 to 2003. The Water cannon was one of five technologies identified as holding some promise and requiring further research with regard to Patten recommendations 69 and 70. After significant research, testing, and operational deployments, and with the loan arrangement becoming less and less certain, the decision was made to procure based on a competitive process. The RCV9000 was selected and the first two delivered in September 2003. They expect operational readiness in March 2004.
United States. There were a number of presentations from the United States delegates. With regard to impact projectiles, the multiple-projectile rounds (rubber balls, foam/rubber/wooden batons) are not viewed well because the point of aim does not always equal the point of impact. Single, well-aimed projectiles save lives. The M26/X26 TASERs are in use across the United States and are generally viewed as excellent systems by those officers that have used them. But, as is generally recognized throughout the international law enforcement community, less lethal weapons cannot stop everyone. There are individuals who, whether psychotic or drug-induced, will continue to resist. In any case, proven tools that are properly used will save lives. Those tools must be pushed out of the laboratory and in to the hands of trained police officers, however, to be of any use.

Public perception and acceptance of less-lethal weapons will continue to have impact on their use in the United States. As stated by Commander Sid Heal, “Nothing is so insignificant that it can’t be blown out of proportion by the media and influence public perception.” There are devices with nomenclature that arouse an emotional response and therefore public perception and acceptance.

Some of the challenges faced by the law enforcement community in the United States include quality control of less-lethal devices and munitions, obsolescence, and statistically supporting the use of less-lethal. There are currently no standards against which these devices (in all categories) can be compared. The “state of the art” for these devices, as in other sectors, continues to move ahead and evolve. Success in the development of these devices will challenge our existing use-of-force standards, both the type and amount of force. Additionally, to the degree that they are effective and accepted by the public, there will be a corresponding demand for these devices to be accessible to the public. Every device currently available to law enforcement is limited with shortcomings such as range, effectiveness, need for decontamination, cross-contamination, or single subject discrimination. These shortcomings can be mitigated by using one device to complement another. Additionally, learning from the experiences of other officers on the employment of these devices will diminish these shortcomings.

Penn State continues to conduct its Human Effects Advisory Panels (HEAPs) which examine different aspects of less-lethal weapons and their interaction with the human body. Since the last ILEF meeting, they have assessed advanced kinetic models (selected thoracic models, head injury models, and head injury criteria), pulsed energy projectile (PEP), experiment exit criteria, incorporating crowd behavior/dynamics into the Inter-service Non-lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC), the Interim Total Body (ITBM) Road Map, and an assessment of the SAS-035 non-lethal weapon (NLW) Effectiveness Framework. They are currently conducting HEAPs for the characterization of NLWs, the Area Denial System (ADS), and a Riot Control Agent Comparison Study. Future work includes an assessment of selected animal models, a variety of non-lethal weapons education initiatives, a tactical acoustic reconnaissance projectile, and an in-depth examination of the Sturdivan Deterrence Model.
An operational case study of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department was presented as model for strategic reform of use-of-force accountability. The impetus for this effort was that the Metro Police led all other police forces in the United States in incidents where officers used lethal force. The new police chief (Chief Charles Ramsey), an outsider with a reputation for innovation, drove the efforts. The approach addressed four areas: an invitation for external scrutiny, a revision of departmental policies, a redesign of training, and a reengineering of how investigations are conducted. This strategic approach, coupled with an extraordinary effort to reconnect with the community, resulted in a 72 percent reduction in use-of-force incidents in the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department.

Canada. Presently, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has several items in the less-lethal inventory. Some of these items are available to all members of the force, while others are restricted to special units such as tactical troops (public order units) or emergency response teams (ERTs) that are responsible for special weapons and tactics. Some items may not be available in a given detachment (police station). Geographical location, identified need, and other variables determine who presently has access to each system.

Regular uniformed members of the RCMP have available the collapsible ASP baton and oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray. If trained, officers can also employ the M26 TASER, 12 gauge shotgun sock round (drag stabilized round), based on availability at their detachment. Many detachments use the “spike belt” as a means to stop speeding vehicles by flattening tires.

Tactical troops, or public order units, have available tear gas (deployed in several types of different rounds either hand thrown or launched) and OC spray (larger canisters than the personal issue MK3). They also employ the 12 gauge shotgun sock round (drag stabilized round), wooden batons (24” & 36”), and the TASER® in “touch” mode. Emergency response teams (ERTs) have all of these available, but can also use the TASER® in either mode.

The RCMP is presently acquiring two vehicles for further testing and conversion to Water Projection Systems (WPS) commonly referred to as “water cannon” for public disorder events. Initial inquiries and testing will also be conducted for an additional impact round (likely 37mm) to complement the 12 gauge drag-stabilized round presently in use. This is initially intended to be considered at for tactical troop (public order) and ERT use, not general duty.

Republic of Ireland. Following the fatal shooting of an armed person with a mental illness in April 2000, by the Garda Emergency Response Unit (ERU), the Commissioner established a Working Group to make recommendations on the use of Less Lethal Weapons in similar situations. The terms of reference were set out as follows:

- Examine current practices and procedures for such situations.
- Examine procedures currently in place in other Jurisdictions.
- Gather all information available regarding ‘non lethal’ methods currently available and evaluate same with regard to use by An Garda Síochána.
Make recommendations, including all implications for An Garda Síochána (costs, training etc.), as to whether such 'non-lethal' methods should be made available for use by members of An Garda Síochána. Such recommendations should include weaponry to be used; command structure/management of such incidents; hostage negotiations techniques and instructions regarding media attendance at such incidents.

Legislative changes, which may be necessary following from your recommendations.

Any other appropriate recommendations following your examination of current and future procedures.

The group attended international conferences on the subject of less-lethal weapons and visited police agencies in Europe and the U.S. during their research. In conjunction with this, live-fire demonstrations were conducted plus a review of additional test material prior to a final decision on recommendations. Essential requirements for the choice of devices were set to incorporate: universal application; discriminating; environmentally benign; portable; reusable; reversible; and instantaneous effect.

In November 2001 the Working Party submitted its report to the Commissioner who approved the recommendations included. The devices recommended were the Bean-Bag shotgun round (kinetic energy round); the Ferret OC shotgun cartridge (delivering pepper spray); and the Aerosol Projector (delivering pepper spray).

An Implementation Team was established with terms of reference to:

- Draw up guidelines for the introduction of Less Lethal Weapons into An Garda Síochána
- Develop a suitable training program.
- Develop operational guidelines to include deployment and command and control structures.
- Recommend amendments to the Garda Code.
- Identify suitable equipment.

In July 2002 the Implementation Team report was submitted and in November 2002 the Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform approved the acquisition of the three devices. The original 'square bean-bag' was replaced by the drag-stabilized version and the Defense Technology Mark 21 projector was selected as the OC delivery system. A tendering process commenced and in December 2003 the final purchase orders were authorized.

Two members of the ERU traveled to the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department in December 2003 and received instructor grade training in three devices. Currently, a training syllabus is being developed and it is envisaged that training for ERU will commence by April 2004. Deployment of the devices is restricted to ERU personnel to incidents where firearms may be deployed.
Other training has been identified and will be delivered at the Garda College to Scene Commanders, First Responders and Crisis Negotiators.

There is currently a public enquiry taking place into the fatal shooting which occurred in April 2000. The less lethal programme and the issues surrounding crisis response continue to be relevant.

**New Zealand.** In 2002, the New Zealand Police (NZP) commenced a project to review its use of LLW. This project, dubbed "Project Lincoln," was completed in late 2003 and made a number of recommendations regarding LLW and their use.

The Project determined that of the over 40 types of LLW considered, five were considered worthy of further evaluation. These were the 12-gauge sock round, the single baton round, an encapsulated round system, OC pepper spray, and the TASER®. The NZP Executives are currently considering these recommendations.

The Project also reviewed the NZP current use of OC spray. Oleoresin Capsicum pepper spray for all front line officers was introduced in 1998 and was a mandatory accoutrement. The spray selected was the DefTec Mark III. Project Lincoln undertook an analysis of 4,190 reports of OC spray use over a period of 34 months. In summary, the analysis showed that since the introduction of OC spray, assaults on police officers had declined by 2.1 percent. Officers suffered very little injury when using OC spray to resolve a violent confrontational situation. Suspects suffered very little injury when OC spray was used. Officers tended to also use another means of constraint, however this was usually confined to a manual hold or handcuffs. In 30% of cases, however, officers used either a restraint hold or a baton in conjunction with OC spray. While New Zealand has a high rate of asthmatics only 1.5% of subjects were recorded as such. The salbutamol inhaler provided in all front line patrol vehicles was only used in 16 cases. Overall, OC spray was considered by officers to be effective in 89% of cases. The initiating offense was usually violence-related including assault on police, officers used OC spray most between 0001 and 0400 hours on Saturdays and Sundays, the subjects were predominately male persons aged between 31 and 40.

The project also considered the operational and tactical use of LLW and the relationship between LLW and lethal force. A number of recommendations were made in this area including a modified adoption of the British system of training and issuing of lethal weapons to selected groups.

**Finland.** The Finnish Police are currently equipped with ASP expandable baton and Bodyguard OC-spray made by Guardian Products. There is an active research and evaluation program in place. They have recently completed an evaluation of the Primetake 12-gauge IMP Long Range CS ammunition, Defense Technology Corporation of America (12GA #23, #23P, #T23 and #T23P). Accuracy and velocity distribution was at -20, +20 and +40 C. There was penetration of triple glazed window at 25deg angle and penetration of heavy door construction at 30deg angle.
The Defense Technology Corporation of America’s 12-gauge #23DS kinetic rounds are also being evaluated for accuracy and velocity distribution at currently being evaluated at the following temperature ranges-20, +20 and +40 C.

Evaluation will also take place in respect of the box magazine 12-gauge pump-action shotguns Valtro PM5 and Baikal 133K. The Finnish researchers consider the 12-gauge shotgun a good general purpose weapon. The assortment of ammunition available, especially the various less-lethal cartridges, make it a very versatile tactical weapon. The intent of the evaluation is to assess whether this shotgun construction reduces the risk of accidents and provides for a safer weapon design for the use and exchange of various types of ammunition than the conventional tubular magazine shotgun. They have also commenced a TASER® evaluation.

**Norway.** It was reported that the Norwegian Police currently have two approved products for use. The first is 0.4 litre canister Chlorobenzylmalononitrile (CS) gas at a solution of one to two percent (1%–2%). This has been issued in all police districts. Additionally, all police districts have been authorized the 37/38mm and 12/70 calibre CS cartridges for use with the Multi-Purpose Riot Gun (MPRG 83). They also are authorized the 37/38mm long range CS cartridge for riot control. The ARWEN weapon platform has been authorized for use only by special units. There was no use of CS reported in 2003.

The Norwegian Police began an Oleoresin-capsicum (OC) pepper spray evaluation project in May 2003. This project will last two years and will result in the evaluation of the Def-Tech and Cap-Stun 50 – 55ml canister OC spray that has been issued in all police districts. For the eight months of the project in 2003, there were 28 reported cases of use of OC pepper spray. In 26 cases, the OC was effective. In two cases, the OC had no effect.

**Sweden.** Every piece of equipment which is to deliver force against a human being has to be reviewed by a Government Delegation for Human Rights Supervision on Weapon Projects at the Defence Ministry. This requirement is set out in legislation and carries the weight of law in Sweden. The requirement applies to both police and military equipment and that used by all governmental organizations. The following is a summary of recent development in respect of firearms and less lethal technologies

Oleorsin-Capsicum (OC)-spray has been successfully tested in an operational test during 2003. Out of 243 expositions, police officers have in 17 cases avoided the use of lethal force (i.e., their service pistol). In two cases, suicide candidates have been rescued due to the use of OC. The OC is to be issued to all police officers beginning this year.

Operational test on impact ammunition will be taking place during 2004. This will involve the testing of 12 gauge and 40mm projectiles. Preparations are also being made for operational test of the TASER® during 2004. At the moment, the equipment is being reviewed by the Delegation. Following review by the Delegation the service ammunition used in conventional firearms was changed from full metal jacket to hollow point. (9 mm 124 grain Speer Gold Dot).
Demonstration of the L21A1 Baton Round

After the delegates completed their updates, the Sussex Police conducted a demonstration of the L21A1 Baton Round. The demonstration included a live fire against a paper target to demonstrate the round’s inherent accuracy at 30 meters and a situational scenario whereby a suspect believed to be armed and intoxicated was subdued and apprehended. A brief question and answer period followed the demonstration.
Workshop Syndicate Sessions - Major Issues, Discussions, and Recommendations

After completing a less-lethal weapon (LLW) overview and briefings on the first day, the group participated in four breakout sessions (second day). These sessions addressed developing and populating the less-lethal weapons database; determining effectiveness and injury potential; optimizing tactics, training and use; and specifying definitions, standards, and testing.

**Developing and Populating the Less-Lethal Weapons Database.** This session addressed the development, publication, and maintenance of the International Less-Lethal Weapons Database. This database was created by the Police Scientific Development Branch (Home Office) as response to one of the recommendations of the International Law Enforcement Forum in 2002. There was general consensus among the group that the effort thus far was laudable. There was also much discussion regarding who would see the collected data. Security issues notwithstanding, there was consensus within the group that the database should be published on the internet. It was generally agreed that the database should strive to conduct updates quarterly, but certainly annually. The group concluded that a number of access levels would probably be most appropriate for the database. In order to encourage use of the site, and more importantly encourage data submission, it was also generally agreed that all law enforcement officers/agencies should have free access to the site.

**Determining Effectiveness and Injury Potential.** This Session addressed less-lethal weapon effectiveness and related injury potential. A lack of human testing and a corresponding reliance on animal and cadaver data makes it difficult to measure injury potential and effectiveness. Some predictions are reliant upon police assessments of injury and injury potential rather than definitive medical data. A goal might be to develop an objective scale of injury. This type of technology independent scale could conceivably serve as both a situational weapon selection tool and as injury design parameters for less-lethal weapons. The group acknowledged that effectiveness was dependent upon a number of contextual variables beyond the capabilities of a particular technology. It was generally agreed that evaluating short-term effects is fairly straightforward (yet requires extensive testing). Determining long-term effects is a much more difficult proposition, however. The group consensus was that it is unreasonable to test every particular technology for every possible long-term effect. What is reasonable is to identify those primary long-term effects of concern and conduct the appropriate research in an effort to discount them with some level of certainty.

What is reasonable is to identify those primary long-term effects of concern and conduct the appropriate research in an effort to discount them with some level of certainty.
Optimizing Tactics, Training and Use. The purpose of this Session was to address whether Law enforcement internationally were optimizing tactics, training and use of Less Lethal Options. The group had a view that less lethal development was often being driven by manufacturers rather than the users. Increasingly there was recognition that only a small percentage of these devices could be described as being consistent, accurate, effective and acceptable less lethal weapons. The group was of the view that there needed to be a way to capture internationally information as to what worked and what did not work within an authoritative, independent, and easily accessed database such as that being developed by PSDB.

The group corroborated the well-travelled idea that the “ideal” less-lethal technology was that exemplified by the ‘Star Trek Phaser.’ The nearest that law enforcement has is the latest generation of TASER® technology. Notwithstanding this, the use of less lethal devices was undoubtedly saving lives in jurisdictions where police officers were equipped with a range of accessible less-lethal options. It is therefore important that individual police departments have a clearly articulated doctrine on less-lethal options as well as a doctrine about the management of situations where force may require to be used and that both situational and generic applications for the use of less lethal options had been worked through.

Historic and cultural issues were factors that have often inhibited full use of currently available options (police dogs and water cannon in the US, use of CS smoke in Northern Ireland). This has changed in a number of situations through positive engagement with the community and public education programs, especially with regard to the TASER®.

There is a need for strategic and tactical training for many Operational Commanders and they need to be exposed to the wider issues to preclude unrealistic expectations and critical misunderstandings of LLW capabilities.

Policy writers and tacticians should be cautious not to preclude a technology from a given situation where it could be used to protect or save lives.

Specifying Definitions, Standards, & Testing. The purpose of this Session was to address definitions, standards, and testing. The desire was to develop a way forward in clarifying terminology and developing standards for less-lethal technologies specifically and minimal force option in general. Much of the discussion centered on the appropriate metrics to characterize a “scale for incapacitation.” The utility of such a scale is in providing officers some means of understanding what they should expect from a particular device. Time intervals and “levels” were discussed as possible approaches. The group agreed that it should charge the EORG (Electronic Operational Requirements
Group) with drafting and vetting levels of incapacitation in some form. There should be a concerted effort put forward to conducting a literature review to identify a comprehensive international terminology list, identifying new terms (e.g., pain compliance) and address/resolve discrepancies with regard to definitions so that we might press forward with a common vernacular when discussion less-lethal systems. The group also debated the issue of the appropriateness and methodology of establishing international standards for less-lethal development and testing. There was consensus that accuracy and other measurable characteristics of weapons might have established standards and these must be reasonable. However, developing standards for effectiveness may be illusive, due to the variability of the human anatomy, its condition, and the context of operational use. There was general agreement that gaining the political, if not monetary, support of law enforcement professional organizations would be crucial to pursuing acceptance and implementation of developed standards by governments.

**Less-Lethal Consultative Forum**

This year ILEF delegates had the opportunity of attending and participating in a consultative forum with a wide range of individuals and groups who had both interest in, and concerns regarding the testing, development and use of less lethal weapons by police and approaches to the management of conflict. The event hosted by ILEF and organized by the Northern Ireland Office was held at the Royal Society of Arts conference house in London, on 5 February 2004 and followed on directly from the main two day ILEF event held on the 3rd and 4th February. The theme of the consultative forum was Article 2 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms which states that:

*Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms* (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp43.htm).

