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Reducing Courts’ Failure to Appear Rate: A Procedural Justice Approach

Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins, & Elizabeth M. Neeley

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Reducing Courts’ Failure to Appear Rate: A Procedural Justice Approach

Brian H. Bornstein, Alan J. Tomkins, & Elizabeth M. Neeley

Abstract

Failure-to-appear (FTA) is a significant problem in the nation’s courts. This paper examines the effectiveness of using different kinds of written reminders to reduce misdemeanants’ FTA rates. Misdemeanants (n = 7865) in 14 Nebraska counties were randomly assigned to one of four conditions prior to their court date: no reminder (control), reminder-only, reminder with information on the negative consequences of FTA (reminder-sanctions), or reminder with information on sanctions as well as the procedural justice benefits of appearing (reminder-combined). A subset of defendants (n = 452) was also surveyed after their scheduled court date to assess their perceptions of procedural fairness (both in general and regarding participants’ specific court experience) and their level of trust/confidence in the courts.

Reminders significantly reduced FTA overall, and more substantive reminders were significantly more effective than a simple reminder. Specifically, the FTA rate was 12.6% in the control condition, 10.9% in the reminder-only condition, 8.3% in the reminder-sanctions condition, and 9.8% in the reminder-combined condition. The FTA rate was higher for some categories of misdemeanors than others, and for defendants with multiple charges (15.4% if two or more charges, versus 5.4% for one charge). The baseline FTA rate was higher for Blacks (18.7%) than for Whites (11.7%) and Hispanics (10.5%), but this difference was not statistically significant when controlling for other factors such as number of offenses and type of offense.

Survey results indicated that misdemeanants’ trust/confidence assessments, as well as their perceptions of procedural justice, were related to their appearance in court. Defendants who
appeared in court had higher institutional confidence and felt they had been treated more fairly by the criminal justice system (means = 3.23 and 3.52, respectively, on a 5-point scale) than non-appearers (means = 3.02 and 3.23, respectively). Institutional confidence and procedural justice were themselves highly correlated. Defendants with low trust in the courts were less likely to appear than those with higher trust when there was no reminder, but this relationship was not statistically significant when there was a reminder.

The study has important implications for public policy and pretrial services, such as improving system efficiencies and increasing criminal defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice. We recommend that courts, especially in larger jurisdictions, adopt a reminder program for defendants and engage in outreach to increase offenders’ trust/confidence.

This work was supported by a grant from the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice (2008-IJ-CX-0022).
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The opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Justice. For correspondence, please contact Brian Bornstein, Dept. of Psychology, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588-0308 (bbornstein2@unl.edu).
Reducing Courts’ Failure-to-Appear Rate: A Procedural Justice Approach

Introduction

For the law to be effective, people must obey it (Caldeira, 1986; Tyler, 2006b). Although the law frequently involves elements of coercion, in practical terms the legal system has, at best, a limited ability to compel people to obey the law (e.g., Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 2006b). Voluntary acceptance minimizes the need of authorities to explain and justify each decision, reduces the need to monitor implementation, and limits the expenditure of scarce resources to ensure compliance (e.g., Robinson & Darley, 1997; Tyler, 2006a).

One area of the criminal justice system where compliance is particularly lacking is in individuals’ response to orders to appear in court for relatively minor offenses such as traffic offenses, misdemeanors, and low-level felonies. Non-custodial criminal defendants often fail to appear for court. This occurs for all kinds of mandated appearances: arraignment, pretrial (post-arraignment) hearings, trial, and post-trial. Initial (i.e., arraignment) failure-to-appear (FTA) rates for non-waiverable offenses are particularly problematic, as they involve the greatest volume of defendants. Many, if not most, of these individuals are not detained prior to trial (Goldkamp & White, 2006; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). There are a number of alternatives to pretrial detention (VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009), the most common of which, for minor offenses, is simply to release individuals in the community with little if any government oversight, placing the burden to appear in court entirely on defendants themselves (Goldkamp & White, 2006). Not surprisingly, this can result in substantial failure-to-appear (FTA) rates. FTA rates vary depending on jurisdiction and offense type, ranging from less than 10% (e.g., Cuvelier & Potts, 1997; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009) to as high as 25-30% (e.g., Davis, 2005; Helland & Tabarok, 2004; McGinty, 2000). These failures to appear are costly for both the court system and defendants (Levin, Kennel, Pellegrino, Simmons, & Surett, 2007).
Following the example set by the medical profession (e.g., Larson et al., 1982), several courts have effectively implemented court reminder programs designed to reduce FTA rates (Cozier, 2000; O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006; see, generally, The Court Brothers, 2010a). For example, the Cook County (IL) Juvenile Court’s postcard reminder program reduced the failure-to-appear rate from 38% to 13% (Rohan, 2006). Similarly, an evaluation of Coconino County (AZ) showed a reduction in the percentage of failures to appear at initial appearance in adult misdemeanor cases from over 25% to less than 13% when the defendant was called in advance and reminded of the hearing date (White, 2006). Reminder programs in Arapahoe County (CO), Jefferson County (CO), and Multnomah County (OR) have also increased appearance rates and realized substantial labor and financial savings (Arapahoe County Justice Center, 2010; Jefferson County Criminal Justice Planning, 2006; O’Keefe, 2007). The potential of reminder programs has even spawned a national reminder call business for courts (The Court Brothers, 2010b).

Although the results of such reminder programs are promising, none has incorporated social scientific theory or research methodology to study the matter systematically—that is, comparing different types of reminders to determine which ones are more/less effective. The present study uses principles of procedural justice to test the effectiveness of different kinds of written reminders.

Procedural justice theory has developed from scholars’ desire to understand the process-related factors that influence individuals’ acceptance of outcomes and decisions from authorities, even when those outcomes may not be favorable to the individual. Individuals are more likely to accept adverse outcomes and follow unwanted directives when they perceive the process to be procedurally fair (e.g., Hegtvedt, Johnson, Ganem, Waldron, & Brody, 2009; MacCoun, 2005; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2006a; Walker et al., 1974). Derived from the social psychology of process fairness, procedural justice is thought to be the key construct in determining how people perceive and react to the courts (Burke & Leben, 2007-2008).

Related to procedural justice, the public’s trust and confidence in governmental institutions has received increased attention in recent decades (e.g., Baum, 2006; Gibson et al., 2003, 2005; National Center for State
Courts [NCSC], 1999). Studies indicate that confidence in specific courts’ actions is a fairly stable construct (Brewer et al., 2004) and is linked to procedural justice concerns (e.g., Benesh, 2006; Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 2001, 2003, 2006b).

Rates for failing to appear are comparatively high for minority defendants compared to Whites (O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006). A possible explanation for that difference is that minorities have been found to have lower levels of trust/confidence in the courts (e.g., NCSC, 1999; Rottman & Tomkins, 1999), but little work has been done to examine whether there are racial/ethnic differences in procedural justice perceptions of courts and whether such differences might have an impact on appearance in court.

Perceptions of procedural justice have been examined in a range of contexts, both inside and outside the courtroom (Murphy, Tyler & Curtis, 2009; Murphy, 2008; Tomkins & Applequist, 2008; Tyler, 2006a, 2007), and they have been studied in both experimental and more naturalistic settings (MacCoun, 2005). Relatively little research, however, has examined the link between procedural justice and behavior, although there is a clear relationship between perceived procedural fairness and compliance (Murphy & Tyler, 2008; Lind et al., 1993; Tyler, 2006b). The next step to bolster procedural justice theory is to use experimental or quasi-experimental design strategies in field research (MacCoun, 2005), an approach we take in the present study.

Studies looking at procedural justice and compliance typically vary (or assess) the level of procedural justice in some proceeding, and then measure its relationship to subsequent compliance (e.g., Barry & Tyler, 2009; De Cremer & Van Hiel, 2008; Hartner, Rechberger, Kirchler, & Schabmann, 2008; Murphy & Tyler, 2008; Murphy, Tyler & Curtis, 2009; Murphy, 2008). Other research focuses on individuals’ expectancies of procedural justice, and measures its relationship to behavioral intentions or attitudes (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988). In some circumstances, such as court hearings, it is important to address individuals’ expectancies early in the process, simply because an expectation of low procedural fairness might lead them to avoid the court proceeding altogether (e.g., fail to appear). Thus, the present study seeks to manipulate criminal defendants’ expectancies of procedural justice prior to attending their first court hearing. This extends previous work on
procedural justice and compliance, while also having practical implications for reducing defendants’ failure-to-appear rate.

Study Overview and Hypotheses

The process fairness and justice literatures suggest that reminders would reduce defendants’ FTA rate, and that reminders incorporating a substantive message—such as one emphasizing procedural justice concerns—would be more effective than a simple reminder. The present study tests this hypothesis via a two-stage experiment. In Phase 1, defendants are randomly assigned to one of four reminder conditions: 1) a no-reminder (control) condition; 2) a reminder-only condition; 3) a condition in which the reminder also makes them aware of possible sanctions should they fail to appear (reminder-sanctions); and 4) a condition in which the reminder mentions sanctions but also highlights aspects of procedural justice, such as voice, neutrality, respect, and public interest (reminder-combined). The primary dependent variable is whether defendants appear for their scheduled court date.

