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Author(s): Elizabeth Spinney, Marcia Cohen, William Feyerherm, Rachel Stephenson, Martha Yeide, Michael Hopps

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Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
NOTE: The jurisdictions identified in this study reduced Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) over a three-year period. As with data, trends may have changed since this Report was completed. Though some trends may have changed, these jurisdictions were able to demonstrate reduction of DMC throughout their juvenile justice systems during the research time frame.
CASE STUDIES OF NINE JURISDICTIONS
THAT REDUCED DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT IN THEIR JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS

March 2014

by Elizabeth Spinney, Marcia Cohen, William Feyerherm, Rachel Stephenson, Martha Yeide, and Michael Hopps


Development Services Group, Inc.
7315 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 800E ○ Bethesda, MD 20814
Phone: 301.951.0056 ○ Fax: 301.951.3324 ○ www.dsgonline.com
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The project staff at Development Services Group, Inc., extend thanks to the many dedicated juvenile justice professionals who assisted with this disproportionate minority contact (DMC) case study report. We are most grateful for the guidance and assistance from the experts on our advisory group, who include Lindsey Draper, DMC Coordinator at the Wisconsin Department of Justice; Tom Harig, national juvenile justice consultant and former DMC Coordinator for the state of New York; Darnell Hawkins, professor emeritus of African American studies, sociology, and criminal justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago; and Kimberly Kempf–Leonard, dean of the College of Liberal Arts at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. Mr. Draper and Dr. Harig were able to share their firsthand knowledge of DMC work at the state level. Dr. Hawkins and Dr. Kempf–Leonard were able to share their knowledge of DMC from the research perspective, having published many pieces on DMC, including Our Children, Their Children: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Differences in American Juvenile Justice (2005), which they coedited.

In addition to our advisory group, many individuals helped us complete this final report. As we gathered information, we enjoyed the privilege of speaking with and interviewing numerous members of state and local juvenile justice communities across the country. Cited in our reference section, we interviewed 23 individuals who provided key, detailed information, which formed the base of each of the case studies. Interviews lasted up to 2 hours, and we interviewed some individuals more than once. These interviewees also reviewed case study drafts and provided input and clarification when needed. We are truly grateful for the experiences and knowledge they shared with us. All of the interview sessions were engaging, and we found an exceptionally high level of interest in DMC. We also found that most interviewees had hope that, by devoting enough attention to the issue, we can improve the stark racial disparities that exist today. We hope we have adequately conveyed the experiences and information shared from these dedicated professionals.

Additionally, we spoke with many others who took the time to provide us with the contact information for our key-informant interviews, to schedule interviews, to give us updated data or unpublished information about programming and who answered the many, specific questions we had. This was invaluable, as we gathered accurate and useful information on each of the sites. Still there were other interviewees who provided important information on their jurisdictions, but theirs were not included in the final report for one reason or another (e.g., in some sites, we discovered that the reason for the relative rate index improvement was that there was a change in data-collection methods and thus not a true reduction in DMC). Although their stories are not presented here, we appreciate the time they took to help us in this important project.

Finally, we make special mention of our program manager at OJJDP, Andrea Coleman, whose experience, expertise, and advice helped shape this final report.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Across the United States, youths of color are more likely than their white peers to be arrested and referred to juvenile court. After becoming involved in the juvenile justice system, they are also more likely to go deeper into the system, resulting in a higher likelihood of secure detention, confinement, and transfer to adult court. Minority youths are also less likely to be diverted from court. This phenomenon, known as disproportionate minority contact (DMC), has been recognized for decades as a deep-rooted problem in the juvenile justice system. All states are required to address DMC to stay in compliance with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) tracks compliance with this JJDPA requirement. In 2005, OJJDP began requiring states to input data on the flow of youths at nine points in their juvenile justice systems into a Web-based data entry system. Until now, there has been no methodical national analysis of these data. This study is the first to systematically review the data in OJJDP’s database, to identify sites that have been able to reduce DMC over an extended period of time, and to gather information on the strategies used in those successful sites.

At the start of this study, OJJDP’s Web-based data entry system had reports from nearly 1,500 jurisdictions across the United States. The top 20 jurisdictions with reductions in racial disparities for five of OJJDP’s nine juvenile justice stages (referral, diversion, detention, confinement, and transfer) were selected for further study. After analyzing data trends, gathering information from state Juvenile Justice Specialists and DMC Coordinators, interviewing stakeholders and decision-makers in jurisdictions of interest, presenting findings during meetings and conferences, receiving input from OJJDP, and meeting with our Advisory Committee, nine jurisdictions were selected for case studies. Five of the nine jurisdictions reduced DMC at arrest or referral to court, three jurisdictions reduced DMC at diversion, four jurisdictions reduced DMC at detention, and two jurisdictions reduced DMC at secure confinement. Eight of the jurisdictions reduced DMC for African American youth, eight jurisdictions reduced DMC for Hispanic youth, and two jurisdictions reduced DMC for Native American youth.

The nine jurisdictions selected as case study sites were 1) Bernalillo County, N.M., 2) Clark County, Nev., 3) the state of Connecticut, 4) Essex County, N.J., 5) Hillsborough County, N.H., 6) Montgomery County, Ala., 7) Philadelphia, Pa., 8) Tulsa County, Okla., and 9) Utah County, Utah.

These nine case study sites represent a diverse group of jurisdictions both geographically and demographically. The smallest jurisdiction by population was Montgomery County, Ala., which had fewer than 250,000 residents, and the largest jurisdiction was the state of Connecticut, which had more than 3.5 million residents. Some of the sites, such as Utah County, Utah, and Bernalillo County, N.M., were gaining youth population while others, such as Philadelphia, Pa., were losing youth population. The portion of youth population ages 10–17 that was minority ranged from 15 percent in Hillsborough County, N.H., to 78 percent in Philadelphia. The poverty rates for children and youth also varied significantly among the nine sites.
Although the selected sites had numerous differences, interviewees often pointed to similar strategies that they felt were responsible for reducing racial disparities in their systems. The eight most-noted strategies were

1. Focusing on data collection and utilization
2. Increasing collaboration with other state and local agencies, police, judges, and the community
3. Changing the institutional culture away from a punitive or procedural focus toward a focus on what was best for the youth and the community
4. Affiliating with national juvenile justice reform initiatives
5. Creating alternatives to secure detention, secure confinement, and formal system involvement
6. Focusing intentionally on DMC reduction (and not just on general system improvement) while using a nonaccusatory tone
7. Leadership at the local level, the state level, or both
8. Making DMC reduction a long-term priority

While these eight strategies were the most common, each site approached its unique DMC problems in its own way. Following is a brief summary of strategies utilized and achievements gained in each of the nine sites.

**Bernalillo County, N.M.**

Bernalillo County is the largest county in New Mexico and home to Albuquerque, the largest city in the state. In the past 10 years, the youth population has grown by 11 percent, and approximately 71 percent of youths ages 10–17 today are minorities. During 2004–10, Bernalillo County was able to reduce racial disparities for African American, Hispanic, and Native American youth among law enforcement referrals to probation and among diversions from court. There were also positive trends among referrals to the Children’s Court Attorney. During these years, Bernalillo County focused on multiple strategies designed primarily around systems reform, attention to data, and increasing community-based services for court-involved youth. Bernalillo County became a Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) site in the 1990s and has used the JDAI framework for many years to improve its system. Much of the emphasis has been on reducing the number of youths in secure detention and serving detained youths after they return to the community. Notably, Bernalillo County established a licensed freestanding mental health clinic adjacent to its detention facility to serve court-involved youths in the community. Bernalillo County also focused directly on increasing access to diversion by establishing the Prevention Unit. It has been able to involve multiple partners over long periods of time in their efforts, even when individuals move to new positions.

**Clark County, Nev.**

Clark County is a large jurisdiction with a majority minority youth population. During 2007–11, racial disparities for African American youth decreased at secure detention and secure
confinement. The relative rate index (RRI) value decreased from 1.7 to 1.4 at secure detention and from 2.4 to 1.7 at secure confinement, while overall numbers also decreased. For Hispanic youth, the RRI value at secure detention was 1.0 for 4 of the 5 years from 2007 through 2011, indicating no racial disparities at this point in the system for Hispanic youth. During this time, Clark County used numerous systemwide strategies, including better incorporation of technology and data analysis into decision-making, adherence to a risk-assessment instrument to determine placement in secure detention, increasing access to alternatives to secure detention and confinement, building relationships with the community, and changing the culture of the system toward one that concentrates on addressing the needs of the youth (rather than concentrating on law enforcement). Throughout all of this, Clark County also made sure that there was an intentional focus on DMC by having a Racial Disparities Workgroup, making DMC reduction a public issue, and working with a national DMC technical assistance provider.

The State of Connecticut

The state of Connecticut, the largest jurisdiction in this report, has published three comprehensive DMC assessment studies since the early 1990s, which have informed decision-makers on where to allocate DMC–reduction resources. During 2006–12, the years highlighted in this report, Connecticut concentrated its DMC strategy primarily on training and awareness of DMC across the state. Connecticut developed the Effective Police Interactions With Youth training curriculum between 2004 and 2006 to reduce DMC at the arrest stage. This curriculum has been used to train more than 1,500 Connecticut police officers as well as officers in other states. Other strategies in Connecticut included the development of a model memorandum of understanding for police officers and schools to use to reduce school-based arrests and referrals to court, funding for projects to build relationships between youth and police in local jurisdictions, and establishing two informational campaigns: JUST.Start, which focused on DMC in the juvenile justice system, and Right.ResponseCT, which focused on schools and police knowing the “right response” to youth misbehavior. Steady leadership from the Juvenile Justice Specialist and the State Advisory Group has contributed to the development and execution of these strategies, which appear to have reduced DMC in Connecticut. During 2006–12, the RRI values at referral declined from 2.9 to 1.6 for Hispanic youth and from 6.3 to 4.7 for African American youth.

Essex County, N.J.

Essex County, N.J., is the third-most populous county in New Jersey and part of New York City’s greater metropolitan area. Approximately 71 percent of youths ages 10–17 in Essex County are minority, and the largest minority group is African American. During 2004–11, Essex County was able to reduce racial disparities among the youths who were both referred to court and diverted from court. The RRI value at referral declined from 4.9 to 3.5 for African American youths and from 2.2 to 1.1 for Hispanic youths. The RRI value at diversion improved from 0.59 to 0.87 for African American youths and from 0.71 to 0.93 for Hispanic youths. Additionally, the number of African American youths being securely detained and confined decreased 39 percent and 73 percent, respectively. During these years, there were systemwide reform efforts...
involving multiple system stakeholders and decision-makers, which resulted in a positive change in organizational culture. Essex County was one of the five original sites to participate in JDAI in New Jersey (which was named the first-ever statewide model JDAI site) and was very active in implementing JDAI principles. Essex County increased its use of data to make decisions, created and improved alternatives to secure detention, and utilized its numerous diversion options to reduce DMC.

**Hillsborough County, N.H.**

Hillsborough, N.H., has a small but growing minority population. Many decision-makers felt that the number of minority youth was too small to warrant much attention. However, the state DMC Coordinator, key police chiefs, and other juvenile justice stakeholders decided it was important to concentrate on reducing racial disparities in the juvenile justice system before the problem got out of control. Strategies such as improving data accuracy, engaging police chiefs in DMC work, and providing training to police officers in diversity and police–youth interactions seem to have made a positive impact. There has been a decrease in arrest rates for both white and Hispanic youth as well as a decrease in racial disparities. During 2007–11, the overall arrest rate decreased from 5.7 arrests per 100 youths to 4.2 arrests per 100 youths. Arrest rates for Hispanic youths also declined steadily from 8.8 per 100 in 2008 to 5.2 per 100 in 2011, resulting in a decrease in the relative rate index from 1.8 to 1.3.

**Montgomery County, Ala.**

Montgomery County, the smallest jurisdiction in this report, was identified as a DMC–reduction success story for its reductions in racial disparities for African American youth at both secure detention and secure confinement. The number of youths being detained and confined also decreased, as did the confinement and detention rates. Key stakeholders credit the reduction in numbers as well as the decreases in rates and racial disparities to the JDAI. In Montgomery County, the JDAI led to a strong collaboration of juvenile justice partners in both the executive and judicial branches. Through this collaboration, Montgomery County has been able to concentrate more on data and to develop a risk assessment instrument that has helped minimize the number of youths who qualify for secure detention. During 2009–11, the number of African American youths being sent to secure detention decreased by more than half, and the RRI improved from 1.6 to 1.3. At secure confinement, the number of African American youths declined by 26 percent, and the RRI improved from 1.3 to 1.1.

**Philadelphia, Pa.**

Philadelphia is a large city with many initiatives aimed at systems-involved and at-risk youth. During 2006–10, DMC decreased for African American and Hispanic youth at the detention stage. During this time, the RRI for African American youth declined from 1.6 to 1.3, and the RRI for Hispanic youth declined from 2.3 to 1.3. Four particular initiatives—an active working group of the DMC committee, opportunities to build relationships between youth and police, a Graduated Response Court, and global positioning satellite monitoring as an alternative to detention—were credited as contributing to the reduction in DMC at secure detention.
Tulsa County, Okla.

Tulsa County’s DMC–reduction strategy was initiated at the state level with direction from the state Juvenile Justice Specialist and the state DMC Coordinator, and was implemented in collaboration with county stakeholders. Tulsa County’s DMC–reduction strategies included hiring a local DMC Coordinator, forming a local DMC Steering Committee, conducting strategic planning, implementing trainings for police, and establishing a crisis intervention center to provide law enforcement with an alternative to detention for youths who commit low-level offenses. Between 2005 and 2011, diversion rates improved for white, African American, Hispanic, and Native American youth in Tulsa County, leading to an improvement in RRI values for the largest minority group, African American youth. At detention, the RRI improved for African American youth from 1.4 to 1.1. Additionally, the RRI value at secure detention for Hispanic and Native American youth was 1.0 for the last years this indicator was measured. Finally, there is a promising trend at the arrest stage in Tulsa. During 2005–11, the total number of juvenile arrests decreased by 33 percent, while arrest rates decreased for each of the primary racial/ethnic groups.

Utah County, Utah

Utah County’s DMC–reduction efforts were initiated at the state level and designed with local leaders to best address DMC in Utah County. The state of Utah was interested in addressing DMC and started the process by bringing in a technical assistance provider to review the state’s data and assist in developing a DMC–reduction strategy. Given what the data showed, state-level decision-makers decided to focus on reducing DMC at the diversion stage with an emphasis on three counties, including Utah County. Utah also hired a DMC Coordinator, concentrated on improving data collection, developed a training curriculum for police cadets to work better with diverse communities, and increased awareness of DMC statewide. In Utah County, a local DMC Working Group was formed, changes were made to certain diversion eligibility requirements, and there was an increased use of receiving centers. Between 2007 and 2010, Utah County’s data have shown improvements at four contact points: arrest, referral to court, diversion, and secure detention. The African American RRI at arrest declined from 5.7 in 2007 to 3.6 in 2010, and the Hispanic RRI at arrest declined from 2.8 to 2.2 in the same time period. The RRI for Hispanic youth at referral to court improved from 3.2 to 2.3, at diversion improved from 0.59 to 0.91, and at detention improved from 1.4 to 1.1.
1. INTRODUCTION

Disproportionate minority contact (DMC) has been recognized for decades as a deep-rooted problem in the juvenile justice system, and states are required to address it to stay in compliance with the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA). For more than a decade the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) has led efforts to address DMC through conferences, training and technical assistance, publications, and enforcing requirements in the JJDPA to address DMC. For DMC monitoring purposes, OJJDP requires states to collect raw juvenile justice data on the volume of activities by race and ethnicity at nine different juvenile justice contact points—arrest, referral, diversion, detention, petitioned/charges filed, delinquent findings, probation, confinement in secure correctional facilities, and transfer to adult court—for targeted DMC-reduction sites within their boundaries. This is a rich source of DMC data over time and across jurisdictions.

Despite years of data submission, there had been no systematic national analysis of these data and no longitudinal portrait of the changing (or static) nature of the experiences of minority youths with the justice system. To assist states and localities in achieving and maintaining compliance with the DMC requirements in the JJDPA and in reducing racial disparities in their systems, Development Services Group, Inc., conducted a national analysis of the DMC data to identify promising and best practices in reducing DMC. The analysis was funded by OJJDP’s Field Initiated Research and Evaluation program and began in 2009. This analysis included identifying the jurisdictions that showed a consistent positive movement in their DMC data over 3 consecutive years and then obtaining detailed information on the approaches used by these successful jurisdictions. This study was guided by a four-member Advisory Committee of DMC experts and is the first to systematically examine all of the collected data at each contact point to identify data-driven best practices in reducing DMC.

This report presents nine case studies of jurisdictions that have successfully reduced DMC at one or more juvenile justice contact points, which can be replicated by other jurisdictions. The nine selected jurisdictions represent a diverse group of sites in terms of geography, population size, racial composition, income level, and strategies used, reflecting the diverse nature of communities across the nation.
2. OJJDP, DMC, AND THE RRI: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

What Is DMC?

Disproportionate minority contact (DMC) refers to rates of contact with the juvenile justice system among juveniles of a specific minority group that are significantly different from rates of contact for white non-Hispanic juveniles. DMC is a problem in jurisdictions across the United States. For example, a national single-day count of juveniles held in secure residential facilities in 2010 found that 41 percent of the population were African American and 22 percent were Hispanic (Sickmund et al. 2011), even though only 13 percent of teens in the general population are African American and 16 percent are Hispanic (Puzzanchera, Sladky, and Kang 2011). These racial disparities are called disproportionate minority contact.

What Is the DMC Core Requirement?

Criminology researchers and theorists have long understood that there are racial and ethnic disparities in the degree of contact that juveniles have with the juvenile justice system and in the operation of the multiple parts of that system as they apply to juveniles. In 1988, those concerns were given statutory voice in an amendment to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (JJDPA), which required states participating in the Formula Grants Program to examine disproportionate minority confinement. In 2002, through reauthorization of the JJDPA, the U.S. Congress modified the language related to DMC to include all system contact, whether it related directly to confinement or to other forms of justice system contact. In addition, the language in 2002 created a directive to reduce such disproportionate minority contact (Hsia 2009). The language of “reduction” in turn means that it is necessary to measure change in disparities as well as to create strategies to accomplish those reductions.

Who Coordinates DMC–Reduction Work at the State Level?

Much of the DMC–reduction work in the states is coordinated by State Advisory Groups (SAGs), state Juvenile Justice Specialists, and state DMC Coordinators. SAGs are appointed by the chief executive officer of a state (usually a governor) to maintain state compliance with the JJDPA. The SAG consists of 15 to 33 members who have training, experience, or special knowledge concerning the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency or the administration of juvenile justice [JJDPA § 223(a)(3)]. SAGs often use other names within their own states. For example, the Connecticut SAG is called the Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee, and the Alabama SAG is called the Alabama Advisory Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. State Juvenile Justice Specialists and state DMC Coordinators are usually employees of a state and can be funded with federal Formula Grants. In partnership with the SAG, the Juvenile Justice Specialist is responsible for developing a comprehensive 3-year plan, which is submitted to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) and updated each year. This 3-year plan is also the application for federal Formula Grants funding, which provides grants to state agencies, local units of government, and private nonprofit organizations to prevent and control delinquency and to address DMC. The state DMC
Coordinator is responsible for providing leadership so states can address DMC and for facilitating compliance with the DMC core requirement (Coleman 2009). In the states, the DMC Coordinator is a fulltime position, a parttime position, or part of the job responsibilities of the Juvenile Justice Specialist. Some states also have local DMC Coordinators who work in targeted DMC–reduction jurisdictions.

**What Are the Five Contact Points Examined in This Report?**

In this report, we chose jurisdictions that were able to reduce racial disparities at arrest, referral to court, diversion, secure detention, and secure confinement. The definitions below are from OJJDP’s DMC Web-based data entry system, where the data from this report originated. At times, jurisdictions used a slightly different definition of these stages.

