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A Collaborative Approach to Eliminating Street Drug Markets through Focused Deterrence

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Executive Summary

This report presents the evaluation process and findings from the grant, *A Collaborative Approach to Eliminating Street Drug Markets through Focused Deterrence*. The evaluation was conducted by a team of researchers from The University of North Carolina at Greensboro’s Center for Youth, Family, and Community Partnerships, the University of Notre Dame, and the Winston-Salem State University Center for Community Safety from January 2007 through December 2008.

Drug markets that exist in public spaces are harmful to communities and cause many negative consequences, which include violent criminal behavior, social disorder, public nuisances, and decreased quality of life for community residents. In an effort to combat open-air drug markets, two mid-sized cities in North Carolina have implemented a multi-dimensional, partnership-based, focused deterrence strategy that addresses illicit drug dealing in open-air markets and circumvents many of the problems associated with general deterrence methods in order to reduce related violent crime.

The purpose of the current project was to conduct a process and outcome analysis of the street drug market elimination strategy. Two main goals were addressed by the evaluation. The first goal was to model and describe the elements, developmental stages, and operational steps of the street-drug intervention. The second goal of the project was to measure the impact of the strategy across several levels: a) key stakeholder perception of roles and impact; b) resident perception of impact; c) observable neighborhood changes; and d) crime impact. In order to meet these objectives, several data sources were utilized including interviews with law enforcement personnel, key community stakeholders, and notified offenders; focus groups with community residents; a systematic neighborhood observation; and analysis of crime impact indicators.

The report presents an overview of the intervention sites and the methodology, findings, and subsequent discussion of the data sources utilized. The following are summaries for each data collection source:

- According to law enforcement personnel, some of the most important stages and aspects of the strategy include using a data-driven approach throughout, engaging the police department internally, conducting a thorough and in-depth undercover investigation, establishing meaningful contact with the offenders’ significant others, communicating with community stakeholders and residents, and sustaining the strategy.
- Key community stakeholders perceived the partnership development between the community and their respective police department as both a positive process and outcome of the strategy and noted that this collaboration has multiple advantages.

- Community residents who live in drug impacted areas can assist in deterring criminal behaviors in their own communities by providing meaningful insights into the activities that occur within the neighborhoods that otherwise would go unknown to law enforcement and resetting the normative behaviors in the community among residents and between residents and law enforcement personnel.

- Notified offenders offer an often unavailable or untapped perspective, providing insights to the strategy from a central but often silent population. Based on the case studies detailed here, the notified offenders expressed far more negative than positive opinions and perceptions regarding the strategy and its implementation.

- The systematic social observation conducted for the evaluation raised many methodological issues including logistical concerns, accurate measurements and interpretations of the indicators utilized, and the possibility of finding unexpected outcomes.

- Mixed results were evident when assessing the strategy’s impact via violent and drug crime indicators. Pre- and post intervention comparisons of equivalent time periods indicated drug crime declines in two out of four High Point sites thus far. In Winston-Salem, the most recently available data indicated that although there had been an overall decrease in drug crimes, both Part One violent crime and Part Two crimes had increased in the Winston-Salem New Hope site.

- There is not yet a single methodological best practice for conceptualizing the crime indicators to be compared, nor have more sophisticated analysis techniques (e.g., regression or time series) been applied to these data.

The report concludes with an amalgamation of the research findings, considerations for engaging new sites, and directions for future research. Continued investigation into refining the strategy, modifying the strategy to be site specific, understanding the impacts on notified offenders and families to increase individual successes, exploring long term normative community changes, and monitoring its sustained impact are all much needed future research directions.
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview

The community destruction wrought by open-air drug markets has impacted inner city and urban areas across the nation. Drug markets that operate in public spaces are clearly toxic to neighborhoods (Weisburd & Mazerolle, 2000; Wilson & Kelling, 1982) because of the “direct nexus between drug dealing and violence” (Hunt, Sumner, Scholten, & Frabutt, 2008, p. 396). Indeed, the association among drug markets, drug trafficking, and violent crime is well established (Aitken, Moore, Higgs, Kelsall, & Kerger, 2002; Braga et al., 1999; Goldstein, Brownstein, & Ryan, 1992; Weisburd & Mazerolle, 2000). Not only are the market participants themselves at risk but the deleterious community impacts are numerous as well:

- traffic congestion, noise (from traffic and people), disorderly conduct, begging, loitering, vandalism, drug use and littering (discarded drug paraphernalia), criminal damage to property, prostitution, robbery, residential and commercial burglary, theft from motor vehicles, fencing stolen goods, weapons offenses, assaults, and homicides. (Harocopos & Hough, 2005, p. 3)

The social disorder that reigns in and around the illegal drug market subsequently impacts residents’ quality of life.

Strategies for Addressing Open-air Drug Markets

There has been a range of strategies to combat these negative effects of open-air drug markets (Mazerolle, Soole, & Rombouts, 2006). Harocopos and Hough (2005) organized responses into multiple categories. First, drug enforcement approaches include policing in a highly visible manner, enforcing the law intensively, buy-busts, intelligence-driven investigative
work, confiscating drugs, arresting drug buyers, and warning potential buyers. Examples of community responses include community-led anti-drug initiatives or an intelligence gathering local hotline. Harocopoulos and Hough outline several civil remedies for responding to drug markets that include encouraging active engagement of local place managers (e.g., landlords, local businesses, and housing authorities), utilizing nuisance abatement laws, issuing Drug Offender Restraining Orders, notifying mortgage holders of drug related problems at their properties, enforcing regulatory codes, and seizing and forfeiting assets related to drug dealing.

A fourth category is modifying the physical environment, which includes reclaiming public areas, installing and monitoring surveillance cameras, altering access routes and restricting parking, changing public pay phones, and securing vacant buildings. Finally, rather than focusing on supply, it is possible to use demand reduction strategies, primarily providing drug treatment and prevention opportunities.

Each of these strategies can be effective, but are less effective solely on their own. At the outset of their text, for example, Harocopoulos and Hough wrote “Simply arresting market participants will have little impact in reducing the size of the market or the amount of drugs consumed” (p. 2). Traditional short-term interdiction efforts often yield short term results as the market responds by changing their playbook (Curtis & Wendel, 2007). Actors in the market have been shown to be able to modify their strategies to respond to law enforcement suppression efforts (Abele, 2004). Multi-dimensional efforts, that feature combinations of civil, enforcement, community, and environmental elements—what some have termed an “eclectic approach” (Hough & Edmunds, 1999)—hold much more promise (e.g., Green, 1995; Weisburd & Green, 1995).
Enacting a Multi-Dimensional, Partnership-Based Strategy

To combat open-air drug markets, two North Carolina communities have employed a data-driven, focused deterrence strategy designed to close drug markets and reduce drug-related violence. The brainchild of David Kennedy of the Center for Crime Control and Prevention at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the initiatives have received extensive local and national attention (CBS Evening News, 2006; Kennedy, 2009; Schoofs, 2006, Smalley, 2009). These initiatives have developed out of the focused deterrence or “pulling levers” framework (Kennedy, 1997). The drug market elimination strategy uses crime-mapping information to target drug dealers, drug suppliers, and street-level drug sales that impact community safety in a clearly defined neighborhood. Building on a statistical and mapping foundation (Hunt, Sumner, Scholten, & Frabutt, 2008), extensive intelligence is gathered both on networks of individuals involved in the local drug market and individual patterns of criminal behavior (Fealy, Sumner, & Kennedy, 2006). To the usual menu of targeted enforcement and service provision, however, the strategy adds a process of direct engagement between law enforcement and the community with respect to examining and changing norms and narratives on each side, and then utilizes new norms and understandings to intervene with offender networks (Sumner, Hunt, & Frabutt, 2005). The principal actors, in their application for the 2006 Herman Goldstein Award, summarized their drug market elimination strategy thusly:

An operational plan was developed that addressed individual geographic drug markets as ‘beachheads’ in a larger citywide enterprise that directly engaged drug dealers and their families; created (but rarely employed) clear, predictable sanctions; offered a range of services and help; and, especially, mobilized community and even offender standards about right and wrong. Over the two-year course of implementation, overt drug markets
in High Point were eliminated, directly and sustainably. No outside or additional resources were employed. There was no apparent displacement, and clear diffusion of benefits. (Fealy et al., 2006, p. 1)

Preliminary process evaluations of the initiatives were conducted (as Project Safe Neighborhoods research initiatives) as they unfolded in both High Point (Frabutt, Gathings, Hunt, & Loggins, 2004) and Winston-Salem (Harvey, 2005). In addition, Kennedy (2009) authored a text that delineates the full theoretical approach to the intervention with an applied example. However, a systematic and multi-stakeholder-informed analysis (drawing upon both retrospective and in-process viewpoints) of the operational steps and developmental stages of the initiative has not been conducted.

The Current Project: Goals, Objectives, and Context

Therefore, the overarching purpose of this inquiry was to conduct a process and outcome analysis of a novel, police- and community-driven strategy to address illicit drug dealing in street-level, open-air markets. As noted in Table 1, five such intervention sites were operative prior to and during the current project. The first goal of the project was to model and describe the elements, developmental stages, and operational steps of the street-drug intervention. The second goal of the project was to measure the impact of the strategy across several levels: a) key stakeholder perception of impact; b) resident perception of impact; c) observable neighborhood changes; and d) crime impact. Objectives within this goal include a) determining the long-term impact at intervention sites; b) focusing on the effects of intervention dynamics on the nature of drug market change and displacement; and (c) focusing on the narratives and norms that surround the drug market dynamics based on qualitative inquiry with offenders, key community stakeholders, law enforcement partners, and community residents.
This report is organized according to the major categories of data collection that have
been at the heart of the project. The following chapter provides necessary contextual
information regarding the intervention sites in High Point and Winston-Salem. The subsequent
chapters trace the project methodology (Chapter 3), findings (Chapter 4), discussion (Chapter 5),
and present a closing synthesis (Chapter 6). Appendix A provides a quarter-by-quarter project
log, detailing the research activities throughout the funding period.

Table 1. Intervention Sites Listed Chronologically according to Notification Session Date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Site</th>
<th>Notification Session Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West End—High Point</td>
<td>May 18, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hope—Winston-Salem</td>
<td>March 29, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Brooks—High Point</td>
<td>April 5, 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southside—High Point</td>
<td>June 8, 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central—High Point</td>
<td>August 14, 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 2: Description of Intervention Sites

The research activities were centered on Guilford and Forsyth counties, the two urban centers of the Piedmont Triad of North Carolina. The region has an overall population of 1.5 million people, the third largest metropolitan area in the state and the 30th largest metropolitan Census Statistical Area in the country. Guilford County is the third most populated county in NC with 451,905 residents in 649 square miles. Forsyth County is the fourth most populated county, with 332,355 residents in 410 square miles. Within these two contiguous counties, there are three major cities: Greensboro (pop. 236,865); High Point (pop. 97,796); and Winston-Salem (pop. 196,990). The three cities form a triangle linked by easily accessible transportation, are located between 15 and 25 miles apart, and have considerable economic, social and cultural interaction. Within the past decade, the population of Guilford and Forsyth counties has increased 7.3% and 8.6%, respectively, about the state average.

Five intervention sites were studied in this project. Narrative descriptions of each are provided below along with an overview map of the target area. Using Census 2000 data and GIS methodology, several maps are provided in Appendix B to describe each intervention site more fully. For each neighborhood (four in High Point and one in Winston-Salem), four maps were produced to depict: a) households in poverty; b) median household income; c) distribution of
renter-occupied housing; d) distribution of female-headed households with children; and e) distribution of black\(^1\) residents.

**City of High Point**

*West End.* The West End neighborhood is bounded by several streets including Chestnut Drive, Kivett Drive, Phillips Avenue, West English Road, North West Point Avenue, and Rotary Drive (see Figure 1). The neighborhood is comprised of 815 acres and is located in the western corner of High Point approximately .5 miles from the central business district.

The area is comprised of mostly single family residential houses with a mix of commercial businesses on the periphery that include gas stations, small grocery stores, storage companies, and a funeral home. Racially, the neighborhood used to be predominantly white, however, it is now a mix of races (the most racially diverse of all the drug initiative neighborhoods) that now includes blacks (32%) and Hispanics (23%). White residents comprise 46% of the population. Economically, the West End neighborhood ranks second of the four High Point neighborhoods in median household income ($27,231), and first in median per capita income ($12,605).

Due to a relatively high number of homeowners (26%), the housing stock is in better condition than the other three High Point neighborhoods and there is stronger support for the police and the drug initiative efforts. One unique feature of the West End is that the city has been aggressive about demolishing dilapidated housing and building new housing in an effort to revitalize the area. West End was the first neighborhood to be targeted for the drug initiative. An open air drug market had been active along English Road.

\(^1\) The research team is using the term black to align with the racial categories and terminology of the U.S. Census data drawn upon here. Otherwise in the report, the term African-American is used.
Figure 1. Map of the West End Neighborhood.

_Daniel Brooks_. The Daniel Brooks neighborhood is bounded by Boundary Avenue on the north; East Washington Drive and Gordon Street on the south; Cedar Street on the west and portions of Montlieu Avenue and Barbee to the north and west (see Figure 2). The neighborhood comprises 838 acres and is situated in the eastern portion of the city approximately .5 miles from the central business district. The neighborhood is comprised of predominantly low-income, black residents (91%). Of all four High Point drug initiative neighborhoods it is the most segregated by race. Indeed, over the course of the 20th century, Daniel Brooks was the neighborhood most likely to be homogeneous with regard to race.
The Daniel Brooks neighborhood contains a large public housing project located in the middle of the neighborhood boundary. This provides a different dynamic in the composition of the neighborhood. The public housing units are mostly 8-unit complexes as well as duplexes and triplexes. Single family residential units are also scattered throughout the outlying neighborhood. A high percentage (70%) of residents rent homes compared to 20% who own their homes; ten percent are vacant. High Point University is adjacent to the neighborhood and, unlike the Southside neighborhood. Daniel Brooks is surrounded by residential housing. From a policing perspective, the neighborhood is characterized by many entry and exit points, making it difficult for police to monitor in- and out-flow of traffic.
East Central. East Central is bounded by East Commerce Avenue, Brentwood Street, South College Drive, and East Russell Avenue (see Figure 3). The neighborhood is comprised of 142 acres and is located in the southeast corner of the city and is approximately .5 miles from the central business district. The neighborhood is comprised mostly of black residents (80%). The neighborhood contains the Carson Stout Public Housing Complex, which is known for frequent fight and drug activity. Economically, East Central shows the highest median household income ($30,223) of all four High Point neighborhoods although this could be due to fact that additional areas outside of the neighborhood boundary were included in the block group analysis due to the
unavailability of block-level data. Mixed throughout the neighborhood is high density single family residential housing of which renters are the majority (63%).

Figure 3. Map of the East Central Neighborhood.

Southside. The Southside neighborhood is bounded by four primary streets, which are Taylor Avenue on the north, West Ward Avenue on the south, West Green Drive on the west and South Main Street on the east (see Figure 4). The neighborhood comprises 839 acres and is located in the southwest corner of the city and is approximately 0.25 miles from the central
business district. Guilford Technical Community College (GTCC) is located adjacent to the neighborhood across Main Street. Southside consists predominantly of single family detached housing 63% of which is renter occupied, 23% owner occupied, and 14% vacant. Black residents make up 80% of residents while whites make up 9%.

Economically, Southside is the poorest of the High Point neighborhoods in terms of median household income ($16,034) and median per capita income ($12,084). The residents of this neighborhood are relatively tight knit and share a sense of identity. One of the dominant gangs in High Point—Southside—is considered a community group rather than a street gang with ties to illegal activities. Drugs and prostitution are the main problems that plague this area of High Point. One notable feature is that the Southside Recreation Center is located outside of the neighborhood, which requires children and teens to walk approximately .5 miles to the facility. The neighborhood is surrounded by warehouses and manufacturing businesses.
City of Winston-Salem

*New Hope.* The New Hope neighborhood is bounded on the South by Fourteenth Street, on the North by Twenty-sixth Street, and on the West by U.S. Highway 52 (see Figure 5). Claremont Street forms most of the eastern boundary, but the line juts one block east to the two northern-most blocks of Locust Street between Bethlehem and Twenty-first streets. The boundary also moves one block east from Claremont to Dunleith Street between Twenty-second
and Twenty-third streets and again between Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth. The neighborhood is comprised of 159 acres in the northeast sector of Winston-Salem, approximately 1.5 miles from downtown.

Cleveland Avenue Homes, a public housing property with one- to four-bedroom apartments, covers about 16 acres near the southern end of the neighborhood. A privately owned apartment complex sits near the center of the neighborhood, two blocks north of Cleveland Avenue Homes. The drug market operated primarily within the boundaries of the public housing property and between it and the apartment complex to the north.

Commercial properties and single-family dwellings face Fourteenth Street. For a few blocks on North Liberty Street, near the western boundary in the southern part of the neighborhood, commercial properties proliferate, but single-family houses are the rule in the rest of the neighborhood. Three-fourths (76%) of the housing units are renter occupied, 13% are owner-occupied, and 11% are vacant.

Median income levels in New Hope are lower than those in all of the High Point neighborhoods where the drug market elimination strategy was implemented: $12,175 per household and $7,227 per capita. Almost all of the neighborhood’s residents are black (94%), while small proportions are white (2%) or Hispanic (3%).
Figure 5. Map of the New Hope Neighborhood.
Chapter 3: Methodology

The methodology consists of six major sub-sections, each representing a key data collection and analysis strand. These components—interviews with law enforcement personnel, interviews with key community stakeholders, focus groups with residents, interviews with notified offenders, neighborhood observations, and crime impact data—are described in turn below.

Interviews with Law Enforcement Stakeholders

Thirteen key law enforcement stakeholders from the Winston-Salem Police Department and the High Point Police Department participated in semi-structured interviews that were conducted by a member of the research team. A purposive sampling approach was used to understand the initiative from various perspectives and from different levels within the organization. Thus, the final sample included five members of the departments’ command staff (including both chiefs of police), two captains, one lieutenant, three detectives, and two line officers.

The interview protocol is available in Appendix C, Part A. The protocol was developed and finalized based on earlier action research interviews conducted in real time during the emergence of the initiation in 2004 (Frabutt et al., 2004). It was refined through two research meetings between the academic partners and law enforcement representatives from each police department. The final protocol includes questions to elicit data on history and development of the initiative, the participants’ role in the initiative, operational dynamics of the initiative, and insights and perceptions on program impact and improvement.
The interviewer met individually with the stakeholders at their respective department. Individual interviews typically lasted from 45 minutes to an hour. With the participants’ consent, interviews were audio recorded. The verbatim recording of the sessions were stored electronically in a secure format and were reviewed by the entire research team. Following the interviews, the audio recordings were summarized for subsequent thematic analysis. A summary transcript of the interview was provided to each interviewee for their review. Participants clarified missing information and checked the evaluation team’s summary for accuracy. The revised interview summary was then used in all subsequent analyses. The summaries were analyzed to elicit participants’ understandings, insights, and recommendations regarding the street drug intervention.

**Key Community Stakeholder Interviews**

Thirty-eight key community stakeholders from the High Point and Winston-Salem street drug elimination strategy participated in semi-structured interviews that were conducted by a member of the research team. These participants included representatives from the district attorney’s office, United States Attorney’s Office, county health departments, substance abuse treatment providing agencies, city housing and community development, training and technical assistance providers, resource delivery providers, probation and parole, crime analysis units, faith-based agencies, other community-based support agencies, and community activists and residents. At the time the interviews were conducted, the street drug elimination strategy had been executed in five city neighborhoods, the first of which dated back to 2004.

A semi-structured interview protocol was developed by the research team (see Appendix C, Part B). Institutional review board approval was obtained and all interview participants provided informed consent. Interviews were conducted at the most convenient locations for the participants, often their place of work. Individual interviews typically lasted from 30 minutes to
an hour and a half. Interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The completed interview transcript was provided to each participant for his/her review; modified, participant-corrected interview transcripts were used in all subsequent analyses.

Using an open coding approach, each interview was read multiple times and assigned first-level codes by at least two coders from the research team. To assess convergence, coders then conferred to articulate emerging themes and distill codes. A joint, second-level coding analysis further refined patterns into major themes.

**Resident Focus Groups**

Three focus groups were held in initiative areas: two in High Point and one in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Focus groups were convened by key residents and housing authority employees in the initiative areas, and they were facilitated by members of the research team. Collectively, 22 community residents participated in the sessions. In High Point, one session was held in the first initiative area and a second session was held in the third initiative area. Eight community residents attended the first and three the latter. In Winston-Salem, eleven community residents from the initiative area in Winston-Salem participated. Participants had resided in the initiative area for varying amounts of time, ranging from four years to thirty-eight years. Most of the residents in attendance were African-American.

The focus group participants were recruited by a member of the cities’ Housing Authority and by a local minister in the initiative area. To select the focus group participants, the Housing Authority members conferred with the Presidents of the Resident Councils who chose an array of active and concerned residents in the community and the local minister selected participants to invite who were involved with strategy implementation. In extending participant invitations, recruitment efforts were made in attempt to ensure that all segments of the community were represented.
The research team developed a group interview format design to delineate the focus
group’s direction and to ensure that targeted responses were elicited from the participants. The
focus group discussion guide is available in Appendix C, Part C. Prior to commencing the focus
group session, participants provided their informed consent as well as the number of years of
residency in the neighborhood.

The focus groups were held at a community center or church located within the initiative
neighborhoods, which served as a convenient location for the community residents. The focus
groups lasted between 50 and 80 minutes. A member of the research team served as the
moderator, introduced the remaining research team members in attendance, and described to the
participants what the focus group would entail. At the end of each session, the moderator
thanked the participants for their contributions. Subsequently, each participant received a $35
gift card as compensation for their time and contribution.

With the participants’ consent, the focus groups were audio recorded. Three separate
digital recorders were utilized in order to capture all participants’ contributions. The verbatim
recordings of the sessions were stored electronically in a secure format and were reviewed by
members of the research team. Following the interviews, the audio recordings were compiled
into transcriptions for subsequent analysis.

In order to code the focus group transcriptions, the interview protocol was divided into
three main themes: strategy knowledge and awareness; direct strategy involvement; and resident
perceptions of crime, personal safety, the police, and the community in general. These three
major thematic areas created predetermined coding categories, which corresponded to the
researcher-initiated questions during the focus groups. Members of the research team analyzed
the focus group transcriptions for responses corresponding to each predetermined theme separately and then convened to compare the coded data.

**Notified Offender Interviews**

Individual, semi-structured, qualitative interviews were conducted with three notified male offenders that had attended a call-in as part of the High Point Police Department’s street drug initiative. After being informed by their respective probation officer or by the community resource specialist of the study, offenders self-selected themselves for participation. Their participation in no way had bearing on their current probation/parole status. As Cope and Hochstetler (2005) have noted, “little can be done about selection biases introduced by volunteering”... [As researchers we] “must accept that we generally only know the stories of those who choose to tell them as they choose to tell them” (p. 25).

Two of the offenders were interviewed at a community probation and parole office and the third at a community/neighborhood center by a researcher from a local university. After obtaining written consent, interviews were audio-taped and typically lasted 30 to 40 minutes. One interview lasted almost 1.5 hours.

Cope and Hochstetler (2005) observed that there are several reasons why persons with a criminal history are willing to speak with researchers. Some do so because they recognize the personal benefits associated with participation. For some, participation affords criminal offenders the opportunity to tell others what they believe they want to hear or to defend their actions using “techniques of neutralization” (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Others do so in an effort to manage the impressions they want the public to have of them as honest people struggling to do

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2 Dr. Terrell A. Hayes, Professor of Sociology at High Point University, spearheaded the data collection, analysis, and writing efforts regarding the perspective of notified offenders. His collaborative work with the research team allowed for the inclusion of an important and much needed stakeholder perspective.
the right thing. Still others choose to participate in research studies for more altruistic reasons like serving as an example to others of why a criminal career should be avoided. It was clear from one of the participants that he agreed to take part in the interview because he wanted to vent his frustration with the notification phase of the initiative, something he did not get to do during the call-in. For him, at least, the opportunity to speak his mind was therapeutic, a catharsis affording him the opportunity to “blow off some steam.” It was not made clear during the interviews why the other two offenders chose to participate. Researchers conducting interviews of more than just a few minutes often provide a small monetary incentive in an effort to encourage participation. In this study, drug initiative participants were paid 20 dollars at the end of the interview. Subsequently, the financial incentive provided might have encouraged participation as well.

One of the greatest advantages to interviewing criminal offenders is the unique perspective they offer regarding “the perceived effectiveness of crime control activities in deterring crime” (Miethe & McCorkle, 2001, p. 17). Transcripts of the interviews were reviewed by the research team to derive case profiles of offenders’ reactions to the drug initiative strategy, including their perceptions of its advantages, disadvantages, and overall impact. While exploratory at this stage because of the small sample, common threads among the participants’ responses are noted.

**Systematic Neighborhood Social Observation**

The methodology was a modified and scaled-down application of the systematic social observation protocol utilized in the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). The observations were conducted during the sustainability phase of the strategy in Winston-Salem. Observations occurred before and after the police department arrested 30 individuals for drug-related offenses in the neighborhood where partners
in the strategic initiative had conducted a notification/call-in three years earlier. After the call-in, the market had slowly re-emerged, and the police conducted another surveillance and undercover operation that led to the additional 30 arrests. The neighborhood is three city blocks wide and 12 blocks long, but the street-drug market activity was focused in about 15% of the total area.

The major constructs assessed included physical order, physical disorder, physical decay, social order, and social disorder. These constructs were assessed via the indicators listed in Table 2 (adapted from Weisburd, Wyckoff, Ready, Eck, Hinkle, & Gajewski, 2004). Physical disorder was assessed using four items, physical order using two items, physical decay using three, social disorder using five, and social order using three. Police patrols and police interaction with neighborhood residents were noted as well as miscellaneous physical and social indicators. Space was provided on the data collection instruments for observers to note other items relevant to either physical or social order/disorder. All items were assessed on a dichotomous scale indicating presence or absence on a given block face, and some were counted for the purpose of indicating frequency.
Table 2. Neighborhood Constructs and Indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Disorder</strong></td>
<td>• Trash/garbage/litter on sidewalk/street/gutter/common areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Residence with trash/garbage/litter in yard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Structures marked with graffiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Abandoned cars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Order</strong></td>
<td>• Signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating neighborhood watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Buildings with graffiti painted over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Decay</strong></td>
<td>• Burned out or boarded or abandoned houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Burned out or boarded or abandoned commercial buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Buildings with broken windows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Physical Indicators</strong></td>
<td>• Note any indicator observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, or any other physical attribute that may be of interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Disorder</strong></td>
<td>• Individuals congregating with verbal conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Individuals congregating with physical conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential drug transaction activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential prostitution activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Loud noise/music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Order</strong></td>
<td>• Individuals congregating, no observable conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Residents on porches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Individuals out in the neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Social Indicators</strong></td>
<td>• Police patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Police interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Note any indicator observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, or any other social attribute that may be of interest.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two pilot tests of the observation methodology were conducted on June 1 and September 21, 2007. Details of these pilot observations and the resulting methodological modifications are described in Appendix D. Using refined procedures, the neighborhood observations used in the analysis were conducted by a six-member team using a city-owned van. The team consisted of a driver, a “navigator” directing the driver through a systematic pre-determined route, two observers of physical indicators, and two observers of social indicators. Observers noted on recording sheets (Appendix D) the presence/absence and frequency of the Table 2 indicators.