The ILEF delegates were joined by other representatives from police departments, research and evaluation organizations and police oversight bodies, academic, political research groups, government departments and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In total there were over 100 delegates including speakers. The conference organizers were very deliberate in seeking such a diverse group of delegates. This brought with it a wealth of experience and a wide variety of different views on the issue of less lethal technologies and police responses to potentially violent situations.
The program for the day included presentations from keynote speakers followed by delegates’ questions and responses.

Topics covered by the presentations included:

- Human Rights, Police Ethics and Use of Force – Chief Constable Peter Neyroud;
- Developments in Conflict Management in the U.K. – Chief Constable Paul Acres;
- Accountability Issues – Mrs. Nuala O’Loan, Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland;
- A United States perspective – Mr. Michael Berkow Deputy Chief of Police Los Angeles Police Department;
- A Northern Ireland perspective – Mr. Denis Bradley, Vice Chairman of the Northern Ireland Policing Board.

In addition to formal presentations and question times, delegates also met in syndicate sessions to discuss in greater detail three topics related to the differentiated use of force and firearms by police officers. The syndicate sessions commenced with short presentations by representatives from NGO invitees; they covered the following issues which were then discussed in more detail within the workshop groups:

- The police approach to violent individuals endangering themselves or others.
- The police approach to serious crowd disorder involving individuals engaged in potentially life-threatening action.
- Issues associated with the use of force and international Human Rights principles.

Following the workshop sessions, the facilitator from each group, provided a summary report to all delegates and there was further opportunity for more question and discussion.

The Northern Ireland Office will provide a comprehensive report of all the proceedings which includes a reproduction of the presentations and addresses that were given to this conference. It also notes the responses to the speakers and reports on the discussions that took place within the workshops. A full copy of the report will be found at http://www.nio.gov.uk.

This consultative event was important in promoting engagement, between practitioners, interest groups and other non-government actors. It undoubtedly provided an opportunity for a greater appreciation of the issues and concerns surrounding use of less lethal technologies.

It is hoped that as a result of this consultation, future debate will be better informed and will reflect a willingness to seek engagement between all interested parties.
Summary and Conclusions

The 2004 Forum addressed many issues related to less-lethal concepts, technologies, and deployment. The delegates explored less-lethal weapons (LLW) database development and resource sharing; effectiveness and injury potential; tactics and use; and common standards for development, testing, training, and operational use. The presentations and the Syndicate Sessions are detailed in the following text. The major recommendations are:

1. Development of Agreed Operational Requirements. The work on developing Operational Requirements for less-lethal weapons, and consensus across the international law enforcement community, is considered a high priority. The work initiated by the Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG) following ILEF 2002 should continue. The group should also address issues associated with measurements of effectiveness.

2. Articulate Operational Requirements to Manufacturers. There is a need to create a mechanism to communicate the agreed international Operational Requirements being developed by EORG to bodies such as the International Chiefs of Police and particularly with manufacturers. One option was for ILEF to harness the support of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. It would then be able to articulate and communicate the ‘model’ international law enforcement operational requirements to manufacturers and suppliers and for law enforcement to begin to drive technology development in this field.

3. Terminology Standardization. That the EORG develop standard definitions for life threatening, serious injury, and other less-lethal medical terminology.

4. ILEF Standards. That the EORG (Electronic Operational Requirements Group) develop a comprehensive set of standards for review by all ILEF members, then, publish these documents for external/peer review by practitioners, industry, and professional organizations. These standards should consider including levels of incapacitation in some form and establishing or defining levels of effectiveness, recognizing that human variability will always be a challenge.

5. Identify Desired Effects and Outcomes. There is a need to formulate an operational statement of desired effects/outcomes of less-lethal weapons. There should be as much clarity as possible as to what a particular device does, or does not do. There is a need to appreciate that there are different interpretations influenced often by departmental doctrine and historical issues. This is work that could be developed by EORG.
6. **Describe and Provide Measures of Effectiveness.** There is a need to link descriptions of effectiveness with measures of effectiveness. The group was made aware of work commenced in the UK under the auspices of the Patten/ACPO Steering Group to identify effectiveness criteria for less-lethal devices. A summary of the emerging approach is provided in the Steering Groups Phase 4 Report (see [http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf, page 18](http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf, page 18)). The integration of these descriptions with the type of measures described by Syndicate 2 (Determining Effectiveness and Injury Potential) could enable effectiveness criteria to be better articulated and measured.

7. **Incorporate Psychological Criteria into Operational Requirements.** There is a need to identify and understand the psychological elements of aggressive behavior in conflict situations and ensure that the development of less-lethal weapons includes design factors intended to operate on both the physical and psychological level. It was evident that the use of the aiming laser on the TASER® was in itself resolving many situations without resort to discharge of the weapon. Similarly, it was evident that the often intended deterrent effect of a show of force capability could either diffuse or incite a crowd. There is a need to gain a clearer understanding of how different options are likely to be interpreted by groups.

8. **Sharing of Information & Data Exchange.** There is a need to encourage the sharing of information between military and law enforcement agencies and across international boundaries. The database should leverage the abundance of open source data that is available on the internet. Through the professional organizations, ILEF should strive to identify and solicit support from key representatives in each country to advocate the Forum, and its data sharing initiatives, within that country. Release and open exchange of related medical, operational, and test data would facilitate understanding of these concepts and technologies and perhaps permit the development of systems that will ultimately provide law enforcement with better options without placing officers, subjects, and the public at risk of death or serious injury. The database, in conjunction with the existing website (and its discussion board and project tools), could become a virtual form of ILEF workshop to further develop our role, maintain our work, and sustain important relationships. It was also recognized that there is a need for marketing in some fashion in order to fund aspects of the forum. This might also be considered an aspect of strategic planning and accomplished within the framework of the ILEF website as a project.

9. **Notification of Program Testing and Sharing Information on Operational Trials.** It is important for the professional user community to endeavor to ensure that colleagues are aware of ongoing and future conflict management tests and experimentation. This will reduce the duplicative efforts and perhaps encourage a wider acceptance of developed solutions through open and ongoing peer review. There should be a mechanism to notify other departments and jurisdictions of structured force-wide or national operational trails. It would be useful if there was a wider source of information for such trails. One suggestion was that these could be stored on the International database being discussed by Syndicate 1 (Developing and Populating Less-Lethal Weapons Database).
10. **Medical Data Access.** Conduct an investigation into, and seek support for, appropriate methods to obtain accurate and comprehensive medical data related to less-lethal effects and injuries. Consider an approach that might include a “firewall” that provides researchers only anonymous identifiers. There is some precedent for this in the area of corrections (prisons).

11. **Literature Review.** That members of ILEF (perhaps as a continued EORG task) conduct a literature review to compile a comprehensive international terminology list, identify new terms (e.g., pain compliance), and address/resolve discrepancies with regard to definitions so that a common vernacular for discussing less-lethal systems could be progressed. Consideration should be given to collaborative arrangements with other research programs or seeking out opportunities for international funding to advance this work.

12. **Develop/Adapt Injury Model.** Conduct a thorough literature review to identify potential models and their characteristics which make them appropriate for less-lethal injuries. Select a number of these and validate them with actual injury data. Over time, these models could be modified to better suit less-lethal systems.

13. **Conflict Management.** The concept of conflict management as being advanced within the UK is indicative of the importance of this topic. It should be used to complement the work being developed by ILEF, and law enforcement agencies internationally, in respect of less-lethal options and technologies. Conflict Management should be viewed holistically rather than in a manner that isolates segments independently for examination or application. This includes developing a greater understanding of what causes individuals or crowds to react in particular ways. There is a need for a greater understanding of the parameters and range options – from brawls outside a pub through to full public disorder situation as well as encounters with emotionally disturbed individuals to determined armed criminals or terrorists groups. Each aspect of conflict management – be it pre-event planning, negotiation, less-lethal technologies, or lethal force – should be viewed as a component that must consider the potential contribution of the other components to best address a particular situation. Desired outcome should be determined then appropriate conflict management tools to reach end state. These decisions should consider the human rights of all those who will be affected by the police action. Sometimes less-lethal technologies are just one contribution and not an entire effect for resolution itself.

14. **Develop and promote ILEF.** The Forum requires some strategic planning and funding arrangements to ensure that it continues to provide a mechanism not only for sharing information but promoting concepts, requirements and best practice in relation to less-lethal options to the international law enforcement community. One of the first steps in this process is the development of a collective vision for the Forum, crafting a concise mission statement, and outlining clear and obtainable objectives. This might be accomplished within the framework of the protected side of the ILEF website as a project.
SECTION 1:
Workshop and Conference Discussions
SYNDICATE SESSION 1:
Developing and Populating the Less-Lethal Weapons Database

CHAIR: Matthew Symons

The purpose of this Session, led by Mr. Matthew Symons of the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) - Home Office, was to address questions regarding the development, publication, and maintenance of the International Less-Lethal Weapons Database.

Obtaining information related to less-lethral weapons is challenging. There is not a single source where this data has been adequately correlated. Nor has the international law enforcement community had a reputable, independent, and structured source of information from which to draw. There is therefore no single comprehensive reference point to assist in researching whether there is a technology for use in a given situation, what research has been undertaken, what agencies have operational experience of equipment or to examine the associated injury data.

The International Less-Lethal Weapons Database created by the Police Scientific Development Branch (Home Office) has the potential to provide such a structure. This database was created in response to one of the recommendations of the International Law Enforcement Forum in 2002. There was general consensus among the group that the effort thus far was laudable. There was also much discussion regarding who would and should see the collected data.

Discussion in open forum clarified that all of the information currently contained within the database could already be sourced by searching through web-based or openly published material. In particular, statements made by police organizations after the use of less-lethal weapons were drawn entirely from the official press releases of the police department concerned.

It is important for the credibility of the database that original source material be used whenever possible. At a minimum, the material should be traceable to a credible source.

Database Publication

Security issues notwithstanding, there was consensus within the group that the database should be prepared on the internet with appropriate access control. Publishing in another format, such as a compact disk (CD), would reduce the value of the database as it would become dated nearly immediately after publication.
A web-based version would reduce costs (printing and mailing of CDs), allow for more regular updates (reducing obsolescence), provide access to a broader range of law enforcement professionals, and facilitate the data acquisition process through electronic submissions. This format would also allow the Forum and the database itself to be advertised.

There was some concern expressed about computer literacy and the need to ensure the graphical user interface (GUI) is intuitive. The “face” of the database should not intimidate those with minimal computer and internet skills. Online help tools, graphics, and large understandable print would also be recommended.

Automated data entry tools might allow data to be submitted by an authorized contributor or organization. There would be some controls required in order to prevent database corruption, but this is feasible.

### Database Access

The debate surrounding access to the database centered on existing and future requirements (letter and spirit) of the Freedom of Information Acts (FOIA) of the US and UK on the one hand, and rightfully maintaining security for public safety and criminal countermeasure reasons, on the other.

A publicly accessible database could reduce the number and frequency of FOIA requests to individual jurisdictions. Concern was expressed that such accessibility had the potential to enable those with hostile intent to learn enough about less-lethal technologies and police methods to develop countermeasures significant enough to put public safety at risk.

The group generally agreed, however, that if a completely restricted database were published, it would eventually become known in the public domain and there would then be great pressure to release all information.

The group concluded that the best approach for submitting information to the database would be for contributors to only submit information that they are happy to be released into the public domain. Other more sensitive information might then be obtained by site visitors through contact details and information links to the owner of the information. This approach leaves, then, only one version of the database.

In order to encourage use of the site, and more importantly encourage data submission, it was generally agreed by the group that all government-sanctioned law enforcement officers/agencies should have free access to the site, as could those who have a registered interest subject to some form of agreed official endorsement. In this light, an online registration form that can be verified by the administrator would be useful. This may require designating referees for agencies (e.g., large police forces, governmental bodies, etc.) to verify identities. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other users might possibly pay for access, which could defer the maintenance costs incurred by PSDB or whoever is designated to maintain the site.
Sharing Information

The group expressed concerns about convincing military and law enforcement agencies to release data to the site. Certainly in North America there may be some difficulties with access to existing databases. Perhaps part of the answer lies in ensuring that the database includes the abundance of verified and impartial open source data that is available on the internet. This would provide a wealth of information for the casual researcher and public "watchdogs." Additionally, data for which governments would like a level of control maintained could be forwarded to, or accessed by, individuals only after a request has been made, and some level of verification of identity/background conducted. This is obviously fraught with its own challenges.

Another approach would be to merely provide a summary of the research or assessment conducted with contact information for the responsible agency. This would allow legitimate requests to be made to the owner of the data while managing out the risks associated with entirely open access.

The group anticipated that the police approach to information sharing is likely to be less restrictive that that of the military. In part, this was due to the fact that the police tended to make very little use of highly classified technologies, but there was a different cultural approach adopted by the Police service. In this regard, it is important to expand the reach of ILEF more broadly into the professional law enforcement and military, perhaps through professional organizations, and gain support from key individuals as advocates for data sharing on less-lethal weapon deployments.

Scope of Information and Database Administration

The discussion here centered on the ability to achieve a balance between the number of data elements needed to make the database useful (increasing complexity) and making data entry simple enough to preclude "scaring off" potential sources of deployment data. Generally, there seemed to be agreement that separate fields were necessary in order to allow searching and statistical analysis of data.

A number of members recommended a standardized deployment template. It was suggested that, as much as feasible, the fields should use "tick boxes" or "drop-downs" for data entry simplicity. Additionally, it was suggested that the data entry page be kept to a single page (or screen). The proposed fields included:
The group felt that it was best for a single administrator to oversee the database, this would ensure that the data within the database and the overall design stayed constant. The development of the database thus far has been backed and funded by the Home Office and ACPO. The group was happy for the Home Office and ACPO to continue developing the database. When the subject of manufacturers having access and possibly providing financial support was raised, the group consensus was that this would jeopardize the independence of the database and its perceived legitimacy. Charging companies for access to data could provide funding, but would again require that all data be unrestricted.

**Recommendations**

- **Database Publication.** Development of the International Less-Lethal Weapons Database should be continued with the aim of producing an unrestricted web-based version of the current database containing verified and impartial open source information relating to less-lethal weapons.

- **Sharing of Information.** There is a need to do more to encourage the sharing of information across military and law enforcement boundaries and across international lines. The database should leverage the abundance of open source data that is available on the internet, if it can be shown to be from a credible source. Also, the professional organizations should strive to identify and solicit support from key representatives in each country to advocate ILEF, and its data sharing initiatives, within that country.

- **Virtual ILEF.** The existing ILEF website (and its discussion board and project tools already online), could become a virtual form of ILEF to further develop our role, maintain our work, and sustain the important relationships that we have established. The database could be accessed or linked from this site.
SYNDICATE SESSION 2:
Determining Effectiveness and Injury Potential

CHAIR: Dr. John M. Kenny (Commander, USN-Ret)

The purpose of this Session, led by Dr. John Kenny of the Applied Research Laboratory at Penn State, was to address questions regarding less-lethal weapon effectiveness and any related injury potential.

This session began with Dr. Kenny focusing the group first on determining what we currently know about injuries and effectiveness, then on what is important for the future and why.

Injuries

One of the main questions here was: “Is there an accurate list of injuries?” What the group decided was – sort of. Due to the lack of human testing and the corresponding reliance on animal and cadaver data, it is difficult to make clear scientific statements. There are exceptions. There are a few systems – including the Area Denial System (ADS) developed in the United States – which have actually undergone significant human testing.

Beyond these few, however, much work conducted to date has perhaps been overly reliant upon police assessments of injury and injury potential rather than definitive medical data. A suggestion was made regarding a standard framework for medical practitioners to use in their own research that might be useful. In this regard, there is the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS) which has been applied as a start point. In any case, the first step is to conduct a thorough literature review to identify potential models and their characteristics, which make them appropriate for less-lethal injuries. Then a number of these must be selected and validated with actual injury data. The model(s) might then be modified to better suit less-lethal systems.

Anecdotal data can also be difficult to obtain. The context of the LLW deployment is one variable that impacts on the level of detail of any available data. For example, incidents involving individuals with arrests would have detailed information available either through permission of the subject to view medical records or through officer observation. On the other hand, deployments in a crowd control situation may have an intended effect of dispersing subjects, therefore no arrest or detailed observation of effects and certainly no ability to view records of medical services rendered.
There was also much discussion regarding characterization and modelling of injuries. The group agreed that there needs to be a thorough literature review to identify any models and frameworks that we might apply and to develop a more comprehensive list of clear and accurate definitions that we can use across a range of jurisdictions. It also agreed that there is an “acceptable level of injury,” but the definition is still illusive, since there are a host of political, community, economic and social issues influencing this definition. A goal might be, therefore, to develop an objective scale of injury, which might look like that at Figure 2-1. This type of technology independent scale could conceivably serve as both a situational weapon selection tool and as injury design parameters for less-lethal weapons.

![Less Lethal Scale of Injury](image)

**Figure 2-1.** Example of what a less-lethal weapon injury scale might look like. The area above the broken red line displays all unacceptable injury types. The area below the broken red line encompass all of the acceptable injuries without considering probability. The curve represents a notional less-lethal weapon’s injury types and associated probabilities of occurrence.

**Effects and Effectiveness**

Related very closely with injury potential are effects and effectiveness. The group acknowledged that effectiveness was dependent upon a number of contextual variables beyond the capabilities of a particular technology – and beyond the scope of what the group hoped to accomplish during the session. The comment was made that we haven’t really come very far regarding less-lethals when we are still using “cave-man” technology (blunt impact).
There was much discussion, however, concerning short and long term effects of less-lethal weapons (both physiological and psychological). It was generally agreed that evaluating short term effects is fairly straightforward (yet still requiring extensive testing). Identification of all potential injuries, including those unexpected, and determining a probable frequency of those injuries is important in characterizing the effects of the particular technology. Additionally, there is an implied obligation to conduct additional toxicity research and testing when dealing with technologies such as CS and other chemical-based riot control agents.