In Phase 2, we assessed a subset of participants’ public trust and confidence in the courts and perceptions of procedural justice via a survey administered after their scheduled appearance (or non-appearance). This allowed for an examination of the possible interaction between the reminder manipulation and participants’ degree of trust/confidence.

For Phase 1, we predicted a linear effect of the reminder manipulation, such that individuals who received the reminder-combined reminder would be most likely to comply, followed by individuals who received the reminder-sanctions reminder, followed by participants in the reminder-only condition, who would be more likely to comply with court orders than those who receive no reminder. We expected that the reminder-sanctions condition would be less effective than the reminder-combined condition, because some research shows that sanctions alone are not a very powerful means to get people to obey the law (Robinson & Darley, 1997). Thus, sanctions—or the threat thereof—should be a less efficient means of influencing behavior than other tactics, especially those based on a normative rationale (McAdams, 2000).
Previous studies have found that minorities have higher FTA rates, and that reminder programs show some evidence of a disproportionate benefit for minorities (O’Keefe, 2007; White, 2006). We therefore made two hypotheses related to race/ethnicity: first, a higher FTA rate for minorities than for Whites; and second, an interaction between the reminder manipulation and defendants’ race/ethnicity, such that the reminders would have a relatively greater impact for minority defendants than for White defendants.

For Phase 2, we hypothesized that trust/confidence in the judicial system and defendants’ procedural justice assessments would be greater for defendants who appeared in court than for defendants who failed to appear. We also predicted lower trust/confidence for minorities than for Whites. Finally, we predicted an interaction between the reminder treatment and individuals’ trust and confidence. Specifically, individuals with high levels of trust and confidence would have a high probability of complying with court orders, regardless of the treatment level that is administered (see, e.g., Scholz & Lubell, 1998; Tyler, 2006b; Tyler & Rasinski, 1991). The reminder manipulation would exert a stronger effect in individuals with relatively low trust and confidence in the courts.

Method

Participants

The sample for Phase 1 consisted of 7865 misdemeanor defendants from 14 counties in Nebraska. Data collection began in March 2009 and continued through May 2010. The selected counties include both urban (e.g., Lincoln and Omaha) and rural portions of the state. All misdemeanants meeting certain eligibility criteria (e.g., age 19 or over [the age of majority in Nebraska], type of offense, scheduling of court hearing) were included in the sample. For example, we excluded offenses for which defendants could waive their court appearance (appearance in court is not mandatory for waiverable offenses, which can be handled by the defendant via mail). This includes the majority of minor traffic offenses (e.g. suspended license, no proof of insurance, etc.) and offenses such as disturbing the peace, disorderly conduct, open container, etc. We also excluded cases that were entered into the state court’s computer system too close to the assigned court date, as it
limited our ability to send a reminder in the appropriate amount of time.\(^1\) The sample is racially diverse: 69.8% White, 10.7% Hispanic; 10.1% Black, 6.6% Unknown; 1.6% Native American; 1% Asian; and .2% Other.

All of the misdemeanor categories provided for by state statute were represented in the sample, with most coming from the relatively severe categories. For example, nearly one-third (30.5%) of defendants were charged with a Class W offense (alcohol-related misdemeanors, e.g., first offense DUI); and an additional 31.0% were charged with violations of city ordinances (e.g., injuring or destroying property). Just over 17% (17.6%) were charged with a Class 1 misdemeanor (e.g., carrying a concealed weapon-first offense; failing to stop and render aid), with the remainder charged with a Class 2 (9.3%; e.g., shoplifting $0-200) or Class 3 misdemeanor (11.2%; e.g., minor in possession of alcohol). Four individuals were charged with a Class 3A misdemeanor (.1%; e.g., possession of marijuana-3rd offense); 21 were charged with a Class 4 misdemeanor (.3%; e.g., possession of marijuana-2nd offense); and five were charged with a Class 5 misdemeanor (.1%; e.g., unlawful entry of state park without park permit). For analytical purposes, we combined the latter three categories with Class 3 misdemeanors.

A subset of the Phase 1 misdemeanants comprised the Phase 2 sample. Specifically, all of the misdemeanants who did not appear for their hearing and 20% (randomly selected) of those who did appear were sent a survey prenotification one week after their scheduled court hearing alerting them to a forthcoming survey mailing. Two weeks after the scheduled hearing date participants were mailed the actual survey with a $2 bill as an incentive. Replacement surveys were mailed two weeks later if they had not already been returned. Surveys were sent to 2,360 individuals: 1,551 to those who appeared for their court date and 809 who did not appear. We received surveys from 335 defendants who appeared in court, and 117 who failed to appear (452 total). The response rate was 21.6% for participants who appeared in court and 14.5% for those who failed to appear, making the overall response rate 19.2%.

\(^1\) The exclusionary criteria meant that our sample size was smaller than originally projected. We addressed this by adding counties and extending the data collection phase of the project. Our final sample was still smaller than projected, but these measures preserved the integrity of the sample while ensuring that it was large enough to confer adequate statistical power to test our major hypotheses.
The demographics of the Phase 2 sample were fairly comparable to the Phase 1 sample, although Whites comprised a slightly larger proportion of Phase 2 respondents (77.6%), and Blacks and Hispanics comprised slightly smaller proportions than in the Phase 1 sample (7.8% and 5.7%, respectively). We also examined differences between those who responded to the survey invitation and those who did not. First, older individuals were more likely to respond, $X^2(3) = 36.04, p < .001$ (age was broken down into four categories of roughly equal size), as were individuals who appeared for their court date, $X^2 (1) = 17.49, p < .001$. Additional tests also showed that there were significant differences in response rates across the three major racial categories, with Whites (21.7%) more likely to respond than Blacks (13.0%) and Hispanics (9.4%), $X^2 (2) = 28.15, p < .001$. Significant differences were also seen across offense type; individuals charged with Misdemeanor W (alcohol-related) were most likely to respond (22.7% response rate), while those charged with Misdemeanor 3, 3A, 4, or 5 were least likely to respond (13.5%), $X^2 (4) = 12.98, p = .011$. There were no significant differences in response rates across urban/rural respondents, $X^2 (1) = 3.09, p = .08$; gender, $X^2 (1) = 2.58, p = .11$; reminder condition, $X^2 (3) = .31, p = .96$; or number of offenses, $X^2 (1) = 1.36, p = .24$.

Materials, Design and Procedure

Phase 1. Each misdemeanor defendant in the participating counties was randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) no-reminder (control), (2) reminder-only, (3) reminder with explanation of consequences for failing to appear (reminder-sanctions), and (4) reminder explaining the negative consequences while also highlighting issues of procedural justice (reminder-combined). We did not include a procedural justice-only condition, with no mention of sanctions, because feedback from court personnel suggested that it would be unrealistic for courts to include the “positive” information without also mentioning the “negative” (it would also be potentially unethical, as a procedural justice-only condition might imply an absence of penalties for failure to appear). The reminders were in a bilingual format (English and Spanish) and sent by postal mail several days

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2 The study design and procedures were informed by discussions with stakeholders throughout the state of Nebraska. We benefited especially from the efforts of court administrators and Clerk Magistrates in the 14 counties where we collected data, as well as from the support of the Nebraska Minority Justice Committee.
before defendants’ scheduled court appearance (usually 4 working days prior to the court date). This resulted in the postcard arriving at the defendants’ residences 2-3 days prior to their scheduled court appearance.³

In the control condition, the defendant received no reminder notice. The reminder-only condition consisted of a message printed on a postcard reminding the defendant that he or she was scheduled to appear in court on a specified date and time (Appendix A, Panel 1). The reminder-sanctions condition contained this information as well as an additional message informing participants of what would happen if they failed to appear (Appendix A, Panel 2). The message in the reminder-combined condition contained the same information as the reminder-sanctions condition; in addition, it emphasized the various conceptual components of procedural justice (voice, dignity, respect, and public interest) that are attendant to the defendant’s appearance in court (Appendix A, Panel 3).

