Bureau of Justice Assistance.
Regional Seminar Series on Implementing
Antistalking Codes
Monograph
June 1996
NCJ 156836

This document was prepared by the National Criminal
Justice Association, under grant number 93-DD-
CX-0025 awarded by the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, and grant
number 94-VF-CX-K001 awarded by the Office for
Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice. The
opinions, findings, and conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this document are
those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.

Bureau of Justice Assistance
633 Indiana Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20531
U.S. Department of Justice Response Center
800-421-6770

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse
800-688-4252

Bureau of Justice Assistance Internet Address
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National
Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office
for Victims of Crime.

----------------------------------

Foreword

I am pleased to present this monograph on the
regional seminar series "Developing and
Implementing Antistalking Codes." The seminars were
funded jointly by the Bureau of Justice Assistance
(BJA) and Office for Victims of Crime (OVC), both
agencies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

The regional seminars were conducted to acquaint
State policymakers with the model antistalking code
developed by the National Criminal Justice
Association (NCJA) under contract to the National
Institute of Justice. The seminars also allowed
policymakers to assess the strengths and weaknesses
of existing State laws and to review alternative
approaches to enforcement.

The monograph includes an overview of the seminar
proceedings and findings, a profile of existing
State antistalking statutes (current through the
1994 State legislative sessions), an analysis of
recent State appellate court decisions in stalking
cases, and information on developments in the area
of civil protective order laws since publication of
the model code. The model code and commentary and
the principal recommendations contained in the
final report of the model code project are included
in appendixes. The seminars provided participants
with the opportunity to obtain valuable information
from practitioners on intervening in and
prosecuting stalking cases. We hope that this
information will guide legislators, public
policymakers, and criminal justice officials in
making informed decisions about antistalking laws
and policies.

Nancy E. Gist
Director
Bureau of Justice Assistance

------------------------------------
         
Acknowledgments

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) wishes to
thank Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President,
National Criminal Justice Association (NCJA) for
her outstanding work in supervising and
coordinating the preparation of this document. BJA
acknowledges the skill, knowledge, and hard work of
NCJA project staff, which included Paul E.
Lawrence, Lisa Doyle Moran, Robert A. Kapler,
Nadine M. Rapacioli, Carolyn J. Reid, Wanda A.
Meredith, Jennifer A. Ferrante, and Doug B.
Roberson. In addition, BJA would like to recognize
the work of the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) (under contract with NCJA).

BJA also thanks the NCJA Advisory Council, whose
members provided the NCJA project staff with the
names of potential participants in the regional
seminars, and the cohosts of the regional seminars:
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement; the
Oregon Administrative Services Division, Criminal
Justice Services Section; the Illinois Criminal
Justice Information Authority; the Illinois
Attorney General's Office; and the Chicago
(Illinois) Police Department. 

BJA and NCJA are especially appreciative of members
of the project resource group, who are introduced
in the following paragraphs, for their dedication
to this endeavor and willingness to share their
experiences with the project staff. 

o David Beatty is Director of Public Policy at the
National Victim Center (NVC). In this capacity, he
is responsible for all matters related to
legislative and legal issues regarding victims'
rights and interests. Mr. Beatty also serves as
Director of the Center's Crime Victim Litigation
Project and the Coalition of Victims' Attorneys and
Consultants. He currently serves on the Victim
Committee of the American Bar Association and is a
member of the American Restitution Association and
the National Constitutional Amendment Network. Mr.
Beatty holds a bachelor of arts degree in political
science from Colorado College and a Juris Doctor
from University of Iowa School of Law. 

o Joseph M. Claps is the Chief of Criminal Justice
for the Illinois Attorney General's Office, where
he has served in various capacities for 12 1/2
years. Previously, he served as an Assistant
State's Attorney for the Cook County (Illinois)
State's Attorney's Office. Mr. Claps currently is
an adjunct professor of law for trial practice at
Loyola University Law School (Illinois) and a
lecturer at John Marshall School of Law (Illinois).
He also is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army
Reserves as a judge advocate general, currently
serving as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate for the
commanding general. Mr. Claps received his
undergraduate degree from Loyola University and his
Juris Doctor from IIT-Chicago Kent College of Law
(Illinois).

o Michael T. Farmer currently serves as Manager of
Corporate Security for the Exploration, and
Producing Division of the Mobil Oil Corporation.
Prior to assuming his current position, he was
Manager of Corporate Security Planning; Manager of
Security,Exploration, and Producing; and Manager of
Corporate Security Operations at Mobil. Before
joining Mobil, Mr. Farmer served as Director of the
Criminal Justice Center, John Jay College,City
University of New York. He also served as Director
of Research and Field Operations for the Police
Executive Research Forum (PERF). Mr. Farmer served
as Special Assistant to the Administrator of the
U.S. Department of Justice's Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) and as Acting
Director of the Office of Evaluation in the U.S.
Department of Justice's National Institute of
Justice (NIJ). He began his career with the
Kentucky Crime Commission, where he served as the
director of planning. Mr. Farmer holds a bachelor's
degree in sociology and psychology from University
of Kentucky and a master's degree in regional
planning from University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill. 

o Robert A. Fein is a forensic psychologist who
currently is a Visiting Fellow at NIJ and a
consultant psychologist with the U.S. Department of
the Treasury's U.S. Secret Service. He codirects
the Secret Service Exceptional Case Study Project,
a multiyear operational study of violence directed
at public officials and public figures. Previously,
Dr. Fein worked for 15 years as a clinical and
forensic psychologist with mentally disordered
offenders in Massachusetts and with the mental
health and correctional systems that evaluate and
care for them. He holds a bachelor's degree in
American studies from Amherst College
(Massachusetts) and a doctorate in clinical
psychology and public practice from Harvard
University (Massachusetts).

o Jon R. Felde is General Counsel of NCSL and
Director of NCSL's Committee on Law and Justice.
Prior to joining NCSL in 1986, he practiced law in
Franklin, Kentucky, with the firm of Harlin, Parker
& Rudloff. Mr. Felde holds a bachelor of arts
degree from Harvard College (Massachusetts) and a
law degree from University of Kentucky College of
Law. 

o Susan W. Hillenbrand has worked for the American
Bar Association (ABA) for more than 20 years and
currently is Director for Special Projects for
ABA's Section for Criminal Justice. During her
tenure, Ms. Hillenbrand has contributed to a
variety of victim assistance research projects and
publications. She also has served as a consultant
to the National College of the Judiciary and as a
contractor for the U.S. Department of Labor, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation,
and Research. Ms. Hillenbrand holds a bachelor's
degree in political science from Marymount College
(New York) and a certificate from the Paralegal
Institute in New York (New York).

o Sally Hillsman is presently serving as Assistant
Director of NIJ, under an interagency personnel
agreement between the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC) and NIJ. Upon conclusion of this
appointment, Dr. Hillsman will return to her
position as Vice President of research at NCSC.
From 1979 to 1991, Dr. Hillsman served as Associate
Director and Research Director of the Vera
Institute of Justice (New York). She holds a
bachelor of arts degree from Mount Holyoke College
(Massachusetts), attended the University of
Edinburgh (Scotland), and holds a Ph.D. in
sociology from Columbia University (New York).
 
o Donna Hunzeker is Criminal Justice Program
Manager for NCSL in Denver, Colorado. She staffs
NCSL's Criminal Justice Committee. Prior to joining
NCSL in 1989, Ms. Hunzeker was a community action
planner and spent 7 years with a justice-oriented
nonprofit organization where she was editor of a
corrections magazine. Ms. Hunzeker holds a
bachelor's degree in sociology and has done
graduate work in journalism at University of
Nebraska-Lincoln. 

o Nolan E. Jones is the Group Director for the
Human Resources Group of the National Governors'
Association (NGA). He has served as Staff Director
for NGA's Task Force on Alcohol and Drug Abuse.
Previously, Dr. Jones was assistant professor of
political science at the University of Michigan in
Ann Arbor. Recently, Dr. Jones was elected to the
governing council of the American Political Science
Association. He holds an undergraduate degree from
Texas Southern University and a doctoral degree in
political science from Washington University
(Missouri).
  
o John C. Lane is a 22-year veteran of the Los
Angeles (California) Police Department and serves
as Officer in Charge of the Department's Threat
Management Unit, which focuses on abnormal, long-
term threat and harassment cases. Lt. Lane is the
founder and current President of the Association of
Threat Assessment Professionals. Lt. Lane, who
developed the unit, holds a bachelor's degree in
physical education from California State University
at Long Beach and a master's degree in public
administration from University of Southern
California. 
 
o Helen M. Lardner is Attorney-Advisor for the U.S.
Department of the Treasury's Office of Enforcement.
Previously, she practiced law at private firms. She
holds a bachelor's degree in English from Xavier
University (Ohio) and a Juris Doctor from Catholic
University of America (Washington, D.C.). 
 
o Victoria O'Brien currently serves as Attorney-
Advisor in the Office of the General Counsel,
Office of Justice Programs (OJP), U.S. Department
of Justice. Previously, she served as Acting
Director of Operations for the Special Projects
Division of the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC),
U.S. Department of Justice, which administers
training and technical assistance to victim service
providers and criminal justice system
professionals. She also has served as a legal
advisor and grant monitor at the Legal Services
Corporation and community organizer for the
VISTA/Student Community Service Program in Denver,
Colorado. She holds a bachelor of arts degree from
Denison University (Ohio) and a Juris Doctor from
Loyola University Law School (Illinois). 
 
o Roxann M. Ryan currently serves as Assistant
Attorney General of Iowa in the Criminal Appeals
Division. She has worked in the Iowa Attorney
General's Office since 1980, previously serving as
Deputy Attorney General, Division Head, and Staff
Attorney in the Criminal Appeals Division. Ms. Ryan
is a full-time student in the criminal justice
doctoral program at University of Nebraska at
Omaha. Ms. Ryan holds a bachelor's degree in
economics and a Juris Doctor from Iowa State
University.

o John R. Stedman is a Senior Researcher for PERF
in Washington, D.C. Prior to assuming that post,
Mr. Stedman spent 16 years with the Alexandria
(Virginia) Police Department, serving as a patrol
officer, police investigator, sergeant, and
lieutenant. During his tenure, he was commander of
several divisions, including the Patrol and Special
Investigations Divisions. He also is the former
Director of PERF's Senior Management Institute for
Police. Currently he serves as Assistant Project
Director of PERF's Comprehensive Gang Initiative
Project and its Asset Forfeiture Training and
Technical Assistance Project. Mr. Stedman holds a
bachelor of arts degree in sociology from Bowling
Green State University (Ohio) and a master's degree
in psychology from George Mason University
(Virginia).

o John H. Stein has been Deputy Director of the
National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA)
since 1981. Previously, he served as Vice President
of the NOVA Board. Mr. Stein's extensive experience
in victim services has entailed helping to train an
experimental team of community service officers in
the Dayton (Ohio) Police Department and designing
paralegal roles for the U.S. Attorney's Office in
Washington, D.C. He also served as Deputy Director
of the Criminal Justice and the Elderly Project at
the National Council of Senior Citizens, where he
helped design service programs for elderly crime
victims and provided technical assistance to crime
projects for the elderly across the Nation. Mr.
Stein holds a bachelor's degree from Yale College
(Connecticut) and a law degree from George
Washington University (Washington, D.C.). 

o Norma Mancini Stevens is a Senior Policy Analyst
with the American Prosecutors Research Institute
(APRI). In this capacity, she is the project
coordinator for two U.S. Department of Justice-
funded projects on domestic violence and stalking
and violence against women. Previously, she served
as Chief of the Fiscal and Management Division,
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), U.S. Department
of Justice. As a Presidential Management Intern for
the Federal Government, she served in the U.S.
Marshals Service, on the U.S. Senate Judiciary
Committee staff, and in BJS. Ms. Stevens holds an
undergraduate degree from Lake Eric College (Ohio)
and a master's degree in public administration from
George Washington University (Washington, D.C.).

o Brian Vossekuil is a Special Agent of the U.S.
Department of the Treasury's U.S. Secret Service.
He currently serves as Assistant Special Agent in
charge of the Domestic Investigations Branch of the
Office of Protective Research. Special Agent
Vossekuil codirects the Secret Service Exceptional
Case Study Project, a multiyear operational study
of violence directed at public officials and public
figures. During his 17-year career with the Secret
Service, Special Agent Vossekuil has served in the
Detroit, Michigan, field office; in the
Presidential Protective Division; and in the
Intelligence Division.

o Michael Ward currently serves as Assistant U.S.
Attorney in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He has
prosecuted stalking behavior using the Federal
threatening letter statute and participated in the
drafting of the antistalking statute enacted by
Minnesota. Previously, Mr. Ward was an attorney
with the firm of Chairman and Sterling in both New
York, New York, and San Francisco, California. He
is a graduate of the National Law Center of George
Washington University (Washington, D.C.) and served
a judicial clerkship with the Honorable Oliver Seth
of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Santa Fe, New
Mexico.

Two resource group members, Mr. Claps and Dr. Fein,
deserve special thanks for serving as facilitator
and panelist, respectively, for each seminar. BJA
also would like to acknowledge the contribution of
the following individuals who provided
presentations on the status of antistalking
legislation in their States at the regional
seminars: Michael J. Niemand, Bureau Chief,
Criminal Division, Florida Office of the Attorney
General; Oregon Senator Ron Cease (D); Oregon
Representative Kevin L. Mannix (D); Oregon Circuit
Court Judge Hollie Pihl; and then-Illinois Attorney
General Roland W. Burris. In addition, the
following individuals provided valuable insight
into the problem of stalking while serving as
panelists at one of the regional seminars: John F.
Gorczyk, Commissioner, Corrections Department,
Vermont Human Services Agency; Lt. Lane; Laura
Scott, Victims Advocate Coordinator, Pinellas
County (Florida) Sheriff's Office; Vermont Senator
Susan Sweetser (R); Mr. Stein; Mr. Beatty; Leslie
Landis, Executive Director, Life Span; and Ms.
Ryan. 

Aileen Adams, Director, OVC, U.S. Department of
Justice, and Nancy Gist, Director, BJA, U.S.
Department of Justice, provided support and
guidance for this project. The project also
benefitted greatly from the contributions of
Carolyn Hightower, Assistant Director, OVC; Lois
Mock, Program Manager, NIJ; Kenneth R. Thomas,
Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research
Service, U.S. Congress; Olga Trujillo, General
Counsel, OJP; Charles M. Hollis, Law Enforcement
Program Manager, BJA; Jennifer Knobe, Grant
Programs Specialist, BJA; and Melanie Smith,
Program Specialist, OVC. BJA also acknowledges the
contributions of Charles A. Lauer, former Special
Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, OJP,
and project monitor for the model code project, who
also provided valuable guidance in planning the
regional seminars.

BJA would like to thank all of the seminar
participants who generously shared their time and
experiences in dealing with stalking cases and who
engaged in lively discussions during the seminars. 


--------------------------------

Table of Contents
 
Chapter 1. Overview of Seminar Proceedings and
Findings 
 Conducting the Seminars         
 Issues Discussed          
  Stalkers' Motivations and Behaviors        
  Evaluation and Treatment      
  Uncooperative Victims         
  Other Observations and Recommendations  

Chapter 2. Profile of State Stalking Statutes   
 Stalking Defined    
 Threat Required         
 Intent Provisions         
 Course of Conduct         
 Sentencing          
 Bail         
 Special Provisions         
 Civil Remedies         
 Mental Evaluation and Civil Commitment 
 Related Laws  

Chapter 3. Stalking Case Law: State Appellate
Court Decisions         
 California Statute Upheld         
 Florida Statute Upheld         
 Georgia Statute Upheld         
 Oklahoma Statute Upheld        
 Virginia Statute Upheld        
 Massachusetts Overturns Conviction   
 Illinois' Interpretation 
   
Chapter 4. Using Civil Protective Orders in
Stalking Cases          
 Eligibility for Civil Protective Orders      
 Enforcement of Protective Orders       
 Double Jeopardy Implications of Protective Orders 

Sources for Further Information 
 
Bibliography 

Appendix A. Model Antistalking Code and Commentary 
 
Appendix B. Principal Recommendations of the Final
Report of the Project To Develop an Antistalking
Model Code  

Appendix C. Participant Lists  

Appendix D. Seminar Agenda 

Appendix E. Hypothetical Stalking Cases 

Appendix F. Appellate Court Citations of Stalking
Cases

List of Tables
 
Table 1. Stalking Law Code Citations 

Table 2. Proscribed Acts. 

Table 3. Comparison of Proscribed Acts Provisions
Before and After Publication of the Model Code 

Table 4. Threat Requirements 

Table 5. Comparison of Threat Requirement
Provisions Before and After Publication of the
Model Code 

Table 6. Intent Requirements 

Table 7. Comparison of Intent Requirement
Provisions Before and After Publication of the
Model Code 

Table 8. Sentencing Provisions 

Table 9. Comparison of Sentencing Provisions Before
and After Publication of the Model Code
  
Table 10. Citations for Protective Order
Provisions 

Table 11. Eligibility Provisions for Civil
Protective Orders  

--------------------------------

Chapter 1. Overview of Seminar Proceedings and
Findings
 
Stalking captured widespread public attention in
the wake of the 1989 murder of actress Rebecca
Schaeffer and reports of a fan's persistent
harassment of talk-show host David Letterman.
California enacted the first State antistalking
legislation in 1990. Since then, 48 other States
and the District of Columbia have enacted
antistalking laws.
 