Determining long term effects is a much more difficult proposition. The group consensus was that it is unreasonable to test every particular technology for every possible long term effect. What is reasonable is to identify those primary long term effects of concern and conduct the appropriate research in an effort to discount them with some level of certainty.

Finally, it is important to underscore that although a particular less-lethal technology might have some undesirable effect or potential for serious injury, there are often numerous means to mitigate the severest of these injuries. Weapon accuracy can mitigate potentially serious injury by increasing the probability that an impact can be directed to a less vulnerable part of the anatomy. This was seen in the UK development of the L21A1 Baton Round. Not only was the accuracy improved dramatically from its predecessor, but appropriate tactics for employment were designed for the system and officers trained exhaustively to the established standard to reduce the potential for serious injury.

Acceptability of a particular technology is a complex concept tied to both effects and injury potential (or the perception thereof). It is also a matter of perspective. What might seem reasonable to a law enforcement officer in a given situation might not seem reasonable to the public, the community, or society. On the other hand, it might also be perfectly reasonable from a legal perspective. Often we are culturally predisposed against the use of certain technologies due to historic “bad experiences,” which might render a particular technology unacceptable for a given context.

**Recommendations**

- **Data Exchange.** Related to the continuance of ILEF, and the maintenance of less-lethal databases in general, is breaching the logjams that exist in data exchange. Release and open exchange of related medical, operational, and test data would facilitate understanding of these concepts and technologies and perhaps permit the development of systems that will ultimately provide law enforcement with better options without placing officers, subjects, and the public at risk of death or serious injury.
**Notification of Program Testing.** That members of ILEF, as a community of professionals, endeavour to ensure that colleagues are aware of ongoing and future test and experimentation plans in the realm of conflict management. This will allow a reduction in the duplicative efforts and perhaps a wider acceptance of developed solutions through open and ongoing peer review.

**Terminology Standardization.** That ILEF’s Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG) develop a standard definition for life threatening, serious injury, and other less-lethal medical terminology.

**Medical Data Access.** That ILEF conduct an investigation into, and seek support for, appropriate methods to obtain accurate and comprehensive medical data related to less-lethal effects and injuries. Consider an approach that might include a “firewall” that provides researcher only anonymous identifiers. There is some precedent for this in the area of corrections.

**Develop/Adapt Injury Model.** That ILEF conduct a thorough literature review to identify potential models and their characteristics which make them appropriate for less-lethal injuries. Select a number of these and validate them with actual injury data. As we proceed, we may then find we can modify the model(s) to better suit less-lethal systems.
SYNDICATE SESSION 3:
Optimizing Tactics, Training and Use

CHAIR: Assistant Chief Constable Ian Arundale

The purpose of this Session, led by Ian Arundale, Assistant Chief Constable, ACPO Police Use of Firearms Secretariat was to address whether law enforcement internationally were optimizing tactics, training and use of less-lethal options. The group used a series of sub-questions to develop the issue under review.

Is Law Enforcement Making the Best Use of Currently Available Options?

In addressing this issue it was first acknowledged that there was a responsibility to protect life and that there was a paradox in that sometimes it became necessary to use lethal force in order to protect life. It was considered that the ideal LLW would be one that enables the user to also deal with a lethal threat. However, technologies were not sufficiently mature or predictably consistent, to allow them to be deployed in many situations without overwatch by officers armed with conventional bullet firing weapons.

In considering whether law enforcement was optimizing tactics and equipment, there was a view that development of less-lethal technologies was often being driven by manufacturers as opposed to users. This had resulted in a situation where in the United States there was often an abundance of implied ‘solutions looking for users’ (i.e., law enforcement would become aware of new products then the practitioners would determine the scenario in which they would be used).

While a similar approach was recognized elsewhere, the policing arrangements and smaller number of policing departments enabled a more corporate and structured approach to research, development, and introduction of evaluated less-lethal weapons. It was also recognized that there is an extensive range of less-lethal devices being used across the US and elsewhere and that users are gradually becoming aware of what does and does not work effectively. Increasingly, there was recognition that only a small percentage of these devices could be described as being consistent, accurate, effective and acceptable less-lethal weapons.

In the open forum feedback session, several US delegates highlighted that while there were 81 kinetic energy devices being used by various police departments, there were only four that could be considered to be accurate, consistent, and acceptable.
The group was of the view that there needs to be a way to capture, internationally, information on what worked and what did not work in a particular incident within an authoritative, independent, and easily accessed database. They considered the work on international databases being discussed in syndicate 1 to be of high importance.

The work started by the Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG) following last year’s ILEF has the potential to provide an internationally endorsed Operational Requirement that would help inform users and manufacturers as to what was actually required by law enforcement. It would be essential to find a way of having endorsement given to the findings of the group. One option was for ILEF to harness the support of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP). It should then be able to articulate and communicate the international law enforcement operational requirements to manufacturers and suppliers and for law enforcement to begin to drive technology development in this field. In addition, Associations of Chief Police Officers, most of whom are affiliated with IACP could be in a position to ensure that localized operational requirements are developed within the generic framework.

There was recognition that the impetus provided by the UK Steering Group set up to take forward Patten Recommendations 69 and 70 had resulted in the publication of a broad yet definitive operational requirement endorsed by the UK’s Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and a coordinated less-lethal research and development program. It was noted that this approach, which included scientific and medical assessment of less-lethal weapons and the publication of operational guidance on use, had been endorsed by the UK Government and reflected in the recently published Code of Practice by the UK Home Office. This Code sat above the Manual of Guidances issued by ACPO and had the potential to promote “corporacy” with respect to the pursuit of LLW in the UK.

The Ideal Less-Lethal Technology

While military and law enforcement had struggled to articulate the ideal less-lethal candidate, the standard which has become the ‘virtual bench mark’ had been introduced into the public psyche by a futuristic television series in the 1960’s – The Star Trek “Phaser”.

The imaginary Star Trek Type II Phaser can be set for stun, heat, disrupt, and other settings.

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1 Patten Report Recommendation 69 stated that “An immediate and substantial investment should be made in a research programme to find an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal alternative to the plastic baton round (PBR).”

2 Patten Report Recommendation 70 stated that “The police should be equipped with a broader range of public order equipment than the RUC currently possesses, so that a commander has a number of options at his/her disposal which might reduce reliance on, or defer resort to, the PBR.”
Although such a device does not exist, the nearest that law enforcement has is the latest generation of TASER® technology. There was a view that electricity is a technology to be pursued but that its effect need to be better articulated to the public. Ideally, electrical incapacitation technologies would be able to operate without the need for connecting wires — the electricity could be transferred without barb penetration of the skin. If this was an ideal less-lethal concept it would be important for law enforcement to find a mechanism for communicating this effectively with technology developers and to assist in developing the concept. It is also essential that the police service is not seen in any way to stifle innovation and that there was clear communication with manufacturers.

**Operational Doctrine**

There was concern expressed that in some jurisdictions officers found themselves having to use particular less-lethal weapons in situations for which they had not been purchased. Often weapons designed for use against an individual subject were being used in an indiscriminate manner to disperse a rioting mob. While it was agreed that less-lethal weapons should not generally be categorized for use only in particular situations, there was a requirement for well founded guidance and policy documents to inform the command and control mechanisms of the capabilities and drawbacks of particular weapons.

It is therefore important that individual police departments have a clearly articulated doctrine on less-lethal options. It was also recognized that currently there is no single technology that has potential to meet all the needs of the police service. All have their limitations.

Notwithstanding, the use of less-lethal devices is undoubtedly saving lives in jurisdictions where police officers are equipped with a range of accessible less-lethal options. These jurisdictions have also seen a significant reduction in officers resorting to discharging conventional bullet firing weapons, improving public safety, and reducing use of batons as well as the incidence of violent struggles with police officers. It is essential that organizations have robust policy and guidance documents relating to the use of specific less-lethal options.

**Cultural and Historical Inhibitors**

Historic and cultural issues were a factor that often inhibited full use of currently available options. The US use of police dogs and water cannon during the 1970’s race riots were cultural impediments to developing these tactics as was early use of baton rounds as a means of crowd dispersal in Northern Ireland. Despite historical baggage there were examples of how public education, police training and advances in technology can enable progress to be made and technologies to be used with public support in appropriate situations to save lives and protect society. The recent successful introduction of the UK baton round system as a less-lethal option in support of firearms in the UK is one such example.
In 1991, the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles had the potential to stop or impede the acceptability of electrical devices. However TASER® was now being widely used throughout LA and North America and is being evaluated in the UK. In reviewing the reasons for this turn around in public acceptability, the following points were noted with respect to TASER® technology and the LA experience:

- The technology had changed in terms of design, appearance and effect;
- There was public engagement and information provided with respect to the technology;
- The police training programmes were more extensive;
- Community Support Groups were now in place;
- The police proactively engage with all community and interest groups especially in the aftermath of any controversial use of force incident; and
- The public wish and expect police to have effective and tested less-lethal options in resolving critical situations.

Similar public education processes were noted in Canada in respect of TASER® and the UK trial was being undertaken on a similar basis. It was considered that such a process could be used to ensure that enhanced technologies, which could contribute to the saving of lives and effective resolution of incidents, were not removed from the police armory because of perceptions of previous abuse or inappropriate use. Rather it was important that improved technology, revised guidance on use, and effective post-use scrutiny enabled effective and appropriate use to save lives.

It was reported that the Canadian experience of water cannon had been positive and consideration was being given to use chemical irritants (CS) within the water supply. It was also noted that this concept, widely used in Europe, was not being taken forward by the Police Service of Northern Ireland who had recently introduced modern, built-to-specification water cannon. The introduction had involved what is considered to be the most comprehensive research, technical assessment, and medical assessment ever undertaken in respect of this technology (for details see the report at [http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf](http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf)).

It was also acknowledged that ILEF had provided the opportunity for interchange between policy-makers, scientists, medical experts, and practitioners on an international basis and had resulted in the sharing of good practice.
Societal factors), details of this are set out in the 2nd report of UK Steering Group (see page 44 of the Phase 2 report at http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/baton rep4.pdf).

**Where Are the Gaps? Training, Command, Technology?**

It was considered that the right framework and language is needed to enable Chief Officers, Government, and the public to be informed of operationally and technically accurate details of less-lethal equipment and its deployment. There was also a need to ensure that the appropriate strategic and tactical training was given to Operational Commanders. They need to be exposed to the wider issues. This could not completely be delivered by tactical trainers who would not have been exposed to or have had the opportunity to critically consider strategic issues.

It was considered that, internationally, practitioners understood the tactical and weapons issues related to less-lethal options but that often commanders had a knowledge and skills gap. This had given rise to unrealistic expectations and critical misunderstandings of certain weapon systems. A number of UK police forces had mistakenly believed that the L21 baton rounds would instantly incapacitate, while Northern Ireland officers realized this to be incorrect. Many UK officers were surprised when the first operational uses in Great Britain (GB) did not result in instant incapacitation. Similarly, the Canadian experience of 37mm Arwen was such that in public order situations operational officer expectations were not met and officers were surprised it did not knock the person down.

There was clearly a need for the public to be informed and educated about less-lethal systems which were being introduced. This had occurred in Canada in relation to the introductions of the TASER® and had eased its introduction.

**Are Specific Tactics in Place for Less-Lethal Options?**

In considering tactics, it was agreed that it was necessary to differentiate between technologies designed to encourage compliance as opposed to those which invoked a degree of incapacitation. There may also be a need to consider the context in which LLWs would be used. While the directions and guidance on use should be essentially the same irrespective of the situation, there may be specific command and control or authority issues in public order situations which would not apply in one-on-one or small group confrontations.

The early use of baton round to disperse crowds had more recently been replaced by the precise accurate use against specific individuals who were offering serious threats. This application applied both within the context of public order situations and the lone aggressor. While this distinction between use against individuals (albeit in public order context and their former use as a crowd control dispersal concept) had been articulated, it had not fully entered the public consciousness. It therefore followed that baton round technology (unlike water cannon or so called tear gas) should not be described as dispersal tactic. This is a significant change in role from the earlier one, which was simply to maintain distance and to disperse or contain the crowd.
There was disappointment expressed that the malodorants have not been pursued as vigorously as other technologies. It was recognized that essentially these were chemical compounds and did require testing. However they could be used in either dispersal or area denial capacity and if applied through an accurate and discriminating projectile, could assist in making an individual not only desist any violent action but isolate the perpetrator from associates.

The potential for greater use of malodorants was discussed particularly in that it was recognized that these were essentially chemical agents and there is a requirement to determine what tactical advantage they offered beyond other chemical dispersants. It was agreed that there were circumstances where malodorants would be useful. The objective was to make an individual desist from violent activity and to disperse, and there were other situations where there was a need to immediately arrest the individual.

It was suggested that operators should have a careful articulation of the effect that they want, not the solution. It was agreed that this articulation of effect should sit within the operational requirement.

Policy writers and tacticians must be careful not to preclude a technology from a given situation where it could be used to protect or save lives. It was recognized that technologies could have crossover applications into situations which were outside of the envisaged situational use for which they had been introduced. For example, it was stated that within Canada, some police organizations train to the use of TASER® in ‘touch stun’ mode within a public order/crowd situation. Also, an operational example was cited from elsewhere in which the police approached a rioting crowd in line formation while collectively ‘arching’ the TASER® and this had the effect of causing the crowd to disperse.

There was a need for policy developers to adopt a holistic overview and there were risks in devolving responsibility for developing less-lethal options to separate public order, firearms and officer safety sub groups. It was considered that greater integration was required. The way forward was considered to be through a more integrated Conflict Management Committee and the holding of regular Conflict Management conferences.

**Are Less-Lethal Tactics “Tacked-on?”**

It was acknowledged that some less-lethal weapons are controversial and this is made worse when they are ‘tacked-on’ as a supporting option within a conventional firearms operation without there being an integrated set of tactics within a broader use of force doctrine. Within the UK, it had become the norm to dispatch a police dog patrol when firearms officers are sent to an incident. Increasingly, armed response crews are also issued with Baton Guns.
Situations were discussed where operational commanders had dismissed less-lethal options due to the perception that they were dealing with a lethal threat which they considered could only be met by lethal force. The consensus view was that in most situations there is no reason (subject to the number of officers available for deployment) why less-lethal are not also deployed, albeit with lethal capability over watch. It was agreed that there is a need to incorporate LLW into operational contingency plans and standard operational procedures.

Another consideration is whether the deployment of a LLW might actually aggravate a situation rather than resolve it and this needs articulating. Essentially this was no different than other considerations for police deployment to specific events and a graduated response to threats is normally appropriate.

Police presence and tactics should be designed to resolve threats and to minimise threats to the public and the police officer. There was concern expressed about vertical or linear use of force continuums that placed weapons or tactics not a hierarchy of options. The preferred model was much more situational which permitted the appropriate option to be selected at the appropriate time. This concept was well articulated in the UK’s Guidance on use of TASER® in the following words:

The TASER® should not be regarded as replacement for other routinely issued protective equipment or for conventional firearms but rather one of a number of options. An officer may also need to resort to another option if the device does not have the effect intended. In circumstances where authorised firearms officers have been deployed to a situation, the authorisation to utilise their firearm will also include the authority to use any other less-lethal option or technology with which they have been issued including where appropriate the TASER®. It would be inappropriate for commanders or supervisory officers to attempt to restrict the deployment of an authorised firearms officer to a particular less-lethal technology or use of force option. (ACPO TASER® guidance section 5)

It was considered important that this type of generic guidance should, where appropriate, be uniformly applied to all less-lethal weapons. There was a risk that each set of operational guidance even when issued with a particular jurisdiction would be subtly different.

**Recommendations**

- **Articulate Operational Requirements to Manufacturers.** There is a need to create a mechanism to communicate agreed international Operational Requirements being developed by EORG with manufacturers. One option was for ILEF to harness the support of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. It would then be able to articulate and
Communicate the ‘model’ international law enforcement operational requirements to manufacturers and suppliers and for law enforcement to begin to drive technology development in this field.

- **Identify Desired Effects and Outcomes.** There is a need to formulate an operational statement of desired effects/outcomes of less-lethal weapons. However, there are risks in having a rating of incapacitation. There should be as much clarity as possible as to what a particular device does, or does not do. There are also hazards in developing rigid definitions of effect. There is a need to appreciate that there are different interpretations influenced often by departmental doctrine and historical issues. This is work that could be developed by EORG.

- **Describe and Provide Measures of Effectiveness.** There is a need to link descriptions of effectiveness with measures of effectiveness. The group was made aware of work commenced in the UK under the auspices of the Patten/ACPO Steering Group to identify effectiveness criteria for less-lethal devices. A summary of the emerging approach is provided in the Steering Group’s phase 4 report (see [http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf](http://www.nio.gov.uk/pdf/batonrep4.pdf), page 18). The integration of these descriptions with the type measures described by syndicate 2 could enable effectiveness criteria to better articulated and measured.

- **Incorporate Psychological Criteria into Operational Requirements.** There is a need to identify and understand the psychological elements of aggressive behavior in conflict situations and ensure that the development of less-lethal weapons includes design factors intended to operate on both the physical and psychological level. It was evident that the use of the red dot on the TASER® was in itself resolving many situations without resort to discharge of the weapon. Similarly, it was evident that the often intended deterrent effect of a show of force capability could either diffuse or incite a crowd.

- **Share Information on Operational Trials.** There should be a mechanism to notify other departments and jurisdictions of structured force wide or national operational trials. It would be useful if there was a wider source of information for such trials. One suggestion was that these could be stored on the International data-base being discussed by Syndicate 1.