The geographic unit of analysis for the observation was a city block face – the block segment on one side of a street (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999). In this procedure each intersection of two streets marks the end of one block face and the beginning of another. An individual identification number and a corresponding coding sheet were designated for each block face. Duration of each observation session was approximately two hours. A tape recorder was present in the vehicle to capture any comments made by investigators and/or the driver for later documentation.

After the pilots, the procedure was conducted twice: November 16, 2007, and April 4, 2008. Observations were matched for day (Friday) and time (beginning at approximately 1:30 p.m.). Between these two dates a police surveillance and undercover operation, which began during the summer of 2007, was completed, and 30 arrests on drug-related charges were made in the neighborhood from February 22 through April 3, 2008.

**Crime Impact Indicators**

The two cities that were included in this study used different methodologies to measure the quantitative impacts of the strategy in the implementation sites. Although some general benchmarks were used to develop the method for tracking the outcomes, differences among agencies are inevitable and are affected by agency capacity, technological sophistication, and
agency-specific goals and objectives. Due to the different methodologies utilized by each agency, direct, one-to-one comparisons of outcomes between cities were not conducted. Impacts for each city remain separate in that they are best understood within each site’s individual context.

*Pre-post indicators.* A straightforward comparison of intervention effects is derived from ongoing comparisons of violent and drug crime in a specified time interval both before (e.g., 6 months, 1 year, 18 months) versus after an intervention date (i.e., the date of the notification session). Such long-term tracking of drug and violent crimes within the four target areas in High Point has been conducted for over four years, spearheaded by Dr. Eleazer Hunt, High Point Police Department Crime Analyst. Similar analyses have been conducted by Julia Conley, Crime Analyst with the Winston-Salem Police Department, for the New Hope intervention area.

In order to analyze the data, the High Point methodology created a group of serious crimes which included homicide, manslaughter by negligence, robbery, aggravated assault, carrying concealed weapon, prostitution, assisting/promoting prostitution, drug violations, buying drug paraphernalia, and possessing/concealing drug paraphernalia. This amalgamation of offenses was created in order to include all possible offenses that could be associated with open-air drug markets. In addition, High Point used only the most serious offense that occurred in a criminal incident based on UCR codes in the analysis.

High Point used the night the notification sessions occurred as the pre/post intervention point for data comparison purposes. “This data creates the condition to compare statistics previous to and post-call-in time periods from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives” (Hunt et al., 2008, p. 404). The police department tracked the drug and violent crimes previously mentioned that occurred within the implementation areas for over four years through
the use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) and computer based mapping. According to Hunt et al. (2008), “a variety of spatial analyses were conducted in order to assess change in crime counts and spatial distribution” (p. 405). The analysis of the collected data began approximately 100 days after the notification session occurred and were analyzed in 50 day increments thereafter. Moreover, GIS allowed relative analyses to be conducted based on analogous crimes throughout other communities and the entire city of High Point. In addition to collecting aggregate criminal data counts, crime density maps were created in an effort to view the change in intensity of hot spots across the area.

Crime analysts at the Winston-Salem Police Department derived a somewhat different way of analyzing the effectiveness of the strategy in the implementation area. Rather than reporting the most serious offense based on UCR codes, they utilized Incident Based Reporting (IBR) coding and reported all offenses associated with an incident. This captures what they believe to be a more complete view of the criminal activity in the area. Winston-Salem’s analysis includes violent Part One crimes including homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, and Part Two property crimes including burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. Winston-Salem also includes all Part Two crimes including, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, drugs, DWI, family offenses, forgery, fraud, gambling, kidnapping, liquor laws, missing person, prostitution, runaway, sexual offenses, simple assault, statutory rape, stolen property, traffic violations, trespassing, vandalism, and weapons violations.

Follow-up on Notified Offenders. Lists of notified offenders attending each notification session were compiled into a master list. Criminal record checks were examined on each attendee to assess whether they had re-offended after the notification and to catalog the nature and severity of that offense.
Chapter 4: Findings

Law Enforcement Perspectives: Articulating the Strategy

Based on analyses of the 13 law enforcement stakeholder interviews and through a review of previous evaluations and archival documents, the street-drug elimination strategy has been synthesized into several major steps (Fealy, Sumner, & Kennedy, 2006; Frabutt, Gathings, Hunt, & Loggins; Harvey, 2005; Hunt, Sumner, Scholten, & Frabutt, 2008; Sumner, Hunt, & Frabutt, 2005; Lang et al., 2007; Shelton et al., 2007; Sumner, Hunt, & Frabutt, 2005). Each is outlined in detail below. To remain as close as possible to the data, each stage is illustrated via the participants’ comments, insights, and observations.

Identifying the Target Area through Crime Mapping. A primary stage in the drug elimination strategy employed by both High Point and Winston-Salem Police Departments consists of identifying the area in which the strategy is to be implemented. According to stakeholders from both law enforcement agencies, the ideal method of identifying the target area is through the analysis of crime data and examination of crime density maps.

In choosing the area, the High Point and Winston-Salem Police Departments analyzed crime data for their respective cities including violent, Part I offenses, drug related crimes, drug arrests, property crimes, and calls for service acquired by each department’s Crime Analysis Units through data information systems such as PISTOL (Police Information System Totally On-Line, OSSI, Inc.). Once the appropriate crime data were examined, crime density maps and overlays were created for each city in order to distinguish where the greatest concentration of crime occurred within each municipality (see Hunt, Sumner, Scholten, & Frabutt, 2008 for a full
description of the GIS methodology). According to one stakeholder, “our computer systems had grown [since earlier initiatives] to the point where we could really get greater information to help us identify the areas [where] we need to go.”

Many stakeholders in High Point and Winston-Salem consider this technique of targeting the specific implementation area through the use of crime data to be advantageous. “When you identify the target area through crime mapping, you take biases and personal decisions about where this program should take place out of the process.” Moreover, by choosing the target area in this manner, the decision of the police departments to intervene in a particular neighborhood is defensible to the community at large:

We decided, before we even got any results back, to make this a fair process, to make this a process where we could go to any community and initiate it, and if there was any controversy about why we picked a certain neighborhood, we were going to say this is where the data sent us.

Although the overall consensus was positive in relation to this element of the strategy, some minor challenges did exist. According to one High Point stakeholder, no challenges arose until the selection of the city’s second intervention site. “Although we did our homework, we did our crime mapping, and we did our research, and analysis, we stopped short a little bit.” High Point did not anticipate the possibility of something other than the drug trade and the crime associated with the illicit operations motivating the increase in violent crime in this particular area. The department consequently found that most of the violence occurring in the area was domestic violence and not crime resulting from drug activity in the neighborhood. “That taught us to be a little bit more careful with our research and our homework.”
Similarly, only one challenge related to this element of the overall strategy was discussed by police department personnel in Winston-Salem. One law enforcement stakeholder stated that the only challenge with their initiative was convincing internal, department personnel that the chosen area was the best place to implement the strategy. “A lot of folks said that was too hard of a location to start with and that we would not see an impact because it was a traditional location for drugs and drug selling.” However, by choosing the area as a result of analyzing the appropriate crime data and having the data to support the department’s decision, it was difficult to dispute the fact that this area should be the target implementation area. According to a stakeholder in Winston-Salem, “We didn’t pick the area. The area picked itself based on the criteria we said we were going to use.” Overall, this step is viewed as being a critical element in the overall process of the drug elimination strategy. “The crime mapping was, and remains, absolutely instrumental to what we do [in terms of the initiative].”

Engaging the Community. After the police department chooses the target area through crime mapping, the community, including local government and community resource agencies, as well as local community members, must be engaged in and connected to the strategy. In general, the High Point and Winston-Salem police departments engaged their respective communities, although through somewhat different avenues and with somewhat different breadth..

The city of High Point is in a unique situation in terms of community engagement. Since 1998, the police department and the community members have laid the groundwork for community engagement by cooperatively taking part in community responses to violent crimes, particularly homicides. High Point’s existing collaboration between the community and the police department, most prominently displayed through the High Point Community Against
Violence—a community-police partnership—significantly supported the community commitment for the street drug elimination strategy.  

Before the community’s engagement was solidified for the current strategy, High Point’s law enforcement officials had to be convinced that this particular strategy was in the best interest of the city. Subsequently, the police department’s executive staff met with city government agencies, local and state level law enforcement agencies (probation/parole, SBI, DEA, ATF, etc), community groups, and local community members to explain the goal of the initiative and how the strategy would be arranged within the city.

Two High Point stakeholders agreed that engaging the members of the target neighborhood in the initiative was not difficult. According to one stakeholder, “They wanted to be engaged. They were anxious for something different to happen; something good to happen. So, it wasn’t a case of us engaging them. It was a case of us allowing them to be engaged like they wanted to be.”

Winston-Salem’s community and government partners were engaged primarily through a meeting with the Police Chief and through Winston-Salem State University’s Center for Community Safety (a university-community partnership dedicated to violence reduction). “I think a key component was going to the Executive Council at the Center for Community Safety. We rolled out the strategy to them and that’s where we got additional partners, because they loved the idea.” The Winston-Salem Police Department engaged community members within the target neighborhood through the faith community, the Housing Authority of Winston-Salem, and by personal interactions with community residents. “From the beginning, we sent them [the

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3 A group of community volunteers and service agency representatives formed in the late 1990s with the goal of reducing violent crime. That group has since filed for non-profit status and meets monthly with the Police Department as the Community Against Violence Initiative.
community members and organization] letters and made phone calls to the churches and to the other organizations to try to explain to them what we had going. And, we told them up front that we wanted them to be a part of this program.” Moreover, “once the people in the community understood what was going on, they became very receptive to the program.” Prior to the community meetings, flyers were passed out in the community notifying the residents of the assemblies. The community meeting consisted of the Police Chief delivering a message explaining the strategy to the community. Overall, the Winston-Salem Police Department felt that they successfully engaged the community in the strategy. One stakeholder noted, “We thought we were very effective in engaging the community at the appropriate times.”

Stakeholders from High Point and Winston-Salem collectively identified the faith community, in particular neighborhood ministers, as being key elements in and necessary actors of the strategy. “For me, what went well every time was engaging the ministers first in that [the target] neighborhood, because those ministers have some standing [within the community]. So, I think that’s a good place to start.” Other noted community participants of significance included the Housing Authority, NAACP, and the Urban League.

Although the law enforcement agencies of High Point and Winston-Salem felt they effectively engaged their respective communities, certain challenges did exist. Both police departments expressed difficulty in gaining and maintaining the engagement of the community. One High Point stakeholder stated, “It’s difficult to convince people in these communities to expend energy on what they may see as a lost cause and sometimes they see their neighborhoods as a lost cause.”

Moreover, one High Point stakeholder expressed that it was particularly difficult to engage community members in public housing neighborhoods, because of the transient nature of
the population. In order to compensate for this barrier, resident packets were handed out to new residents informing them of the initiative. “We had to make it [the guidelines of the initiative] part of the new resident housing package. Because, otherwise, in a year, hardly anybody would be living there that even knew what you did and you lost ground. So, we had to develop a way to educate newly arriving members of that community.”

High Point also expressed that a number of local neighborhood community members wanted the Police Chief to engage them in the initiative, while others preferred to be engaged by unofficial leaders within their communities, such as ministers. During interviews with Winston-Salem law enforcement personnel, two challenges emerged. One stakeholder noted that the culture of the neighborhood as it relates to the drug trade was somewhat of a challenge. “We tried to get people on board, but you still had a lot of people who just would side more with the drug dealers than with us [the police department] who just never got on board. So, that was a barrier.” Subsequently, this element of the strategy took a great deal of patience and time to achieve. “It took some work, but wasn’t a huge problem.”

Personnel from both law enforcement agencies suggested modifications for future strategy implementation. One High Point stakeholder believed that community members, especially church leaders, could have been recruited more intentionally. In addition, one Winston-Salem stakeholder would have liked for the community to have been more involved with the initiative, ranging from initial strategy development to a more engaged supporting role throughout implementation.

*Engaging the Police Department Internally.* In addition to engaging the community, the police department itself must also be brought on board in terms of supporting the strategy.
Stakeholders from the High Point and Winston-Salem police departments agree that it is important to have the buy-in of the entire department, including top-tier leaders.

In High Point and Winston-Salem, the members of the police departments were engaged by their respective command staffs through a two-fold plan. First, the departments’ Command Staffs attended police department roll calls, assemblies, and meetings until the elements of the strategy were explained to members of each department. One High Point stakeholder stated that the members of the department were informed about the deterrence methods employed by the strategy, what their particular role was going to be, and how every piece fits together. Winston-Salem stakeholders noted that the command staff approached the officers with the proposal that, “we’ve tried to combat our city’s drug problem for years with no avail. It is now time to try something different.” Second, High Point and Winston-Salem police officers were surveyed about the individuals recognized as being involved in the drug trade in order to enhance the process of identifying the street- and upper-level dealers in the intervention neighborhoods. In Winston-Salem, the undercover detectives would also send out pictures of unknown individuals identified as selling drugs to see if the other officers within the department knew who the unidentified dealers were or had additional information on them.

Although this method of engaging the police departments seems uncomplicated, some challenges did exist within each department. One High Point stakeholder stated that engaging the police department internally was time consuming. However, most of the High Point stakeholders interviewed agreed that this step did not pose any major barriers and most individuals within the department were eager to accept the initiative. “I was not skeptical of the idea of the initiative. When you see someone who wants your help, it makes you feel good about what you do. What you sign on to do as a police officer is to protect and serve.”
However, two officers in High Point acknowledged that the police department should have worked harder to engage their internal personnel, and in order to be completely successful, should do so in the future. “I think that if I had to do it again, that’s one portion that I would make sure we did better is that you have to bring as many [police department personnel] along with you as you can.” This broader engagement did occur to a large extent in High Point, but was further expressed as a recommendation for moving forward. “If you don’t include everybody in the explanation so they understand their piece, then sometimes they aren’t going to play. And that’s the way cops are.”

Although selling the strategy to the members of the High Point Police Department was unproblematic overall, the undertaking in Winston-Salem was not so straightforward. Winston-Salem stakeholders stated that a lot of pessimism by the officers occurred when the strategy was first presented to the department and it was difficult to convince a lot of the officers that the strategy was worthwhile. This difficulty was present, in part, because this particular initiative goes against certain aspects of police officer training. According to one Winston-Salem stakeholder, “I really had to transform my whole way of thinking about policing to be successful with this program.” But, as the strategy progressed, more and more officers became receptive of the idea and began to see the results.

Several aspects of engaging the police department internally emerged as being of particular importance for the Winston-Salem police department. First, it was noted that it is important to get the commitment of the command staff before attempting to engage the rest of the department. In addition, one stakeholder noted that the key is to get someone the officers really respect to speak to them about the initiative. In Winston-Salem’s case, one particular individual had the most influence within the department regarding the city’s drug trade because
of his extensive experience in the area. Finally, it is important to take the appropriate amount of time in accomplishing this step of the strategy and sufficiently explain the initiative and what will be occurring to the officers.

Overall, stakeholders in High Point and Winston-Salem agree that this step is of the utmost importance in carrying out the drug elimination strategy. One High Point stakeholder stated, “What I like about this strategy is it gives everyone a chance to give their input at the front end, before anything is implemented. All the officers felt like they had a little piece of it. We looked for ways to get everyone who works here involved.” Of note, following several implementations of the strategy, the High Point Police Department restructured its organizational chart in order to engage all department members in further focused deterrence efforts.

Identification of Street Drug Offenders. After the mapping process has yielded a geographic focus area bounded by defined parameters, attention shifts to identifying the actual street drug offenders within the market area. Input from major stakeholders groups (i.e., officers, probation and patrol officers, vice and narcotics officers, and community members) contributes to an initial master list of offenders. Moreover, exact locations involved with dealing are compiled.

The master list at this point may range from 30 to 50 individuals and it must undergo further refinement in order to adequately serve the mission and intent of the strategy. That is, ultimately, street level drug offenders—not individuals controlling the market and not occasional sellers/users—are those who will comprise the final list. Cognizant of that goal, law enforcement stakeholders referred to this step as “doing your homework.” It is imperative to focus on the individuals that are part of the problem:
Just because someone has been caught with dope or just because someone was once tagged with dealing dope does not mean they are an individual who’s contributing to the problem in a given neighborhood. And the only way to do that is very in-depth research and homework.

Reviewing Street Drug Incidents to Refine the List. In order to move beyond a list of names and locations, a deeper level of intelligence and data mining is necessary. Therefore, at this stage law enforcement engages in a comprehensive and systematic review of drug dynamics in the target area. Efforts at this stage are in line with elements of the crime incident review process much utilized in Project Safe Neighborhoods efforts across the country (Klofas et al., 2006). The guiding notion of a crime incident review is to “unpack” crime activity in a systematic manner in order to reveal linkages, associations, root causes, and common circumstances across a host of incidents. As articulated by one stakeholder:

This is where the term ‘unpacking’ became very important, because there was pressure from people in the community and with the city to go do Washington Street area. Now, the map was telling us that Washington Street and Daniel Brooks were both pretty bad. So, you have to review the drug incidences or drug arrests, you have to unpack them. You actually have to pull each report and read it and determine exactly what’s going on with those drug cases in those two areas. For example, Washington Street turned out to be a lot of drug paraphernalia arrests, because the Open Door Shelter’s right there. Where, when you looked at Daniel Brooks, a lot of what was going on there was actually drug possession. So, if you have all this, this drug stuff going on, clearly you want to focus on Daniel Brooks just based on the drug stuff.
Vice/narcotics officers typically take a lead role in unpacking the offender and location information. All reports, contacts with police, and intelligence are examined through link analysis. As one stakeholder explained, a two or three inch binder is created for each individual and “we know their entire life history.” The full reports associated with the incidents forming the original density map are re-examined with a specific focus on how the incidents are drug-related. As the drug/offender dynamic begins to emerge, an even more fine-grained level of analysis begins—determining whether or not a given individual meets the criteria for the intervention.

Both sites reported that extremely violent, high-level dealers were not the focus of the intervention. Rather, those offenders were pursued for immediate arrest and prosecution. To make these distinctions, however, law enforcement considered multiple criteria, such as a) is the dealer still active? b) in the specified geographic area? c) are they street level or mid-level? d) what is their history of and propensity for violence? e) do they have any pending charges? and f) what is their history and current status regarding probation and parole? One stakeholder provided the logic about the types of offenders that would be excluded from the final list:

We would come back and evaluate each individual to see what kind of record they had. Some of them did not qualify because of violence on their record as in violent assaults, weapon offenses. Those people were not going to be allowed to have the opportunity to participate in the program. Now, we did allow some people that, upon their next conviction of a felony, they would be a habitual offender. We chose to allow at least a couple of those to be allowed into the program because their past record, even though they were convicted of felonies, were not violent felonies.
Another stakeholder detailed the whole process, noting the convergence of law enforcement and community input to make decisions about the final list. Moreover, several stakeholders noted the critical role that the local District Attorney’s Office must play at this step. One Winston-Salem stakeholder described a multi-stage decision process. It began with detectives creating work-ups on each offender documenting their past history. The work-up included offenders’ record, their past history, their past arrests, drug arrests, age, etc. Then detectives gave input on each of the offenders and then the work-ups went to the sergeant, the lieutenant, and the captain for each of them to look at it and decide if they agreed or disagreed about the decision made. Then, the information went before a larger panel, which included all stakeholders giving input on this decision (police officers, substance abuse providers, Center for Community Safety, the faith community, District Attorney, etc.). All the names were written on a board and the histories of each offender were presented to the panel. After all the information was released, the group voted on who should be let in, who should be arrested, who has had their chance and just not taken the opportunity, and who would not take the opportunity now.

As an outcome of this stage, the agreed upon list of offenders is refined to include only the street dealers based on the review. By this point, several individuals would have been dropped from the original master list. A final list is approved.

*Conducting the Undercover Investigation.* There appear to be two phases to the undercover investigation: a) surveillance to build and refine intelligence and b) actually engaging in undercover operations to make drug buys from offenders. This stage and the operations therein are those that are most often thought of as standard police work. As one stakeholder commented, “Frankly, that’s the easiest piece of it [the strategy]. We’ve been doing that for decades. That is…our traditional tactics. That’s something that we’ve been doing for a long,
long time. We’re very good at it.” Law enforcement in High Point has used informants that have agreed to testify, undercover officers that attempt to make buys in the neighborhood by driving down particular streets, and a long-term embedding of an informant that lived in the neighborhood. Drug houses are photographed. Undercover purchases are made from individuals. Each buy is video-taped with audio. The bottom line was to get as much evidence as possible on film and on tape so that the investigation requires only a judge’s signature to make the arrest.

Even within this phase of “traditional” law enforcement, officers highlighted challenges. For example, one explained:

The challenge was sometimes getting it on film. You could always get it on audio, but the challenge sometimes was getting it on video. And we got creative with that, just having the informants say, ‘I’m not comfortable coming in this boarding house. Can you meet me outside next time, cause everybody’s trying to hit me up to buy a crack rock when I come in. I don’t mind dealing with you, but I’m a little bit scared in here.’ So…next time we’d have ‘em call and they’d meet ‘em outside and we’d get ‘em on film.

Other stakeholders stressed the commitment of time and resources that a quality undercover operation demands. Another cautioned: “The key to it is not to be rushed. Don’t make a decision on one day’s worth of video. Let’s see what happens over a period of time. You can’t do surveillance for one day and think you know the trade. But, if you watch it constantly for a specific period of time, roles will be identified and you will know who the movers and the shakers are.”
Establishing Contact with the Offender’s Family. Establishing contact with and engaging the offender’s family members or significant others, as well as the offenders themselves, is an important step in the drug elimination strategy. According to one High Point stakeholder, in order to make an impact on the offender and, consequently, the community’s drug trade, it is critical to obtain contact with someone who has standing in the offender’s life.

The High Point and Winston-Salem police departments performed this step by employing strategies similar to one another, namely by utilizing visitation teams to reach out to the family members of the notified offenders. High Point’s visitation team consisted of a minister, a police detective, and a community volunteer. The message presented by the visitation team embraced the idea that, ‘you and/or your loved one have been identified as participating in this community’s drug trade. However, we [police department, community, etc] want to offer the opportunity for you to turn your life around and stop selling drugs.’ Moreover, a letter from the Police Chief (see Figure 6) was presented to each notified offender stating that, ‘this is not a trick. You will not be arrested during the notification, but you need to attend. Please bring your family members with you for support.’ In addition, several days before the call-in, High Point police officers would call the offenders to remind them of the approaching notification.
Figure 6. Notification Letter from Police Chief.

The High Point Police Department

Date

John William Doe:

As Chief of Police with the High Point Police Department, I am writing to let you know that your activities have come to my attention. Specifically, I know that you are involved in selling drugs on the street. You have been identified as a street level drug dealer after an extensive undercover campaign in the target neighborhood.

I want to invite you to a meeting on date, at time at the Police Department. You will not be arrested. This is not a trick. You may bring someone with you who is important to you, like a friend or relative. I want you to see the evidence I have of your involvement in criminal activity, and I want to give you an option to stop before my officers are forced to take action. Let me say again, you will not be arrested at this meeting.

If you choose not to attend this meeting, we will be in contact with you along with members of the community. Street level drug sales and violence have to stop in High Point. We are giving you one chance to hear our message before we are forced to take action against you.

Chief James Fealy
High Point Police Department

Similarly, the Winston-Salem police department reached out to the offenders and their family members through visitation teams consisting of a police officer, a member of the faith community, and a community member. According to one Winston-Salem stakeholder, “What made this work is it was more than just a police officer [visiting and engaging the family
members]. You had people that they, the families respected; NAACP, the Urban League, the faith community. They partnered with us.” Other individuals, whom the families generally respected, were also involved including representatives from the NAACP, the Urban League, the Center for Community Safety, and the faith community. “Just having that other party there that’s not actively involved with the prosecution helps to put the family at ease.”

Similar to High Point’s approach, the visitation team went door-to-door to provide verbal notice of the call-in and invite the offenders and the most influential people in their lives to attend. Subsequently, a letter from the Police Chief was sent to the offenders via local street workers and police officers. Analogous to High Point, Winston-Salem’s letter from the Chief stated that the offenders would not be arrested at the call-in, but that they needed to attend the meeting to hear the message that law enforcement and the community wanted to present to them. After a certain amount of time passed, the letter from the Chief was sent out a second time to remind the offenders about the upcoming notification.

Various methods were utilized in identifying the family members of the offenders and other influential persons in the lives of the offenders. In some instances, the police departments were able to make contact with the individual offenders who would, in turn, identify the most influential individuals in their lives. However, the task of contacting the offenders and their family members does not always occur without substantial effort. One Winston-Salem stakeholder stated that this work requires the police department’s partnership with Winston-Salem State University’s Center for Community Safety. “It takes a lot of folks to reach out there and help get that done.” Technological data systems were also used to identify family members and significant others of the offenders. The High Point police department utilized probation and parole as one resource for gathering information such as current addresses and contact
information for family members. One High Point stakeholder also stated that the names of the offenders’ family members can be taken from booking logs and jail visitation lists.

Several High Point stakeholders stated that a great deal of research was conducted on the individuals prior to establishing contact. This did not, however, eliminate all of the challenges associated with this stage of the strategy. One challenge noted by both High Point and Winston-Salem stakeholders was that this work is very time consuming. Not only did it take a great deal of time to identify the individuals who played a significant role in the lives of the offenders, but it was also often difficult to find the offenders and their family members at home concurrently. According to one Winston-Salem stakeholder, “we spent a lot of time, several contacts with significant family members, which was the key to getting to the offenders. It was just a matter of putting the resources and the work there [into the initiative].” One High Point stakeholder also noted the difficulty in coordinating the schedules of everyone on the visitation team in order to collectively meet with the offenders and their families.

A stakeholder in Winston-Salem noted that a major barrier in conducting this work is inherent in the culture of the community in which the strategy was implemented. More specifically, a trust issue existed between the community and the police. “There is that culture of [not trusting the police and the attitude of] ‘I don’t trust you and you don’t trust me’.”

Even though various challenges did exist during this stage for both departments, several key components of establishing contact with the offender’s family also emerged. One High Point stakeholder stated that the department has begun to recognize the importance of some people in the offenders’ lives and has realized that the most important individuals are not always primary family members, but can also include grandmothers, aunts, ministers, etc. “It’s a little
bit more holistic than when we first started. And we’re trying to continually evolve and make it better.”

Another key element stated by both departments was the use of visitation teams to contact the offenders and their family members. As one Winston-Salem stakeholder stated, “We did the double team approach. We didn’t just talk to the offender. We talked to the family members as well. And I think it really worked.”

Overall, this step of the strategy is viewed by both police departments as critical component in the overall initiative. According to one High Point stakeholder, “I find this to be one of the most critical points, because if you get the family involved (and the ministers and the church are there), that is a huge deterrent. The more family you can get involved, the better.”

*Conducting the Call-In or Notification Session.* Notification sessions have been a key element in overall violence reduction efforts across the Middle District of North Carolina for several years, and particularly in High Point and Winston-Salem (Allen & Frabutt, 2002; Frabutt, Easterling, & MacKinnon-Lewis, 2001; Gathings & Frabutt, 2005; McDevitt et al., 2006). The notification sessions are similarly structured for High Point and Winston-Salem. During each assembly, the community partners present their message to the dealers first, articulating that they want the drug dealing and related violence to stop in their community and that they are offering resources to the dealers to aid them in stopping the illicit behaviors. The community also makes it clear that they stand behind the police department and support them unconditionally. In Winston-Salem, the community support element was organized through the Center for Community Safety and in High Point the effort was coordinated by the High Point Community Against Violence.
Subsequently, various law enforcement partners present their message. Law enforcement’s message centers on the fact that the offenders have already been identified as participating in the drug trade within the intervention neighborhood and drug dealing will stop immediately. Pictures and undercover video surveillance are put on display showing the identified offenders selling drugs or being in the presence of someone who is selling drugs. According to one Winston-Salem stakeholder, “[this] is a good way to get them to acknowledge that you really have them.” Also, casebooks are created on each notified offender, which sit at the front of the room. Each casebook contains an unsigned warrant charging the dealer of the drug offenses they committed, to be brought out and signed if ever needed.