The messages in the respective conditions were pretested on a separate sample, to ensure that the manipulations captured the constructs of interest. Pretest participants (n = 55) were recruited from the University of Nebraska- Lincoln psychology department online study website, Experimetrix.com, and were offered extra credit for completing the survey. Participants were asked to imagine that they had been cited for a misdemeanor and had a court date scheduled, followed by a questionnaire asking several questions about their expectations regarding the fairness of the procedure (e.g., How likely do you believe it is that the court (i.e., the judge) would listen to your opinions? How likely do you believe it is that you would be treated in court with dignity and respect?). They were then told to imagine that they had received a reminder prior to their court date (using the language from the reminder-only condition), and answered the same questions. Then they saw either the reminder-sanctions postcard or a reminder describing the benefits of appearing, followed by the reminder-combined condition (with either the negative or the positive information presented first, counterbalanced across

³ We used regular mail for the Phase 1 reminders, as well as for the Phase 2 surveys, rather than telephone contact because we expected that home addresses would be a more reliable means of contacting participants, in light of the frequency with which many individuals change phone providers. Written materials also meant we did not have to invest the time and money into training, and then paying for, telephone interviewers. If the postcard was returned at any time because of an incorrect address, etc., the individual was immediately removed from the sample. Likewise, if any survey mailing was returned because of an incorrect address, we took a conservative approach by assuming that that individual may not have received the original postcard mailing and subsequently removed them from the sample.
Thus, they answered the same questions for each of four different conditions. The reminder-combined condition (with the negative sanctions presented first) was perceived as significantly fairer than both the control condition, *t*(28) = 3.35; *p* = .002, and the reminder-only condition, *t*(28) = 2.65; *p* = .013. In contrast, the reminder-sanctions condition was rated as no fairer than either the control or reminder-only condition, *t*(26) < 1, *p*s > .5. These results were used to justify our use of the postcard language in the main study.

**Phase 2.** The survey (see Appendix B) asked participants to respond to items regarding their reasons for appearing (or not appearing) in court, their general attitudes toward the courts, as well as items assessing confidence in the courts, cynicism, dispositional trust, general trust in governmental institutions, and obligation to obey the courts. We also asked three questions to all participants relevant to procedural justice (referred to henceforth as general procedural justice), inquiring about their assessments of the judicial system in general regarding fairness, bias, and the respect with which they were treated from the time of their ticket to the time they completed the survey, regardless of whether they appeared in court (and excluding their experience with law enforcement who issued the ticket). For those who appeared for their hearing, we also asked more extensively about the defendants’ procedural justice perceptions regarding their court appearance using, an eight question scale targeting the subconstructs of fairness, voice, dignity, and respect (referred to henceforth as specific procedural justice). Finally, we collected demographic data from each participant.

**Results**

**Phase 1**

*FTA across conditions.* Overall, the mean FTA rate was 10.4%, but it varied significantly across conditions (see Table 1), $X^2(3) = 20.90, p < .001$. It was 12.6% in the control (baseline) condition, compared to 8.3-10.9% in the various reminder conditions. Post hoc contrasts showed a difference between receiving any reminder (9.7% FTA rate) vs. the no-reminder control condition, $X^2(1) = 14.29, p < .001$. There was also a significant difference between the simple reminder and the two conditions with more substantive information.

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4 As described above, we ultimately dropped the “positive-only” condition because it would be impractical for courts to adopt it.
(i.e., reminder-sanctions and reminder-combined), $X^2(1) = 4.63, p < .05$. The FTA rate was slightly higher in the reminder-combined condition than in the reminder-sanction condition, but this difference was not statistically significant, $X^2(1) = 2.60, p = .11$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reminder Postcard Treatment</th>
<th>Appeared For Court</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reminder Only</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reminder Sanctions</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reminder Combined</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>90.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Case disposition. For defendants who appeared in court, there were a number of possible case dispositions (see Table 2; we could not obtain disposition data for some cases). Over three quarters (78.8%) pleaded guilty in court, while the charge was dismissed in 11.6% of cases. An additional 6.2% pleaded guilty by waiver. Only 3.4% of cases went to trial; of these, nearly all were bench trials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disposition</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guilty Plea/Admission in Court</td>
<td>5189</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissed by Prosecutor/Party</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilty Plea by Waiver</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tried/Adjudicated by Court</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismissed by Court</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jury-Verdict Issued</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>6582</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Disposition of primary offense.

---

5 As noted above, all waiverable offenses and traffic cases were removed from our sample before reminder postcards were mailed to defendants, which raises the questions of how cases in the sample could be disposed of by waiver. Most of the cases disposed through a waiver were originally non-waiverable cases that were amended by the courts. For example, one case that began as a child neglect case in Hall County—a Class 1 misdemeanor—was originally scheduled to go to trial. Eventually, the case was reduced to an attempted Class 1 misdemeanor, with the defendant ordered to pay a fine. Further examination of waived cases shows that a majority of such dispositions took place in a small number of counties: Hall County accounted for 41.4% of all guilty waivers; Lancaster, 16.3%; Dakota 13.8%; and Sarpy 11.1%. These numbers suggest that courts in those counties use their discretion in offering defendants to waive their rights and issue a guilty plea. Finally, a number of waiverable cases at the city level appear to have been inadvertently included in the sample because our screening criteria were based on state statutes rather than city ordinances.
Factors Associated with FTA. Secondary analyses focused on differences in FTA rate as a function of several factors, specifically 1) defendants’ race/ethnicity, 2) defendant sex, 3) geographic location (specifically, rural vs. urban counties), 4) offense type, and 5) number of charges. To explore these relationships, we estimated a logistic regression model with all of these factors as predictors of FTA, as well as reminder condition. The model also included the predicted interaction between reminder and race/ethnicity. The tables in this section show both baseline (control) and overall (all conditions combined) FTA rates, but the regression used overall rate as the criterion variable.

Controlling for these other factors, the effect of the reminder manipulation was reduced but was still marginally significant, $B = .14, S.E. = .08, Wald = 2.96, p = .085$. This suggests that the reminders were still effective, but that FTA was also associated with some of the other factors included in the regression model, as discussed next.

We predicted that non-Whites would have higher baseline FTA rates than Whites. In the control condition—which serves as a baseline measure of FTA—FTA rates were 11.7% for Whites, 18.7% for Blacks, and 10.5% for Hispanics (see Table 3). The overall FTA (all conditions combined) rate also varied as a function of defendant race/ethnicity: White (9.5%) vs. Black (16.4%) vs. Hispanic (9.4%). However, when controlling for these other factors, the effect of race/ethnicity was not significant, $B = -.09, S.E. = .09, Wald = 1.00, p = .32$.

| Table 3. Failure to Appear Rate by Race / Ethnicity |
|-----------------|--------|---------|--------|-----|
| FTA Rates       |         |         |        |     |
| Whites          | 11.7%   | 18.7%   | 10.5%  | 12.4%|
| Blacks          | 18.7%   | 11.8%   |        | 10.3%|
| Hispanics       | 10.5%   | 11.8%   |        |      |
| Total           | 12.4%   | 10.3%   |        |      |

The FTA rate did not differ significantly as a function of defendant sex: Male (10.8%) vs. Female (9.4%), $B = -.10, S.E. = .09, Wald = 1.13, p = .29$. The FTA rate varied across geographic locations (see Table 4) and was higher in urban (12.4%) than rural counties (6.8%), $B = .40, S.E. = .11, Wald = 13.44, p < .001$. 

15
Table 4. Failure to Appear Rate by County and Urban/Rural Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Baseline Appearance Rate</th>
<th>Overall Appearance Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeared For Court</td>
<td>Appeared For Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colfax</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dakota</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dawson</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodge</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hall</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancaster</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>82.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platte</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saline</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarpy</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotts Bluff</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (Douglas, Lancaster, Sarpy)</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>91.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We also examined whether FTA rates differed by the type of offense and by the number of charges issued for each court hearing. FTA rates differed significantly as a function of the type of offense (see Table 5), \( B = -.18, S.E. = .03, Wald = 42.71, p < .001 \). Individuals charged with Misdemeanor 2 offenses and violations of city ordinances were the most likely to FTA.

Table 5. Failure to Appear Rate by Offense Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense Type</th>
<th>Baseline Appearance Rate</th>
<th>Overall Appearance Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeared For Court</td>
<td>Appeared For Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>92.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class W (alcohol)</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3/3A/4/5</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Ordinance</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FTA rates also differed significantly depending on the number of charges issued on each ticket (coded as 1 vs. 2 or more; see Table 6), with the likelihood of FTA increasing with the number of citations on the ticket, $B = -1.28$, $S.E. = .10$, $Wald = 172.86$, $p < .001$. Only 5.4% of individuals with one offense failed to appear, whereas 15.4% of individuals with two or more offenses did not appear. Based on the results of this analysis, and in relation to the other analyses conducted above, it appears that number of offenses is one of the strongest predictors of FTA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense Type</th>
<th>Baseline Appearance Rate</th>
<th>Overall Appearance Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeared For Court</td>
<td>Appeared For Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Offense</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 or more Offenses</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>87.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Differential effectiveness of reminders.** We predicted that the postcard reminders would be more effective for minorities than for Whites (i.e., a race x reminder interaction). The interaction between race and reminder was non-significant, $B = -.013$, $S.E. = .05$, $Wald = .06$, $p = .80$. Thus, the effectiveness of the reminders was essentially comparable for the three major racial groups (see Figure 1). For exploratory purposes, however, we examined treatment effects for each racial/ethnic group separately.