*Arrest*
Youths are considered to be arrested when they are apprehended, stopped, or otherwise contacted by law enforcement agencies and suspected of having committed a delinquent act. Delinquent acts are those that, if committed by an adult, would be criminal, including crimes against persons, crimes against property, drug offenses, and crimes against the public order.

*Referral*
Referral occurs when a potentially delinquent youth is sent forward for legal processing and received by a juvenile or family court, or juvenile intake agency, either as a result of law enforcement action or upon a complaint by a citizen or school.

*Diversion*
Youths referred to juvenile court for delinquent acts are often screened by an intake department (either within or outside the court). The intake department may decide to dismiss the case for lack of legal sufficiency, to resolve the matter informally (without the filing of charges), or formally (with the filing of charges). The diversion population includes all youths referred for legal processing but handled without the filing of formal charges.

*Detention*
Detention refers to youths held in secure detention facilities at some point during court processing of delinquency cases (i.e., before disposition). In some jurisdictions, the detention population may also include youths held in secure detention to await placement following a court disposition. For the purposes of DMC, detention may also include youths held in jails and lockups. Detention should not include youths held in shelters, group homes, or other nonsecure facilities.

*Secure Confinement*
Confined cases are those in which youths are placed in secure residential or correctional facilities for delinquent offenders following a court disposition. The confinement population

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*Also, at times, jurisdictions use different terms for these stages. For example, Bernalillo County, N.M., uses the term “law enforcement referral to probation” instead of “arrest” and uses the term “referral to the Children’s Court Attorney” instead of “referral to court.”*
should not include all youths placed in any form of out-of-home placement. Group homes, shelter homes, and mental health treatment facilities, for example, would usually not be considered confinement. Every jurisdiction collecting DMC data must specify which forms of placement do and do not qualify as confinement.

**What Is the Relative Rate Index?**

The primary tool developed for OJJDP to identify DMC was the relative rate index (RRI), which is simply the ratio of rates of contact at several decision points for minority youth compared with the rates for white youth at the same contact points. The RRI identifies disparities in the volume of activity from one contact point to the next and how it differs for white and minority youths. The RRI is calculated by dividing the rate of activity involving minority youths divided by the rate of activity involving white youths. For example, to find the RRI for African American youth at the arrest stage, first we would calculate the arrest rate for African American youth, and then the arrest rates for white youth. The arrest rate is the number of arrests per youth in the general population. Then, the African American rate is divided by the minority rates to get the RRI. An RRI of 1.0 would show no disparity. In this report, we look at RRI values at arrest, referral to court, diversion, secure detention, and secure confinement. We hope to see decreases in RRI values at arrest, referral to court, secure detention, and secure confinement, while we hope to see increases in RRI values at diversion.
3. METHODOLOGY

The data used to identify case study sites came from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP’s) Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) Web-Based Data Entry System. OJJDP developed this Web-based data entry system in 2005 and requires states to enter raw juvenile justice data on the volume of activities by race and ethnicity at nine different juvenile justice contact points—arrest, referral, diversion, detention, petitioned/charges filed, delinquent findings, probation, confinement in secure correctional facilities, and transfer to adult court—for targeted DMC-reduction sites within their boundaries (usually at least three counties in each state) into this system at least once every 3 years.

In 2009, at the start of this project, this database had reports from nearly 1,500 jurisdictions, in some instances ranging back to 2003 and 2004. To examine trends, multiple years of data were necessary. A limit was imposed of having at least 3 years of data. This prerequisite reduced the number of jurisdictions being considered to 717 jurisdictions (37 states and 680 counties).

After the data were extracted from the system, some changes were made to the traditional RRI format to make the data more usable. First, the general youth population was used as the base for calculating the referral rate (instead of using the number of arrests) because arrest numbers are frequently unavailable for Hispanic youth. Second, diversion rates, detention rates, secure confinement rates, and transfer rates were calculated using referral numbers as the base.

After extracting the data, three stages were intentionally excluded from the analysis. Issuance of a petition and the finding of delinquency were both excluded on the basis of small variation. In most jurisdictions these stages show an RRI value near 1.0 and are not a major contributor to overall disparities in the extent of contact with the justice system. The probation decision point was excluded in part based on lower variation, as with petition and delinquency, and in part because the probation decision is often viewed as the “flip side” of the incarceration/confine ment decision, which does, however, show greater variability across jurisdictions and is more closely related conceptually to the origins of the DMC mandate.

At that point, the top 20 jurisdictions with RRI improvements for each of the five juvenile justice stages (referral, diversion, detention, confinement, and transfer) were selected for further study, resulting in 78 jurisdictions under consideration (some jurisdictions were identified at more than one contact point). Change in RRI scores was calculated by taking a log transformation of the RRI scores and calculating the mathematical difference in scores from the first year reported to the last (most recent). Jurisdictions were ranked on that change measure.

*As a result, the rate of referral for Hispanic youth (expressed as a rate per 100 arrests) cannot be calculated, and significant missing information results. However, by basing the referral rate on the population, it essentially becomes an entry rate for juvenile justice and is available for Hispanic youth as well as for others.

†Diversion and detention rates are traditionally calculated using “refer to adult court” data. But the base for calculating secure confinement rates is usually the “adjudication delinquent” data, and the base for calculating transfer rates was “petitioned/charges filed” data. However, data are not always available for each juvenile justice stage. When this happens, the rate is treated as missing. When secure confinement and transfer to adult court are both expressed as rates per 100 cases referred to court, we do not lose as many cases.
RRI data (rates of processing and the calculated RRI values) for the 78 jurisdictions was then graphed across time for each jurisdiction. In that process, a standard presentation was developed in which the rates of processing for a minority group and for white youth were graphed against the left-hand axis of the chart and the RRI value was graphed against the right-hand axis, with the available years of data shown on the horizontal axis. Based on visual analysis of each graph, jurisdictions were classified into several qualitative categories of improvement (very good, good, fair). While creating the graphs, sometimes additional races or decision points were identified where DMC was declining.

The charts appear like the one shown below. On the x-axis, the year is presented. Under the years, the white rate, the minority rate, and the RRI are presented in a table for each of the years. In the chart, the rates and the RRI are presented. The blue line represents the white rate. In the example below, it represents the white detention rate. Other charts will show arrest rates, referral rates, diversion rates, or secure confinement rates. The pink line represents the minority rate. In the example below, the pink line represents the African American detention rate. In other examples, the pink line will represent Hispanic or Native American youth. The right-hand y-axis is for the RRI. As the rates and the RRI are different measures, the scale is also different. However, we wanted to present the information in one chart to make it easier to see. Because of this, the left-hand y-axis (and the blue and pink lines) represents the rates while the right side (and the green line) represents the RRI.

**Figure 3.1. Sample Chart: Detention Rates and RRI—African American**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White Rate</th>
<th>Black Rate</th>
<th>RRI Detention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the analysis, new data became available for many of the jurisdictions. If a jurisdiction had at least one promising graph, the new data were entered and the graph was updated to reflect the new data. Additionally, jurisdictions came to our attention in publications or during conferences. When this happened, we also analyzed the data from those specific jurisdictions. Finally, for identified jurisdictions with reliable data, we examined the RRI at arrest.
Over the course of 2 years, we analyzed and updated data, gathered information from state Juvenile Justice Specialists and DMC Coordinators, interviewed stakeholders and decision-makers in jurisdictions of interest, presented findings during meetings and conferences, received input from OJJDP, and met with the Advisory Committee. For the interviews, an interview protocol was developed and used for each of the nine sites. The names of the interviewees are listed in the references that appear at the end of this document.

By the end of the project, nine sites were selected as case studies to be included in this report. Most sites were chosen for their reductions in racial disparities at one or two contact points. This is important to note since at other decision points the racial disparities may have stagnated or even gotten worse. Transfer to adult court was eventually excluded as a contact point of interest because the lack of large numbers over an extended amount of time made clear data trends difficult to find. Information presented in the case studies comes from OJJDP’s DMC Web-based data entry system, other cited documentation, interviews with stakeholders and decision-makers, and from other sources obtained during the interviews.
4. OVERVIEW OF SELECTED SITE CHARACTERISTICS

The nine selected sites are located across the nation and include four jurisdictions in the Northeast, one in the Midwest, two in the West, one in the South, and one in the Southwest. Eight of the jurisdictions reduced disproportionate minority contact (DMC) for African American youth, eight jurisdictions reduced DMC for Hispanic youth, and two jurisdictions reduced DMC for Native American youth. Five jurisdictions reduced DMC at arrest or referral, three jurisdictions reduced DMC at diversion, four jurisdictions reduced DMC at detention, and two jurisdictions reduced DMC at secure confinement. Similar to national statistics, DMC for African American youth appeared to be greater than DMC for Hispanic youth. The small numbers of Native American youths make comparisons difficult, but it is possible.

Nine Sites

Bernalillo County, N.M.
Clark County, Nev.
Connecticut (statewide)
Essex County, N.J.
Hillsborough County, N.H.
Montgomery County, Ala.
Tulsa County, Okla.
Utah County, Utah

The sites share numerous similarities as well as many differences. The smallest jurisdiction was Montgomery County, Ala., which has fewer than 235,000 residents, and the largest jurisdiction was the state of Connecticut, which had more than 3.5 million residents (see Figure 4.1). The percent of youth population that was minority also varied considerably among the sites, ranging from 15 percent minority in Hillsborough County, N.H., to 78 percent minority in Philadelphia, Pa. (see Figure 4.2).

Sites also varied greatly in whether they were gaining or losing population. For example, the population under age 18 increased by 25 percent in Clark County, Nev., and by 39 percent in Utah County, Utah, over the past 10 years, while it declined slightly in Philadelphia and Connecticut. These changes in population also varied by race. For example, in Connecticut the white population under 18 decreased 15 percent over the past 10 years while the Hispanic population increased 31 percent and the Asian American youth population increased 43 percent. Bernalillo County, N.M., showed similar trends with a decrease of 14 percent in the white youth population over the past 10 years, while the Asian and Hispanic populations increased by more than 25 percent. In Clark County, Nev., the white youth population declined 4 percent over the past 10 years, while the African American youth population increased 29 percent, the Hispanic youth population increased 56 percent, and the Asian youth population

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*During 2002–12.
increased 75 percent. In Philadelphia, the white youth population decreased 19 percent and the African American youth population decreased 12 percent, while the Hispanic youth population increased 31 percent and the Asian youth population increased 149 percent.

**Figure 4.1. Jurisdictions by Total Population**

![Jurisdictions by Total Population](image)


**Figure 4.2. Portion of Youth Population (Ages 10–17) That Is African American, Hispanic, Native American, or Asian American**

![Portion of Youth Population](image)


Among the nine sites, the poverty rates for children and youth also vary significantly. For example, while fewer than 15 percent of children and youths under age 18 in Hillsborough County, N.H., and Utah County, Utah, live in poverty, more than one third of children and youths under 18 in Montgomery County, Ala., and Philadelphia, Pa., live in poverty. The poverty rates in these jurisdictions were strongly related to the percentage of youths that were
minority. The diverse jurisdictions chosen for this report also varied considerably in overall child well-being indicators. For example, the states of Connecticut, New Hampshire, and New Jersey were all found to be in the top 10 states for child well-being in 2013, while the states of Alabama, Nevada, and New Mexico were found to be in the bottom 10 (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2013b).

Figure 4.3. Percent of Individual Under Age 18 Living In Poverty*

Jurisdictions by Race/Ethnicity

**African American**
- Bernalillo County, N.M.
- Clark County, Nev.
- Connecticut
- Essex County, N.J.
- Montgomery County, Ala.
- Tulsa County, Okla.
- Utah County, Utah

**Hispanic**
- Bernalillo County, N.M.
- Clark County, Nev.
- Connecticut
- Essex County, N.J.
- Hillsborough County, N.H.
- Tulsa County, Okla.
- Utah County, Utah

**Native American**
- Bernalillo County, N.M.
- Tulsa County, Okla.

Jurisdictions by Decision Point

**Arrest/Referral**
- Bernalillo County, N.M.
- Connecticut
- Essex County, N.J.
- Hillsborough County, N.H.

**Diversion**
- Bernalillo County, N.M.
- Essex County, N.J.
- Utah County, Utah

**Detention**
- Clark County, Nev.
- Montgomery County, Ala.
- Tulsa County, Okla.

**Confinement**
- Clark County, Nev.
- Montgomery County, Ala.

*RRI for the largest minority group is still high at referral for Essex County, N.J. Also, we have not yet been able to get much information on strategies that have succeeded in reducing DMC at referral.
5. COMMON STRATEGIES ACROSS CASE STUDY SITES

During interviews with key stakeholders and juvenile justice system decision-makers, some common themes emerged. Many interviewees pointed to similar strategies that they felt were responsible for reducing racial disparities in their systems. Many of these are also mentioned in other published literature. The most-often mentioned strategies are presented here.

Examining the Data

“Advocates, public officials, and funders often talk about “data driven” reforms, and nowhere is this more important than in addressing [disproportionate minority contact (DMC)]. In an area where stereotypes are at the center of the problem, advocates must have solid data to support their claims of unfairness and ineffectiveness of existing policies.”

[Building Blocks for Youth Initiative 2005]

All major national efforts toward DMC reduction as well as publications documenting effective strategies mention the importance of accurate data collection and utilization (Building Blocks for Youth 2005; Cabaniss et al. 2007; Hoytt et al. 2005; Nellis 2005). The nine sites highlighted in this report were no different. Most all of the sites felt that concentrating on the data was a vital strategy in identifying and reducing DMC. Sites spent significant time ensuring that the data were accurate, presenting data to decision-makers and stakeholders, and making sure that interventions were based on current data. Most sites used the relative rate index (RRI) to measure disparity, and at least one DMC Coordinator commented that the RRI is “critical to guiding the direction of both a state and local strategy” (OJJDP 2013). Being able to rely on data improved the ability of sites to address DMC, which is often difficult given the potential for strong emotions when discussing race and ethnicity. Presenting the data took some of the subjectivity and emotion out of a difficult topic and helped everyone involved share a similar starting point.

At times, a lack of trust in existing data stunted progress toward addressing DMC. Addressing the accuracy of the data directly and getting others involved in ensuring its accuracy were important strategies for some of the sites. For example, in New Hampshire, the state DMC Coordinator had worked previously for the New Hampshire Census Bureau and supervised the count for the 2010 Census. His background in data collection, specifically as it related to race, helped bring much-needed attention to the importance of accurate data collection and analysis in Hillsborough County, N.H., where decision-makers tended to avoid addressing DMC because they did not trust the data. In Tulsa County, Okla., many of the meetings got stuck because members complained that the data being presented were not accurate. To respond to this, the state DMC Coordinator decided to take the IT representative to the meetings to explain exactly the way the data were inputted. It took years of education, but eventually the individuals attending these meetings all agreed on the reliability of the data.
Understanding the data also helped in targeting DMC–reduction interventions. According to OJJDP’s DMC Technical Assistance Manual, jurisdictions that wish to reduce DMC should base their interventions on data and research that shows where racial disparities exist in their system as well as the potential contributing mechanisms to DMC (Gies, Cohen, and Villarruel 2009). Most of the case study sites in this report also point to the importance of basing interventions on data. For example, since the early 1990s, Connecticut has published three comprehensive DMC assessment studies, which have informed decision-makers where to allocate DMC–reduction resources. In Utah, a thorough review of data helped decision-makers choose diversion as their target DMC–reduction point and make positive change. At times, data awareness alone can help create change. For example, in Montgomery County, Ala., a close look at the data revealed that, at one point, two thirds of the youths being detained in secure detention facilities were originally referred to court from the public schools for minor disorderly conduct offenses. Building awareness of this trend in the school system eventually contributed to a reduction in these referrals.

Incorporating appropriate technology for entering and sharing data also appears to be an important strategy. For example, in Clark County, Nev., when a youth is arrested on the weekend, the booking center can find out in real time about his previous record and whether there is a warrant. Other information is entered into the booking system, which indicates whether the youth should be released to a parent or held until the next court day. This reduces the number of youths who would be locked up on weekends.

“We have such an amazing data system. I can’t imagine doing my job without the data we have and what we have access to.”

—Oklahoma DMC Coordinator

Increasing Collaboration

“When you win over your biggest critic, you are on your way.”

—State DMC Coordinator

All of the sites mentioned the importance of increasing collaboration with other agencies or with the community as vital to addressing DMC. This is not a surprise given that the OJJDP Technical Assistance Manual states that DMC reduction requires strong partnerships (Hsia 2009). All of the nine sites had some sort of committee, task force, or group that made DMC reduction a priority. For example, in Philadelphia, Pa., the Philadelphia Working Group focused on addressing the problem of DMC at the local level and involved the District Attorney’s Office, the Department of Human Services, public defenders, law enforcement, public schools, the Juvenile Court, the mayor’s office, a local university, a behavioral health consultant, faith-based and community organizations, and youth members. Some of the nine case study sites—including Bernalillo County, N.M., and Montgomery County, Ala.—credited their improvements in collaboration to nationwide juvenile justice system improvement efforts such as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI).
In interviews, many of the sites mentioned strategies to engage partners into DMC–reduction efforts. Since most of the leaders of these efforts worked in departments of youth services or probation departments, strategies to engage these agencies were not often mentioned. However, many sites mentioned strategies to engage police or judges as being important, depending on the juvenile justice stages with which they were concerned.

**Engaging Police**

Many of the sites included police officers in their DMC–reduction strategies and on their DMC committees. For example, Utah County, Utah, focused on raising awareness of DMC with law enforcement and presented DMC data to them. New Jersey’s State Advisory Group (SAG) prioritized increasing the use of stationhouse adjustments in police departments to reduce DMC. While most of the sites included law enforcement in their strategies, some of the case study sites employed a large portion of their energies on engaging police. For example, Clark County, Nev., engaged law enforcement, the juvenile justice system, and the community through the Safe Village Initiative, which began in response to a sharp increase in violent crime in one West Las Vegas community with a large minority community. Additionally, Hillsborough County, N.H.; Tulsa County, Okla.; and the state of Connecticut used the *Effective Interactions With Youth* curriculum with police officers. This curriculum was developed in Connecticut to reduce DMC at the arrest stages. The curriculum targets patrol officers and their knowledge of DMC, youth behavior, and effective strategies for interacting with young people, as well as their general attitudes toward young people. Hillsborough County, N.H., and Tulsa County, Okla., were both able to adapt the curriculum to their individual needs. In addition to using the *Effective Interactions With Youth* curriculum, New Hampshire developed and implemented diversity training at the state police academy for police recruits.

Involving police on DMC committees is also an important approach. Most of the nine case study sites have at least one member of the law enforcement community on their statewide DMC committee. Police participate in local DMC committees as well. For example, in Hillsborough County, N.H., the police chiefs have taken a lead on their local DMC committees, and one of the police chiefs is the chair of the statewide DMC committee. In Philadelphia, there is representation from the Housing Authority Police, the Mass Transit Police, the School District Police, the Philadelphia Police, and the sheriff. Finally, the DMC–Reduction Steering Committee in Tulsa County, Okla., consists of representatives from several law enforcement agencies.

**Engaging Judges**

Given the influence they have, engaging judges is important to DMC–reduction efforts, especially when trying to reduce DMC at diversion, detention, and contact points deeper in the system. Each of the case study sites involved judges on its SAG, as part of their DMC committees, or in other systems-reform initiatives. Getting the buy-in of judges was not always easy. Because there tends to be a smaller number of judges compared with other juvenile justice players, one or two judges being against the effort can derail the entire strategy. To avoid this, jurisdictions had to be creative. For example, for Utah County, the Utah state DMC Coordinator and the state Juvenile Justice Specialist decided to go to small, regional meetings.

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*Essex County, N.J., also used the *Effective Interactions With Youth* curriculum—but after the years of data analyzed for this report.*
with judges rather than to large, statewide meetings. In this way, they were able to build allies one at a time and limit the power of the judges who were not as supportive. It also showed that the state cared about the courts at a local level.