In addition to the city’s local police department, supplementary law enforcement agencies from the local, state, and federal levels including, but not limited to, the Sherriff’s Office; probation/parole; District Attorney’s Office; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; State Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Marshall’s Office; U.S. Attorney’s Office; and Federal Bureau of Investigation, also speak to the dealers. These law enforcement entities communicate to the dealers that, in addition to the community, they also support the local police department in their efforts to eliminate the street drug markets in their community. Moreover, the law enforcement agencies of neighboring cities are present to tell the offenders they cannot start selling drugs in other cities, because each notified offender is on a “watch list” in a shared database.

The call-in concludes with a final message from the community support/resource delivery component. According to one Winston-Salem stakeholder, “you have to convince the offenders that you have them. But, then you have to defeat any reason they have for selling drugs and provide them support to quit selling drugs.”
Stakeholders from High Point and Winston-Salem identified two aspects of the notification sessions as being key elements. First, both departments indicated that showing picture and video surveillance of the dealers engaging in drug transactions is an important part of the notification.

What ended up being a very, very key [component] is, when we video taped the drug dealers doing [drug] transactions or whatever, we actually had them on video tape committing a felony. That was key when we tried to sell to them that we had the goods on them. When the dealers come in for that notification, in order for them to turn their lives around, you have got to convince them that you’ve got the goods on them. And if you don’t do a good job of convincing them, they’re not going to listen to you.

In addition, stakeholders from both departments believe another important aspect of the call-ins is the fact that family members and significant others of the offenders are present for support.

Winston-Salem stakeholders also pointed to the community component as playing a particularly important role in the notification. “The community involvement in the call-in was a key component in the initiative.” Furthermore, another important element of the call-in was the letter from the Chief that was sent out to each of the offenders who was going to be called in and their families. The letter stated that we needed you to come in, we want to talk to you, and you will not be arrested. “[The Chief] gave her word and she signed those letters and I think that was key.”

Most of the police personnel believed that the notification sessions were executed smoothly. Nevertheless, small challenges were present for each department. Stakeholders from High Point and Winston-Salem indicated that getting the offenders to the notification was a bit of a challenge. In some instances, police personnel would physically go out into the community
prior to the notification to remind the dealers of the call-in, or even go pick them up and bring them to the call-in.

Another challenge centered on the uncertainty of the conveyed messages presented to the offenders, especially in terms of the community component. It is critical that the message presented is consistent and clearly communicated. In an effort to combat this barrier, High Point scripts who speaks, how long they are to speak, and what they are to speak about. In addition, only one representative from each community organization speaks to the group in order to eliminate lengthy and repetitive speeches.

**Setting a Deadline.** The first step in eliminating open-air drug markets following the notification was setting a deadline for the offenders to quit selling drugs. Even though High Point and Winston-Salem both set a post-notification deadline, their timeline and rationales for doing so differed initially. After several implementations in High Point, the setting of the deadline now mirrors that which was implemented in Winston-Salem.

High Point set the zero tolerance deadline several days after the call-in occurred. According to police department stakeholders, this occurred for various reasons. One stakeholder stated that the department waited to set the zero tolerance deadline because the notification message can be a bit overwhelming to the offenders and not setting the deadline immediately gives the offenders a little time to think about the message. In addition, it gives the dealers time to go into the community and tell others about the call-in. One change implemented by the High Point police department is that the deadline is no longer used.

The impact you’re going to see from the notification is immediate. They can’t go back out there the next day and do anything the next two days. They’re already impacted by
the message. So, we don’t even use the deadline anymore. When you have that notification that night we tell ‘em, it’s done tonight.’

Similarly, Winston-Salem’s command staff set the zero tolerance deadline immediately following the call-in. If any of the notified offenders were observed engaging in illegal behaviors after the notification, the department would immediately serve the unsigned warrants they had on each of the notified dealers. One Winston-Salem stakeholder stated that setting the deadline instantly is a key element to the initiative, because it shows the dealers and the community that the police are serious about eliminating street drug markets in the neighborhood.

Following the establishment of the zero tolerance deadline in the communities, police officers and community members observe the neighborhood for any signs of drug dealing through strict enforcement.

**Strict Enforcement.** A “zero tolerance” approach for drug and violent activity best describes the immediate, strict, neighborhood enforcement that follows the notification session. Patrol is coordinated to create a high visibility of beat officers. To ensure consistent pressure, additional overtime beat officers would be assigned (in some cases up to six weeks) in order to saturate the area. However, it is important to note that the additional overtime and manpower commitment may become a stress on personnel resources departments, a factor that emerged in Winston-Salem. Since the vice and narcotics officers that worked the undercover investigation and surveillance so exclusively will not be able to make drug buys anymore, the beat officers become the primary eyes and ears of the neighborhood. The High Point team reported that they “watched relentlessly for any dealers to emerge in the target area, stopped them, and ‘marketed’ this back to notified dealers, their families, and the community: somebody tried, we stopped
them, and this activity isn’t going to work or be tolerated” (Fealy, Sumner, & Kennedy, 2006, p. 11).

A guiding notion of this stage is immediacy, most clearly evident as an immediate response to threats in the neighborhood. One stakeholder explained, “…any threat to that neighborhood beyond that call-in, somebody’s got to be paying attention. Somebody’s got to find out what the root cause of it is. And somebody’s got to work on that every day until it’s gone.” Any and all Part One offenses in the target area initiate an intensive case review and are thoroughly examined. Drug complaints are responded to in numerous ways, which may include additional surveillance; an undercover buy; procurement of a search warrant; a consent search; personal notification of residents of the complaint location; or a visible disruption of the complaint location (i.e., posting an officer near or in front of the location). Any reports of dealing are immediately investigated and any involving an offender who was called-in resulted in the warrants being signed and their immediate arrest. Any such arrests are communicated to the rest of the notified offenders and their families, and to the larger community (Hunt et al., 2008).

Follow-up. Perhaps a better term for this stage is “maintenance.” Key stakeholders agreed that without a dedication to sustainability, this initiative would be like many other failed drug strategies over the past decades. For example:

historically what law enforcement has done in battling violence and street level drug dealing is we would come in, we would think we’ve done something wonderful, and then we leave. When we go back to normal routine operations in that area, what we have basically done is turned our back and walked away thinking that what we have done will be long lasting and it has not been.
Maintenance of the initiative is best conceived as demonstrating accountability, occurring on three distinct but interrelated levels: with notified offenders, within the police department, and within the community at large.

Immediate follow-up with notified offenders is key. High Point stressed the importance of helping the offenders get connected with a resource coordinator, a paid position within the City of High Point, Division of Community Development. Winston-Salem law enforcement stakeholders explained that the lack of a dedicated resource coordinator in their effort may have been the single greatest obstacle to successful maintenance. Even with a resource coordinator in place, the most challenging aspect of resource provision for these offenders is helping them to find employment. In High Point, follow-up contact was made with offenders about one month after the notification to see if they were getting the help they needed. Community members were encouraged to keep in contact with those notified through phone calls or visits. Within the police department, notified offenders were monitored to see if they had been arrested.

Within the police department itself, consistent follow-up is built upon a foundation of systematic, routine communication. For example, High Point used a bulletin board—updated weekly—in the officer assembly room to display photos of wanted suspects. The department used mobile data terminals in police vehicles to quickly send messages between patrol units among all the units in a particular beat. A secure file drive on the city network was utilized to provide a storage space that officers could use to store relevant offender intelligence. The High Point Police Department has since developed an intranet blog for officers to exchange information and respond to one another’s posts. Direct contact with mirror shift officers was initiated every few weeks. Lieutenants or officers met personally with their counterpart on the opposite shift, thereby improving the information flow and complementing that which could be
shared electronically. Last, members of patrol met weekly with their Lieutenant to follow-up on neighborhood crime. A High Point stakeholder concluded: “[It is] very easily sustainable with no additional officers…Once you break that cycle and the dealers don’t have any reason to be there, the customers don’t have any reason to come back, there’s no safety in numbers in anymore, cause if somebody goes out there they are called on immediately.”

During the end of 2007, a joint operation took place in High Point between the North Carolina Alcohol Law Enforcement agency and the High Point Police Department’s Alcohol Beverage Control Detectives targeting convenience stores where open air drug transactions were being conducted. Two of the convenience stores targeted were located within the drug initiative areas: one in East Central and one in Daniel Brooks. Several undercover buys, and consequently, a number of drug arrests were made at various locations including the two convenience stores in the East Central and Daniel Brooks neighborhoods. This information was sent to the North Carolina ABC Commission in Raleigh. Some of the undercover buys were made from offenders notified at the East Central drug call-in. [This] “is part of the relentless follow-up that must be done for maintenance. We regularly check the areas with informants.” (from HPCAV meeting minutes on 1-9-2008 and personal communication with M. Sumner, Assistant Chief, High Point). “We continue to count on our partnerships to support and maintain these initiatives” (personal communication with M. Sumner).

Follow-up with community members, neighbors, and residents to keep them aware of the status of the initiative and any additional drug or criminal activity in the neighborhood is another key activity in this phase. Departments produced occasional newsletters for the community containing information on arrests or local success stories. Flyers were developed and distributed with the same purpose. Officers attended community watches in the area and through such
events maintained the lines of communication with residents. Community association meetings were another venue for officers and residents to keep one another abreast of suspicious or illegal activity in the geographic area. Both Winston-Salem and High Point have at times implemented this strategy in geographic areas that contained public housing communities. The dramatic resident turnover rate in public housing introduces several challenges into the follow-up phase. Law enforcement stakeholders stressed that were they to do the initiative again, they would make a concerted effort to inform new, incoming residents of the initiative and the expectations that go along with it. In sum, though, one stakeholder explained that the strategy works, but “it has to constantly be maintained. You can’t ever take your hand off of it. You’re always in the maintenance phase, whatever that looks like.”

**Key Community Stakeholder Perspectives**

Findings are reported across three major thematic categories: a) individual partner role and engagement over time; b) community role and engagement over time, and; c) evaluating strategy impact for refinement and improvement.

*Individual Partner Role and Engagement over Time.* To understand partners’ involvement in the recent street-drug elimination strategy, it was first necessary to trace their initial involvement in the violence reduction task force that served as the community umbrella for such initiatives. There were three categories of reasons for key partners’ initial involvement in the community violent crime task force. First, initial involvement was driven by partners’ agency affiliation and the need for particular agencies—given their very mission and purpose—to be highly invested in the effort. Thus, several key partners represented agencies as a part of their employment obligations such as the District Attorney’s Office, the police department, the county health department, the local chamber of commerce, and non-profit social service providers. Some of these partners were assigned these duties within their agencies. A second
Driver of initial involvement emerged from a sense of pastoral care and solicitude from local pastors and ministers. These key partners spoke of the need to be present to address the challenges and concerns facing the local community and this particular initiative was a direct extension of their public ministry. Essentially, the task force was a focused way for them to channel their ministerial and outreach efforts. A third category explaining initial involvement is best described simply as those who defined themselves as “concerned” community members. These individuals did not necessarily have an institutional affiliation that supported their commitment; rather, they felt that they were responding to a community need and fulfilling an important civic responsibility.

A second observation from key partner interviews regarding their involvement in the task force centers on the length of their affiliation. Notably, most of those interviewed in one city indicated that they “had been there since the beginning,” which dates back to the founding of the community violent crime task force in 1997. In the other city, many had been key partners since the time of general focused deterrence strategy development while others were specifically engaged during the process of targeted initiative planning for this specific implementation. Those partners who had been involved since the beginning of task force development represented some of the catalysts and originators of the cities’ community activism around violence reduction.

In regard to the roles that key stakeholders play, two categories were apparent. The first was that individuals involved in the task force in a professional capacity articulated that they—and the institution that they represent—had a discrete, particular role to play. These partners might be termed instrumental actors, in that they described their role as an important and irreplaceable part of the puzzle. For example, the key partner from the District Attorney’s Office
said simply, “we’re the stick,” meaning that their primary objective was to follow through on charges and sanctions for offenders. Likewise, a key partner from a social service agency cited its role as supporting community organizing efforts to keep neighborhood citizens informed. A stakeholder from one city’s community development and housing unit discussed his role in supporting offender community reintegration, especially as it relates to employment. A second category encompassed those that are present to do whatever needed to be done, and were less likely to be directed by an agency’s agenda. These key partners cited examples such as helping the task force to become an incorporated non-profit in one city; fostering the initial collaboration; supporting police department efforts; and publicly delivering the message, “we’re sick of the violence” to ex-offenders; and volunteering for officer (e.g., chair, secretary, board, etc.) roles within the task force. One partner described his role in terms of community education and awareness raising summarizing efforts as, “to help get the word out in the community, go door to door… and advise the residents and give them some information about what’s going on or what is about to go on.” Surprisingly, some of these key partners downplayed their role, claiming, “I’m just a member” or “I’m just a volunteer.”

Key stakeholders also spoke to the concept of role change or modification since their initial involvement in the task force. Half of the participants interviewed stated that their role has not changed but has remained fairly consistent since their initial involvement, which was more likely when the key stakeholder represented an institution. It makes sense that personal involvement would not change greatly given the consistent and steady instrumental role that a particular institution would play in the task force. A second group noted that their role had changed. Some had not changed dramatically but that their personal understanding of the task force—its objectives, operations, and rationale—had grown and deepened. Others indicated less
involvement or more involvement over time. A third category of stakeholder was comprised of those whose overall understanding increased, but they reported significant growth in responsibilities or effort as well. For example, some identified their personal growth into accepting leadership positions within the task force. Others explained that their outward and vocal advocacy for the task force and its goals had increased. One stakeholder confirmed that as the task force began to see positive results, “all of our roles have evolved,” once they recognized the importance of what they were doing. Overall, 13 of the 38 interviewed stakeholders provided responses that indicated an increase in responsibility or personal involvement with the task force over time. Only five key stakeholders stated that their role had in fact decreased over the last several years. One partners clarified, however, that his diminished role was both intentional and by design so that another designated community advocate could be the neighborhood’s major voice on the task force. Four other partners direct role with the task force decreased due to a change in his job description.

Each of the key community stakeholders was then asked about their specific role in implementing the street drug strategy. As with the overall task force, participants seemed to identity their efforts in particular instrumental ways or else maintained that they provide general support. Examples of instrumental roles include that of the District Attorney’s office, which works to both reinforce the gravity of the police department message but also to prosecute notified offenders aggressively when the anti-drug, anti-violence message is not heeded. Other specific roles articulated through interviews were: a) attending and speaking at call-in sessions; b) making door-to-door contacts with offenders’ families and friends; c) directing a church-based mentoring program for notified offenders; d) developing and refining the methodology for identifying a street-drug market via GIS and crime mapping; e) developing and refining the
methodology to assess street-drug intervention impact through analysis of crime trends; f) serving as a liaison between an intervention community and the police department; g) offering a location (his church) as a surveillance outpost for collecting intelligence and documenting drug sales; and h) facilitating a linkage between notified offenders and potential employers. At least nine community members identified that part or all of their contribution was to serve as an envoy of sorts for the street-drug initiative. That is, these individuals used an array of communication strategies and community leadership opportunities to ensure that communities and residents were informed about the initiative. They ensured that lines of communication were open between the intervention neighborhoods and the police department; moreover, it is important to note that the communication was bi-directional. In addition to the specific roles already delineated, several participants explained that their major contribution consisted simply of being supportive.

In addition to each key partner’s specific role in implementing the street drug strategy, each participant also was asked about their specific involvement during the call-ins or notification sessions. Twenty-nine of the key stakeholders interviewed reported attending the most recent street drug initiative call-in in High Point. Out of these stakeholders who were present, 14 reported having a speaking role. As one stakeholder stated, the message the community conveys to the notified offenders is “we’re sick and tired of your violence. Stop it. If you’re willing to turn [your life] around, we’ll do what we can to help you.” In addition, three of these 29 stakeholders who attended the most recent call-in reported serving as a community resource for the notified offenders. One stakeholder stated, “[my role is] providing a resource linkage to dealers who want to change their lives. I also work with employers in [the city] to see who hires people with felonies and who would be willing to give the notified offenders a chance.” Another stated, “I was there for support for the young boys and girls. We had one girl
and, uh I think it was 12 boys, young men, and uh I was just there to support them if they needed my help to come talk with me about anything.” Others reported roles at the call-ins included serving as observers, serving in a prosecutorial capacity, and preparing the notification environment and visual aids necessary to make a strong impact on the dealers.

Interviewees were asked how their participation in the larger task force impacted them. One theme centered on gaining new understanding and perspective as a result of their involvement. Participants described themselves as more sympathetic to the plight of the ex-offender, having become more acutely aware of the challenges and hurdles of offender community reintegration. Participants readily articulated an increased sense of compassion and understanding for offenders as a result of their exposure to and direct involvement in the task force and the drug initiative. One stakeholder stated, “when I see somebody come and talk that, that’s trying to do better, my heart goes out to them. So, it’s, it just makes me want to go and do it [the strategy] and try to help people.” Another common theme underscored participants’ beliefs that a community can work together successfully to deal with intractable social issues. Those interviewed felt truly satisfied that the task force and the drug strategy tangibly demonstrated that “people really can work together.” The expressed value of collaborative partnerships was an overriding theme that recurred throughout most interviews. One partner stated, “I am just thankful that we can have a place and talk about the issues and get something done.” Others stated, “I think the cooperation is there. The walls are down uh, between us and [other] agencies. And uh, we’ll try it again…everything we do here is on a personal basis and we’re all uh, we’ve all known each other for years uh, and hopefully the next generation will continue that cooperation. It’s a great place to practice”, and, “I think it has value and it also enhances our uh, relationship with, with other law enforcement agencies. I mean, we wouldn’t
have any contact with the Federal attorneys, you know, but uh, people like Rob Lang [U.S. Attorneys Office]. Uh, and, and our involvement with the police department…at least it gives us that we’re talking to each other.”

A similar question was posed to participants with regard to the street drug strategy: “In what ways has this strategy impacted you?” Again, the primary theme to emerge centered on compassion, empathy, understanding, and being a difference-maker. As before, participants were encouraged by a broad-based community effort to address crime and violence that was solutions-oriented. Indeed, some were heartened to know that they were part of the solution: systematic efforts to address violence and illegal drug activity were alive and well in their community. As one key partner cited, “It’s made me more acutely aware of my role in community that I’ve ever been aware of. Not just my presence, but my responsibility to my community.” A few participants described the primary impact of their involvement was simply feeling safer in their community. Furthermore, one key partner expressed that the street drug initiative provided a different perspective of the police. “The fact that the police department has taken this on to help people before they go to prison says a lot. This strategy has given me a different outlook on the overall operation of the police department.”

*Community Role and Engagement over Time.* The overt drug market strategy involves a multitude of community partners working together in support of the initiative to assist notified offenders with accessing community resources, supports, and networks. Building these community partnerships occurs over time with trust and accountability on the part of key stakeholders.

Community partners were asked to describe what resources, supports, and networks they had available to support the intervention. Several themes emerged multiple times, organized into
the common categories of faith based resources, community networks, existing community services, and service providing agencies.

Of the key resources mentioned, faith based resources were mentioned by 19 of the 38 respondents. These included specific churches, faith based assistance programs, specific pastors and ministers, and the category of “faith based” partners. One respondent indicated a need for an increase in faith based support. These faith based agencies were credited with providing mentoring, food, clothing, barber shop services, housing assistance, and assistance with job training and placement.

One city has had a Weed and Seed initiative in place since 1998, established soon after the aforementioned task force. The task force network and the Weed and Seed initiative were identified as a resource available to support the intervention by eight respondents and collectively were referred to in general as a “networking” avenue where needs could be met for notified offenders and families. The task force “is not just one-dimensional. We had, at least at one point, at least 42 different agencies that was at the table at one time. We still keep a core of about 15 to 20 agencies at the table uh, each month. And that’s what really helps to keep us strong.” Multiple general services were identified as being available to support the strategy as well in the general categories of education, support for finding jobs and housing, alcohol and drug services, food, thrift stores, clothing and shoes, bus passes, assistance with utility bills, child care, mental health services, ministry, and others.

City and County community resource agencies were also named such as the police department, County Parks and Recreation, YMCA/ YWCA, Department of Social Services, Chamber of Commerce, Boys and Girls Club, Housing Authority, Health Department, and
others. The Community Development and Housing Services Department was credited with helping to remove abandoned houses in one city in particular.

Each of the key community partners interviewed was asked how the community at large and community members became involved or engaged with the drug elimination strategy in the city. Although the method of engaging the community varied somewhat based on the type of community entity involved (community stakeholders vs. neighborhood residents), participants identified two main avenues for community engagement: communication and connection with the task force and the police department and direct engagement through police department invitations and presentations. In one city the community’s violent crime task force was reported by almost every key stakeholder as being the primary conduit through which external partners were engaged in the strategy. As one community stakeholder in this city stated, the task force “is the driving force behind the community part” of the formalized law enforcement network. Community stakeholders and community residents were engaged through the task force as a result of already existing members informally inviting others to participate, by spreading the word of the strategy to community residents/leaders, and through the community’s responses to violence that occur after an act of violence has occurred within the city. “Our community responses usually bring interested persons to the table for support.” In addition to becoming involved through the task force, community partners were engaged by the police department primarily through community meetings. According to one key stakeholder,

I think the secret has been the openness that law enforcement has had and the fairness that they have rendered. Before there is an initiative, law enforcement goes in and, first of all, builds a rapport with the community uh, leaders that are there. Cause they identify key leaders in every community. Umm, they really fortify a team before they go in and
when they do go in umm, the community is able to stand side-by-side with law enforcement.

One key stakeholder also mentioned that community neighborhood residents were, at one point, engaged through various media outlets, although this avenue of engagement was very limited.

An important piece of information was also solicited with regard to community perception. Key partners were asked how they think that the community perceived the strategy. The majority response to this question was “positive,” indicated by 13 of the respondents. One noted,

It’s fair and when the community sees they understand that they believe that and they know that it restores relationships. It is marvelous with race relationships…because it involves people, it creates that, as I already alluded to, sense of community and it helps with all the relationships and dynamics in that community [and the] community is able to start focusing on other matters as the crime and the violence and all these other factors go down, they can start saying, you know, ‘well, hey, what about flowers over there at the park?’

Five respondents indicated they did not know how the community perceived the strategy, and four respondents indicated an awareness that the community perception was negative. Three of the respondents alluded to distrust of law enforcement by the communities that had been long standing. One key stakeholder talked about this changing though over the course of the intervention, mentioning that more and more residents have come forward to show support:

I think the community is impressed with the strategy. At first, they didn’t understand what was happening and were scared because they didn’t want to come face-to-face with the offenders in their neighborhood. But then, after starting to see positive changes in
their communities, they started to support the initiative more and came together as a community.

Another noted that the community was not well educated about the strategy on the front end, “They were somewhat confused because we didn’t articulate ourselves well, but when they saw the resources that were brought to the table and the opportunities that we were giving the young men and women to change their behavior, they really bought into it.”

_Evaluating Impact of the Strategy for Refinement and Improvement._ In terms of the coordination between the police department and the community as it related to the drug elimination strategy, all but three interviewed partner stated that the efforts between the two groups was well coordinated. According to one community partner, “I think key to the whole strategy is that it be a true partnership between the community and the police department.” Several partners mentioned that the coordination of the groups involved has been modified over time as the strategy has evolved. One partner stated, “I think over the years the strategy has been tweaked and the coordination has been tweaked… so I think on the whole coordination has been good, it’s just been some trial and error and some give and take on both sides.” Only three partners interviewed felt that the efforts between the police department and the community were not coordinated with one another.

Further, a difference in responses was apparent between the cities. In one city, all but one respondent felt that the efforts between the community and law enforcement were well, if not tremendously well-coordinated while in the other city, about one-third of the respondents indicated that coordination waned over time, starting out well and then declining due to the lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities. Referencing resident engagement and sustainability of the efforts, one partner stated, “Well, after the initial suppression several programs popped up
and things were going really well and the suppression dropped off. And the community had not sustained itself well enough to fight off the new influx and proliferation of some young men that we weren’t really familiar with.”

Three main categories of challenges related to the street-drug elimination strategy emerged from the key partner interviews. First, resource and service delivery, especially obtaining and providing jobs and having someone to aid the offenders in this pursuit, was seen as a major challenge in both cities. One stakeholder stated,

Always service delivery, you know, having somebody dedicated to working with these folks. We just don’t have it. It would be great, but we haven’t had a good history with that and I don’t know that we’ll ever go back to it, but that’s probably the biggest challenge and that’s the one we talk about every month [at task force meetings]. People need jobs. People need those connections. That’s the hardest part.

A second challenge in both cities based on the interviews was partnership engagement—getting and keeping agencies and community groups involved and engaged in the initiative. Relatedly, the third challenge that key stakeholders identified was sustaining the efforts of the initiative. Unsuccessful engagement of the community and difficulty building and maintaining community trust of the police department and the strategy were also cited as challenges of the strategy. One site in particular identified an additional component that presented challenges to maintenance efforts: other political and social issues which took the attention of law enforcement efforts away from their focus on the strategy. One partner stated, “There were a number of other uh, totally unrelated issues going on uh, that reflected umm, on the police department that, I think, maybe caused them to, to be distracted from the Initiative.”
Conversely, the drug elimination strategy presented many areas of growth for the initiative specifically and the local community in general. Based on the key partner interviews, two main strengths of the initiative were that it *restores relationships and creates a sense of community* and that it *strengthens valuable and meaningful partnerships*. One community relationship that has been restored is the relationship between the community and the police department and the apparent dedication the two groups have to making the city a better and more livable community:

In my opinion, that’s the biggest strength of it all. And when, when I go to the [task force] meetings, that’s what I see. I see umm, police officials. I see store owners. I see community service and service industry related people at the table. I see pastors at the table. I see just concerned residents at the table. I see you guys [university, research partners] at the table. And that says to me, Wow. Ok, this is not just a small thing. These are people from every walk. From education to law enforcement to uh, the merchants to you name it. They’re all at the table. They’re all fed up. They’re all thirsting for change. And they’re all not afraid to stand up and make it happen. Uh, that’s been my biggest delight and the biggest strength that I see with it all.

Regarding the value of the partnerships that the strategy builds, one partner stated, “Because the partnership itself, you just can’t find it anywhere. People are calling all over just to figure out how folks can talk to each other for ten years, and still can do something. If we make mistakes we are able to move forward and evolve from that. You can’t do anything in a vacuum.”

Moreover, community members are coming together to improve their neighborhoods and consequently, their quality of life. As one key partner stated,
I think that the term, concept, the reality of ‘community’ is definitely the backbone that makes it all work. I think when those that are notified find out…“Ok, it’s not just the police that are out to get us, but my neighbor’s sick of it. The guy across the street is sick of it. My kid’s school teacher is sick of it. The guy on the corner is sick of it.” Then, they begin to find out, “Ok. Uh, maybe we do need to reevaluate this thing [drug dealing].

While the lack of trust community members often have in the police department was viewed as being a challenge of the strategy, building and creating trust between these community groups was identified as a strength. One partner commented,

…it brings police out of the law enforcement mold and makes them into more community strategists and community umm, it makes police, social workers and social workers, police; community police. I mean, the police start thinking about other uh, means of controlling crime and changing umm, crime patterns beyond just enforcement. And the community uh, members and clergy members and, and those other individuals stop blaming the police for all their issues and they become more vigilant about taking responsibility for their own neighborhoods. So, everybody sort of starts acting out of uh, outside of their own usual patterns and that’s one of the strengths.