Stalking is a complex problem with three defining
elements: the stalker's relationship with the
victim, the stalker's motive in pursuing the
victim, and the stalker's behavior. Suspected
stalkers' motives and intentions are uncertain, and
their obsessive and unpredictable behavior makes it
difficult for criminal justice officials to
determine with any certainty how great a threat
they pose to their victims. Moreover, stalking is
different from many other types of criminal
behavior because it involves a series of acts, each
of which may be legal by itself, that become
criminal when, taken collectively, they cause the
victim to fear injury or death.  

Conducting the Seminars
 
In 1994, the National Criminal Justice Association
(NCJA) conducted a series of seminars on
"Developing and Implementing Anti-Stalking Codes"
to assist States in establishing antistalking
codes. Conducted under a grant from the Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Office for Victims
of Crime (OVC), both agencies of the U.S.
Department of Justice, the seminars were developed
to acquaint State policymakers and criminal justice
practitioners with a model antistalking code and to
assist policymakers in assessing existing State
laws and developing alternative approaches to
enforcement. 

The seminars were a followup to the project funded
by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), U.S.
Department of Justice, to develop a model
antistalking code that would be both constitutional
and enforceable. NCJA managed the project under the
direction and oversight of NIJ. The project was
congressionally mandated under section 109(b) of
the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State; the Judiciary; and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993 [P.L.
102-395). A project resource group established for
the model code project continued its work for the
seminars series, providing guidance for the
project. In drafting the model code, the project
resource group analyzed issues relating to freedom
of expression, due process, freedom of movement,
excessive punishment, and double jeopardy to ensure
the code's constitutionality. The model
antistalking code and commentary, and the principal
recommendations contained in the project final
report, are provided in Appendices A and B,
respectively, of this monograph. The final report
of the code development project includes the text
of the model code and commentary on issues that
arose in drafting the code. In addition, the final
report contains a profile of existing State
stalking statutes; an overview of police agencies'
current policies for managing stalking incidents;
and discussion and recommendations for States'
consideration concerning bail and sentencing, code
implementation, and stalking-related research.
 
The grant from BJA and OVC supported five seminars
of two types: two briefings on the model code for
State legislators and staff, conducted by the
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
under contract to NCJA, and three regional seminars
geared toward criminal justice practitioners,
including law enforcement officers, victims
advocates, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. 
 
The first briefing took place at NCSL's Assembly on
the Legislature, May 5-7, 1994, in Washington, DC.
Members of the NCSL Criminal Justice Committee were
updated on emerging issues concerning State
antistalking laws and learned how the model
antistalking code could serve as a basis for
constitutional and enforceable antistalking laws at
the State level. A second briefing took place in
conjunction with NCSL's annual meeting in New
Orleans, Louisiana, July 24-28, 1994. A joint
session of NCSL's Criminal Justice Committee and
Children and Family Services Committee on "Stalking
Laws and Critical Issues in Domestic Violence"
focused on antistalking legislation as an important
element of the response to the broader issue of
domestic violence. Topics discussed included how
State legislation concerning domestic violence,
civil protective orders, and training can help
States better address the broad issues of
victimization. 

In November 1994, NCSL mailed packets to legal and
criminal justice legislative staff including an
NCSL update on antistalking laws, an NCJA article
on State appellate court decisions in stalking
cases, and copies of the model code. Subsequently,
NCJA held 1 1/2-day seminars in the following three
geographical regions: 
 
o Eastern Region: Held March 31 April-1 in Tampa,
Florida, in cooperation with the Florida Department
of Law Enforcement, this seminar included the
States of Connecticut, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Vermont, the Virgin
Islands, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
 
o Western Region: This seminar, which took place
May 12-13 in Portland, Oregon, in cooperation with
the Oregon Administrative Services Division,
Criminal Justice Services Section, included the
States of Alaska, American Samoa, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, the Northern Mariana Islands,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. 

o Central Region: Held October 27-28 in Chicago,
Illinois, in cooperation with the Illinois Criminal
Justice Information Authority, the Illinois
Attorney General's Office, and the Chicago Police
Department, this seminar included the States of
Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Ohio, South Dakota,Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
 
The participant lists from each seminar are
provided in Appendix C. During the first day of
each seminar, panelists provided a review of the
methodology and collaborative process used to
develop the model code and described antistalking
statutes in the region. On the second day, using
three hypothetical stalking case studies,
participants discussed substantive issues related
to stalking. The agendas from each seminar are
provided in Appendix D. The hypothetical stalking
cases used at the seminars are provided in Appendix
E. 

Speakers for the seminars included the following
persons:
 
o Gwen A. Holden, NCJA Executive Vice President,
discussed stalking and provided a brief history of
efforts to address the problem. Lisa Doyle Moran of
NCJA provided an overview of the model
antistalking code for the States and a profile of
the existing antistalking statutes for the
particular region. Robert Fein, a consulting
psychologist for the U.S. Secret Service, U.S.
Department of the Treasury, and visiting fellow at
NIJ, discussed the most current information on the
psychological profiles of stalkers.
 
o At the Eastern Region seminar, Michael J.
Niemand, Bureau Chief of the Criminal Division,
Florida Office of the Attorney General, briefed
participants on a recent Florida District Court of
Appeals decision upholding the Florida antistalking
statute. It was the first decision by a State
appellate court to address the constitutionality of
antistalking laws.   

o At the Western Region seminar, Oregon Senator Ron
Cease (D) and Representative Kevin L. Mannix (D)
discussed the development and enactment of the
Oregon antistalking statute. Circuit Court Judge
Hollie Pihl, who had declared the Oregon statute
unconstitutional, discussed his decision. 
 
o In the Central Region seminar, Illinois Attorney
General Roland W. Burris welcomed participants.
 
The three hypothetical case studies, which include
elements of actual stalking cases, were used to
demonstrate potential practical implications of the
model antistalking code; examine the experiences of
States with existing statutes and practices for
handling stalking cases; and explore options for
handling the complex and unique legal, social, and
mental health issues raised by stalking cases. One
of the hypothetical cases involves an estranged
married couple, another involves a supervisor and a
former employee, and the third involves two
individuals who do not know each other.
 
Ms. Holden and Joseph M. Claps, First Assistant
Attorney General of the Illinois Office of the
Attorney General, were facilitators for discussions
of the hypothetical cases. After presenting a
hypothetical case in its entirety, the facilitators
broke the case down into various stages of official
action prearrest, postarrest, prosecution,
postconviction, and postrelease.   

The facilitators presented the facts and issues of
a particular stage for discussion by panelists from
various disciplines. For example, a panelist with
expertise in law enforcement may have been asked
how he or she would handle a particular series of
events in the pre- and post-arrest stages.
Panelists reacted to each others' responses, and
audience participation was encouraged.
 
o Panelists for the Eastern Region seminar were Mr.
Claps; Mr. Fein; John F. Gorczyk, Commissioner of
the Corrections Department, Vermont Human Services
Agency; Lt. John Lane, Los Angeles (California)
Police Department; Laura Scott, Victims Advocate
Coordinator, Pinellas County (Florida) Sheriff's
Office; and Vermont Senator Susan W. Sweetser (R). 
 

o Panelists for the Western Region seminar were Mr.
Claps; Mr. Fein; and John Stein, Deputy Director of
the National Organization for Victim Assistance. 
 
o Panelists for the Central Region seminar were
David Beatty, who was then Acting Executive
Director of the National Victim Center; Mr. Fein;
Leslie Landis, Executive Director of Life Span; and
Roxann M. Ryan, Deputy Attorney General, Iowa
Attorney General's Office.  

Issues Discussed
 
The seminars addressed three principal issues:
whether the stalker's motivation should be
considered in prosecuting a case, the role of
psychological evaluation and counseling in handling
and sentencing stalkers, and how to handle stalking
cases in which the victim is unwilling or unable to
cooperate with the prosecution.  

Stalkers' Motivations and Behaviors
 
Stalkers may have many reasons for engaging in
their conduct, including desire for contact and
control, obsessions, jealousy, anger, and revenge.
Stalking behavior can vary from case to case and
from incident to incident within a single case. One
stalker may be angry with the victim for a real or
perceived injury and may pursue the victim by
sending threatening letters and making threatening
telephone calls. Another stalker may seek to win or
maintain the affection of the victim, making his
interest known by sending flowers and other gifts.
However, the stalker may become violent if
overtures are rejected.
 
During the development of the model code, the
resource group agreed that the alleged stalker's
behavior, not motives, should be the most
significant factor in determining whether to file
charges. However, the project resource group
pointed out that the stalker's relationship with
and motive in pursuing the victim may have
important implications for selecting an
appropriate, potentially effective strategy for
intervening in the stalking behavior. The group
urged, therefore, that research be carried out on a
wide range of matters relating to stalkers
including behavior, motives, and relationships with
victims to provide guidance for criminal justice
and social services practitioners in developing
intervention strategies. Discussion at the regional
seminars focused on the relationship between
stalking and domestic violence and on whether
stalking behavior should be handled differently
depending on the stalker's motives and the context
in which the behavior occurs.
 
Although motives are relevant to the ultimate
management and disposition of a case, the resource
group agreed that neither the stalker's motives nor
the context in which the stalking occurred should
be considered when the crime is charged. If the
conduct in which the person engages is seriously
threatening, it should be charged as stalking,
regardless of the defendant's motivations or
relationship to the victim. In taking this
approach, the resource group reaffirmed the model
code's focus on behavior rather than motivation.  

Evaluation and Treatment
 
Although stalking cannot be considered normal or
appropriate, a stalker may not necessarily be
diagnosed as mentally ill. However, some stalkers
appear to suffer from psychiatric or psychological
disorders, and it is unlikely that simply punishing
the convicted stalker will resolve the problem. In
fact, a stalker with a mental disorder who has been
convicted and incarcerated may be embittered and
seek retribution for being kept from the victim,
especially if the illness was left untreated during
incarceration. 
 
The report of the model code development project
recommends that States consider requiring mental
evaluations and counseling as part of sentences
imposed on convicted stalkers and as part of
conditions for pretrial release, probation, or
parole. 

Including counseling in a stalker's sentence may
make it easier to intervene immediately if a
stalker resumes pursuit of the victim after
release. If a probationer or parolee fails to
comply with the counseling conditions, the release
could be revoked. In cases where the stalker does
not comply, or if treatment fails initially, the
prosecutor may be more successful in obtaining a
jail sentence at a later court date. However,
judges do not always know whether a defendant
complies with release conditions.
 
Some mental health professionals and others in the
field contend that it is useless to require
counseling for individuals who do not believe they
have a problem. In addition, the victim may be
lulled into a false sense of security because the
offender is in treatment and may fail to take steps
to protect himself or herself once the treatment
program ends. Finally, a judge may be more apt to
dispose of a case without sentencing, even in the
case of a dangerous stalker, if there is an option
to release the individual on the condition that he
or she participate in counseling.  

Prior to requiring counseling as a condition of
probation, there should be a presentencing mental
health evaluation to determine what value
counseling might have in the particular case. The
sentencing judge and mental health professionals
who are assigned to the case should be apprised
fully of the results of the evaluation.
 
In addition, victims should be informed that
treatment may not be successful and that they
should still take steps to protect themselves.
While the defendant is undergoing treatment, the
victim may have an opportunity to relocate,
commence separation proceedings, or make other
decisions with less fear. 
 
In cases of domestic abuse, victims are most at
risk when attempting to leave an abusive
relationship. It may be helpful to keep the alleged
abuser under court supervision during this time.
Many stalkers are released on unsupervised
probation without conditions, or are released from
prison because of crowding. By making participation
in counseling a requirement for release, the court
can retain control over the defendant without
requiring a prison sentence. If a defendant is
committed to a mental institution as a result of an
evaluation, he or she may be institutionalized for
a longer time than would have been the case if the
individual has been sentenced to prison, allowing
the victim a longer period of respite.   

After careful consideration, the resource group
reaffirmed its position that counseling should be
considered as a condition of pretrial release or
probation in all cases. Although mental health
professionals cannot always predict whether a
person will be helped by counseling, some stalkers
may benefit even though they are reluctant to
recognize the problem initially. The resource group
recognized that treatment and counseling may be
more useful in obsessive, vengeful, or domestic
situations than in less common stalking cases
involving organized crime, gang activity, or
abortion protesters.
 
Uncooperative Victims
 
Although stalking victims may also be victims of
domestic violence, the relationship between the
defendant and the victim in stalking cases is often
very different from that in cases of domestic
violence. Stalking victims often cooperate more
readily with law enforcement officials and
prosecutors than do victims of domestic violence
because stalking victims are more likely to have
made a decision not to continue a relationship, if
there was one, with the stalker. 
 
In domestic cases involving stalking, if the victim
has not ended the relationship with the alleged
stalker or is unwilling to testify against the
stalker, problems of proof can arise, and
prosecutors may be unable to build a convincing
case.
 
Although this problem was not addressed in the
final report of the model code development project,
it was discussed at the regional seminars and by
the resource group following the regional seminars.

The resource group agreed that victims and
prosecutors must have information about the
consequences of their decisions. Many prosecutors
have established no-drop policies in stalking
cases, which require a prosecutor to prosecute the
case regardless of whether the victim will
cooperate. As a result, victims often are left out
of the decision-making process or discredited on
the witness stand. A victim who is still married to
a stalker may in some States take advantage of the
privilege not to testify against a spouse in a
criminal case. Many States have created exceptions
to this privilege in cases of domestic violence,
but the exceptions may not extend to stalking.
 
Victims' rights advocates have attempted to
reconcile the sometimes conflicting goals of
pursuing and prosecuting offenders and, at the same
time, empowering victims by allowing them to regain
a sense of control. Forcing victims to testify
against their will can negate efforts to make them
feel in control. 
 
Many victims' advocates believe that victims should
have a voice, but not a veto, in the prosecution of
a stalker or an abuser. Often a victim's refusal to
testify may be a result of direct or indirect
coercion by the defendant. Victims' advocates are
in the best position to provide advice concerning
what course of action is in victims' best interest.
Advocates attempt to empower victims and enable
them to make their own decisions. However,
empowerment does not mean that victims should
always have the final say about whether to
prosecute a case, some victims' advocates
emphasize.  

In some circumstances, victims have been so
traumatized that they are incapable of deciding
what is in their best interests. Advocates must
ensure that a victim's decision is as fully
informed and independent as possible. 
 
Victims' advocates should inform victims about the
potential consequences of failing to testify. If a
victim's decision not to pursue prosecution is
based on a threat to the victim or a family member
or the fact that the defendant is the victim's main
source of economic support, these issues should be
discussed. 
 
Whenever possible, victims' advocates should work
to resolve external factors such as threats or fear
of economic deprivation that may hinder their
decision to cooperate in the prosecution of a
stalker. In many States, police must provide
victims with information about services that are
available to them when an incident is investigated.
 
It is important to make a distinction between
victims who refuse to testify because they are
afraid and those who do not wish to testify because
they have reconciled with their partners. When
provided with information and support, those who
are afraid may realize that they have other options
and, therefore, may be more willing to testify than
those who believe that they have reconciled and
that the abuse will not occur again.   

Although no-drop policies may help remove the onus
from the victim and make the stalker less likely to
hold the victim responsible for the prosecution,
the defendant may still hold the victim
responsible for reporting the incidents to the
police. Moreover, stalkers often have obsessive
personalities and are likely to exaggerate the
victims' role in the prosecution.
 
The resource group agreed that mandatory no-drop
policies are not feasible because they remove
discretion from prosecutors and fail to take into
account other factors that may weigh in favor of a
dismissal, such as lack of evidence. The group
agreed that there should be a presumption against
dropping a case but that the existence of certain
factors could serve to rebut that presumption.

In stalking cases, it is particularly difficult to
prove a victim's fear without his or her testimony.
However, it is important for prosecutors to
recognize that they can effectively prosecute a
case even if the victim is unable or unwilling to
cooperate. Police should conduct an independent
investigation to learn whether probable cause
exists. Furthermore, in States that require
evidence of "reasonable fear," it may be sufficient
to prove that a reasonable person would be in fear.

The National College of District Attorneys (NCDA)
conducted a seminar on "Prosecuting Domestic
Violence Cases Without the Victim" in 1994 in San
Diego, California. Many of the following tactics
recommended at that seminar could benefit
prosecutors throughout the country in stalking
cases:  

o Prosecutors should develop a trusting
relationship with victims and their families as
early as possible. When victims trust the
prosecutor, they are more likely follow through
with the case.  

o Keeping a defendant in custody may prevent
witness intimidation and influence and may expedite
a guilty plea. 

o Prosecutors should consider preparing a case from
the beginning as if there will be no victim
cooperation, even if the victim appears cooperative
at the outset. Prosecutors can build a case through
corroborating evidence such as tapes and printouts
from a 911 emergency call; damaged property;
weapons; employee records; telephone records;
letters from the defendant if the victim is willing
to divulge them; photographs of the defendant, if
possible; and interviews with neighbors, children,
and other witnesses. 

o Prosecutors should determine the number of
hearsay exceptions available in the evidence rules
of their States. Excited utterances by the victim,
admissions by the defendant, former testimony, and
declarations of state of mind may all be used to
admit statements that would otherwise be
inadmissible hearsay. 

o If a defendant violates a protective order, the
victim may not have to testify if there is
documentation of the violation. Even if a victim is
unwilling to testify in person, the victim may be
willing to provide a victim impact statement that
the prosecutor can read to the court prior to
sentencing.
 