Table 7 (see also Figure 1) shows that for Whites, the FTA rate ranged from 11.7% to 8% depending on the treatment, a finding that was significant, $X^2(3) = 12.26$, $p < .01$. Follow up tests comparing each reminder condition to the control condition showed that the reminder-sanctions condition was effective, $X^2(1) = 10.78$, $p = .001$, as was the reminder-combined condition, $X^2(1) = 6.21$, $p < .05$; however, the reminder-only condition did not greatly reduce FTA among Whites, $X^2(1) = 2.94$, $p = .086$.

For Blacks, the various treatments did not appear to have the same effect. As Table 7 shows, the FTA rate for Blacks ranged from 18.7% in the control condition to 13.5% in the reminder-sanctions condition, but
the omnibus test was not significant, $X^2(3) = 3.85, p = .28$. Tests comparing each type of reminder to the control condition were also not significant: the FTA rate for the simple reminder was virtually the same as the control condition, $X^2(1) = .002, p = .96$; the *reminder-sanctions* treatment reduced FTA from 18.7% to 13.5%, although the difference was not significant $X^2(1) = 1.86, p = .17$; and the *reminder-combined* treatment reduced FTA to 13.6%, but again the difference was not significant, $X^2(1) = 1.93, p = .17$.

For Hispanics, there was a marginally significant difference in FTA rate across the conditions, $X^2(3) = 6.90, p = .078$. As with the other two racial groups analyzed, the reminder with sanctions had the greatest absolute impact upon reducing FTA rates, as the FTA rate was reduced to 4.7% from 10.5% in the control condition, $X^2(1) = 4.934, p < .05$. The other reminders did not significantly reduce FTA below the baseline level among Hispanics, $X^2(1)s < 2, ps > .5$.

### Table 7. Failure to Appear Rate by Race / Ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reminder Postcard Treatment</th>
<th>FTA Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Reminder</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reminder Sanctions</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reminder Combined</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 1. Failure to Appear Rates by Race / Ethnicity
Phase 2

Scale construction. In a previous, related study, we found that our trust/confidence items could be statistically and conceptually organized into scales (Hamm, PytlikZillig, Tomkins, Herian, Bornstein, & Neeley, 2011). We used this same approach for the data we obtained from the Phase 2 survey (see Table 8). We used four trust/confidence sub-scales (Confidence in the Courts, Cynicism, General Trust in Institutions, and Obligation to Obey) that we combined into a single trust/confidence scale (Total Institutional Confidence).

Alpha scores for each of the subscales were high except for Obligation to Obey (.57), and when combined into one scale measuring Total Institutional Confidence, the alpha level continued to be acceptable (.77). We also asked about Dispositional Trust, but because this construct is conceptually different from a person’s perceptions about institutions (i.e., it looks at people’s general trust of others), we examined it separately. It also had an acceptable alpha level (.78).

### Table 8. Trust / Confidence and Procedural Justice Scales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Example item</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>α</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Courts</td>
<td>Judges in my county do their jobs well.</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynicism</td>
<td>People in power use the law to control people like me</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Trust in Institutions</td>
<td>Do you trust the government in DC to do what is right?</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation to Obey</td>
<td>I feel I should accept the decisions of legal authorities;</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Institutional Confidence</td>
<td>Average of the four scales above</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional Trust</td>
<td>Generally speaking, do you think most people can be trusted?</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Procedural Justice</td>
<td>How unbiased or biased do you feel that the judicial system was towards you?</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Procedural Justice</td>
<td>The procedures followed in my case were fair.</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Items measured using a 1-5 scale, recoded so that larger numbers indicate more trust/confidence.

We also measured defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice. We asked all defendants three general questions about courts’ fairness, bias, and respect related to the judicial system in general (general-procedural
We also asked the defendants who appeared for their hearing eight questions about their case-specific procedural justice perceptions (*specific-procedural justice*). Alpha levels for both Procedural Justice scales were fairly high (.92 and .82, respectively). There was a strong relationship between the two sets of questions, each treated as a scale ($r(324) = .661, p < .01$; see Table 9).

**Trust/Confidence, Procedural Justice, and FTA.** We hypothesized that those defendants who appeared for their hearing would indicate greater levels of institutional confidence and have greater levels of procedural justice than those who did not appear. We found that defendants who appeared in court for their hearing had significantly greater Total Institutional Confidence scores ($M = 3.23$) than those who did not appear ($M = 3.02$), $F(1,445) = 7.816, p < .01$. Among the subconstructs, appearers’ general trust in government ($M = 3.22$) was greater than nonappearers’ ($M = 2.98$), $F(1,445) = 8.06, p < .01$), as was their trust in the courts ($M = 3.30$ for appearers; $M = 3.04$ for non-appearers), $F(1,441) = 7.784, p < .01$). Conversely, participants who did not appear were more cynical ($M = 3.48$) than those who appeared ($M = 3.20$), $F(1,444) = 5.984, p < .05$). Additionally, there was a relationship between perceptions of (general) procedural justice and appearance, $F(1,438) = 6.61, p = .01$, such that those who appeared for their hearing perceived greater levels of procedural justice in their overall experience with the criminal justice system ($M = 3.53$ vs. $M = 3.23$).

As expected, we also discovered strong relationships among the various constructs of interest (see Table 9). For example, the correlation between Total Institutional Confidence and general-procedural justice was significant $r(440) = .59, p < .001$, as was the correlation between Trust in the Courts and general-procedural justice, $r(438) = .65, p < .001$. Furthermore, among those who appeared for court, there were strong relationships between Total Institutional Confidence and specific-procedural justice, $r(324) = .57, p < .001$, and between Trust in the Courts and specific-procedural justice, $r(323) = .64, p < .001$.)
Table 9. Trust / Confidence and Procedural Justice Scale Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>V1</th>
<th>V2</th>
<th>V3</th>
<th>V4</th>
<th>V5</th>
<th>V6</th>
<th>V7</th>
<th>V8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V1</td>
<td>Trust in the Courts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2</td>
<td>Cynicism&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.545**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3</td>
<td>General Trust in Institutions</td>
<td>.601**</td>
<td>-.455**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4</td>
<td>Obligation to Obey</td>
<td>.455**</td>
<td>-.325**</td>
<td>.443**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5</td>
<td>Total Institutional Confidence</td>
<td>.826**</td>
<td>-.772**</td>
<td>.779**</td>
<td>.727**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6</td>
<td>Dispositional Trust</td>
<td>.324**</td>
<td>-.340**</td>
<td>.361**</td>
<td>.252**</td>
<td>.411**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V7</td>
<td>General Procedural Justice</td>
<td>.649**</td>
<td>-.421**</td>
<td>.446**</td>
<td>.356**</td>
<td>.591**</td>
<td>.279**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8</td>
<td>Specific Procedural Justice</td>
<td>.641**</td>
<td>-.341**</td>
<td>.465**</td>
<td>.341**</td>
<td>.571**</td>
<td>.335**</td>
<td>.661**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.01 (2-tailed test of significance)

<sup>a</sup> For purposes of constructing the Total Institutional Confidence Scale, the Cynicism items were reverse coded.

We hypothesized that there would be a race/ethnicity effect, with Whites having greater trust/confidence than minorities. The data did not show an institutional confidence (either total scale or the subscales) difference when we examined racial differences between Whites and non-whites. For the Total Confidence Scale Whites ($M = 3.20$) were more trusting than non-Whites ($M = 3.07$) but not significantly so $F(1,414) = 1.93, p = .16$. Likewise, trust in the courts was higher for Whites ($M = 3.26$) than for non-White ($M = 3.08$) but not at a significant level $F(1,410) = 2.61, p = .26$. However, there was a difference for the dispositional trust scale, indicating Whites were more trusting in general, $F(1,414) = 13.17, p < .001$. There was no difference in procedural justice assessments as a function of race/ethnicity for either the general (Whites, $M = 3.47$; non-Whites, $M = 3.48$, $F(1,408) = .011, p = .92$) or the specific measure (Whites, $M = 3.35$, non-Whites, $3.25$, $F(1,300) = .38, p = .54$).

However, when we examined the data using a more refined classification of race/ethnicity – Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics – we did see significant differences on a number of constructs related to trust (see Table
10). We again saw a significant difference on Dispositional Trust, $F(2,401) = 9.20$, $p < .001$, with post-hoc tests showing that Whites ($M = 2.90$) had greater dispositional trust than both Blacks ($M = 2.34$) and Hispanics ($M = 2.44$). Notably, we also found that there was a significant difference across the three racial/ethnic categories on Total Institutional Confidence $F(2,402) = 3.71$, $p < .05$, and Trust in the Courts $F(2,398) = 4.34$, $p < .05$. Post-hoc tests showed that on both variables, the significant difference was largely driven by the gap between Whites and Blacks rather than any differences between Whites and Hispanics, or Blacks and Hispanics. Together, the findings suggest that although Blacks and Hispanics were similar in Dispositional Trust, Blacks tended to have lower levels of confidence in legal institutions than Hispanics, who were, in turn, comparable to Whites.