A fourth strength of the strategy reported by key partners was the effectiveness of the initiative in increasing safety in the community. During the interviews, the key stakeholders were asked to define “success” as it relates to the drug strategy. Two overarching themes emerged: a) the overt drug market and violent crime in the city has diminished or disappeared; and b) positive community changes and an increase in the quality of life for the residents, offenders, and the community in general have occurred. Reported positive community changes include, but are not
limited to, neighbors talking to other neighbors again, children walking and playing in the neighborhood, the community looking better, community residents feeling safer, and greater community ties. According to one key stakeholder, “Everything improves because of it. Everything. Everything in life improves because of this.” In addition, one stakeholder reported that the initiative helped bring information to the forefront in terms of the violent and drug crimes occurring in the city.

Key stakeholders were asked to recommend any changes that could be made to improve the overall drug strategy in their cities. Many partners in one city stated that no changes needed to be made other than minutely modifying the strategy due to its expected evolution. “It seems to be working pretty well, and everyone seems to be willing to change things a little bit to meet a different situation I think that’s probably a really good way to keep it. I don’t know that I would do anything else.” Overall, many stakeholders stated that increasing partner engagement, locating more services to offer the notified offenders, and increasing the capacity for service delivery are ways the strategy could be improved.

In addition to changes that could be made to improve the overall strategy, key partners were asked about changes that could be made to improve the call-ins or notification sessions. Again, several stakeholders reported that no changes need to be made. The changes that were revealed dealt mainly with the case management and delivery of services to notified offenders and format of the notification sessions including monitoring who speaks from the community and what community message is being delivered, limiting the number of notified offenders and significant others/influentials at the session, keeping the notification within a certain time frame, and maintaining control during the session by managing questions from the offenders and the
audience. Again, minor modifications have been made to the notification sessions along the way. According to one stakeholder,

We are continually critiquing ourselves after each call-in to not repeat what does not work and to find what message is most effective. We have made changes most recently as to the persons who are designated to speak on our behalf and who is also present in the room representing the community.

In regard to the overall summary of the impact of the initiative in the city, three categories were evident. First, the overt drug market and violent crime in the city have decreased dramatically. According to one stakeholder,

There’s a level of expectation that we’ve, that we’ve established citywide now so that we’ve changed the behavior of the drug dealers. I mean, we know that we’ve changed the way that dealers are operating out there. They’re not overt. And that’s what we want. Because it’s that overt environment that’s causing the violence. Umm, so they’ve changed their patterns.

Second, positive neighborhood impacts have transpired, including an improved quality of life and the enhancement of relationships among the community residents. Third, several positive community impacts have occurred for the city. Law enforcement and the community have developed a respect for one another and have been able to collaborate on making High Point a better place to live. In addition, new initiatives have emerged from the networking that has occurred in the city as a result of the drug elimination strategy. Overall, the sentiment was consistent: “It is really an awesome initiative. I would recommend it to any community or city. It is probably one of the best things that could have happened.”
To sharpen the efficacy of community-level interventions such as this one, it is important to be attentive to what went well but also the implementation challenges. Although the overall initiative was viewed as being successful, several barriers existed in the delivery of services to the notified offenders. Most responses addressed resource availability and service delivery as being major barriers including providing jobs, transportation, and housing to the notified offenders. Moreover, many key partners viewed a full-time resource coordinator as being an integral part of the strategy, but questions remain about how to establish, supervise, and fund the position. One stakeholder explained that the city “needs to have a full-time person dedicated to the initiative and working very closely with probation & parole.” Another barrier reported by several key partners related to the myriad difficulties of the offender population being served, including delivering a message to those who are not receptive to it and the challenging family environments in which the offenders often grew up.

**Resident Perspectives**

Focus groups took place between two and four years following the notifications in the initiative areas. Regardless of the fact that a relatively long period of time had passed the participants recalled a good deal of information regarding the overall strategy. Analysis of the resident perspectives gleaned from the focus group are presented according the three major emergent categories: strategy knowledge/awareness; direct strategy involvement; and resident perceptions of crime, personal safety, police, and the community.

*Strategy Knowledge/Awareness.* The focus group participants had varied levels of awareness about the overt drug elimination strategy implemented by the police department. In two sites a large majority of the participants expressed that the strategy was not explained to them by the police department or other community agency. Only one focus group participant
reported that he/she attended the community meeting where the police department presented the strategy to community partners. In one site, all participants recalled being informed by the police department about the notification strategy prior to the event at a community awareness meeting. Further, several of these participants had also been made aware of the strategy through media coverage and direct conversations with their respective police department.

In one site, a recent “sting” effort had been made by the police department as an effort to continue the maintenance phase of the strategy in that community. All participants in that community had knowledge of the sting operation that occurred and provided various descriptions of the event ranging from reasonably accurate to exaggerated descriptions. The participants’ overall understanding of the sting was that the police department conducted surveillance on people in the neighborhood and arrested the individuals who were engaging in illegal activities. Regarding the arrests made during the sting operation, most participants had accurate information on the number of people arrested. Some had seen a community newspaper, which included a list of who had been arrested based on the police department’s strategy. Of those who had seen the newspaper, the consensus was that the document was not distributed within the Cleveland Avenue Homes community, the target area of the intervention. The community residents expressed that this information needs to be given to every community resident in order for them to help keep their community safe.

While some of the participants’ understandings of the sting were accurate, others were exaggerated. Some participants said they heard helicopters over the neighborhood and saw the police jumping out of them. Others saw police cars crowd the area. One participant mentioned that she heard the police had administered DNA testing on offenders in the neighborhood. However, while some of the perceptions of what occurred during the sting were sensationalized,
the participants’ overall knowledge of the sting operation that occurred in the initiative area was fairly accurate.

In one session in particular, all participants also expressed agreement that their neighborhood had been selected because of the high crime rate and drug market activity. Although half of these participants were clearly able to explain the messages being delivered at the call-in session only one participant had been in attendance at the session.

The participants were also asked about their knowledge of the notification or call-in that occurred several years beforehand, during the first phase of the initiative. Approximately 13 of all participants (just over half), were aware of the notification taking place: four or five participants in the first focus group session, all eight in the second, and two of three in the third. According to the participants who were aware of notification, the purpose of the notification was to redirect the thinking of the offenders in the community and to show that other options exist besides drug dealing. The attitude was also expressed that the police were trying to assist the young offenders in the neighborhood to prevent them from acquiring a criminal record due to the difficulties that subsequently creates for finding future employment and obtaining future resources. The community residents stated that training and school opportunities were offered to the offenders, but felt like what the dealers really needed was financial help. One participant stated, “What I’ve heard from these boys…and girls that were watched was that they really needed financial [help] because if you go to these trainings, money’s not coming in and that’s why they turned around and did it [drug dealing] back again.” Other comments included:

I heard they were called them in and showed them the evidence they had on them, the drug dealers, and they gave an opportunity to straighten up and if they didn’t straighten
up they had the evidence and they would get ‘em later down the road if they did not straighten up. They gave ‘em an opportunity to straighten up.

and, “They gave them a chance to call them in and tell them to quit and try to help finds jobs and everything else and the ones who didn’t take it they ended up getting slammed with it.”

Overall, community residents in all three initiative areas were very knowledgeable about activities, legal and illegal, that go on within their community including crime and drug dealing. Not only were the residents aware that crime and drug dealing occur in their neighborhood, but they were cognizant of offender patterns, modifications in behaviors, and various ways in which offenders attempt to deceive the authorities.

Direct Strategy Involvement. The focus group participants were asked about their involvement in the strategy. Of all 22 participants, 5 had attended the notification. Two of the focus group participants, who were very involved in the overall community, attended the call-in and spoke to the offenders on behalf of the community. These community residents also attended meetings with the local Police Department and were strong advocates for their efforts. No other participants had any direct involvement in the overt drug elimination strategy. The focus group participants expressed the opinion that the community residents need to become more engaged by reporting crimes and illegal activities to the police in order to help deter crime in their neighborhood.

Resident Perceptions of Crime, Personal Safety, Police, and the Community. The focus group participants were asked about their perceptions of crime in the neighborhood, personal safety, the police, and their community in general both before and after the strategy was implemented. In terms of criminal activity in the neighborhood, all participants stated that drug dealing had decreased in the neighborhood since the police department conducted the sting
operation and/or the notification, but that dealing is still present and offenders continue to come back into the neighborhood to sell drugs. One community resident stated, “Right after, we saw a change. It’s just like with the sting. We’ve seen a change, but they’re gradually coming back. And that’s the way it was last time [during Phase 1], you know, they [the police] back down, but gradually...you know, they’re [dealers] moving back in.”

Similarly, another participant stated:

Oh, they’re, they’re still around, but they’re, they’re more high-tech now. They’ve got the little cell phones. See when they first started this program then when they needed, uh, drug dealers, prostitutes, whatever, cell phone. Now that they’ve got cell phone, if they see a policeman in one area they’re gonna call the other eight, ‘One over here. They’re over here.’ So they got high-tech now, they got cell phones.

One participant expressed the impact of the message in terms of community awareness: “They (dealers) know not to come back here because the people are not going to take it.” Moreover, many participants asserted that most of the decreases in dealing had occurred during daytime hours, but dealing was still fairly heavy in the evenings and at night.

The community residents attributed part of the decrease in drug dealing to increased police visibility and heightened scrutiny of the neighborhood. However, many participants in one community noted that various physical obstacles were present in the neighborhood that can obstruct police surveillance of the area. The residents noted that areas exist where the dealers can hide the dealing or the drugs from the police such as behind bushes and certain buildings. The participants also attributed part of the decrease in drug dealing to the willingness of community members to report crimes to the police department.
The community residents were mostly very knowledgeable about the temporal patterns of the drug dealers. Many residents stated that the dealers work in shifts throughout the day. From five o’clock in the evening until morning, most drug traffic occurs. The participants also asserted that drug dealing varies with city-wide pay schedules, becoming most intense during times of the month when employees are paid. In fact, some of the participants in one session noted having observed city employees coming through the neighborhood to buy drugs during those times.

The focus group participants were also asked about their perceptions of personal safety before and after the strategy was implemented. In general, most community residents felt the community was much safer after the strategy was implemented than before. The residents were no longer afraid to walk around their neighborhood. One participant stated,

Well, I want to say it uh, it’s much safer now than it had been, and I’m not afraid to walk around any community at no time, because I know I have protection around me and I’m not afraid to walk around in the community and it’s much, much safer now than it has been.

Three residents spoke about how children are now out playing in the parks and on the sidewalks. One resident of 13 years expressed that the difference from when he moved to West End to now is “like night and day.” The resident explained:

Yes, because the police were more present than before and that really made a difference and I know that sometimes they would be on foot, and that really got those rascals on the move. And, uh, so, yes, I felt a lot safer. For me, being a man, and there would be times I would come to the store late at night, but I would always be careful. I mean, I just never did feel 100% safe in doing so, but once the police came through and started
making their presence known, it really made a difference. I mean, I think we all, uh, could tell a difference around. It’s not only me; I’m a voice for many that said the same thing I did. It just made a difference. Afterwards you could see kids going to the store by their self. You still see them today. Before that you, parents wouldn’t let their kids and you couldn’t blame them, because there were drug dealers out on the street, but it made a big difference, in the daytime and night.

Another exchange also made this point:

Participant 5: You didn’t even see the kids out. Now you see kids out all the time.

Participant 3: Yeah.

Participant 5: Playing in the streets.

Participant 3: At the park.

Participant 5: Sidewalks. The park.

Participant 5: At the parks.

However, according to the participants, the feeling of safety in two initiative areas started to diminish between two and four months after the notification took place. Even with the decreased sense of personal safety after the notification, the community continued to feel safer than before the strategy was implemented. According to another focus group participant,

I work in the community and I usually, you know, now I can walk now no problems at all, but you know, back months ago I used to have a few little problems, you know, but I just keep on walking. And now, since our management and the police department and stuff came in and got some of the [inaudible] out, it’s easy to walk now. No problems.

But even with an overall increased sense of personal safety since before the strategy began, several security problems were still present in the neighborhood. One participant spoke about
not being able to sit on her porch in the evening, because the porch is shared with other apartments and the young people take over. Another community resident mentioned that the back of the apartments look identical to one another and therefore, if a dealer was trying to hurry inside for any reason, one apartment could be mistaken for another. In reference to that issue, one participant stated,

All these apartments looking alike, especially from the back. If there’s drug traffic coming in to someone’s house, your houses can be easily mistaken for someone else, and if you don’t have a lock on your screen door they will open it up and come on in. And to me that’s a great concern.

Several participants also reported that individuals who are non-residents of the community come into the area during the late night and early morning mainly to sell drugs, because this is where the drug market is located. Many young mothers allow dealers from other parts of the city to stay with them and sell drugs out of their homes. This is a convenient adaptation for the dealers since the police department is monitoring dealing on the streets. According to the focus group participants, the young women think the dealers will help them by paying for bills and helping with the children. However, the dealers come and go whenever they need money, a place to stay, or to sell drugs.

In addition to criminal activity and personal safety, the focus group participants were asked about their perceptions of the police before and after the implementation of the strategy. In contrast to their relatively uniform perceptions about crime and personal safety, participants expressed mixed perceptions about the police. One participant felt that the police had been excellent all along, while another was very vocal about his frustration with the police department and for several years felt like he tried everything he could to get them to take any action in the
neighborhood, even approaching City Hall and the mayor directly. One resident expressed a concern about turnover in the police department, specifically with the hire of the new Chief. He spoke about how he was concerned that with a new Chief they would lose the commitments that the previous Chief had made to change the community and recalled giving the new Chief a pretty hard time at the onset. In short time, his concerns were dispelled and he referred to the new Chief as “the best thing that has happened to High Point.” He continued,

Chief Fealy and the police department put us on our feet; it’s up to us to take steps to where we want to go. They can’t be right behind us holding our hand every time. Of course, you know, if you call or something like that, that’s true. But every time something happens we got to stand on our own two feet. As a community, we can do it. You can’t, you can’t uh, expect every time we have a meeting that the, uh, chief of police or somebody higher up is going to be there. They started this program. It’s up to us to see it through. It’s our community.

More than half of the participants expressed having a closer relationship with the police following the notification that is the result of increased police visibility in the community, attendance at community meetings and events, and communication with residents about what is going on in the neighborhood.

Although there was consensus amongst the group that the community still has quality of life concerns, their perceptions of the community at large since the call-in were generally positive. One resident said they are more aware of who is around and in the neighborhood, and another talked about a decrease in criminal behavior and drug sales. Specifically, participants talked about children being out playing and going to the store and about police officers being visible and working with the community. Although the West End was noted by one resident as
having had the worst reputation in town prior to the call-in, they now feel safer there than in
other communities in High Point.

Residents also seemed to feel that drug sales and criminal behavior continue to go on in
West End, but on a much smaller scale that is nowhere near where it was prior to the call-in.
Further, participants talked about the importance of residents getting involved and taking
ownership of problems in their community:

Yeah, our community is safer now that, that these criminals know that the people, the
citizens in this community, ain’t gonna stand for it. So if they know that the people will
call in or something like that, they are not going to come around no more. But with this
kind of problem you have to be on top of it all the time, you can’t never uh, say, “Well,
everything’s all nice, we will just sit back and everything.” No, because it’s always
going to be there, you’ve got to be one step ahead of ‘em.

Likewise, another resident commented:

You know, if you don’t have the community sitting there saying, “Well, I’m tired of it. If
I see it I call” and you ain’t gonna take care of the problem. They are just going to say,
“They don’t care.” I mean, normally, you know, we’re, we’re cool over here. You
know, the police are still here and they are still over here doing what they need to do.
Over here I get new people moving in and I tell them, I say look, “This is the West End,
you know, this is what we do. We don’t tolerate drugs, we don’t like drug dealers.”

Residents expressed great appreciation for the efforts of a local minister and reiterated that the
police “can’t do it on their own.”

One suggestion by many residents was that the police should be more visible throughout
the neighborhood. A majority of the focus group participants in one session agreed that the
community was safer when the police foot patrol was active in the neighborhood. "It was much, much better when we had our foot patrol, but when they took the foot patrol out of Cleveland it just became an open air drug market." Similarly, several participants mentioned that they would like the officers to get out of their patrol cars while patrolling the area. A great deal of crime occurs hidden from the view of officers in patrol cars, such as behind apartments, bushes, and other buildings. One participant stated,

I feel like if the police would be more, a little more visible, it’d be a little bit more better. They are not umm, visible enough. Because I noticed that when the police is more visible, you know what I’m trying to say, the crime situation goes down. Boys are not hanging around if they know the police is going to be here today and then they don’t know whether they’re coming back tomorrow, but the hours that they looking for ‘em, they don’t come, but they show up a little later, they not going to be on the streets selling drugs. But, if they stay, the police stay off two, three days and don’t let ‘em see ‘em, they back on the street.

Overall, the participants believed that some of the police officers do care about the well-being of this particular community, but feel some of the officers may be a bit afraid to get out of their patrol cars because of the fear of being injured in the neighborhood. The participants believed the perceived fear by some of the officers is justified because young offenders have the potential to engage in extreme behaviors, even as far as coming after an officer. According to one community resident,

A lot of ‘em, they have families too. And a lot of times what, what people are carrying on them could hurt them. You know and I always tell ‘em I know they got families and they got mommas and daddies too. And I tell them to be careful. I tell the police to be
careful. You know if you need to come to my house, come in. It’s a safe house. You never, cause you never know when they might turn and run down the police.

Nine participants (41%) were very vocal about being willing to call the police when they see illegal activities occurring in the neighborhood. Other participants had reservations about calling the police for various reasons. According to this participant,

I work a third shift, and I come in, in the morning, and there are people that are not from our community walking. There’s some times I just sit in my car and they’ll come up to the car and start banging on my window and you know, and I haven’t thought about calling the police, but that’s the time of the morning that you know, that there are all kind of people walking up and down the street.

The focus group participants were also asked about their perceptions of the community in general before and after the strategy. Various positive community changes had occurred in the neighborhood since the implementation of the strategy, such as residents feeling safe to walk around the community. In addition, several participants stated that various community members had prepared a variety of prosocial activities for the residents and youth including summer picnics and youth events at the community center. As one participant stated,

They have a lot of stuff for ‘em. They have uh, summer picnics. Uh, [name of community member], you know, she does things with the community, you know. Ain’t a lot of good things with the community besides these drugs. Now we got some, some older people in the community and they do good things for the community and for the kids. It ain’t all bad you know.

However, while positive changes have occurred in the community, several concerns continued to appear in the minds of the residents. One great concern was for the children in the community.
neighborhood who have a great deal of idle time and who observe the illegal activities taking place. The participants agreed that more activities need to be created, perhaps hosted at the community center, so that the children won’t continuously witness drug dealing and crime in the neighborhood. The participants emphasized the negative behaviors and activities that the children in the area observe as illustrated in this short dialogue:

Participant 1: And the children, they know more drug dealers than the police.

Participant 2: Yeah.

Participant 3: They know exactly whose selling drugs.

Other community concerns included the need for more parental involvement and the need for the young dealers to obtain employment so they won’t have as much idle time. As one participant stated,

I think if, if boys, the younger people, the ones that are eligible, our young kids that are eligible to work, back when I was coming up they had jobs [inaudible] summer youth programs. They don’t have that anymore, so they have idle minds, you know, they stay at home, they got little sisters and stuff ain’t gonna babysit em. So if I feel that if we, you know, if the community could find jobs for some of these kids that would at least give em something to do.

Other focus group members spoke about the need for enforcing housing codes such as banned lists to keep the identified dealers out of the neighborhood.

**Notified Offender Findings**

Because of the small sample size of notified offenders, an in-depth, case study approach was emphasized, treating each interview as a single unit of analysis. Thus, findings are presented below for each of the three interviewed offenders.
Offender A. Offender A, an African-American male, approximately 30 years of age, explained that he had been charged with drug sales and drug possession but for reasons he could not fully comprehend since he believed his drug activities were not all that serious given the rarity of their occurrence.

I stopped doing what I was doing [selling] but I really wasn’t doing it like that… I might say, okay I need to make some money today. I might just sell it for a day. It’s not like I sold it every day…When I sold I kept a low profile.

Offender A implies that his motivation for selling drugs somehow makes his selling a relatively minor offense in his own view.

I just sold [drugs] for enjoyment. I wanted to buy some nice things. I did it for enjoyment, not because I had to. Since I was 16 I always had cars, shoes and clothes. I didn’t do it because my parents didn’t give a shit about me or I need to get something to eat or the lights were going to be cut off…It [selling] really wasn’t that serious to me.

He believes that he was unfairly singled out by some in the community.

Here’s what I think [about why I was asked to the call-in] people in the neighborhood just identified me because they said I sold to somebody… This particular lady in our neighborhood I think she had something to do with identifying me. I’ve heard that at community meetings she was always yelling my name. I don’t know why that lady don’t like me. She would follow me around. She’s just crazy.

He also suggests that he was a victim of guilt by association. Just because he was around people who sold drugs and because he had some material possessions, others in the community had automatically assumed that he must have obtained those things through dishonest means.
I worked for eight years straight when I got out of school. People in the neighborhood see me buying nice cars they automatically suspect okay he’s around these people selling drugs. Just because you are around them doesn’t mean you are. I mean everybody I know is not living the good life. Just because I’m around them doesn’t mean I have to participate in what they are doing.

At the notification itself, Offender A explained that he “didn’t feel that bad.” He felt that his drug sales were an activity that he chose because he “had a little fad where I liked to get nice things.” He was upset, however, with the “hollering and yelling” and the impression given by law enforcement that “if you get another charge after the call-in that your bond would be so high that you are never going to get out.” Offender A sensed that other offenders had continued to sell/buy drugs and were apprehended by law enforcement officials, but they were quickly back out on the streets.

I know four or five people from my neighborhood that were sitting there in the meeting beside me got more charges [after the call-in] and they are signing themselves out. In effect, he felt there was some bluster to the message, and that if one was savvy as an offender, “you can tell them what they want to hear… If you rat you can stay out here as long as you want to” and “they’ll give you your bond and you can go about your business.”

Asked directly what impact the notification had on him, Offender A explained, “to me it said, look here, I’ve got to straighten up or be shipped out.” When asked for an overall opinion of the notification session, his reaction that “it was good that they notified you to let you know what was going on,” was tempered by the observation that “they’re not doing what they said they were going to do.” In other words, he found it helpful that the law enforcement and community partners clearly issued a warning—and the potential for employment opportunities—but the
follow-through via the resource coordinator did not meet his expectations. Referring to the resource coordinator, Offender A stated that he was never able to leverage any job assistance from the resource coordinator.

I called…for 45 days straight…I left messages every day, I mean two or three times a day. He never answered the phone…It took him 32 days to call me back. When he finally called me I asked him for the paperwork to fill out for getting a job. He told me to call him back in ten minutes and I still haven’t heard from [him].

Finally, he sought work on his own but fared no better.

I called them [the personnel office off of Johnson Street] every morning and they have you call in before 7:30. And you call in and they still, you leave a message on the answering machine and if they have work they call you back. They never call back.

Although he eventually found work, his intensive probation status proved to be an obstacle to not only finding a job but also to how much money he could hope to earn.

I went out and found my own [job]. This guy I used to work with before I got fired. Now I work with him delivering furniture but I can’t do it [consistently] because I am on intensive probation. I have to be home at 6:00 pm and I cannot leave the county… If he has something in Greensboro I can help him with that…but I can’t go out of town anymore. I have to wait until I get off of [intensive probation]…Since I’ve been on intense probation [for the past five months] I have not been working that many hours. Before that, I could leave on Friday and come back on Sunday and make $1200 or $1300 tax free money delivering furniture. Now I can’t really work that much. Now I might go to Greensboro and work 4 or five hours and make $200.
While he understood that there was an offer of assistance, he reiterated that he did not receive the help (i.e., employment assistance) for which he asked. Other alternatives mentioned at the notification, such as education assistance, he felt were not pertinent to him at the time. He believes if he had a job that he could obtain anything else he needed on his own.

I didn’t take advantage of [some assistance offers]. I wanted a job first, that was my first thing getting a job. Education, I can go back to night school. I have a high school diploma. I can pay my own for night school and things like that…I didn’t try the housing…I always stay in the projects anyway…If I have a job I can get the housing and the food. I don’t need that.

The major advantage to the initiative that the offender expressed is that “they give you a chance.” However, he repeated his admonishment that if they say they are going to be aggressive with drug offenders, they need to follow-through or it undermines the intent of the initiative:

I mean you’ve got people in there screaming and hollering and going crazy, then you get out of there and two days later you’ve got a boy in the neighborhood who was sitting beside you at the meeting and he has a drug charge. I’m thinking, okay, he has a drug charge. We won’t be seeing him for a while. By the time you crank your car and pull out of the back yard he is walking down the street again.

His concern was that some offenders will “work” the system when they are apprehended on a drug charge, offering intelligence or serving as an informant. Offender A cautioned that “I think it shouldn’t be like that. I mean if you did it, you did it. Why should you be able to tell on somebody?” Offender A also noted that at least he gave the program a chance whereas others have not.
My cousin was also at the call-in. He said the same thing. He tried to get a job. The rest of those guys, I don’t think they even tried to get a job. I know I tried. That’s all I know. The only advantage to having attended the notification is that it gave him a “second chance.” However, in his estimation the disadvantages of the program outweigh the advantages. For instance, Offender A had concerns about being singled out or identified by the violent crime task force that operates the notifications. He implies that once you have been labeled—“had a star put beside your name”—the community and law enforcement will not let you forget who you are or what you have done even after agreeing to participate in the program. He contends that once you’re on “the list,” all of your behavior is suspect and you’re much more likely to be pulled over or searched. He related two separate instances of being pulled over by police he believes because of the “star by his name.”

First,

I had both my kids on our way to church and I got pulled over…I said, look here man, we’ve got on our dress clothes, We’re on our way to church. I told the kids to get out so he could search the car and we could get on with our business. I mean if I’m going to be doing something I’m not going to be doing nothing with the kids in the car. I mean, come on.

And second:

I was coming from Greensboro on I-85 where I had been shopping…You can tell when a police car is around because you see everybody hit their brake lights so I hit my brakes and put my car on cruise control. The K9 man pulls me over… I asked the man why are you even pulling me over? He gives me a ticket for doing 64 mph in a 55 mph speed zone. When he gives me the ticket he asks me to get out of the car so he can explain the ticket to me. I tell him plain and simple. I said look here man, I know what you want to
do, you want to search the car…He said, you’re on the violent crime task force and all of this so you’re subject to get searched at any time. I said look here man, you can’t search me, I’ve got my license and I’ve not done anything illegal. Look, there’s my bags I’ve been shopping. So finally, I said man go ahead. I just jumped out of the car and told him to go ahead and search it. He gets all up in my face. He gets mad because I didn’t let him search the car when he wanted to. I mean I think that is a crock of shit. Every time they pull me over they want to search the car...if they just see me driving down the highway and they pull me over after reading my tags and my names pops up, okay he’s a violator, he’s on that list, let me pull him over…I [finally] sold my car because of that. Now if I’m driving my mother’s car or someone else’s and they get behind me and read the tags they don’t know who I am.

Offender A implies that the constant monitoring by law enforcement does not benefit him in any way but only continues to stigmatize him in the eyes of the community.