- **Develop a holistic approach to conflict management.** A more holistic approach to minimal force options and to conflict management is encouraged. This should include developing a greater understanding of what causes individuals or crowds to react in particular ways. There is a need for a greater understanding of the parameters and range options are applicable; from brawls outside a pub through to full public disorder situation as well as encounters with emotional disturbed individuals through to determined armed criminals or terrorist groups.
SYNDICATE SESSION 4:
Specifying Definitions, Standards, & Testing

CHAIR: Colonel Andrew F. Mazzara (USMC-Ret)

The purpose of this Session, led by Colonel Andy Mazzara of the Applied Research Laboratory at Penn State, was to address definitions, standards, and testing. The desire was to develop a way forward in clarifying terminology and developing standards for less-lethal technologies specifically and minimal force option in general.

Definitions

The group first addressed the subject of defining a scale for incapacitation. An incapacitation scale would enable users and medical personnel to better classify and articulate outcomes in a manner which would enable comparison. It would have the potential over time to provide informed data on the range of likely outcomes and could eventually be used to give devices an incapacitation rating. Although the scale may not provide complete clarity, users need to know what generally to expect from a particular system or device. Device failures are often reported due to lack of realistic expectations (e.g., the first British Police experience with using a baton round in a non-public order situation did not result in incapacitation). There was a similar experience when a TASER® failed to incapacitate and follow-up measures were necessary. A well-developed scale might allow officers to more easily select a system or approach from a number of options according to a scenario or threat. Additionally, having a universal test method considers that the levels of required performance and acceptability may vary by country, culture, and organization.

Much of the discussion centered around the appropriate metrics to characterize such a scale. One such approach would be to assign a time for incapacitation (e.g., 2 to 3 seconds; 2 minutes; 15 minutes; 1 hour; more than 1 hour) for a number of “levels of incapacitation.” An alternate approach might be to broadly define a level by a particular desired response. For example, the scale could start at distracting, through debilitating3, into incapacitating4:

3 Debilitating has been defined by the EORG of ILEF as degraded functionality to the point of inability to present a threat. Considered by degree, but only partially or not completely incapacitating.
4 Incapacitating has been defined by the EORG of ILEF as causing temporary and total dysfunction and a complete inability to perform basic aggressor functions or pose a threat.
The nature of less-lethal technologies is that the desired effect on a particular subject is as much a function of the characteristics of the target (subject) as it is a function of the characteristics of the particular weapon or device.

Level 1 – Subject(s) temporarily distracted
Level 2 – Subject(s) debilitated/degraded function
Level 3 – Subject(s) incapacitated/self-recovery
Level 4 – Subject(s) incapacitated/requires medical intervention

The group did not achieve consensus, but recommended that it should charge the EORG (Electronic Operational Requirements Group) with drafting and vetting levels of incapacitation in some form.

There are a growing number of terms related to less-lethal weapons and their effects. These terms seem to take on a number of different meanings depending upon the weapon, target, situational context, and whether the discussants are law enforcement, military, or academic professionals. Often these terms are defined for legal purpose or simply as a matter of convenience.

There should be a concerted effort put forward to conducting a literature review to identify a comprehensive international terminology list, identifying new terms (e.g., pain compliance) and address/resolve discrepancies with regard to definitions so that we might press forward with a common vernacular when discussion less-lethal systems.

Standards

The group also debated the issue of the appropriateness and methodology of establishing international standards for less-lethal development and testing. First, they acknowledged that there is precedent for establishing such standards. There are accepted international standards and protocols in many professional fields which influence – if not govern – research, development, testing, and manufacturing. On the other hand, it was also noted that in the area of less-lethal technologies and their effects on humans there are many variables that often make each encounter unique. This is not nearly as precise a science as, for example, electrical engineering, where there are indisputable principles at work. The nature of less-lethal technologies is that the desired effect on a particular subject is as much a function of the characteristics of the target (subject) as it is a function of the characteristics of the particular weapon or device.

Members of the group illustrated that particular countries often define their standards based on the review of generally accepted standards developed by other countries or international organizations unaffiliated with a particular government. For example, with regard to body armour standards, the French have a tender document (non-binding), whereas the British Police have a formally established government standard (binding). In the UK the Police Scientific Development Branch of Home Office have published standards for the testing and classification of both ballistic and knife resistant body armour, which manufacturers wishing to have body armour tested for police use are required to accept and mark their products according to such classifications.
The US National Institute of Justice (NIJ), French and PSDB standards whilst similar do have their differences (point blank shot, penetration depth, etc).

There was consensus that accuracy and other measurable characteristics of weapons might have established standards and these must be reasonable. For example, we should define minimum safe range based on point of aim and not try to anticipate every possible move by a subject. However, developing standards for effectiveness could be illusive, due to the variability of the human anatomy and its condition (fitness, health, intoxication, emotional response). It was also emphasized that there are operational use differences that would impact on perceived effectiveness. There are often differences in what may be viewed as effective for public order and individual assailant scenarios. The public order situation might require preventing future hostile actions, whereas individual assailants often need to be brought under immediate control before they become a threat.

One member described the work currently being done by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Studies, Analysis, and Simulation (SAS) Panel number 035 regarding less-lethals. The NATO framework might be an approach for ILEF and participating member organizations to consider as an initial set of “measures of performance” and “measures of response.” In the open feedback forum it was considered that these measures of performance and response could be integrated with some UK work already underway to describe the measures of effectiveness.

Who sets standards?

Certainly an important aspect of gaining general acceptance of an international standard in any field is the support of appropriate academic and professional organizations, governments, the private sector, and of course the practitioners in the community to which those standards apply. The group agreed that, in terms of implementing standards, it would be best if they were established (if not developed) by the body responsible in each jurisdiction for determining standards for police equipment at the national level. An independent body would be a second choice for who should establish standards, merely because the standards would not be binding. Least desirable would be for manufacturers to establish standards, although in many cases that is currently the de facto state of affairs.

There was general agreement that gaining the political if not monetary support of professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) would be crucial to pursuing acceptance and implementation of developed standards by governments.
Recommendations

- **Literature Review.** That members of ILEF (perhaps as a continued EORG task) pursue international funding to conduct a literature review to compile a comprehensive international terminology list, identify new terms (e.g., pain compliance), and address/resolve discrepancies with regard to definitions so that we might press forward with a common vernacular when discussion less-lethal systems.

- **ILEF Standards.** That the EORG (Electronic Operational Requirements Group) develop a comprehensive set of standards for review by all ILEF members, then publish these documents for external/peer review by practitioners, industry, and professional organizations. These standards should consider including levels of incapacitation in some form and establishing or defining levels of effectiveness, recognizing that human variability will always be a challenge.
SECTION 2:
Special Remarks
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for
MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies
Applied Research Laboratory
The Pennsylvania State University

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

Developing a Less-Lethal Approach for the Police Service: a UK Perspective

Chief Constable Paul Acres QPM

Paul Acres is the Chief Constable of the Herefordshire Constabulary, England. He is also the Chair of the Conflict Management Sub Committee of the Association of Chief Constables, England Wales and Northern Ireland. As such, he has responsibility for the development of National Guidance and Policy, the development of less-lethal approaches to the management of conflict, and responses to potentially violent situations.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as Chair of Conflict Management Portfolio for ACPO [Association of Chief Police Officers], England Wales and Northern Ireland, thank you very much for this opportunity to update you on the approach being taken within the United Kingdom to the development of a less-lethal approach in the management of conflict and the police services responses to violent situations. I would also wish to extend your thanks to PSDB for hosting us at this superb venue.

The ACPO Conflict Management Portfolio embraces:

- Officer Safety issues associated with Self Defence, Arrest and Restraint
- Managing Public Order – Keeping the Peace
- Police Use of Firearms
- Close links with ACPO (TAM) - Terrorism and Allied Matters
- The use of Police Dogs and Horses

Whilst the portfolio deals with important issues in relation to the development of equipment the overall emphasis is on policies, process and training designed to 'Manage Out' Conflict and Violence.

The whole point of the police service and our very clear priorities are reflected in our Statement of Common Purpose and Values is to protect, help and reassure. So in resolving conflict at whatever level our aim is always the same. It is to do so safely without any use of force if possible. If it is not possible then we seek to use only the minimum amount of force necessary. It is an ethical position and leaders of the service work constantly to ensure the principles underpin all we do.
This conference has been organised as part of the international drive to develop policing approaches to the management of conflict and less-lethal weapons. Participation by the various policing, non-government organisations and other experts from Great Britain, Northern Ireland and overseas is very much welcomed and indeed essential if we are to achieve best results.

Increasingly the most active, dangerous and prolific criminals are resorting to a wide range of sophisticated weaponry to further their aims and we must be able to respond to and remove the threat robustly. In doing so we must ensure the safety of our public and staff and reassure all that our use of force is proportionate. But reassurance should not lead to the creation of false expectations. Where officers face firearms we must respond with firearms and we continually develop weaponry and tactics to counter new threats such as suicide killers. What we seek with less-lethal options is to realise always the principle of using the minimum force necessary in any situation.

This is now the third ILEF gathering and much work has been carried out in this area in the UK since we started. I thought it would be helpful if I updated you on our progress. A few months before last years meeting, 3 key documents had been produced: the Joint ACPO Operational Requirement for Less-Lethal Weapons, the PSDB review of commercially available and near market less-lethal options, and the first report of the Joint Patten ACPO Steering Group led by the Northern Ireland Office.

The 4th Report of this group has just been published and will be made available to you during this conference. The international linkages formed as a result of the previous two International Law Enforcement Forums and the many other links between Scientific and Policing organizations worldwide have proved invaluable in ensuring a joint approach to the review. I think that is significantly good news.

The ACPO Operational Requirement was the first crucial step in the UK programme to identify less-lethal options for the police. It also provided the basis for the prioritization and evaluations carried out by PSDB, as well as that carried out by DSTL where medical implications of the use of the more promising options are established. It is the bedrock of all our development.

Indeed the approach taken has now been formalised in the Code of Practice on the Use of Firearms and less-lethal weapons. Issued by a Government Department, this Home Office Code is the first of its kind in the United Kingdom. This is a seminal document amongst other stipulations it requires each police force to have a nominated senior officer who has policy responsibility for this important area and requires the scientific monitoring of and the medical review of potential less-lethal weapons.

The Defence Scientific Advisory Council on the Medical Implication of Less-Lethal Technologies or DOMILL have been called upon to provide statements on a number of the technologies that have been deployed or trialed in the UK since that first meeting of the Forum. These have included:
Use of the L21A1 baton round at ranges under 20 metres;

Comparative injury potential of the L21A1 and the 12 Gauge sock round;

Medical evaluation of TASER;

Testing and medical evaluation of a made to specification Water Cannon (currently being introduced in Northern Ireland details of which you will hear later).

For each of the technologies used ACPO have issued comprehensive guidance on use. The medical evaluation and statements that are made and laid before Parliament on these technologies have been in part based on the guidance issued as to how these technologies will be used.

The 1999 Human Rights Act requires ACPO, in common with other public authorities throughout the UK to review in detail how we undertake all our business. It has been particularly relevant in respect of firearms and less-lethal weapons. Establishing the attributes and medical implications of any weapon we deploy to such an exact degree allows an informed judgment to be made on whether the option is proportionate. As was reported at the last ILEF we have developed a strategic audit framework which we have used to review each technology that we have introduced against its Strategic, Operational, Ethical and Societal effects.

Because the UK has a predominantly unarmed police force any additional use of force option may be seen as an increase in our weaponry rather than an attempt to reduce the use of force used. This is a sensitive and important issue. We seek to move forward with public support with their consent and their confidence. It is essential if we are to develop the concept of public engagement, which is central to our approach to Building Safer Communities. Where officers are permanently armed, less-lethal options will perhaps more readily be seen as an attempt to reduce the level of force.

L21 Baton Round System

In November 2001, ACPO in consultation with the Home Office had taken the decision to adopt the L21 baton round system as a less-lethal Option to be deployed by armed firearms officers in situations those who were presenting an violent threat. We had previously been closely involved with this weapon system as a potential Public Order contingency - however we recognised that the significant improvements in accuracy and consistency over the type of baton rounds previously used in Northern Ireland made it appropriate for use as a less-lethal option in other situations.

Whilst it took the best part of a year to introduce and train Firearms officers in this new equipment it is now in service with all forces in England and Wales and is being introduced as a less-lethal option to all forces in Scotland.

Since its introduction it has been fired on 17 occasions, often at close quarters without causing serious or life threatening injuries. Its availability and use has undoubtedly saved lives. There is a demonstration of this round after lunch.
M26 TASER® Trials

We have also introduced the TASER® in a limited field trial, which you will also hear more about later. The introduction of technologies such as TASER® that allow officers to gain compliance by a more effective means than pain compliance must be welcomed and encouraged but, as I said earlier we must ensure we fully understand any medical implications of their use before deployment. The current field trial has followed this approach and any extension to it will also be carefully implemented.

Development Work

So far we have not identified any impact technologies that can match the performance of the L21A1 however a programme to develop an Attenuating Energy Projectile has been put in place to develop a round which can offer safety advantages over the L21A1 whilst maintaining its accuracy and effectiveness. There is also a parallel programme to develop a Discriminating Irritant Projectile that will accurately deploy a sensory irritant at an extended range.

The corporate work that has been carried out over the last few years is important. PSDB have produced a database framework to contain the work and make the sharing of results and experiences easier. You will have an opportunity to see this during the conference and to have an influence on how it is taken forward and developed. This forum has come together to share information and I hope that this can be continued by using frameworks such as the one PSDB have developed.

I also hope this forum will be able to identify what still needs to be done in this area. Less-lethal technologies are a growth area and we need to ensure that developments are driven by people such as ourselves using well founded Operational Requirements rather than allowing manufacturers to drive us to use their latest development. We can help manufacturers to do this by the production of requirements and standards. This is what we have done in many other areas of police equipment and, although there are difficulties to be overcome, I hope that we will be able to do this with less-lethal technologies as well.

I want to take this public opportunity to thank all those who have supported us – in particular, Brian Coleman and PSDB who seem to me to be world leaders in the rigorous assessment and research of such weaponry and who are always clearly focused on providing answers to our operational problems; Robin Masefield and the Northern Ireland Office; and Colonel Andy Mazzara and the team from Penn State University for their work in helping to develop this International forum on less-lethal options and for their active and continuing support. I look forward to working with you and am now pleased to introduce Assistant Chief Constable Ian Arundale, from the West Mercia Constabulary who leads the ACPO Police use of Firearms Committee and is your Chairman and Moderator for the rest of the conference.
PRESENTATION:
Northern Ireland and the Wider International Context

Robin Masefield CBE

Robin Masefield CBE, is head of the Northern Ireland Office’s Patten Action Team. He provided an update on the work of the UK Steering Group led by the Northern Ireland Office in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers, England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland. The Steering Group are reviewing alternative approaches to the management of conflict. The work undertaken by the Steering Group includes a less-lethal research and development programme, which is one of the most comprehensive ever undertaken in within policing.

Background

Public order policing and in particular the use of baton rounds in these situations by the security forces in Northern Ireland was one of the many issues addressed by International Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (the Patten Report). The Commission reported in September 1999 and its recommendations were accepted by Government and as such form the basis for the transformation of Policing within the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Two recommendations in particular (69 and 70) are directly associated to the issues which form part of the ILEF discussions:

■ An immediate and substantial investment should be made in a research programme to find an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal alternative to the Plastic Baton Round (PBR).

■ The police should be equipped with a broader range of public order equipment than the RUC currently possess, so that a commander has a number of options at his/her disposal which might reduce reliance on, or defer resort to, the PBR.

In the summer 2000, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, having consulted with Cabinet colleagues and others, established a UK-wide Steering Group to lead a research project aimed at:

…establishing whether a less potentially lethal alternative to the baton round is available; and reviewing the public order equipment which is presently available or could be developed in order to expand the range of tactical options available to operational commanders.
The Steering Group, chaired by Northern Ireland Office, comprised representatives from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Ministry of Defence, the Police Authority for Northern Ireland, the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) of the Home Office and the members of the Police Service Northern Ireland, and was chaired by the Northern Ireland Office.

The Steering Group has produced four publicly available detailed reports on less alternative approaches to the management of conflict and less-lethal weapons (http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/policing.htm).


The work of the Steering Group has enabled a number of in-depth research programmes to be undertaken. These have included:

- Use of the L21A1 baton round at ranges under 20 metres;
- Scientific and medical of the 12 gauge sock round;
- Scientific and medical evaluation of TASER; and
- Testing and medical evaluation of a made to specification water cannon for use by the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

Arrangements have also been made for patrol officers in Northern Ireland, in common with colleagues throughout the rest of the UK, to be issued with personal incapacitant CS Sprays; orders have been placed for 6 built-to-specification water cannons for use by the PSNI; and guidelines on the use of baton rounds in public order situations have been revised.

**Use of the Current Baton Round**

The introduction of the current UK L21 baton round system overlapped with a major research programme implemented by Government following the publication of the Patten Report.

I am pleased to be able report that due to improvements in the public order situation no baton rounds have been fired in Northern Ireland since September 2002.

The accuracy and consistency of the baton round has, however, enabled it to be introduced to firearms officers across the United Kingdom as a less-lethal option. Since the baton round has been introduced in this role, there have been a total of 21 baton rounds fired against individuals in 17 incidents in Great Britain, many of which have been at close quarters (Correct at 29th Jan 2004). Resort to the L21A1 in those circumstances obviated the need to use higher levels of force, saved lives, and did not result in serious or life threatening injuries being caused to the person struck by the baton round.
The Wider Approach of the Steering Group

The reports of the Steering group are deliberately entitled “A Research Programme Into Alternative Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict,” and whilst a great deal of research has gone into the scientific and medical evaluation of less-lethal weapons, considerable work and research has also gone into the issues associated with understanding the dynamics of crowds and public order policing.

In the spring of 2003, in support of the work of the Steering Group, the Northern Ireland Policing Board asked for research to be undertaken in regard to the dynamics of crowds. This work built on the management of conflict models set out in the earlier phase 2 and 3 reports of the Steering Group. The Penn State’s Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies (INLDT) Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP) report on “Crowd Behavior, Crowd Control, and the Use of Non-Lethal Technologies (January 2001)” was one of the key documents that helped shape our approach to this area and demonstrates the benefit of international sharing of information.