**Engaging the Community**

Though many of the sites concentrated primarily on engaging state and local juvenile justice agencies, some of the sites mentioned the importance of engaging the community. For example, in Clark County, Nev., strategies to engage the community include the Latin Chamber of Commerce working with court-involved youth, juvenile justice leadership visiting a struggling housing authority complex weekly, and weekly dinners at the detention center where mentors in the community come to talk to the youth and share their own experiences.

**Changing the Culture**

“It can’t just be lip service. It can’t just be a program. It needs to be the philosophy of the police department.”

—New Hampshire Police Chief

Most of the sites talked about an organizational culture change that was necessary for systemwide improvements. Organizational culture in these organizations normally changed from one where staff felt their roles were merely procedural or that their collective purpose was more to punish the youths to a culture geared toward rehabilitation where staff cared more and concentrated on addressing the youths’ needs so that they could avoid recidivating and succeed in life. For example, a recent report about Bernalillo County, N.M., noted that Bernalillo’s juvenile court “underwent a noteworthy culture change” and quoted the presiding juvenile judge at the time as saying: “We used to think that everybody is better off if this kid is locked in detention. But I think we’ve made a philosophical shift that, in general, we now recognize that detention is not healthy or rehabilitative for kids, even if it is necessary in some cases [to protect public safety]” (Mendel 2013).

Another example is Essex County, N.J., which mentioned promoting a new “mindset” with regard to the juvenile justice system (a system now primarily seen as a court of rehabilitation). Still another is Utah County, Utah, which talked about the importance of changing how diversion officers viewed their positions. Interviewees also noted the importance of culture changes to ensure that staff turnover did not derail the overall effort, saying things such as, “Even when leadership changes, we stay focused on it.”

**Affiliation With National Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives:**

**Models for Change, Burns Institute, CASP, and JDAI**

Many of the case study sites participated in juvenile justice reform efforts with the help of national organizations. These initiatives include the MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change DMC Action Network, the W. Haywood Burns Institute (BI), OJJDP’s Community and Strategic Planning (CASP) Initiative, and the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s JDAI.
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

The Models for Change DMC Action Network was launched in 2007 by the MacArthur Foundation to bring together teams from select local jurisdictions, expose them to the latest thinking of national experts, and give them an opportunity to learn from one another about effective ways to reduce DMC (Models for Change N.d.a). Philadelphia, Pa., became a DMC Action Network member in 2008. As part of the DMC Action Network, Philadelphia implemented a Graduated Sanctions Court and expanded its Youth–Law Enforcement curriculum at the police academy.

The BI is a national organization working to reduce overrepresentation of youth of color in the juvenile justice system. The BI works at reducing racial disparities in the juvenile justice system by promoting and ensuring fairness and equity in youth-serving systems across the nation (Burns Institute N.d.). Clark County, Nev., is a BI site. Clark County stakeholders noted that the BI taught them how to analyze and look more deeply at their data and to identify needs in terms of policy and programming.

The CASP curriculum is part of OJJDP’s overall DMC initiative. Sites are selected through a competitive process. Through CASP, OJJDP provides funding to the selected states to develop effective strategies to facilitate state and local initiatives to reduce DMC throughout the juvenile justice system. The CASP curriculum contains a 12-month implementation timeline to assist with implementing training modules, which include the history of DMC as a core requirement, OJJDP’s enhanced DMC–Reduction Model, community engagement, and how to conduct a DMC assessment study. Philadelphia, Pa.;* Tulsa County, Okla.; and Utah County, Utah, have all participated in CASP.

Table 5.1. Affiliation With National Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>JDAI</th>
<th>Burns Institute</th>
<th>OJJDP CASP</th>
<th>Models for Change DMC Action Network</th>
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<td>Bernalillo County, N.M.</td>
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<td>Clark County, Nev.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connecticut (statewide)</td>
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<td>Essex County, N.J.</td>
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<td>Hillsborough County, N.H.</td>
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<td>Montgomery County, Ala.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, Pa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tulsa County, Okla.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utah County, Utah</td>
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*Pennsylvania was a demonstration site when CASP was implemented in 2010 but is not a current site.

The JDAI is a juvenile justice reform and improvement initiative devoted to reducing overreliance on detention. One of JDAI’s core strategies is to reduce racial disparities (Annie E. Casey Foundation N.d.a). JDAI has been working in sites across the United States for more than 20 years. Today, JDAI is one of the nation’s most widespread juvenile justice system reform initiatives. Five of the nine case study sites are also JDAI sites. Bernalillo County, N.M.; Essex County, N.J.; and Montgomery County, Ala.; all name JDAI as a key strategy in reducing their

*Pennsylvania was a demonstration site when CASP was implemented in 2010 but is not a current site.
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

DMC, especially in changing the culture of their juvenile justice systems. Clark County, Nev., has been a JDAI site for almost 10 years, and interviewees felt that JDAI certainly helped to “get the ball rolling” on juvenile justice reform. New Hampshire is a statewide JDAI site, and although interviewees felt that JDAI was important in their juvenile justice system they did not feel that it had much influence on reducing racial disparities at arrest (the focus of their case study).

Increased Access to Community-Based Alternatives to Formal Court Involvement, Secure Detention, and Confinement

Most of the sites mentioned the importance of having community-based alternatives available for judges, police officers, and other juvenile justice decision-makers when presented with a juvenile who had allegedly committed a crime or other delinquent act. For example, Tulsa County, Okla., mentioned the importance of having a crisis intervention center (CIC) where police can bring youths who are arrested or picked up for delinquent and misdemeanor offenses instead of keeping them in a police lockup or secure detention center. In addition to keeping youths out of secure environments, the CIC can deliver immediate consequences for delinquent behavior, detect and address the underlying causes of problem behavior on the front end as a preventive measure, intervene before problems escalate, and create a more effective and efficient alliance among police, parents, and juvenile justice and treatment providers (Youth Services of Tulsa N.d.). Similarly, Utah mentioned the importance of having receiving centers where youth can go after being arrested. Finally, Philadelphia, Pa.; Essex County, N.J.; and Clark County, Nev.; all mentioned the importance of global positioning system or home-based electronic monitoring as alternatives to secure detention or confinement. Tweaking the monitoring systems to work better for youth was also important. For example, in both Essex County, N.J., and Philadelphia, Pa., electronic monitoring had some drawbacks, including the prerequisite of having a functioning telephone landline with certain requirements. Both sites made changes to the system to reduce processing time and reduce the number of youths in secure detention.

Being Intentional About Addressing Racial Disparities While Using a Nonaccusatory Tone

“My initial approach was not to blame or target or accuse people. It was to have a conversation.”

—New Hampshire Police Chief

Many people in the United States are hesitant to discuss race. It makes many quite uncomfortable. Police and other juvenile justice decision-makers often have a hard time discussing race issues openly, may fear “looking racist,” and thus avoid discussions of this topic. Because of this, many of the interviewees stressed the importance of addressing DMC in an open, nonthreatening way. Some interviewees mentioned starting conversations focused on “fairness” and “systems reforms” in general rather than jumping right into race.

At the same time, race needs to be addressed explicitly. In most of the sites we interviewed, decision-makers agreed that racial disparities will not disappear with overall systems reform.
For example, the DMC Coordinator from Connecticut said, “Nationally, we have done a lot of systems improvement; sometimes that benefits the white kids more and might increase the DMC intentionally.” Additionally, a recent report by the Annie E. Casey Foundation presenting JDAI’s annual results found that, while most JDAI sites reduced their average daily detention population for both white and minority youth, for most sites the reductions for white youth were greater than the reductions for minority youth; thus, as a result, there was more DMC (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2013a). Given these realities, most interviewees agreed that there needs to be an intentional focus on reducing disparities. The Juvenile Justice Specialist from Oklahoma stated: “We go right into bias. It’s really amazing once you’re done with that conversation; it’s like a weight off their shoulders.” Most of the other interviewees agreed that this “weight” needs to be addressed and explicit strategies to reduce DMC must be developed.

**DMC Leadership: Statewide Driven or Locally Driven?**

OJJDP’s *DMC Technical Assistance Manual*, published in 2009, lists eight lessons learned in the DMC field. Two of these are “DMC reduction needs to occur at the local level” and “DMC reduction requires support from the top.” Both of these were mentioned by interviewees, who identified the importance of leadership at both levels. Interviewees also pointed out the importance of having a DMC Coordinator as a source of leadership, continuity, and coordination.

According to OJJDP’s *Disproportionate Minority Contact Technical Assistance Manual*,

> Although the state and/or OJJDP often support [the identification] phase through financial and technical assistance, the jurisdiction carries out the majority of the activities in targeted local communities because the factors or combinations of factors that emerge as important are most likely to be jurisdiction specific or community specific. [2009, 4–1]

The efforts of Clark County, Nev., appear to be driven primarily at the county level. Its systems-reform initiatives and its work to reduce DMC are driven primarily at the county level. Hillsborough County, N.H., noted the importance of having separate DMC committees and events for the different cities given unique local issues and realities. The efforts of Bernalillo County, N.M., at reducing the overreliance on secure detention and reducing DMC were also initiated at the county level.

Alternatively, Connecticut and Utah both pointed to the benefits of having leadership at the state level. Both states have statewide juvenile courts and statewide data collection systems. In many of the identified sites, addressing DMC was a priority first of the state and then in the identified county. For example, both in Utah County, Utah, and in Tulsa County, Okla., the DMC-reduction work was initiated at the state level with direction from the state Juvenile Justice Specialists and the state DMC Coordinators. Additionally, Bernalillo County, N.M., pointed to the benefits of having a statewide risk assessments instrument that was implemented more quickly than if the state had to develop them individually for each county. And New Hampshire noted the importance of incorporating diversity training for all new recruits at the state-run police academy rather than developing training for each county.
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

Many of the selected sites pointed to the importance of having a DMC Coordinator with experience in the field, the ability to bring people together to discuss DMC, and the power to make change. Because DMC Coordinators attend national conferences about DMC and participate in regular conference calls with OJJDP staff and other DMC Coordinators, they are in a unique position to understand what is going on nationally with DMC, including funding and training opportunities, as well as what is working in other sites. Sometimes the DMC Coordinator is a unique fulltime or parttime position; at other times, the Juvenile Justice Specialist also acts as the DMC Coordinator.

In Bernalillo County, N.M., interviewees spoke about making the state DMC Coordinator position “important.” In Utah County, Utah, one interviewee remarked: “We wouldn’t be paying attention to [DMC] at all if it weren’t for [the state DMC Coordinator]. He is very proactive in reaching out and keeping things going at a county and district level.” Tulsa County, Okla., is an example of a jurisdiction that had a local DMC Coordinator who coordinated local DMC-reduction efforts exclusively in the county.

During the interviews for this report, experience in the DMC Coordinator role was mentioned various times as an important asset in many of the sites. For example, in Oklahoma, the state DMC Coordinator had 11 years of experience in her position; in Connecticut, the DMC Coordinator has been in that position for more than 20 years. Experience in similar positions was also noted as important to the DMC Coordinator role. In Hillsborough County, N.H., for example, the state DMC Coordinator was relatively new but had experience and a background in both data collection and diversity training. This background was an advantage in addressing DMC in the state.

“To give it the life and attention DMC deserves, we got a DMC Coordinator. He has made great headway, and we have advanced on our goals.”

—Sheriff from New Hampshire

Working Long Term

Finally, DMC reduction takes a long-term commitment. Many of the individuals interviewed for this report had years and even decades of experience working on DMC reduction and juvenile justice reform. Of the eight lessons learned and identified in OJJDP’s DMC Technical Assistance Manual, one was that DMC reduction requires sustained efforts.

“People think we can change attitudes and beliefs with a conversation. It takes more than that. You need to get over a lot of hurdles. It takes time. At the end of the day, it’s about leadership. You may be long gone before the attitudes shift.”

—New Hampshire Police Chief
6. CASE STUDIES

Bernalillo, N.M.
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem

In the late 1990s, Bernalillo County, N.M., began concentrating on detention reform and DMC reduction in partnership with state partners and the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative (JDAI). Much progress was made, and Bernalillo County was subsequently named a model JDAI site. The county was also highlighted on OJJDP’s DMC–Reduction Best Practices Database. Nevertheless, there were still racial disparities at certain points in Bernalillo County’s juvenile justice system. In 2004 the relative rate index (RRI) for Hispanic youths being referred to probation from law enforcement was 1.9, the RRI for Hispanic youths being referred to the Children’s Court Attorney (CCA) was 1.3,* and the RRI for Hispanic youths being diverted from the system was only 0.61. Racial disparities existed at these points for African American and Native American youths as well.

Juvenile Justice Strategies

“Bernalillo is making headway. There can be multiple reasons for this because there are multiple strategies being used.”

—DMC Coordinator, New Mexico

Since the late 1990s, Bernalillo County, N.M., has been focused on making systems reforms to reduce overreliance on secure detention and reduce DMC. Partners in this effort have included local agencies such as the Bernalillo County Youth Services Center; the Children’s Court Division of the Second Judicial District Court; the Children, Youth and Families Juvenile Probation Office; the District Attorney’s Office; and the Public Defender Office. Bernalillo County also worked closely with the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s JDAI as well as with the New Mexico Juvenile Justice Specialist and DMC Coordinator. In the past few years, many of the successful strategies have continued and some new ones, including the creation of a Prevention Unit after referral to court, have emerged.

A History of Success. Bernalillo County is a JDAI model site (Annie E. Casey Foundation N.d.b), and its work has already been highlighted in the DMC–Reduction Best Practices Database.

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*Bernalillo County, N.M., is home to some 670,000 residents, including 158,995 youths under age 18. Bernalillo is the largest county in New Mexico and home to the largest city in the state, Albuquerque, where most Bernalillo County residents live. In the past 10 years, the youth population grew 11 percent. By 2012, the youths between the ages of 10 and 17 are 29 percent white, 3 percent African American, 5 percent Native American, 2 percent Asian American, and 61 percent Hispanic (Puzzanchera, Sladky, and Kang 2013).† About 27 percent of the children under 18 living in Bernalillo County live in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).‡

†The referral rate for Bernalillo County was based on arrest.
‡2002 and 2012 data.
§2011 data.
Bernalillo has been recognized as a successful jurisdiction because of its decreasing reliance on secure detention and its DMC reduction, which resulted from numerous systemwide reforms. The county methodically reorganized its resources, budget, and staff to concentrate on community-based treatment and innovative policies. The Bernalillo County Juvenile Detention Center then reassigned staff to frontend services and closed secure units, saving the county hundreds of thousands of dollars. After closing its maximum-security facility in 2003, the county directed some of the cost savings into acquiring portable buildings outside the detention center’s razor-wire fence to house an alternative public school, a community-custody program, a day treatment program, and a mental health clinic (Annie E. Casey Foundation N.d.b). The results have been considerable:

By improving system operations and offering a greater array of programmatic choices, Bernalillo County has made great strides in reducing the number of youth overall—including minority youth—who come into contact with the juvenile justice system. Much of this success has come from decreasing the reliance on locked detention. The population of the Juvenile Detention Center has declined from an average daily population of 113 in 1999 to 47 in 2004. Over a 6-year period (from 1999 to 2005), the number of youth booked declined from 4,726 to 3,892, and the number of youth booked and held in confinement dropped from 2,494 to 1,549. Fewer youth are going to detention and those who are placed in detention stay fewer days. The average length of stay fell from 15 days to 13 days. [Gies, Cohen, and Villarruel 2009]

During this time, racial disparities in detention also decreased. The proportion of detained youths who were minority decreased from 72 percent in 1999 to 62 percent in 2005, even as the general proportion of minority youths in the general youth population was increasing.

Since then, state, county, and community partners have continued to work on systems reforms in Bernalillo County to reduce contact with the juvenile justice system for all youth and to reduce racial disparities. Among other things, they sustained their status as a JDAI site, established a community mental health clinic to serve court-involved youth, created a prevention unit for youth with second or third referrals to court, continued to make data collection a priority both statewide and in the county, created additional alternatives to detention and maintained existing ones, strengthened the positive juvenile justice culture change galvanized by their JDAI involvement, and continued to receive support from the State Advisory Group (SAG).

Created a Culture Where System Reform Was a Priority. With the implementation of JDAI, there was a clear culture change in Bernalillo County’s juvenile justice system. According to Tommy Jewell, Bernalillo County’s then-presiding juvenile judge: “We used to think that everybody is better off if this kid is locked in detention. But I think we’ve made a philosophical shift that, in general, we now recognize that detention is not healthy or rehabilitative for kids, even if it’s necessary in some cases [to protect public safety]” (Mendel 2013). This culture is also evident in major system changes such as the closing of the county’s maximum-security facility in 2003 and the opening of the community mental health center in 2002, which has been called “a project that is like no other in the entire nation” (Bernalillo County, N.M., N.d.a). According to the Juvenile Justice Specialist at the time, Richard Lindahl, the continuity of leadership in Bernalillo County has been good for several years, and although people may
change positions there have been smooth transitions. For example, some of the juvenile court judges who were involved when JDAI was beginning to move to different courts, but their successors have been just as involved in JDAI and DMC reduction. Mr. Lindahl noted that “although there have been changes, there has been total continuity in efforts among the judges, probation, and detention.” When individuals leave their positions, they train their successors. This is not always the case in other jurisdictions.

Made Data Collection and Analysis a Priority Statewide. One of JDAI’s eight core strategies is to use accurate data to diagnose system problems and assess the impact of reforms. At the state level, New Mexico has concentrated on establishing an accurate data collection system to identify areas to fix and implement changes. For example, New Mexico developed a risk assessment instrument to determine detention eligibility in 2003, which continues to be used statewide. Additionally, in 2008, New Mexico was the first state to develop an Internet-based, real-time information system called SARA (Screening, Admissions, and Release Application), which is a secure Web site that is available to all juvenile justice offices, detention center, and courts. SARA consistently screens children eligible for detention while also accurately tracking admissions into and releases out of detention and movements from one detention center to another. The system is designed to reduce the risk to public safety through unified tracking of client history and outcomes regarding detention and nonsecure alternatives. In 2010, the Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee (JJAC) funded the development of an enhancement to the SARA system that interfaced the juvenile self-reported and often inaccurate demographic race/ethnicity data with juvenile probation data from FACTS* to ensure that New Mexico has the highest quality race and ethnicity data for the purpose of assessing disproportionate treatment of minorities in the juvenile justice system (New Mexico Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee 2013).

Made Data Collection and Analysis a Priority in Bernalillo County. Bernalillo County has also dedicated significant resources to developing a strong capacity for data collection and analysis. In 2006 the JJAC helped Bernalillo County fund a position to analyze its juvenile detention data. A couple of years later, the county picked up the position and added an additional parttime position as well. Bernalillo County has a separate data system and is supported in part under JDAI. The county also has extensive DMC and RRI data. The former Juvenile Justice Specialist recently said: “They have developed the ability to have good data analysis. They collect it well and analyze it. That is amazing.”

Established a Community Mental Health Clinic to Serve Detained Youth. In 1999, Bernalillo County Detention Director Thomas E. Swisstack directed his staff to study the mental health status of the youths held in secure detention. The study uncovered striking mental health needs. It also revealed that youths with a mental health diagnosis were more likely to return to detention than other youths and that most of the youths being served in detention were either on Medicaid or eligible for Medicaid. In response, Mr. Swisstack expanded the scope and quality of mental health treatment services for youths inside the secure detention facility, which improved the county’s ability to stabilize mental health conditions and improve behavior. Unfortunately, these improvements were often temporary, and once many of the youths left

*FACTS, for Family Automated Client Tracking System, is a statewide data management system in New Mexico.
the detention center the problems resurfaced; many of the youths subsequently returned to detention. To address the mental health needs of youth after leaving detention, Bernalillo County took “extraordinary steps” and established a licensed freestanding community mental health clinic adjacent to its detention facility in 2002. The clinic is required to serve children of all ages, referred from anywhere in the county, but the vast majority of clients have been court involved, and most of them were referred through the probation department. During 2003–11, between 462 and 601 youths participated each year. According to a 2013 report published by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the clinic has proven a useful component in Bernalillo County’s notable successes in reducing detention population and promoting success for court-involved youth (Mendel 2013).