If you have to put a star beside my name that’s not benefiting me it’s just putting me right back in the same category I was in. By putting a star beside your name the community is basically saying, he won’t change. He’s not ever going to do right. That’s what I’m getting out of the program. By putting a star beside my name all these people in the community are thinking the same thing. He’s doing this, he’s doing this. They’ve done sent about 5 or 6 undercover officers to buy dope from me. I sold my truck for $20,000 I don’t need to sell drugs.

He also lamented the difficulty in terms of time and cost of finding a job where there are few to begin with, coupled with the stigma which accompanies having committed a felony.
I go out there four or five different places in a day and they say, we’re not hiring. You know how much it cost in gas? There are no jobs in High Point so you have to go to Greensboro. You just burn tons of gas and then when you get there you just fill out the application… they look it over and see where I have experience then they get to the part where it says I was convicted of a felony. They look at that and then their whole expression changes… they look at you like you are a mass murderer and they say, “we’ll call you back.” [They don’t call] and you call them and they say, “the manager hasn’t gotten in.” They don’t want to talk to you.

As for how the program changed him personally, he noted, “I did stop doing what I was doing,” but he feels he wasn’t a big dealer like some people in that area. Offender A hopes to eventually obtain his Commercial Drivers License, buy a dump truck, and have his own small business. While he appreciated the warning and the intent to give people a chance, on a scale from 1-10 he rated the overall initiative as a four or five. He was most annoyed that the resource delivery amounted to nothing in his case and that the jobs which are available offer no hope of a real future.

They said they were going to do these other things and they don’t. All that big talk they did about these jobs. They told us in that meeting that there would be jobs with the city, in parks and recreation, and all this… Basically, I have found that the only thing you can do is to get on the road and deliver furniture. Things like that. Who wants to work at McDonald’s? I can make more in three days (delivering furniture) than they can make in three weeks.
In his final analysis, his conclusion is that the program did not live up to its hype and expectations. He stated that the meeting contained “a bunch of BS.” “If they would do what they said they would do then great. I see it as just a crock of shit.”

Offender B. Offender B, a 29-year old African-American male, claimed to be unaware of the specific charges that led to his invitation to the notification session. In fact, he maintained that he had “no idea” what the charges were and that it was his understanding that attendance was “semi-mandatory.” He said, “If we didn’t go participate in the meeting we would have charges brought up on us and that we was to get in real serious trouble.” He said he also attended the notification because he “wanted to know what was going on and didn’t want to be left out.” His confusion about the specific charges against him contributed to an uncertain overall impression of the notification: “I really can’t say anything. It confused me. It confused a lot of people...A lot really confused me. I didn’t know too much about it.”

When asked about his feelings during the notification, Offender B explained that he felt some fear in the presence of so many law enforcement officers. For example, he said that such a situation where you “don’t know what you’re charged with but they say they got stuff on you, it scares me. He thought the “interview [notification] was a lot of threats, that’s all it was. I ain’t heard anybody come out and say I’m in trouble for doing this and that.” He re-expressed his displeasure that he learned no specifics about what in particular he was in trouble for: “I feel like we had a right to know what we was charged with; but we couldn’t know it.” Regarding the attendees of the notification session, he did note that in his opinion some offenders should not have been at the session because they don’t sell drugs.

I seen a lot of guys at the call-in who shouldn’t be at the call-in...I mean some guys there that you know sell drugs...I knew for a fact there were...a couple people [that don’t sell]
I know that [they] didn’t understand why they there and I know I guy who didn’t come cause he didn’t feel like he needed to be there.

In terms of the notification’s personal impact, there did appear to be an immediate effect. Specifically, he said that he was not from the geographic area where the initiative was targeted: “I didn’t really need to be in the area…so I haven’t been over there since then and I haven’t associated with the people over there since then.” He noted that the message of the session got his attention: “It woke me up.” He experienced no problems as a result of his participation in the initiative, and noted that his friendships had not been affected.

He believed that the notification was beneficial to him, especially the direct warning about discontinuing drug activity in the initiative area. In addition, Offender B cited that he is attending school full time, a development he traces to contacts made with community members at the notification session. He acknowledged that other resource opportunities were mentioned at the session.

There was a guy giving out cards [at the call in]. I called him one time talked to him on the phone. Said he was trying to find someone to call him again and ask him for some information. I really never heard back from him. So basically what I did was try to go out on my own and find things.

Offender B came to the conclusion that pursuing his GED was the most important task. He hoped to become a general contractor for construction work and perhaps own his own business operating small commercial trucks in two or three years.

His general assessment of the notification was moderate, a 5 on a 1-10 scale. He revealed an attitude that crime will always be present. It’s the offenders that change. He said that he sees “young children coming through. I see young kids coming in.” In his view, it can be surmised,
initiatives such as this will have an impact that reaches only as far as those offenders directly involved. This sentiment implies that the initiative may act as a deterrent for those involved but not long term. Somewhat skeptical of others sincere willingness to assist offenders he added, “There aren’t too many people out there who are willing to help. They’ll say they’ll help but you they’re not really willing...I can help myself you know?  

*Offender C.* Offender C, a 22-year old African-American male, was interviewed three weeks following the call-in he attended. While he admitted to having served time in the past for selling drugs he says that he learned from that experience.  

I sold a little bit of weed, or whatever, just to make some money but when I got caught for that I did my time. I learned from it and I let that go. So, when I came home in 2005 none of that was on my mind. I came home and got me a job, I was trying to do right by my mother, my family.  

He also claimed, as did Offenders A and B, to not know what he was charged with or even why he had been asked to attend the call-in. He added that when he inquired about the evidence the police would present him with at the call-in none was forthcoming.  

They [said] if you show up to this meeting, we gonna show you evidence that we have against you. They didn’t show us nothing. I went to the captain who was standing outside and asked him about that and he said, “Oh they misplaced it.” They didn’t wanna show us nothing [because] they didn’t have nothing.  

While Offender C acknowledged that his past history might account for why he is still being accused, as with Offender A, he too implied that he was a victim of guilt by association and was adamant that he was not guilty of selling.
I know for a fact, I shouldn’t have been in that room [at the call-in]. I’m not a drug seller. I’ve been in the neighborhood where people selling drugs. There’s a lot of people who sell drugs.” I don’t have to lie about nothing I do. If I did it I’ll tell you I did it. If you did it then fess up to what you did. I was taught that since I was little. If I get caught with something…I’m gonna step up to the plate. I’m gonna tell them, Yea, I did it cause I don’t want nobody else getting in trouble for it and then I don’t want myself getting in further trouble if [the police] find anything, any evidence saying that I did do it.

Referring to friends of his who sell drugs, he contends that he should be able to associate with friends and freely move about in an area noted for its drug activity without being suspected of any wrongdoing.

It’s my homeboy, we gotta bond but it don’t mean because he sells drugs I sell drugs and because he be this [a drug dealer] I gotta be one too…It’s just a bunch of people that’s in the same neighborhood that really have no other choice than to be [hanging out]…I live in a neighborhood that’s a drug related area. That’s where I live. You know what I mean?…That’s where my house is, where I lay my head. I should be able to walk around this neighborhood anytime I feel like it.

As with Offender B, comments by Offender C likewise indicate that there was some uncertainty as to whether he was required to be at the call-in.

They made us feel like we were required to go [to the call-in] and they basically said we were. They say it was voluntary but if we don’t go then don’t expect this or that afterwards. So basically we were required.

Offender C also expressed displeasure with how the notification was carried out.
The way they [law enforcement] come and get you. They can find a better way to present themselves…when they first called my sister. She called me frantic like I had done killed somebody or somethin’ and I was like what’s going on she like, “the police called for you.” I wasn’t there to hear the phone conversation they had but whatever they said made her scared.

After the visitation team members informed his sister of the charges against him, Offender C was suspicious of contacting officials.

I called the guy who left his number with my sister. We talked about 15 minutes then I finally felt comfortable enough to come meet them. I felt like they were trying to set me up and lock me up or something like that…He said, when we meet I’m going to get out of the car and walk over to you and just hand [you] the paper and I’ll walk off you don’t have to talk to me or anything. It just sounded crazy [I imagined] like soon as he handed me the paper the police just come rush around the building and stuff like that…It’s the way he went about it that had me nervous.

As with Offender A, Offender C expressed disdain for the overall way law enforcement officials conducted the call-in. He was unimpressed with what he perceived as the grandstanding and scare tactics used by law enforcement officials believing that much of it was simply for show.

They [law enforcement] sounded stupid…They was telling us stuff about the community and how they got people watching us…but we don’t know who they is or they got cameras but we don’t know where the camera’s at…Just all a bunch of stuff they were saying like to scare us but they weren’t showing us nothing [evidence they had against us]…They had pictures on the wall of our apartments or people’s houses stuff like that to
make [it] seem like they been watching them or whatever. It was crazy. It was fake, the whole situation was fake. I was not too pleased with it.

He was also angered by the general tone taken by law enforcement, which he perceived, overall, to show disrespect for him as a human being.

Talk to me like I’m a human. Don’t down me right here in my face and expect me to sit here gratefully and accept you downing me like I’m inhuman or my actions make me less than what I really am…I mean you sitting there telling me that I’m a bad person or threatening me with locking me up… The whole situation is crazy… They got us in a room full of people, cameras all in our face. I felt disrespected…They basically got us trapped sorta you know the ones who showed up. They was treating us like criminals before we first got there. We first got in we getting patted down… I voluntarily came in; you act like I’m a rapist drug head or something.

Comments by Offender C further suggest that insult was added to injury when a local television station ran a news story on the offenders at the call-in.

What makes you think that somebody wants to call [and ask for assistance] after they hear you downing them on TV. That right there is just a main point like they downed us on TV. For those [of us] who were at the meeting I can guarantee you that was probably the turning point that really made them say I’m not going to deal with these people… Everybody in certain neighborhoods pretty much knew who was going to be at that meeting… so why get on the TV and downgrade us or make us look bad in front of all these people ain’t nobody going to pick up the phone and call…we’re not going to want to reach out grab your hand for help.
Additional statements made by Offender C imply that the negative tone taken by law enforcement may have unintended consequences such as making offenders less willing to fully participate in the program.

I mean you try to change somebody, help somebody change, why bother or threaten them with jail or you know what I’m saying, things of that nature. That’s crazy. If you wanna help somebody you pull them to the side, let them know the situation…If they come at people positively instead of the community members come up first and downing us about what we doing in the community or what they think we doing in the community and then the police coming up after them and threaten us that’s not going to make us leave that meeting and call [anybody for help]…coming at me negatively that’s going to make me feel bad then I go home and get to thinking about everything that was said in the meeting and the way you all came at us that’s not going to make me want to pick up the phone…the way they come off on you at first will make you turn around and go the opposite way… I know one other person because it’s my home boy that really turned around after the program [call in] but he didn’t even ask for their help to turn around you know what I’m saying? He did it on his own. But I feel like if they would have came at everybody a different way, a better way, a more positive way then he would have came to them for help. Right now he’s struggling hard. It’s harder when you trying to change by yourself when you have no body behind you it’s real hard because he got a background just like me you know what I’m saying he got a police record just like me so it’s hard to just go out there and get a job without certain people behind you.

Offender C’s biggest complaint, however, was that he and the others called in had no voice in the process.
[At the call in] they don’t really give you a chance to say [anything]. I mean I understand they might be angry but that shouldn’t be the way [they] come [across] at the meeting. The whole time, nobody letting us speak. Every time we [tried] to put in our two cents or make a comment, they like, “You will not speak. Be quiet”. Well what was the point of us being there? …I might as well not even be there if I can’t state my opinion… When the community members talk and the police and the DEA and all them talk…shouldn’t it be a time when we should be able to [talk]

Despite the negative experience of the call-in Offender C sought assistance but did so with his mother’s encouragement.

After I left that meeting I talked to my momma and she said, “just give it a try.” And I gave it a try…God willing it came out in a positive manner.

While Offender C was very critical of law enforcement in general and how the notification and call-in were orchestrated, he had high praise for some members of the community. In particular, he singled out the efforts of Jim Summey, the recently appointed Executive Director of High Point Communities Against Violence (HPCAV) and former pastor of English Road Baptist Church and Yon Weaver, a community resource specialist with the City of High Point’s Housing and Community Development Department, as being key to his willingness to stay with the program.

I pretty much called everybody that gave us a [phone] number at the meeting [who indicated they would be willing to help us]…[Jim and Yon were] the only two that responded to [the messages I left]. [They] helped me get into the house…two or three weeks after the meeting… They helped me get my lights turned on…[Jim will] bring food by or he’ll talk to my landlord…Outta the whole deal, [they] pretty much stood
behind everything they said… We stay in contact. Every time I’m saying anything has to
be done as far as like with the house or any bills or me getting a job. Both of them are
right behind me 100%.

Offender C suggests that people should understand that an individual will do whatever he has to
do when times are tough in order to get by, even if it might be illegal.

It’s fucked up out there for a lot of people man. Like not just black people, this ain’t a
race issue, it’s fucked up out here for a lot of people period in general like people can’t
get jobs, or there’s people out here who have no food to eat, you know what I’m saying?
When their family turn their back on them, or if their family don’t got much to offer, then
a man put in that situation, where he ain’t got nowhere to go no food to eat, no nothing
you know what I mean? Wrong is right.

In short, Offender C suggests that loyalty to oneself and to one’s family may take priority over
obeying the law. Even though selling drugs is wrong there are times it may be necessary in
which case “wrong is right.”

Offender C indicated that initially he thought the program “was gonna be a bunch of
nonsense.” He indicated that “After we [those who had been called-in left the meeting we were
telling people] they won’t ever get housing [for us] they won’t ever get jobs. Everybody was
down [on] the program.” He also stated that at one point, despite the assistance he had received
from Jim and Yon, he still considered giving up on the program: “I told [Yon]I was gonna leave
the program, I was getting beyond legal.” A key turning point in his decision to stay with the
program was the willingness of other community members to step forward and offer their
assistance.
[A community member] got on the phone with a lady from the temp service and he explained the situation and how he’s behind me 100%. So now even the city of High Point, the crime initiative they all behind me…Even the lady up there at the personnel said that all of her employees, all of them are gonna put their effort toward finding me a full time job. So as far as like people sticking to their word, promises they made [they]stuck to everything that came out of their mouth.

Comments made by Offender C underscore the importance of securing steady, full time work if participants in the program hope to be successful.

I gotta call [the temp service] every morning and they go down the hot list sheet [of possible employers] They let you know [about available work] and ask you if you wanna take it. But you know I’m trying to find something steady… Once I get that job, a consistent job where I know it’s not a temporary thing…and I know I have enough hours to pay my bills every month then I’ll go back to school for a time. But right now I’m focused on making sure my bills can be paid at the end of the month.

With a good steady job, Offender C believes returning to school will be the next step he needs to take in order to turn his life around.

I don’t have no GED. School really ain’t for me, that probably why I didn’t get my degree…We been talking about me getting back to school, but being that I just got into a new house I’m trying to get everything stabilized with a job. When I know for a fact that I can pay my bills, before I fully try to focus on going back to school…I’m going back to school so I can better myself in a whole 360 circle not just half of my circle…I wanna make sure I can pay my bills before I go back to school.
Offender C says the program is “better than what [he] expected.” Despite his negative impressions initially, overall his outlook on the program is generally positive.

[The program] is better than what I expected. Coming into [the call-in] I had a real down outlook about it…Even right after the meeting I kinda left there with like a cocky attitude. Like man whatever they talking about I ain’t trying to do that. But um everything went on a positive look since [that] meeting.

Despite his insistence that he should not have been at the call-in, Offender C reflects back on the experience stating that “everything happens for a reason” and suggests that the key to his being successful will in part depend on his maintaining a positive state of mind.

As long as you stay with a positive mind or a positive outlook the situation’s gonna pan out. Everything’s just been looking positive for me since [the call-in]… I really didn’t feel like I was supposed to be in there [referring to the call-in] but I’m grateful for going because if I wouldn’t have I wouldn’t be in the situation I’m in now. Everything turned out for the positive for me.

When asked where he saw himself in five years Offender C said he hoped to have a good job, be back in school and hopefully raising a family.

**Systematic Neighborhood Social Observation Findings**

As outlined in the methodology, pre/post observations of the physical and social characteristics of one of the drug market initiative sites were conducted. In order to assess whether the observed indicators at Time 1 (11/16/07) were similar to observations conducted at Time 2 (4/4/08) for social order/disorder (see Table 3), one-variable Chi-square analyses were conducted. “Other” observations, which included a variety of notations, were excluded from the analysis. No significant differences between Time 1 and Time 2 were observed at the .05 level.
for either the individual indicators (e.g., individuals congregating, no observable conflict) or the aggregate (e.g., social order) indicators.

Table 3. Observed Values of Social Disorder/order Indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Social Variable</th>
<th>Time 1 (11/16/07)</th>
<th>Time 2 (4/4/08)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potential Drug Activity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Prostitution Activity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loud Noise</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregating, No Conflict</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitting on Porches</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals Out in Neighborhood</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Patrol</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Interaction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Social Disorder</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Social Order</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observed values of the physical order/disorder/decay variables are shown in Table 4. As was the case with the social order/disorder indicators, no significant differences were found at the .05 level between Time 1 and Time 2 for any of the individual indicators of physical disorder, physical order, or physical decay, or for the aggregate indicators (e.g., physical disorder).
Table 4. Observed Values of Physical Disorder/order/decay Indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed Physical Variable</th>
<th>Time 1 (11/16/07)</th>
<th>Time 2 (4/4/08)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trash in common area</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence with trash</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures with graffiti</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned cars</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signs restricting access, documenting rules, indicating Neighborhood Watch</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti painted over</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burned out, boarded, abandoned houses</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burned out, boarded, abandoned commercial buildings</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings with broken windows</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Physical Disorder</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Physical Order</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Physical Decay</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
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</table>

To further refine the analysis, block faces observed were grouped according to the city’s fire and police departments’ “fire demand zones” (FDZs). The neighborhood of interest consists of six of these FDZs (numbers 68-73). The police department’s surveillance and undercover operation for this initiative observed street drug dealing on four block faces within two adjacent FDZs (71 and 72), so for this phase of the analysis observations in those two FDZs were combined to determine if social and physical factors differed between them and the other nearby FDZs.
Results can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, which show observed counts of social and physical indicators by observation date and FDZ. These tables combine multiple indicators into the aggregate categories of Social Disorder, Social Order, Physical Disorder, and Physical Decay. Observations for the two Physical Order indicators – Signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating neighborhood watch and Structures with graffiti painted over – are separated in the table because the number of signs observed was so much greater than the number of any other indicator in any category. Results obtained in this part of the analysis continue to show (on the left side of each table) no significant differences between the total pre-arrest and post-arrest observations within any category of social or physical indicators for FDZ 71+72 versus the other four FDZs (68-70, 73) combined.
Table 5. Social Observation Results by Fire Demand Zone (FDZ) and Date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>FDZ</th>
<th>Social Disorder</th>
<th>Social Order</th>
<th>Social Other</th>
<th>Number of Block Faces</th>
<th>Per Disorder</th>
<th>Per Order</th>
<th>Per Other</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2007</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4/2008</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2007</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/4/2008</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/16/2007</td>
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<td>2</td>
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Table 6. Physical Observation Results by Fire Demand Zone (FDZ) and Date.

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<th>Date</th>
<th>FDZ</th>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Signs*</th>
<th>GPO**</th>
<th>Decay</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Block Faces</th>
<th>Disorder</th>
<th>Signs*</th>
<th>GPO**</th>
<th>Decay + Other</th>
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<td>1.83</td>
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<td>3.64</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>4.24</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/4/2008</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>4/4/2008</td>
<td>All others</td>
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<td>129</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Signs = Signs restricting access or activities; **GPO = Graffiti painted over
Because the number of block faces varies from 6 to 37 across the different FDZs, the right side of each of these tables shows the number of observations per block face. While nothing startling emerges in pre-arrest to post-arrest observations, this part of the analysis makes clear that, generally, the amount of orderly social interaction and the number of signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating Neighborhood Watch are much higher per block face in FDZ 71+72 than in the rest of the neighborhood combined. In FDZ 71+72, orderly social interaction was observed 1.76 times per block face in November and 1.67 times in April, compared with 0.55 times per block face in both November and April in the rest of the FDZs combined (see highlighted section of Table 5). In FDZ 71+72 the number of signs counted per block face was 4.24 in November and 3.38 in April, while the same observations in other parts of the neighborhood found 1.40 and 1.55 signs per block face, respectively (see highlighted section of Table 6).

**Crime Impact Indicators**

*High Point.* It has been nearly five years since the first intervention site—West End in High Point—held its street drug notification. Based upon pre- and post-intervention comparisons, Tables 7 and 8 are provided to illustrate violent and drug crime trends in 50-day intervals beginning at the 100-day mark. Table 7 indicates that the impact on violent crime was immediate, with 75%, 40%, and 56% declines in violent crime observed in the target area at 100, 150, and 200 days, respectively. Violent crime still showed declines after 1, 2, 3, and 4 years, and the average change across all reporting periods in that four-year span was 39%.
Table 7. Pre- and Post-Intervention Comparison of Violent Crime in the West End Neighborhood.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days from Implementation</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>-37</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>365</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>465</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>515</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>655</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>730</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.45 Years</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 depicts the pattern of drug crime in the West End neighborhood across the same 4-year time interval. Note again that drug market impacts were immediate, with a one-third decline in drug crime at the 100-day mark. At the end of the first year, a 39% decrease in drug crime was recorded. By four years from the implementation date, drug crimes were nearly 26% lower than the four years prior to the intervention. The average drug crime decline—across all reporting periods—over the four years was 30%.
Table 8. Pre- and Post Intervention Comparison of Drug Crime in the West End Neighborhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days from Implementation</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>730</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.45 Years</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-25.6</td>
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</table>

Table 9 presents the same type of pre/post comparisons for violent crime across three neighborhood sites and citywide. Additionally, the table maintains the chronological emergence of the newer sites keyed back to the West End implementation date. Note, for example, that the Daniel Brooks intervention occurred approximately nine months after West End. In reviewing the table, also note that the first number listed in each neighborhood column represents the percentage change from 50 days pre-intervention to 50 days post-intervention. For these additional High Point sites, it appears that at the 100-day mark, two out of three exhibited violent
crime decreases. Violent crime was up 67% in Daniel Brooks, but down 11% and 22% in Southside and East Central, respectively. A longer-term view of 400 days post-intervention, however, showed that violent crime declines were maintained in only one of the three sites: a 69% increase in Daniel Brooks, a 10% increase in Southside, and a 30% decline in East Central.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days from West End Implementation</th>
<th>Percent Change in Violent Crime by Neighborhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daniel Brooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>19</td>
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</table>
Table 10 narrows the crime impact lens to focus specifically on drug crimes in the three intervention neighborhoods. As in the previous table, the first number in each neighborhood column represents the percentage change from 50 days pre-intervention to 50 days post-intervention, then continuing in 50-day increments. Drug crimes declined markedly in each of the sites, posting drops of 8%, 70%, and 52% at the 100-day mark for Daniel Brooks, Southside, and East Central, respectively. Drug crime did not seem to be impacted for the long term in Daniel Brooks, however. Drug crime was showing a 24% increase measured 1250 days post-intervention. Likewise, after sustaining decreases for over a year and a half, the Southside neighborhood posted a 4% increase in drug crime at 800 days post-intervention. East Central, in contrast, sustained large drug crime declines, down 42% for the first 400 days.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days from West End Implementation</th>
<th>Percent Change in Violent Crime by Neighborhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Winston-Salem. As discussed in the Methodology, the crime analysts in Winston-Salem applied a different approach to identify their target area and evaluate impact. They included all Part One violent and drug crimes as well as Part Two crimes in their consideration of impact. Although there was an immediate decrease in violent crime in the initiative area immediately following notification, violent crimes and Part Two crimes rose following implementation. Drug crimes, however, did decrease within each of the comparative time frames.

Table 11 presents the pre- and post- comparisons of violent crime occurring in the target area. Although violent crime dropped by 2.9% six months following implementation, violent crime rose 7.6% on average when comparing the number of crimes that occurred three years prior to and three years following notification. It is important to note, however, that the intensive law enforcement sting in 2008 may contribute to a higher number of violent crimes documented in the area; law enforcement focus on the initiative area may lead to greater numbers of incidents being identified by officers and reported by neighborhood residents.
Table 11. Pre- and Post Comparison of Part One Violent Crime in the Winston-Salem New Hope Intervention Site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months from Implementation</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>+5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>+10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>+9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>+13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>+8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crime analysts in Winston-Salem felt it was important to capture property crimes as an indicator of impact. In part this is because property crimes can be associated with drug markets in terms of both sales and use. Comparing pre- and post- time frames from the date of the notification session, property crime decreased consistently during comparable time frames, resulting in an average overall decrease of 30.2% in the initiative area (see Table 12).
Table 12. Pre- and Post Comparison of Part One Property Crimes in the Winston-Salem New Hope Intervention Site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months from Implementation</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>-47.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>-32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>-21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>505</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>-17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In keeping with their logic, the Winston-Salem crime analysts felt that Part Two crimes should also be tracked and reviewed to assess the impact of their initiative. Table 13 shows that when comparing pre and post time periods, Part Two crimes remained higher following the initiative than prior to the implementation. Overall, the area saw an average increase of 14.6% in documented Part Two crimes.
Table 13. Pre- and Post Comparison of Part Two Crimes in the Winston-Salem New Hope Intervention Site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months from Implementation</th>
<th>Pre</th>
<th>Post</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>+17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>+10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1561</td>
<td>1756</td>
<td>+12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2303</td>
<td>+15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2513</td>
<td>2888</td>
<td>+14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>2916</td>
<td>3417</td>
<td>+17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Follow-up on Notified Offenders. Beyond comparison of crime data at the neighborhood and city level, other outcomes to consider are the person-level impacts on the notified offenders themselves. Table 11 presents an overview of pertinent information relative to the notification participants including whether they have received a subsequent criminal charge of any type (57% had), whether drug sales and possession was among the charges (yes for 25% of offenders), and whether the law enforcement agency had to actually follow through on activating the banked charge (yes for 22% of offenders). The banked charge refers to the set of charges that resulted from the surveillance operation and that led to the notification session.

Complex chi square analyses were conducted to determine if the number of individuals who had subsequent criminal activity following the call-in was significantly less than those without charges. The number of individuals with criminal charges relative to those called in was significantly less for “any criminal charge” \( \chi^2(4) = 11.2, p < .024 \), for sales/possession \( \chi^2(4) = 29.3, p < .001 \), and for activation of the banked charge \( \chi^2(4) = 9.97, p < .04 \).
Table 14. Offender Outcomes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th># Called In</th>
<th>Any Criminal Charge</th>
<th>Sales/Possession with Intent to Sell &amp; Deliver</th>
<th>Activation of Banked Charge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West End</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Brooks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southside</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hope</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5: Discussion

Law Enforcement Interviews

The 11 steps outlined via the law enforcement interviews constitute the blueprint for executing a police and community-driven drug market elimination strategy. Importantly, the operational steps are described here for the first time in the voices of the law enforcement officers that have executed these initiatives. Hunt et al. (2008) have condensed these operational steps into three distinctive stages: an identification phase, a notification phase, and a resource delivery/community support phase (see Table 15).
Table 15. Stages and Operational Steps for the Drug Market Intervention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Operational Step</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Identifying the Target Area through Crime Mapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engaging the Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engaging the Police Department Internally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification of Street Drug Offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reviewing Street Drug Incidents to Refine the List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducting the Undercover Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notification</td>
<td>Establishing Contact with the Offender’s Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducting the Notification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Delivery</td>
<td>Setting a Deadline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Support</td>
<td>Strict Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though there is a logical, orderly progression to the initiative’s rollout and continuation, it is clear that the system is complex, multi-faceted, and dependent on external input and collaboration. First, it is complex because the strategy cannot be undertaken unilaterally; an entire department, from the command staff to the front line officers, must demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the initiative’s principles. Beyond intra-department buy-in, the strategy simply does not proceed without cultivating and developing active community engagement. Second, it is multi-faceted in that the strategy uses multiple levels of deterrence by drawing on traditional means such as threat of arrest and prosecution as well as more non-traditional deterrence levers such as family, friends, and close
associates. Combined with the deterrence message is an offer of proactive change, backed up by social service supports and resources. Third, it is evident that external partners—District Attorney’s office, probation and parole, and offenders’ families—are each key to the process. Clearly, the strategy is responsive to calls for multi-dimensional efforts to eliminate street drug markets (Harocopos & Hough, 2005), utilizing partners from law enforcement, the faith community, neighborhood residents, housing authorities, and offenders’ own social networks.