Other Observations and Recommendations
 
Seminar participants offered these additional
observations and recommendations:
 
o Early intervention and prosecution is crucial to
prevent the behavior from escalating to the level
of criminal stalking.  

o Participants noted that law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, judges, and victims' advocates should
receive special training in handling stalking
cases. Training on stalking should be a two-tier
process: the first tier to impart general
information about stalking and the second to
provide information about specific steps that can
be taken and tools that can be used to manage
stalking cases effectively. In addition, criminal
justice practitioners should receive some incentive
to participate in the training programs, which
should be offered frequently because of high
turnover rates in law enforcement and prosecutors'
and public defenders' offices.  

o Several participants noted that violence is
likely to escalate when a person is abusing alcohol
or drugs and suggested research into the
relationship between stalking and drug abuse.
 
o Because stalking statutes can often be more
easily enforced than protective or restraining
orders, stalking statutes can be used instead of
protective orders in States that limit eligibility
for protective orders.  

o Participants recommended that even if there is
insufficient evidence to arrest or charge an
individual with stalking, police should investigate
the case and file a report for future reference.
Because stalking involves repetitive behavior,
seminar participants emphasized that police
officers should refer to previous reports
concerning the same victim. If different police
officers are called at different times to incidents
involving the same parties, each incident may be
viewed as an isolated event unless accurate and
complete records are kept. Although maintaining a
compilation of all reports on a victim is
difficult, participants agreed that this practice
should be encouraged so that police can recognize
and quickly intervene in a pattern of abusive or
stalking behavior.  

o Participants noted that law enforcement and
prosecutors must be creative in their use of
stalking statutes. They stressed that prosecutors
should use the numerous charges available in
prosecuting these cases, such as violation of
protective orders, disorderly conduct, harassment,
terroristic threats, and trespass. For example, if
children are involved, the prosecutor may be able
to charge a stalker with endangering the welfare of
a child. If several persons are working together to
stalk or terrorize a victim, prosecutors may be
able to bring conspiracy charges. The stalking
statutes of some States may be used to prosecute
abortion protesters. Gang members who conduct
questionable surveillance in public housing
projects may be subject to stalking charges.  

o Participants addressed the disadvantages of plea
bargaining in stalking cases. For example, it was
noted that corrections officials will devote fewer
resources to an individual who has pled guilty to
trespassing than to one who has been convicted of
stalking. Moreover, in States that provide enhanced
penalties for defendants who have been convicted of
more than one stalking offense, a defendant who is
permitted to plead to a lesser offense may not be
subject to the enhanced penalty.  

o Participants recommended that restitution be
imposed in addition to, not as an alternative to,
other sentences or punishment. Rather, restitution
should be construed as paying a debt to the victim.
 
o Participants recommended that States agree to
enforce protective orders from other jurisdictions
and that States develop cooperative data bases so
that information on incidents of stalking, domestic
violence, and violation of protective orders in
other jurisdictions can be provided to the courts
as part of criminal history records. 

o Participants recommended that there be
interaction between criminal and civil courts in
cases involving stalking in a domestic
relationship. Communication between the two court
systems will enable a judge presiding over a
divorce or custody case to take into account
previous charges and convictions for assault or
stalking in making rulings. 

---------------------------------------

Chapter 2. Profile of State Stalking Statutes
 
As noted in Chapter 1, 49 States have enacted
antistalking laws since 1990, when California
approved the Nation's first State-level statute on
stalking. The California law was enacted in
response to the unrelated murders of five women who
had been stalking victims, including the young
television actress Rebecca Schaeffer. Thirty other
States followed suit 2 years later. California
expanded and increased penalties under its stalking
law in 1992. Eighteen additional States and the
District of Columbia approved antistalking
legislation in 1993. Maine is the only State
without a specific law to address stalking.
However, the State uses a terrorizing statute to
address stalking and added provisions to the
State's protective order statute in 1993 that allow
such orders to be issued to enjoin stalking. 

Seventeen States have amended their stalking laws
since the model code was promulgated in September
1993. Iowa, Virginia, and Utah amended their
statutes to incorporate the language recommended by
the model code. Wisconsin amended its code to
include provisions that are similar to those in the
model code, but does not incorporate the code's
language regarding implicit threats. Other States
that have approved amendments are Alabama,
California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Washington, and West
Virginia. A complete list of statutory citations of
State stalking statutes is provided in Table 1.
 
Stalking Defined
 
Although there is a common purpose underlying all
State antistalking statutes, there is little
uniformity in how they define and address the
problem. The statutes typically define stalking as
willful, malicious, and repeated following and
harassing of another person. However, five States
do not enumerate specifically the types of conduct
that are prohibited. Three States proscribe lying
in wait. Many stalking statutes prohibit
nonconsensual communication. Seven States include
surveillance in the description of stalking
behavior. 
 
Illinois considers a defendant who confines,
restrains, or causes bodily harm to a victim guilty
of aggravated stalking. Many State statutes require
a pattern of conduct by the alleged stalker and
specify that victims have a reasonable fear for
their safety or of death or bodily injury. Texas
requires that the stalking behavior continue after
the victim has reported the conduct to law
enforcement in order for a defendant to be charged
under its stalking law. A list of acts prohibited
in State stalking statutes appears in Table 2. A
comparison of acts prohibited by State laws before
and after release of the model code appears in
Table 3. 

Threat Required
 
The two chief elements of most stalking statutes
are threatening behavior and criminal intent by the
defendant. Fourteen States require that the
perpetrator make a threat against the victim in
order to be charged under the stalking code.
Colorado and New Mexico require that the
perpetrator make a threat and then engage in
additional conduct in furtherance of the threat.
Forty States and the District of Columbia have
provisions that encompass stalking actions that
would cause a reasonable person to feel threatened
even if there has been no verbal threat by the
perpetrator. Eight States require that the
defendant has the intent and/or the apparent
ability to carry out the threat. Some States allow
threats made against members of the victim's
immediate family to be presented as evidence of
stalking. Four States require that a threat be made
to prove aggravated stalking, but not stalking.
Statutes in Hawaii and Texas prohibit threats in
conjunction with intent to damage property and
threats in conjunction with intent to cause
personal injury. A description of the threat
provisions in State stalking statutes appears in
Table 4. A comparison of threat provisions included
in State statutes before and after publication of
the model code is provided in Table 5. 
 
Intent Provisions
 
To convict a person of stalking in most States, it
must be shown that the defendant demonstrated
criminal intent to cause fear in the victim. The
course of conduct must be willful, purposeful,
intentional, or knowing. Seven States require that
the prosecution prove that the defendant intended
to cause alarm or annoyance. Sixteen States do not
require such proof provided that the alleged
stalker intended to do the act that resulted in
fear. In these States, if the victim has reasonable
cause to feel frightened, the intent element of the
crime has been met. In Indiana and Missouri, if
there is proof that the defendant intended to cause
fear, the crime is elevated to aggravated stalking.
A description of the intent provisions of State
stalking statutes is provided in Table 6. A
comparison of State intent provisions before and
after publication of the model code is provided in
Table 7.  

Course of Conduct  

State stalking laws almost always require that the
alleged stalker engage in a course of conduct, not
just a single act, to fall under their provisions.
Typically, a course of conduct is characterized as
a series of acts over a period of time, however
short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. 

A few States specify how many acts must occur and
during what period of time the conduct must take
place in order to constitute stalking. Illinois
refers to "acts done on at least two occasions. .
."; Michigan specifies a "series of two or more
separate, noncontinuous acts"; Oklahoma, "two or
more separate acts"; and Colorado and North
Carolina, "on more than one occasion."
 
Sentencing
 
Many States have both misdemeanor and felony
stalking classifications. Typically, a stalker
convicted of a misdemeanor may receive a jail
sentence of up to 1 year. Penalties of 3 to 5 
years are typical for felony convictions. Some
States allow 10-and 20-year sentences. Enhanced
penalties are available in most States if a stalker
violates a protective order, brandishes a weapon,
directs his conduct toward a victim who is under
age 16, or has committed a prior stalking offense.
In 14 States, the prior offense must have been
against the same victim. Nine States permit
enhanced penalties for stalking if the defendant
previously has been convicted of another felony. A
description of sentencing provisions of the State
stalking statutes is provided in Table 8. A
comparison of sentencing provisions in State laws
before and after the model code is provided in
Table 9.   

Recently, several States have enacted legislation
that mandates a life sentence in prison without
parole for those who have been convicted of a
violent offense for the third time ("three strikes,
you're out" laws). In States that classify stalking
as a violent crime, such provisions may become
relevant in stalking cases.  

Bail
 
Eleven States include bail or pretrial release
provisions for stalking defendants in their
stalking laws or in related law. Arkansas,
Maryland, Texas, and West Virginia require a no-
contact order as a condition of pretrial release.
Georgia, in addition to requiring a no-contact
order, provides that bail may be denied if evidence
shows that the defendant previously violated
conditions of pretrial release, probation, or
parole arising from a stalking offense.
 
In Illinois, bail may be denied after a hearing if
the State proves that the defendant would pose a
threat to the stalking victim. The Ohio statute
lists specific factors that a court must consider
in determining the amount and conditions of bail.
In Montana, the defendant may not be released
without appearing before a judge, and the court
must notify the victim of pretrial release. In
California, a hearing must be held before a person
arrested for stalking or domestic abuse is released
on bail that is different from that specified in
the bail schedule or if the individual is released
on his or her own recognizance. Vermont law
considers stalking a violent crime, and bail is
determined according to State guidelines for
violent crimes. In a number of States, the
constitutional right to bail does not apply to
persons charged with felony offenses if the alleged
offense was committed while the accused was out on
bail, probation, or parole for another offense or
if the accused previously has been convicted of a
felony. In those States, a charge of felony
stalking may allow the court to determine that the
defendant is ineligible for bail.

Special Provisions
 
In 1994, some States amended their statutes to
include fear of sexual assault as part of the fear
element. The West Virginia statute specifies that
the stalker has a relationship, had a relationship,
or is seeking to establish a relationship with the
victim through his or her conduct.
 
Several States permit police to arrest stalking
suspects without a warrant, provided there is
probable cause. Many States allow a warrantless
arrest if there has been a violation of a
protective order. Implicit in such statutes is the
provision that the officer need not see the
violation. Pennsylvania's law makes such a
provision explicit.  

In Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Washington, it is presumed that the defendant acted
with intent to harass if the defendant has been
warned that the victim does not wish to be
contacted.  

In Michigan and Oklahoma, evidence that the
defendant continued to engage in a course of
conduct, after having been requested to discontinue
contact, gives rise to a rebuttable presumption
that the conduct caused the victim to feel
frightened.  

New Hampshire enforces protective orders issued by
other States if the order is in effect in the
issuing State.  

Some States require training for law enforcement,
prosecutors, and the judiciary in handling stalking
cases.  

Some States may require electronic monitoring of
the defendant as a condition of pretrial release or
probation, or as an alternative to jail. In
California, the electronic monitoring program is
dependent on the defendant's consent. Other States
allow a court to order monitoring.  

Montana provides that a person convicted of
stalking may be required to pay all medical,
counseling, and other costs incurred by or on
behalf of the victim as a result of the offense.
 
In Maryland, a sentence under the State's
antistalking law may be imposed separately from and
consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for
any other offense.
 
In California, an incarcerated person who makes a
threat against another person can be prosecuted
under the State antistalking law. 

In Florida, a juvenile may be transferred to adult
criminal court if charged with aggravated stalking.
 
Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin allow
stalking victims to keep their addresses
confidential under certain circumstances. 

In California, State employees are prohibited from
releasing the registration or driver's license
records of individuals who verify to the Department
of Motor Vehicles that they have reasonable cause
to believe that they are being stalked or to fear
death or great bodily injury.  

Wyoming requires law enforcement agencies to
provide emergency assistance to victims, including
making recommendations regarding available
services. However, the statute makes law
enforcement immune from civil liability for failure
to provide these services. 

Some States require that victims be notified if the
an alleged stalker is released before trial. Some
also require that the victim be notified when a
stalker is released after conviction. Victim-
notification provisions are included in the
antistalking laws of California, Georgia, Indiana,
Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Texas, and Washington. 
 
Since July 1, 1994, a person convicted of stalking
in North Carolina has been required to provide a
DNA sample.
 
Civil Remedies
 
Stalking laws appear to provide a stronger link
between civil protection orders and criminal law.
Some States have amended their domestic abuse
and/or protective order statutes to make it
possible to issue protective orders in stalking
cases. Other States have included provisions in
their antistalking laws designed to strengthen the
enforcement of civil protection orders.
 
In Oregon, California, and Wyoming, a victim can
bring a civil action against a stalker to recover
damages incurred as a result of the stalking
behavior. In Wyoming, the civil cause of action is
permissible even if an alleged stalker has not been
charged or convicted of stalking, and a civil suit
does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution,
regardless of the outcome of the civil case. 

At the Federal level, the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994 creates civil liability for crimes of
violence motivated by gender bias. The statute,
codified at 42 U.S.C. section 13981, states, "A
person . . . who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender . . . shall be liable to the
party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a
court may deem appropriate." As defined in the law,
a crime of violence includes an act that would
constitute a felony against the person.    

This statute and similar ones may prompt States to
explore further the possibility of making civil
remedies available to stalking victims.  

Mental Evaluation and Civil Commitment
 
None of the State stalking laws specifically
address civil commitment, although several States
provide guidance to courts regarding mental health
evaluations, treatment, or counseling. In many
States, courts may order an evaluation or
counseling before trial or may order counseling as
a condition of probation. Minnesota and West
Virginia require courts to order evaluation and
counseling for all stalking defendants. Laws that
recommend mental health treatment for convicted
stalkers allow medical professionals to determine
the treatment to be provided. 
 
State statutes regarding the civil commitment of
mentally disordered persons do not apply to
individuals who commit domestic violence. Sex
offenses are the only violent crimes for which
States have enacted or are considering civil
commitment measures. Some States are considering
broadening the criteria for civil commitment to
include the inability to take care of oneself and
substance abuse.
 
Related Laws
 
Prior to enactment of antistalking legislation, law
enforcement agencies handled stalking through laws
regarding criminal trespass, terroristic threat,
and harassment. Stalking laws are unique in the
elements they require, their application to a
variety of intimidating and threatening situations,
their ties to civil protection, and their penalty
structures. However, the types of behavior could
constitute trespass, harassment, or stalking.  

Some State antistalking laws operate in conjunction
with related laws to suggest gradations of behavior
and punishment. States that pair stalking with
harassment or trespass are Colorado, Indiana,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
 
The 46 States that have criminal trespass laws
generally describe the offense as knowingly and
unlawfully entering or remaining in a dwelling, a
building, or upon real property if notice against
trespass is given. A person also may commit
criminal trespass if he remains in any place in
defiance of a lawful order to leave.  

Twenty-eight States have harassment statutes. These
usually prohibit intentionally annoying or alarming
another person by subjecting him to offensive
physical contact, public insults, or false reports
about the victim. Some harassment laws contain
provisions for handling threats or violations of
restraining orders.
 
Nineteen States have laws against terrorizing or
making terroristic threats. Terrorizing usually
means threatening to commit a crime of violence or
unlawfully causing the evacuation of a building or
facility. Terroristic threat is generally described
as threatening to kill another with the purpose of
putting that person in fear of imminent death and
under circumstances that would reasonably cause the
victim to believe that the threat will be carried
out.   

-----------------------------------------

Chapter 3. Stalking Case Law: State Appellate Court
Decisions  
    
When the model antistalking code was released,
there were no appellate court decisions on stalking
statutes. Since then, several State appellate
courts have decided stalking cases. Although legal
challenges and court interpretations of
antistalking laws vary widely, all appellate courts
that have addressed the issue of constitutionality
have upheld the laws. 

Courts in California, Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma,
and Virginia have found State stalking statutes to
be constitutional, rejecting arguments that the
laws are so vague or overly broad that they deny
defendants their First Amendment right to free
speech. 

Other courts, although not addressing
constitutional issues, have clarified statutory
language. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts overturned a stalking conviction,
ruling that the lower court's interpretation of the
stalking statute was incorrect. The Appellate Court
of Illinois, based on its interpretations of the
legislative intent, clarified the language of the
State stalking statute.

The following sections discuss selected State
appellate cases. A complete list of citations for
State appellate court decisions is provided in
Appendix F.

California Statute Upheld

In People v. Heilman, for example, the California
Court of Appeal rejected a vagueness challenge and
found that the State's stalking statute was
constitutional under the State constitution. The
case stemmed from the 1992 shooting death of Janice
Davis in the building where she worked. Police
charged her ex-boyfriend, John Heilman, with first-
degree murder, alleging that he had gone to her
place of employment, followed her into the
elevator, and shot her. According to court records,
Davis' assailant ripped the emergency phone out of
the elevator wall to prevent her from calling for
help and fled.

Heilman was convicted of the murder charge as well
as charges of aggravated stalking and violating a
restraining order that Davis had obtained against
him. In appealing his conviction, the defendant
focused on the wording of the California statute
that defines the crime of stalking: "Any person who
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or
harasses another person and who makes a credible
threat with the intent to place the person in
reasonable fear of death or bodily injury is guilty
of the crime of stalking." Heilman argued that the
term "repeatedly" is vague. When a statute is held
invalid for vagueness, it either does not inform a
person of the conduct that is proscribed, or it
creates the danger of arbitrary law enforcement.

The court interpreted the statute as proscribing
two different courses of conduct: willful and
malicious harassment, and the repeated following of
a victim. The court held that the term "repeatedly"
modifies the word "follows," not the word
"harasses," because harassment already implies a
series of acts, and to require repeated harassment
would not comport with the intent of the statute.
Therefore, a key issue in deciding the case was to
determine whether Heilman's actions constituted
harassment, repeated following, or both.

Heilman and Davis had dated intermittently for 3 or
4 years. After the relationship ended, Heilman
called Davis on numerous occasions. He left angry,
profane messages on her answering machine at home
and called her at work. Heilman often went to
Davis' car while she was at work and left
threatening notes. He also left a beer bottle
covered with a condom and ketchup on the hood of
her car and damaged her car by placing super glue
on the gas cap and door locks. Davis told security
officers at her office that she was afraid, and
they distributed reports containing Heilman's
picture to building management and security
personnel.