**Used a Prevention Unit to Divert Youths From Formal Court Involvement.** Youths who are referred from law enforcement on a first, second, or third misdemeanor charge are eligible to go to the Prevention Unit. The Prevention Unit’s focus is on diverting youths from the formal juvenile justice system and preventing their return to court. There are various diversion programs available, which are organized using a graduated sanctions framework and have shifted over the years given the changing needs of youths. For example, youths who are referred from law enforcement on a first misdemeanor charge can participate in the Girls Circle or Boys Circle. The circle programs are immediate sanctions that use restorative justice principles, which are recommended by OJJDP’s *Model Programs Guide*. On the second offense, youths can participate in the Alternatives to Violence program or the Scouts program, depending on the charge. By the third charge, youths meet with probation officers to develop individualized plans. Bernalillo County diverts about 50 percent of the youths referred to probation by law enforcement through the Prevention Unit.

**Created Alternatives to Detention.** Alternatives to secure detention were created, enhanced, and sustained to initiate and maintain the decrease in secure detention use. In 1998, Bernalillo County was already operating a home detention and electronic monitoring program, but it was used infrequently. On any given day, just four or five youths were enrolled in the alternative, and no staff had been solely dedicated to the alternative programs. Today, alternatives to detention are used much more frequently. Staff members have been reassigned to work on these alternative programs, and during just one quarter, in 2011, 90 youths were served by the Community Custody Program (CCP) and 130 youths were served by the Youth Reporting Center (YRC). The CCP employs a flexible system of six levels of supervision that are graduated and range from minimal supervision to intensive supervision (intensive supervision includes electronic enhancements and increased face-to-face contacts with random field checks at school, work, or home). The CCP uses a treatment/rehabilitation philosophy and provides individual assessments to determine the services each child should receive. This alternative to detention offers counseling, recreation, group therapy, and community service. The program provides outreach by sending officers into the community to facilitate services and provide supervision (Bernalillo County, N.M., N.d.b). Some of the youths in CCP also participate in the YRC program. The YRC is dedicated to offering continuing services and programming with a wide variety of structured programs that are geared toward skill-based instruction that promote, encourage, and reinforce proactive and acceptable social behaviors (Bernalillo

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*The fourth referral is an automatic referral to the district attorney.*
County, N.M., N.d.c). These alternatives cost significantly less than secure detention. In fiscal year 2010, these alternatives cost $30 per day, compared with $280 per day for detention (Swisstack 2010).

**Received Support at the State Level.** The SAG in New Mexico (the JJAC, or Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee) is very active and focused on prevention, diversion, and intervention. The JJAC has awarded about $200,000 in federal Formula Grants a year to Bernalillo County for many years to help with its systems-reform work. State funds have also supported the global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring program used as an alternative to detention. In 2007 and 2008, New Mexico issued 170 GPS monitors to all 23 jurisdictions in the state as an alternative to detention. Policy and procedures were put into place to ensure that only those eligible would be placed on GPS monitors. Finally, support at the state level has also come from the DMC Coordinator and the former Juvenile Justice Specialist, who both had years of experience working on DMC and system reform. Their expertise has been recognized nationally and has been an asset to Bernalillo County. For example, in 2008, New Mexico’s Juvenile Justice Specialist, Richard Lindahl, won the Tony Gobar Outstanding Juvenile Justice Specialist Award, which recognizes one state Juvenile Justice Specialist who has exemplified excellence in service to others, has been dedicated and committed to improving the juvenile justice system, and has demonstrated compassion and concern for juveniles and advocates. At the award ceremony, the presenter said, “In his own quiet and steady manner, he has contributed substantial and long-lasting improvements to our juvenile justice system” (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2008).

**Data Improvements**

During 2004–10, the minority youth population in Bernalillo County grew, while the white youth population shrunk. During this time, the white youth population decreased by 20 percent, the African American youth population increased by 29 percent, the Hispanic youth population increased 7 percent, and the Native American youth population increased 6 percent. Even with these demographic changes, racial disparities decreased. Bernalillo County was able to reduce racial disparities for African American youths, Hispanic youths, and Native American youths who were referred by law enforcement to probation; for African American youths and Hispanic youths who were referred from probation to the CCA; and for African American youths, Hispanic youths, and Native American youths who were diverted from the juvenile justice system.

**Law Enforcement Referrals to Probation.** During 2004–10, there was a decrease in the overall number of law enforcement referrals to probation, a decrease in law enforcement referral-to-probation rates, and a decrease in racial disparities at the law enforcement referral-to-probation stage. In 2010, there were 36 percent fewer total law enforcement referrals than in 2004 (see Table 6.1). Referral rates decreased for white, African American, and Hispanic youth. For white youths, the referral rate decreased from 9 referrals per 100 youths to 7 referrals per 100 youths; the African American referral rate decreased from 16 to 7; the Hispanic referral rate declined from 16 to 10; and the Native American referral rate decreased from 11 to 6 (see Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3). The RRI improved from 1.9 to 1.1 for African American youths, improved from 1.9 to 1.5 for Hispanic youths, and improved from 1.3 to 0.9 for Native American youths.
Figure 6.1. Law Enforcement Referrals to Probation Rates and RRI: African American

![Graph showing referral rates and RRI for African American youth.](image)

"Law enforcement referrals to probation" are similar to "arrests" in other jurisdictions.

Figure 6.2. Law Enforcement Referrals to Probation Rates and RRI: Hispanic

![Graph showing referral rates and RRI for Hispanic youth.](image)

"Law enforcement referrals to probation" are similar to "arrests" in other jurisdictions.

Figure 6.3. Law Enforcement Referrals to Probation Rates and RRI: Native American

![Graph showing referral rates and RRI for Native American youth.](image)

"Law enforcement referrals to probation" are similar to "arrests" in other jurisdictions.
Referral to the Children’s Court Attorney. After a youth is referred to probation by law enforcement, a decision must be made about whether to refer the youth to the Children’s Court Attorney. Referrals to the CCA for all youths decreased from 4,315 in 2004 to 2,607 in 2010, a decrease of 40 percent (see Table 6.2). African American referral rates decreased from 66 referrals per 100 arrests to 46 referrals per 100 arrests, and Hispanic referrals decreased from 52 to 48 referrals per 100 arrests (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5). During this time, white referral rates stayed between 39 and 47 referrals per 100 arrests.

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**Figure 6.4. Referral-to-CCA Rates and RRI: African American**

*Rate per 100 law enforcement referrals to probation. “Referrals” refer to Preliminary Inquiry Decisions (refer to CCA).*
Figure 6.5. Referral-to-CCA Rates and RRI: Hispanic

Table 6.2. Bernalillo County Referral to Children’s Court Attorney Numbers, 2004–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Referrals</th>
<th>White Referrals</th>
<th>African American Referrals</th>
<th>Hispanic Referrals</th>
<th>Asian American Referrals</th>
<th>Native American Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4,315</td>
<td>862</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>2,873</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4,023</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2,554</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,586</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,058</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1,993</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,607</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>1,737</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diversion.** Diversion rates have also improved for Hispanic, African American, and Native American youth, which has resulted in a decrease in the RRI. The Hispanic RRI value at diversion has steadily increased from 0.80 in 2004 to 0.95 in 2010 (see Figure 6.7). Though the populations are much smaller, the diversion RRI values have also improved for African American youth and Native American youth (from 0.65 to 0.98 and from 0.84 to 0.96, respectively).
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

Figure 6.6. Diversion Rates and RRI: African American

Figure 6.7. Diversion Rates and RRI: Hispanic

Figure 6.8. Diversion Rates and RRI: Native American

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Table 6.3. Bernalillo County Diversion Numbers, 2004–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Diversions</th>
<th>White Diversions</th>
<th>African American Diversions</th>
<th>Hispanic Diversions</th>
<th>Asian American Diversions</th>
<th>Native American Diversions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4,064</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2,441</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4,078</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2,209</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,855</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2,469</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,609</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2,320</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,441</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2,218</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

Bernalillo County, N.M., was able to decrease racial disparities among law enforcement referrals to probation, referrals to the CCA, and diversions from the juvenile justice system for African American, Hispanic, and Native American youth over an extended number of years. This DMC reduction was most likely a result of multiple strategies designed primarily around systems reform, attention to data, and increasing community-based services for court-involved youth. Bernalillo County became a JDAI site in the 1990s and has dedicated many years utilizing the JDAI framework to improve its system. Much of their effort has been aimed at reducing the number of youths in secure detention and serving detained youths after they return to the community. Research has shown that placement in secure detention can increase reoffending and that alternatives to detention can curb crime and recidivism better than secure detention (Holman and Ziedenberg 2006). As a result, it makes sense that the declines in the total number of youths being detained and the decreases in racial disparities at secure detention could positively affect the future juvenile referrals to probation and to the CCA. Increased access to mental health and diversion services for minority youth can also contribute to reductions in racial disparities at the front end of the juvenile justice system, for untreated mental health disorders are often the underlying reasons for some youths’ delinquency (Center for Children and Youth Justice). State juvenile probation partners in Bernalillo County also concentrated directly on increasing access to diversion by establishing the Prevention Unit. Bernalillo County’s efforts have received national attention, and county officials continue to work on improving their system. Their ability to involve multiple partners over long periods of time, even when individuals move to new positions, is notable and an important factor in their success—as is the expertise and the commitment of many of these partners.
Clark County, Nev. Disproportionate Minority Contact—Reduction Case Study

The Problem
In 2007, there were significant racial disparities for African American youth in Clark County, Nev., both in detention and in the state secure confinement facility. The relative rate index (RRI) for African American youth at secure confinement was 2.4. The RRI at secure detention was 1.7.

Juvenile Justice Strategies
In Clark County, numerous juvenile justice strategies were implemented after 2007. Most of these were designed to improve the system overall, while others were focused specifically on reducing racial disparities. Given the large size of Clark County, numerous activities, events, strategies, collaborations, and committees occurred simultaneously. Some of the key ones are presented here.

Changing the Culture—Developing a Staff Focused on the Well-Being of the Youth and Reducing Recidivism
“Our first commitment is to keep the kids from recidivating. Law enforcement [is] secondary.”
—Director of Clark County Juvenile Justice Services

In 2004, Clark County became a Juvenile Detention Alternative Initiative (JDAI) site. JDAI was an important tool in getting collaborative juvenile justice reform work started in Clark County, and juvenile justice leadership took the lead in making positive changes in the system. According to the JDAI Web site, there were reductions in the average daily detention population after the JDAI framework was used, primarily because of daily monitoring of the population, better training of supervisors, closing of the largest detention unit, and a hands-on JDAI coordinator.

JDAI was the first step in changing the culture of the Clark County Department of Juvenile Services (DJJS). Today, at all levels of the DJJS, the culture reflects that of a youth-serving agency, which concentrates on what a youth needs to improve his or her life outcomes (and less of a law enforcement culture). This culture is clear at the top management level.

DJJS Director John Martin refers to his organization as “law enforcement that does social services” and recently said, “If you can’t get passionate about these kids, who can you get passionate about?” Mr. Martin has direct experience rebuilding troubled systems. Significantly,

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\[^*\]2012 data.
\[^\dagger\]2011 data.
he is a “believer in second chances for children and has dedicated his professional life to improving systems to serve children and families” (Clark County, Nev., N.d.b). Other decision-makers, such as previous directors and JDAI coordinators, have also contributed to this positive culture change.

There has been a culture change within the frontline staff as well, which was a result of changes in training, organizational, and hiring practices. For example, the Juvenile Probation Officer (JPO) hiring process was changed. Previously, the JPO test was based mostly on law-related questions. But now, to ensure that the individuals who are hired are committed to the process and want to work with people, 40 human-relations questions are incorporated. Additionally, there are now numerous committees consisting of individuals from diverse levels of the system who all have an equal voice. This helps ensure buy-in from staff. Three examples of committees are the training committee, the policy committee, and the ropes course committee. Staff members recently put together a mentoring program—called Brother to Brother or Sister to Sister—which connected system-involved youths to mentors in the community.

As a result of these training, hiring, and staff engagement strategies, staff now spend more time engaging in conversations with youths and teaching them the social skills they need to be successful. There has been a more humanistic approach in how the youths are treated, and conditions of confinement have improved. For example, in 2003 there were more than 1,500 episodes of 24-hour room confinement, compared with today, when there are 6 to 12 a year.

**Increased Adherence to a Risk Assessment Instrument.** Since 2005, Clark County has used a risk assessment instrument (RAI) to determine whether a youth is placed into secure detention. The RAI uses a scoring system that weighs specified risk factors associated with public safety. It was developed with the intent of finding an objective means of deciding which youths would be detained (Clark County Department of Juvenile Justice Services 2013). New leadership in 2008 led to increased enforcement of the RAI. Discretionary overrides, which occur when a youth is detained because of a special circumstance that is not listed as a category in the RAI, are now rare (fewer than 5 percent each year since 2008). To receive an override, approval must be granted by the detention manager and the assistant director of the DJJS. Before approval for an override is granted, the management staff walks through all of the steps to make sure that all resources have been utilized and all alternatives considered. The goal is to avoid the harshest options whenever possible. Significantly, the discretionary overrides do not show bias toward minority youth.

**Engaging Law Enforcement and the Minority Community.** There are many activities and groups aimed at building relationships between the juvenile justice system and the community. For example, the Latin Chamber of Commerce works with court-involved youth twice per week, juvenile justice leadership visits a struggling housing authority complex weekly and participates in numerous school and community activities, and there are weekly dinners at the detention center where mentors in the community come to speak with youth and share their experiences. Juvenile justice leaders have also been building relationships with numerous community groups such as the local mosque and the local chapter of the NAACP.
There are also many noteworthy initiatives aimed at building relationships between the police and the juvenile justice system. The director of DJJS recently stated that the law enforcement piece was very important and that having law enforcement officials at the table at community meetings with minority leaders has been “pivotal to moving the community forward.” He also added, “It’s magical to see that happen.” One example of these initiatives is the Safe Village Initiative, one of the largest engagement strategies, which engages numerous individuals in government, law enforcement, and the community. The Safe Village Initiative began its work in 2007 in response to a sharp increase in violent crime in the West Las Vegas community known as William 5/6 (Gillespie 2008). Safe Village is a multifaceted partnership among law enforcement, government agencies, the community, and faith-based organizations to reduce violence and its impact in selected neighborhoods. The steering committee produced a simple plan based on best practices that would run smoothly as different personnel would be assigned.

**Home Management and Global Positioning Satellite Monitoring as Alternatives to Secure Detention.** The Clark County Detention Review and Release Program (DRRP) provides judges with alternatives to secure detention for youth, when appropriate. Through the DRRP, judges can order home management or global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring instead of sending youths to detention. Youths who are released to the community under home management and/or GPS monitoring agree to be held accountable for abiding by the conditions stipulated in the behavioral contract, which restricts activities beyond school, work, medical, and religious reasons to ensure public safety. Probation officers conduct numerous unannounced home, school, employment, and community visits 7 days a week during day and late-evening hours to ensure compliance. During 2008–12, while the number of secure detentions decreased over 10 percent, the number of youths on home management or GPS more than doubled (Clark County Department of Juvenile Justice Services 2013).

Notably, 2012 data show that there are no racial disparities disadvantaging minority youth in the decision to use home management or GPS compared with secure detention. Juveniles violating either the home management or the GPS monitoring contract rules face a series of graduated sanctions, including detention (Clark County Department of Juvenile Justice Services 2013).

**Increased Reliance on Data and Technology.** Use of accurate data is important in any DMC–reduction initiative. Clark County uses data and technology on a daily basis to improve its juvenile justice system. The site compiles systemwide juvenile justice data for distribution on a yearly basis, uses data throughout the year to examine the results of programs and procedures, and strives to implement technological solutions to make the system work better for youths and families. Clark County’s data collection system is called Family Tracking Reporting and Automatic Case Reports, or FamilyTRAC.

Each year, the DJJS publishes a statistical report that includes data on court-involved youth. For example, the 2012 data book included 88 pages of information on youths in the general population as well as court-involved youths at referral, intake, diversion, petition, disposition, detention, probation, and confinement and on youths using community-based alternatives. Information for youths referred to court is presented by gender, race, time of offense, referral sources, charges, and other legal and extralegal variables. When available, data trends are
presented for the past 5 years. This data book is published in a user-friendly format so stakeholders can easily access and use the data.

Additionally, court data are used on an ongoing basis. For example, recently there was a concern that white youths were more likely to be placed on GPS monitoring as an alternative to detention than minority youths were. As a result, decision-makers came together and analyzed the existing data. In the end, the data showed that the racial breakdown of youths placed on GPS monitoring was similar to those being sent to detention. By using data in real time, they were able to show that their GPS monitoring tool was working. Internal data reviews such as these help improve the likelihood that the system is run without bias.

Clark County also uses technology to accelerate detention decision-making when court is closed. This reduces the number of youths who would be locked up on weekends. For example, when a youth is arrested on the weekend, the booking center can find out in real time about his or her previous record and whether there is a warrant. Other information is entered into the booking system, which indicates whether the youth should be released to a parent or held until the next court day.

**Programming in Detention.** Clark County has improved programming for youths in detention during the past few years, and juvenile justice decision-makers believe that, by doing so, fewer youths are sentenced to their staff secure facility at adjudication. Programs offered by detention staff emphasize building self-esteem, drug awareness, guidelines to positive behavior, health and hygiene, gang intervention, life skills training, conflict resolution, current events, arts and crafts, yoga, and cultural awareness. The Clark County School District provides educational services that include the standard core subjects, as well as physical education, special education, and adult education. A school counselor and second-language services are also provided. The Mental Health Treatment Team, which consists of an assistant manager, five licensed clinicians, and a parttime contracted, board-certified child and adolescent psychiatrist, provides best practice assessment and treatment of youth in detention (Clark County, Nev., N.d.a).

One example of a detention center program is the Creating a Successful Environment (CASE) Program, which was developed to provide a safe and secure environment, enhance positive life skills, and gain the cooperation and compliance of youth in detention. CASE encourages positive interaction with staff and peers. The goal is “prevention and resolution” of problem behavior by ensuring that rules and expectations are known, understood, and followed and by providing a mechanism to recognize youths for their positive behavior while in detention.

**An Emphasis on Reducing DMC.** Clark County juvenile justice decision-makers understand that, while excellent programs, community engagement, and fair policies for all youth are vital to the effectiveness of the juvenile justice system, there must be an intentional emphasis on race to reduce racial disparities. Thus, Clark County has done the following:

- Engaged people of color in community-wide efforts (see above).
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

• Formed the Racial Disparities Workgroup, which is part of a larger group of juvenile justice system reformers. This larger group consists of numerous individuals, including judges, elected officials, juvenile justice system leaders and staff, concerned citizens, and the local JDAI Coordinator. The Racial Disparities Workgroup concentrates on using data to ensure fairness in processing. For example, the group has looked closely at judicial orders and violations of probation to examine trends.

• Made DMC reduction a public issue. Clark County juvenile justice leaders have spoken about racial disparities at numerous meetings, forums, and other public spaces. For example, the director of the Clark County DJJS recently spoke on a radio show about DMC and the importance of getting people involved in the issue.

• Worked with the W. Haywood Burns Institute (BI), which is a national nonprofit organization dedicated to reducing racial disparities in the juvenile justice system by promoting and ensuring fairness and equity in youth-serving systems across the nation. Clark County stakeholders noted that BI taught them how to analyze and look more deeply at their data and to identify needs in terms of policy and programming.

Data Improvements
From 2007 to 2011, there were reductions in racial disparities in Clark County at both the secure detention stage and the secure confinement stage.