The author of the Northern Ireland Policing Board study, Neil Jarman, will be speaking in one of the workshops at Thursday’s wider conference in London to which interest groups and NGO Conference have been invited. Extracts from Neil Jarman’s report on Public Order in Northern Ireland during the summer of 2003 is sub-titled ‘Nothing Happened’ and can be found at page 35 of the Steering groups phase 4 report. No doubt the efforts of police, community leaders and influencers all contributed to creating an environment where resort to baton rounds was not considered necessary.

Within Northern Ireland, the report of the Steering Group and the work it represents has considerable political importance. But its significance is wider than just Northern Ireland. We are genuinely committed to transparency – to putting as much as we can into public. In relation to this ILEF conference, the timing is good as the report has only just been published and is current.

There is also considerable interest in the International Operational Requirement for less-lethal technologies being developed by the Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG) established after last year’s ILEF conference. I believe this work has great potential.

The Political Context

There is great international interest in support for the Peace Process in Northern Ireland and for the policing transitions that are taking place. There have also been regular meetings between the British and Irish Prime Ministers. The issue of acceptable and effective less-lethal weapons and alternatives to baton rounds remain one of the issues to be resolved and have featured in such discussions.
The significance of the issue was reflected in the statement issued by the Northern Ireland Office Minister on the 9th April 2003, which contained the following paragraph:

_On the basis that an acceptable and effective and less-lethal alternative is available, the baton round would no longer be used after the end of 2003. In the event that that has not been achieved, the Government would report on the progress of the fourth phase of the research programme and review the options for less-lethal alternatives, consulting widely with a range of interested parties including the Chief Constable and the Policing Board._

Since then, the work has continued apace. The work of this international forum of experts has been important to providing an international aspect to the work programme. However, despite a protracted and international search for a commercially available product, we have been unable to find anything that meets the criteria of an acceptable, potentially less-lethal alternative to the baton round currently in service which provides an effective capability that does not expose officers and the public to greater risk in violent public disorder. In the forward to the Phase 4 report the Northern Ireland Office Minister states:

_It is our judgment that there is still no commercially available product that is an acceptable, more safe and effective alternative to the current baton round although we will continue to monitor all developments. Against this background, two alternatives to the current baton round are currently being developed which the Government believes has the potential to fulfill this criteria._

**Current work**

Very good progress is however been made in developing two alternative projectiles, which are currently at the prototype stage. The first, the Attenuating Energy Projectile (AEP), is a result of research following up on previously published evaluation of the current L21 baton round by the independent medical advisers (DOMILL). This approach is designed to reduce the peak force, thereby achieving a similar effect to the existing baton round, but more safely. This development work is continuing. Subject to testing, it is hoped that this alternative will be available by the end of 2004, ready for operational deployment before summer 2005.

Other work in progress includes exploration of a different technology that has potential to meet the Patten requirements in the longer term. This approach, the Discriminating Irritant Projectile (DIP), would incapacitate a violent individual through delivery of irritant to their upper body, at a distance.
I would commend to you the detailed work on the operational requirement for the AEP and the DIP rounds set out page 11-18 of the Phase 4 Report and the work on effectiveness criteria outlined at pages 18 and 19 of the report. The proposal in relation to the DIP is to incorporate elements of technology similar to those already in use with some police forces in Western Europe and the US to create a safer and acceptable, but still effective alternative to the current baton round. As a new system for the United Kingdom, it is inevitable that it will take around a year longer to develop.

The International Context

In Northern Ireland, the Phase 4 Report and the work it represents has considerable political importance. But its significance is wider than just Northern Ireland. There is genuine commitment to transparency – to putting as much as we can into public. Both the material on the water cannon evaluation and testing and the detail on the TASER® trial in England and Wales together with ACPO policy have not been published before. We hope they may be of help and interest to law enforcement agencies in other countries. Likewise we want to draw on others research and good practice.

When Police officers either within their own environment, or when engaged with military in peacekeeping missions elsewhere are engaged in managing conflict and responding to potentially violent encounters there is a requirement on them to have access to less-lethal means of resolving the conflict.

Article 2 of the UN Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms requires that:

Governments and law enforcement agencies should develop a range of means as broad as possible and equip law enforcement officials with various types of weapons and ammunition that would allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms.

It is, therefore, appropriate that Article 2 is the theme of the third day this conference and will be held in the Royal Society of Arts building in London and in which we will all have the opportunity to explore issues relevant to the use of force with a much wider interest group.

Article 2 is also of central importance to the work of this forum. The UN principles transcend national boundaries and provide us all with an international framework within which to work.
SECTION 3:
Workshop Presentation Slides
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for
MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies
Applied Research Laboratory
The Pennsylvania State University
Background

- Numerous nations around the world are exploring minimal force options, specifically less-lethal weapons (LLWs), for improved public safety and public order.

- The U.S. and UK law enforcement communities have been engaged in a cooperative fashion for several years in developing a common understanding of operational needs in this area.

- The 1st International Forum on Minimal Force Options (MFOs) was conducted at Penn State in April of 2001. The 2nd ILEF Workshop was held also in State College, Pennsylvania October 29-30th, 2002.

- The implementation of the Patten Report in Northern Ireland combined with the growing level of violence associated with potential Post-9/11 terrorist threats provide a more immediate sense of urgency for identifying broadly accepted (international) approaches for MFOs.
Purpose of the Workshops

To continue to build on previous work (2001, 2002) to assess and define operational needs as they apply to minimal force options and less-than-lethal technologies for public order. Ultimately, to develop international professional consensus on those needs and translate them into usable standards for both testing and training.

Objectives of the Workshops

- Validate previous work by Forum on operational needs
- Assess new concepts and technologies for minimal force options
- Review ongoing work by the ILEF Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG)
- Recommend direction and guidance for ILEF, and US and UK law enforcement agencies on future activities relative to LLWs
ILEF II Workshop Break-out Sessions

- Current Operational and Technological Limitations
- Effectiveness and Medical Issues
- Acceptability Criteria, Public Policy and Legal Issues
- Less-lethal Tactics and Procedures

ILEF II Recommendations

- Develop a less-lethal database
- Develop an Injury database
- Define operational needs
- Develop standards for testing and training
- Conduct independent assessments
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

ILEF I and II Products

http://ilef.nldt.org/

Electronic Operational Requirements Group (EORG)

Questions?

Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies
Applied Research Laboratory
The Pennsylvania State University
Third
International Law Enforcement Forum
February 2004

PSDB Update

Police Scientific Development Branch

Graham Smith BSc (Hons) CPhys MInstP
PRIORITISING

- Category A (Devices which may be subject to immediate more in depth research)
  
  Kinetic Energy Rounds
  Chemical Delivery Devices
  Distraction Devices (Light and noise devices)
  Water Cannon
  Electrical Devices

PRIORITISING

- Category B (Devices warranting further research over a more extended time)
  
  Tranquillisers and Malodorants

- Category C (Devices which presently do not require further research)
  
  Stun Grenades, Smoke, Acoustic Devices, Electromagnetic Waves, Nets and Wire Entanglement Systems, Glue, Foam and Grease
INITIAL EVALUATION CRITERIA

• Accurate from 1-20m (and up to 50m if possible)
  – 40cm wide x 60cm high
  – 95% POH bench-fired
  – 85% POH man-fired
• Consistent Orientation on Impact
• Variety of platforms
• Energy not greater than L21A1 at 20m
• Single Point of Aim
• Impact not Penetration
CHEMICAL INCAPACITANT DEVICES

- Incapacitant Sprays
  - 10-14ft
  - Discriminate

- Grenades and Projectiles
  - Crowd, room or vehicle
  - Indiscriminate

- Longer-Range Discriminating Devices
  - 1-20m
Chemical Incapacitants

Himsworth Report

Part I

Enquiry into Medical Situation following the Use of CS in Londonderry on 13 & 14 August, 1969

Part II

Enquiry into Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS and its use for Civil Purposes

Any chemical agent that might be used for the control of civil disturbances should be studied from the point of view more akin to that from which we regard the effects of a new drug than to that from which we might regard a new weapon
Types of Incapacitants

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<th>CS (1928)</th>
<th>OC (1921)</th>
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Chemical Incapacitants (CS Spray)

- Referred to Independent standing Committees on the Toxicity, Mutagenicity and Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment

- “The available data did not, in general, raise concerns regarding the health effects of CS spray itself”
PAVA (Pelargonic Acid Vanillylamide)

- Synthetic spray based on pepper spray
- The solvent used is 50% water, 50% ethanol
- Only one compound
- Easier to assess toxicologically than OC

Chemical Incapacitants (PAVA)

- COT - April 2002
  We consider that it is not possible to make a complete assessment of the likely adverse health effects that could arise from the use of PAVA spray as a chemical incapacitant in view of the limited data available.

- COT - May/June 2004

?
Chemical Incapacitants

  - Toxicology
  - Effectiveness
  - Operational Considerations

ENCAPSULATED ROUNDS
DISTRACTION DEVICES

- Laser/Light Devices
  - Laser Targeting
  - Laser Dazzling
  - Spotlights

- Noise Generation Devices
  - Non-fragmenting
  - Non-pyrotechnic
  - ‘Non-injurious’

PORTABLE WATER CANNON

Shot Number: 3
Range: 100m
Gun Capacity: 1 Liter
Cone Size: 4.3 mm
Wind Speed: 60 mph
Test Date: 06/03/02
PSDB Evaluation of Taser Devices

- Comparison of taser manufacturers, models and cartridges
- Physical Testing
  - Batteries
  - Accuracy
  - Drop Tests
  - Clothing Penetration
  - Flammability
  - Extreme Temperature
  - Electrical Output Measurements
- Handling Trials
  - 64 officers from various backgrounds (20 police forces and the prison service), firing over 600 cartridges over three days in 15 scenarios
  - Assessment by observations, accuracy and officer feedback by way of a questionnaire
PSDB Evaluation of Taser Devices

• International taser use
  – Information gathered from a range of sources including manufacturers, police forces and corrections agencies in US and Canada, and from the press
  – History of use, operational use, deaths and injuries, training methods

• Comparison with the Operational Requirement
  – In August 2000 ACPO Police Use of Firearms (PUoF) and Self-Defence, Arrest and Restraint (SDAR) working groups produced an Operational Requirement (updated June 2001 to include public disorder) for all less lethal alternatives.

PSDB Evaluation of Taser Devices

• Conclusions
  – Tasers have a number of characteristics that may make them suitable for UK police
  – 21ft (6.4m) range is a drawback, for acceptable accuracy only really 15ft (4.6m)
  – Not 100% effective. However, often effective without the need to fire the weapon (use of laser sight, sparking demonstration)
  – Variation in performance and handling characteristics between models noted and made available to ACPO and Home Office
  – Passed on data for medical assessment
  – Recommendation to avoid use on individuals covered in a flammable liquid (e.g. CS or PAVA sprays) if possible. Also avoid flammable environments such as petrol stations
Medical Assessment

- Provided by the DSAC Sub-committee on the Medical Implications of Less Lethal Weapons (DOMILL)
  - DSAC: Defence Scientific Advisory Council
  - Made up of surgeons and well respected medical practitioners
- Brief: “(to carry out) a wide-ranging review of literature and preliminary analytical studies on the biophysical interaction of taser current pulses within the body”
- On behalf of DOMILL, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) undertook a comprehensive review of publicly available information

Operational Trial

- ACPO Trial started on 21st April 2003
- Tasers issued to Firearms trained officers for deployment to situations where firearms had been authorised for use.
- Five Forces Involved
DOMILL: Recommendations

- Clarification of cardiac hazards
  - Enhancing Dstl model to investigate magnetic and electric field strengths in vulnerable parts of the body
  - Possible hypersusceptibility to taser currents arising from illegal drugs, acidosis and pre-existing disease; may be by using in vitro tissue models
  - Vulnerability of pacemakers and other implanted devices: a more thorough review

- Laser sight should be classified to British Standards

- Forensic Medical Examiners and clinical staff in areas covered by the operational trial should be fully briefed

- DOMILL should be advised of any changes in:
  - the specification or performance of the M26 Advanced Taser
  - the guidance to users, and training practices
  - the policy and practice of deployment, use and audit

The Taser International X26
Advanced Taser

Picture courtesy of Taser International Inc
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for
MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

Size Comparison

![Size Comparison Image]

X26 - Features

![X26 Features Image]

Picture courtesy of Taser International Inc
Electrical Output - M26

Energy per pulse

\[
\text{area} = \int_{\text{min}}^{\text{max}} Wf(x)^2 \, dx
\]

\[
\sum_{i=\text{min}}^{\text{max}} \left( Wf[i]^2 + Wf[i+1]^2 \right) \times \frac{X_{\text{incr}}}{2}
\]

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Electrical Output

Future Testing

- PSDB Evaluation tests
- PSDB Handling Trials
- Accuracy should be similar
- All issues relating to the cartridge will be the same
- We are studying the wave output
- Results will be passed to DOMILL
  - Different wave form may be significant
  - Fall seems to be less controlled
Tranquillisers and Malodorants

- Part of Phase 4 report - General Conclusion

Neither calmatives nor malodorants currently meet the police requirements. For this reason both calmatives and malodorants have been moved to category C for the purposes of evaluation. No further research will be carried out on either of these areas unless there are significant advances in the available technology.
PSDB Update

Police Scientific Development Branch

Graham Smith BSc (Hons) CPhys MInstP
 Operational Requirements

- Why create
- What use is it
- What do we do with it
- Who subscribes to it
- Where do we send it
- Is it worth progressing further
- What work requires to be done

EORG Concept and Approach

- Based on the Delphi Process and the ILEF Model
- Electronically connects professionals/subject matter experts for focused discussion
- Small group, geographically dispersed
- Iterative discussion and review in order to develop consensus
The ILEF Concept for Minimal Force Options

“Dynamic, Evolving”
Minimal Force Options

- Preemption
- Isolation
- Negotiation
- Individual control techniques
- Crowd/riot control techniques and training
- Less-lethal technologies

Guiding Principles

- Augment Proportionate and Justifiable Force
- Apply across the Range of Police Operations
- Maintain Public Acceptability
- Focus on Discriminate Applications
- Leverage Simple Technology
- Enhance Supportability of Operations
- Ensure Predictable Results
- Provide for Reversibility of Effects
Core Capabilities

- Dissuade and Deter Actions
- Deny Areas
- Disrupt Communications
- Incapacitate/Control Individuals
- Crowd Control

Concept Input

- Professional eForum
- Controlled access
- Information clearinghouse
- Funded by the U.S. National Institute of Justice
- Hosted and maintained by Penn State University

http://ilef.nldt.org/
EORG Membership

- Colin Burrows, ACPO Consultant, UK - Coordinator
- Col Andy Mazzara USMC (Ret), Penn State University, US - Facilitator
- Cdr Sid Heal, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Dept, US
- Inspector Robert Blackburn, Metropolitan Police, UK
- Constable Casey Brouwer, York Regional Police, Canada
- Major Richard Zenk, Pennsylvania State Police, US
- Major Steven Ijames, Springfield (Missouri) Police Dept, US
- Superintendent Neil Haynes, Metropolitan Police, UK
- Sergeant Andy Baird, Critical Incident Program, RCMP, Canada
- Chief Inspector Richard Prior, PSDB, UK
- Chief Inspector William Brown, CMDU, UK
- Chief Inspector Martyn Perks, ACPO Firearms, UK

EORG Background

- EORG Initiation - November 12th, 2003
- First Topic -

  "As we describe “operational requirements” for less-lethal weapons, with an eye towards developing standards for testing and training, what in your opinion should be the major headings or topic areas to which we could associate available and future data? Why?"