<p>| Table 10. Trust / Confidence and Procedural Justice Scale Means by Race / Ethnicity |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|---------------|</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Post-Hoc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the Courts</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cynicism</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Trust in Institutions</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligation to Obey</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>.994</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Institutional Confidence</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>2.84</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispositional Trust</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Procedural Justice</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.795</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Procedural Justice</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.264</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a – Significant differences between Whites and Blacks
b – Significant differences between Whites and Blacks, and Whites and Hispanics

Finally, we hypothesized that the level of trust/confidence would interact with the reminder manipulation, such that the reminder would be most effective for defendants relatively low in trust/confidence. We conducted a binary logistic regression (see Table 11) to examine this hypothesis (with appearance as the
Because the Phase 1 analyses showed that the largest effect was for receiving any reminder versus the control condition, we dichotomized the reminder variable (i.e., any reminder vs. none); trust in the courts was categorized as low, medium, or high; and we controlled for participants’ race using dummy variables. Low trust ranged from 0-2.83 \((n = 142)\); med trust ranged from 3.00-3.50 \((n = 161)\); high trust ranged from 3.60-5 \((n = 140)\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B (S.E.)</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.40 (.56)</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Courts (TC)</td>
<td>.79 (.30)*</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reminder</td>
<td>1.32 (.66)*</td>
<td>3.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC x Reminder</td>
<td>-.70 (.34)*</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-.44 (.40)</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>.87 (.63)</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.01

The results (see Table 11 and Figure 3) revealed that both independent variables (reminder manipulation and trust in the courts) were statistically significant, but these effects were qualified by an interaction. Consistent with our hypothesis, we found that the reminder was most effective for those low in trust in the courts. Put another way, the hypothesized relationship between trust and FTA occurred in the absence of a reminder, but it disappeared when there was a reminder.
Survey respondents rated the importance of various factors (on a 5-pt scale) in their decision either to appear or not to appear. Table 12 shows the rated importance of reasons for appearing (among participants who did appear), and the rated importance of reasons for non-appearance (among participants who did not appear). Although these data are merely descriptive, there are several features worth noting: First, the ratings are considerably higher for appearance than for non-appearance, suggesting that there might have been factors for non-appearance that we did not capture; alternatively, non-appearers might simply fail to consider the reasons underlying their behavior altogether. Second, the high ratings for all appearance factors show the importance of both instrumental (e.g., “wanted to avoid additional penalties”) and normative concerns (e.g., “felt I should obey the law”) in the decision to appear. Third, the highest-rated reasons for non-appearance reflect very practical, instrumental factors (e.g., “had scheduling [or work] conflicts”). Fourth, simply forgetting the court date was not much of a factor in participants’ failure to appear ($M = 1.89$).
### Table 12. Reasons for Appearing / Not Appearing in Court

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Appearing</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to avoid additional offense for FTA.</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to avoid additional penalties.</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt I should obey the law.</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System depends on compliance from people</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>like me.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to tell my side of the story.</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1.62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Not Appearing</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Had scheduling conflicts.</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had work conflicts.</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had transportation difficulty.</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgot about the hearing date.</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had family conflicts (e.g. childcare)</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afraid of what the outcome would be if I</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>went.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Benefits and costs of FTA.** Even if postcard reminders reduce FTA, courts will adopt such a system only if the benefits outweigh the costs. We therefore conducted an exploratory analysis to address this issue.⁶ In order to understand and quantify the benefits and costs, we conducted phone interviews with county judges and personnel from clerk magistrate offices, county jails, and law enforcement. Costs of FTA include labor costs associated with issuing a warrant, arresting defendants for FTA, investigating unresolved warrants, incarcerating defendants, etc. The benefits from reducing FTA come mainly from cost savings associated with these activities, which can be estimated from the salaries of various personnel (judges, clerks, and parole officers). Conversely, the costs of a reminder program come primarily from the materials (i.e., paper, postage) and labor costs involved in tracking cases through the system, addressing and mailing reminders.

Based on labor estimates provided by court personnel and state data on employee wages (which vary by county), the labor benefits from eliminating even a single FTA are substantial (see Table 13).

---

⁶ These findings are exploratory because of the difficulty in estimating labor costs for many activities (e.g., clearing warrants, processing bookings) that may be normal business functions performed by salaried staff.
Table 13. Summary of Potential Time and Labor Benefits from One FTA Reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Minutes</th>
<th>Labor Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Warrant Issued:</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bench Warrant</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>$15.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest Warrant</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>$14.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA Charge Added</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest for outstanding warrant</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>$25.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Warrant from System</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>$4.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booking processing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>$13.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bond processing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$8.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jail (Cost/Inmate for 24 hours)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>$50-$83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The costs of reminder postcards also vary somewhat, primarily due to the size of the postcard (the reminder-sanctions and reminder-combined postcards were larger and therefore cost more to mail). Overall, the greatest costs were from labor to process the postcards and postage to mail them (see Table 14).

Table 14. Total Per Unit Postcard Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Cost</th>
<th>Reminder-only</th>
<th>Reminder-sanctions &amp; Reminder-combined</th>
<th>Weighted Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>$1.15</td>
<td>$1.15</td>
<td>$1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
<td>$0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postage</td>
<td>$0.27</td>
<td>$0.49</td>
<td>$0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1.46</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1.68</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1.61</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The benefit from increased efficacy at FTA reduction of the larger postcards with more substantive messages (reminder-sanctions and reminder-combined) outweighs the cost of their additional postage. However, the benefit-cost analysis also reveals that at the current cost of sending postcards, implementation of a postcard notification program using either of these reminders would only be cost effective in counties with relatively high rates of arrest of defendants with FTA warrants (i.e., urban counties). It might be possible to
lower the labor cost of sending postcards, perhaps through automated case look-up; in this scenario, the postcards become even more cost-effective.

Discussion

Summary of Findings

The Phase 1 findings replicate previous research in showing that a reminder effectively reduces the FTA rate. There was evidence that a more substantial reminder, containing information about possible sanctions for FTA, is more beneficial than a simple reminder; however, inclusion of a more positive message, derived from procedural justice principles, did not yield additional benefit. Indeed, although the interaction from the omnibus test was not statistically significant, there was some indication that the reminder with only negative, threatening information (i.e., the reminder-sanctions condition) was the most effective method of reducing FTA rates for all three racial groups we examined: The sanctions condition reduced the FTA rate by 3.7% for Whites, 5.2% for Blacks, and 5.8% for Hispanics; these reductions were statistically significant for Whites and Hispanics, but not for Blacks. This was a surprising finding, inasmuch as research shows that sanctions alone are not a very powerful means to get people to obey the law (Robinson & Darley, 1997). It is possible that the decision-making calculus is different in an offending population, and that the threat of sanctions is particularly effective for this group.

FTA differed as a function of demographic and offense characteristics, especially geographic location (urban vs. rural), offense type, and number of charges. The difference between urban and rural communities likely reflects the greater sense of anomie and disconnectedness in urban centers, compared to more closely knit rural settings (Curry, 2000). The FTA rate did not differ across race/ethnicity when controlling for these other factors. This supports arguments that racial/ethnic minorities are quite diverse and that it may prove problematic to focus on race without consideration of variables that might covary along with race (e.g., Covington, 1995; Hitlin, Brown, & Elder, 2007). Furthermore, the fact that 54.9% of the Hispanic sample actually came from rural areas might suggest that Hispanics in rural areas are particularly aware of the potential sanctions associated with FTA. The data regarding offense type and number of charges support previous findings showing
that FTA is more likely for more serious cases (i.e., more severe offenses and multiple charges; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009).

The most striking finding from Phase 2 was that trust/confidence, procedural justice perceptions, and levels of cynicism were significantly correlated with court appearances. This finding is consistent with other demonstrations that trust/confidence is an important construct for understanding compliance with the law (Murphy, 2004; Scholz & Lubell, 1998). The data provide insights into the aspects of trust/confidence that are related to appearance rates. The difference in total institutional confidence scores appears to be driven mainly by the differences in defendants’ general trust in institutions, their general trust in the courts, and their cynicism about the courts. We also found a race effect for dispositional trust and trust in the courts: Whites had more dispositional trust than non-whites, and Blacks had less trust in the courts than Whites and Hispanics. Others have also found race effects related to trust/confidence (e.g., Brooks & Jeon-Slaughter, 2001; Tyler, 2001). Perhaps dispositional trust, a factor we believe is not as sensitive to specific interactions with institutions but more of a trait-like construct (see also Brewer, Gross, Aday, & Willnat, 2004), might provide insight into why non-whites have higher FTA rates than Whites.

We found support for the expected interaction between the reminder manipulation and participants’ trust in the courts, such that a reminder was more effective for defendants relatively low in trust. The relationship between trust in the courts and FTA that was apparent without a reminder—namely, that less trusting defendants were less likely to appear—disappeared when participants received a reminder.