Secure Detention. During 2007–11, the total number of detentions went from 3,800 to 3,362, a nearly 12 percent decrease (see Table 6.4). The RRI for African American youth at detention decreased from 1.7 to 1.4 during this time (see Figure 6.9). Notably, racial disparities for Hispanic youth at detention have been almost nonexistent for the period studied (see Figure 6.10).
Figure 6.10. Detention Rates and RRI: Hispanic*

Table 6.4. Clark County Detention Numbers, 2007–11*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White Detentions</th>
<th>African American Detentions</th>
<th>Asian American Detentions</th>
<th>Hispanic Detentions</th>
<th>Other Detentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3,732</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>3,603</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1,296</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3,362</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secure Confinement.* Additionally, during 2007–11, three secure confinement indicators declined: the number of youths with new secure confinements, the secure confinement rates for African American youths, and the RRI for African American youths at secure confinement.† The total number of youths classified as new confinements from Clark County decreased from 374 in 2007 to 243 in 2011, a reduction of 35 percent (see Table 6.5). By 2011 the white secure confinement rate was 8.4 confinements per 1,000 referrals, while the African American confinement rate was 14.5 secure confinements per 1,000 referrals—resulting in a relative rate index of 1.7. This level of disparity declined steadily from 2007, when the African American rate was 22.5 compared with the white rate of 9.4—resulting in a 2007 RRI value of 2.4 (see Figure 6.11).

*Secure detention differs from secure confinement. For more information, see chapter 2 of this report.
†“Secure confinement” refers to Clark County Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) placements.
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

Figure 6.11. Secure Confinement Rates and RRI: African American

![Graph showing Secure Confinement Rates and RRI: African American]

*Data Source: Clark County Department of Juvenile Justice Services. DCFS Dispositions.

Table 6.5. Clark County Secure Confinement Numbers, 2007–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>White Confinements</th>
<th>African American Confinements</th>
<th>Hispanic Confinements</th>
<th>Other Confinements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data Source: Clark County Department of Juvenile Justice Services. DCFS Dispositions.

Conclusion

Clark County is a large jurisdiction with a majority minority-youth population. To reduce racial disparities at detention and secure confinement, Clark County used numerous systemwide strategies, including better incorporation of technology and data analysis, adherence to a risk assessment instrument, increasing access to alternatives to secure detention and confinement, and changing the culture of the system toward one that concentrates on addressing the needs of the youth (rather than focusing on law enforcement). Throughout, Clark County also made sure that there was an intentional concentration on DMC by having a Racial Disparities Workgroup, making DMC reduction a public issue, and working with a national DMC technical assistance provider. These strategies appear to have made a positive impact on the number of youths being sent to detention and secure confinement and on racial disparities. Given the many efforts at engaging the police and the community, it is hoped that there will be improvements at the arrest and referral-to-court stages very soon.
Connecticut
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem
Connecticut has been intent on reducing disproportionately minority contact (DMC) statewide for decades. However, although many gains had been made, the latest DMC assessment study (which used 2006 data) showed disparate handling in 9 of the 18 contact points studied, even when controlling for a variety of factors such as demographics, incident characteristics, and jurisdiction. One of these contact points showing disparate handling was referral to court, which had not been identified in previous Connecticut DMC assessment studies, indicating that this was a new area of concern. In 2006 the relative rate index (RRI) at police referral to court was 2.9 for Hispanic youth and 6.3 for African American youth.

Juvenile Justice Strategies
Connecticut has had steady leadership from the DMC Coordinator (who is also the Juvenile Justice Specialist) for decades and a supportive State Advisory Group (SAG), called the Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee (JJAC), with multiple subcommittees that have made data analysis and utilization a priority. After more than 20 years of data analysis and implementation of DMC–reduction strategies, the JJAC has learned that to reduce DMC, they must concentrate specifically on DMC reduction and not on general juvenile justice system improvement alone. Additionally, there must be an emphasis on changing the behavior of system practitioners, not that of youth. Connecticut has worked on building awareness of DMC issues, fostering working relationships between schools and police, and creating a training curriculum for police officers that was subsequently found to be effective in enhancing the officers’ knowledge of DMC and strategies for interacting with youth.

Data and Research. Since the early 1990s, Connecticut has published three comprehensive DMC assessment studies of its juvenile justice system, the last of which was published in 2009 (Richetelli, Hartstone, and Murphy), using 2006 data. The studies looked closely at various decision points in the Connecticut juvenile justice system to identify contact points where disparate decision-making was occurring. The analysis went beyond Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) requirements by examining contact points such as the

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*For example, how police became aware of the incident, number of offenders, school versus nonschool incident.
†For example, distance from detention center, presence of a juvenile review board, size of city/town.
‡2012 data.
§2011 data.
holding of youth in the police station (securely or not) and measuring the amount of time youth spent at residential placements (secure or not) after being adjudicated delinquent. This in-depth analysis informed the JJAC on which decision points to target for DMC action. These analyses were possible because of a statewide court data collection system.

**Stability of Leadership and an Active State Advisory Group.** Connecticut has had the same DMC Coordinator, Valerie LaMotte, for more than 20 years. Her experience, commitment, and expertise have benefited Connecticut. She is well known nationally and has presented at numerous conferences and published various pieces on DMC. In Connecticut, Ms. LaMotte works closely with the JJAC, which meets regularly and has nine subcommittees, including three that directly address DMC (the Subcommittee on DMC, the Police/Juvenile Task Group, and the School/Police Task Group). The JJAC’s membership has been consistent over many years, and in addition to the JJAC members appointed by the governor, the subcommittees include non–JJAC members related to the particular task. Connecticut’s Subcommittee on DMC developed recommendations to the JJAC based on the findings of Connecticut’s assessment studies and recommended action strategies for implementation. In addition, the subcommittee developed a plan to share the study findings and recommendations statewide. The other two relevant subcommittees are described below.

**Police/Juvenile Task Group.** As part of the process of implementing DMC assessment study recommendations, the JJAC convened a group of police personnel in 2004 to look into police decision-making when handling juveniles. After considerable deliberation, the Police/Juvenile Task Group focused its efforts on creating a 1-day curriculum titled *Effective Police Interactions With Youth* (see below). It also created two videos to advertise the training.

**Training for Police Officers.** The *Effective Police Interactions With Youth* training curriculum was developed between 2004 and 2006 to reduce DMC at the arrest stage. The curriculum targets patrol officers and their knowledge of DMC, youth behavior, and effective strategies for interacting with young people, as well as their general attitudes toward young people (LaMotte et al. 2010). Training of Connecticut police officers started in 2007. Since then, more than 1,500 Connecticut police officers have been trained in the curriculum, which has been shared with numerous other jurisdictions as well. An evaluation of the training, published in *Police Quarterly* in 2010, found that the training curriculum did indeed enhance police officers’ knowledge and improve their attitudes toward youth.

**School/Police Task Group.** In 2010 the JJAC convened the School/Police Task Group to address school-based DMC in disciplinary actions. The group consisted of about 25 members from schools, police departments, and advocacy agencies. Concentrating on improving school response to discipline problems was important in Connecticut given the racial disparities that existed in the school data. For example, a recent report found that while African American youths accounted for only 14 percent of all youths enrolled in public schools, they accounted for 30 percent of the disciplinary offenses; while Hispanics youth accounted for 17 percent of enrolled students, they accounted for 29 percent of the disciplinary offenses (State Education

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*Three of the other case study sites in the report—Hillsborough, N.H.; Tulsa, Okla.; and Essex, N.J.—have also used this curriculum.*
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

Resource Center 2011). The School/Police Task Group developed four core assumptions to its work: 1) graduated response to school-based incidents, 2) collaboration and partnership at the local level, 3) utilization of prevention, early identification, and service referrals as interventions, and 4) defining the extent of the problem with reliable data.

**Model Memorandum of Agreement Between Schools and Police Departments.** Based on its core assumptions, the School/Police Task Group developed a six-page model memorandum of agreement (MOA) and encouraged superintendents of schools together with chiefs of police in local communities to formalize their working relationship using the model MOA. The goals of the MOA were to reduce school-based arrests and referrals to court and to ensure a consistent response to incidents of student misbehavior. The School/Police Task group promoted the MOA, which is also available online. Communities that adopted the MOA could apply for up to $20,000 in funds for preventive and intervention services. In 2011, nine communities participated in this program. In 2013 the Center for Applied Research in Human Development at the University of Connecticut evaluated the effectiveness of using these MOAs to reduce arrests. The study found that, after MOAs were implemented, there was a significant reduction in the percentage of incidents that led to arrests. When controlling for a variety of variables including sex, grade, minority status, and school district, serious incidents that occurred after implementing an MOA were 3.7 times less likely to end in arrest compared with serious incidents that occurred before implementation of an MOA. The study also found that ethnic and racial minority youth continued to be disproportionately represented among students arrested, even after implementing the MOA. However, further analysis showed that some headway was being made regarding DMC. For example, the study found that minority status was not a significant predictor in number of days sanctioned after an incident.

**Awareness of DMC Statewide.** Connecticut built awareness of DMC through various approaches, including presentations, surveys, and professionally designed Web sites. In 2009 the JJAC began implementing a communications plan to build support for DMC reduction by reaching out to policymakers, juvenile justice practitioners, and the public. The plan included language to convince people that race does affect how youths are treated, to present DMC as something that should be everyone’s concern, and to encourage individuals to change practices rather than act defensively. In 2010 the JJAC created an initiative titled JUST.Start, which included a logo, a brochure, informational postcards, promotional stories, display materials, and a professionally designed Web site (www.ctJUSTstart.org). Earlier, it had also created an 11-minute video to discuss its DMC activities and showcase the two major products: the Effective Police Interactions With Youth curriculum and a DMC management tool for residential facilities. Later, the JJAC created a second Web site (Right.ResponseCT.org) dedicated to helping schools and police find the “right response” to youth misbehavior in school.

**Passed Laws Requiring Attention to DMC.** In 2011 the Connecticut legislature passed a law concerning detention of children and DMC in the juvenile justice system (Public Act 11–154). Among other things, it required that state juvenile justice agencies submit biennial reports on the plans of their department to address DMC and the steps taken to implement those plans. These reports were presented in the first biennial report covering fiscal years 2010 and 2011 under the following categories: data, policies and practices, shared initiatives, and training and technical assistance (Connecticut Office of Policy and Management 2011).
Police and Youth Program. Connecticut has also provided funding for projects aimed at improving relationships between police and youth through two initiatives: 1) the Police and Youth Program and 2) the Reaching for Respect Program. Applicant agencies under the Police and Youth Program apply for funds to increase or enhance opportunities for youth and police to work together to benefit their community. The goals of the program are to promote positive youth development and to increase the numbers of police officers who are experienced and comfortable working and interacting with youth. During 2006–12, the average total yearly funding for these projects was over $90,000, usually for 10 or 11 individual projects. The typical project has an early team-building component for the officers and youths, a series of activities/events enjoyable for both groups that provide opportunities for police and youth to interact, a joint community service project that benefits the community or individuals in the community other than youths ages 12–18, and a concluding recognition event. Projects generally serve 15 to 30 youths and budget funds for police overtime, contractual services, and supplies. Additionally, the Reaching for Respect Program provides technical assistance and minigrants for youth-led and youth-designed projects to improve police–youth relations. Between 2010 and 2013, eight rounds of funding were made to 47 projects in 23 urban, suburban, and rural communities. Finally, the JJAC sponsored annual statewide conferences for police, which helped build working relationships. The last of these annual conferences—the 17th—was held in 2011.

Improvements in the Data
During 2006–12 the number of referrals and referral rates improved for white, African American, and Hispanic youth. Referral rates for white youth decreased from 2.6 to 1.9, referral rates for African American youth decreased from 16.0 to 8.9, and referral rates for Hispanic youth decreased from 7.4 to 3.1 (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13). While juvenile crime declined during this period in Connecticut, as it did in many other states, the decrease in referrals to court in Connecticut is even more remarkable given the change in juvenile court age eligibility. In 2007, Connecticut was one of only three states to set the age of adulthood at 16 for criminal prosecution. Thus, only youths ages 15 and under were part of the juvenile justice system. However, this eligibility law was changed, and on Jan. 1, 2010, 16-year-olds became a part of the juvenile justice system. On July 1, 2012, 17-year-olds also moved to the juvenile justice system (Raise the Age CT). Thus, there were more youths eligible for juvenile justice system involvement in 2010, 2011, and 2012 than in the preceding years. The RRI values also improved significantly for both African American youth and Hispanic youth. In 2006 the RRI for Hispanic youth was 2.9, and by 2012 the RRI was 1.6. For African Americans, the RRI was 6.3 in 2006, and by 2012 the RRI had decreased to 4.7.

*Data are taken from the JJAC’s Annual Reports to the Governor, available online, and from reports posted on the Connecticut’s Office of Policy and Management Web site.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White Referrals</th>
<th>African American Referrals</th>
<th>Hispanic Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,199</td>
<td>5,665</td>
<td>3,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,397</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>2,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,443</td>
<td>3,449</td>
<td>1,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,704</td>
<td>4,275</td>
<td>2,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3,935</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>2,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,455</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>2,045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.12. Referral Rates and RRI: African American

Figure 6.13. Referral Rates and RRI: Hispanic
Conclusion
The state of Connecticut concentrated primarily on training and awareness of DMC to reduce its racial disparities. It developed a strong capacity to design and implement its DMC-reduction approach by having an experienced DMC Coordinator and an active SAG with numerous subcommittees focused on clear goals and objectives. One of the most significant strategies was a police training, which was developed by Connecticut and is now used in various jurisdictions nationwide. Connecticut also provided funding for short-term programs to build relationships between police and youth as well as incentives for police and school superintendents to develop MOAs primarily to decrease referrals to court. The emphasis on these targeted strategies appears to have helped reduce DMC in Connecticut. From 2006 to 2012, the RRI values at referral declined from 2.9 to 1.6 for Hispanic youth and from 6.3 to 4.7 for African American youth. Obviously, there is much work yet to be done, especially to reduce the RRI for African American youth, but in a state with such stark differences between rich and poor the progress made is significant.
Essex County, N.J.  
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem  
Data from Essex County, N.J., showed that there were large racial disparities for African American youth—the largest minority group—in the juvenile justice system. There were significant racial disparities for Hispanic youth as well. These racial disparities existed at the front end of the system—such as arrest, referral to court, and diversion—and were amplified in the confined populations, where almost all of the youths were African American or Hispanic.

Juvenile Justice Strategies  
“Essex County embraces JDAI core values, owns the process and the issues, and discusses their philosophy on using the least restrictive setting necessary. System reform is not just about programs; it’s about changing hearts and minds.”  
—Director of Local Programs and Services, New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission

Interviewees in New Jersey point to the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI) as the key factor in improving the juvenile justice system in Essex County and in reducing minority involvement in the system at certain points. As part of JDAI, Essex County was able to reform its juvenile justice system and positively change the institutional culture, increase access to diversion programs and community-based alternatives to detention, and increase its use of data.

Became a JDAI Site. New Jersey began participating in the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s JDAI in 2004. Essex County was one of the five original sites to participate in JDAI in New Jersey. Later, New Jersey was named the first-ever statewide model site. Essex County was very active in implementing JDAI principles. In 2009, one of the Essex County JDAI members, Andrea McCoy Johnson, was recognized with the Champion Award from the New Jersey JDAI (Essex Observer 2009) and was chosen to be part of the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s JDAI Applied Leadership Network (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2009a). Active leadership also came from other juvenile justice reformers such as the Hon. James Troiano, a judge in Essex County’s Family Division. In 2008 the JDAI state steering committee’s name was changed to the New Jersey Council on Juvenile Justice System Improvement to reflect the state’s broader system-reform goals.

*For the years with reliable data (2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011), 97 percent to 99 percent of the youths sent to secure detention were African American or Hispanic (mostly African American) and 95 percent to 100 percent of the youths sent to secure confinement were African American or Hispanic (mostly African American).

†2012 data.
‡2011 data.
Overall Systems Reform and Culture Change. While nationally the JDAI model has concentrated primarily on detention, in New Jersey, and in Essex County specifically, those involved in JDAI conceptualized it as an overall systems-improvement initiative with the idea that if you focus on one point in the juvenile justice system and get collaboration and data-driven decision-making in place you can start using these same tools and practices at other points. Involvement in JDAI resulted in a cultural change in Essex County. Those working in the system developed a new mindset in regard to the juvenile justice system. According to one of the JDAI partners: “There was a philosophy of diverting kids who aren’t supposed to be in detention. It had a profound effect on making sure kids don’t get to detention if they aren’t supposed to be there.” As a systems-change initiative, Essex County targeted its work on a broad spectrum of areas of the system. From pre–JDAI until 2011, Essex County reduced its average daily population in detention by 130.4 youths, a decrease of 53.5 percent; reduced overall admissions to detention by 1,166 youths, a 47.4 percent decrease; and reduced average length of stay by 6.8 days, a 17.1 percent decrease.  

Alternatives to Detention. One of the main areas of emphasis for Essex County was to create and improve alternatives to detention. Alternatives to detention are short-term placements for youths who would otherwise remain in detention while their cases are pending in court. One example of an improvement to alternatives to detention was reducing delays in accessing electronic monitoring. Historically, Essex County relied on electronic monitoring units that required a landline telephone with specific features. At times, youths ordered to electronic monitoring would have to wait in detention while staff assessed (and in many cases updated) their home telephone situation. Additionally, the staff in charge of the electronic monitoring and other alternatives to detention were based solely out of the detention center, thus youths ordered to be released to electronic monitoring at their court hearing had to go back to detention to be processed. Both of these situations led to delays in release from detention to the court-ordered alternatives. In 2006 and 2007, Essex County introduced wireless electronic monitoring systems as an alternative to detention and stationed an alternatives-to-detention staff person at the courthouse. Other alternative-to-detention programs also exist in the county, including an Evening Reporting Center. In 2011, minority youths comprised 99.2 percent of all youths held in the Essex County detention center and 99.0 percent of youths placed in Essex County’s community-based detention alternatives (New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission N.d.). During 2007–11, between 77.5 percent and 84.0 percent of the youths sent to detention alternatives successfully completed their program.  

Diversion Options. There are numerous diversion options for youth in Essex County, many of which are coordinated statewide. For example, the Juvenile Conference Committees (JCCs), which serve under the authority of the Family Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, are designed to divert juveniles charged with first- or second-time minor offenses. The JCC is a six- to nine-member citizen volunteer panel appointed by the family division judge (New Jersey Courts, N.d.b). In a confidential setting, JCC panels hear and decide matters involving the

*Data are taken from New Jersey’s JDAI reports, available online.
†Between 3.6 percent and 6.7 percent of the youths in the alternative program picked up a new charge and were removed from the program. Between 11.6 percent and 16.7 percent of the youths were removed from the alternative program for a violation (noncompliance).
referred juveniles. The juvenile, parent (or parents) or guardian (or guardians), and complainant (complainants)/victim(victims) are invited to discuss the offense and related matters. The JCC considers the facts, and makes recommendations to the judge for a resolution that would aid in the juvenile’s rehabilitation. Another example is the Intake Service Conferences (ISCs), which target juveniles with less-serious offenses or for repeat minor offenses. ISC use community resources to resolve matters without the need for formal court intervention. Cases are referred to ISC by a family division intake officer when the complaint is screened or through a referral from court by a family division judge. Whereas the JCCs are made up of volunteers who reside, hear, and decide matters in the juvenile’s community, ISC are scheduled and heard by a probation officer in the family division. Also available are diversion programs for specific offenses, such as the Juvenile Auto Theft Prevention Program for juveniles whose primary charges are auto theft related and the Prevention, Intervention, and Education Program for juveniles arrested a first time for substance abuse-related offenses.

**Increased Use of Data.** Involvement in JDAI also resulted in an increase in collecting, sharing, and using data for making decisions. Annual JDAI reports with comprehensive data on secure detention and alternatives to detention are now compiled and available to the public on the New Jersey attorney general’s Web site. These reports are written by Jennifer LeBaron, a Ph.D.–level criminologist who is currently the director of local programs and services at the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission. According to New Jersey’s 2006 JDAl Annual Report, “[Many of New Jersey’s] JDAI sites have made great progress implementing the core strategy of relying on data to advise detention system policy and practice, expanding local capacity for collecting and regularly reviewing data.” According to the Hon. James Troiano, a family court judge who was involved with JDAI in Essex County, JDAI helped with the utilization of data in Essex County.