Because Heilman engaged in conduct that constituted
willful and malicious harassment, the section of
the statute that prohibits repeated following did
not apply to him, the court found. The court
continued, however, that even if the section
proscribing repeated following did apply to the
defendant, the statute still would survive a
constitutional attack. The court held that the word
"repeatedly" has a common meaning more than one
time so that it adequately informs a person of what
is prohibited. The court also held that the law
does not create the danger of discriminatory
enforcement because perpetrators have to follow
their victims more than once and communicate a
credible threat before police can arrest them.

Florida Statute Upheld

A Florida District Court of Appeal held that the
Florida stalking law is constitutional under the
U.S. Constitution. Several other appellate courts
in the State have cited this case in upholding the
statute.

In Pallas v. State, John Pallas was charged with
aggravated stalking after harassing his wife, Edie
Pallas, from whom he was separated. He pleaded no
contest to the charge, reserving the right to
appeal. 

The arrest was based on threatening calls that John
Pallas allegedly made to his estranged wife, Edie,
while she was staying with her parents, the
Raglands, during divorce proceedings. The
prosecution said that one Sunday during January
1993, the defendant began calling the Raglands'
residence at 7:00 a.m. He called continually
throughout the day, forcing Edie's parents to take
the telephone off the hook several times. When he
did get through, he cursed and threatened the
Raglands. Testimony at trial also revealed that
during the marriage, the defendant beat Edie and
broke her jaw. 

Pallas argued that the aggravated stalking statute
under which he was charged is unconstitutional
because it is vague and overly broad. Under the
Florida law, "Any person who willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses
another person, and makes a credible threat with
the intent to place that person in reasonable fear
of death or bodily injury, commits the offense of
aggravated stalking. . . ." The definition of
"harasses" is "to engage in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person that causes
substantial emotional distress. . . ." Pallas
argued that the phrase "substantial emotional
distress" in the definition of "harasses" creates
an entirely subjective standard, so that an
unreasonably sensitive victim could arbitrarily
place a defendant in jeopardy of prosecution.
Pallas also contended that the statute is overly
broad in that it encompasses constitutionally
protected expression in its prohibitions. 

The court found that Pallas harassed and threatened
his estranged wife but did not follow her. Unlike
the California court, the court in Pallas held that
the word "repeatedly" modifies both "follows" and
"harasses" and held that the defendant's actions
met the requirements for the elements of the crime.

The court held that the "substantial emotional
distress" language creates a reasonable person
standard. Only if a reasonable person would be
disturbed by the defendant's action could the
conduct be considered criminal.

Although some protected expression may be
encompassed, the statute was not broad enough to
invalidate the statute, the court found. The
perpetrator's conduct must be "willful, malicious,
and repeated," indicating that the person must have
malevolent intent before his speech can be
curtailed by the statute. Furthermore, the
prohibition requires that speech be combined with
some conduct, and the standard for protecting
speech mixed with conduct is lower than for
protecting speech alone.

Georgia Statute Upheld

The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled in Johnson v.
State, that the Georgia stalking statute is
constitutional under the State constitution. The
defendant was charged with misdemeanor stalking and
burglary. In Georgia, an element of burglary is the
intent to commit a felony, and court records
indicated that the defendant intended to commit
aggravated stalking as an element of the burglary.
After a jury convicted the defendant on both
counts, he sought to overturn the convictions by
arguing that the stalking statute was vague and
overly broad.

The defendant challenged a section of the stalking
statute that prohibits "[contacting] another person
. . . without the consent of the other person . . .
," arguing that the statutory language could outlaw
much constitutionally protected conduct, and
therefore was overly broad. The court rejected the
argument, stating that a person who engages in
nonconsensual contact must do so with "the purpose
of harassing and intimidating the other person."
The specification that there be an intent to harass
on the part of the defendant and the element
requiring that the victim be in "reasonable fear of
death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to a
member of his or her immediate family" saves the
statute from criminalizing protected conduct. It is
clear that the defendant must be engaging in
conduct that does not have a legal purpose to fall
under the coverage of the statute, the court said.

The defendant also argued that the stalking statute
is vague because it does not require an explicit
threat of bodily injury or death, nor does it
require that the defendant's conduct actually cause
substantial emotional distress. The court
disagreed, holding that because the statute
requires that the victim be "in reasonable fear of
death or bodily harm to himself or herself or to a
member of his or her immediate family," the
language is sufficiently clear to ordinary people
to protect the statute from a vagueness
challenge.

Oklahoma Statute Upheld

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
unanimously upheld the Oklahoma statute in State v.
Saunders and found the statute constitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Saunders, who was charged with stalking in 1993,
filed a motion to dismiss the charges before trial,
alleging that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague and overly broad. The trial court granted the
defendant's motion, and the State appealed.

Under Oklahoma's stalking statute, "Any person who
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or
harasses another person in a manner that: (1) would
cause a reasonable person or a member of the
immediate family of that person . . . to feel
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested; and (2) actually causes the person being
followed or harassed to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested . . . shall be guilty of the crime of
stalking."

The court stated that the basic rule of statutory
interpretation requires a court to indulge the
intent of the legislature in favor of
constitutionality whenever possible. It found that
the statute is not vague because it gives fair
notice of the prohibited. The court wrote,
"Stalking statutes must be defined as broadly as
possible to maximize victim protection, but
narrowly enough to prevent serious abuse." The
Oklahoma statute's use of the words "willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly" indicate a specific
intent element. Statutes that require specific
intent have been found constitutional because the
defendant must know that the conduct is wrong in
order to create the intent. The court also relied
upon cases in other jurisdictions, such as Pallas
v. State and People v. Heilman, to support its
holding. 

The defendant also challenged a part of the statute
that gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the victim felt terrorized, frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested if
the victim has asked the defendant to cease the
conduct, and the defendant disregards the warning
and continues the course of conduct.

A rebuttable presumption is void if there is no
rational connection between the facts proved and
the presumption, the court said. In this case, the
court found that there was a rational connection
between the facts proved the warning by the victim
and the defendant's continued conduct and the
presumption that the victim was fearful. "Clearly
the victim would not have requested the perpetrator
to stop the conduct if the conduct was not causing
a problem . . . . The continuation of such conduct
would naturally lead the victim to feel terrorized,
frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested," the court said. Therefore, it denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss on this ground.

Virginia Statute Upheld

In Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals
of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of the
Virginia statute under the State and U.S.
constitutions. The statute has since been amended
to reflect the language of the model code. 

Anderson Woolfolk was arrested and charged with
stalking after maintaining surveillance over his
estranged wife's house for 4 consecutive days.
Woolfolk told police that he was monitoring his
children's environment, but a jury convicted him of
stalking.

The statute under which Woolfolk was convicted read
in part: "Any person who on more than one occasion
engages in conduct with the intent to cause
emotional distress to another person by placing
that person in reasonable fear of death or bodily
injury shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor."

The case stemmed from activities that began in 1987
when Woolfolk and his wife, Jane, were separated.
Anderson Woolfolk allegedly began following his
estranged wife and watching her home. In 1991, the
couple was divorced after 15 years of marriage.  

Court records show that in 1992, when Jane began
dating another man, her ex-husband's surveillance
activities increased. He frequently drove up and
down the street where his ex-wife lived and parked
near the house. He watched the house for hours at a
time, day and night, and even followed her out of
town to a wedding.

After Jane Woolfolk's tires were deflated in her
driveway, Anderson Woolfolk was served with a "no
trespass" warning. He continued to drive past the
home and park near there.

One morning, her new boyfriend received a telephone
call from a man who threatened, "If you don't stop
seeing her, I'm going to shoot [both of you]." The
boyfriend recognized the voice as that of Anderson
Woolfolk.  

On appeal, Woolfolk argued that the statutory
phrase "intent to cause emotional distress" is
unconstitutionally vague and that the statute was
overly broad. 

The court held that "emotional distress" is a
common and well-recognized legal term. Emotional
distress is "suffering or mental anguish that
arises from being placed in reasonable fear of
death or bodily injury and is so severe that no
reasonable person could be expected to endure it."
The court held that the statute creates a
reasonable person standard, not a subjective
standard, so that the proscribed conduct does not
depend on the sensitivity of the victim.

The court rejected the assertion that the statute
is overly broad, holding that the only proscribed
actions are those that have no legitimate purpose
and that are intended to cause fear in the victim.
Therefore, very little, if any, constitutionally
protected expression is encompassed by the statute.

Massachusetts Overturns Conviction

In Massachusetts, the State supreme court
overturned a stalking conviction, ruling that the
lower court misinterpreted the stalking statute. In
doing so, the supreme court provided guidance on
the proper interpretation of the statute. 

The case, Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, stemmed from
an incident in which James Kwiatkowski visited his
estranged wife's home in violation of a restraining
order and threatened her when she called the
police. Kwiatkowski was arrested and eventually
convicted of stalking and of violating a
restraining order.

In 1991, Mary Kwiatkowski filed for divorce after 7
years of marriage. James Kwiatkowski was served
with a restraining order that prohibited him from
abusing Mary, visiting her home, or telephoning
her. The prohibition on telephone calls was added
to the order after James Kwiatkowski made more than
150 threatening calls in 1 week.

On appeal, Kwiatkowski argued that the statute is
invalid because it is unconstitutionally vague.
Under the statute, a person is guilty of stalking
if he or she "willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follows or harasses another person, and
makes a threat with the intent to place that person
in imminent fear of death or serious bodily
injury."

In rendering its decision, the Massachusetts
supreme court weighed the facts of the case against
the meaning of the statutory language. One weekend,
while the couple's children were visiting James
Kwiatkowski, he called his estranged wife at 2:45
a.m. and said that one of the children had a
nightmare. When she asked to speak with the child,
he said the child was asleep. He told his estranged
wife that he wanted to work things out with her but
when he asked her if there were men at her
apartment, she hung up. Immediately, the phone rang
again. Mary Kwiatkowski hung up again, and left the
telephone off the hook for the rest of the night.

When Kwiatkowski showed up at his ex-wife's home
with the children about 2 hours later, she called
the police. Kwiatkowski threatened her and was
arrested when the police arrived. 
 
The court agreed with the defendant that the
statute was vague because it prohibited someone
from repeatedly harassing, although the crime of
harassment already denotes a series of acts over
time. Under the lower court interpretation,
repetition of an act is required to meet the
elements of the crime of stalking. 

The court held that the intent of the legislature
was likely to criminalize one pattern of conduct,
not several, but that this intent was not
sufficiently clear in the way the statute was
drafted. "The result is that the portion of the
stalking statute concerning harassing conduct lacks
any reasonably discernible unambiguous application,
and the defendant may properly assert a facial
challenge to it."

The court wrote that from the date of its opinion,
the crime of stalking would be committed if a
person "willfully and maliciously engages in a
knowing pattern of conduct or series of acts over a
period of time directed at a specific person which
seriously alarms or annoys that person and would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial
emotional distress, and . . . also makes a threat
with the intent to place that person in imminent
fear of death or bodily injury."

Repeated conduct is not an element of the crime,
but the legislature's intent is included in the
phrases "pattern of conduct" and "series of acts"
because both require more than one incident of
stalking behavior.

Illinois' Interpretation

In People v. Krawiec, the Appellate Court of
Illinois sought to clarify an Illinois stalking law
by holding that the law allows an act to be
considered threatening even if the act does not
result in violence.

After threatening his estranged wife and placing
her under surveillance, Thomas Krawiec was
convicted of stalking and sentenced to 30 months of
probation with conditional discharge. 

The prosecution alleged that Krawiec had made
threatening telephone calls to his estranged wife
and had taken his 11-year-old son to his wife's
home to show him that she was having sex with
another man. Krawiec videotaped his estranged wife
and another man in the bedroom and pushed her when
she tried to stop him. Krawiec also allegedly
knocked two television sets to the floor and told
his wife that he was going to play the video for
their daughter. The tape was later admitted into
evidence against the defendant.

Under the Illinois statute: "A person commits
stalking when he or she transmits to another person
a threat with the intent to place that person in
reasonable apprehension of death, bodily harm,
sexual assault, confinement or restraint, and in
furtherance of the threat knowingly does any one or
more of the following acts on at least two separate
occasions: (1) follows the person, other than
within the residence of the defendant; (2) places
the person under surveillance by remaining present
outside his or her school, place of employment,
vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or
residence other than the residence of the
defendant."

On appeal, the defendant questioned the meaning of
the phrases "in furtherance of the threat," and
"places the person under surveillance."

The court held that an act may be threatening even
if the perpetrator did not intend for the act to be
threatening and the act does not result in
violence. The court held that an act is threatening
if the threat is reinforced by further conduct. In
this case, the broken television sets and the fact
that the defendant pushed Marilyn Krawiec were
sufficient to meet the element of "in furtherance
of the threat."

The court also clarified the meaning of placing a
person under surveillance. "It is the act of
remaining in the vicinity of the would-be victim's
house, with the requisite intent to further a
threat that is prohibited," the court wrote. The
court noted that it is irrelevant whether the
victim is at home or is aware that the stalker is
watching. 

------------------------------------

Chapter 4. Using Civil Protective Orders in
Stalking Cases

The final report of the model antistalking code
contained a chapter on the use of protective orders
in stalking cases. However, since publication of
that report, there have been several developments
in the area of protective order law, which are
outlined in this chapter. A number of States have
expanded the eligibility provisions of their
statutes to make protective orders available to all
stalking victims. In addition, a number of State
appellate courts have decided cases involving the
constitutionality of bringing criminal charges
based upon conduct for which the defendant already
has faced criminal contempt charges for violating a
protective order. 

One characteristic of stalking is the element of
escalation. Behavior that initially may be
bothersome and annoying, but legal, escalates to
the level of obsessive, dangerous, violent, and
even fatal acts. Stalking victims, therefore, need
appropriate means to protect themselves against
potential acts of violence.

Protective orders can serve as the first formal
intervention in the stalker's behavior. The
protective order puts the suspected stalker on
notice that this behavior is unwanted and that any
further similar behavior will be regarded as
criminal and will result in more severe
intervention by the criminal justice system. In
addition, protective orders provide a means for
protecting a victim by allowing law enforcement
officials to take defendants into custody
immediately if they violate the order.

However, two factors may limit the applicability
and effectiveness of protective orders in stalking
cases. Statutory provisions limiting the category
of individuals eligible to apply for protective
orders may prohibit certain stalking victims from
obtaining protective orders. Furthermore, recent
studies suggest a need to reexamine and improve the
enforcement of civil protection orders.

Eligibility for Civil Protective Orders

Most States have statutes authorizing civil orders
of protection in domestic abuse cases. States
should consider reviewing their protective order
statutes to determine whether protective orders
would be available to all stalking victims. A list
of statutory citations of State protective order
provisions is provided in Table 10.

All protective order statutes establish some
eligibility limits, but the limits vary among
States. Thirteen States offer broad eligibility,
permitting victims of harassment to obtain
protective orders. In 1994, California enacted
legislation that permits an employer to obtain a
protective order on behalf of an employee. In most
States, protective orders are available to
individuals who have been married; persons who live
with, or who once lived with, another individual;
individuals who have a child in common; and persons
related by blood or marriage. Some States have
stricter eligibility limitations. Some States, for
example, require that the applicant live or have
lived in the same residence as the person against
whom the protective order is sought. 

To provide for early intervention in stalking
cases, States should consider amending their
statutes to ensure that all stalking victims,
regardless of their relationship with the alleged
stalker, can obtain protective orders. Eligibility
provisions are provided in Table 11.

Enforcement of Protective Orders

For protective orders to be enforced effectively,
all parties, including the victim, the defendant,
the judge, and probation and parole officer must be
aware that an order is in effect and its specific
terms. States should review their protective order
notification procedures to ensure that adequate
instructions are given for notifying all parties of
the existence and specific terms of an order. For
example, States should consider implementing
procedures to ensure that defendants receive a copy
of a protective order issued against them and an
explanation of the possible consequences of a
violation. 

In most States, law enforcement officers can arrest
a person without a warrant if they have probable
cause to believe that the person has violated a
protective order. In many States, violating a
protective order is a misdemeanor. In many
jurisdictions, violation of a protective order
results in civil or criminal charges. In some
States, courts can enforce protective orders issued
by another jurisdiction.

Seminar participants indicated a need to reexamine
and improve the enforcement of civil protection
orders. Victims need to be better informed of their
rights once they have obtained a protection order
and of the process for reporting violations.
Similarly, defendants need to be better informed
about what constitutes a violation of a protective
order.

Police need to be better informed about how to
respond to violations of protective orders. Judges
and prosecutors need a better understanding of the
sanctions available when protective orders are
violated. Many States now require that judges and
prosecutors have domestic violence awareness
training.

Double Jeopardy Implications of Protective Orders

Although civil protection orders can provide early
intervention in stalking cases, there are questions
about whether they violate the double jeopardy
clause of the Constitution, which prohibits trying
a defendant twice for the same offense. In June
1993, in United States v. Dixon, the U.S. Supreme
Court, ruled that law enforcement officials can
enforce protective orders through criminal contempt
proceedings in addition to bringing subsequent
criminal charges based on the same conduct. 

A lower court had cited a 1990 U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Grady v. Corbin, in which the court ruled
that a subsequent prosecution is barred under the
double jeopardy provision if, in order to establish
an essential element of the crime, the government
had to prove conduct that constituted an offense
for which the defendant already had been
prosecuted. 