Limitations and Future Directions

One question about this study is whether the message in the reminder-combined condition was sufficiently potent. Pretesting of the postcard manipulation indicated it was significantly different from the other postcard reminders. However, the pretesting was done with a college student sample. Actual defendants might have been more skeptical about the positive aspects of the message (i.e., voice, respect, etc.), particularly if they have had experiences with the criminal justice system in the past. In such instances, it is possible any message
would be unable to persuade a repeat offender – who may have previously had bad experiences with courts– that the positive message is an accurate reflection of the way courts actually work. Indeed, there was evidence of substantial cynicism in the Phase 2 sample, with those failing to appear significantly more cynical than those who did appear.

It is unclear how to overcome this limitation, as an even stronger message would likely be met with the same cynicism. It is possible that a telephone reminder from court personnel emphasizing aspects of procedural justice would accomplish this goal, but it would be offset by the substantial additional investment of labor and time. Prerecorded telephone reminders are potentially more efficient, but it is also unclear whether any added benefit of a phone reminder would accrue from a prerecorded voice message, or would only occur with a reminder from a “live” individual who could provide a more personal touch and also answer questions. Email reminders are another efficient, relatively low cost option that warrant investigation. One of the reasons we chose to use postcard reminders was our expectation that home addresses would be a more reliable means of contacting participants, in light of the frequency with which many individuals change phone and internet plans/providers. As cell phones (many with internet access) and online access become even more ubiquitous and affordable than they are presently, it is possible that their reliability as a method of contacting those charged with misdemeanors will increase. Future research should directly compare different types of reminders across all available media (print mail, telephone, email), taking into account the program costs as well as the benefits of reduced FTA.

One alternative solution is simply to accept that negative messages might be more effective at inducing desirable behavior in this context than positive messages. For example, recent work in social psychology has shown that shame can work as a potentially powerful “commitment device” that motivates people to act prosocially and work toward long-term strategies (deHooge, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2008). Furthermore, recent work in the field of voting behavior has shown that shaming, in the form of reminding individuals of their past abstention to vote, can increase adherence to civic activities (Green, Gerber, & Larimer, 2010).
Perhaps lessons from such field experiments can inform future efforts to understand compliance with both civic duties and legal obligations.

Another limitation is possible response bias in Phase 2. The overall response rate was 19.3%, and although a relatively low response rate is not uncommon among specialized populations such as this, it nonetheless raises questions about the sample’s representativeness. The Phase 1 and Phase 2 samples were reasonably similar, as were Phase 2 misdemeanants invited to participate who did and did not complete the survey. However, there were some differences: Individuals who participated in Phase 2 were older, more likely to appear for their court date in Phase 1, and more likely to be White. Importantly, there were no differences in response rate as a function of the experimental treatment, the reminder manipulation. We have no reason to suspect that these few differences would skew the overall pattern of results, but researchers and policy makers could be more confident about the study’s generalizability if future studies increased the response rate, perhaps by offering a greater incentive.

Future research should also extend the racial/ethnic findings of the present study. Our sample was a reasonable representation of the Nebraska population--which contains more Native Americans than the national average--but the sample still contained too few Native Americans, as well as too few Asian-Americans, to address FTA in these groups. Larger-scale research could target areas in states with large populations of Native Americans and Asian-Americans. On the other hand, defendants from the rural counties in our sample contained a substantial number of Hispanics (16.6%, and a large proportion of those classified as “unknown” may also have been of Hispanic origin). This diversity provides valuable information about rural Hispanics in the U.S., as there is a general lack of research on this population (Kandel & Cromartie, 2004), and future research would also do well to continue to investigate this population that makes up an increasing proportion of rural populations across the U.S. (Kandel & Cromartie, 2004).

Finally, future research should address the effectiveness of reminders at reducing FTA among felony defendants. Felony defendants are less likely than misdemeanor defendants to have the opportunity to fail to
appear, as they are often in custody prior to their hearing or trial; nonetheless, many felony defendants awaiting trial are released on bond, making FTA an issue for them as well (VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). On the one hand, they might be more likely to appear, because they are more likely to have attorneys who will remind them of their court date, or are released to a pre-trial program that will remind them of their court date; and the penalty for FTA (e.g., forfeited bail) is potentially greater. On the other hand, they might be less likely to appear, because the nature of their more serious offense means that, on average, they are probably more likely to have a previous criminal record and to have low trust in the criminal justice system; in addition, the prospect of a stiffer sentence if they are tried and convicted might give them a greater incentive to flee. Our finding that defendants with more charges were less likely to appear suggests that this latter expectation is more likely; indeed, VanNostrand and Keebler (2009) found that federal defendants charged with a felony were substantially (61%) more likely to fail than defendants charged with a misdemeanor or infraction. It is therefore arguably even more important to explore ways of reducing FTA for more serious crimes.

**Implications for Criminal Justice Policy and Practice**

Despite these limitations, the study has important implications for criminal justice policy and practice, such as improving system efficiencies and cost savings through better compliance, increasing criminal defendants’ perceptions of procedural justice, and reducing racial/ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system. Reducing FTA rates can have significant financial and labor savings (O’Keefe, 2007; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). Our exploratory cost-benefit analysis shows, however, that a postcard reminder system is not invariably effective; it is most likely to be effective in counties with relatively high rates of arrest of defendants with FTA warrants. A reduction of even a few percentage points, as in the present study, can improve the efficiency of court dockets and lower the number of misdemeanor defendants who are jailed on an additional FTA warrant. This, in turn, saves costs for the jail system and the defendants themselves. Thus, there are some very real practical implications from the present findings.
Knowing which types of misdemeanants are most likely to FTA--such as those in urban locales, with multiple charges, or cited for certain offenses--has implications for how to allocate pretrial services most efficiently (Goldkamp & White, 2006; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). The findings from the present study suggest that targeting defendants with multiple charges or in urban centers using a reminder program would yield the biggest “bang for the buck.”

The observation that the threat of sanctions is especially effective in reducing FTA in the context of misdemeanor level offenses has implications for the larger justice system as well. The threat of sanctions could be utilized to reduce failures to appear in other contexts, such as reducing the number of citizens who do not respond to their jury summonses (Seltzer, 1998-1999), or to decrease failure to pay court fines or child support payments. A more positive, procedural justice-focused message effectively fosters compliance in many settings, including the courts (Burke & Leben, 2007-2008; Tyler, 2006b); however, threats might be more effective in certain circumstances and for certain classes of individuals.

The findings of this study are also useful on a practical level for pretrial service programs. The findings can be used to develop programs that can better estimate the impact that a court reminder intervention will have on reducing FTA and may improve existing programs through utilization of the knowledge that reminder messages that describe sanctions are more effective in improving appearance rates. The literature on pretrial services programs’ ability to reduce FTA and ensure community safety is relatively small (Goldkamp & White, 2006). In addition to the utility for practitioners in the implementation of programs, being able to quantify the impact of pretrial services program interventions also improves the predictive power of pretrial risk assessment instruments, such as those that calculate latent risk (Bhati, 2010; Goldkamp & White, 2006; VanNostrand & Keebler, 2009). This is extremely important, given that “the pretrial release decision represents the highest volume decision stage in the judicial process” (Goldkamp & White, 2006, p. 143).

Procedural justice is extremely important in determining how people perceive and react to the courts (Burke & Leben, 2007-2008). In the present study, defendants who appeared for court perceived that they were
treated with greater fairness and respect from the time of their ticket to the time they completed the survey, compared to nonappearers. Public trust and confidence in legal institutions, which is closely related to, yet arguably distinct from, procedural justice (Rottman, 2007; Tyler, 2006a, 2006b), has also been identified by both researchers (e.g., Benesh, 2006; Rottman, Hansen, Mott, & Grimes, 2003; Tyler, 2006b) and members of the judiciary (e.g., O’Connor, 1999) as important. Misdemeanants who appeared for court had higher trust in institutions and confidence in the courts, and less cynicism, than those who did not appear for court. Efforts to increase trust/confidence--especially in populations likely to offend--should yield lower FTA rates (the observed correlation between trust/confidence and appearance does not, of course, necessarily imply a causal relationship, but some element of causation seems likely). Outreach efforts by the courts are one way to accomplish this goal (National Center for State Courts, 2005).

Finally, the implementation of a reminder program can play a small yet important role in reducing the overrepresentation of minorities in the corrections systems for both the current offense and future offenses. For all racial/ethnic groups the greatest reduction in the failure to appear rate was realized with the reminder-sanctions message. For this condition, the reduction in the FTA rate for Hispanic (a 5.8% reduction) and Black (a 5.2% reduction) defendants was greater than for white defendants (3.7%). Although not statistically significant for Blacks, this reduction was statistically significant for Hispanic defendants. Thus, pretrial services such as a reminder program can serve the larger goal of improving racial justice.