**Stationhouse Adjustments.** At the same time that JDAI was being implemented, there was an increased concentration on stationhouse adjustments at the state level. A stationhouse adjustment is an alternative method that law enforcement agencies in New Jersey may use to handle first-time juvenile offenders who have committed minor juvenile delinquency offenses. The intent of the stationhouse adjustment program is to provide for immediate consequences, such as community service or restitution and a prompt and convenient resolution for the victim, while at the same time avoiding the stigma of a formal juvenile delinquency record for the juvenile offender. According to the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General, in many instances, this early intervention will deter a youth from continuing his or her negative behavior and divert the youth from progressing further into the juvenile justice system (Office of the Attorney General, State of New Jersey, 2005b). However, although the Office of the Attorney General issued an executive directive in 1990 to encourage the use of curbside warnings or stationhouse adjustments, a 2004 report noted disparities in the availability, implementation, and procedures of these opportunity programs as applied in different municipalities. The findings suggested that disparate application of such policies and procedures may make a significant impact on the unequal treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system. In response to these findings, the Office of the Attorney General devised various recommendations to standardize, improve, and equalize the use of stationhouse adjustments

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* Part of the Office of the Attorney General.
throughout New Jersey. In 2005, standardized guidelines were developed and distributed through a statewide directive from the office of the Attorney General to promote a more uniform method of diverting eligible juveniles that would promote equality within the justice system by providing equivalent access to police diversionary programs regardless of domicile. These guidelines were clarified in another statewide directive in 2008. The New Jersey State Advisory Group also prioritized increasing the use of stationhouse adjustments in urban areas where there tends to be a concentration of minority youth, provided funding for these programs, though not in Essex County (New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission, N.d.), and offered to monitor the use of these diversions from the formal system.*

**Data Improvements**

**Referral to Court.** In 2004 the rate of African American youths’ being referred to juvenile court from the general population was approximately five times as great as the white rates (4.9), and the Hispanic rate was over twice as great (2.2). By 2011 the disparity was cut significantly for both minority groups. The African American referral-to-court rate declined from 5.7 per 100 youths in 2004 to 4.3 per 100 youths in 2011, and during the same period the Hispanic referral-to-court rate declined from 2.5 to 1.3 while the white rate remained relatively steady (between 1.2 and 1.4). During this time, the relative rates index (RRI) for African American youth declined to 3.5 while the RRI for Hispanic youth declined to 1.1 (see Figures 6.14 and 6.15). In addition to these decreases in referral rates and racial disparities, overall number of referrals declined by 40 percent (see Table 6.7).

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*State of New Jersey Governor’s Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Committee.
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

Figure 6.15. Referral Rates and RRI: Hispanic

![Graph showing referral rates and RRI for Hispanic youth from 2004 to 2011.]

Table 6.7. Essex County Referral to Court Numbers, 2004–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Referrals a</th>
<th>White Referrals</th>
<th>African American Referrals</th>
<th>Hispanic Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3,637</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>2,661</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3,442</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,893</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,851</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>2,166</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>1,613</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Referrals are “New Complaints Docketed,” which were originally obtained from the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General and retrieved from OJJDP’s DMC Web-Based Data Entry System.

Diversion

“I am not surprised that diversion was identified as an area where Essex has seen positive changes. Diversion is a function of the courts, and the courts have been an incredible leader in New Jersey and Essex County in addressing DMC and taking on JDAI.”

—Director of Local Programs and Services

Diversion rates (the number of diversions per 100 youths referred to court) improved for both African American and Hispanic youth between 2004 and 2011. In 2004, there were 32 diversions per 100 referrals for African American youth compared with 54 diversions per 100 referrals for white youth, resulting in an RRI of 0.59. By 2011 the African American diversion rate was 41 per 100 referrals and the white rate was 48 per 100 referrals, resulting in an RRI of 0.9 (see Figure 6.16). Hispanic diversion rates also improved, resulting in improvements in the minority group’s RRI (see Figure 6.17).
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

Figure 6.16. Diversion Rates and RRI: African American

Figure 6.17. Diversion Rates and RRI: Hispanic

Table 6.8. Essex Count Diversion Numbers, 2004–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Diversions</th>
<th>White Diversions</th>
<th>African American Diversions</th>
<th>Hispanic Diversions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,123</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Secure Detention and Secure Confinement. During 2004–11, the numbers of youths being sent to secure detention and secure confinement decreased. Given that the vast majority of these youths are African American and Hispanic, this decrease primarily affected them. From 2004 to 2011, the number of African American youths securely confined after adjudication declined from 91 to 25, a 73 percent decrease (see Figure 6.18). During this same time, the number of minority youths securely detained decreased from 1,969 to 1,344, a 32 percent decrease; the African American youths securely detained decreased from 1,720 to 1,050, a 39 percent decrease (see Table 6.9). Data from JDAI reports show even more improvement since the start of JDAI in 2003. Annual JDAI reports show that during 2003–11 the average daily population (ADP) in detention decreased from 243.6 to 79.0, a 68 percent decrease; the ADP for minority youth decreased from 242.6 to 78.0.

Table 6.9. Essex County Secure Detention Numbers, 2004–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Detentions</th>
<th>White Detentions</th>
<th>African American Detentions</th>
<th>Hispanic Detentions</th>
<th>ADP Minority Youth</th>
<th>ADP Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>242.6</td>
<td>243.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2,144</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1,858</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>127.3</td>
<td>128.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>113.2</td>
<td>114.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,322</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,383</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total detention data unavailable for 2005 and 2007. ADP data from New Jersey’s JDAI Annual Data Reports.

Figure 6.18. Total Detentions and Secure Confinements, 2004–11

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*Secure detention differs from secure confinement. For more information, see chapter 2.
†RRI values do indicate decreasing, though very high, RRI values at detention for African American youth. However, the small number of white youths compared with the large number of African American youths makes these values unreliable.
‡Data are taken from New Jersey’s JDAI reports, available online.
Conclusion

Essex County has a majority minority youth population, and the confined juvenile population is overwhelmingly minority. Essex County was able to reduce racial disparities among the youths being referred to court and among the youths being diverted from court. Additionally, the number of African American youths being securely detained and confined declined. Interviewees point to systemwide reform efforts involving multiple system stakeholders and decision-makers as the most important factor in reducing disproportionate minority contact (DMC) at the court decision points. Access to diversion and alternatives to detention improved, and there was an increased use of data to make decisions. At the same time, DMC was also declining at referral. This could be due to the increased use of stationhouse adjustments and curbside diversions by police departments or to some other factor.
Hillsborough County, N.H. Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem
Hillsborough, N.H., has a small minority population, but it was overrepresented in juvenile justice processing. In 2008 the relative rate index (RRI) for Hispanic youth in Hillsborough at the arrest stage was 1.8. Racial disparities existed at other levels of the system as well, though small numbers made interpreting the data difficult. During this time, many minority residents felt they were being unfairly targeted by police, and many police were uncomfortable talking about race issues. Additionally, some juvenile justice stakeholders and community members did not trust the accuracy of juvenile justice data that were being collected and were distrustful of census data. During this time, many felt that the minority population was too small for the community to use its scarce resources to concentrate on disproportionate minority contact (DMC).

Juvenile Justice Strategies
“One of the things that is really working for us is the collaboration from all segments of law enforcement.”
—Chair of DMC Subcommittee of New Hampshire State Advisory Group

During the past 2 decades, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of minority residents, including youth residents, living in Hillsborough County. During 1990–2011, while the white youth population increased 14 percent, the African American youth population increased 299 percent and the Hispanic youth population increased 345 percent (Puzzanchera, Sladky, and Kang 2012). Although some decision-makers felt the number of minority youths was still too low to focus much energy on DMC, for others the increasing number of minority residents created a sense of urgency to understand what the data were saying and also to make sure that the data were accurate. A key group of decision-makers felt that they needed to concentrate on addressing the concerns of the growing minority populations before larger problems developed. The youth seemed like the best place to start.

Improving Data Accuracy Statewide. To address this desire to better understand racial and ethnic trends, there was an emphasis on improving the accuracy of data statewide, which led to an increase in the understanding and use of data. As noted in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s DMC Technical Assistance Manual, data can be powerful tools and should guide every phase of DMC–reduction efforts. However, many in New Hampshire were
mistrustful of the data, which hindered any work on data-driven solutions. When New Hampshire hired Andrew Smith as its new DMC Coordinator in 2010, he wanted to make sure there was accurate information. He stated: “I am relentless in making the point that if your data is not accurate and challengeable you can’t improve” and “Data is the only objective criteria we have to work with.” Before becoming DMC Coordinator, Mr. Smith worked for the New Hampshire Census Bureau and supervised the count for the 2010 Census. His background in data collection, specifically as it related to race, helped bring much-needed attention to the importance of accurate data collection and analysis.

**Leadership From Law Enforcement.** At the same time, there was strong leadership from many of the key police chiefs in the county, including Chief David J. Mara in Manchester, Chief John J. Seusing in Nashua, Chief Mike Allen in Rochester, and Chief Eddie Edwards, the chief liquor enforcement officer for the state of New Hampshire. These chiefs supported DMC–reduction efforts at the state and local levels and contributed to increasing awareness of DMC and finding solutions to decrease it. Many of the chiefs participated actively on committees that address racial disparities, and some even chaired the statewide DMC committee. The police chiefs also used their leadership to initiate officer trainings and make changes to programs when necessary. The New Hampshire DMC Coordinator noted that the police chiefs “could have said this wasn’t important. They could have said the population is so small that it didn’t matter, but they didn’t do that. They put aside limited funding to do these trainings. We have built a lot trust, and they have my support.” Sheriffs have also played an important part in addressing DMC. Donald Vittum became the Director of the Police Standards and Training Council in 2007 and required that all new police recruits take a diversity course. This course was designed and run by Strafford County Sheriff David Dubois and DMC Committee Chair Chief Eddie Edwards and is presented to other audiences as well (see below).

**Police Training in Cultural Competency, Diversity, and Working With Youth.** The police chiefs also led the efforts to train their officers in cultural competency, diversity, and police–youth interactions. Starting in 2010, police officers from the Hudson, Manchester, and Nashua police departments were trained using the *Effective Interactions With Youth* curriculum, which was designed in Connecticut and customized for New Hampshire. The curriculum is designed to improve knowledge and skills among officers in how to interact with youth, particularly minority youth, to reduce negative outcomes and results in police action. Specifically, the curriculum helps officers distinguish problematic adolescent behavior from typical adolescent behavior and deescalate situations involving agitated or defiant youth. The goals of the training are to increase patrol officer awareness of DMC, increase patrol officer knowledge of youth behavior and strategies for interacting effectively with youth, improve police attitudes toward young people, increase the likelihood that police–youth interactions will have positive outcomes for youth, and increase the likelihood that youth will respond positively toward police officers (Sanderson et al. 2008). In addition to the curriculum, police were able to benefit from the expertise of the DMC Coordinator, who had also been a diversity consultant before accepting his current role. This expertise served to put stakeholders and decision-makers at ease and build trust when discussing race, which can be difficult for many in the juvenile justice and law enforcement fields, as well as for the community.
Diversity training was also implemented at the New Hampshire Police Academy for police recruits across the state. This training is a 3-hour course that has grown and matured over time. It was developed internally by police officers and is updated depending on the students in the class as well as on current events.

**Committees Focused on DMC and Other Diversity and Cultural Issues.** Finally, there were both new and established state and local committees focused on racial issues. For example, the statewide DMC Subcommittee had been meeting for years, and the cities of Nashua and Manchester had groups that addressed racial and ethnic concerns. Nashua has an Ethnic Awareness Committee whose mission is to encourage understanding and appreciation of ethnic diversity in the city and to facilitate communication between the ethnic community and city government (City of Nashua, N.H., 2009). Manchester has a Community Advisory Board that addresses issues for the growing immigrant refugee population by helping minimize cultural and linguistic conflicts with the police department, among other rapport-building community events. Manchester also has an effective Office of Youth Services that has numerous bilingual workers who provide outreach services that build rapport, communication, and trust in the areas of the city where the potential for conflict exists.

Most important in terms of committees, in 2010 local DMC committees formed in both Nashua and Manchester. These local committees have strong leadership from police (see above) and meet monthly. The committees include representatives from the juvenile court, probation, juvenile diversion programs, the superintendent of schools, school resource officers, and judges. Primary areas of emphasis included data collection and police trainings, but other topics were also addressed. Each committee has developed its own goals and objectives according to local needs and realities. For example, the purpose of the Nashua DMC Committee is to begin a dialog among police, educators, parents, youth, and community leaders seeking to identify things the community can do together to prevent all youth from entering the juvenile justice system and reduce the disparity evident among minority youth (City of Nashua, N.H., N.d.a).

Dialog nights were planned at the state level in 2009–10 to provide an opportunity for community members and police officers to speak and share different points of views to understand one another better. The specific events were designed locally with the police chiefs based on each community’s needs. For example, in Nashua many minority community members felt that police were unfairly targeting them, and many of the youths did not know what their rights were. At the same time, many law enforcement officers were afraid to talk about race issues because they did not want to be labeled as racist. During the dialog nights, many of these issues were addressed and discussed in a welcoming, nonthreatening way.

**Improvements in the Data**
The overall juvenile arrest rate in Hillsborough decreased from 5.7 arrests per 100 youths in 2007 to 4.2 arrests per 100 youths in 2011. In 2007, there were 2,740 juvenile arrests, compared with 2011 when there were 1,892 juvenile arrests (see Table 6.10). Arrest rates for Hispanic youths also declined steadily from 8.8 per 100 in 2008 to 5.2 per 100 in 2011. * During population data for Hispanic youth in 2007 were not entered into the RRI database and thus were not used in the analysis of rates.
this same time, the white arrest rate increased slightly, then decreased. Finally, the RRI for Hispanic youth at arrest also decreased from 1.8 in 2007 to 1.3 in 2011, indicating a reduction in DMC (see Figure 6.19).

**Figure 6.19. Arrest Rates and RRI: Hispanic**

![Arrest Rates and RRI: Hispanic](image)

**Table 6.10. Hillsborough County Arrest Numbers, 2007–11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Arrests</th>
<th>White Arrests</th>
<th>African American Arrests</th>
<th>Hispanic Arrests</th>
<th>Asian American Arrests</th>
<th>Native American Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2,269</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>1,971</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,426</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,892</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

Hillsborough, N.H., provides some insight into the DMC problems and responses of a jurisdiction with a small but growing minority population. Small numbers make meaningful data analysis difficult at more than just a few juvenile justice stages. However, the trends in arrest rates do indicate a decrease in arrest rates for both white and Hispanic youth as well as a decrease in racial disparities. Strategies such as improving data accuracy, engaging police chiefs in DMC work, and providing training to police officers in diversity and police–youth interactions seem to have had a positive impact.
Montgomery County, Ala.  
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem
In 2008 the relative rate index (RRI) for African American youth at detention in Montgomery County, Ala., was 1.6, and the RRI for African American youth at secure confinement was 1.3. Collaboration between the judicial and executive branches of state government needed improvement, data awareness was lacking, and there was no objective risk assessment instrument to determine detention placement. Finally, most of the youths in secure detention were originally referred to court for only minor disorderly offenses.

Juvenile Justice Strategies
In 2007, juvenile justice decision-makers and stakeholders began concentrating on improving their juvenile justice system, primarily through the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI). As a result, there were positive outcomes at both the secure detention stage and the secure confinement stage.

Implementing JDAI Strategies. Montgomery County became a JDAI site in 2007 along with three other Alabama counties. The Annie E. Casey Foundation in 2007 awarded Alabama a $150,000 grant to begin the JDAI. These funds were matched by the Governor’s Office (Administrative Office of Courts, Alabama Judicial System, Family Court, N.d.). Funds were distributed to the four selected counties to help offset costs incurred in commencing the reform efforts. According to the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts Web site, “one of the great benefits of JDAI has been in the interbranch cooperation between the judicial and executive branches of government in [the] state.”

Alabama built on this cooperation by incorporating the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s vision with the practical experience of a retired circuit court judge and the dedication of other juvenile and family court judges and staff. Under the leadership of the Hon. John Davis, a retired family court judge in Montgomery County, JDAI principles began to take root. Judge Davis assisted the juvenile/family court judge and JDAI Coordinator at each of the four sites in understanding the concepts and rewards of objective admissions, alternatives to detention, accurate and timely data collection, and other core strategies of the JDAI model. Judge Davis is often cited as the guidepost of this initiative by those involved in this reform effort. “Judge Davis had the credibility to implement this project and the enthusiasm to keep you believing that it could be done,” stated current Chief Justice Charles R. Malone. “The work he and our four site judges have accomplished is nothing short of phenomenal” (Administrative Office of Courts, Alabama Judicial System, Family Court, N.d.).

The development of a risk assessment instrument (RAI) was an important step for the Montgomery County JDAI. The RAI was developed and field tested in 2008 through a
collaborative process involving various stakeholders and decision-makers such as the District Attorney’s Office, the Sheriff’s office, the police, intake officers, judges, and probation officers. There was also an active subcommittee devoted exclusively to developing the RAI. After approximately 1 year and 22 revisions, the RAI was adopted by the executive committee and implemented countywide in 2009. Through the RAI, detention eligibility was changed: only youths who were public safety risks would be recommended for detention (although there was still a place for an override and discretion). Beverly Wise, the senior probation supervisor and JDAI Coordinator for Montgomery County’s Juvenile Court, said that the RAI was the county’s “crowning jewel.”

An additional JDAI strategy to decrease the number of youths going to secure detention in Montgomery County was building awareness of the data among those in the juvenile justice system and in the community. For example, a close look at the data revealed that, at one point, two thirds of the youths being detained in secure detention facilities were originally referred to court from the public schools for minor disorderly conduct offenses (e.g., harassment, trespassing, fistfights in the hallway). The JDAI committee felt that secure detention was not the ideal response for offenses such as these, so it created a pie chart presenting the detention referral information and presented it to the superintendent of Montgomery Public Schools. The data surprised the superintendent. Given this awareness, the number of referrals for disorderly conduct from the schools has decreased.

Using JDAI Principles to Reduce DMC at Confinement. Although JDAI was originally designed to concentrate on the detention stage, Montgomery County used JDAI principles to improve its juvenile justice system at the secure confinement stage as well. At this stage, there was a concerted effort to increase data awareness and utilize other core JDAI principles. The Alabama Administrative Office of the Court Web site notes that “the JDAI experience has filtered throughout all levels of juvenile justice in Alabama” and that collaboration and partnership between the court and the Department of Youth Services (DYS) led to a steep reduction in admissions to DYS (Administrative Office of Courts, Alabama Judicial System, Family Court, N.d.).

Walter Wood, Director of DYS, stated the following about DYS’s involvement in JDAI and the effect on secure confinements:

By partnering with [the Administrative Office of Courts] to promote discussion about appropriate use of detention and services for children, DYS is meeting its obligation to assist local courts in developing more effective programming for troubled youth and, in doing so, working to reduce the number of youth who end up in the deep end of the system: a state juvenile or adult correctional facility. [Administrative Office of Courts, Alabama Judicial System, Family Court, N.d.]

The reduction in the number of youths going to secure confinement after being referred to court may also be related directly to the reductions in detentions. Various studies have found that youths who are placed in detention are more likely to move deeper into the system. These studies have found statistically significant links between pre-adjudication detention placement and petition, out-of-home placements, and secure confinement after controlling for other
variables such as offense and prior record (Bray, Sample, and Kempf–Leonard 2005; Guevara and Spohn 2006; Holman and Ziedenberg 2006). Following this same logic, reducing racial disparities in detention could also reduce racial disparities in secure confinement.

**Data Improvements**
Montgomery County stakeholders credit JDAI with decreasing the detention and confinement numbers, rates, and RRI values during 2009–11.