In reviewing stakeholders’ comments as a whole, several perceived strengths of the strategy come to the fore. Respondents cited the fairness and equity inherent in this strategy. Selecting the target community based on quantifiable criteria from crime mapping data and explaining the selection methodology clearly and succinctly to citizens makes the approach eminently defensible to the broader community. Second, a sense of equity derives from the belief that if arrest is ultimately necessary, it is at least understandable because offenders were clearly offered a chance to change. Moreover, not carrying through with the banked charge when the offender accepts the offer of change seems to reinforce this idea of fairness. Third, stakeholders commented that such a strategy allows the police department to meet the community “where they are.” That is, there was a sense that law enforcement stakeholders relinquished the notion that citizens do not care about drug-ridden communities and instead found a way to engage them as part of the solution. Third, stakeholders seemed impressed (if at times outright incredulous) with the novelty of the broad partnerships that coalesced through the strategy. Law enforcement stakeholders forged new alliances with partners—the NAACP, Urban League, and the housing authority—and united toward a common goal: eradicating illegal street drug markets.
The law enforcement findings reviewed here also indicate that challenges are to be expected at each and every stage, though they are certainly not insurmountable. For example, while community engagement is core to the strategy, law enforcement readily acknowledged how time intensive and challenging it was to engage and maintain community support, especially in the public housing community. Another challenge arose in terms of “selling” the strategy itself within the respective police departments. Some stakeholders noted that it was an “uphill battle” to convince officers that a focused deterrence strategy that involved community partners and offenders’ family members had real merit. Without top-down support from the command staff and some key bottom-up buy-in from respected line officers, the strategy might never successfully launch. A third challenge inherent in stakeholders’ comments was the need, especially in one site, to ensure that a dedicated staff position was available—somewhere in the partnership—to fulfill the role of resource coordinator after offenders had been notified and the strict enforcement began. If maintenance is to be sustained, directed and individualized support must be accessible to the notified offenders.

**Key Stakeholder Interviews**

To better understand the dynamics of a unique police-community partnership to eliminate overt street-drug markets, semi-structured qualitative interviews with 38 key community stakeholders were conducted. The interviews shed light on stakeholders’ operative roles in the strategy, their means of engagement, and their perceptions of the initiatives’ strengths and areas of needed improvement.

*A Call to Engagement.* The point of departure for the stakeholder interview was discerning what led to their initial involvement in the task force, and more particularly, the
street-drug reduction efforts. Respondents’ consensus was that in some form or fashion they felt especially called to engagement in this type of community endeavor. Their involvement appeared to be an acknowledgement that this was simply the right thing to do. That compunction to “do the right thing” took two forms essentially—either they felt their agency or organization had an indispensible, instrumental role to play or they felt that on a personal level, their contribution was essential. Once stakeholders responded to the call to engagement, the interviews indicated that they played needed roles and found multiple ways to contribute to the initiative. Examples included speaking at notification sessions, serving as an envoy to the broader community, or directing a mentoring program for notified offenders. In sum, stakeholders expressed professional and personal interest in the efforts of the task force and/or its drug elimination efforts, and participated actively in helping to achieve its desired ends.

*A Vehicle to Channel Engagement.* A willingness to contribute one’s effort and sensing a personal and/or professional imperative to bring about change is a necessary but not sufficient factor bring about such change in the community. In any social action effort, effective vehicles are needed to channel engagement and harness the unique strengths, energies, and skill sets of committed participants. The interviews in High Point strongly indicated that the city’s violence reduction task force played this crucial role. As the critical convening structure of community input, support, and participation, it appeared to serve as a backbone for the initiative. Since the task force’s humble beginnings over a decade ago, it has grown into a source of long term vision and commitment regarding community safety issues in the city. As so many interviewees attested to their dedicated and long-term affiliation, it is apparent that the task force’s longevity and continuity contribute to coalescence around shared community work. Such dynamics certainly contribute to the group’s effective institutional memory, efficiency, and focus.
It is interesting to note as well that there was a developmental progression among stakeholders’ task force involvement. More than half reported that they increased their responsibilities in regard to the group. Several described a growth in their understanding of violence reduction issues, increased leadership capacity, and more extensive advocacy in regard to the task force’s mission. When stakeholders were asked directly about the community resources that undergird drug elimination efforts, the faith community and Weed and Seed programming were mentioned explicitly, but all noted the salient role of the task force. For violence reduction more broadly, and eliminating street drug markets in particular, it has been “the driving force.” The task force clearly united all those who “are called” and served as the vehicle to involve and engage contributors based on skill, talent, or their instrumental role.

Reflections on Engagement. Community-based and partnership-driven efforts to blend police expertise with community wisdom hold the potential to modify the underlying and often unspoken community norms and narratives surrounding crime, justice, fairness, and equity. As articulated by Kennedy and colleagues (Fealy et al., 2006; Kennedy, 2009), the theoretical background surrounding focused deterrence efforts such as this street drug elimination strategy uplifts the power of collaborative efforts to change norms and narratives, which are the individual, peer, and community norms that influence how individuals behave. Interviews demonstrated stakeholders’ belief in the power of community to take action for change. By partnering with the police department and using a systematic, proactive approach, they felt an empowerment to address social issues. Their comments revealed new understandings of the complex interface of criminal behavior, environmental conditions, and available services and supports. They reported a fresh perspective on offenders themselves, using terms like “sympathetic,” “compassion,” and “my heart goes out to them.”
The Police-Community Relationship. Another critical level of norms and narratives exists between the community and law enforcement. In their application for the 2006 Herman Goldstein award, Fealy et al. (2006) described the crux of such conversations:

Within law enforcement, the deep historic and racial narratives through which drug enforcement was viewed in the affected communities; the real, if unintended, harm that drug enforcement did in the community; and the fact that what was common knowledge in law enforcement was never discussed in public (for example, that law enforcement would like to stop profligate drug enforcement but does not know what else to do); With community figures, the ways in which existing community narratives gave license or even encouragement to dealers; that the community did not clearly articulate its real opposition to drug dealing; and that the community was free to take any position it chose on racial and other important issues and still say to the small number of drug dealers in the community that what they were doing was wrong; With both sides, the fact that low-level drug dealing is driven as much or more by small-group dynamics as by individual character and calculation; that offenders’ views on the positions of the community and the legitimacy of law enforcement mattered as much, and probably more, than enforcement risks and economic benefits; and that positive norms and narratives also existed within offenders and offender networks. (pp. 8-9)

Evidence that engagement with the strategy impacted community norms and narratives was evident in the stakeholders’ perception of the police department. When asked about their overall assessment of the strategy, key community stakeholders spoke positively about it. The overall communication and coordination level were well regarded. They noted its fairness and some said that it helped race relations. They talked explicitly of an initial distrust of the police that
gave way to a better relationship. One noted the police-community partnership as “the biggest strength of it all.” The strategy in itself helped to rebuild relationships and restored a sense of community, and according to one stakeholder, “is definitely the backbone that makes it all work.”

**Successes Observed and Challenges Noted.** Key stakeholders discussed the impact of the initiative on three levels—the decline of the street drug market, an increase in quality of life indicators, and a solidification of the police-community relationship. Participants’ sense of the initiative’s positive impact on drugs and crime is backed by hard data. Hunt et al. (2008) reported that “more than 3 years after the call-in, the reduction in violent crime appears to have stabilized at a one-third decrease – an average of 36.7%...Drug offenses have a similar pattern, with an average decrease of 30.85%” (p. 406). Regarding general quality of life indicators, stakeholders confirmed that after the initiative neighborhoods witnessed more pedestrian traffic and more visible social interactions, described simply as neighbors being neighbors. An interesting impact is one that was perhaps unintended and could carry forward positively for other community initiatives. That is, some saw the existing relationship between the community and the police department as having reached a refined and more efficient state, which is conducive to increased networking opportunities and the emergence of new initiatives and ideas.

One of the major challenges noted was the need to maintain a resource coordinator position for the initiative. The resource coordinator serves as the point of contact for the notified offenders and provides case management assistance regarding employment, housing, and other needed social services. Stakeholders stressed how important it was to have a permanent, funded position dedicated to that work. The resource coordinator role was viewed as an integral cog in the overall operation of the strategy.
**Limitations and New Research Directions.** As with any broad-based community improvement strategy, there are many partners whose roles range from great to small. A focused investigation like this one—while purposively selecting a sample of key informants—nonetheless may miss the voice and perspective of important contributors. To mitigate this effect, the sampling process consciously solicited the opinion of those being interviewed with “who else would it be important for us to talk to?” Future investigations must continue to inform the model by eliciting feedback from as many perspectives as possible.

**Resident Perceptions**

In evaluating the community focus group participants’ responses, several main elements of the overt drug elimination strategy came to the forefront. These included illustrations of norms and narratives that exist within the community; the level of knowledge and awareness the residents have about the strategy and the neighborhood in general; the continued need for youth support and engagement; discussions centered on the impacts of the strategy; and issues around strategy maintenance and the need for increased police visibility.

**Norms and Narratives.** One fundamental element of the overt drug elimination strategy centers on the particular norms and narratives that are present within a community that directly influence the ways individuals behave. According to Kennedy (2009), although the norms and narratives that exist significantly impact the lives of the people who reside in these neighborhoods, they are very explicitly confronted across community groups, leading to mistaken beliefs between groups and defective means of dealing with community problems. Kennedy (2009) wrote that, “powerful narratives – accounts of and explanations for what is going on – are developed by the affected communities, by law enforcement, and by drug dealers themselves” (p. 142).
First, Kennedy (2009) contends that a racial and ethnic narrative in minority neighborhoods exists as it relates to oppression by law enforcement officials. “A dominant community narrative embeds drug issues and the community’s experience with drug enforcement in the historic experience of minorities, especially African Americans, in America” (p. 142). Another existing narrative within these communities is the idea that the police are ineffective in combating drug dealing and cause authentic damage to the community. “High levels of enforcement, arrest, and incarceration are seen as the intended outcomes of a deliberate outside attack, designed to destabilize the community, control strong young men, and provide work for law-enforcement agencies and prison staff” (p. 143). Therefore, community members often see law enforcement as being part of the problem, as opposed to part of the solution.

Second, Kennedy continues, a racial and ethnic narrative exists in the minds of law enforcement, in which the community is viewed as being permanently fractured, the community members are perceived as being aloof or ambivalent about their community and tolerant of any criminal behaviors that take place in it. Moreover, this perception holds that everyone in the community is in opposition to law enforcement authorities. According to Kennedy (2009), law enforcement officials feel that,

…the community as a whole no longer stands against drugs, violence, and other crime; sets and enforces no standards for its young people; takes no responsibility for itself but seize any opportunity to blame outsiders, especially the police; does not insist that it’s young people finish school, go to work, care for their own children, and the like; and lives off drug money. (p. 143)

In addition, the drug dealers are often seen as being unreasonable and sociopathic (Kennedy, 2009). As a result of the previously mentioned narratives that exist within law enforcement
agencies, similar to the consequence of the narratives community members possess, law enforcement often perceives the community as being part of the drug problem and not part of the answer.

Third, norms exist among drug dealers that allow groups of offenders and delinquent peers to produce and maintain the ideas that the life choices available to the dealers are limited due to racism in our society, and therefore, they are justified in participating in the drug trade (Kennedy, 2009). Moreover, the narrative exists that “arrest, incarceration, and death are inevitable and nothing to be afraid of, that ‘respect’ is everything and disrespect must be met with violence; that the community tolerates or supports what they do; and that the police and others in law enforcement are racist predators” (p. 143).

According to the design of the overall strategy, the negative norms of a community may shift toward more positive norms as an additional result of the strategy’s work, above and beyond the elimination of the overt drug markets and the corresponding violent behavior.

Several of the focus group discussions centered on the traditionally negative norms that have existed and continue to exist within the community. In addition, evidence suggested that some of the negative norms were shifting to more positive ones within the community. In reference to illustrations of negative norms that continue to exist in the community, some of the descriptions the participants provided of their understanding of the sting operation were exaggerated and most likely based on negative norms that exist within the community about the police and their treatment of crime and criminal offenders. As stated previously, the focus group participants believed that the police flew over the neighborhood in a helicopter and several police officers jumped out of the aircraft into the area. In addition, one participant heard that the police had administered DNA testing on several offenders in the area. These examples portray the
overall distrust of the police and a view of them as obtrusive in their response to criminal behavior, causing undue harm to the community. This perception speaks directly to the norm of the police working against, instead of on behalf of, economically disadvantaged communities or communities of color.

During a subsequent discussion, one participant spoke about having drug dealers approach her vehicle when she arrived home from work, but had not considered calling the police. This suggests that drug dealing has become a normative behavior in this particular community and is often viewed as a recurrent behavior that no one can deter, not even law enforcement officials. Many community residents in this neighborhood, and other similar neighborhoods, believed that the police cannot prevent or terminate drug dealing, so calling the police when drug dealing is witnessed is ineffective and a waste of time.

Although several examples were presented to illustrate the traditionally negative norms of the community, some instances illustrated the changing nature of the community’s norms. One of the focus group participants asserted that the community residents need to call the police when criminal or illegal behavior is witnessed in order for the individuals who live in the area to play a positive, proactive role in making their neighborhood a safer place to live. The other participants present agreed with this sentiment. This example speaks directly to the changing nature of this community’s norms and how the residents’ view of the police may be shifting to include a more positive association between law enforcement officials and the community in which the residents live.

Participants’ understandings of the sting operation and the discussion of the community’s reluctance to call the police are illustrations of Kennedy’s (2009) notions that norms and narratives exist in communities that powerfully and tangibly influence the individual and group...
behaviors of the residents, offenders, and law enforcement officials. Moreover, the latter example demonstrates that the negative norms that have existed for so long can be transformed and, in this particular case, may be changing toward a more positive direction. The example shows that the residents do care about their community and are willing to stand up for the safety and health of their neighborhood if presented with the right motivation, which comes in the form of trust in and assurance from the police of a truly collaborative, long-standing effort. It is more than apparent, based on the findings that the norms and narratives that exist in any community play a commanding role in the behavior of the individuals who comprise it, but are not devoid of the ability of transformation.

In order to overcome the negative norms and narratives that exist within particular communities, discussions need to take place among differing groups of community members. However, according to Kennedy (2009), discussions of this type very rarely occur. “These strong beliefs therefore go unexamined, unchallenged, and become even more deeply internalized. The result is a profound racial schism with impact and implications well beyond issues of crime and drugs” (p. 144). Therefore, the previous narratives illustrate the importance of mutually engaging law enforcement officials and community members in order to become acquainted with the positions of each in an effort to broaden each party’s understanding of the other and to reach a degree of mutual understanding and perspective.

Knowledge and Awareness. An additional key aspect of the overt drug elimination strategy is the significance of obtaining and maintaining the support of community members and community residents throughout the entire implementation of the strategy. One element that emerged during the community resident focus group was the level of knowledge and awareness the community residents have as it relates to the strategy and to the neighborhood in general.
The residents were asked what their knowledge and perceptions were of the overall strategy in terms of what was explained to them about their strategy, why their neighborhood was chosen, and what actually occurred from their perspective. Although varied awareness levels about the overall strategy were present among the participants, every participant was aware of the sting operation that took place several months previous. Even though several exaggerated descriptions of what occurred during the sting were presented, most descriptions were fairly accurate, especially in terms of how many arrests took place. In addition, of the community residents who were familiar with the notification sessions, their perceptions of why they occurred and what they entailed were accurate.

Not only were the residents aware of the overall overt drug elimination strategy, but they also had a very strong knowledge of general occurrences in the neighborhood. For instance, the focus group participants were exceptionally knowledgeable about the temporal patterns of the drug dealers in the area. According to the participants, the open-air drug dealers work in shifts. After five o’clock in the evening until the morning is the busiest time. Overt dealing is also very busy around citywide pay days. The residents also were aware of locations throughout the community where the dealers hide from law enforcement officials who are patrolling the area.

These narratives illustrate that the community residents in this particular neighborhood, for the most part, understood the general principles behind the strategy. In addition, they possessed an enormous depth of understanding and knowledge about the community of which they are a part. These findings illustrate that it is possible for law enforcement officials to educate the community about the strategy and to build understanding of the overall model despite possible normative misunderstandings that exist between the various sectors of the community. Moreover, the community residents know a great deal about what goes on within
their particular neighborhood. Therefore, it can be very useful for law enforcement officials to engage the residents in order to obtain pertinent information that may otherwise go unknown to the police.

*Youth Support and Engagement.* Drug markets that operate in public spaces are toxic to neighborhoods (Weisburd & Mazerolle, 2000; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). The drug market intervention strategy asserts that one of the toxic elements open air drug dealing brings to communities is that the illegitimate activities attract area youth and children into the drug trade (Frabutt et al., 2006). Moreover, the drug trade creates norms and ideas among youth in support of drug dealing and in opposition to school and employment (Kennedy, 2009). One great concern voiced by the focus group participants was for the youth in the community who observe and are most certainly influenced by the illegal behaviors that occur within the neighborhood. The participants even noted that some of the youth know more about the drug dealers in the area than the police. The community residents agreed that more activities need to be planned for young children to engage in, particularly after school and during the summer, so the amount of time they spend in the presence of illegitimate activities can be decreased. Moreover, the participants noted the need for increased parental involvement in order to keep young children away from the illegitimate activities that may be taking place.

The statements expressed by the focus group participants regarding children in the neighborhood demonstrate the need to deter drug and criminal activity, indicating that such markets negatively impact the children in the communities where overt drug dealing takes place. As stated previously, open air drug markets create negative norms among neighborhood youth (Harocopos & Hough, 2005) which, according to Frabutt et al. (2006), consist of ideas that imprisonment increases street status, and that it is not masculine to succeed in educational
endeavors or to work beginning-level jobs (see also Kennedy, 2009). The negative attitudes that are created because of open air drug markets are the very positions that guide youth towards the drug trade in the first place. Therefore, if overt dealing could be deterred, then greater opportunities would arise to restore the existing negative narratives into more positive ones, encouraging a legitimate work ethic, the importance of education, and the notion that jail or prison will only hinder one’s overall life chances.

Strategy Maintenance and Police Visibility. Based on the overt drug elimination strategy, the follow-up or maintenance period is directed by community partners and law enforcement officials collectively. According to Frabutt and colleagues (2006), this strategy “allows limited resources to be used most strategically through police-community partnerships to reduce drug dealing and improve community safety and community quality” (pp. 25-26). During the maintenance phase of the strategy, the community follows up with the notified offenders by making contact with them immediately after the call-in or notification session to see if they are receiving the assistance they need to discontinue dealing drugs. In addition, law enforcement officials attend meetings that take place in the neighborhood in which the strategy was implemented and notify the community residents of arrests, convictions, and success stories of the notified offenders (Fealy et al., 2006). Even though the strategy calls for a collective maintenance phase by the community and law enforcement partners, the focus group participants placed particular emphasis on the need for police visibility in deterring criminal and drug behavior in their neighborhood.

The focus group participants attributed at least part of the reduced drug dealing to increased police visibility and inspection. One major suggestion made by many of the community residents was that the police should continue to increase their visibility throughout
the community. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the foot patrol that was previously stationed within the neighborhood and it was expressed by the residents that the community was much safer when this patrol was in place. In addition, it was noted that the residents would like the officers to get out of their patrol cars in order to maximize surveillance, due to the fact that a good deal of crime occurs hidden from the view of officers in their patrol cars such as behind buildings or bushes.

**Impact of the Strategy.** The main impacts of the overt drug elimination strategy are the removal of open-air drug markets and a decrease in the types of violent crime associated with these markets. According to the focus group participants, the positive impacts of the strategy in this neighborhood were illustrated by various aspects which included, but were not necessarily limited to, decreases in overt drug dealing, violent crime, and quality of life crime, increases in feelings of personal safety and a sense of community, and the establishment of trust between the community residents and law enforcement officials.

Overall, the focus group participants felt much safer in the community after the strategy than before. Individuals in the community were not longer afraid to walk around in the area, because they felt confident that the police were protecting them. In addition, various individuals within the community have been creating positive events and activities for the local youth and other community members to engage in. However, the feeling of safety that many of the residents felt was relatively short-lived and started to lessen a few months after the initial notification took place. In addition, the community residents expressed that even though overt drug dealing was still present in the neighborhood, it had decreased significantly since the implementation of the strategy particularly during daytime hours.
The participants also indicated that, after the strategy, community members were more willing to report criminal and illegal behaviors to the police, which helped to decrease the overt dealing and subsequent violent crime that was occurring in the area. The increased commitment to inform law enforcement officials of negative behaviors that continued to occur after the implementation of the strategy was most certainly a product of an increased level of trust of the community residents in the police. This illustrates that long-standing divisions between law enforcement and the community can be broken down and mended through the implementation of this strategy.

This investigation helps illustrate the importance of community engagement and the imperative role the community plays in this overt drug elimination strategy. Not only can the community residents aid in deterring potential future criminal behavior, but they can inform institutional stakeholders of incidents that occur in the area through the acquisition of direct, first-hand knowledge.

**Notified Offenders**

Several common themes emerged from the three offender interviews. Although all three offenders expressed some gratitude for essentially being given a second chance, far more negatives than positives regarding how the drug initiative program worked were expressed. One common theme was the criticism surrounding how the notification and the call-in were conducted. Offenders A and C felt the way they were identified was unfair or not altogether accurate. Offenders B and C complained that they did not know what they were charged with or why they had been asked to the call in. There was also a lot of uncertainty as to whether attending the call-in was mandatory.
The overall impression of the call-in is that there is a lot of theatrics and grandstanding. Law enforcement makes a big show to impress or intimidate but the perception exists that they do not back up with actions their rhetoric. This applies both to the community message in terms of helping with needed resources and also to the message that law enforcement presents. Offenders A and C spoke angrily about the stigma attached to being identified as an offender and the problems that creates in their personal lives. Offenders A and C imply that if the program was really meant to help, they [law enforcement] would not operate in ways that show disrespect to the offender. The offenders also suggested that some actions (e.g., random traffic stops, allowing television cameras at the call-in) on the part of law enforcement have unintended consequences that actually serve as an obstacle to offenders desiring to fully participate in the program. Being treated with respect and fairness seems to be valued more highly than all the resources community members and law enforcement claim they will assist offenders with.

At a HPCAV (community violent crime task force) meeting attended by one of this study’s researchers, a probation officer echoed offenders’ sentiments observing that “the call-ins are very intimidating.” In response, another community member in attendance pointed out that the probation officer should come to the session where community members are interacting with offenders to see the “other side of the process.” Indeed, Offender C, although highly critical of the interaction with law enforcement was quite complimentary of the other side of the process – his interactions and relationships with some community members.

Another common theme that emerged from these interviews concerned offenders’ perceptions that they, or others in attendance, should not have been at the call-in to begin with. Offenders either expressed their own innocence, the innocence of others, or believed that what they had done was not serious enough to warrant their participation in the call-in. Two offenders
implied that they were victims of guilt by association based on erroneous assumptions made by those in the community who did not know them.

Although each saw some assistance as useful, another common theme expressed by all three offenders was a preference to be in a position to help themselves without having to rely on others for assistance. All three offenders made explicit the fact that they were not looking for a handout. What they needed more than anything else was simply help in securing a job. Offenders A and C felt that having a good job would enable them to acquire for themselves anything else they might need. Offender C’s priority was completing his education from which he thought good things (e.g., a good job) would follow.

In her ethnographic study of upper level drug dealers, Adler (1993) found that some individuals were reluctant to leave drug dealing because of the difficulty they would have being accountable to a prospective employer. This left many with the realization that self-employment might be the only viable occupational choice left open to them. In the interviews referenced in the current study, both Offenders A and B expressed an interest in one day being self-employed. Offender A hoped to have his own trucking company and Offender B hoped to be a general contractor. Although neither explicitly stated that their motivation for self-employment was out of fear that no one would be willing to hire them, given their criminal backgrounds, it can nonetheless be implied from other statements they made throughout their respective interviews that each understood that, with their backgrounds, it is not likely that they are going to be able to work for anyone else and have much hope of securing a decent living for themselves.

In their efforts to exit a drug dealing career, Adler (1993) identified four patterns that upper level drug dealers experience in the “phasing out” process. The most frequent pattern was resolving to quit after carrying out one last big sell. Others planned to get out of drug dealing but
never did. Neither of these patterns is relevant to offenders participating in the High Point drug initiative since law enforcement already knows of their actions and their “phase out” was, therefore, forced and immediate. Two patterns identified by Adler, however, may be relevant to drug initiative participants and serve as a cautionary tale for the program’s success. While some did suspend their dealing activities, they did not replace them with an alternative source of income. Subsequently, once money ran out some felt forced to go back to dealing. Some continued to sell a little on the side while working their way back to legitimate forms of employment. Offender C suggested that a person will do what he has to do in order to survive. “A man put in that situation, where he ain’t got nowhere to go, no food to eat, no nothing you know what I mean? Wrong is right.”

Adler (1993) also found that some drug dealers found it difficult to exit the role because it satisfied hedonistic and materialistic needs that could not be so easily fulfilled in a legal occupation paying substantially less money. Offender A stated that he “just sold drugs for enjoyment. I wanted to buy some nice things.” This raises questions concerning the need to better understand the motivation behind why offenders turned to drug dealing to begin with. For instance, if Offender A’s motivation was simply to have extra money as he claimed, then might not a slightly different approach be taken with him than for someone who sold drugs in an effort to meet some basic need? It seems unlikely that the exact same procedures which might be taken to deter Offender A from further dealing would also have the same outcome for someone who felt like he had little choice but to sell drugs.

Observations from individuals working in an auxiliary role to support the drug initiative also imply that a lack of jobs for offenders may undermine the program. At the January 2007 monthly meeting of HPCAV, one of the probation officers in attendance complained that
resources to help offenders did not seem to be available, noting in particular that jobs are few and far between. The probation officer also suggested that perhaps “we should tone it down at the call-ins. Promises are being made but not delivered.” Additionally, two local university students who spent three days assisting the Community Resource Manager in identifying employers who might hire ex-offenders found that identifying a list of employers willing to hire ex-offenders is nearly impossible. The students reported that:

We spent approximately 1.5 hours the first day calling temp agencies around the area. We found that almost every temp agency accepts ex-offenders but the temp agencies themselves are looking for individuals they might be able to place in a job. The temp agencies have trouble finding companies or clients who are willing to take the ex-offenders that they accept. Some of the agencies we contacted actually asked us if we knew of any employers that were hiring ex-offenders. We found that to be ironic since that is the question we were hoping to be able to answer.

The students also noted from their efforts to locate potential employment opportunities that management was often unaware of company policy on hiring persons with a criminal history. Frequently the person(s) we needed to speak with were simply not available. In some instances management did not even know what company policy was with regard to hiring ex-offenders. Fast food restaurants would accept applications…Even if the offenders are successful in landing one of these jobs the wages are minimal and insufficient to live on. When many of these offenders were dealing drugs, they were making more money on their time and were able to support their families and lifestyles. Giving up that easy money and having to work around the employer’s schedule does not appeal to many offenders.
Creative solutions to finding legitimate employment opportunities need to be considered.