Conclusions

In conclusion, this study demonstrates that it is possible to reduce the risk of FTA with a simple postcard reminder system. FTA rates varied across a number of offender and offense characteristics, such as geographic location (rural vs. urban), offense type and number of charges, and race/ethnicity. FTA was highest for Blacks; however, reminders were less effective for Blacks than for Whites and Hispanics. It is important to consider various offense and offender characteristics when devising and implementing pretrial services programs.
Misdemeanor defendants who appeared in court had greater trust in institutions, more confidence in the courts, less cynicism, and a greater sense of procedural justice than defendants who did not appear. Although there was only suggestive evidence that the reminder manipulation’s effectiveness varied as a function of defendants’ level of trust/confidence, raising trust/confidence could nonetheless be reasonably expected to reduce FTA. Overall, the present study shows promise that there are ways of ameliorating the costly problem of failure-to-appear.
Papers and Presentations Based on Our Findings

The present study has yielded a number of papers/publications and presentations.

Papers/Publications

Bornstein, B.H., Tomkins, A.J., Neeley, E.M., Herian, M.N., & Hamm, J.A. (in revision). Reducing courts’ failure-to-appear rate by written reminders. [We submitted this to Law & Human Behavior, a top-tier law-psychology journal, in Fall 2010 and were invited to revise and resubmit; we resubmitted it in March 2011]

Hamm, J.A., PtylikZillig, L.M., Tomkins, A.J., Herian, M.N., & Bornstein, B.H. (in preparation). Trust and confidence in governmental institutions. [This paper includes data from the present study as well as data from other trust/confidence studies conducted by members of the research team, as part of efforts to develop a general model of trust/confidence; submission planned for Spring 2011]


Hutsell, N., Rosenbaum, D., Tomkins, A.J., Bornstein, B.H., & Neeley, E.M. (in press). Using court date reminder postcards to reduce courts’ failure to appear rates: A benefit-cost analysis. Judicature. [This paper estimates the financial savings of implementing a postcard reminder program similar to the one used in the present study]

Presentations


References


Appendix A – Postcard Reminder Conditions

Panel 1: Reminder-Only

Dear XXXX XXXX:

This notice is to remind you that you have a hearing scheduled at the XXXX County Courthouse at 1:30 PM on 12/11/2009.

Estimado(a) XXXX XXXX:

Este aviso es para recordarle que tiene una audiencia programada en la Corte del Condado de XXXX a las 1:30 PM en el día 12/11/2009.

Case ID: C X CR X XXXX

If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
Panel 2: Reminder-Sanctions

Este aviso es para recordarte que tienes una audiencia programada en la Corte del Condado de XXXX a las 1:30 PM en el día 5/1/2009.

El no presentarse para esta audiencia puede traer como resultado un número de consecuencias negativas, que incluyen:

- Ud. puede ser acusado de un delito adicional por faltar a comparecer, que es un delito menor. Clase II.
- Ud. puede tener que recibir hasta seis meses en la cárcel y/o una multa de $1,000 por este cargo adicional.
- Una orden judicial puede ser expedida para una fianza en el futuro.
- Aunque no se acuse formalmente por faltar a comparecer, puede ser considerado por el juez en la determinación de su pena por el delito menor original.

¡Le advertimos energéticamente que no faltes a comparecer en la fecha y el tiempo descrito arriba y que no dejes de presentarte!

Case ID: X.C.CR.X.XXX

We strongly encourage you to not miss your hearing on the date and time listed above.

If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX

Dear XXX XXX:

This notice is to remind you that you have a hearing scheduled at the XXXX County Courthouse at 1:30 PM on 5/1/2009.

Failure to appear for this hearing may result in a number of negative consequences, including:

- You may be charged with the additional crime of failure to appear, which is a Class II misdemeanor.
- You may receive up to six months in jail and/or a $1,000 fine for this additional charge.
- A warrant may be issued for your arrest.
- Even if you are not formally charged with a failure to appear, failing to appear may be considered by the judge in determining your sentence on the original misdemeanor charge.

We strongly encourage you to not miss your hearing on the date and time listed above.

If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
Dear XXXX XXXX:

This notice is to remind you that you have a hearing scheduled at the XXXX County Courthouse at 1:30 PM on 5/1/2009.

Failure to appear for this hearing may result in a number of negative consequences, including:

- You may be charged with the additional crime of failure to appear, which is a Class II misdemeanor.
- You may receive up to six months in jail and/or a $1,000 fine for this additional charge.
- A warrant may be issued for your arrest.
- It may be harder to get bail in the future.
- Even if you are not formally charged with a failure to appear, failing to appear may be considered by the judge in determining your sentence on the original misdemeanor charge.

This Court aims to serve the best interests of both you and the public by:

- Providing neutral and consistent judgments to all defendants. The judge who presides over your hearing will be fair and open-minded.
- Treating all defendants charged with the same kind of offense in the same way.
- Treating all defendants politely, with courtesy, dignity and respect.
- Taking defendants' concerns seriously. We understand that you might be worried about the hearing and its consequences, and we are prepared to listen to your concerns and offer explanations as best we can.
- Allowing defendants to explain the situation from their perspective.

We strongly encourage you to not miss your hearing on the date and time listed above, and to be sure to appear for it!

If you have questions about this postcard, please call: (XXX) XXX-XXXX

Case ID: C X CR X XXXX

Estimado(a) XXXX XXXX:

Este aviso es para recordarle que tiene una audiencia programada en la Corte del Condado de XXXX a las 1:30 PM del día 5/1/2009.

El no presentarse para esta audiencia puede resultar en un número de consecuencias negativas, que incluyen:

- Ud. puede ser acusado de un delito adicional por faltar a comparecer, que es un delito menor, Clase II.
- Ud. puede recibir hasta seis meses en la cárcel y/o una multa de $1,000 por este cargo adicional.
- Una orden judicial puede ser expedida para su arresto.
- Puede ser más difícil calificar para una fianza en el futuro.
- Aunque no sea acusado formalmente por faltar a comparecer, el faltar a comparecer puede ser considerado por el juez en la determinación de su pena por el delito menor original.

Esta Corte tiene la meta de servir mejor a los intereses de Usted y del público al:

- Emitir fallos neutrales y contundentes para todos los acusados. El juez que preside sobre su audiencia será justo y de actitud abierta.
- Tratar a todos los acusados con igual justicia.
- Tratar a todos los acusados con buenos modales, con cortesía, dignidad, y respeto.
- Tomar seriamente en cuenta las preocupaciones de los acusados. Entendemos que Ud. pueda estar preocupado sobre la audiencia y sus consecuencias, y estamos preparados para escuchar sus preocupaciones y para ofrecerle la mejor explicación que podamos.
- Permitir a los acusados explicar la situación desde su perspectiva o punto de vista.

¡Le advertimos energéticamente que no falte a comparecer en la fecha y el tiempo descrito arriba, y que no deje de presentarse!
Appendix B

Invitations, Informed Consent Documents, and Survey Instrument

Initial Survey Invitation

Dear <<First Name>> <<Last Name>>,

A few days ago we mailed you a postcard notifying you about a survey that we are conducting. You are invited to take this important survey because you have recently had an experience with the Nebraska Courts.

The purpose of this study is to better understand what people think about Nebraska’s courts. That is why it is important to hear from you, and we hope you complete our survey. We are including a small token of our appreciation as our way of saying thanks. The gift is yours to keep.

*Your individual responses to the survey will not be shared with anyone.* You will not be identified when we analyze the results. The “Frequently Asked Questions” document included with this letter explains in greater detail how we will ensure the privacy of survey respondents.

Again, this survey is extremely important in helping researchers understand Nebraska’s courts. We will use the information to suggest improvements to the justice system that will benefit all people in Nebraska.

We truly hope that you will take part in this important research project.

Sincerely,

Dr. Brian H. Bornstein

Professor of Psychology

Courtesy Professor of Law
Follow Up Survey Invitation

Dear <<First Name>> <<Last Name>>,

Recently, you were invited to take a survey about the Nebraska Courts. You were invited to take this important survey because you recently had an experience with the Courts in Nebraska. The purpose of the study is to better understand what people think about Nebraska’s judicial system. As you recall, we included a small token of our appreciation as our way of saying thanks.

If you have already completed the survey and mailed it to us, we thank you for your participation. If you have not yet completed the survey, we are including another one for you to complete in the case the last one was misplaced. We hope that you will take the time to complete this brief survey.

To maintain your privacy, your individual responses to the survey will not be shared with anyone. You will not be identified when we analyze the results. The “Frequently Asked Questions” document included with this letter explains in greater detail how we will ensure the privacy of survey respondents.

Again, this survey is extremely important in helping researchers understand Nebraska’s courts. We will use the information to suggest improvements to the justice system that will benefit all people in Nebraska.

We hope that you will take part in this important research project.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Brian H. Bornstein
Professor of Psychology
Courtesy Professor of Law
Informed Consent and Frequently Asked Question Document

Frequently Asked Questions

Why am I receiving this survey?
You have been invited to participate in this study because you recently had an experience with the Nebraska Courts. Individuals who have recently had court experiences in Nebraska were randomly invited to receive this survey.