**Secure Detention.** During the first 4 years that the JDAI was implemented, the number of youths sent to secure detention fell from 361 to 172, a 52 percent decrease (see Table 6.11). Racial disparities also decreased. Detention rates* for both white and African American youth decreased from 2009 until 2011. In 2009 the white detention rate was 17 detentions per 100 referrals; in 2011 that rate dropped to 9 detentions per 100 referrals. For African American youths, there were 28 detentions per 100 referrals in 2009 compared with 11 detentions per 100 referrals in 2011. During 2008–11, the RRI declined from 1.6 to 1.5 to 1.3, indicating a steady decrease in disproportionate minority contact at secure detention (see Figure 6.20).

**Figure 6.20. Detention Rates and RRI: African American**

Table 6.11. Montgomery County Detention Numbers, 2008–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Detentions</th>
<th>White Detentions</th>
<th>African American Detentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Secure Confinement.**† Since the start of JDAI, secure confinement numbers have decreased in Montgomery County. During 2008–11, the total number of youths securely confined declined

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*Detention rates are based on referrals to court. Referral numbers are available only for 2009, 2010, and 2011 when they went from 1,345 to 1,608 to 1,603 (the 2008 data cannot be verified). White referrals went from 166 to 171 to 127. African American referrals went from 1,173 to 1,403 to 1,441.

†Secure detention differs from secure confinement. For more information, see chapter 2.
Case Studies of Nine Jurisdictions That Reduced DMC in Their Juvenile Justice Systems

from 204 to 120, a 41 percent decrease (see Table 6.12). Additionally, the secure confinement rates* for both white and African American youth decreased. For white youths, in 2009 there were 11 secure confinements per 100 referrals compared with 7 secure confinements per 100 referrals in 2011. For African American youths, there were 15 secure confinements per 100 referrals in 2009 compared with 8 secure confinements per 100 referrals in 2011. Finally, the RRI decreased from 1.3 to 1.1 during this time (see Figure 6.21).

Figure 6.21. Secure Confinement Rates and RRI: African American

![Confinement Rates and RRI](image)

Table 6.12. Montgomery County Confinement Numbers, 2008–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Confinements</th>
<th>White Confinements</th>
<th>African American Confinements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion
Montgomery County, Ala., was able to reduce racial disparities for Africa American youth at both secure detention and secure confinement. The number of youths being detained and confined also decreased, as did the confinement and detention rates. Key stakeholders credit the reduction in numbers as well as the decreases in rates and racial disparities to the JDAI, which led to a strong collaboration of juvenile justice partners in both the executive and judicial branches. Through this collaboration, Montgomery County has been able to focus more on data and develop a RAI that has helped minimize the number of youths who qualify for secure detention.

* Based on the number of youths referred to court.
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem
Juvenile justice stakeholders and decision-makers in the state of Pennsylvania have been focusing on disproportionate minority contact (DMC) for years. DMC was identified as an action issue in Pennsylvania in 1989, and funding for programs that serve minority youth began shortly after. In Philadelphia, where approximately three fourths of the youth are minority, there has been much work done to reduce the number of youths with formal contact with the juvenile justice system. Nevertheless, racial disparities in Philadelphia—the state’s largest city—remained significant. In 2006 the relative rate index (RRI) for African American youth at detention was 1.6. For Hispanic youth, it was 2.3.

Juvenile Justice Strategies
There are many initiatives in Philadelphia aimed at preventing and reducing delinquency among youth as well as reducing their contact with the juvenile justice system. These include four core strategies related to potential DMC reduction: 1) the Philadelphia Working Group of the DMC Subcommittee, 2) Graduated Response Court (GRC), 3) utilization of global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring as an alternative to placement and detention, and 4) activities to build relationships between youth and law enforcement. Additionally, Philadelphia is part of the MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change DMC Action Network.

Philadelphia Working Group of the DMC Subcommittee. In 2003 the Philadelphia Working Group was formed to address the problem of DMC at the local level. The Philadelphia Working Group includes individuals from many organizations including the district attorney’s office, the Department of Human Services, the public defender, five branches of law enforcement, the School District of Philadelphia, the juvenile court, the mayor’s office, the local university, a behavioral health consultant, faith-based and community organizations, and youth members. The Philadelphia Working Group is concerned with DMC at all points in the juvenile justice system, but concentrates primarily at the front end of the system. It has implemented training and other activities dedicated to improving police–youth relations and helped create a GRC (see below).

In addition to the diverse representation of the membership, what makes this group unique is its dedication to the work and its capacity to get things done. The group is quite action

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*2012 data.
†2011 data.

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oriented—much more than most community collaborations. According to the coordinator of the group, the members are “committed to do anything they can for kids of color in Philadelphia.” The coordinator also noted that once a plan is made, the group almost never needs follow-up from the coordinator because “they just do the work.” The Philadelphia Working Group has been a catalyst for developing strong relationships between members, which has served only to improve the work. The former deputy commissioner for juvenile justice services at the Philadelphia Department of Human Services, who is also a member of this group, stated that any success Philadelphia has had in reducing racial disparities is due to ongoing collaborative efforts, including the efforts undertaken by the Philadelphia Working Group.

**Graduated Response Court.** The Philadelphia Working Group worked closely with the Philadelphia Family Court, Philadelphia Juvenile Probation, the Defender Association of Philadelphia, and the district attorney’s office to develop a system of graduated sanctions to address youths who violate probation. Graduated sanctions broadly refer to the continuum of options that juvenile court judges have at their disposal for responding to juvenile offenders. Graduated sanctions programs provide swift and appropriate responses to juvenile offenders based on the gravity of the specific offense and an assessment of the potential risk for reoffending as well as appropriate treatment to reduce the risk of recidivism (NCJFCJ N.d.; OJJDP N.d.b).

Reducing the number of youths sent to secure detention for violating conditions of probation is a key area of emphasis for many local, state, and national groups (Steinhart 2001). Nationally, about 16 percent of the youths in juvenile residential facilities were sent there for a technical violation such as a violation of probation or parole, or a valid court order. In Pennsylvania, 22 percent of the youths in residential placement are there for technical violations (Sickmund et al. 2011). Most juvenile justice advocates agree that secure confinement for probation violations should be used sparingly, if at all.

In 2008 the GRC in Philadelphia was opened. A special steering committee oversaw the GRC, which emphasized the principles of balanced and restorative justice by addressing probation violations with prompt responses. The GRC operated 1 day per week in one courtroom. By targeting young people on probation with technical violations (e.g., breaking curfew, not reporting to a probation officer), the GRC could offer alternatives such as weekend respite instead of detention placement. The GRC also reduced the number of youths being sent to detention awaiting a long-term placement. The GRC has been able to keep youths—especially minority youths, who are already overrepresented among the probation population—out of detention. Although a recent study found no overall pattern or discrimination in probation violations (Models for Change 2011), since a majority of the youths on probation are African American, reducing technical violations is a high priority for the GRC.
American or Hispanic (over 90 percent; see Figure 6.22), reducing the number of youths with probation violations being sent to detention is important to reducing DMC.

**Global Positioning Satellite Monitoring.** Philadelphia currently uses numerous alternatives to detention programs, which are designed to provide services and supervision to youth who would otherwise be held in secure detention either before or after adjudication. One of these alternatives is GPS monitoring. GPS monitoring allows probation officers to track the youth’s location and is especially helpful if the youth is allowed to go to some specific places (e.g., to school or to a drug counseling program) but not everywhere. In 2011 and 2012, more than 400 youths per year were placed on GPS monitoring instead of going to secure detention.

Before the utilization of GPS monitoring, the Philadelphia Court was more likely to use home-based electronic monitoring as an alternative to detention. However, electronic monitoring did not work as smoothly as it could have, since many of the youths did not have landlines in their homes, which was a prerequisite to electronic monitoring utilization. Youths without landlines either were denied the electronic monitoring alternative or they had to wait in detention until a landline was installed. With the move toward using GPS, these issues were resolved and more youths were able to benefit from being able to reside in their homes. Given the overwhelming number of minority youths being referred to court in Philadelphia, the option to stay home instead of being locked up disproportionately benefited minority youths.

**Activities to Build Relationships Between Youth and Law Enforcement.** Statewide, Pennsylvania has also developed, modified, and expanded the Youth–Law Enforcement curriculum. This curriculum consists of youth and law enforcement coming together to have open and honest dialog. The information is presented in a forum format to educate youths about their rights and responsibilities when they come into contact with law enforcement and also to educate the law enforcement officers on the culture of the youths in their respective jurisdictions. The overall goal is to have fewer arrests, which should result from law enforcement officers having a better understanding of the youth behavior as well as youth having a better idea of the law enforcement culture. It is hoped that the curriculum will lead to more respect and cooperation from each group so that arrests will not occur. This curriculum has been implemented in five Pennsylvania jurisdictions, including Philadelphia. In Philadelphia, forums are also held in schools and in the police academy for new recruits (Coleman et al. 2011).

**MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change DMC Action Network.** Pennsylvania was selected to participate in the MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change DMC Action Network in 2008. The DMC Action Network was launched in 2007 to bring together teams from select local jurisdictions, expose them to the latest thinking of national experts, and give them an opportunity to learn from one another about effective ways to reduce the disproportionate contact of minority and ethnic youth with the juvenile justice system (Models for Change, N.d.b). Pennsylvania works with the MacArthur Foundation to improve its statewide data collection and to move toward becoming a model state for DMC data collection. Philadelphia County (conterminous with the city) is one of three Pennsylvania counties to participate in Models for Change. Through Models for Change, Philadelphia concentrates primarily on the GRC and the Youth–Law Enforcement curriculum in the police academy.
**Data Improvements**

During 2006–10 the RRI at detention for African American youth declined from 1.6 to 1.3 (see Figure 6.23). During the same time, the RRI for Hispanic youth declined from 2.3 to 1.3 (see Figure 6.24).

![Figure 6.23. Detention Rates and RRI: African American](image)

![Figure 6.24. Detention Rates and RRI: Hispanic](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Detentions</th>
<th>White Detentions</th>
<th>African American Detentions</th>
<th>Hispanic Detentions</th>
<th>Asian American Detentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,564</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>4,410</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>4,551</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,511</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>5,232</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6,171</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>4,894</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,869</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>4,643</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also noteworthy that, although there was no reduction in racial disparities at the arrest stage, the number of youths being arrested has decreased for the two major racial groups in 2006–10.
Philadelphia. The total number of juvenile arrests declined by 34 percent in 4 years, from more than 40,000 in 2006 to under 27,000 in 2010. The youth population has also decreased during this time, but only by 20 percent, which indicates a real decrease in arrests. White arrests decreased from 9,538 to 5,718 (a 40 percent decrease) and African American arrests decreased from 27,403 to 18,475 (a 33 percent decrease). Arrest rates have also declined for both white and African American youths (see Figure 6.25), but the decrease for white youths (from 20.7 arrests per 100 to 15.8 arrests per 100) was greater than the decrease for African American youths (from 30.5 arrests per 100 to 26.8 arrests per 100), hence there was no reduction in racial disparity.

**Conclusion**

Philadelphia is a large city with many initiatives aimed at at-risk and systems-involved youth. In addition to local approaches to DMC reduction, Philadelphia has benefited from strong statewide attention on DMC as well as involvement with the MacArthur Foundation’s Models for Change DMC Action Network. Three particular initiatives—an active Philadelphia Working Group of the DMC committee, a GRC, and GPS monitoring as an alternative to detention—seem to have had a significant effect in reducing DMC at the detention stage. During 2006–10 the RRI for African American youth declined from 1.6 to 1.3, and the RRI for Hispanic youth declined from 2.3 to 1.3. In 2011, Philadelphia became a Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative site. It is hoped that Philadelphia’s involvement with JDAI can result in reductions in overall numbers of youths going to secure detention. Additionally, it is hoped that the continued emphasis on improving relationships between police and youth can lead to DMC reduction at the arrest stage.
Tulsa County, Okla.
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem
In Oklahoma’s 2009 application for Formula Grant funds submitted to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), disproportionate minority contact was listed as its top problem area to be addressed. The application states

Disproportionate overrepresentation of minority youth exists in the Oklahoma juvenile justice system, specifically in the two major metropolitan areas. This is neither fair nor equal and erodes minority communities’ faith in the justice system. It further sends disproportionate numbers of minority youth on a path deeper into the justice system. Previous research showed that this issue specifically affects the African American community. Current data has identified a similar trend with both Hispanic and Native American youth.

In Tulsa County, Okla., where African Americans are the largest minority group, race has historically been a sensitive topic. In 2005 the relative rate index (RRI) at detention for African Americans was 1.4 and the RRI at diversion was 0.7. Racial disparities also existed at other points in the system and for smaller minority populations such as Native American and Hispanic youths.

Juvenile Justice Strategies
Tulsa County’s DMC–reduction strategy was initiated at the state level with direction from the state Juvenile Justice Specialist and the state DMC Coordinator. The state provided funding and resources to hire a local coordinator, conduct DMC training with strategic planning, and conduct evidence-based law enforcement training. The community also opened a crisis intervention center to provide law enforcement with an alternative to detention for youths who commit low-level offenses.

Received Support at the State Level. Oklahoma concentrated its DMC efforts on three targeted counties, including Tulsa County, and starting in 2004 the state awarded federal Formula Grants specifically to those communities. The Tulsa Juvenile Bureau received these grant awards, and one of the first projects was a street outreach and caseworker program for youths with high-risk backgrounds, which ran from 2005 through 2007. Tulsa County also got support from the state DMC Coordinator, who was available to attend all of the Tulsa County DMC meetings and helped with much of the DMC planning and organization.

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* 2012 data.
† 2011 data.
Hired a Local DMC Coordinator and Did Strategic Planning. In 2009, Tulsa County was awarded funding to do a year of strategic planning to target local DMC issues. Two additional years of funding was added to provide direct services to affect DMC at specific contact points. The county chose to concentrate on arrest, diversion, and detention as the primary contact points where it saw a need to reduce DMC. A local DMC Coordinator was hired to coordinate the process, and a DMC–Reduction Steering Committee was formed, which consisted of representatives from law enforcement, social services, education, and other community agencies. A local DMC Web site was created, and according to its Web site Tulsa County’s multipronged approach to decrease DMC included both delinquency prevention efforts and system improvements “to assure fair and equal treatment for all youth regardless of race and ethnicity.”

Established a Crisis Intervention Center. In 2008 the city of Tulsa opened a 24-hour crisis intervention center (CIC) for juveniles who were arrested or picked up by law enforcement officers for delinquent and misdemeanor offenses. The Tulsa CIC was a one-stop centralized intake, assessment, and service referral system and could hold juveniles for up to 24 hours. This was the ninth such center in Oklahoma. According to the current CIC provider, Youth Services of Tulsa, CICs throughout the nation have proven to be a tremendous asset to local communities by reducing the time that law enforcement officers are engaged with youths, by providing assessments and referrals to families, and by tracking trends in juvenile crime. CICs can also reduce recidivism by delivering immediate consequences for delinquent behavior, detect and address the underlying causes of delinquent or problem behavior on the front end as a preventive measure, intervene before problems escalate by making family referrals to community services, and create a more effective and efficient alliance among police, parents, juvenile justice, and treatment providers (Youth Services of Tulsa, N.d.). According to Oklahoma’s Juvenile Justice Specialist, the CIC caused a massive change in the volume of activity and made a huge difference in the number of juveniles receiving diversion services. For example, during 2006–09, the total number of youths diverted from the juvenile justice system more than doubled and the diversion rate increased from 11 diversions per 100 arrests to 38 diversions per 100 arrests. According to Oklahoma’s DMC Coordinator, the CIC made a significant impact on detention rates as well.

Trained and Involved Police. In 2010–11, Tulsa County used the Effective Police Interactions With Youth (EPIY) curriculum, training police officers from the Tulsa Police Department, the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office, Tulsa Public Schools, and the Broken Arrow Police Department. The curriculum, which was developed in Connecticut, was customized slightly to best meet the needs of Tulsa County. EPIY was used for current police officers and also was incorporated into the police academies for new recruits. In addition to paying for law enforcement training, funds were utilized to create and develop a video educating youth on how to interact with law enforcement. Tulsa County also benefits from the participation of law enforcement on its DMC Steering Committee, including the chief of the Tulsa Police Department. Additionally, in 2009, police from Tulsa attended the OJJDP DMC Conference in Austin, Texas, focusing on effective and promising systems-improvement strategies to reduce disproportionality throughout the juvenile justice system.
Addressed Underlying Racial Issues

“We go right into bias. It’s really amazing once you’re done with that conversation; it’s like a weight off their shoulders.”

—Oklahoma Juvenile Justice Specialist

Tulsa has a long history of racial tensions. To effectively address DMC in Tulsa County, state and local stakeholders felt they had to address these racial issues directly. “It’s always there under the surface if you don’t,” said one stakeholder. However, addressing race had to be done in a nonaccusatory manner. The state DMC Coordinator explained that it was important to take group responsibility and not place blame. She stated, “It’s not about saying it’s the fault of the police or someone else.” She also stressed the importance of taking personal and group responsibility for finding solutions.

Built Awareness of DMC at the State Level. Oklahoma spent much time educating various juvenile justice stakeholders about DMC. During 2009–11, DMC report cards were distributed, and there was a widespread public awareness campaign with print and televised news stories. Most recently, this awareness is being built through the OJJDP’s Community and Strategic Planning (CASP) Initiative. Tulsa County benefited from this statewide DMC awareness campaign.

Data Improvements

During 2005–11, racial disparities decreased at both the diversion stage and the detention stage in Tulsa County. Additionally, there was positive movement at the arrest stage.

Diversion. Diversion rates improved substantially for youths of all races during 2005–11. In 2005, there were approximately 10 white diversions per 100 arrests, 8 Hispanic diversions per 100 arrests, 7 African American diversions per 100 arrests, and 3 Native American diversions per 100 arrests. By 2011, there were approximately 46 white diversions per 100 arrests, 50 Hispanic diversions per 100 arrests, 37 African American diversions per 100 arrests, and 35 Native American diversions per 100 arrests (see Figure 6.27).

Figure 6.27. Diversion Rates by Race, 2005–11

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Unfortunately, it is common for the RRI to get worse when rates and numbers improve overall. However, during this time, the RRI at diversion for African American youth also improved along with the numbers and rates. By 2011, the RRI for African Americans at diversion was 0.8, which was the best RRI value in the past 7 years (see Figure 6.28). Because of smaller numbers of Hispanic and Native American youths, the RRI trends were a bit more unstable, but they are clearly not getting worse.

Figure 6.28. Diversion Rates and RRI: African American

Table 6.15. Tulsa County Diversion Numbers, 2005–11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Diversions</th>
<th>White Diversions</th>
<th>African American Diversions</th>
<th>Hispanic Diversions</th>
<th>Native American Diversions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secure Detention. DMC at secure detention also decreased in addition to the total number of youths being sent to secure detention. During 2005–11, the total number of secure detentions declined from 710 to 587, a 17 percent decrease (see Table 6.16). Although the detention rate increased for white, Hispanic, African American, and Native American youths, this increase seems to reflect the reduction in referrals to court. Significantly, racial disparities decreased at detention for African American youths. In 2005 the RRI was 1.4, compared with 1.0 in 2009 (see Figure 6.29). The RRI increased slightly in 2010 to 1.1. For Native American youth the RRI at detention was 1.0 in the last 3 years of reliable data (2008, 2009, and 2010) (see Figure 6.31), and for Hispanic youth the RRI at detention was 1.0 in the last 2 years of reliable data (2009 and 2010) (see Figure 6.30). According to the DMC Coordinator, the implementation of a CIC for
low-level offenders made a significant impact on the detention rates and largely contributed to the reductions in DMC at the detention point.

**Figure 6.29. Detention Rates and RRI: African American**

![Graph showing detention rates and RRI for African American offenders from 2005 to 2010.]

- **Rate - White:** 16.5, 19.5, 20.6, 21.2, 32.9, 34.1
- **Rate - Black:** 23.5, 24.1, 24.6, 24.9, 31.7, 37.8
- **RRI Detention:** 1.4, 1.2, 1.2, 1.2, 1.0, 1.1

*2011 is not included in this graph because the referral numbers (which are the base for the rates) were collected differently in 2011.*

**Figure 6.30. Detention Rates and RRI: Hispanic**

![Graph showing detention rates and RRI for Hispanic offenders from 2005 to 2010.]