- First topic has gone through four iterations through January 2004 (Nov 25th, Jan 9th, and Jan 27th)
- Current results available.
EORG Initial Results

- Nine LLW-related definitions derived
- Twenty-one operational criteria identified and described
- Initial Operational Test Criteria Matrix developed and under review

EORG - Next Topics

- Identifying common nomenclature and taxonomy
- Defining commonly accepted classes of LLWs
- Developing of a clear Statement of Intent to support operational requirements
- Generating agreement on where in the Use of Force Spectrum LLWs might be placed
Summary/Conclusions

- There is still much work needed on operational needs and standards
- A generally accepted “concept” facilitates both professional discourse as well as frames actual operations on the street
- The EORG process in concert with the ILEF Workshops has brought “us” a long way toward understanding LLW operational needs

QUESTIONS?
Background

- DSAC L21 statement: recommended research into energy attenuation systems
- Patten Recommendations 69 & 70 re. Baton Rounds
- ACPO requirements for alternatives to conventional firearms
- NIO Minister’s statement:
  - On the basis of an acceptable & effective ...alternative available...baton round will no longer be used after end 2003.
- Steering Group concluded no commercial alternatives to L21 (KE & irritant-based systems)
Two requirements

• Attenuating Energy Projectile (AEP)
  – “reduced injury potential compared to L21A1, specifically to the head”

• Discriminating Irritant Projectile (DIP)
  – “deliver a cloud of sensory irritant in a discriminatory manner to an individual”

Facts & basic principles

• Dstl/MOD is the Design Authority for the L21A1 Baton Round
• MOD’s design, quality and safety standards are more rigorous than commercial systems
• AEP is more complex than L21
• Manufacturers must be integrated into development
• Accuracy & consistency must not be compromised
• Dynamic behaviour of complex materials & biological systems requires specialist knowledge, not hope
Programme management

- MOD will be the Design Authority....military stores
- Research, development, prototyping, initial delivery, will be undertaken by Dstl (MOD), in collaboration with industry
- Steering Group advised by
  - Operational sub-committee.....chaired by ACPO representative
  - Technical sub-committee.....chaired by Defence Logistics Organisation

Programme management

- Operational sub-committee
  - Agree operational reqt. with ACPO & MOD policy branches
  - Review operational issues....
  - Launchers; sights; zeroing; issue; carriage; training; guidance
- Technical sub-committee
  - Oversight of research; development; weapon integration; military “safe and fit for purpose” testing (DOSG) et al
  - Programme to bring into service
Key AEP requirements (detail in Phase 4)

- **Role**
  - Impact not intended to cause serious or life-threatening injury...sufficient to dissuade potentially violent individual from intended course of action
  - Fired at individual aggressors...many operational scenarios
- **Reduce injury potential compared to L21A1, specifically to head**
- **Must maintain operational effectiveness**
- **Accuracy specified**
- **Range:** 1-40 m essential; 1-65 m desirable
- **Capable of firing from L104 gun / L18 sighting system**

Key DIP requirements (detail in Phase 4)

- **Same role...plus**
  - Serious public disorder – maintain a “sterile zone”, or disperse
- **Deliver a cloud of sensory irritant in a discriminatory manner to an individual**
- **Injury potential not greater than L21**
- **Toxicology should not introduce serious health risks**
  - Likely to be micronised CS
- **Accuracy specified**
- **Range:** 1-25 m essential; 1-40 m highly desirable; 1-65 m desirable
- **Weapon system:** preferably 37 mm...but should not preclude others
AEP general biomechanical principles

• Need to reduce peak forces to skull
• Options
  – Increase contact area
  – Extend duration of loading
  – Transform energy
• Could achieve using
  – Geometry e.g. voids
  – Deformable material i.e. extend duration of loading
  – Shatter i.e. expend energy in breaking

Three conflicting issues

• Reducing injury potential given a hit
• Maintaining effectiveness
• Maintaining consistency at range
• Why?
  – Soft enough for impact; hard enough to engrave in rifling (consistency)
  – Soft enough for head; hard enough for acceptable impact area
  – Faster/lighter for extended range; but lower momentum (reduced effectiveness)
  – Multi-component design…tighter tolerances to maintain accuracy etc. etc.
Principal current risks

- Cartridge integration—wider temp. conditions
  - New cartridge design
- Ability of industry to manufacture to required tolerances
  - Concentricity, mass, dimensions, integrity
- Completion & outcome of DOSG tests—military store
  - Vibration, dropping, water ingress; heating; cooling etc.
- DSAC statement on medical implications of use

Principal achievements

- Prototypes already meet requirements in terms of accuracy/consistency
  - But we intend to do better and match L21
- Can attenuate peak forces to head & reduce skull fracture severity
  - But maintain effectiveness on torso
- Six prototypes currently; four manufacturers employed (risk reduction)
  - Combinations of voids, materials and construction
AEP Conclusions

• AEP will meet military quality standards…like L21
• There are many risks arising from timeframe
• Reduction of skull fracture severity achievable
• Consistency looks very promising, but more difficult to achieve than L21
• Safety (target & firer) & suitability for service will not be compromised by Dec 04 availability date
• End-Dec 04 is achievable

DIP

• “Deliver a cloud of sensory irritant in a discriminatory manner to an individual”
  – Desirable range 1-65 m
  – Will undoubtedly be micronised CS
• Currently in the design phase
DIP Design Progress

- Initial designs 37 mm DIP showed low density body required:
  - Rigid foam polyurethane
  - Light, and fast
  - CS(M) container sub-calibre and situated at front
  - CS dispersion based upon previous MOD ammunition
- 17 mm DIP failed to consistently deliver sufficient CS(M) simulant without weapon modification

Testing to date on prototype DIPs

- Trajectory – mathematical predictions & firing of prototypes
- Consistency
- CS(M) simulant dispersion
  - Assessment of effectiveness
  - Particle size
  - Cloud density – inhaled/deposited dose of CS(M)
  - Toxicological assessment
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ACPO Working Group on Police Use of Firearms

Operational Use of L21A1 and Taser

Chief Inspector Martyn Perks

Introduction of the L21A1 Baton Round

- Home Office authorised operational use from 1st June 2001
- ACPO guidance for use produced and entered into National Manual of Guidance
- Gradual adoption by forces with deployment on Armed Response Vehicles
Operational Uses of the L21A1 Baton Round

- First used in North Wales on 27th February 2002
- Use at 17 policing operations since introduction
- Last used in Nottinghamshire on 5th January 2004

Introduction of the M26 Taser

- Home Office authorised operational trial on 30th January 2003
- ACPO policy, guidance and training produced
- Deployment in trial forces on Armed Response Vehicles at operations where a firearms authority had been granted
- Independent evaluation
Operational Uses of the M26 Taser

- Use at 47 policing operations since start of trial
- First used in North Wales on 21st April 2003
- First fired in North Wales on 14th June 2003
- Discharged at 14 operations and of these:
  - Arced twice
  - Drive Stun once
  - Fired on eleven occasions

Future of the Taser Trial

- Outcome of evaluation
- To be pursued:
  - Residual medical concerns
  - Ministerial support
  - Rewrite of policy and guidance
  - Chief officer agreement

---

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Future of the Taser Trial

- Taser to be made available to all forces for use where there is a firearms authority

- Extended trial in current five forces where officers are facing violence or threats of violence of such severity that their use of force is necessary to protect themselves or the public

Comparative Data

![Bar chart showing comparative data for conventional discharges, Baton Round discharges, and Taser firings from 2001 to 2004.](chart.png)
ACPO Working Group on Police Use of Firearms

Operational Use of L21A1 and Taser

Chief Inspector Martyn Perks
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POLICE SERVICE OF NORTHERN IRELAND

Vehicle Mounted Water Cannon

Chief Inspector J O’Brien
Operations Department

WHY WATER CANNON?

• OVER 30 YEARS NORTHERN IRELAND EXPERIENCE EXTREMES OF STREET VIOLENCE

• PUBLIC ORDER POLICING AND IN PARTICULAR USE OF BATON ROUND IN CROWD CONTROL BECAME A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE.

• RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR A BROADER RANGE OF PUBLIC ORDER EQUIPMENT TO DEAL WITH DISORDER - PRIOR TO PATTEN REPORT

• WATER CANNON WIDELY USED THROUGHOUT EUROPE WITH LITTLE OR NO CONTROVERSY
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

- CO-OPERATION BETWEEN POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BELGIUM GENDARMERIE - NOW THE FEDERAL POLICE

- LED TO AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND “BORROWED” TWO MOL WATER CANNON EACH SUMMER FROM 1999 TO 2003

---

NOT A NEW CONCEPT

- Water Cannon were used by both Police and Military in Northern Ireland in the early days of the ‘Troubles’ 1968 to 1971

- Technology was limited and use was abandoned around 1971

---

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LESS LETHAL RESEARCH - STEERING GROUP

- Set up under Patten Recommendations 69 & 70
  - Immediate & substantial investment in research to find an acceptable, effective and less potentially lethal alternative to Plastic Baton Round
  - Broader Range of Public Order Equipment which may reduce reliance on, or defer resort, to Plastic Baton Rounds

- Water Cannon was one of 5 Technologies identified as holding some promise and requiring further research

- Literature Review - No Fatalities or Life Threatening Injuries

- Bio-medical tests of Belgian Models - DOMILL Interim Statement – favourable

DECISION TO PROCURE WATER CANNON

- Research findings were positive

- Limited operational deployments – successful

- Loan arrangement becoming less and less certain

- Commitment to Patten and to change process

- Procurement based on a competitive process & technical specification produced by PSNI

- PSNI project team includes ACPO (UK policing) representatives
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THE END PRODUCT

• SOMATI awarded contract for six water cannon vehicles

• RCV9000 - Outwardly similar in appearance to Belgian Mol Models but inwardly incorporates state of the art technology

Mol

RCV 9000

CURRENT STATUS

• FIRST TWO RCV9000 DELIVERED IN SEPTEMBER
  – NEXT TWO IN MID FEBRUARY 2004 - FINAL TWO IN APRIL

• ACPO GUIDELINES ON THE USE OF WATER CANNON - APPROVED

• DOMILL MEDICAL STATEMENT - PENDING

• PSNI DEVELOPING TRAINING BASED ON ABOVE AND INCORPORATING HUMAN RIGHTS

• OPERATIONAL READINESS - MARCH 2004
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END

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Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies
Applied Research Laboratory
The Pennsylvania State University
Human Effects Advisory Panel

Activities: Oct 02 – Feb 04

Dr. John M. Kenny
Associate Director
Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies
February 3, 2004

Human Effects Advisory Panel

HEAP Activities from Oct 02 to Feb 04

- Assessment of Advanced Kinetic Models: Selected Thoracic Models
- Assessment of Advanced Kinetic Models: Head Injury Models and Head Injury Criteria
- Assessment of the Pulsed Energy Projectile (PEP) BE-2 Experiment Exit Criteria
- Incorporating crowd behavior/dynamics into the Individual Non-Lethal Weapons Instructor Course
- Assessment of the Interim Total Body (ITBM) Road Map
- Assessment of the SAS-035 NLW Effectiveness Framework
- NLW Characterization (in progress)
- Assessment of the ADS (in progress)
- Assessment of Riot Control Agent Comparison Study (in progress)
Human Effects Advisory Panel

SAS-035 Study Purpose

- Develop Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs) that provide NATO a means to assess NLWs
  - Relevant for various user communities (operational, acquisition, research and development, etc.)
- Support Comparisons:
  - Across various technologies (Electromagnetic, Chemical, Acoustic, Mechanical/Kinetic, and Ancillary)
  - Across various weapons systems
    - NLW versus NLW
    - NLW versus Lethal

Human Effects Advisory Panel

Goals and Objectives

- Specific Objectives
  - Construct agreed and appropriate scenarios
  - Identify requirements deriving from scenario missions and tasks
  - Select and evaluate example NLWs using appropriate tools
  - Develop an MoE Framework and an Effects Database Structure
  - Identify capability gaps and issues
  - Provide inputs for DCI and NATO defense planning processes
- Deliverables: MoE Framework and Effects Database Structure, with Results and Recommendations in a Final Report
When developing a MOE Framework for NLWs (and lethal systems), it is important to recognize distinctions between:

- **System Characteristics**: physical properties such as size, weight, etc.
- **MOPs**: measures showing how environmental factors influence weapon effects at the target
- **MORs**: measures indicating how a target reacts to a system’s effects
- **MOEs**: measures indicating the degree to which a target response satisfies a military requirement within an operational context

These seven Basis Responses, individually or in combination, can generate all of the military tasks (and associated constraints) identified to this point.
Human Effects Advisory Panel

Calculating MoRs

- MoRs are measures showing how a target reacts to the effects of a given weapon/system
- SAS-035 identified seven types of responses, affecting a target's:
  - Mobility
  - Communication
  - Physical Function
  - Sense and Interpret
  - Group Cohesion
  - Motivation
  - Identification

Required Response

- Specified for each basis response
- Indicating
  - Onset time
  - Desired Magnitude
  - Desired Duration
  - Desired Recovery
Three Types of MoEs

• The Task Objective, \( P_1 \)
  – Successful accomplishment of the military task
• The Target Constraint, \( P_2 \)
  – Satisfying restrictions regarding the effects on, or recovery of, the target
• The Collateral Constraint, \( P_3 \)
  – Satisfying restrictions regarding the effects on, or recovery of, bystanders, own force, or infrastructure

Task Objective MoE, \( P_1 \) - Calculated vs. Required Response

The value of \( P_1 \) can be considered as the ratio of the area \( A_{1,1} \) to the region enclosed by rectangle abcd.
Applying the MOE Framework

- **Anticipated User Communities**
  - Operational (Commanders, Force Planners, and Troops)
  - Force Generators
  - Concepts, Doctrine, Requirements, and Training
  - Acquisition
  - Research and Development
  - Wargame, Model, and Simulation Development

- **Value of the Framework**
  - Compare Relative Contributions
    - NLW vs. NLW
    - NLW vs. Lethal
  - Show Task Accomplishment and Constraint Satisfaction
  - Identify Desired System Characteristics

SAS-035 Conclusions

- SAS-035’s methodology provides a framework for calculating system effectiveness (NLWs and lethal/other weapons)
- The methodology addresses effectiveness:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Three Forms</th>
<th>Across 7 Basis Responses</th>
<th>Accounting for</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Accomplishing Military Objective</td>
<td>• Mobility • Communications • Physical Function • Sense and Interpret • Group Cohesion • Motivation • Identification</td>
<td>• Time • Effects’ Magnitude • Effects’ Duration • Target Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Satisfying Target Constraints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Satisfying Collateral Constraints</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- SAS-035 confirms the need for the proposed Follow-On Study
- The biggest challenge to assessing NLW’s is the lack of target effect/response data to test and implement the methodology
Human Effects Advisory Panel

Upcoming HEAP Activities

• Force Protection Assessment
  – COMCRUDESCRU 12/USS Enterprise Battle Group
• Assessment of Selected Animal Models
• Pulsed Energy Projectile Combined HEAP/ITA
• Cross Comparison of Multiple NLW Counter-Personnel Programs

Validation and Enhancement of the BC Model

• The (Sturdivan) Blunt Criterion (BC) model can be applied to NL blunt impact weapons.
• The parameters are the kinetic energy of the projectile, the (contact) diameter of the projectile, the mass of the target human, and the thickness of the body wall of the individual at the point of impact, which are formulated into an equation for the probability of injury and probability of deterrence.
• The objectives of this project are to validate the BC model, determine the limits of its utility, and propose an enhanced variation of the model.
• The basic approach is to examine the basis for the BC, compare it to other injury criteria, and test it against known injury data. The associated tasks are:
  – Review the data that were the basis for the formulation of the BC.
  – Compare the BC to other relevant injury criteria such as the viscous criterion.
  – Locate a body of injury data that was not part of the basis for BC model formulation and test the limits of applicability of the BC.
  – Develop an improved approach based on the aforementioned validation process.
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Strategic Reform of Use-of-Force Accountability: An Operational Case Study

Joshua Ederheimer
Police Executive Research Forum

International Law Enforcement Forum
London, U.K., February, 2004

Origins of the Police Executive Research Forum

10 Leaders of large American law enforcement agencies created the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in 1976 as a national organization that would not only encourage - but foster - debate, research, and an openness to challenging traditional police practices.
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PERF
We Provide Progress in Policing

- Research
- Technical Assistance
- Publications
- Conferences
- Executive Search

Providing Progress in Policing

Strategic Reform of Use-of-Force Accountability:
An Operational Case Study

The Washington, D.C., Experience

Providing Progress in Policing
Presentation Overview

• Impetus for Change
• Four Pronged Strategic Approach
  • Invite External Scrutiny
  • Update Department Policies
  • Redesign Training
  • Reengineer Investigations
• Community Connections

Impetus for Change
Impetus for Change:

The Washington Post

Headline:

DC POLICE LEAD NATION IN SHOOTINGS

First day of a 5 day front-page series

Providing Progress in Policing

Impetus for Change:

A New Police Chief

- Newly appointed
- Outsider from Chicago
- Innovator
- Problems did not occur during his tenure
- Opportunity to freshly address use of force issues

Chief Charles Ramsey

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Four Pronged Strategic Approach

Invite External Scrutiny

Update Department Policies

Reengineer Investigations

Redesign Training

Prong #1

Invite External Scrutiny

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Invite DOJ to Partner with MPD

- Chief Charles Ramsey asks U.S. DOJ to help MPD assess use of force issues
- MPD & DOJ partner to address problems
- Immediate reforms begin while working with DOJ
- Eventual written agreement with DOJ
Prong #2

Update Department Policy

Revise Departmental Policy

- Outdated policies
- Unclear Force Terminology
- No Force Continuum
- No Less-Lethal Options
- Poor Tactics with Vehicles
- No K-9 Accountability

- Updated policies
- Clarified Force Terminology
- Implemented Force Continuum
- Provided Less-Lethal Options
- Restricted Shooting at Vehicles
- New K-9 Policies and Accountability
Prong #3

Redesign Training

- Redesigned training to focus on judgment
  - Classroom
  - Simunitions
  - Range 2000
  - Live fire
  - Use of Force Continuum
  - ASP and OC Spray Training options
- Scenario based
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Redesign Training

Non-Traditional Training

Law Enforcement & Society: Lessons of the Holocaust

US Holocaust Memorial Museum

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Prong #4

Reengineer Investigations

Providing Progress in Policing
Reengineer Investigations

Created specialized highly-trained force investigation units:

MPD Force Investigation Teams
• Deadly Force Team
• Less Lethal Force Team

Force Investigation Team Procedures Designed Using Established Business Theories

• Quality Design
• Focus on Systems
• Team Operations
• Customer Centered
• Human Rights Emphasis
Providing Progress in Policing

12 Primary Customers

- Law Enf. Industry DOJ, FBI
- Juries Criminal & Civil

Involved Police Officers

Subject Receiving the Force

Community

Exec. Police Mgt.

Media

Labor Unions

Civil Rights Org.

Critics at Large

Elected Officials

Prosecutors

FACTS

Policy Review (administrative) Investigation

Criminal Investigation

Criminal Civil Rights Investigation

Flow of Investigations
1) Criminal and Criminal Civil Rights aspects of a use of force.
2) Policy Review (administrative) investigation.

Most of the facts apply to all three investigations.

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Reengineer Investigations
24 hour on-scene response to serious use-of-force incidents
Creation of two Force Investigation Teams:

I. Deadly Force Team Responsibilities
   • All firearm discharges (except animals & training incidents)
   • All use of force resulting in death
   • In-custody death after police contact
   • Officer suicides
   • Discharges by OIG

II. Less-Lethal Force Team Responsibilities
   • Head strikes with object
   • Injuries resulting in broken bones
   • Injuries resulting in hospital admittance
   • Loss of consciousness
   • Risk of death, disfigurement, disability
   • K-9 Bites
Reengineer Investigations

Both teams have investigation response protocols for use of force incidents that occur during mass demonstrations.