**Systematic Neighborhood Social Observation**

Systematic observations were conducted in a Winston-Salem neighborhood that is the focus of an initiative to eliminate a long-standing street-drug market. A comparison of observations from before and after 30 arrests on drug-related charges found no significant changes in levels of social order or disorder or of physical order, disorder, or decay, even in the specific parts of the neighborhood where the drug market activity was most prevalent. However, the area where the police observed the market operations was found to have a higher level of orderly social interaction and a larger number of signs notifying passersby of alarm systems, warning about dogs, prohibiting trespassing or other specific activities, or laying out additional rules for the neighborhood. This difference was observed both before and after the arrests.

The research team’s expectations were that any physical changes would be slower to emerge than social changes, if the drug market elimination initiative was successful. Even in the short term, however, neighborhood residents might feel safer after the drug-related arrests, leading to more people being out in the neighborhood or on their porches, involved in observable, friendly social interaction or individual activities. Given that such changes were not observed, what types of lessons can be learned from this application of systematic neighborhood observation to the evaluation of a strategic initiative to eliminate a street-drug market?

It is possible, of course, that the strategy simply did not have the anticipated impact on observable physical and social features of the neighborhood. If that is the case, the question remains as to whether the results are generic to the strategy or influenced by particular characteristics of the Winston-Salem case. The drug market had re-emerged in the three years since the notification. Rather than re-implementing the strategy, the police department decided to arrest currently active dealers in the area, considering the action to be an element of the
sustainability phase. Thus, observations were conducted before and after a series of arrests, rather than before and after a complete implementation of the strategy, and that could have affected the findings.

Other lessons to be learned from the lack of pre- to post-implementation changes may be methodological in nature. First, time of day and day of week for such observations must be carefully considered, and conducting observations on a variety of days and at a variety of times could be useful. There would be difficulties involved in trying to observe these types of indicators after dark, when some indications of social disorder might be more likely. Conversely, it may be that Friday afternoons, when observations were conducted for this evaluation, are typically times of outdoor social activity of an orderly nature. This may be particularly true in the type of neighborhood in which this drug market existed. Police observed market activities within a public housing area and between that area and a nearby apartment complex. Thus, the neighborhood is densely populated, and there are recreational opportunities, both of which are likely to encourage residents to participate in orderly outdoor activities on sunny Friday afternoons when the weather is pleasant, as it was on both days that these observations took place. This means that the type of neighborhood and the weather may be important considerations, also, at least in interpreting results.

It is possible that the indicators of social order/disorder employed in this study were not numerous enough or not specific enough to distinguish different types of activity on the two observation dates. To some extent this issue is inherent in this type of observational study. While a situation of conflict may be relatively easy to recognize as an indicator of social disorder, content of conversations is not accessible to passing observers. It may be, for example, that some “orderly” interactions are in fact related to illicit drug transactions. In more general
terms, do the indicators indicate order or disorder? Consider, for example, the large number of
signs in this street-drug market area notifying passers-by that residences are protected by alarm
systems, restricting access in other ways, or documenting rules of behavior. While such signs
clearly indicate attempts to maintain order, are they so numerous because disorder is rampant or
a constant threat? Evaluators should address these types of measurement issues in designing
neighborhood observations, taking into account other data that may be useful in interpreting the
results.

The amount of time between the arrests and the second observation in this study may not
have been sufficient to allow for changes in social activity that might be expected when criminal
activity in a neighborhood is suddenly reduced. Although the bulk of arrests occurred at least a
week before the observation, two of the 30 arrests took place just one day prior to the
observational fieldwork. A follow-up observation at a later date in such situations would be
advisable. This seems especially important, given that physical changes in the neighborhood
may become evident over longer periods of time, if the elimination of the street-drug market is
sustained.

Increased numbers of indicators and observations conducted at more times both raise
issues of research staff size, as well as the amount of time and other resources that will be
devoted to such neighborhood observations. This, of course, applies to data entry and analysis as
well. As in any project, a research team considering the use of this methodology will need to
balance the value of observational data with the costs of collecting the data in this way, in
comparison and/or combination with those of alternative data collection strategies. Data from
neighborhood observations certainly can be supplemented and made more meaningful through
the use of interviews, focus groups, and police department records such as calls for service,
arrests, and criminal charges. Moreover, as was evident from the interviews and focus groups with community stakeholders, they may be in the best position to identify the timeframes and locations that might be the areas in which any potential changes are most likely to be observed.

Systematic neighborhood observation, like any other data collection strategy, can reveal unexpected patterns that may not be recognized when only other methods are employed. In this study, for example, the extent of social interaction in specific parts of the neighborhood became evident, and such information can provide value in interpreting other data. Similarly, systematic observation can give researchers a “feel” for what life in a neighborhood really looks like, providing context that is not accessible through any other commonly used methodology.

Thus, the potential value of systematic neighborhood observation to any evaluation project similar to this one should be carefully considered. Full consideration will involve details of the methodology, the resources it requires, and its potential for both expected and unexpected findings, as well as the neighborhood context and the objectives of the evaluation.

**Crime Impact Indicators**

It is still unclear how best to measure the quantitative, criminal impacts of the drug market intervention strategy. However, as shown in this analysis, debates do exist regarding this topic. In a structured interview with the High Point Police Department crime analyst,

…a few of the people that have applied our [strategy] are trying, you know slightly different things which is fine because it all depends on the kinds of data that they have in the Data Management System. How they collect the data…how they’re going about…implementing the surveillance and assembling the information about the drug market itself…so I think there’s some latitude in terms of how you analyze it.
In effect, one of the lessons High Point learned was that you cannot necessarily utilize the same measures across every drug market due to the differential nature of each market. Unique features and characteristics are present in each drug market making the methodologies used for assessing the strategies’ impacts also somewhat unique.

More sophisticated techniques that embrace inferential methods and population normed data are called for. It is certainly advisable to examine offense rates per 1,000 residents, for example, in all pre-post comparisons. Regression techniques can assist in modeling the effects of program impact. Moreover, for some of the earlier intervention sites, which now offer many pre-post data points, time series analyses using ARIMA estimates (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008) can detect patterns of change and program impact.
Chapter 6: General Synthesis and Future Research Directions

A multi-tiered investigation such as this one brings us closer to a comprehensive understanding of a complex social intervention. As with all fruitful action research, significant questions were answered, some questions demand more thorough exploration, and many new ones have emerged.

A 360° Perspective on the Intervention

This novel, police-community partnership to reduce street drug markets through focused deterrence has been successfully implemented in multiple sites. While interventions such as this one are dynamic, fluid collaborations, it is possible to discern a replicable blueprint that can serve other communities. As the drug market intervention model has taken root in High Point, Winston-Salem, and several other locations across the country, the perspective and voices of law enforcement personnel have been the dominant chord. As the principal actors in this model, that state of affairs is only natural and to be expected. And to be fair, to some extent other key stakeholder perspectives, emanating from ministers and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, have shaped the regional and national dissemination of the strategy. However, from proposal throughout implementation, the research team was committed to engaging the voices of more stakeholders. This project represents important strides forward in engaging the commentary and reflection of other influential actors—the district attorney, city employees, social service providers, community organizers and activists, faith community leaders, health department officials, business leaders, school representatives, youth service providers, and elected officials. Their
valuable contribution is essential to grasping the community connections necessary to implement the strategy.

The multilevel nature of the investigation has import in several areas. First, given the complexity of this type of intervention, it is important to have an evaluation strategy that mirrors such complexity. It is the combination of both quantitative (e.g., uniform crime reporting data) and qualitative (e.g., interviews) data points from multiple perspectives, over time, that is necessary to fully elucidate the active ingredients in such an intervention.

Second, as was evident in the data reviewed earlier, the factors that motivate different stakeholders to join such an endeavor and to continue to be engaged vary. While reducing community violence is a shared goal, some community activists expressed interest in the outcomes for individual offenders, while law enforcement are more focused on whether offenders continue to deal and traffic in illegal drugs. Embracing a multidimensional evaluation provides an opportunity to track a variety of outcomes that can become key in engaging and sustaining the involvement of all the actors necessary.

Finally, as will be discussed later regarding implementation, ongoing evaluation is critical to successful implementation, particularly with regard to the fidelity or integrity with which any model or intervention is implemented. The comprehensiveness of the current evaluation provided an important “quality improvement” component to the implementation, particularly in the High Point sites. The frequent local, regional, and national presentations on the High Point data and the role of the High Point stakeholders in the national implementation led to an environment of evaluation, documentation, and accountability. Perhaps more important, this data-informed and evaluation-rich approach became a key part of the High Point
There is still much to learn, however. For example, extensive and protracted deliberations between university Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) and the North Carolina Department of Corrections IRB resulted in only a few one-on-one interviews with offenders that had attended a street-drug notification session. While some in-depth information can be gleaned from those pilot interviews, a greater proportion of offenders must be engaged and interviewed. While continuing to pursue offender input, another need is a full debriefing of offenders’ family members, friends, and influentials to provide insight into elements of the strategy and the deterrence message in order to improve the outcomes for these individuals. The research team exhausted all possibilities in endeavoring to enlist this sub-sample for interviews. Although university IRB approval was obtained for this component of the study, several avenues for participant recruitment—via police call lists, ministerial contacts, resource coordinator data base, informal contacts via the violent crime task group—yielded no participants. For many reasons, but especially their integral role in explicating the norms and narratives component of this intervention, family members, friends, and influentials remain an important stakeholder group whose voices must be heard.

Implementation

It is impossible to talk about a model of this nature—with so much complexity and so many intervening variables, without initiating the discussion about implementation. Recent attention has been directed toward the importance of best practice in implementation. As noted in the work of the National Implementation Research Network (NIRN; Fixsen, Naoom, Blasé, Friedman, & Wallace, 2005), effective and sustained outcomes occur when equal attention is
directed toward implementation as is directed toward the model itself. This is evident in the examination of the findings from these five sites. While successes were noted in various indicators in all five sites, those that implemented the model with the greatest fidelity, observed the more significant and more sustained gains.

According to NIRN, there are several elements that are key to both successful initial implementation as well as for sustainability (see Figure 7). These include:

- **Identification/Selection of Staff/Partners** (e.g., suited to the role having the knowledge, experiences, authority, temperament to implement the strategy);

- **Setting the Stage for Changing How You Do Business – Training** (e.g., background info, theory, philosophy, key practices are reinforced and key players receive the information necessary to implement the strategy);

- **Consultation and Coaching** (e.g., supervisors/supports take training to scale; work based, opportunistic, readily available, reflective, provision of emotional support);

- **Staff and Program Evaluation** (e.g., how both individuals and organizations are doing with regard fidelity; choosing the right measure; open to what the data say; a systematic way to use information in an ongoing way);

- **Administrative Supports and Decisions** (e.g., proactive, enthusiastic, and consistent attention to review and make internal policy analyses and decisions, procedural changes, funding allocations that lead to a culture focused on what it takes to implement with fidelity); and

- **Systems Intervention** (e.g., 40,000 foot level view, multi-level alignment, maintaining leadership and focus, creating and staying connected to champions, intervening to change policies and funding contingencies, look for opportunities and
threats to fidelity and sustainability, must clearly identify leadership and responsibility at all levels for systems alignment and structure to support the communication within and among these levels).

Figure 7. Depiction of Core Implementation Components (Reproduced from Fixen et al., 2005).

Focusing on the most effective implementation and sustainability of the model, many of these key elements become apparent. While there are multiple stakeholders, and as evidenced by the interviews, each play a unique and important role, the drug market intervention is not a leaderless model. In fact, as noted in the body of implementation research, leadership, whether community or law enforcement, is essential. In those sites where there was both strong community leadership and equally visible and strong law enforcement leadership, there were greater gains. Moreover, particularly with regard to law enforcement leadership, communicating a clear message that the initiative is important, that individuals will be held accountable for the
successful implementation of the model, and the necessary supports will be provided to sustain the model is critical.

As mentioned, successful implementation of any model is dependent on a systematic plan to use information in an ongoing and evolving way. The ways in which the crime analysts have been utilized, particularly in driving not only site selection but in day-to-day operations and in the successful adaptation of the drug market intervention to other issues (e.g., gangs) clearly illustrates this point.

The importance of key administrative supports and decisions that support the initiative is best illustrated by a change instituted within the High Point Police Department. In order to expand and sustain successful practices, the department underwent a major organizational restructuring such that instead of the drug market intervention being a “special” project, not well integrated into the fabric of the department, it became a way of doing business. And with regard to systems interventions, successful sites are characterized by a willingness and passion to examine practices, openly discuss challenges and mistakes, and flexibly and quickly make adjustments as needed. Successful sites clearly illustrate Fixsen et al.’s (2005) observation that sustainable initiatives adjust without losing the functional components or dying due to a lack of essential supports.

Considerations for Engaging New Sites

*Formal and Informal Leadership.* This investigation showed the importance of leadership that is formally bestowed or held by office as well as leadership that is borne out of community social capital and community connectedness. For successful implementation, a police chief or assistant chief or mayor must be fully committed to the strategy. As interviewees noted, the strategy essentially puts forth a new law enforcement paradigm and challenges entrenched ways of thinking about crime and punishment. But it appears that for the strategy to take root,
individuals with standing must be engaged, oftentimes ministers, neighborhood leaders, and community activists. Interviews clearly indicated that these “people with standing” must exert their influence to enlist the support of even more allies.

Further, an overriding theme emerging from resident focus groups was the power of resident voice. All focus group sessions revealed that community residents know the dynamics of their community best, especially in terms of resident behavior. Community residents understand who is driving violent activity and who is peripherally involved, which actors are leaders of which activity, and the patterns of activity such as time of day, locations, hiding places, intercommunications between players to warn each other of police presence, etc. When law enforcement can gain the trust of these residents, a wealth of information becomes available that can direct law enforcement resources, potentially improve the impact of the intervention, and thus further develop community and law enforcement relations. This development over time appears to hinge on effective communication and accountability on both sides. The added benefit of bolstering these relationships may result in longer term impacts wherein community residents begin to understand they do not need to tolerate criminal or violent activity and they can stand beside law enforcement to keep their communities safe. This is a critical component requiring further, long-term investigation.

*Measuring Impact.* Fairly traditional strategies to understand and express impact have been examined here such as pre- and post-intervention crime comparisons, trend analyses, as well as stakeholders’ perceptions ranging from law enforcement actors to community residents. Future investigations would benefit from continuing to conceptualize impact broadly and at several different levels (i.e., with regard to offenders, neighborhood crime, resident perceptions, community engagement, and altered norms and narratives). This study incorporated a systematic
social observation component and future inquiry should continue to measure observable neighborhood change. The lessons learned methodologically from this component of the study are of value and the efforts are well worth revisiting in a focused and intensive way.

Commitment to Community Engagement. This investigation unearthed many important caveats and disclaimers that bear consideration when disseminating the model to potential sites and police departments that show interest. Principal among these are the numerous skills or orientations that typically do not fall under the rubric of traditional law enforcement practice. This investigation revealed how essential it is to cultivate and develop a relationship between law enforcement and the community that holds clear communication in the highest regard. Building rapport and trust is essential, and while these relationship components might be bolstered by challenging longstanding norms and narratives through the strategy itself, without a basis of trust from which to launch the initiative, gaining a foothold would seem impossible. The strategy, as highlighted through the intensive maintenance and follow-up required, demands a commitment to long-term community engagement. Further, along this vein, there are concomitant implications that law enforcement agencies may need to take into consideration during hiring and training processes, effecting the development of the new generation of effective law enforcement officers.

Closing

Continued investigation into refining the strategy, modifying the strategy to be site-specific, understanding the impacts on notified offenders and families to increase individual successes, exploring long term normative community changes, and monitoring its sustained impact are all much needed future research directions. The collective, multi-disciplinary approach employed in this project has yielded rich data for further mining to address some of the
above questions, and to highlight the value of furthering data collection and analysis to complement the breadth of efforts yielded thus far. The type of ground-level data collection embodied in this report must directly inform dissemination, training, and technical assistance efforts geared toward replicating the model in new locales.
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Appendix A:

Project Log: Chronology of Research Events by Quarter

Quarter 1: January 1, 2007-March 31, 2007

- January 10, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
  - During the several weeks after the call, the research team continued to work on: a) finalizing grant paperwork; b) compiling existing project manuals for High Point and Winston Salem; c) monitored site selection process by attending relevant meetings with law enforcement; d) reviewed samples of observational data collection methods; and e) developed an interview protocol for interviews with police department personnel.
- January 19, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- February 2, 2007, Research team members attended the second site selection meeting in Winston Salem
- February 6, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- February 27, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- March 6, 2007, Interviews completed with High Point law enforcement stakeholders
- March 13, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- March 26, 2007, Interviews began with Winston Salem law enforcement stakeholders
- March 28, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
  - After these conference calls, in addition to the tasks already in progress, the group worked on: a) additional work for the systematic social observation including, adding to the proposal for pilot testing, inter-observer reliability, and observer training and researching indicators for Physical and Social Disorder.

Quarter 2: April 1, 2007-June 30, 2007

- April 12, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- April 23, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- April 24, 2007, Interviews conducted with the Winston Salem and High Point police departments were completed and the interview coding protocol was reviewed by the team and all agreed to move forward on coding.
- May 9, 2007, David Kennedy attended a meeting at UNCG’s Center for Youth, Family, and Community Partnerships with the NIJ research team and various members of the High Point and Winston Salem police departments.
- May 23, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team. By this group discussion, the coding of the first round of law enforcement interviews had been completed by the initial coder.
- June 1, 2007, Systematic social observation team conducted the first pilot observation of the neighborhood in Winston Salem in which the drug elimination strategy took place.
- June 5, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- June 18, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
Quarter 3: July 1, 2007-September 30, 2007

- July 3, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- July 9, 2007, HPPD crime analyst made a presentation at UNCG’s Center related to the drug elimination strategy occurring in High Point.
- July 17, 2007, E-mail disseminated to research team updating the group on the progress of the evaluation.
- July 23-25, 2007, Members of the research team attended the National Institute of Justice Conference in Arlington, Virginia. In addition, Dr. Terri Shelton presented strategies from High Point’s drug offender notifications.
- August 1, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- August 8, 2007, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.
- August 14, 2007, Attended and observed High Point’s drug notification. Lois Mock and Phelan Wyrick met with the NIJ research team at UNCG’s Center and High Point Police Department personnel at the police department, explored High Point’s four drug notification sites (West End, Daniel Brooks, Southside, and East Central) led by Major Marty Sumner, and attended the drug notification/call-in.
- August 16, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- September 4, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- September 12, 2007, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant
- September 20, 2007, Members of the research team met with personnel from the Winston Salem Police Department in order to discuss the status of Winston Salem’s drug strategy.
- September 21, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- September 21, 2007, Systematic social observation team conducted a second pilot observation of the neighborhood in Winston Salem in which the drug elimination strategy took place.

Quarter 4: October 1, 2007-December 31, 2007

- October 9, 2007, The research team held a meeting in Greensboro, NC.
- October 10, 2007, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.
- October 17, 2007, The research team attended the Winston Salem working group meeting at the WSSU Center for Community Safety. At this meeting, representatives from the WSPD presented to the community and working group partners an overview of the overt drug market strategy efforts to date and discussed plans for community partnering and sustainability.
- October 17, 2007, Conference call conducted by the research team to discuss site and methodology updates.
- November 5, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- November 16, 2007, Systematic social observation team conducted an observation in the neighborhood in Winston Salem in which the drug elimination strategy took place. This observation was the first of the official series following the pilot with the intention of
gathering data indicative of the presence or absence and frequency of indicators signifying social and physical order and disorder.

- November 19, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- December 11, 2007, Conference call conducted by research team
- December 12, 2007, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

Quarter 5: January 1, 2008-March 31, 2008

- January 7, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
- January 9, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.
- January 22, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
- February 4, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
- February 13, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.
- February 18, 2008, Members of the research team attended a meeting with the Winston Salem Police Department and key community partners. At this meeting, information was provided regarding the direction of Winston Salem’s drug initiative including a brief description of the initiative, current updates, and next steps. In addition, input from community partners was obtained for various topics including the best way to establish a program coordinator to serve as a point of contact for individuals within the initiative area needing assistance.
- February 20, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
- March 3, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
- March 5, 2008, High Point key partner interviews completed
- March 12, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant
- March 17, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
- March 31, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

Quarter 6: April 1, 2008-June 30, 2008

- April 4, 2008, Systematic social observation team conducted an observation in the neighborhood in Winston Salem, North Carolina. This observation was the second of the official series of observations following the pilot and the first following the continuation of the Winston Salem Police Department’s maintenance phase with the intention of gathering data indicative of the absence or presence and frequency of social and physical order and disorder.
- April 9, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.
- April 14, 2008, Members of the research team attended a New Beginnings meeting in Winston Salem, NC with community agencies and the Winston Salem Police Department in order to update the community and research partners on the progress of the drug initiative.
- April 17, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
April 28, 2008, Members of the research team met with personnel from the Winston Salem Police Department and community partners involved in the New Beginnings initiative at Winston Salem State University’s Center for Community Safety in order to discuss the status and updates of Winston Salem’s drug strategy.

April 29, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

May 14, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

May 15, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

May 30, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

June 11, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

June 13, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

Quarter 7: July 1, 2008-September 30, 2008

July 8, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

July 9, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

July 21-23, 2008, Members of the research team attended the National Institute of Justice Conference in Arlington, Virginia. In addition, Dr. Terri Shelton presented updates from the High Point, NC Overt Drug Elimination Strategy.

July 24, 2008, Winston Salem key partner interview completed

July 28, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

August 13, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

August 15, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

August 26, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

September 9, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

September 10, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

September 22-23, 2008, Members of the research team attended the Closing Overt Drug Markets Conference: The High Point Initiative” in Greensboro, NC and delivered a presentation entitled, “Sustaining and Refining the Drug Market Intervention.”

September 30, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

Quarter 8: October 1, 2008-December 31, 2008

October 8, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.

October 14, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

October 30, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team

From November 11-November 15, members of the research attended the American Society of Criminology Conference in St. Louis, Missouri. During the conference, the team presented a poster and conducted four roundtable sessions related to the NIJ grant.

December 4, 2008, Conference call conducted by research team
December 10, 2008, Members of the research team attended the monthly High Point Community Against Violence meeting as outlined in the grant.
Appendix B:

Descriptive Neighborhood Information

Using Census 2000 data and GIS methodology, several maps are provided here to describe each intervention site more fully. For each neighborhood (four in High Point and one in Winston-Salem), five maps were produced to depict: a) households in poverty; b) median household income; c) distribution of renter-occupied housing; d) distribution of female-headed households with children; and e) distribution of black residents.
West End Neighborhood
Population for Whom Poverty Status is Determined
West End Neighborhood
Median Household Income (1999) By Census Tract
West End Neighborhood
Distribution of Renter-Occupied Housing by Census Tract
West End Neighborhood
Distribution of Female Headed Households With Children by Census Block

Female Headed Households With Children
- 0 - 2
- 3 - 10
- 11 - 28
- 29 - 62
- 63 - 100

Miles

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Daniel Brooks Neighborhood
Median Household Income (1999) By Census Tract
Daniel Brooks Neighborhood
Distribution of Renter-Occupied Housing by Census Tract

Renter Occupied Housing
- 0
- 1 - 2
- 3 - 6
- 7 - 13
- 14 - 355
- Housing Authority Property

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Daniel Brooks Neighborhood
Distribution of Black Residents

Number of blacks per census tract
- 0 - 19
- 20 - 65
- 66 - 142
- 143 - 263
- 264 - 582

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East End Neighborhood
Population for Whom Poverty Status is Determined
East End Neighborhood
Median Household Income (1999) By Census Tract
East End Neighborhood
Distribution of Renter-Occupied Housing by Census Tract
East End Neighborhood

Distribution of Female Headed Households With Children by Census Block
East End Neighborhood
Distribution of Black Residents
Southside Neighborhood
Population for Whom Poverty Status is Determined
Southside Neighborhood
Distribution of Female Headed Households With Children by Census Block

Female Headed Households With Children
- 0 - 2
- 3 - 10
- 11 - 28
- 29 - 62
- 63 - 100

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Southside Neighborhood
Distribution of Black Residents

Number of blacks per census tract

- 0 - 19
- 20 - 65
- 66 - 142
- 143 - 263
- 264 - 582

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New Hope Neighborhood
Median Household Income (2000) By Census Tract

Median Household Income

- $10,139 - 13,329
- $13,330 - 16,519
- $16,520 - 19,709
- $19,710 - 22,899
- $22,900 - 26,089

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Appendix C:

Data Collection Instruments

Part A: Law Enforcement Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

1. Why did your department decide to pursue this particular drug market intervention strategy?
2. Describe the target geographic area (e.g., size and sociodemographic profile) of the intervention.
3. What criteria were used to choose the target area?
4. What criteria were used to determine which individual offenders would be arrested and which ones would be asked to attend the call-in?
5. Describe the available community resources, supports, and networks to support the intervention.
6. How did the community/community members become involved or engaged?
7. How well were law enforcement efforts coordinated with those of the community?
8. Describe the level of coordination among law enforcement agencies.
9. What was your role in implementing this strategy?
10. Where did your role fit within the whole chain of command responsible for implementing the strategy?
11. Here is a list of steps/stages that the High Point and Winston-Salem Police Departments have identified as part of conducting this type of intervention strategy.
   a. Identify the target area through crime mapping
   b. Engaging the community
   c. Survey of police officers
   d. Identification of street drug offenders
   e. Reviewing street drug incidents
   f. Conducting the undercover investigation
   g. Establishing contact with the offender’s family
   h. Conducting the “call-in” or notification session
   i. Setting a deadline
   j. Strict enforcement
   k. Follow-up
   For each stage…
      a. What went well?
      b. What would you have done differently?
      c. Did any barriers exist that really challenged your efforts? If so, what were they?
12. Which elements of the strategy are the most important?
13. How would you best summarize the impact of this initiative (crime stats, neighborhood changes, etc)?
14. What do you think the Department should do differently this time to enhance the impact of this initiative?
15. How will you know if the Department is successful in making these changes to the strategy?
16. Are there any other thoughts you would like to add about this strategy or your experience that I haven’t given you the opportunity to say?
Part B: Key Stakeholder Semi-Structured Interview Protocol

Section I: Partner Role and Engagement over Time

1. How did you initially become involved with the Task Force in your community?
2. What was your original role as a member of the task force?
3. Has your role changed? If so, how?
4. What was your role in implementing the overt street drug strategy?
5. Did you attend the most recent call-in? If so, what was your role?
6. In what ways, if any, has your participation with the task force impacted you?
7. In what ways, if any, has this strategy impacted you?

Section II: Community Role and Engagement over Time

8. Describe the available community resources, supports, and networks to support the intervention.
9. How did the community/community members become involved or engaged?
10. How do you think the community perceives the strategy?

Section III: Evaluating Impact of the Strategy for Refinement and Improvement

11. How well coordinated were the efforts of the community and the police department?
12. What have been some of the challenges of the strategy from your perspective?
13. What have been some of the strengths the strategy from your perspective?
14. How would you define “success” for the street drug initiative?
15. What one or two changes do you think should be made to improve the strategy?
16. What one or two changes do you think should be made to the call-in?
17. How would you best summarize the impact of this initiative?
18. What barriers are you aware of, if any, that existed in the delivery of services to notification participants?
19. Looking back, are there any particular experiences or stories that you think are important to tell to help explain the impact of the initiative on:
   i. Participants?
   m. Families?
   n. Community residents?
   o. Partner agencies
   p. Other systems?
20. Are there any other thoughts you would like to add about this strategy or your experience that I haven’t given you the opportunity to say?
Part C: Focus Group Discussion Guide

Good morning. Thank you for being here. I’m Lynn Harvey. I teach at Winston-Salem State and I’m part of the research team that invited you to be here this morning. We’re here to talk about what the police and others have done in this neighborhood to try to stop people from selling illegal drugs.