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in
Dixon, overruled the Grady decision. Three justices
dissented from the portion of the opinion
overruling Grady. 

The Court reestablished the "same-elements" test
used prior to Grady to determine whether a
subsequent prosecution violated the prohibition
against double jeopardy. The test requires a court
to analyze whether each offense contains an element
not present in the other. If the charged offenses
have some different elements, the offenses are not
barred from prosecution by double jeopardy. If all
elements of the crime already have been litigated
in the first proceeding, the double jeopardy clause
applies and the second prosecution is barred. 

By violating a protective order, a defendant also
may be committing an act which, if combined with
other conduct, constitutes stalking. A critical
element of any stalking conviction is evidence that
the defendant repeatedly engaged in the stalking
behavior. Therefore, in order to obtain a stalking
conviction, the State would have to prove the
element of repeated behavior. 

However, to find a defendant in criminal contempt
for violating a protective order, the State must
prove that the defendant knew about the protective
order and engaged in the prohibited behavior on one
occasion. Since the elements needed to prove each
offense differ, it appears that, under the majority
decision in Dixon, the State would not be barred
from prosecuting the defendant for stalking, even
if he or she has been found in criminal contempt.
Policymakers, legislators, and law enforcement
officials should be aware that the law in this area
is somewhat unsettled, as evidenced by the reversal
of the Grady test, which was established only in
1990. At least 11 State supreme courts have adopted
the Dixon "same-elements" test. Since the Dixon
decision, at least one State supreme court has
rejected the "same- elements" test, ruling that the
State constitution's double jeopardy provision
provides greater protection than does the provision
in the U.S. Constitution. The reestablished
standard has been the basis of much litigation in
State courts, and many States have cases pending in
the intermediate appellate courts.

Two Florida courts have reached opposite decisions
in considering whether a subsequent prosecution for
aggravated stalking after a conviction for criminal
contempt based on violation of a protective order
would violate the double jeopardy clause.

In State v. Johnson, Robert Johnson was charged
with criminal contempt for violating an injunction
against domestic violence when he broke into the
house of Andrea Green. Simultaneously, the State
charged him with "aggravated stalking by violating
a prior injunction." In Florida, an element of
aggravated stalking is violation of an injunction
against violence. Johnson pleaded no contest to the
criminal contempt charge and moved to have the
aggravated stalking charge dismissed. 

The State appellate court dismissed the aggravated
stalking charge, holding that according to the test
articulated in Dixon, prosecuting Johnson for
aggravated stalking based on violating an
injunction was forbidden under the double jeopardy
clause because each element of the aggravated
stalking charge was subsumed in the violation of
the injunction charge. The court wrote, "There is
no conceivable way in which [Johnson] could have
committed aggravated stalking against the victim
without also violating the terms of the injunction,
a crime for which he had already been convicted."

A separate appellate court in State v. Miranda came
to the opposite conclusion. Humberto Miranda was
charged with criminal contempt for violating a
domestic violence injunction and aggravated
stalking. Miranda pleaded guilty to the criminal
contempt charge and moved to dismiss the aggravated
stalking charge on the grounds that it violated the
double jeopardy clause. The court found that the
defendant was charged with aggravated stalking for
conduct he engaged in after the conduct for which
the violation of the injunction was based. 

The court, using the test articulated in Dixon,
examined the elements of the criminal contempt
charge and the aggravated stalking statute. The
court noted that Dixon required that in order to
prosecute for both offenses, each offense must
contain at least one element that the other does
not. Both the aggravated stalking statute and the
contempt charge required that the State prove that
an injunction for protection had been issued. 

In continuing its analysis, the court found that in
order to prove aggravated stalking, the prosecution
had to prove that the defendant "knowingly,
willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow[ed]
or harass[ed] another person" and "engage[d] in a
course of conduct directed at a specific person
that cause[d] substantial emotional distress."
These requirements, however, were not elements of
the charge of violating the conditions of the
injunction. 

The court also found that the contempt charge
included an element that was not part of the
aggravated stalking charge that the defendant had
entered on or about the victim's place of
employment. Because each offense contained at least
one element that the other did not, prosecution for
both offenses was constitutionally permissible.
 
Protective orders and domestic violence were the
focus of much State legislative activity in the
past year. For example, the provisions listed below
were approved during the 1994 State legislative
sessions.

o Arizona: The address of a person seeking a court
order of protection from harassment or domestic
violence may not be listed on the petition and
cannot be disclosed to anyone except by court
order, unless it was the common residence of the
plaintiff and defendant during the past 5 years. A
protection order expires if it is not served within
1 year from  the date it is signed. (Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Section 12-1809 (1994 and Supp. 1994)).

o California: 

A person subject to a protective order is
prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm.
(Cal. Fam. Code Section 6389 (West Supp. 1995)). 
Each county is required to increase enforcement
procedures for protective orders among
jurisdictions. (Cal. Fam. Code Section 6385 (West
1994)).  A mandatory minimum sentence is imposed
for second and subsequent convictions of spousal
battery within 7 years. (Cal. Penal Code Section
273.6 (West 1988 and Supp. 1995)). 

An employer is authorized to obtain a temporary
restraining order on behalf of an employee. (Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code Section 527.8 (West Supp. 1995)). 

A prosecutor may recharge a misdemeanor crime based
on domestic violence within 6 months if the reason
the case was originally dismissed was because the
complaining witness refused to testify after being
served with a subpoena. (Cal. Penal Code Section
1387 (1982 and Supp. 1995)).  A person convicted of
battery may be required to pay up to $5,000 to a
battered women's shelter, and a court may order the
individual to participate in a batterer's program
as a condition of probation. (Cal. Penal Code
Section 243 (1988 and Supp. 1995)).

o Colorado: The definition of domestic violence
includes the invasion or threat of invasion of home
or property. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section
18-6-800.3 (West 1990 and Supp. 1995)).

o Hawaii: A person subject to a protective order
may not possess a firearm or ammunition. (Haw. Rev.
Stat. Section 134-7 (1988 and Supp. 1995)).

o Indiana: The protective order laws were amended
to require increased enforcement among
jurisdictions and to allow protective orders to
remain in effect for 1 year. (Ind. Code Ann.
Sections 5-2-9-6, 31-1-11.5-7, 31-11-5-8.2,
34-4-5.1-2 (West Supp. 1995)).

o Louisiana: The duration of protective orders is
increased from 3 months to 6 months. (La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Section 46:2136 (West Supp. 1995)).

o New Hampshire:  

Previous reconciliation can no longer be grounds
for denial of a protective order. (1994 N.H. Laws
259) (to be codified at N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
Section 173-B:4). 

A minor can seek relief from domestic violence
without being accompanied by a parent or guardian.
The court is authorized to require counseling for
the abuser. (1994 N.H. Laws 259) (to be codified at
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Section 173-B:3).

o Rhode Island: The definition of domestic assault
now includes persons who are in a substantive
dating or engagement relationship. (R.I. Gen. Laws
Section 8-8.1-1 (1985 & Supp. 1994)).

o South Dakota: Law enforcement officers and
prosecutors are required to attend training on
domestic abuse, and law enforcement agencies are
required to develop policies pertaining to domestic
abuse. (S.D. Codified Laws Ann. Sections 23-3-39.4,
-39.7, -42.1 (Supp. 1994)).

o West Virginia: Several laws relating to domestic
violence are amended. (W. Va. Code Sections
48-2A-6, -10, -14, 61-2-28 (1994)).

o Wisconsin: The laws relating to restraining
orders are amended. (Wis. Stat. Ann. Sections
46.95, 813.12, 968.075 (West Supp. 1995)).

--------------------------------  

Sources for Further Information

For more information about this document on
implementing antistalking codes or other documents
on stalking, contact the following:

BJA Contact Jennifer Knobe 
Program Manager 
Adjudication Branch 
Discretionary Grants Program Division 
633 Indiana Avenue NW. 
Washington, DC 20531 
202-616-3212

NCJA Contact 
Lisa Doyle Moran 
Assistant Director for Legal Affairs 
444 North Capitol Street NW. 
Suite 608 
Washington, DC 20001 
202-347-4900

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse
Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
800-688-4252


--------------------------------

Bibliography

"A Remedial Approach to Harassment." Va. L. Rev.
70(507). 1984.

Boodman, Sandra G. "Abortion Foes Strike at
Doctor's Home Lives." The Washington Post (April 8,
1993), pp. A1, A17.

Carmody, Cristina. "Deadly Mistakes." A.B.A.J.
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Castine, John. "Getting the Message." Detroit Free
Press (May 26, 1994), p. 1A.

Cheh, Mary M. "Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives:
Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil
Law Distinction." Hastings L.J. 42(1325). 1991.

Corwin, Miles. "When Law Can't Protect." Los
Angeles Times (May 8, 1993), pp. A1, A21.

Dietz, P.E. "Defenses Against Dangerous People When
Arrest and Commitment Fail." Review of Clinical
Psychiatry and the Law, V.1, 10, ed. Robert I.
Simon. 1990.

Dietz, P.E., D.B. Matthews, D.A. Martell, T.M.
Stewart, D.R. Hrouda, and J. Warren. "Threatening
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(September 1991), pp. 1445-68. 

Dietz, P.E., D.B. Matthews, C. Van Duyne, D.A.
Martell, C.D.H. Parry, T. Stewart, J. Warren, J.D.
Crowder. "Threatening and Otherwise Inappropriate
Letters to Hollywood Celebrities." J. Forensic Sci.
36 (January 1991), pp. 185-209.

Finn, Peter and Sarah Colson. Civil Protection
Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and
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1992), p. 58.

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Fears: Guercio Convicted in Stalking Case, Is Told
to Leave Woman Alone." The Buffalo News (June 25,
1993).

Guy, Robert A. "The Nature and Constitutionality of
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Harrell, Adele et al. Court Processing and the
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Hart, Barbara J. "State Codes on Domestic Violence:
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Kentucky Domestic Violence Association. Domestic
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Tucker, James Thomas. "Stalking the Problems with
Stalking Laws: the Effectiveness of Florida
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Stalking Laws Fatally Flawed?" The Council of State
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available from the National College of District
Attorneys.) 

----------------------------------         

Appendix A     

Model Antistalking Code and Commentary

Model Antistalking Code for the States

The model antistalking code development project has
sought to formulate a constitutional and
enforceable legal framework for addressing the
problem of stalking.

The model code encourages legislators to make
stalking a felony offense; to establish penalties
for stalking that reflect and are commensurate with
the seriousness of the crime; and to provide
criminal justice officials with the authority and
legal tools to arrest, prosecute, and sentence
stalkers.

The Model Antistalking Code for the States

Section 1. For purposes of this code:

(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly
maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a
person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written
threats or threats implied by conduct or a
combination thereof directed at or toward a person;

(b) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions;

(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent,
child, sibling, or "any other person who regularly
resides in the household or who, within the prior 6
months, regularly resided in the household."

Section 2. Any person is guilty of stalking who:

(a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself
or herself or a member of his or her immediate
family or to fear the death of himself or herself
or a member of his or her immediate family; and

(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
specific person will be placed in reasonable fear
of bodily injury to himself or herself or a member
of his or her immediate family or will be placed in
reasonable fear of the death of himself or herself
or a member of his or her immediate family; and

(c) whose acts induce fear in the specific person
of bodily injury to himself or herself or a member
of his or her immediate family or induce fear in
the specific person of the death of himself or
herself or a member of his or her immediate family.

Analysis and Commentary on Code Language

Prohibited Acts

Unlike many State stalking statutes, the model code
does not list specific types of actions that could
be construed as stalking. Examples of specific acts
frequently proscribed in existing stalking statutes
include following, nonconsensual communication,
harassing, and trespassing.

Some courts have ruled that if a statute includes a
specific list, the list is exclusive. The model
code, therefore, does not list specifically
proscribed acts because ingenuity on the part of an
alleged stalker should not permit the stalker to
skirt the law. Instead, the model code prohibits
defendants from engaging in "a course of conduct"
that would cause a reasonable person fear. 

Credible Threat

In contrast to many State stalking statutes, the
model code does not use the phrase "credible
threat." Stalking defendants often do not threaten
their victims verbally or in writing but instead
engage in conduct which, taken in context, would
cause a reasonable person to fear. The model code
is intended to apply to such "threats implied by
conduct." Therefore the "credible threat" language,
which might be construed as requiring an actual
verbal or written threat, was not used in the model
code.

"Immediate Family"

A stalking defendant may, in addition to
threatening the primary victim, threaten to harm
members of the primary victim's family. Under the
provisions of the model code, such a threat to harm
an immediate family member could be used as
evidence of stalking in the prosecution for
stalking of the primary victim.

The model code uses a definition of "immediate
family" similar to one currently pending in the
California legislature. This definition is broader
than the traditional nuclear family, encompassing
"any other person who regularly resides in the
household or who within the prior six months
regularly resided in the household."

States that are considering further expanding the
definition of "immediate family" should be aware
that broadening it too much may lead to challenges
that the statute is overly broad.

Classification as a Felony

States should consider creating a stalking felony
to address serious, persistent, and obsessive
behavior that causes a victim to fear bodily injury
or death. The felony statute could be used to
handle the most egregious cases of stalking
behavior. Less egregious cases could be handled
under existing harassment or intimidation statutes.
As an alternative, States may wish to consider
adopting both misdemeanor and felony stalking
statutes.

Since stalking defendants' behavior often is
characterized by a series of increasingly serious
acts, States should consider establishing a
continuum of charges that could be used by law
enforcement officials to intervene at various
stages. Initially, defendants may engage in
behavior that causes a victim emotional distress
but does not cause the victim to fear bodily injury
or death. For example, a defendant may make
frequent but nonthreatening telephone calls.
Existing harassment or intimidation statutes could
be used to address this type of behavior. States
also may want to consider enacting aggravated
harassment or intimidation statutes that could be
used in situations in which a defendant
persistently engages in annoying behavior. The
enactment of a felony stalking statute would allow
law enforcement officials to intervene in
situations that may pose an imminent and serious
danger to a potential victim. Classification as a
felony would assist in the development of the
public's understanding of stalking as a specific
crime, as well as permit the imposition of
penalties that would punish appropriately the
defendant and provide protection for the victim. 

Of utmost importance is a State's decision to
require the criminal justice system and related
disciplines to take stalking incidents seriously.
The decision about how to classify stalking and how
to establish a continuum of charges is of less
importance. 

"Conduct Directed at a Specific Person"

Under the model code's language, the stalking
conduct must be directed at a "specific person."
Threatening behavior not aimed at a specific
individual would not be punishable under a statute
similar to the model code. For example, a teenager
who regularly drives at high speed through a
neighborhood, scaring the residents, could not be
charged under a stalking statute based upon the
model code.
 
Fear of Sexual Assault

It is likely that victims who fear that a defendant
may sexually assault them are also likely to fear
that the defendant would physically injure them if
they resisted. Furthermore, because the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which causes acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), could be
contracted through a sexual assault, a victim is
more likely to fear bodily injury or death, as well
as psychological injury. Nevertheless, States may
wish to consider expanding the language of felony
stalking statutes to include behavior that would
cause a reasonable person to fear sexual assault in
addition to behavior that would cause a
reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death. 

Intent Element

Under the provisions of the model antistalking
code, a defendant must engage purposefully in
activity that would cause a reasonable person to
fear and have or should have knowledge that the
person toward whom the conduct is directed will be
placed in fear. In other words, if a defendant
consciously engages in conduct that he knows or
should know would cause fear in the person at whom
the conduct is directed, the intent element of the
model code is satisfied.

Suspected stalkers often suffer under a delusion
that their victims actually are in love with them
or that, if properly pursued, the victims will
begin to love them. Therefore, a stalking defendant
may not intend to cause fear but instead may intend
to establish a relationship with the victim.
Nevertheless, the suspected stalker's actions cause
fear in the victim. 

As long as stalking defendants know or should know
that their actions cause fear, they can be
prosecuted for stalking. Protection orders can
serve as notice to alleged stalkers that their
behavior is unwanted and that it is causing the
victim to fear.

Fear Element

Since stalking statutes criminalize behavior that
might otherwise be legitimate conduct because the
behavior induces fear, the level of fear induced in
a stalking victim is a crucial element of the
stalking offense. The model code, which treats
stalking as a felony, requires a high level of fear
of bodily injury or death. Acts that induce
annoyance or emotional distress would be
punishable under statutes such as harassment or
trespassing, which do not rise to the felony level
and carry less severe penalties.

In some instances, a defendant may be aware through
a past relationship with the victim of an unusual
phobia of the victim's and use this knowledge to
cause fear in the victim. In order for such a
defendant to be charged under provisions similar to
those in the model code, the victim actually must
fear bodily injury or death as a result of the
defendant's behavior and a jury must determine that
the victim's fear was reasonable under the
circumstances.

--------------------------------        
Appendix B

Principal Recommendations of the Final Report of
the Project To Develop an Antistalking Model Code
 

A Model Antistalking Code for the States

o Because stalking often is characterized by a
series of increasingly serious acts, States should
consider establishing a continuum of charges that
law enforcement agencies can use to intervene at
various stages in a stalking case.

o States should consider creating a felony charge
of stalking to address serious, persistent, and
obsessive behavior that causes a victim to fear
bodily injury or death.