- **Rate - White:** 16.5, 19.5, 20.6, 21.2, 32.9, 34.1
- **Rate - Hispanic:** 13.1, 22.3, 24.8, 17.8, 31.9, 34.5
- **RRI Detention:** 0.8, 1.1, 1.2, 0.8, 1.0, 1.0

*2011 is not included in this graph because the referral numbers (which are the base for the rates) were collected differently in 2011.*
Figure 6.31. Detention Rates and RRI: Native American

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Detentions</th>
<th>White Detentions</th>
<th>African American Detentions</th>
<th>Hispanic Detentions</th>
<th>Native American Detentions</th>
<th>Other Detentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Arrest.** Finally, there is a promising trend at the arrest stage in Tulsa County. During 2005–11 the total number of juvenile arrests decreased from 5,635 to 3,756, a 33 percent decrease (see Table 6.17). Additionally, arrest rates decreased for each of the primary racial/ethnic groups. The white arrest rate decreased from 6.1 arrests per 100 youths to 3.5 arrests per 100 youths, the Native American arrest rate decreased from 8.0 to 5.4, the Hispanic arrest rate decreased from 5.8 to 4.8, and the African American arrest rate decreased from 21.9 to 15.1 (see Figure 6.32).
Conclusion

Tulsa County was able to decrease racial disparities at two juvenile justice contact points—diversion and detention—benefiting the county’s largest minority group, African American youth, as well as Hispanic and Native American youth. Tulsa County’s DMC-reduction initiative, which was supported by its state-level DMC Coordinator and Juvenile Justice Specialist, included an emphasis specifically on these two contact points as well as the arrest stage, which also shows promise. Tulsa County hired a local DMC Coordinator, formed a local DMC Steering Committee, implemented trainings for police, and established a CIC. Each of these key strategies seems to have contributed to the DMC reductions this county has achieved. Today, Tulsa County is a CASP site and is receiving technical assistance to achieve even more parity.
Utah County, Utah
Disproportionate Minority Contact–Reduction Case Study

The Problem
The state of Utah knew it wanted to address disproportionate minority contact (DMC) but was uncertain where to start. Statewide, it was difficult to get buy-in from judges to address this issue, and at the local level, there was a lack of awareness of what the data were saying. In Utah County, graffiti charges, which disproportionately affected Hispanic youth (the largest minority group), were not eligible for diversion. Diversion officers lacked training, and some officers perceived their jobs to be more “procedural” than designed to help youth and reduce recidivism. In Utah County in 2007 the arrest relative rate index (RRI) for Hispanic youth was 2.8, the referral RRI was 3.2, the diversion RRI value was 0.5, and the detention RRI was 1.4. Racial disparities for African American youths were more pronounced, although smaller numbers made RRI values less reliable.

Juvenile Justice Strategies
“We started presenting the RRIs about 8 years ago to the judges. They didn’t like it. Now there is a generalized acceptance of these numbers. Now they will call [the DMC Coordinator] to do a presentation or to get some numbers and background numbers of where we are. [The DMC Coordinator] really became a resource for the courts.”

—Utah Juvenile Justice Specialist

Utah was interested in addressing DMC and started the process by bringing a technical assistance provider to the state to review all of its data and assist in developing a DMC–reduction strategy. Given what the data showed, state-level decision-makers decided to concentrate on reducing DMC at the diversion stage with special attention on three counties, including Utah County. The state also hired a DMC Coordinator, focused on improving data collection, developed a training curriculum for police cadets to work better with diverse communities, and increased awareness of DMC statewide. In Utah County, a local DMC working group was formed, changes were made to certain diversion eligibility requirements and other procedures, diversion officers began to see their role differently, and there was an increased use of receiving centers.

State-Level Collaboration and Data-Driven Decisions. In 2008, juvenile justice decision-makers and staff at the state level began to look at their data to see where disparity was the greatest and where they could make a difference. They received technical assistance from Bill Feyerherm through the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to address DMC in the state. Dr. Feyerherm reviewed all of the available juvenile justice data and helped

Utah County, Utah, the second-largest county in the state, is home to more than 530,000 residents, including 186,544 children and youth under age 18. The third- and fifth-largest cities in Utah—Provo and Orem—are located in Utah County. In the past 10 years, the under-18 population has increased by 39 percent. The youths between the ages of 10 and 17 are 83 percent white, 13 percent Hispanic, 2 percent Asian American, 1 percent African American, and 1 percent Native American (Puzzanchera, Sladky, and Kang 2013).† Approximately 13 percent of the children under 18 in Utah County live in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).†

*2012 data.
†2011 data.
state-level decision-makers identify where DMC was evident and decide where to target interventions to make positive changes in the RRI. During this time, a working group was formed from the state DMC Subcommittee to review and revise data definitions to align with the federal database collection system. For the DMC Subcommittee to address DMC, it realized that it had to build political capital by generating collaboration among stakeholders and show changes through movement of RRI. To do this, the state of Utah decided to concentrate primarily on diversion and then engaged local decision-makers, such as judges and chief probation officers, to design and implement initiatives to reduce racial disparities in their own jurisdictions. Utah also developed a strategy for increasing awareness of DMC across the state and hired a state DMC Coordinator. As all this was happening, there were individuals in statewide leadership positions who understood the importance of addressing DMC, which helped the effort gain momentum at the state level. For example, the current director of Utah’s Division of Juvenile Justice Services was the former Juvenile Justice Specialist, and there are numerous members of the State Advisory Group (SAG) and DMC Subcommittee in leadership positions.

**Built Awareness of the Data and Engaged Decision-Makers at the Local Level**

“I presented the data to local leaders, and they didn’t buy in to it. They questioned the data. I had to go back and redraw the plan. Next time I showed them where the data came from and came to the meeting with a data analyst from the court. At this second meeting, they understood where the data came from. Rather than focus on data, they started mapping the court process to find gaps and areas for improvement.”

—State DMC Coordinator

The DMC Coordinator and the Juvenile Justice Specialist worked strategically to engage stakeholders in DMC-reduction work. In the beginning, they would present data in large statewide meetings, but unfortunately, if there were one or two judges who were skeptical or who spoke loudly against addressing racial disparities, the whole presentation was derailed. The Juvenile Justice Specialist and the DMC Coordinator realized they needed to change strategies. The work had to focus on specific points—things that could be controlled—and it had to be done at the local level. They began to go to smaller bench meetings and presented the RRI data in small, regional groups. This approach also improved relationships between the executive branch and the judicial branch and made the focus more local. Allies were developed this way.

The Juvenile Justice Specialist and the DMC Coordinator spent much time in Utah County presenting the data and building an understanding of DMC. The DMC Coordinator worked closely with court staff members to develop a strategy and begin to get buy-in. An informal local DMC working group was formed, which was chaired by the chief probation officer in the Fourth District Juvenile Court in Utah County, who was also on the statewide DMC Committee. Other members of the informal working group included the trial court executive, the diversion supervisor, and diversion staff. The working group came together to brainstorm what could be causing the racial disparities at diversion and to develop effective strategies. The group had no clear answers but was able to identify areas it wanted to address that could make a difference.
**Changed Diversion Eligibility.** In 2007, graffiti charges did not qualify for diversion in Utah County. Given that this charge disproportionately affected Hispanic youth, this eligibility exclusion was contributing to DMC. In each jurisdiction in Utah, the judges had a certain amount of sway in what qualified for diversion. During 2007–08, Utah County judges expanded diversion eligibility to include graffiti. Additionally, at the time, for a property offense to qualify for diversion, the damage done had to be less than $100. However, the legislature increased that amount to $250 but did not legislate restitution. As a result, there was more flexibility to resolve a graffiti case through a nonjudicial agreement; thus, more youths with graffiti charges became eligible for diversion.

**Changed Diversion Officer Philosophy.** When diversion officers were made aware of the racial disparities in diversion, many of them were alarmed, and some took it personally—for they were working hard to treat all referrals equally and were governed by the diversion criteria. Before this time, officers were more procedural in petitioning noncompliant diversion cases. However, around 2007 or ‘08, as DMC awareness was building, the diversion officers were new and they became more engaged in their work to help youths fulfill their diversion obligations and avoid recidivism. Overall, the officers became more concerned with keeping low-risk offenders out of the system. According to the chief probation officer at the Fourth District Court, the diversion officers today are more social-work oriented (and less law-enforcement oriented). When youths miss deadlines the officers actively try to help them meet their requirements (instead of initiating a formal response).

**Increased Use of Receiving Centers.** Across Utah, receiving centers have been established for youths after an arrest. Instead of going to secure care at arrest, police officers can take juveniles to receiving centers to be processed and wait for a parent or guardian to pick them up. There, the juveniles speak with a diversion officer. If the youth admits to the allegation, he or she can have a nonjudicial closure. This process keeps many youths out of secure detention while awaiting court decisions. It also increases the number of diversions and reduces referrals (since they will be treated as diversions). During 2007–11 in Utah County, there was an increase in the use of receiving centers as diversions for youth, even as the number of arrests decreased. During this time, the number of youths served in receiving centers increased from 265 to 390, a 47 percent increase. The number of white youths served by receiving centers increased by 31 percent, while the number of Hispanic youths served by receiving centers increased by 56 percent.

**Small Changes.** While brainstorming how to improve the system to reduce DMC, Utah County decision-makers realized that some small changes to procedures could perhaps make a difference. First, they came to the conclusion that the letters sent to parents of youths being referred to court could be improved. They had always thought the letters were fine, but at second glance it seemed as if the language was difficult to understand, included too much legal jargon, and was heavy handed. During 2008–09, they simplified the letters and used lay terms. Additionally, they made the letter double-sided with English on the front and Spanish on the back; previously, there was a phone number to call to obtain the translated version. They also

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*Youths with graffiti charges still had to go through a slightly different court process, but they were eligible to be considered for diversion.*

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changed the structure of the class offered to youths and their parents after referral to court. Before 2007, youths and their families would listen to a PowerPoint presentation that described different crimes and their consequences. Juvenile court officials realized that the presentation needed to be more engaging and shorter. Today the class includes 30–45 minutes of instruction and another 15 minutes for families and youths to meet individually with diversion officers to have their questions answered and decide on a diversion agreement (e.g., a fine, counseling, a referral to another program). Additionally, they used to offer the class once per month in Spanish for Spanish speakers. Today, they welcome Spanish speakers at any of the offered sessions and have interpreters available. Finally, the officers giving the class are more social-work oriented, whereas before they were more law-enforcement oriented. This helped make the class more engaging and a more welcoming experience for the youths and their families.

In addition to focusing on DMC reduction at diversion, there was much work done to build general awareness of DMC across the state. Further, there was a curriculum developed for police officers on working with diverse communities.

**Building Awareness of DMC in General at the Statewide Level.** Increasing awareness of DMC issues among professional communities, including juvenile court judges, trial court executives, probation chiefs, and law enforcement agencies was an explicit goal of the Utah Board of Juvenile Justice. Statewide, the Utah Juvenile Justice Specialist and the DMC Coordinator spent much time building awareness of DMC. For example, in 2010 they conducted a 2-day DMC training to develop a comprehensive DMC assessment plan. Attendees included DMC Subcommittee members, SAG members, University of Utah Criminal Justice Center researchers, representatives from the Administrative Office of the Court, and leaders from juvenile justice in Salt Lake, Utah, and Weber Counties. In 2010, they worked with 14 organizations and stakeholders to build awareness of DMC, reaching 220 community members and professionals (Utah Board of Juvenile Justice 2011).

**Implemented Police Officer Training.** In 2009 the Utah Board of Juvenile Justice developed and submitted a Community Relations Curriculum to train new cadets. The board also developed minority youth scenarios to be part of the training. The curriculum’s goal was to provide officers with tools to effectively protect, communicate, and partner with the diverse communities they serve. The Community Relations Curriculum was submitted and approved for permanent use effective July 1, 2010. By 2011, there were 15 Training of Trainer for Satellite sites, and 84 new law enforcement officers, 40 corrections officers, and 114 civilians were trained in the curriculum (Utah Board of Juvenile Justice 2011).

**Improvements in the Data**

“It all boils downs to relationships and having the data to back up your work.”

—Utah DMC Coordinator

Between 2007 and 2010, Utah County’s data have shown improvements at four contact points: arrest, referral to court, diversion, and secure detention.

**Arrest.** From 2007 to 2010 the total number of arrests in Utah County decreased by 19 percent, with the decreases for African American and Hispanic youths being greater than for white
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youths (see Table 6.18). This decrease in arrests is even more notable given that during this time there was a 21 percent increase in total youth population. Arrest rates also declined for white, African American, and Hispanic youths. The arrest rate for white youths declined from 7 arrests per 100 youths to 5 arrests per 100 youths; the Hispanic arrest rates declined from 19 arrests per 100 youths to 11 arrests per 100 youths; and the African American arrest rate declined from 39 arrests per 100 youths to 17 arrests per 100 youths (see Figures 6.33 and 6.34). Because the arrest rates for African American and Hispanic youths declined more than the rates for white youths, the RRI improved for both minority groups. The African American RRI at arrest declined from 5.7 in 2007 to 3.6 in 2010, and the Hispanic RRI at arrest declined from 2.8 to 2.2.

Figure 6.33. Arrest Rates and RRI: Hispanic

Figure 6.34. Arrest Rates and RRI: African American
Table 6.18. Utah County Arrest Numbers, 2007–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Arrests</th>
<th>White Arrests</th>
<th>African American Arrests</th>
<th>Hispanic Arrests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,958</td>
<td>3,444</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5,007</td>
<td>3,536</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,347</td>
<td>3,011</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Referral to Court. Referral numbers, referral rates, and racial disparities for Hispanic youths also declined during 2007–10. The total number of referrals to court decreased from 5,336 to 4,379, which is an 18 percent decrease (see Table 6.19). The white referral rate decreased from 7 referrals per 100 youths in the general population in 2007 to 5 referrals per 100 youths in 2010. The Hispanic rate decreased from 23 referrals per 100 youths in 2007 to 12 referrals per 100 youths in 2010. The RRI for Hispanic youths decreased steadily from 3.2 to 2.6 to 2.3 (see Table 6.35). Referral rates for African American youths have also decreased, and the RRI has improved, although the numbers are small and should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 6.35. Referral Rates and RRI: Hispanic

Referral Rates (per 100 youth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate - White</th>
<th>Rate - Hispanic</th>
<th>RRI-Referral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Figure 6.36. Referral Rates and RRI: African American

Table 6.19. Utah County Referral Numbers, 2007–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Referrals</th>
<th>White Referrals</th>
<th>African American Referrals</th>
<th>Hispanic Referrals</th>
<th>Native American Referrals</th>
<th>Pacific Islander Referrals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5,336</td>
<td>3,676</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,680</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>4,610</td>
<td>3,365</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,379</td>
<td>3,171</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diversion.** Decreasing DMC at diversion was an explicit goal statewide in Utah, and improvements were certainly made in Utah County. During 2007–10, diversion rates improved for both Hispanic and white youths. Diversion rates for white youths increased from 34 diversions per 100 arrests in 2007 to 38 diversions per 100 arrests in 2010. The diversion rate for Hispanic youths increased from 20 diversions per 100 arrests in 2007 to 35 diversions per 100 arrests in 2010. These diversion rate changes led to improvements in the RRI for Hispanic youth, which went from 0.59 in 2007 to 0.91 in 2010 (see Figure 6.37).

Figure 6.37. Diversion Rates and RRI: Hispanic
Table 6.20. Utah County Diversion Numbers, 2007–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Divisions</th>
<th>White Divisions</th>
<th>African American Divisions</th>
<th>Hispanic Divisions</th>
<th>Native American Divisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secure Detention. Utah County’s detention RRIs also look promising, having declined for Hispanic youth from 1.4 in 2007 to 1.1 in 2009 and 2010 (see Figure 6.38).

Figure 6.38. Detention Rates and RRI: Hispanic

Table 6.21. Utah County Detention Numbers, 2007–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Detentions</th>
<th>White Detentions</th>
<th>African American Detentions</th>
<th>Hispanic Detentions</th>
<th>Native American Detentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

Utah County was able to reduce racial disparities at four juvenile justice stages—arrest, referral to court, diversion, and detention—for its largest minority group, Hispanic youth. The local DMC strategy was to work collaboratively to address the issue, increase access to receiving centers after arrest, change policies and procedures at diversion, make the juvenile justice system more understandable and welcoming for referred juveniles and their families, and improve the diversion officer’s role. Statewide, the Juvenile Justice Specialist, the DMC Coordinator, and the SAG used data, the help of a technical assistance provider, and persistence to engage juvenile justice decision-makers in addressing DMC. They also developed a training for police officers.
Utah County and the state of Utah continue to invest in DMC reduction. For example, in 2010, Formula Grant funding supported the use of evidence-based prevention programs for high-risk, gang-involved youth in Provo, Utah County’s largest city. These targeted youths participated in the Strengthening Families program, which in its first year showed reductions in antisocial attitudes and gang activity (Utah Board of Juvenile Justice 2011). In 2011, Utah was selected by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to become a Community and Strategic Planning Initiative site to strengthen its state and local DMC initiatives. In 2012 a formal DMC working group was formed and it is now chaired by the chief probation officer in the Fourth District Juvenile Court in Utah County. It includes representatives from the local university, an afterschool specialist, a gang specialist, and local law enforcement. Some members of the statewide DMC committee who live in Utah County also attend this group. Finally, in September 2012, the Utah Criminal Justice Center at the University of Utah published a DMC assessment study for the state of Utah looking specifically at arrests and referrals to court.
7. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this report was to identify jurisdictions that have been able to reduce racial disparities at one or more points in their juvenile justice systems for African American, Hispanic, or Native American youth and to document and share their disproportionate minority contact (DMC)–reduction strategies. Since 2002, states have been required to address DMC in their juvenile justice systems to receive awards from certain federal funding sources. The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) has targeted much of its energy at addressing DMC, providing funding for DMC Coordinators, organizing Webinars and conferences, providing technical assistance and training, and holding regular conference calls. It appears that in the nine jurisdictions highlighted in this report the effort is paying off. As measured by the relative rate index (RRI), DMC has been reduced significantly at arrest, referral to court, diversion, secure detention, and secure confinement primarily for African American and Hispanic youths, but also for Native American youths.

Key stakeholder interviews and a document review provided detailed information on what strategies were used by each of the nine sites. Interestingly, many interviewees pointed to similar strategies that they felt were responsible for reducing racial disparities in their systems. Eight of the most common strategies were 1) focusing on data, 2) increasing systemic collaboration, 3) changing institutional culture, 4) affiliating with national juvenile justice reform initiatives, 5) creating alternatives to formal system involvement, 6) concentrating intentionally on DMC reduction, 7) making use of leadership at the local level, the state level, or both, and 8) making DMC reduction a long-term priority.

At the same time, more research is needed. Many of the strategies used by the nine case study sites have also been used in sites that have not been successful in reducing DMC. For example, in some jurisdictions, introducing alternatives to formal system involvement has positively affected white youth more than minority youth, thus increasing DMC. In other jurisdictions, too much emphasis on data analysis leads to “analysis paralysis,” with no realistic interventions being introduced. Still, many systems point to involvement with a national juvenile justice reform organization as their DMC strategy, but often their RRI values do not improve.

Nevertheless, this report provides important information to anyone concerned with DMC in juvenile justice systems across the United States. As noted in OJJDP’s DMC Technical Assistance Manual, DMC reduction demands sustained efforts (Hsia 2009). As jurisdictions across the United States concentrate more on the problems of DMC in their juvenile justice systems, we hope that sustained efforts toward identifying DMC, assessing its contributing mechanisms, implementing intervention strategies, evaluating, and monitoring can make a difference.
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(JJDPA) Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act § 223(a)(3).


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Raise the Age CT. N.d. http://www.raisetheagect.org/


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