How did you know that I had a court appearance?
Nebraska Court records are publicly available – anyone can see those records. We randomly selected individuals who have had recent court appearances to receive a survey.

How did you get my address?
Court records are publicly available. Your address is included with the court records.

Will people be able to see my individual responses on the survey?
No. Any information obtained during this research will be kept strictly confidential. Data will be kept in a locked cabinet in the investigator’s office or within secure, password protected files on a computer.

How will this data be used?
This information will be used by researchers and policy makers to better understand the courts in Nebraska. The results of the survey may be presented at academic conferences and published in scholarly journals. No matter what, the results will be presented in summary form so that nobody’s individual responses will be seen.

Why is there a number on the back of the survey?
This number ensures your anonymity. The number has been assigned to you so that we do not have to use your name when we analyze the results of the survey. Basically, this anonymous number will replace your name as a way to track the survey responses.

How much time will the survey take me to complete and where do I return it?
The survey will only take 10-15 minutes to complete. Once you are finished, simply fold the survey length-wise, put it into the pre-paid return envelope, and put it into the mail.

Do I need to include a stamp on the envelope when I return my survey?
No. The postage has already been paid, so there is no need to place a stamp on the envelope.

Are there any benefits if I complete the survey?
The $2 bill is yours to keep as a token of our appreciation for participating in the survey. Also, you may find that participating in this research will be an enjoyable experience. Participation in this study will give you the opportunity to add to the body of knowledge about how individuals interact with Nebraska courts.

Are there any risks for me if I complete the survey?
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research. In the event of problems resulting from participation in the study, you may contact Dr. Brian Bornstein at (402) 472-3743 or bbornstein2@unl.edu or Dr. Mitch Herian at (402) 472-2520 or mnherian@nebraska.edu.

Can I choose not to participate?
While we would like to hear from everybody who we send surveys to, you are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without adversely affecting your relationship with the principal investigator, the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, or the Nebraska Courts. Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You are voluntarily making a decision whether or not to participate in this research study. Your response to the survey is your indication that you agree to participate, having read and understood the information presented above. Even though on the survey it says you need to return the informed consent document, you do not need to sign or return this letter -- it is yours to keep.

**Who can I call if I have questions about the survey?**
You may contact Dr. Brian Bornstein at (402) 472-3743 or bbornstein2@unl.edu or Dr. Mitch Herian at (402) 472-2520 or mnherian@nebraska.edu. If you have any questions concerning your rights as a research subject that have not been answered by the investigator, or to report any concerns about the study, you may contact the University of Nebraska – Lincoln Institutional Review Board at (402) 472-6965. This project has been approved under IRB# 2008119419EP.

**Información en español**
Esta es una encuesta sobre su experiencia con las cortes de Nebraska. Si Ud. quiere tomar esta encuesta en español, por favor llame al Centro de Política Publica de la Universidad de Nebraska al 402-472-5678, y le mandaremos una copia. Gracias
University of Nebraska  
Survey of Nebraska Court Users

We are university-based researchers studying the justice system in the State of Nebraska. We recently sent you a letter about participating in a survey about your experiences with the court system. Your answers to this survey will help provide policy makers with information to improve the delivery of justice in the State of Nebraska. We cannot provide this information without your help.

Your answers to this survey are completely confidential. There is an ID number on the back of this survey that we use to keep track of when you return your survey, but this number will not be matched with your name when the results are analyzed. Completion of the survey is voluntary, but we would very much appreciate learning about your recent experiences with the court system.

In order to participate, please read and sign the enclosed letter of informed consent. This document explains the purpose of the survey, explains your rights as a research participant, and provides contact information should you have any questions about the survey. Once you have signed the informed consent document, please complete the brief survey. This survey should only take about 10-15 minutes to complete. Finally, place both the informed consent and the completed survey in the enclosed, stamped envelope, and mail it back to us.

Please accept the enclosed $2 bill as a token of our appreciation for your help. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this project, please contact the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center at 402-472-2520.

Thank you for your help with this important study.
1. Do you remember receiving a postcard from the courts reminding you of your recent court date?
   □ No (Go to Question 3)
   □ Yes

2. On a scale from 0 to 4 where 0 means “Not at all” and 4 means “Very much”, how much, if at all, did receiving the reminder affect your decision to attend your hearing? (Only answer if you said “yes” to Question 1.)
   □ □ □ □ □
   0 1 2 3 4
   Not at all                                Very much

3. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “People can be trusted” and 5 means “You can’t be too careful when dealing with people,” where would you say your opinion of people, in general, falls?
   □ □ □ □ □
   1 2 3 4 5
   People can be trusted                  You can’t be too careful

4. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “People try to be fair” and 5 means “People try to take advantage of you,” where would you say your opinion of people, in general, falls?
   □ □ □ □ □
   1 2 3 4 5
   People try to                         People try to take advantage of you

5. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means “People try to be helpful” and 5 means “People look out for themselves,” where would you say your opinion toward people, in general, falls?
   □ □ □ □ □
   1 2 3 4 5
   People try to                         People look out for themselves

6. People try to                          People look out for themselves
6. How often do you think you can trust each of the following levels of government to do what is right?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rarely</th>
<th>Some of the time</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>All of the time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United States government (federal)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nebraska government (state)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your local government (city/county)</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about your attitudes toward the law?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel that I should accept the decisions made by legal authorities.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People should obey the law even if it goes against what they think is right.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law represents the values of the people in power rather than the values of people like me.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in power use the law to try to control people like me.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The law does not protect my interests.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about your county courts and county judges?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judges in my county do their job well.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts in my county treat people with respect.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The basic rights of citizens in my county are well protected by the county courts.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The courts in my county have too much power.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges in my county are dishonest.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts in my county treat some people better than others.</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
<td>□</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. When thinking about the courts in your county, how favorable or unfavorable do you feel toward them?

- Very favorable
- Somewhat favorable
- Neutral
- Somewhat unfavorable
- Very unfavorable
10. On a scale from 0 to 4 where 0 means “Not at all” and 4 means “Very much”, how much, if at all, did each of the following factors affect your decision to attend your hearing? (only asked of those who appeared)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I wanted to tell my side of the story.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I felt I should obey the law.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I wanted to avoid additional penalties.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The system depends on compliance from people like me.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I wanted to avoid an additional offense (for failure to appear) on my record.</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On a scale from 0 to 4 where 0 means “Not at all” and 4 means “Very much”, how much, if at all, did each of the following factors affect your decision not to attend your hearing? (only asked of those who did not appear)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I had scheduling conflicts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I forgot about the hearing date.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had transportation difficulty.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had work conflicts.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I had family conflicts (e.g., childcare conflicts).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was afraid of what the outcome would be if I went to court.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Were there any other reasons you decided to attend/not attend your hearing? If so, please describe below.
12. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about your experiences in court? (only asked of those who appeared)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Somewhat agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>Somewhat disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The procedures followed in my case were fair.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My opinions were heard in court.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was able to freely express my point of view in court.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was treated with respect in court.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was treated with dignity in court.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I was treated the same as others in the same position.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judge gave me a chance to tell my side of the story.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The judge listened to what I had to say.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following questions are about your experience with the judicial system in general. For these questions, please only consider how you were treated from the time you received your citation up until now. Do NOT include your experience with the police officer who gave you your citation.

13. How fair or unfair were the procedures used by the judicial system to handle your case?
   - Very fair
   - Somewhat fair
   - Neutral
   - Somewhat unfair
   - Very unfair

14. How respectfully or disrespectfully do you feel you were treated by the judicial system?
   - I was treated very respectfully.
   - I was treated somewhat respectfully.
   - I was treated neither respectfully nor disrespectfully.
   - I was treated somewhat disrespectfully.
   - I was treated very disrespectfully.

15. How unbiased or biased do you feel that the judicial system was towards you?
   - The judicial system was very unbiased towards me.
   - The judicial system was somewhat unbiased towards me.
   - The judicial system was neither biased nor unbiased towards me.
   - The judicial system was somewhat biased towards me.
   - The judicial system was very biased towards me.
16. Now, thinking about your experience in court, how much better or worse were you treated in court compared to how you expected to be treated before coming to court? (only asked of those who appeared)
   - I was treated much better than I had expected.
   - I was treated somewhat better than I had expected.
   - I was treated the same as I had expected.
   - I was treated somewhat worse than I had expected.
   - I was treated much worse than I had expected.

17. What is your gender?
   - Male
   - Female

18. What is your race or ethnicity? Please check all that apply.
   - American Indian or Alaska Native
   - Asian
   - Black or African American
   - Hispanic or Latino
   - Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
   - White
   - Other (please specify) _________________
   - Prefer not to answer

19. In politics, people sometimes talk of liberalism or conservatism. How would you describe your political views?
   - Very Conservative
   - Somewhat Conservative
   - Neither Liberal nor Conservative
   - Somewhat Liberal
   - Very Liberal

Thank you for participating in this survey. We appreciate your help!