{Introduce other team members & tell where they work.}

Before we start, I want to be sure you understand what we’re going to do and that you definitely want to participate. We have a long form we need you to read and then sign if you do want to take part in this group. I’ll go through the form with you; please ask me questions if there’s anything in the form you don’t understand.

{Review Informed Consent Form, answer any questions, and collect signed forms; allow anyone who prefers not to sign to leave before proceeding.}

{Distribute gift cards.}

{Turn on tape recording.}

This research is part of a larger study funded by the National Institute of Justice. I’m going to be asking you some questions, and I want you to know that there are no right or wrong answers. We do not work for the police department, the housing authority, or any community group, so we are not hoping you will answer the questions in any particular way. We just want each of you to tell us what you’ve seen and what you think and feel about it, so we can provide an honest and accurate report to the National Institute of Justice.

Now, there are some rules I need you to follow during this discussion:
- I’d like to refer to you by your first names and for you to call me Lynn, if that is OK with you. To be sure I remember your name, please write the name you’d like me to call you on the “name tent.” If you do not want your real first name to be on the tape recording, just make up a name you want to use. As it says on the form you signed, we will not be telling anyone else who said what during this discussion.
- For us to be able to hear what each of you has to say, only one person can talk at a time.
- It’s my job to get us through the whole list of questions and to give everyone a chance to talk, so sometimes I may have to ask you to stop so we can hear from someone else or so we can move on to another question. Each person may not get to answer every question – and some questions you may not want to answer – but I want to be sure all of you have a good chance to tell us what you’re thinking.
- Remember, from our point of view, there are no right or wrong answers.

OK, let’s get started. We’re talking about the specific project called the New Hope Initiative. For this project the police did a lot of surveillance of drug dealing in the neighborhood and some undercover work to build cases against the dealers.
They arrested some of those dealers, based on their records, but some they called into the police station for what’s called a “notification.” This was in the spring of 2005. The questions I’m going to ask you are about that notification, or about things that happened before it or after it. You may or may not remember some things, but that’s OK.

1. What do you think of your community in terms of criminal activity?

2. What do you think of your community in terms of personal safety?

3. What are your perceptions of the police?

4. What is the greatest concern in this community?

5. Have you heard about the recent efforts by the Police Department to reduce street drug sales in your Neighborhood?

   **If yes continue below, if No move to question 2**

   a. How did you hear about these efforts?
   b. When did you hear about these efforts?
   c. As a community member, are you working with the police department to keep the community free from street level drug dealing? If yes, how?
   d. Did anyone explain to you why your community had been selected for this initiative?
   e. Were you aware of the notification in your community in 2005?

   **If yes, continue below, if no move to question 2**

   f. Did you attend the notification in your community?
   g. What is your understanding of how the notification process works?
   h. Were you involved in the notification? If so, how?
   i. What did you think of your community, in terms of criminal activity, before the notification?
   j. What did you think of your community, in terms of criminal activity, after the notification?
   k. What did you think of your community, in terms of personal safety, before the notification?
   l. What did you think of your community, in terms of personal safety, after the notification?
   m. What were your perceptions of the police before the notification?
   n. What were your perceptions of the police after the notification?
   o. Have you seen any changes in your community since the notification?
      a. If so, what changes have you seen?
   p. What was the greatest concern to this community before the notification?
   q. What has been the greatest concern to this community after the notification?

That’s all the questions I have. Thank you so much for talking with us this morning. You have been very helpful.
Appendix D:

Systematic Neighborhood Social Observation Materials

Part A: Pilot Testing Background

Two pilot tests of the methodology were conducted, beginning at 4:00 p.m. on Friday June 1 and 12:00 p.m. on Friday September 21, 2007. Prior to the first pilot, the research team met to review the coding instruments and the operational definitions, to identify variables to be coded as “present” and assigned a frequency value, as distinct from variables that would simply be recorded as “present,” and to discuss the driving route. The police department was notified of each scheduled observation.

Two researchers coded Social indicators and the other two coded Physical indicators. All researchers observed the same block face at the same time, and the route was designed so that the opposing block faces could be observed within a reasonable time frame. Social and Physical indicators were recorded on separate sheets, numbered sequentially.

In the first pilot a local YMCA Outreach “street worker” drove the research team through the neighborhood, using his personal vehicle so as to convey a familiar presence. A research team member also familiar with the layout of the neighborhood directed the driver on a systematic route. An audio recorder was used to capture the street names and numbers corresponding with the numbers of the block faces recorded on the coding sheets and other anecdotal commentary for later review.

The team drove slowly through the area, beginning with the periphery and moving to the main streets within the observation area. Due to time schedule constraints, the researchers concluded the pilot test after having observed 51 block faces, 51.5% of the total number of block faces in the target area.
A post-observation debriefing session and inter-observer reliability calculations led to several decisions. Although the researchers agreed that there was little difficulty in observing and recording the indicators, there had been difficulty determining the best route and the assignment of numbers to block faces. A detailed street map of the area was deemed necessary, so that the team could plan a systematic route and assign block face numbers in advance.

For purposes of assessing inter-rater reliability, coding sheets were compared for like records. A point value of “1” was assigned to each item on each sheet that was recorded similarly as being either absent (no notes made) or present and (where applicable) observed with the same frequency. The category “other” was not included in the calculation for this assessment, as its function was to capture any other social activity of interest for anecdotal inclusion or for discussion of indicator selections following the pilot.

The Social Disorder/Order/Other categories (see Appendix B) encompassed ten indicators, excluding “other.” With 51 sample block faces, a total of 510 points would indicate that each variable on each block face was coded in exactly the same way on both coding sheets. Comparison of the sample coding sheets from the pilot resulted in a score of 494 points out of the possible 510, meaning that 96.86% of all indicators were recorded as being absent or present with the same frequency where frequency applied. However, in many cases there was simply a lack of indicators present. In cases where only one record indicated the presence of an indicator, presence was assumed and the point was not assigned. Overall, there were 32 records of indicators present across all block faces. Of these 32, 25 were recorded with a matching frequency, and in 7 cases the frequency differed. Thus, indicators present were recorded by both observers at the same frequency in 78.13% of cases.
Of the seven cases where the records differed, six of them were in the variable category “Individual child or adult out in the neighborhood.” A review of the definition of this variable by the researchers observing social indicators concluded that there was difficulty in categorizing people who appeared to be outside together: i.e., a lady with two very small children in the same yard together, and/or two individuals walking down the street together, but not quite “congregating.” This discussion led to the recommendation of adding “hanging out” to the indicator “adults or juveniles congregating, no observable conflict,” resulting in a revised variable category: “adults or juveniles congregating or hanging out, no observable conflict.”

The Physical Disorder/Order/Decay/Other categories encompassed nine indicators, excluding “other.” With 51 sample block faces, a total of 459 points would indicate that each variable on each block face was coded in exactly the same way on both coding sheets. Comparison of the sample coding sheets from the pilot resulted in a score of 391 points out of the possible 459, meaning 85.19% of all indicators were recorded as being absent or present with the same frequency where frequency applied. Similar to the Social indicator records, in many cases there was simply a lack of indicators observed. In cases where only one record indicated the presence of an indicator, presence was assumed and the point was not assigned. Overall, there were 91 indicators that were recorded as being present across all block faces. Of these 91, 23 were recorded with a matching frequency, and in 68 cases the presence and or frequency differed. Thus, indicators present were recorded by both observers as present and, where applicable, at the same frequency in 25.27% of cases.

Of the 68 cases where presence or frequency records differed, 48 (68.5%) were in the categories “trash/ garbage/ litter on sidewalks, streets and/or gutters” and “Residence with trash/ garbage/litter in yard” (28 and 22 differing records respectively). There were nine cases where
records of “Signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating neighborhood watch”
differed, and between 1 and 4 cases where all other indicator records differed. Reasons for these
differences likely include the following:

- The coding sheet for the pilot did not include “streets and gutter” in its description of
  the first physical disorder indicator pertaining to trash.
- One physical disorder recorder was riding in the front passenger seat with the other in
  the rear driver’s side seat with a view additionally occluded by the two recorders of
  social indicators sharing the rear seat on the passenger side.
- The recorder in the front passenger seat was also navigating the driving route.

The result of this discussion led to recommendations including:

- Review and revision of operational definitions, including clarification of the amount
  of trash within a given space to constitute presence;
- Seating for recorders of physical variables where they can observe the ground level
  more easily – possibly securing a van for future observations;
- Development of training materials for observers;
- A second pilot test of the observation methodology.

The observational methodology was piloted a second time during the afternoon of Friday
September 21, 2007. Prior to this observation, operational definitions of indicators were revised,
and each observer passed a test of his/her understanding of physical or social indicators,
employing a training instrument with vignettes (see this Appendix, Part C) adapted from
Weisburd et al. (2004). A detailed route map with each block face numbered was also prepared
and studied in advance by the “navigator,” who did not double this time as an observer. A city-
owned van was used for this and subsequent observations, allowing all observers an adequate
view of each block face. Whenever requested by an observer, the driver would stop the van to allow additional time to count indicator frequencies or back up to give observers a second look at specific physical or social features.

These changes in the methodology resulted in greater confidence that the indicators were being accurately observed, but a debriefing session led to two additional adjustments. First, operational definitions (this Appendix, Part D) were refined one final time to address any questions raised by the observers. To further address any reliability concerns, the team also decided that the two observers of each type of indicator (physical or social) would work together on subsequent observations. In practical terms this meant that the two observers would discuss what they were seeing on each block face and reach consensus regarding the appropriate notation on the observation coding sheet.
### Part B: Observational Coding Forms

**Systematic Social Observation**  
**Physical Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Constructs</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical Disorder</td>
<td>Trash/garbage/litter on sidewalk/street/gutter/common areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residence with trash/garbage/litter in yard</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structures marked with graffiti</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abandoned cars</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Order</td>
<td>Signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating neighborhood watch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structures with graffiti painted over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Decay</td>
<td>Burned out or boarded or abandoned houses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burned out, boarded or abandoned commercial buildings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buildings with broken windows</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Other (please describe)*
## Systematic Social Observation
### Social Indicators

Block #: _____________  
Date of Observation: _____________  
Day of week: _____________  
Time of Observation: _____________  
Time of Observation relative to initiative: _____________

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Constructs</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorder</td>
<td>Individuals congregating or hanging out with verbal conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals congregating or hanging out with physical conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential drug activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potential prostitution activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Loud music/noise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Order</td>
<td>Individuals congregating or hanging out, no observable conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residents sitting on porches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual juvenile or adult out in the neighborhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please describe)</td>
<td>Police Patrol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police Interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part C: Observational Training Tool

PHYSICAL INDICATORS

Directions:
For each scenario or situation presented, please indicate:
   a) The presence or absence of the possible indicators being coded. The absence of an indicator would be designated if not all criteria for a specific indicator are present.
   b) Identify the indicator(s) for presence and absence
   c) Frequency of present indicators

All scenarios occur on the block face being coded unless otherwise noted.

1. Several items, including bottles, cigarette butts, and food wrappers are seen in a community park. The items appear to be able to fill a two gallon bucket.

2. A neighborhood watch sign is located on the block face being coded and another neighborhood watch sign is observed on an adjacent block face.

3. A house is observed with three visible boarded windows. There is also a car parked in front of the house with a shattered window.

4. Images and words are seen through a coating of white paint on the side of a retaining wall.

5. A vehicle with a shattered windshield is parked on the street.

6. A residential yard is observed littered with typical trash items (bottles, cans, etc). It appears that the amount of trash is more than one person could pick up and dispose of in one trip.

7. A house appears to be in a state of decay, so much so that it is not likely that it is being used for legitimate residential purposes.

8. A commercial building is observed that appears to be in a legitimate state of decay and is no longer being used for legitimate commercial purposes.

9. A car with a missing tire and a shattered window is parked in a yard.

10. A building is observed with two broken windows.

11. A house is observed with one visible broken window and another house, on the same block face, is observed with two visible boarded windows.

12. A building with two broken windows is observed. In addition, designs and images are seen spray painted on the side of the same building. There are also three small, empty soda bottles on the sidewalk in front of the building.
13. Two small bottles are seen in a residential yard. No other trash is visible.

14. A sign denoting “no loitering” is observed near a commercial building.

15. A commercial building appears to be in a state of decay, but is obviously still being utilized for legitimate commercial purposes.

16. Approximately 5 cigarette butts are seen at a bus stop. No other trash is visible.

17. Designs, words, and images are spray painted on the side of two buildings located on the same block face.

18. A house is observed that has three broken windows and two boarded windows.
SOCIAL INDICATORS

Directions:

For each scenario or situation presented, please indicate:

a) The presence or absence of the possible indicators being coded. The absence of an indicator would be designated if not all criteria for a specific indicator are present.
b) Identify the indicator(s) for presence and absence
c) Frequency of present indicators

All scenarios occur on the block face being coded unless otherwise noted.

1. Two males standing in a front yard looking at each other. Even though you can’t hear the details of their confrontation it seems that they are shouting at each other. Their body language suggests tension between the two. They go from standing about 4 feet away and talking, to talking and pointing at each other within inches of each other.

2. A man is walking down the sidewalk when a car approaches him. A woman gets out and confronts him. She slaps him and knees him in the groin. He retaliates by pushing her to the ground.

3. A group of men standing on a corner, just hanging out and talking. A car with a driver and passenger drives up to the corner and the passenger talks to the men on the corner. One of the men from the corner approaches the car, looks over his shoulder several times, then quickly shakes hands with the passenger, possibly exchanging items.

4. A group of three young men are hanging out on a sidewalk, approximately ranging from ages 15 to 25. One guy walks slowly up and down the sidewalk as if to be killing time. An older gentleman approaches the young man in a car. After a minute of talking, the boy gets in the car with the older man and rides away with him.

5. A car slowly drives down the street blasting gangster rap music. With a volume level loud enough to rattle surrounding windows.

6. A man and woman have a verbal dispute in their front yard. Their shouting becomes increasingly intense and a neighbor comes into the yard and joins in the dispute. After a few minutes of shouting and profanities the man leaves.

7. While observing you see a group of two men kicking another man on the ground. After they finish kicking the man on the ground, he rises and staggers down the sidewalk when another group of two men push him back to the ground.

8. A woman approached a man on the corner and begins talking to him for a moment. She offers him some cash, the man refuses and walks away.

9. A woman wearing a short skirt approaches a man in a car and talks to him for a few minutes before getting in the car with him, at the same time on the same block face.
another similarly dress woman accepts cash from a man she’s been talking to for a few minutes, they then continue to walk together into an alley.

10. There’s a party down the street and the music from it is so loud it can be heard from several blocks away. Also, someone on a motorcycle passes by you and the roar of the engine is so loud it almost hurts your ears.

11. A group of five guys are hanging out by a car in the driveway of a house. They’re standing around talking and drinking a few beers. Apparently they’re telling jokes because occasionally they’ll break into laughter.

12. As you ride by a house an elderly married couple sitting in rocking chairs on their front porch waves at you.

13. A girl looking to be about 13 years of age casually rides a bicycle down the street. She makes the appropriate hand signals, follows the street signs, and even is wearing a helmet and knee pads.

14. On a street corner you see two guys standing together talking. On the same block face you see two women walking together and laughing.

15. While riding down a street you notice 8 houses, oddly there is no activity in the yards, drive ways, or porches. Everything seems relatively quiet.

16. You observe a two on two basketball game in a church courtyard.

17. A uniformed policeman walks down a certain street. He doesn’t make any interactions but rather seems to be walking as part of a routine. About fifteen minutes later a woman rides down the same street in what you believe to be an unmarked police car. She appears to be a police detective, she’s wearing a suit and uses a radio to communicate, also there appears to be a strobe light mounted about her rear-view mirror. She too makes no interactions with citizens, but rather continues to ride down the street.

18. You observe a policeman riding down the street in his police cruiser. He abruptly pulls up on the curb and jumps out, grabbing an individual and talks to them for a few minutes. Finally he releases the person and returns to his vehicle, leaving the scene.

19. While on one street you are passed by three police cars riding at normal speeds in single file. There seems to be no apparent rush.

20. A policeman is talking to individuals and taking notes. Simultaneously a police car has pulled a car to the side of the street. The policeman conducting the interview finishes his conversation, thanks the people, and walks down the sidewalk to assist the officer in the cruiser.
Part D: Social Observation Operational Definitions

PHYSICAL DISORDER

Trash/ garbage/ litter on streets, sidewalks, in gutters, and/or in common areas.
This variable measures the presence of litter on sidewalks or in streets or gutters or vacant lots within the neighborhood. Litter is constituted by objects discarded as typical trash items, including bottles and cans, not to include large items in yards such as broken down equipment or other items that could not be disposed of in regular trash collection cans. Trash/ garbage/ litter is present when it appears it would fill a five-gallon bucket or more. Common areas include, but are not limited to, parks, parking lots, passageways, bus stops, benches on streets and other areas common to all community members.

CODING: Indicate if trash/ garbage/ litter on streets, sidewalks and/ or in gutters are present.
No frequency coding for this indicator.

Residences with trash/ garbage/ litter in yard
This variable measures the number of residential yards with trash/ garbage/ litter on them. Litter is constituted by objects discarded as typical trash items, including bottles and cans, not to include large items in yards such as broken down equipment or other items that could not be disposed of in regular trash collection cans. Trash/ garbage/ litter is present when it would take more than one person to pick it up and dispose of in a garbage can or more than one trip to collect and carry by hand. Yard is defined as private property inside a municipal curb or sidewalk.

CODING: Indicate if trash/garbage/litter in yard of residences is present. For frequency, indicate the number of residences where the indicator is present on each block face. Note if large materials are placed at the curb for pickup.

Physical structures marked with graffiti
This variable measures the number of buildings, retaining walls, bus stops, benches, playground equipment, or other common physical structures that are marked with graffiti in spray paint or graffiti markers, to include designs, words, or images.

CODING: Indicate if physical structures marked with graffiti are present. For frequency, indicate the number of structures marked with graffiti on each block face.

Abandoned Cars
This variable measures the number of cars that appear abandoned as indicated by presence of two or more of the following physical characteristics: a shattered windshield or window, an exterior that has been burned or otherwise makes the car appear to be undriveable, missing or flat tire, and missing license plates. This variable is also indicated if a vehicle is surrounded or succumbed by overgrown grass or plants, parked in a wooded area or a similar zone that is not common for currently used automobiles (driveways, carport, garages.)
CODING: Indicate if abandoned cars are present. For frequency, indicate the number of abandoned cars on each block face.

*Note: If a variable is observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, please note it in the “other” category.

**PHYSICAL ORDER**

Signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating neighborhood watch.

This variable measures any signs that denote warnings, or behaviors and actions which are restricted either by any governance or by community residents, property owners, or other. Indicators include No Parking and Beware of Dog signs.

CODING: Indicate if signs restricting access, documenting rules, or indicating neighborhood watch are present. For frequency, indicate the number of signs present on each block face. Note any occurrence of Community Watch signs.

Physical structures with graffiti painted over

This variable measures the number of buildings, retaining walls, bus stops, benches, playground equipment, or other common physical structures with evidence of pre-existing graffiti covered over in a “clean-up” attempt and remains painted or covered over.

CODING: Indicate if physical structures with graffiti painted over are present. For frequency, indicate the number of structures with graffiti painted over for each block face.

*Note: If a variable is observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, please note it in the “other” category.

**SOCIAL DISORDER**

Individuals congregating or hanging out with verbal conflict

This variable measures instances of two or more people in an exchange of verbal; conflict with each other, as recognized by eye contact and proximity of the individuals in the exchange.

CODING: Indicate if individuals congregating or hanging out with verbal conflict are present. For frequency, indicate the number of groups congregating with conflict.

Individuals congregating or hanging out with physical conflict

This variable measures two or more individuals in a physical exchange that includes slapping, kicking, hitting, or other abusive physical contact.

CODING: Indicate if individuals congregating or hanging out with physical conflict are present. For frequency, indicate the number of groups congregating with conflict.
*Note: If individuals are observed congregating or hanging out and appear to be engaged in physical and verbal conflict, code for physical conflict only.

**Potential drug transaction activity**

This variable measures visible potential drug transactions. Drug transaction refers to the drug deal itself and involves the exchange of cash and drugs. Sometimes the drug sales are blatant, and money, vials, or clips can be observed changing hands. At other times, there will be a brief encounter with a contact person (usually from a car driving by).

At other times, the transaction will take place on the street, as an open-air drug market; a third person will join the other two (or the buyer alone); the buyer and seller walk together a ways and at some point money changes hands, at another, the drugs. Interactions characterized by activity that appears consistent with the above will be recorded as potential drug transaction activity.

**CODING:** Indicate if potential drug activity is present. For frequency, indicate the number drug transactions on each block face.

**Potential prostitution activity**

This variable measures each instance where potential prostitution activity is observed. Style of dress is not necessarily a strong indicator of prostitution activity. A female prostitute’s appearance may range from the stereotypical image of wearing heavy makeup and revealing attire, such as a miniskirt with fishnet stockings, to jogging suits, snowmobile suits, and the “collegiate look.”

Female prostitutes often work alone, while male prostitutes often work in groups. Characteristic of both groups is a slow aimless walk confined to a limited area.

The male customer approaching a female prostitute generally does not know the woman; while customers of the male prostitutes have a preference for partners they have used before (though some of the verbal exchanges may indicate that “I haven’t seen you before” or “I haven’t used you before”).

Male prostitutes will wave to cars from the corner; female prostitutes can be more aggressive, stepping into the road, sometimes directly into the path of the oncoming car as though they are flagging down help. There will be a short exchange at the car window, and the prostitute either gets into the car or returns to the sidewalk/corner. It may take some time before you recognize that the man or woman at the corner is soliciting sexual activity. Interactions characterized by activity that appears consistent with the above will be recorded as potential prostitution activity.

**CODING:** Indicate if potential prostitution activity is present. For frequency, indicate the number of potential prostitution transactions on each block face.

**Loud noise/music**

This variable measures the presence of observable loud noise/music.
Loud noise may include loud stereos, boom boxes, power tools, revving motors, band practice, etc, or any noise that would interfere with your ability to hear a personal conversation in which you are engaged.

CODING: Indicate if loud noise/music is present. **No frequency measure for this indicator.**

*Note: If a variable is observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, please note it in the “other” category.

**SOCIAL ORDER**

**Individuals congregating or hanging out, no observable conflict**

This variable measures the presence of two or more people gathered together within the neighborhood with no observable conflict. This variable will be indicated by the absence of verbal or physical conflict.

CODING: Indicate if individuals congregating or hanging out with no observable conflict are present. For frequency, indicate the number of groups congregating without conflict.

**Residents on porches**

This variable measures the number of porches of a residence where people of any age are out front visiting without conflict or where an individual is on their porch, including simply entering or exiting the front door.

CODING: Indicate if residents sitting on porches are present. If individuals are on porches, do not code for any other category. For frequency, indicate the number of porches that are occupied by individuals on each block face.

**Individual juvenile or adult out in the neighborhood**

This variable measures the presence of a single individual of any age out in the neighborhood, in front of home or street, appearing to be engaged in a routine activity such as walking to or from residence to car or to or from a residence or business in the neighborhood.

Note when possible the age(s) of the individuals (adult vs. juvenile) and type of activity engaged in.

CODING: Indicate if a single individual juvenile or adult out in the neighborhood is present. For frequency, indicate the number of individuals out in the neighborhood.

*Note: If individuals are congregating or hanging out, no observable conflict and some of the individuals are on the porch and some not, code for Individuals congregating or hanging out, no observable conflict. Do not code for Residents on porches in this case.

*Note: If a variable is observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, please note it in the “other” category.
**PHYSICAL DECAY**

**Burned out or boarded or abandoned house**

This variable measures the presence of buildings that are in a stage of legitimate decay and are likely no longer being used for legitimate residential purposes. Boarded houses include houses that have two or more visible boarded windows. Tally the total number of buildings you observe in these conditions.

CODING: Indicate if burned out or boarded or abandoned houses are present. For frequency, indicate the number of burned out or boarded or abandoned houses on each block face.

**Burned out or boarded or abandoned commercial building**

This variable measures the presence of buildings that are in a stage of legitimate decay or appear to have been vacant for an extended period of time and are likely no longer being used for legitimate commercial purposes. Tally the total number of buildings you observe in this condition.

CODING: Indicate if burned out or boarded or abandoned commercial buildings are present. For frequency, indicate the number of burned out or boarded or abandoned commercial buildings on each block face.

**Buildings with broken windows**

This variable measures the presence of buildings that have one or more broken windows and/or no more than one boarded window. Tally the total number of buildings you observe in this condition. Note: For corner buildings, only record physical attributes that are visible from the sidewalk on the street segment being observed.

CODING: Indicate if buildings with broken windows are present. For frequency, indicate the number of buildings with broken windows on each block face.

*Note: If the condition of a house or commercial building is consistent with the definition of the indicators ‘burned out or boarded or abandoned house/commercial building’ AND ‘buildings with broken windows,’ code for burned out or boarded or abandoned house or commercial building (which ever one is applicable). If the condition of a house is consistent with the definition of the indicator ‘building with broken windows,’ code for ‘building with broken windows.’*

*Note: If a variable is observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, please note it in the “other” category.

**OTHER**

**Police Patrol**

This variable measures the presence of police patrol within the neighborhood.
Police patrol applies when you witness either a police officer or group of officers reconnoitering the displacement site. Reconnoitering refers to police engaged in foot patrol, riding a bicycle/scooter, driving by in a cruiser, or parked in their cruiser. Record all uniformed and plain-clothes police presence, as well as marked and unmarked motorized patrols. Motorized patrol refers to marked and unmarked police cars, as well as police motorcycles.

CODING: Indicate if police patrol is present. For frequency, indicate the number times police patrolling is observed on each block face.

Police Interaction

This variable measures the presence of police interaction with the residents of the neighborhood.

Police interaction applies when you observe either a police officer or group of officers interacting with a citizen or group of citizens. Interaction refers to the police talking with citizens, performing a search/investigation, or making an arrest. Police talking refers to an incident where a police officer(s) stops to talk with a citizen or citizens. Search/Investigation involves the police frisking a citizen or searching the physical surroundings (i.e., police searching the bushes in an empty lot for drugs).

CODING: Indicate if police interaction is present. If a police interaction is coded, the police patrol column must also be filled out. This is because the police must first have had to enter into the area to interact with the citizen. A police patrol, on the other hand, does not necessarily mean a police interaction will take place, since it is possible for police to patrol an area without interacting with citizens. In other words, police interactions are always preceded by police patrols, but not all police patrols lead to police interactions. For frequency, indicate the number times police interaction is observed on each block face.

Other of interest as observed

You might see rare instances of pick pocketing, murder, rape, and/or other varied criminal activities. Some possibilities include indecent exposure (i.e., “flashing”), urinating in public, etc. You may also see instances of social/physical order/disorder that has not been mentioned previously. If an activity seems criminal or disorderly and does not fit any of the categories above, check this column and describe the activities on the comment page.

CODING: Indicate if other behaviors of interest are present. For frequency, indicate the number times each behavior is observed.

*Note: If a variable is observed in an intersection or in the middle of the street, please note it in the “other” category.