Community Connections

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Community Connections

• Marketing plan
• Focused message to individuals and groups
• Media involvement
• Establishing personal Relationships
• In-Depth Statistical Documentation
• Frequent reporting
• Community outreach

Providing Progress in Policing

Reform Results

• 72% reduction of serious use of force incidents
• MPD’s force investigation process gets national attention
• Chief Ramsey receives 2001 NOBLE Humanitarian Award
• Numerous positive reports in media
• FIT named one of the top 10 quality law enforcement units by IACP/Motorola
• Heightened community confidence & support

Providing Progress in Policing
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for
MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

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International
Law Enforcement Forum

Update

Major Steve Ijames
lesslethal@aol.com

Impact Projectiles

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Applied Research Laboratory
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Multi-projectile rounds

- Rubber Balls
- Foam Batons
- Rubber Batons
- Wood Batons

does not equal P.O.I.

Point of aim
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Single Well Aimed Projectiles - SAVE LIVES
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Taser

X26-M26

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Less lethal tools can't stop everyone........
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Two cans Pepper spray
Eight (8) bean bag rounds
Two M26 Tasers
Multiple baton strikes
Nine (9) officers-17 minutes

Beware of excessive "hoop" jumping
Proven tools—properly used

SAVE LIVES

But they must be IN the field

International Law Enforcement Forum

Thank you

lesslethal@aol.com
Nonlethal Options
a U.S. Perspective

Commander Sid Heal
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
Special Enforcement Bureau

The underlying premise of law enforcement

People don’t get the amount of law enforcement they can afford, they get the amount they can tolerate!
Failures will Occur

“Revenge Factor”

- First described by American Sociologist, Dr. David Klinger, University of Missouri-St. Louis

- A paradox in that the user of less lethal options often finds himself trying to spare the life of the person trying to kill him!

The standard is *not* perfection.
The standard is the alternative.

The fact that the elephant dances well, is not as important as that the elephant dances at all!

Public Perceptions and Public Acceptance

The truth is not enough, you must also believe it!

- Nothing is so insignificant that it can’t be blown out of proportion.
- Unchallenged Assumptions
- Emotion Arousing Nomenclature
- Devices with “baggage”
Perils, Problems and Pitfalls

- Quality Control
  - Currently no standards of comparison
- Obsolescence
  - “State of the Art” is a moving target
- Statistical Review
  - Police are great at documenting details but poor at keeping statistics
  - Exceptions can not be compared or defended

Success Comes with its Own Penalties

- Existing Force Standards will be Challenged
  - Type and amount of force
  - To the degree less lethal options prove effective, so too will the demand for access by the public
- Pepper Spray
- Tasers
Every single device is encumbered with major shortcomings

- Range, effectiveness, decontamination, cross-contamination, single-subjects, etc.
- Use the advantages of one to offset the shortcomings of another
- Learn from the mistakes of others, you’ll never live long enough to make them all yourself!

Penn State & LASD Study

- Examination of 60,000 records of force data
- Will answer question such as:
  - How far away?
  - How many uses to gain compliance?
  - Type of force used most often?
  - Most effective type of force?
  - Anthropomorphic characteristics
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Less-Lethal Update from Canada and the RCMP

Sergeant Andy Baird
Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Less-Lethal Availability

Geographical location, identified need, and other variables determine who presently has access to each system.

- Some of the less lethal inventory items are available to all members of the force. Others are restricted to special units:
  - Tactical troops (public order units).
  - Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) - SWAT.
- Some items may not be available in a given detachments (police station).
Less-Lethal Availability

Uniformed Officers

Regular uniformed members of the RCMP have available:
- The collapsible ASP baton;
- Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray;

If trained, officers can also employ:
- The M26 TASER;
- The 12 gauge shotgun sock round, based on availability at their detachment.

Many of our detachments use the “spike belt” as a means to stop speeding vehicles by flattening tires.

Less-Lethal Availability

Tactical Troops

Tactical troops, or public order units, have available:
- The collapsible ASP baton;
- Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray (larger canisters than the personal issue MK3);
- Tear gas (deployed in several types of different rounds either hand thrown or launched);
- The 12 gauge shotgun sock round (drag stabilized round);
- Wooden batons (24” & 36”);
- The TASER in “touch” mode.
- Emergency response teams (ERTs) have all of these available, but can also use the TASER in either mode.
The RCMP is presently acquiring two vehicles for further testing and conversion to Water Projection Systems (WPS) — “water cannons”

Initial inquiries and testing will also be conducted for an additional impact round (likely 37mm) to complement the 12 gauge drag-stabilized round presently in use.
Norwegian Police, Less-Lethal

Approved products

1. CS-gas

2. OC-spray

CS-gas

CS, canister (0.4 l.)

* Contents 1% or 2% CS, Riot control.

All police district
CS-gas

CS, cartridge cal. 37/38 mm

- Barricade (penetrator)
- Logn Range (Riot control)

Weapon:
- ARWEN
- MPRG 83 (Mulit Purpose Riot Gun 83)

All police districts. (ARVEN only for special units).

CS-gas

CS cartridge cal. 12/70

- Barricade (penetrator)

Weapon:
- MPRG 83 (Mulit Purpose Riot Gun 83)

All police districts.
OC-spray

The project “OC-spray” started May 2003

- Canister 50-55 ml.
- Def-Tech
- Cap -Stun

- Evaluation after 2 years.

All police districts

Experience

CS - gas

- No use of CS reported in 2003
Experience

OC-spray

* 28 cases was reported in 2003
* In 26 cases was OC used successfully
* In 2 cases the OC had no effect.
Police Less-Lethal in Finland

Jorma Jussila
Senior Advisor
Police Technical Centre

The Finnish Police are currently equipped with:

- ASP expandable baton;
- Bodyguard OC-spray (Guardian Products)
Finland

- There is an active research and evaluation programme in place.
- Completed evaluation of Primetake 12-gauge IMP Long Range CS ammunition, (DefTech)
  - Accuracy and velocity distribution was at -20, +20 and +40 C.
  - There was penetration of triple glazed window at 25deg angle and penetration of heavy door construction at 30deg angle.

Future Evaluations include:
- Box magazine 12-gauge pump-action shotguns Valtro PM5 and Baikal 133K.
  - Finnish researchers consider the 12-gauge a good GP weapon due to the assortment of ammunition available (including less-lethal).
  - The intent of the evaluation is to assess shotgun construction to reduce risk of accidents.
- We have commenced a TASER evaluation.
Swedish Police Less-Lethal

Roger Alvefuhr
Police Superintendent
Swedish National Police Board

- Oleoresin-Capsicum (OC) spray has been successfully tested in an operational test during 2003.
- Out of 243 expositions police officers have in 17 cases avoided the use of lethal force (i.e. their service pistol).
- In 2 cases suicide candidates have been rescued due to the use of OC.
- OC is to be issued to all police officers beginning this year.
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Swedish Police Less-Lethal

- We are preparing an operational test on impact ammo during 2004. 12 gauge and 40 mm projectiles will be tested.

- We are preparing for operational test of the TASER during 2004. At the moment the equipment is reviewed by the Delegation for Human Rights Supervision on Weapon Projects at the Defence Ministry.

- This point does not concern LLW but effective from August 2003 we changed service ammo from full metal jacket to hollow point. (9 mm 124 grain Speer Gold Dot)
The Commissioner’s Working Group on the use of Less Lethal Weapons had the following terms of reference:

- Examine current practices and procedures for such situations.
- Examine procedures currently in place in other Jurisdictions.
- Gather regarding ‘non-lethal’ methods currently available and evaluate same with regard to use by An Garda Síochána.
An Garda Síochána  
Ireland's National Police Service

- Make recommendations, including all implications for An Garda Síochána (costs, training etc.), as to whether such ‘non-lethal’ methods should be made available for use by An Garda Síochána.

- Legislative changes, which may be necessary following from your recommendations.

- Any other appropriate recommendations following your examination of current and future procedures.

Activities of the Working Group:

- Attended international conferences on the subject of less-lethal weapons;

- Visited police agencies in Europe and the U.S.;

- Participated in live-fire demonstrations;

- Reviewed additional test material prior to a final decision on their recommendations.
Essential requirements for the choice of devices were:

- Universal application;
- Discriminating;
- Environmentally benign;
- Portable;
- Reusable;
- Reversible; and
- Instantaneous effect.


The devices recommended were:

- Bean-Bag shotgun round (kinetic energy round);
- Ferret OC shotgun cartridge (delivering pepper spray); and
- Aerosol Projector (delivering pepper spray).
An Implementation Team was established with terms of reference to:

- Draw up guidelines for the introduction of less-lethal weapons into An Garda Síochána;
- Develop a suitable training program;
- Develop operational guidelines to include deployment and command and control structures;
- Recommend amendments to the Garda Code;
- Identify suitable equipment.

Implementation Team report submitted (Jul 2002);
Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform approved acquisition (Nov 2002);
Tendering process commenced and in the final purchase orders were authorized (Dec 2003).

The original ‘square bean-bag’ was replaced by the drag-stabilized version and the Defense Technology Mark 21 projector was selected as the OC delivery system.
Training Program

Members of the ERU traveled to the Los Angeles Sheriffs Department in December 2003 and received instructor grade training in three devices.

A training syllabus is being developed;

Training for ERU will commence by April 2004 (deployment of the devices is restricted to ERU personnel to incidents where firearms may be deployed);

Other training has been identified and will be delivered at the Garda College to Scene Commanders, First Responders and Crisis Negotiators.

There is currently a public enquiry taking place into the fatal shooting which occurred in April 2000. The less lethal programme and the issues surrounding crisis response continue to be relevant.
Appendices
Appendix A – Agenda

3 February 2004 (Tuesday)

0900-0925 Registration & Coffee

0925-0930 Housekeeping

0930-0945 Welcome and Introduction

Brian Coleman OBE, Director Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB)

0945-1005 Keynote Speech – Purpose of the International Law Enforcement Forum (ILEF)

Paul Acres QPM, Chair of Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Conflict Management Portfolio

1005-1025 Structure & Objectives for ILEF 3

Ian Arundale

Structure & Objectives of ILEF Day 3

Colin Ashe, Steering Group Investigating Alternative Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict

International Context and Recommendations from ILEF 2

Colonel Andy Mazzara (USMC-Ret), Director, Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, Penn State Applied Research Laboratory

1025-1045 Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) Update

Graham Smith, Manager: Firearms and Protective Equipment, PSDB

1045-1105 Coffee / Tea

1105-1230 International Update Session

Colonel Andy Mazzara: Coordinator of Session

1230-1330 Lunch

1330-1345 Background and Introduction to L21A1 Baton Round

Colin Burrows QPM: ACPO Special Advisor (Steering Group Investigating Alternative Policing Approaches towards the Management of Conflict)

1345-1400 Demonstration of L21A1 baton Round

Sussex Police
1400-1515 Phase 4 Report on Alternative Approaches to the Management of Conflict

Introduction
Robin Masefield CBE, Secretary to the Steering Group Investigating Policing Approaches Towards the Management of Conflict

Sock Round Evaluation
Dr. Graham Cooper OBE, Head of Trauma, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (dstl), Porton Down

Attenuating Energy Projectile and Discriminating Irritant Projectile
Alan Hepper, dstl, Porton Down

Water Cannon
Chief Inspector Jimmy O’Brien, Police Service for Northern Ireland

Operational Use of TASERs and L21A1
Chief Inspector Martin Perks, ACPO Firearms Secretariat

1530-1600 Coffee/Tea

1600-1645 Report from Electronic Operational Requirements Group
Colin Burrows / Andy Mazzara

1645-1700 Panel Discussion on EORG Report
EORG Members

1700-1715 Chairman’s Closing Remarks for Day 1

4 February 2004 (Wednesday)

0900-0930 Registration for Break out Sessions & Coffee

0930-1015 Chairman’s introduction to day 2 and introductory presentations for the breakout sessions

Group 1 – Developing and populating less-lethal weapons database
Matthew Symons, Less-Lethal Weaponry Database Project Manager

Group 2 – Determining effectiveness & injury potential
Dr. John Kenny, Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, PSU

Group 3 – Optimizing tactics, training, & use
Ian Arundale, Chair of ACPO Police Use of Firearms Working Group
Group 4 – Specifying definitions, standards, and testing
Andy Mazzara, Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, PSU

1025-1130 Breakout Session One (Syndicate Rooms)
1130-1145 Coffee
1145-1245 Plenary Session:
• Group reports from Breakout Session 1
• Introduction to Breakout Session 2
1245-1345 Lunch
1345-1500 Breakout Session Two (Syndicate Rooms)
All groups – What still needs to be done in conflict management?
1500-1520 Coffee
1520-1545 What still needs to be done? - Update from groups
Ian Arundale / Group facilitators
1545-1600 Closing comments
Ian Arundale / Andy Mazzara
1600-1800 Transfer by coach to London hotel
1900-1930 Transfer by coach for reception and formal dinner aboard HMS Belfast

5 February 2004 (Thursday)
0930-1000 Registration and Refreshments
1000-1005 Welcome from the Chairman
Ivan Wilson
1005-1030 Police Ethics
Peter Neyroud, Chief Constable, Thames Valley
1030-1055 A Northern Ireland perspective
Denis Bradley, Vice-Chairman, Northern Ireland Policing Board
1055-1105 Discussion
1105-1120 Break
1120-1140 UK Developments in Conflict Management– an ACPO view
Paul Acres, QPM, Chief Constable, Hertfordshire
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

1140-1200  A US perspective  
*Michael Berkow, Deputy Chief of Los Angeles Police Department*

1200-1300  Lunch

1300-1320  An NGO perspective  
*Mark Littlewood, Liberty (cancelled)*

1320-1340  Accountability issues  
*Nuala O’Loan, Police Ombudsman, Northern Ireland*

1340-1415  Discussion

1415-1530  Syndicate Sessions:

(a) The police approach to violent individuals endangering themselves or others

(b) The police approach to serious crowd disorder involving individuals engaged in potentially life-threatening action

(c) Issues associated with the use of force and international Human Rights principles

1530-1545  Break

1545-1645  Feedback from syndicate sessions and discussion

1645  Chairman’s closing remarks
Appendix B – Focus Questions

**Session 1: Databases and Shared Resources**
1. Range of information included - too wide? Too narrow?
2. How can we encourage people to share information?
3. What alternative information sources could be used?
4. Availability - who should have access to the information?
5. What format should be used to share the database? CD, web based?
6. How frequently should the information be updated?

**Session 2: Assessing Effectiveness and Injury Potential**
1. How do we measure/classify effectiveness?
2. What is required to produce effectiveness? - Pain? Restricted movement? Unconsciousness?
3. What is an acceptable level of injury?
4. What models are available to predict injury potential? Are these adequate? Is further research required?
5. How can injury potential be further reduced while maintaining effectiveness?

**Session 3: Optimising Tactics and Use**
1. Is best use being made of currently available options?
2. Where are the gaps?
3. Are specific tactics in place for less-lethal options?
4. Or are less-lethal options "tacked-on" to existing tactics and policies
5. Sharing international experiences - different approaches.

**Session 4: Definitions, Standards and Testing**
1. Definitions - what makes an option "less-lethal"? What is the limit on acceptable injury from a less-lethal option?
2. Who should set standards? Government, academia, industry?
3. What are the essential parameters that must be assessed? How do we set levels for these parameters?
4. Can injury potential be included or tested in a standard? What tests could be used?
5. Can international standards be developed? Are there areas where differences may be required?
6. Can standards keep up with new developments - not just new rounds, but new technologies?
### Appendix C – Workshop Attendees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable Ian Arundale</td>
<td>Constabulary Headquarters, West Mercia-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Constable Paul Acres QPM</td>
<td>Chair of ACPO Conflict Management-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Roger Alvefuhr</td>
<td>Swedish National Police Board, Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Colin Ashe</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Andy Baird</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Cynthia Bir</td>
<td>Wayne State University, US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector Robert Blackburn</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspector Bill Brown</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector Christine Burden</td>
<td>Staff Officer to Chief Constable of Hertfordshire, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Colin Burrows QPM</td>
<td>ACPO Special Advisor-UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inspector Chris Caughell</td>
<td>Edmonton Police Services-Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Joe Cecconi</td>
<td>National Institute of Justice-US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Brian Coleman OBE</td>
<td>Director, Police Scientific Development Branch-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Graham Cooper OBE</td>
<td>Dstl Biomedical Sciences-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. John Cox</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Karen Douse</td>
<td>Police Scientific Development Branch, Home Office-UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Josh Edenheimer</td>
<td>The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)-US</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief Constable Joe Edwards</td>
<td>Sussex Police-UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asst Chief Constable (Acting) Sheamus Hamill</td>
<td>Police Service of Northern Ireland-UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superintendent Neil Haynes</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service-UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander Sid Heal</td>
<td>Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department-US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective Superintendent Pat Hogan</td>
<td>An Garda Síochána -Republic of Ireland</td>
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</table>
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MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS

Lieutenant Colonel Ed Hughes
(USA-Retired) INLDT, Penn State Applied
Research Laboratory-US

Ms. Christine Hussain Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Major Steve Ijames Springfield, Missouri Police
Department-US

Mr. Jorma Jussila Senior Advisor, Police Technical
Centre-Finland

Dr. John Kenny INLDT, Penn State Applied
Research Laboratory-US

Mr. Daniel Longhurst Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Superintendent John MacDonald Her Majesty's Inspectorate of
Constabulary -UK

Mr. Martin Macfarlane Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Mr. Robin Masefield CBE Patten Action Team, Northern
Ireland Office

Superintendent Neville Matthews New Zealand Police-New Zealand

Colonel Andy Mazzara (USMC-Retired) INLDT, Penn State Applied
Research Laboratory-US

Mr. James McDonald LVO MBE Independent Assessor of Military
Complaints Procedure-UK

Inspector Ken Morris Police Service of Northern Ireland-
UK

Chief Inspector Jimmy O'Brien Police Service of Northern Ireland-
UK

Mr. Graham Parker Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Chief Inspector Martyn Perks ACPO Firearms Secretariat,
Police Use of Firearms-UK

Chief Inspector Richard Prior Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Mr. Evan Saether Development Division, Police
Procurement Service-Norway

Mr. Graham Smith Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Mr. Matthew Symons Police Scientific Development
Branch, Home Office-UK

Ms. Catherine Webster Public Order & Crime Issues Unit,
Home Office-UK

Mr. Davis Wilkinson Police Scientific Development
Branch-UK

Mr. Ivan Wilson Information Appeals Tribunal
(Chairman, Day 3)

Mr. David Wood Police Ombudsman’s Office for
Northern Ireland-UK

Note:
ACPO – Association of Chief Police Officers
CBE – Commander of the Order of the British
Empire
INLDT – Institute for Non-Lethal Defense
Technologies
OBE – Officer of the British Empire
QPM – Queen’s Police Medal
UK – United Kingdom
US – United States
Appendix D – Results of the Electronic Operational Requirements Working Group (EORG): Less-Lethal Weapons Definitions and Operational Test Criteria

This appendix presents the best possible compilation of general thoughts and positions regarding definitions and operational test criteria. These were generally agreed upon by the members, but they do not necessarily reflect consensus. It should be clear that each of these criteria needs to be assessed within the differing contexts of strategic, ethical, operational and societal considerations. However that is a function of policy and decision-makers. The EORG process is oriented toward collecting field/street/lab data that can support testing and training standards for the officer/constable on patrol. Also included in this appendix is a matrix of operational test criteria which contains measurable parameter(s) or test data to be collected for each criterion, and a draft on a range of acceptable values. These were also derived by the EORG.