Sentencing Convicted Stalkers

o States should consider establishing a sentencing
policy for stalking that makes incarceration an
option for all stalking convictions.

o If a State decides not to treat stalking as a
felony, it should consider incorporating
aggravating factors into its sentencing policy for
stalking so that a particular incident can be
elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony if an
aggravating factor(s) is present.

o States should consider the same penalty
enhancements for stalking convictions that they
generally apply to aggravating circumstances such
as violation of a protective order, a minor victim,
or use of a weapon during commission of the crime.
States should consider making severe enhancements
available in instances in which the defendant has
committed a previous felony or stalking offense. In
such instances, States should consider requiring
mandatory prison sentences.

o As an alternative to penalty enhancements, States
may wish to establish a separate crime category for
example, aggravated stalking to deal with convicted
stalkers who have committed previous felonies or
stalking offenses.

o States' stalking sentencing policies should
incorporate release options and conditions that
increase in restrictiveness commensurate with the
risk the stalker poses to the victim. At a 
minimum, States should consider no-contact orders
as a condition of release for convicted stalkers
who are about to be placed on probation or parole.
States also may want to consider monitoring
convicted stalkers released on probation or parole
through electronic monitoring or house arrest.

o States may wish to consider requiring convicted
stalkers, as part of their sentences, to pay
restitution to their victims. Alternatively, States
may wish to consider permitting victims to recover
damages from convicted stalkers through civil
causes of action.

o States should consider requiring evaluation and
offering counseling as part of any sentence imposed
on a convicted stalker. States also should consider
requiring counseling as a condition of release for
convicted stalkers placed on probation or parole.

Pretrial Release: Supervising Accused Stalkers 

o States should consider developing appropriate
pretrial release conditions for accused stalkers.
At a minimum, they should consider making it a
condition of release that the accused refrain from
deliberately contacting the victim and, if
appropriate, members of the victim's immediate
family.

o States should consider including provisions in
pretrial release or bail laws that require
authorities to make reasonable efforts to provide
victims with copies of relevant pretrial release
orders, together with information about how and to
whom they report alleged violations, and the
sanctions for violations.

Strategies for Implementing Stalking Statutes and
Protocols

o States should consider developing a
multidisciplinary approach emphasizing early
intervention in suspected stalking. This approach
should involve the law enforcement community, the
judicial system, correctional and social services
agencies, victims' services, advocacy groups, and
community organizations in the characteristics and
behavior of stalkers. 

o Criminal justice officials should receive
training in the characteristics and behaviors of
stalkers. In cases in which two or more criminal
justice disciplines have shared, compatible
training needs, States should consider developing
interdisciplinary training resources.

o Police officials should receive training in four
principal areas: stalking law provisions and
evidentiary requirements; identifying and
monitoring stalking incidents; assessing the
potential danger posed by a suspected stalker; and
assisting stalking victims. Training for police
officials should be incorporated into police
recruit and roll call and in-service specialized
training
curricula.

o States should consider reviewing their protective
order statutes to determine whether, under present
conditions, protective orders would be available to
all stalking victims.

o States may wish to consider adopting legislation
and complementary procedures that allow protective
orders to be issued on an emergency basis after
court hours. 

o Judges should consider incorporating
recommendations for substance abuse monitoring and
treatment and mental health counseling into
restraining orders, when the existence of these
conditions can be documented.

o States should consider reviewing the notification
procedures in their protective order statutes to
ensure that they provide adequate notification to
all parties that a protective order has been issued
and notify them of the terms of the order.
 
o States should consider enacting legislation that
would allow the courts to enforce protective orders
issued by another jurisdiction.

o Law enforcement agency administrators should
establish formal department policies and procedures
for handling stalking cases.

o States should consider enacting legislation and
establishing procedures that encourage judges to
use defendants' criminal history record information
when making decisions about pretrial release
conditions, sentencing, and issuing protective
orders in stalking cases. Similarly, States should
consider developing procedures to ensure that
judicial authorities making decisions about
pretrial release and civil protection orders in
stalking cases, have timely access to information
about civil protection orders applied for, or
issued in, any court in the State.

o States should examine their privacy and freedom
of information statutes to determine whether
amendments are needed to prevent information
contained in public records from being used for
illegal purposes.

o States should review their statutory and
regulatory victim notification provisions, as well
as the protocols of their victims' agencies, to
determine whether they are adequate to meet the
unique needs of stalking victims. 

A National Research Agenda on Stalking

o Research should be undertaken on stalkers'
behavioral histories to respond to the following
questions:

What information is available about stalkers and
their behavioral histories?

Is stalking a new behavior? Have allegations of
stalking behavior increased during the past 3
years? How prevalent was stalking 20 years ago?

Do stalkers as a group exhibit any common
characteristics or patterns of behavior?

How many stalkers have records of prior felony
arrests and convictions unrelated to the stalking
incident?

What behaviors do stalkers exhibit immediately
before committing a violent act?

Are there any mental disorders associated with
stalking behavior?

o Research should be undertaken on handling
stalking cases to answer the following questions:

How many persons are arrested each year for
stalking?

How many of these arrests for stalking were made
under stalking statutes? What charges were filed in
stalking cases in which arrests were made under
nonstalking statutes?

How many individuals arrested for stalking were
convicted?

How many individuals arrested for stalking were
convicted under stalking statutes?

How many individuals were convicted for stalking-
like behavior under nonstalking statutes?

What sentences did stalkers receive in cases
adjudicated under stalking statutes?

What sentences did stalkers receive in cases
adjudicated under nonstalking statutes?

How many stalkers are under the jurisdiction of a
civil or criminal court? 

Is information on stalkers and their behaviors
being used to guide law enforcement and other
criminal justice officials in handling stalking
cases?

o Research should be undertaken on protective
orders to answer the following questions:

How well do defendants understand the terms of
civil protection orders issued against them?

How well do individuals who obtain civil protection
orders understand their rights and the process by
which violations should be reported? 

How well do law enforcement officials and judges
understand the enforcement process for civil
protection orders?

o Research should be undertaken on how private
corporations are handling alleged incidents in
which an employee is a victim of stalking or an
employee is using corporate resources to engage in
stalking behavior.

o Regional seminars should be conducted to help the
criminal justice community explore legislative and
programmatic approaches to addressing the problem
of stalking.  

------------------------------------

Appendix C

Participant Lists

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes
Eastern Region Seminar

March 31-April 1, 1994 Tampa, Florida

Participants

Mr. Stanley E. Adelman 
General Counsel 
Executive Office of Public Safety 
1 Ashburton Place, Room 2133 
Boston, MA 02108 

Sgt. Philip A. Amabile 
Broward Sheriff's Office 
P.O. Box 9507 
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33310-9507

Ms. R. Maria Brady 
Director, Victim Witness Services 
Law Enforcement Planning Commission 
8172 Sub Base, Suite 3 
Charlotte Amalie 
St. Thomas, VI 00802-5803

The Honorable Paul E. Caron 
Massachusetts State House of 
Representatives 
Co-Chair, Joint Committee on 
Public Safety 
Room 473B, State House 
Boston, MA 02133-1053

Mr. Joseph M. Claps 
First Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor 
Chicago, IL 60601 

Mr. Lindsay G. Dorrier, Jr. 
Director 
Virginia Department 
of Criminal Justice Services 
805 East Broad Street 
Richmond, VA 23219 

Ms. Deborah Downing 
Victims Services Analyst 
Department of Criminal Justice 
Services 805 East Broad Street 
Richmond, VA 23219 

Ms. Lisa Doyle Moran 
Assistant Director for Legal Affairs 
National Criminal Justice Association 
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 
Washington, DC 20001 

Mr. Joseph P. Dugdale 
Assistant Attorney General 
Crime Control Section 
P.O. Box 27687 
Raleigh, NC 27611-7687

Mr. William Duryea 
Staff Writer 
St. Petersburg Times 
1000 North Ashley Drive, Suite 700 
Tampa, FL 33602 

Ms. Lynn J. Falkenthal 
Executive Director 
Victim Advocate Program 
630 Estate Frydenhoj 41 6 1 
Suite 25 
St. Thomas, VI 00802-1411

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D. 
Consultant Psychologist 
U.S. Secret Service 
Visiting Fellow 
National Institute of Justice 
39 Linnaen Street 
Cambridge, MA 02138 

Ms. Lisa A. Frisch 
Director of Public Safety 
New York State Office for the 
Prevention of Domestic Violence 
Capitol View Office Park 
52 Washington Street, 3rd Floor
Renssealaer, NY 12144 

Mr. Ted Gest 
Senior Editor 
U.S. News & World Report 
2400 N Street, NW. 
Washington, DC 20037 

The Honorable Judy M. Gomez 
Senator 
Legislature of the Virgin Islands 
P.O. Box 1690 
St. Thomas, VI 00801 

Mr. John F. Gorczyk 
Commissioner 
Department of Corrections 
103 South Main Street 
Waterbury, VT 05671 
   
Ms. Robin S. Hassler 
Executive Director 
Governor's Task Force on 
Domestic Violence 
Executive Office of the Governor 
Room 210, The Capitol 
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001

Sheriff Cal Henderson 
Hillsborough County Sheriff's 
Office 
2008 Eighth Avenue 
Tampa, FL 33605 

Ms. Gwen A. Holden 
Executive Vice President 
National Criminal Justice Association 
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 
Washington, DC 20001 

Mr. Charles M. (Bud) Hollis 
Chief, Adjudication Programs Branch 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
U.S. Department of Justice 
633 Indiana Avenue NW., Room 602 
Washington, DC 20531 

Mr. Henry W. Jaeger 
Assistant Prosecutor 
Union County, New Jersey 
One Elizabeth Plaza 
Administration Building 
Elizabeth, NJ 07207 

The Honorable James P. Jajuga 
Massachusetts State Senator 
Third Essex District 
Co-Chair, Joint Committee on 
Public Safety 
Room 217, State House 
Boston, MA 02133-1053

Dr. Nolan E. Jones 
Director 
Justice and Public Safety 
National Governors' Association 
444 North Capitol Street NW., #267
Washington, DC 20001 

Lt. John Lane 
Los Angeles Police Department 
150 North Los Angeles Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90012 

Mr. Charles A. Lauer 
Special Assistant to the 
Assistant Attorney General 
Office of Justice Programs 
U.S. Department of Justice 
633 Indiana Avenue NW., Room 942 
Washington, DC 20531 

Mr. Paul E. Lawrence 
Director of Administration and 
Information Systems 
National Criminal Justice Association 
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 
Washington, DC 20001 

Ms. Melissa Lazarich 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Delaware Department of 
Justice 
820 North French Street 
Wilmington, DE 19801 

Maj. Connie Locke 
Volusia County Sheriff's Office 
P.O. Box 569 
DeLand, FL 32721-0569

Capt. Denny Martin
Orange County Sheriff's Office 
2430 West 33rd Street 
Orlando, FL 32839  

Ms. Penny Morrill 
Executive Director 
Domestic Violence Program 
Sunrise of Pasco County, Inc. 
P.O. Box 928 
Dade City, FL 33526 

Mr. Michael J. Neimand 
Bureau Chief 
Criminal Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
401 Northwest Second Avenue 
Suite N921 
P.O. Box 01341 
Miami, FL 33101 

Mr. David O'Neil 
President 
Juris Monitor Project 
5757 Central Avenue, Suite 200 
Boulder, CO 80301 

Ira K. Packer, Ph.D. 
Assistant Commissioner 
Massachusetts Department of 
Mental Health 
25 Staniford Street 
Boston, MA 02114 

The Honorable Mary Ann Pickard 
Senator 
Virgin Islands Legislature 
P.O. Box 1051 
Christainsted 
St. Croix, VI 00821 

Ms. Sheryl Powell 
Victim-Witness Assistance 
Program Advocate 
Metropolitan Atlanta Crime 
Commission 
170 Garnett Street SW. 
Atlanta, GA 30335 
 
Mr. Philip G. Ramer 
Special Agent in Charge 
Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement 
4211 North Lois Avenue 
Tampa, FL 33614 

Ms. Nadine M. Rapacioli 
Legal Researcher 
National Criminal Justice Association 
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618 
Washington, DC 20001 

The Honorable Maurice H. Richardson 
First Justice 
Dedham District Court 
631 High Street 
Dedham, MA 02026 

Ms. Elsie V. Roberts 
Deputy Commissioner 
Virgin Islands Police Department 
Enighed #18-37, Cruz Bay 
St. John, VI 00831-0057

Mr. Andrew K. Ruotolo, Jr.
Prosecutor
Union County, New Jersey
One Elizabeth Plaza
Administration Building
Elizabeth, NJ 07207 

Lt. Richard S. Scheff
Broward Sheriff's Office
P.O. Box 9507
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33310-9507

Ms. Laura Scott
Victim Advocate Coordinator
Pinellas County Sheriff's Office
P.O. Box 2500
Largo, FL 34649-2500

Chief L. Jerome Spates
Duval County Sheriff's Office
501 East Bay Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202 

Ms. Lynn Gittens Spencer
Co-Chair
Task Force on Domestic Violence
P.O. Box 8300
Sunny Isle, VI 00823-8300

Mr. Gaylord A. Sprauve
Drug Policy Advisor to the Governor
Law Enforcement Planning Commission
8172 Sub Base, Suite 3
St. Thomas, VI 00802-5803

The Honorable Susan Sweetser
Senate Chambers
State House
Montpelier, VT 05602 

The Honorable Lynn Tepper
Circuit Judge
38053 Liveoak Avenue
Dade City, FL 33525 

Heidi Urich, Esq.
Executive Director
Massachusetts Office for
Victim Assistance
100 Cambridge Street, Room 1104
Boston, MA 02202

Mr. George E. Wattendorf
Prosecuting Attorney
City of Dover Police
46 Locust Street
Dover, NH 03820 

Mr. S. Elwood York, Jr.
Principal Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
48B-50C Kronprindsens Gade
GERS Building, 2nd Floor
Charlotte Amalie
St. Thomas, VI 00802 

------------------------------------

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes
Western Region Seminar

May 12-13, 1994
Portland, Oregon

Participants

Mr. Joe Albo
Executive Assistant
Office of the Governor
1700 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007 

The Honorable Annelle C. Amaral
State Representative
Hawaii State Legislature
235 South Beretania, Room 806
Honolulu, HI 96813 

Ms. Ellen Archibald
Administrative Assistant and
Director of the Victims of Crime
Assistance Program
Davis County Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 618
Farmington, UT 84025 

Ms. Janet Arenz
Director of Education
ACLU Oregon
310 Southwest Fourth, #705
Portland, OR 97204 

Mr. Alan L. Baker
Special Agent
U.S. Secret Service
121 Southwest Salmon, Suite 1330
Portland, OR 97204 

Ms. Claudia Black
Legislative Assistant
State Senate
2625 Northeast Hancock
Portland, OR 97212 

Mr. Greg Boles
Detective III, Supervisor 
Threat Management Unit
Los Angeles Police Department
150 North Los Angeles Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012 

Mr. Alfred S. Bask
Resident Agent-in-Charge
U.S. Secret Service
121 Southwest Salmon, Suite 1330
Portland, OR 97204 

Mr. Timothy A. Brauer
General Counsel
Oklahoma Department of Mental Health
and Substance Abuse Services
1200 Northeast 13th
P.O. Box 53277
Oklahoma City, OK 73152-3277

The Honorable Ron Cease
Senator
State Senate
2625 Northeast Hancock
Portland, OR 97212

Mr. Joseph M. Claps
First Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601 

Joseph J. Cocozza, Ph.D.
Vice President
Policy Research Associates, Inc.
262 Delaware Avenue
Delmar, NY 12054 

Sgt. Gary Cox
Administrative Sergeant
West Jordan Department of
Public Safety
8000 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088 

Sgt. Randy Day
Portland Police Bureau
1111 Southwest Second Avenue
Room 1326
Portland, OR 79204

Ms. Letha DeCaires
Detective
Criminal Investigation Division
Honolulu Police Department
801 South Beretania Street
Honolulu, HI 96813 

Mr. Patrick F. Donaldson
Executive Committee Member
Citizens Crime Commission Portland
610 Southwest Broadway, #302
Portland, OR 97205 

Ms. Lisa Doyle Moran
Assistant Director for Legal Affairs
National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
Washington, DC 20001 

Ms. Robin Estes
Special Agent
Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation
P.O. Box 11497
Oklahoma City, OK 73136

Ms. Star Euthene
Vice President of Domestic Violence
Idaho Coalition Against Sexual and
Domestic Violence
2201 North Government Way, Suite E
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.
Consultant Psychologist
U.S. Secret Service
Visiting Fellow
National Institute of Justice
39 Linnaen Street
Cambridge, MA 02138 

Ms. Susan Evans Grabe
Law Improvement Coordinator
Oregon State Bar
5200 Southwest Meadows Road
P.O. Box 1689
Lake Oswego, OR 97035

The Honorable Jeannette Hamby
Senator
Oregon Legislature
952 Jackson School Road
Hillsboro, OR 97124 

Lt. Mariane Heisler
Portland Police Bureau
1111 Southwest Second Avenue
Portland, OR 97204

Ms. Gwen A. Holden
Executive Vice President
National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
Washington, DC 20001 

Mr. Roy A. Holt
Director
Statistical Analysis Center
Arizona Criminal Justice Commission
1501 West Washington, Suite 207
Phoenix, AZ 85007 

Mr. Allen Horne
Legislative Aide
Texas State Senator Mike Marcrief
P.O. Box 12068
Austin, TX 78711 

Ms. Paula J. Houston
Senior Prosecutor
West Valley City Attorney's Office
3600 Constitution Boulevard
West Valley City, UT 84119 

Capt. Gary Jeffs
West Jordan Department of
Public Safety
8000 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, UT 84088 

Mr. Keith M. Kaneshiro
Prosecuting Attorney
City and County of Honolulu
State of Hawaii
1060 Richards Street, 10th Floor
Honolulu, HI 96813 

Mr. R. Monte MacConnell
Deputy Director
Idaho Department of Law Enforcement
P.O. Box 700
Meridian, ID 83680-0700