Operational Definitions and Criteria

It is important in identifying and assessing operational requirements that will support the establishment of testing and training standards that all parties are “on the same sheet of music” with regard to terminology. The following definitions represent the consensus opinion of the EORG subject matter experts:

- **Debilitating** – degraded function to a point of inability to present a threat. Considered by degree, but only partially or not completely incapacitating.

- **Incapacitating** – causes temporary and total dysfunction and a complete inability to perform basic aggressor functions or pose a threat.

- **Incapacitation** – degraded human function or physical/sensory dysfunction that is temporary and of such a degree that an individual is rendered incapable of carrying out any violent physical act.

- **Effective** – normally achieves the operational (field) performance objective.

- **Serious Injury** – that injury that requires invasive and extensive medical treatment and/or surgery and results in permanent physical damage to the individual.
Non-lethal – A term used by the military aligned to NATO, and in the United Nations’ documents. Tends not to be used in by law enforcement agencies. A strict interpretation of the term implies a weapon, system or technology designed with the intent of not causing serious injury or death.

Less-Lethal – This term has become the most commonly used within law enforcement and is applied to weapons, technologies and tactical options. Proponents of the term argue that it is more precise and recognizes that any use of force option may have unintended lethal consequences either as a direct or indirect result of their application. The following has gained widespread acceptance – “the application of tactics and technologies that are less likely to result in death or serious injury than conventional firearms and/or munitions.” (LLW = Less-Lethal Weapons)

Less-than-Lethal – The term is intended to have a similar usage as less-lethal. On occasions, the terms ‘less-lethal,’ ‘less-than-lethal’ and ‘non-lethal’ are used interchangeably. However, “less-than-lethal” is usually a US law enforcement term which implies, like the military term ‘non-lethal’, a technology or technique designed and employed to achieve effects that are not deadly.

Minimal force options – a broader interpretation of the tactics, techniques or technologies available and intended for other-than-deadly force applications. This term is more comprehensive than the ‘less-lethal’ term and conveys the idea that the force (tactic, technique or technology) applied will be commensurate with the threat.

[Note: It is universally understood both in law enforcement and the military that regardless of the term, non-lethal, less-lethal or less-than-lethal, there is no guarantee of non-lethality whenever force, mass, acceleration and energy are involved with uncertain scenarios, environments and demographics. Generally speaking, there is a consensus among a majority of the respondents that we should not limit the range of testable areas to a specific number which might inadvertently limit the utility of the test. The specific set of parameters to be used for testing or training standards will most likely be a subset of the approved list.]

The following attributes represent the best descriptors of criteria for data collection, necessary to the determination of testing and training standards:

EMPLOYMENT ISSUES

Accuracy. The ability to deliver the less-lethal effect to the intended target (individual or multiple) repeatedly within the intended operating ranges of the system and under anticipated operating conditions when correctly deployed by a trained user.
COMMENT: Coupled with range there also needs to be an acceptable level of accuracy for each device with parameters aligned with the intended operational application. Many of the kinetic impact weapons currently in use achieve part of their effectiveness and less-lethal potential through the accuracy of the weapon system (gun, sight, and projectile). Inadvertently striking a vulnerable part of the body (essentially the cardiac area or possibly the head) may result in serious injury. Accuracy limitations also increase the chance of striking someone other than the intended target. Ideally, the option should be discriminating at ranges up to 25 meters. This range is chosen as an approximation to that within which firearms containment can reasonably be provided by officers with handguns or other weapons with limited accuracy. In public disorder situations, accuracy at range will be particularly important since it may be necessary to target individuals within a group. Considerable further benefit will arise if an option is discriminating over a greater distance (e.g., up to 50m), allowing it to be deployed in a variety of scenarios. Options that are shown to be effective over only part of this range will still merit consideration.

Maximum Effective Range. The maximum distance at which a particular weapon/device can be expected to be used within the accuracy parameters set or at which the desired effect can be reliably anticipated. COMMENT: Details of the range of each device are important. Operators need to have a clear understanding of minimum, maximum and optimum range of the device being used. Arguably, the most indispensable requirement for determining the applicability of any less-lethal weapon is range. This aspect is closely linked to accuracy since it is necessary that the option maintains its accuracy over its entire operation distance. Operational requirements must include the maximum effective range of less-lethal projectile firing munitions.

Minimum Safe Range. The range short of which the application has the potential to cause unintended or more serious and potentially life threatening injuries. COMMENT: Ideally, this range should be 0 meters. It is therefore essential that this information is developed during testing and promulgated during training. This is particularly important where there is an assessed minimum safety distance, short of which a device is more likely to result in serious injury or death, and a maximum effective range, beyond which a device becomes ineffective. This is important since the risk posed by a threat will depend on how far it is away (i.e., a person armed with a firearm will be very dangerous at 20m whereas the threat posed by a person armed with a knife at this distance would not be as immediate). Minimum safe range is particularly crucial when employing those impact munitions where the “sweet spot” is range dependent. It is important, as well, to develop officer and public confidence in the less-lethal systems.

Ease of Operation. Weapon systems should enable ease of use under operational conditions, including poor light conditions and within climatic conditions experienced within the geographical region. COMMENT: The more complicated, the more difficult the weapon will be to use. This may mean officers prove reluctant to use what might be an extremely useful and effective weapon. This is important since violent situations are extremely stressful. It should be possible to operate an option with ease and with as few judgment decisions as possible being requires.
Operational Effect. The ability of the system or weapon to stop, impede or distract and produce a range of intended effects without the least probability of causing serious or life-threatening injuries. COMMENT: Another factor lacking in decisions to employ less-lethal options is an inability to precisely describe and/or understand the desired effects. This is particularly aggravating in that nearly all are to some degree debilitating, not incapacitating. Consequently, they impede a suspect’s ability to accomplish some action or defy authority rather than preventing him. The concept is no less confusing in application than in concept, since a device capable of knocking a person down is often viewed as effective, yet frequently there are suspects who have been knocked down and then get back up. Consequently, a common language and nomenclature would be of benefit so that there is a base of understanding.

Acceptability. Acceptability will be subject to a range of factors including the circumstances in which the system is used, the threats encountered, and the issues associated with proportionality and legality. Historic and cultural issues will also impact on what is considered acceptable. A holistic approach would involve risk and threat assessment followed by an examination of strategic, ethical, operational and societal criteria that would assist in determining acceptability of use. COMMENT: It is acknowledged that how a weapon is used will encroach on a person’s liberty and constitutional rights. It is important therefore that there is operational guidance and training that is legally and human rights audited. It is also essential that the design criteria should minimize the risk and opportunity for the weapon to be used other than as intended. It should be generally accepted within the public that less-lethal weapons are designed to cause minimal injury / harm but that must be one of the overriding tenets of the devices. Levels of criticism - from organizations which monitor law enforcement compliance with international human rights standards – must be considered. The technology should be examined against strategic, ethical, operational and societal criteria to provide a broad determination of acceptability.

Immediacy. Most weapons should be rapidly effective - usually immediate. COMMENT: Although certain scenarios may benefit from a delayed action, these will be limited. Violent situations often tend to be very fast moving and threats can develop and increase very quickly. It is therefore important that the immediacy of any option is known. This information will determine its value in any given situation and enable an assessment to be made as to whether it will achieve its objective quick enough to control a threat.

WEAPON ISSUES

Specification of Weapons. Operators must have a clear understanding of the capabilities of each weapon. This should include ‘user friendly’ details of what the weapon can do including; range (as above), weight, handling information, ammunition, storage, maintenance, etc.
Interaction with other Weapons (LLW or other). Details need to be available as to how a particular weapon may interact with other devices. If potential problems could occur these need to be advertised so as to minimize risk to officers, targets and others.

Reliability. Each weapon must have the highest possible level of reliability (100% is the desired objective, 98% required). COMMENT: Failure of the weapon to perform may have severe consequences not only for the safety of the operator but also the potential target and others in the vicinity. Operational requirements should relate directly to performance reliability requirements.

Safety/Security. The use of the weapon or munition, and any associated equipment required, should be safe to operate and store, and should have the minimum security considerations. COMMENT: It will be necessary to assess whether use of the option presents any risk to the user. Storage/transport of the options should not present an unacceptable danger.

Portability. The weapon or device should be capable of being operated by one officer. COMMENT: It should be suitable for use by the majority of officers with appropriate training, regardless of physical size or gender. It should not rely on complex motor skills.

Mobility / Flexibility. Ideally the system should be capable of being deployed against a non-static target. COMMENT: It should be easily transported to the scene of an incident, and ideally portable at the scene. The ease of transport, set up and deployment should be assessed. The system may or may not be able to be carried on a routine basis by a patrol officer. This determines how available it is to be used when it is needed.

HUMAN EFFECTS ISSUES

Medical Implications. A comprehensive medical assessment of predictable medical outcomes should be completed, to include risk of penetration, perforation, likely injury, or lethality and whether the probable outcomes are affected by individual factors such as age, pre-existing medical condition, or repeat application. COMMENT: Prior to acceptance and employment less-lethal weapon systems should be subjected to independent injury potential assessment by an accredited body. The assessment should be based and provide operational instructions or guidance on use of the system. Officers should be made aware to the potential harm of LLWs.

Subject Population. The system should be effective against the maximum proportion of the population taking account of both permanent and transitory differences (e.g. demographics/ drunkenness). COMMENT: An assessment should be made of whether the option is capable of operating on a range of individuals. Quite often a threat is posed by persons who are intoxicated or for some other reason not in full control of their actions. Such persons do not necessarily respond to pain, which is why an option that relies on pain...
compliance alone may not be effective in all circumstances. It is also
necessary to know whether any risks associated with the use of a particular
option are worsened by physical characteristics of the subject such as age or a
pre-existing medical condition etc.

**Cumulative Effects.** The repeated use of the weapon system or munition
should not produce unintended results or preclude the use of other tactical
options before/after. **COMMENT:** It may be necessary to use an option more
than once. It is therefore necessary to assess whether outcomes are likely to
be different for a number of uses. It is also necessary to know the effects of
using a number of options at the same time (i.e., Taser® and inflammable
solvents used in incapacitant sprays).

**Probable Outcomes.** A comprehensive assessment of the likely or probable
outcomes is beneficial. The more one knows about the effects and
effectiveness of a weapon, the better one will be able to employ it.
**COMMENT:** Following the medical issues, operators should be made aware
that failure to use the weapon in the correct way, or failure to target the correct
point of impact, may reduce (or even remove) the overall effectiveness. The
length of time over which the effects are likely to last is also an important
consideration. Injury potential of the system is of obviously high significance. A
system must be capable of achieving the objective but it must also cause the
minimum injury to the person against whom it is deployed (not merely less-
lethal) – a very difficult balance to achieve. On the other hand, a system may
well be accurate, have a great range, and have a low potential for injury but it
might not achieve its intended purpose (stopping a person from doing what an
officer is trying to stop him from doing).

**PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES**

**Areas of Use/Environments.** Where there are enhanced risks of unintended
consequences, details should be included as to the environments in which
each weapon can be used. **COMMENT:** There may be circumstances when
the use of a particular weapon may create problems. This does not mean a
weapon must not be used in such circumstances but officers must be made
aware of the potential pitfalls. Operational realities make it necessary or any
option to be assessed as to its applicability in a range of environmental
conditions – weather, indoors/outdoors, explosive environments, crowds etc.
Weather conditions must be considered due to the extreme temperature
ranges.

**Costs.** The cost of acquisition, training and use which may have a bearing on
the ability of agencies to acquire or deploy a LLW system is required.
**COMMENT:** Information on initial and ongoing costs is essential. The relative
cost of an option may be an important factor in decisions regarding its
acquisition or extent of its deployment. If too expensive it will reduce amount
of training and again its effectiveness in the field. Having stated this, legally
cost cannot be a major factor in providing or failing to provide appropriate
means to ensure the safety of users, subjects or the public.
Legal Implications. There should be a transparent audit of the adoption of any weapon, its development, medical implications, training and a record of use. COMMENT: The use of a particular weapon and its circumstances of use will be relevant in any subsequent investigation and possible court action. Would the adoption of the option require new legal authority? Tactical options should consider the least intrusion with an individual’s or group’s rights.

Training. An assessment of the adequacy/sufficiency of training required for the weapon system or munition may indicate the value of its adoption. COMMENT: Is the training for the system long and complicated? If a system requires too much training, police agencies are not likely to keep up with this training. Poor training causes both effectiveness of the system to decline and potential for injuries to the subject to increase. Ease of operability is also important in this regard - abstraction for training is a major problem and if new technology is going to add to the problem, acceptance is unlikely.
2004 International Law Enforcement Forum for MINIMAL FORCE OPTIONS
## Less-Lethal Technology

### OPERATIONAL TEST CRITERIA MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Issue/ Criteria</th>
<th>Test Measure</th>
<th>Range of Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EMPLOYMENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Accuracy</td>
<td>Bench rest - x shots on target, measure centre to centre group size. Unsupported = man-fired</td>
<td>400mmx800mm@ 50m Essential: 90% unsupported Desired (Ideal): 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Maximum Effective Range</td>
<td>Weapon specific effect @ maximum range</td>
<td>Essential: 25 meters Desired: 50 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Minimum Safe Range</td>
<td>Weapon specific effect @ minimum range</td>
<td>Essential: 1 meter Desired: 0 meter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Ease of Operation</td>
<td>Time taken to draw, make ready, and accurately discharge weapon</td>
<td>% positive survey results &gt;60% from trained users surveyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Operational Effect</td>
<td># rounds on target/min</td>
<td>Minimum 6 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Acceptability</td>
<td>1. Compatible with uses of force policy currently in effect</td>
<td>1. Yes / no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Immediacy</td>
<td>Time of strike to incapacitation (sec)</td>
<td>0 - 3 seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEAPON</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8 Specification of Weapons</td>
<td>1. Weight</td>
<td>Kgs Specify number.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Interaction with other Weapons</td>
<td>Weapons not compatible with?</td>
<td>Specify weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Reliability</td>
<td>1. Failures during training or operational deployment</td>
<td>Essential: &gt; 90% Desired: 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Safety/Security</td>
<td>1. Risk assessment (Min security/min safety risk)</td>
<td>1. &lt; 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Portability</td>
<td>How is weapon carried during routine patrol?</td>
<td>Yes / no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Mobility/Flexibility</td>
<td>Is weapon effective against moving targets?</td>
<td>Yes / No: % hits on target</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Can weapon be effectively deployed while the officer is moving?</td>
<td>Yes / No: % hits on target</td>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Issue/ Criteria</td>
<td>Test Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HUMAN EFFECTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Medical Implications</td>
<td>1. Risk of serious injury</td>
<td>1. 0 – 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Risk of lethal result</td>
<td>2. 0 – .5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Estimated recovery time</td>
<td>3. &lt; 20 min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Subject Population</td>
<td>Demographic effects - Specify types of person: elderly, under 14yrs, drug induced people, intoxicated etc.</td>
<td>&lt; 1 % probability of serious injury/death by group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Cumulative Effects</td>
<td>Risk or repeat application</td>
<td>&lt; 5% probability of serious injury/death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Probable Outcomes</td>
<td>Fully informed users?</td>
<td>Yes / no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PUBLIC POLICY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Areas of Use/ Environments</td>
<td>1. Weather restrictions</td>
<td>1. None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Temperature range</td>
<td>2. -10 to +35 degrees C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Use restrictions (indoors)</td>
<td>3. Yes/no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Costs</td>
<td>1. Initial cost per weapon</td>
<td>&lt; $800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Cost per round</td>
<td>&lt; $60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Legal Implications</td>
<td>1. Risk of human rights issue</td>
<td>1. &lt;1 % probability per use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Potential liability costs</td>
<td>2. &lt; $100K per claim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Training</td>
<td>1. Initial time to train 1 man</td>
<td>1. &lt; 8 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Required time per year to keep trained to standard</td>
<td>2. &lt; 2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Cost to train one officer (initial/annually)</td>
<td>3. &lt; $500/$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Simple to operate</td>
<td>4. Yes/no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>