Charles B. Maclean, Ph.D.
Principal
Health Promotion and Business
Consultants
P.O. Box 14914
Portland, OR 97214 

Honorable Kevin L. Mannix
Representative
Oregon House of Representatives
2003 State Street
Salem, OR 97301 

Ms. Jessica Mindlin
Attorney
Oregon Coalition Against Domestic and
Sexual Violence
2336 Southeast Belmont Street
Portland, OR 97214

Ms. Lois Mock
Program Manager
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice
633 Indiana Avenue NW.
Washington, DC 20531 

Chief Monty Montague
Idaho Falls Police Department
605 North Capital
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 

Mr. Thomas D. Moots
Supervisor
Nevada Division of Investigation
555 Wright Way
Carson City, NV 89711-0100

Ms. Alicia Philpot
Legislative Assistant
State Senate
2625 Northeast Hancock
Portland, OR 97212 

The Honorable Hollie Pihl
Circuit Court Judge
State Judicial Department
Courthouse
Hillsboro, OR 97124 

Ms. Nadine M. Rapacioli
Legal Researcher
National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
Washington, DC 20001 

Ms. Martha Ross
Administrative Coordinator
Sex Abuse Treatment Center
1415 Kalakaua Avenue, Suite 201
Honolulu, HI 96826 

Ms. Rhonda Saunders
Deputy District Attorney
Los Angeles District Attorney's Office
210 West Temple Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012 

Mr. John H. Stein
Deputy Director
National Organization for Victim
Assistance
1757 Park Road NW.
Washington, DC 20010 

Mr. Bill Taylor
Counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee
Oregon Legislative Assembly
332 State Capitol
Salem, OR 97310 

Ms. Lynda Whitlock
Director
New Horizons Crisis Center, Inc.
146 North Main, Suite 10
Richfield, UT 84701 

Ms. Laurie Wimmer
Executive Director
Oregon Commission for Women
P.O. Box 751
Portland, OR 97207 

---------------------------------------

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes
Central Region Seminar
         
October 27-28, 1994
Chicago, Illinois

Participants

Ms. Carolen F. Bailey
Assistant Commissioner
Minnesota Department of
Public Safety
Suite 1000 NCL Tower
4454 Minnesota Street
St. Paul, MN 55101

Mr. Thomas F. Baker
Executive Director
Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority
120 South Riverside Plaza
10th Floor
Chicago, IL 60606

Mr. Grace Barreras
Law Enforcement Instructor
New Mexico Law Enforcement Academy
4491 Cirrillos Road
Santa Fe, NM 87505

Mr. David Beatty
Director of Public Affairs
The National Victim Center
2111 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 300
Arlington, VA 22201

Mr. Robert P. Boehmer
General Counsel
Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority
120 South Riverside Plaza, Suite 1016
Chicago, IL 60606

Ms. Debra Burton
Court Advocate
Rainbow House
2313 South Millard
Chicago, IL 60623

Mr. Joseph M. Claps
First Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street, 12th Floor
Chicago, IL 60601

Mr. Robert L. Crites
Assistant Deputy Director
Illinois State Police
100 Armory Building
P.O. Box 19461
Springfield, IL 62794-9461

Ms. Patricia Ann Davenport
Victim Service Director
The Salvation Army Catherine
Booth Center
P.O. Box 1144
Greenville, MS 38701

Ms. Rosemary Davis
Court Advocate
Rainbow House
2313 South Millard
Chicago, IL 60623

Ms. Maureen DeMatoff
Associate Director
Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority
120 South Riverside Plaza
10th Floor
Chicago, IL 60606

The Honorable Loretta O. Douglas
Circuit Court Judge
Circuit Court Cook County
10270 South 76th Avenue
Bridgeview, IL 60455

Ms. Lisa Doyle Moran
Assistant Director for Legal Affairs
National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
Washington, DC 20001

Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.
Consultant Psychologist
U.S. Secret Service
Visiting Fellow
National Institute of Justice
39 Linnaen Street
Cambridge, MA 02138

Mr. Theodore A. Gottfried
State Appellate Defender
Office of the State
Appellate Defender
P.O. Box 5780
Springfield, IL 62705-5780

The Honorable James E. Graves, Jr.
Circuit Court Judge
Hinds County Circuit Court of Hinds and
Yazoo Counties
P.O. Box 327
Jackson, MS 39205

Ms. Clare Pfoten Hauer
Trooper
Illinois State Police
8330 S. King Drive
Chicago, IL 60619

Ms. Gwen A. Holden
Executive Vice President
National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
Washington, DC 20001

Ms. Lynda Jones
Executive Director
On Our Own/Hear Our Cries, Inc.
1229 South Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60605

Ms. Becky Kinnamon
Victim/Witness Administrator
Story County Attorney's Office
900 Sixth Street, Courthouse
Nevada, IA 50201

Ms. Leslie Landis
Executive Director
Life Span
Center for Legal Services and Advocacy
P.O. Box 445
Des Plaines, IL 60016

Ms. Susan Laurence
Program Specialist
Office for Victims of Crime
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
633 Indiana Avenue NW.
Washington, DC 20531


Mr. Gregory W. O'Reilly
Legislative Liaison
Cook County Public Defender
200 West Adams Street, 9th Floor
Chicago, IL 60606

Mr. Ronald W. Pavlock
President
Illinois Association of
Chiefs of Police
112 East Northwest Highway
Mount Prospect, IL 60056

Ms. Jane M. Philo
Executive Director
Gulf Coast Women's Center
P.O. Box 333
Biloxi, MS 39533

Mr. Roger Przybylski
Associate Director
Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority
120 South Riverside Plaza
Chicago, IL 60606

Mr. Paul Radzicki
Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge
Chicago Field Office
U.S. Secret Service
Gateway IV Building
300 South Riverside Plaza
Suite 1200 North
Chicago, IL 60606

Ms. Nadine M. Rapacioli
Legal Researcher
National Criminal Justice Association
444 North Capitol Street NW., #618
Washington, DC 20001

Ms. Mary E. Richards
Story County Attorney
Story County Attorney's Office
900 Sixth Street, Courthouse
Nevada, IA 50201

The Honorable Jennie Robak
Senator
Nebraska Legislature
1018 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509

Ms. Sue L. Rockne
Legislative Consultant
550 Warren Avenue
Zumbrota, MN 55992-1164

Ms. Roxann M. Ryan
Deputy Attorney General
Iowa Attorney General's Office
Hoover Building
Second Floor
Des Moines, IA 50319

Ms. Christina M. Schneider
Assistant Division Chief
Women's Advocacy
Illinois Attorney General's Office
100 West Randolph
Chicago, IL 60601

Ms. Melanie Smith
Program Specialist
Office for Victims of Crime
Office of Justice Programs
U.S. Department of Justice
633 Indiana Avenue NW.
Washington, DC 20531

Ms. Vickie M. Smith
Executive Director
Illinois Coalition Against
Domestic Violence
730 East Vine, Room 109
Springfield, IL 62702

Mr. Ezzard Charles Stamps
Program Manager
Department of Public Safety
401 North West Street
Eighth Floor
Jackson, MS 39225

Ms. Taya D. Sun
Director of Preventive Programs
Chicago Housing Authority
3833 South Langley
Chicago, IL 60653

Ms. Ann Tarjan
Assistant Director
On Our Own, Inc.
1229 South Michigan Avenue, #102
Chicago, IL 60605

Ms. Barbara L. Thrasher
Program Manager of Victim
Assistance Department
Chicago Housing Authority
3833 South Langley
Chicago, IL 60653

Ms. Laura A. Tucker
Chief, Women's Advocacy Division
Illinois Attorney General
100 West Randolph
Chicago, IL 60660

Mr. Brian M. Vossekuil
Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Intelligence Division
Office of Protective Research
U.S. Secret Service
1800 G Street NW.
Washington, DC 20223

Mr. Michael Ward
Assistant U.S. Attorney
234 U.S. Courthouse
110 South Fourth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Mr. Mark Warnsing
Senate Legal Counsel
Senate President's Staff
Stratton Building, A Section
Springfield, IL 62706

Mr. Phil Weber
Research Director
Senate President's Staff
Stratton Building, A Section
Springfield, IL 62706

Ms. Nancy D. Whittemore
Division Director
Tennessee Department of Finance
and Administration
500 Deaderick Street, Suite 1400
Nashville, TN 37243 1700

Ms. Marsha Willis
Director, Office of Program
Assessment and Support
Tennessee Department of Finance
and Administration
1400 Andrew Jackson Building
Nashville, TN 47243-1700       

-----------------------------------------

Appendix D

Seminar Agenda

Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes
Eastern Region Seminar

hosted by the National Criminal Justice Association
and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance in cooperation with the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement

March 31 and April 1, 1994
Wyndham Harbour Island Hotel
725 South Harbour Island Boulevard
Tampa, Florida

Agenda

A principal feature of the 2-day regional seminar
will be an examination of three hypothetical
stalking cases, based on common elements of actual
stalking cases, as the basis for demonstrating the
possible practical implications for policymakers,
legislators, and criminal justice officials of the
model antistalking code provisions. The
hypothetical cases will serve as vehicles for
examining the experiences of the States with
existing stalking statutes and current policies and
practices for handling stalking cases. Finally, the
hypothetical cases will provide the means and
opportunity to explore possible options for
handling the complex and unique legal, social, and
mental health issues raised by stalking cases.

Thursday, March 31

Convene 1 p.m.

Welcome and Opening Remarks

Description of the stalking problem; history of
efforts to address the problem 

Charles A. Lauer, Special Assistant to the
Assistant Attorney General U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs and Project
Director for the regional seminars project

Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President  National
Criminal Justice Association 

Overview of the Model Antistalking Code for the
States

Review of the methodology and collaborative process
used to develop the model code and explanation of
the arguments for and against various options that
were considered in formulating code provisions

o Principles that guided statutory construction.

o Uses and limitations of the model antistalking
code.      

o Model antistalking code provisions and related
commentary.

Mr. Lauer

Profile of Antistalking Statutes of Eastern Region
States

Lisa Doyle Moran, Assistant Director for Legal
Affairs National Criminal Justice Association

Recess 5 p.m.

Friday, April 1

Reconvene 9 a.m.

Introduction of Stalking Case Studies

o Explanation of interactive process to be used by
panelists in discussing case studies with seminar
participants.

o Overview of hypothetical stalking cases.

o Overview of critical issues identified by the
model antistalking code project's resource group,
including implementing stalking and related
legislation; the use of protective orders in
stalking cases; and dealing with alleged and
convicted stalkers in light of limited financial
and treatment resources.

Ms. Holden 
   
Practical Exercise: Three Hypothetical Stalking
Cases

Facilitator

Ms. Holden

Panelists

Joseph A. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General  
      
Illinois Office of the Attorney General

Robert Fein, Consulting Psychologist U.S.
Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service and
Visiting Fellow, U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice

John F. Gorczyk, Commissioner
Corrections Department
Vermont Human Services Agency

Lt. John Lane
Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

Laura Scott, Victims Advocate Coordinator
Pinellas County (Fla.) Sheriff's Office

The Honorable Susan Sweetser 
Vermont State Senator 

Adjourn 3 p.m.

----------------------------------
   
Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes
Western Region Seminar

hosted by the National Criminal Justice Association
and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance in cooperation with the Criminal Justice
Services Division of the Oregon
Administrative Services Department

May 12-13, 1994
The Governor Hotel
Southwest 10th at Alder
Portland, Oregon

Agenda

A principal feature of the 2-day regional seminar
will be an examination of three case studies, using
hypothetical stalking fact patterns, as the basis
for demonstrating the possible practical
implications for policymakers, legislators, and
criminal justice officials of the model
antistalking code provisions. The case studies will
serve as vehicles for examining the experiences of
the States with existing stalking statutes and
current policies and practices for handling
stalking cases. Finally, the case studies will
provide the means and opportunity to explore
possible options for handling the complex and
unique legal, social, and mental health issues
raised by stalking cases.

Thursday, May 12 

Convene 1 p.m.

Welcome and Opening Remarks 
  
Description of the stalking problem; history of
efforts to address the problem

Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President National
Criminal Justice Association
 
Overview of the Model Antistalking Code for the
States
 
Review of the methodology and collaborative process
used to develop the model code and explanation of
the arguments for and against various options that
were considered in formulating code provisions

o Principles that guided statutory construction.  
       
o Uses and limitations of the model antistalking
code.    

o Model antistalking code provisions and related   
commentary.

Ms. Holden

Lisa Doyle Moran, Assistant Director for Legal
Affairs  National Criminal Justice Association

Stalker Profiles

Robert Fein, Consulting Psychologist  U.S.
Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service and
Visiting Fellow, U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice

Profile of Antistalking Statutes of Western Region
States

Ms. Doyle Moran

Discussion of Recent Constitutional Challenges to
the Oregon Antistalking Statute

The Honorable Ron Cease Oregon State Senator 

Recess 5 p.m.

Friday, May 13 

Reconvene 9 a.m.

Introduction of Stalking Case Studies
   
o Explanation of interactive process to be used by
presenters in discussing case studies with seminar
participants.       

o Overview of stalking case studies.

o Overview of critical issues identified by the
model antistalking code project's resource group,
including implementing stalking and related
legislation; using protective orders in stalking
cases; and dealing with alleged and convicted
stalkers in light of limited financial and
treatment resources.

Ms. Holden
   
Practical Exercise: Three Stalking Case Studies

Facilitators

Ms. Holden

Joseph M. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Illinois Attorney General

Panelists

Mr. Claps

Mr. Fein

John Stein, Deputy Director National Organization
for Victim    Assistance

Adjourn 3 p.m.

-------------------------------------
   
Developing and Implementing Antistalking Codes
Central Region Seminar

Hosted by the National Criminal Justice Association
and U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Assistance in cooperation with the Illinois
Criminal Justice Information Authority, the
Illinois Attorney General's Office, and the Chicago
Police Department

October 27-28, 1994
The Westin Hotel/O'Hare
6100 River Road
Rosemont, Illinois

Agenda

A principal feature of the 2-day regional seminar
will be an examination of three hypothetical cases,
based on common elements of actual stalking cases,
as the basis for demonstrating the possible
practical implications for policymakers,
legislators, and criminal justice officials of the
model antistalking code provisions. The
hypothetical cases will serve as vehicles for
examining the experiences of the States with
existing stalking statutes and current policies and
practices for handling stalking cases. Finally, the
hypothetical cases will provide the means and
opportunity to explore possible options for
handling the complex and unique legal, social, and
mental health issues raised by stalking cases.

Thursday, October 27 

Convene 1 p.m.

Welcome and Opening Remarks 
  
Description of the stalking problem; history of
efforts to address the problem

Gwen A. Holden, Executive Vice President
National Criminal Justice Association

Overview of the Model Antistalking Code for the
States
 
Review of the methodology and collaborative process
used to develop the model code and explanation of
the arguments for and  against various options that
were considered in formulating code  provisions

o Principles that guided statutory construction.

o Uses and limitations of the model antistalking
code.      

o Model antistalking code provisions and related   
commentary.

Ms. Holden

Lisa Doyle Moran, Assistant Director for Legal
Affairs National Criminal Justice Association

Stalkers: What Do We Know?

Robert Fein, Consulting Psychologist U.S.
Department of the Treasury, U.S. Secret Service
Visiting Fellow, U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice

Profile of Antistalking Statutes of Central Region
States

Ms. Doyle Moran

Recess 5 p.m.

Friday, October 28 

Reconvene 9 a.m.

Introduction of Stalking Case Studies
   
o Explanation of interactive process to be used by
presenters in discussing case studies with seminar
participants.       

o Overview of hypothetical stalking cases.
    
Practical Exercise: Three Hypothetical Stalking
Cases

Facilitators

Ms. Holden

Joseph M. Claps, First Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Illinois Attorney General

Panelists

David Beatty, Director of Public Affairs National
Victim Center

Mr. Fein

Leslie Landis, Executive Director Life Span

Michael Ward, Assistant U.S. Attorney Minneapolis,
Minn.

Adjourn 3 p.m.

------------------------------------

Appendix E

Hypothetical Stalking Cases

Hypothetical Case No. 1 The branch manager/victim
and the teller/stalker, both males, are coworkers
in a suburban branch of a major national bank.

The bank branch is located in a stand-alone
building in a suburban shopping mall that also
houses a carry-out restaurant next to the bank and
several offices. There is no full-time security
guard posted in the branch.  The branch manager has
been employed by the bank for 15 years and has
served as manager of the branch in which he and the
teller currently work for 5 years.

The teller has worked for the bank for 2 years and
has spent that entire time employed as a teller
under the branch manager's supervision. During the
teller's employment with the bank, the branch
manager has identified, documented, and placed in
the teller's personnel file several reports of
problems with the teller's performance. These
problems have escalated during the 2 years of his
employment with the bank and include unexcused
absences, suspected alcohol use during working
hours, and conflicts with and aggressive behavior
directed toward coworkers and customers. 

In the teller's most recent personnel evaluation,
the branch manager rated the teller's performance
unsatisfactory. Continuing performance problems
culminate in the branch manager firing the teller.
The firing is triggered by three occurrences of
significant shortages in the teller's daily cash
settlement over a period of 1 month and the
suspicion that the missing funds are being taken by
the teller. The teller is notified of his dismissal
and advised of the reasons for his dismissal in a
meeting held during regular banking hours,
involving only the branch manager and the teller. 

The meeting becomes confrontational.
Notwithstanding the branch manager's review of the
variety of performance problems that contributed to
the teller's firing, the teller tells the branch
manager that he believes that he is being fired
unjustly because of false allegations of theft. The
teller leaves the meeting in an extremely agitated
state, verbalizing his outrage with the branch
manager as he moves from the branch manager's
office into the bank itself and past bank personnel
and customers, toward the bank's exit.

One week after the teller was fired, the teller
contacts the branch manager's direct supervisor,
the consumer banking manager, by telephone and
accuses the branch manager of unjustly firing him.
The teller alleges that the false accusation was
made to deflect blame from the branch manager who,
the teller says, actually took the missing money.
The consumer banking manager, who is familiar with
the teller's performance history and aware of his
dismissal by the branch manager, concludes that the
teller's behavior is an irrational response to his
dismissal and that his accusations against the
branch manager are without merit. The consumer
banking manager contacts the branch manager to
report the teller's call and the content of the
call and then summarily dismisses the matter. 

After contacting the consumer banking manager, the
teller begins to appear every morning at the carry-
out restaurant located next to the bank, where the
branch manager routinely stops for his morning cup
of coffee. He makes no direct contact with the
branch manager. A week later, the teller enters the
bank, approaches a former coworker, and loudly
complains about the bank's handling of his personal
account. After the teller returns to the bank a
second time to continue his complaints, the branch
manager instructs all bank employees to refer any
further contacts with the teller, either by
telephone or in person, directly to him. The branch
manager informs the consumer banking manager of the
teller's behavior and asks for a security guard to
be assigned inside the branch during banking hours.

The teller begins to make frequent telephone calls
to the branch manager, at his office and his home,
in which he accuses the branch manager of ruining
his life with false accusations that he stole the
missing bank money. The branch manager notifies the
consumer banking manager of the teller's telephone
calls and requests an unlisted telephone number
from the telephone company. 

One evening the branch manager, returning home from
work, observes the teller driving past his home.
The teller drives past the branch manager's home
several times that evening.

A week after the teller is observed in the branch
manager's neighborhood, the branch manager's wife
and two young children return home to find a note
from the teller attached to the front door of their
home. The note reiterates that the branch manager
has ruined his life and states that he plans to
ruin the branch manager's life in return. He
informs the branch manager in the note that he owns
a knife, but he makes no specific threat to use it.

The branch manager notifies the consumer banking
manager and the police of the teller's actions and
threat.
 
Case Assumptions

1. The stalking victim and the stalker are
coworkers. 

2. The stalking victim does not specifically ask
the stalker to cease the stalking activity but
attempts to deal with initial stalking incidents by
seeking the bank's intervention. 

3. The stalking incidents persisted after the bank
hires the security guard.

4. The stalking victim's first contact with law
enforcement authorities concerning the stalking was
made after a series of stalking incidents occurred.

5. In the stalking victim's State of residence, an
individual applying for a protective order must
live with the individual against whom the order is
sought.

Discussion Questions

1. Did the victim report the stalking activity to
the police at the earliest possible time?

2. (a) Are there other individuals or agencies from
whom the victim could have sought assistance? If
so, at what point should the victim have contacted
these individuals or agencies?

(b) How can police officials go about determining
the credibility of the bank manager when he reports
the stalking behavior?

o What questions do police officials ask the bank
manager?    

o What conditions and circumstances, should police
officials look for? 

(c) Should police officials contact the teller
after the report is made of the stalking activity?
If so, should the first contact with the teller be
a warning, a warning that results in the filing of
a report, or a formal contact that produces a
report?

3. (a) What are the stalking events in this fact
pattern?

(b) Looking back over the events listed in response
to question 3(a), would the police have been able
to intervene at an earlier stage?

(c) What events listed in response to question 3(a)
could be used by the prosecution to build a
stalking case? How will the defense respond?

4. Assuming the bank manager would be ineligible to
petition for a protective order, what advice should
law enforcement officials give to him if the teller
is not charged or remains free on bail?

5. What types of conditions should be included in
any pretrial release or probation orders resulting
from this case? How should violations of conditions
be dealt with?

6. Were the actions taken by the bank appropriate?
Should the bank have taken any additional actions?
Could the bank incur any liability based upon its
actions or failure to take action? 

Hypothetical Case No. 1: Supplemental Facts

o Several days after placing the note on the front
door of the branch manager's door, the teller
slashes the tires of the branch manager's personal
car while the vehicle is parked in the bank's
parking facilities. The branch manager/victim's
supervisor and the police are contacted. No one
observed the tires being slashed. Although it is
strongly suspected that the damage was inflicted by
the teller, it cannot be proved. The police take
and file a formal report of the incident. The
bank's consumer banking manager makes arrangements
for the security guard assigned to the bank's
premises to make periodic tours of the branch
parking facilities. 

o The teller arrives at a local bar for the regular
Friday night postwork gathering of bank employees.
The branch manager also is at the gathering. The
teller makes a loud and animated scene in which he
again states that the branch manager falsely
accused him of  theft and asserts that he took the
missing money himself. He announces to the bar
patrons that he has obtained a handgun and plans to
use it, but provides no specific information on how
and when. The police are contacted by the
proprietor of the bar.

o The teller shoots out several windows of the
branch manager's home. He has conducted an informal
surveillance of the branch manager/victim's home
and carries out the shooting at a time of day when
the family generally is away from the home. No one
is injured in the shooting. 

o The teller is arrested by police and charged with
stalking (a felony) and with malicious destruction
of property and trespass (misdemeanors). The teller
agrees to plead guilty to the lesser charges in
return for the prosecutor dropping the stalking
felony charge. The teller is sentenced to 2 years
of probation. As a condition of probation, the
teller is required to undergo a mental health
evaluation and counseling. He is ordered to have no
further contact with the branch manager or his
family and to stay away from the branch offices. He
also is ordered to pay restitution.

Discussion Questions

1. Were there other charges that reasonably could
have been brought against the teller?

2. Would a stalking prosecution of the teller have
been successful?

3. Would dropping the stalking charge have any
effect on prosecuting and sentencing if the teller
engages in further stalking behavior?  

-------------------------------------

Hypothetical Case No. 2

A husband/stalker and his wife/victim own their own
home in a moderate middle-class neighborhood. The
husband is a certified public accountant with a
small accounting firm. The wife left a 4-year
college after 2 years to marry her husband and
currently stays home to care for the couple's two
children, ages 2 and 4. She has no work experience
and no professional skills. Two years ago, the wife
decided to return to college in the evenings to
complete her bachelor of arts degree. Despite a
lack of enthusiasm for his wife's return to school,
the husband agreed to make funds available to
support this endeavor and to babysit the children
on the evenings that she attends classes. A year
later she began classes in the community college's
evening division. 

The relationship between the woman and her husband
of 6 years has become increasingly strained and
stressful during the past 9 months, ending almost a
year of relative calm in a relationship that
suffered a stormy beginning. Career uncertainties,
a young child, money problems, and the death of the
husband's father in the first 2 years of the
marriage combined to create a volatile home
environment. The husband began to criticize the
victim's performance as a wife and mother. Twice in
those early years, police were called by neighbors
to intervene in fights between the woman and her
husband. On one occasion, the husband pushed and
shoved his wife, who received a sprained wrist and
several bruises in the incident. 

These incidents precipitated a 9-month separation
during which the wife and the couple's children
lived with her parents. During that separation, the
wife sought and received a protective order
prohibiting the husband from telephoning, writing,
and following her. The husband continued his
pursuit, and on two occasions the wife reported the
husband's behavior to the police. On the first
occasion, the husband was arrested by the police,
spent a night in jail, and was released the next
day when the woman refused to press charges for the
violation of the protective order. On the second
occasion, the wife refused to press charges when
the police arrived at her home to take the
complaint.

A promotion for the husband and a resulting
improvement in the family's financial status
apparently alleviated many of the husband's
worries. The husband and the wife were reunited, a
second child was born, and the couple's
relationship improved markedly. 

Now completing her second semester of classes, the
wife is enrolled in two evening seminars, each
meeting once a week for 3 hours. The husband's
initial lack of enthusiasm for his wife's return to
college now has been replaced by growing anger over
the impact of the wife's educational pursuits on
his personal schedule. The husband resents the 2
nights a week that he must stay home to care for
the children while his wife attends classes, and he
resents the disruption in the family routine caused
by his wife's absence. The husband's anger and
resentment are heightened further by the wife's
enthusiastic accounts of her classes and
classmates. Moreover, the husband recently has
become suspicious of his wife's relationship with
one of the men in her seminar with whom she has
been working on a seminar project. 

Completion of that project has involved the wife in
several additional hours of class-related work and
has exacerbated the husband's frustration over his
wife's preoccupation with school. A Saturday
meeting between the wife and her male project
associate, from which the wife returns nearly 2
hours later than planned, preempts the husband's
plans to attend a  sporting event that afternoon.
The husband becomes so enraged when the wife
returns home that he tells her of his suspicions
about her relationship with her male associate. The
husband accuses his wife of abandoning her family,
failing in her responsibilities as a wife and
mother, and betraying him by entering into a
relationship with her classmate while he stays at
home taking care of a sick child. The wife
vehemently denies any such relationship with her
associate. 

On several occasions, the husband follows his wife
as she shops for groceries and carries out other
household errands. After observing a conversation
between his wife and a male pharmacist, the husband
accuses his wife of flirtatious behavior. Several
weeks later, when the wife returns home late after
celebrating the end of classes with a drink with
her seminar colleagues, the husband becomes
verbally and physically abusive. He again accuses
the wife of being unfaithful to him and of
abandoning her family. He says that he and the
couple's children have been following her to her
classes and that they have observed her in the
company of the male classmate. An episode of
pushing and shoving concludes with injuries to the
wife and a neighbor's telephone call to the police.
The police arrest the husband and take him to the
city lockup. The next morning, the wife appears at
the police station and refuses to press charges
despite the urging of neighbors and other friends
to do so. The husband is released.

The wife and her children leave the home and move
into the home of her parents. In a note, the wife
informs the husband that she believes that they
need time apart to consider their relationship. The
wife says that she does not plan to seek a legal
separation but that she does not want to speak with
or hear from the husband during the separation.
Notwithstanding this request for no contact, the
husband continues daily attempts to reach the
victim by telephone at her parent's home and is
observed driving by the home each morning and
evening. Despite the wife's objections, the mother
contacts the police. 

Case Assumptions

1. The stalking victim and the stalker are husband
and wife.

2. The stalking victim and the stalker have a
history of domestic problems. The stalking behavior
is one element of those domestic problems.

3. The stalking victim attempts to deal with the
initial stalking incidents as well as the other
aspects of their domestic troubles first by
reasoning with the stalker and second by separating
from him.

4. Despite the stalking victim's attempts, the
stalking persists.

5. In the stalking victim's State of residence,
protective orders are available to spouses and
former spouses.

Discussion Questions

1. Was the stalking activity reported at the
earliest possible time?

2. (a) Are there other individuals or agencies from
whom assistance could have been sought? If so, at
what point should these individuals or agencies
have been contacted?
  
(b) Should police officials contact the husband
after the report is made of the stalking activity?
If so, should the first contact with the husband be
a warning, a warning that results in the filing of
a report, or a formal contact that produces a
report?

3. What charges, if any, could be filed against the
husband after the wife's mother contacts the
police? Would the fact that the husband had engaged
in stalking activities during the couple's first
separation play a role in determining what charges
should be filed? 

4. (a) What are the stalking events in this fact
pattern?

(b) Looking back over the events listed in response
to question 3(a), would the police have been able
to intervene at an earlier stage?

(c) What events listed in response to question 3(a)
could be used by the prosecution to build a
stalking case? How will the defense respond?

(d) Could the wife's mother file stalking charges
against the husband? 

5. (a) How can law enforcement officials deal with
a victim who is reluctant or refuses to take the
actions they suggest, such as filing for a
protective order?

(b) Should law enforcement officials push reluctant
victims to file stalking complaints? 

(c) What courses of action are available to law
enforcement officials when a victim refuses to file
a complaint?

(d) If a victim refuses to file a complaint and
testify, to what extent can prosecutors rely on
third parties in trying a stalking case? What
problems does this present for the prosecution?

6. Assume that the wife had agreed to petition for,
and obtained, a protective order and that the
husband violated the order. Assume further that at
a subsequent contempt hearing the wife had
expressed reluctance to testify against her
husband. How should a judge handle this situation
in light of the following possibilities:

o The court's primary concern is family
preservation.       

o The husband is threatening the wife with violence
if she testifies against him. 
 
o The judge has access to evidence suggesting that
the wife may be in danger. 

7. What types of evidence could a judge rely on to
assess whether a stalking defendant poses a danger,
and how should the judge weigh such evidence?

8. What types of conditions should be included in
any protection order, pretrial release, or
probation order resulting from this case? How
should violations be dealt with?

Hypothetical Case No. 2: Supplemental Facts

o The husband continues contact with the wife by
sending several letters to her parents' home in
which he at first implores her to return home and
then threatens to take the children from her if she
does not come home. On one occasion, the husband
confronts the wife in a shopping mall parking lot
and again threatens to take the children from her
if she does not return home. A passerby alerts mall
security of the altercation. As security approach
the site, the husband returns to his car and leaves
the mall area.

o On returning to her parents' home after the
altercation at the mall, the wife tells her mother
about the incident. The police are notified and
arrive at the wife's parents' home to take a report
on the mall parking lot incident and other recent
incidents associated with the couple's problems.
The police advise the wife to secure a protective
order. The wife says she does not wish to do so.
The following day, a friend of the wife's observes
the husband in his car outside the school his
children attend and notifies the wife of this. 

---------------------------------------

Hypothetical Case No. 3

A local male sportswriter/victim stops each morning
at a convenience store located in a small strip
mall to pick up a cup of coffee and several
newspapers that the convenience store clerk set
aside for him. 

The assistant manager/stalker of a dry cleaning
business located next to the convenience store in
the strip mall has seen the sportswriter enter and
leave the convenience store every day for several
months and has become infatuated with him. She also
has seen him occasionally at the public recreation
center where she regularly participates in aerobics
classes. The assistant manager has hoped for a
casual encounter with the sportswriter on one of
his trips to the convenience store and has imagined
a long-term romantic relationship. She casually has
asked her friend, the convenience store clerk, for
information about the sportswriter and has learned
that he is a sportswriter with the local paper. To
date no encounter has occurred between the
assistant manager and the sportswriter. 

The assistant manager decides to initiate contact
with the sportswriter. For 2 consecutive days, the
assistant manager arranges to be in the convenience
store chatting with the store clerk when the
sportswriter arrives to pick up his coffee and
newspapers. On the first encounter, the assistant
manager says good morning to the sportswriter and
comments on the weather. The sportswriter returns
the greeting but pursues no further
conversation with the assistant manager and leaves
the store. On the second day, the assistant manager
again says good morning to the sportswriter and
comments on the number of newspapers he buys. The
sportswriter returns the greeting and acknowledges
with a smile the assistant manager's comments about
the newspapers, but he again leaves the store
without pursuing any further conversation or
contact with the assistant manager. 

The assistant manager is frustrated by the failure
of her first two attempts to initiate contact with
the sportswriter, but is encouraged that the
sportswriter smiled at her. She has interpreted
that smile as signaling his interest in her and she
decides to pursue more aggressively further contact
with him.

The following day, the assistant manager again
arranges to be in the convenience store when the
sportswriter arrives. She greets the sportswriter
and accompanies him out of the store to his car.
The sportswriter is polite but unresponsive to the
assistant manager's efforts to initiate a
conversation with him. The assistant manager
returns to the convenience store and laments to the
convenience store clerk her failure to engage the
sportswriter in a conversation. The clerk suggests
to the assistant manager that she is being too
obvious about her interest in the sportswriter and
probably has scared him away. The clerk advises her
friend to tone down her pursuit of him. The
assistant manager is visibly angered by the clerk's
remarks. In a loud, hostile voice, which is
overheard by the handful of customers in the
convenience store, the assistant manager tells the
convenience store clerk that her "relationship"
with the sportswriter is none of her friend's
business and suggests that the clerk is jealous of
that relationship. The assistant manager leaves the
convenience store, threatening to end her
friendship with the convenience store clerk.

A few days later, the assistant manager encounters
the sportswriter at the public recreational
facility where he has been playing basketball with
a few of his colleagues. The assistant manager
greets the sportswriter and comments upon the
frequency with which their paths appear to be
crossing. She invites the sportswriter to join her
for a drink. The sportswriter politely declines the
assistant manager's invitation. The sportswriter
rejoins his companions on the basketball court and
the assistant manager overhears the sportswriter
and his colleagues laughing. The assistant manager
assumes that the sportswriter and his colleagues
are laughing at her. She leaves the public
recreational facility.  Hurt, angry, and
embarrassed by the sportswriter's most recent
rejection of her, the assistant manager anonymously
mails him a copy of William Congreve's poem "The
Mourning Bride," which contains the oft- quoted
line, "Heaven has no rage like love to hatred
turned, nor hell a fury like a woman scorned."

The sportswriter receives the poem in the mail at
his home 2 days later. He doesn't know why the poem
has been sent or who has sent it. The following
night, he and his wife return home to find several
telephone hangups recorded on their answering
machine. Later that evening, the sportswriter's
wife answers a telephone call. The caller is the
assistant manager. Without identifying herself to
the sportswriter's wife, the assistant manager asks
to speak to the sportswriter. When he comes to the
telephone, the assistant manager asks him if he
received the poem she sent him and if he is sorry
for hurting and embarrassing her in the company of
his colleagues at the public recreation facility.
The sportswriter asks the caller her identity and
asserts that he does not know what she is talking
about. The assistant manager replies angrily that
he is lying and that she does not plan to tolerate
his behavior toward her any longer. The
sportswriter asserts that the caller is "some kind
of nut," demands that she not call again, and hangs
up. 

The assistant manager is startled to learn that the
sportswriter is married and is angered that he has
further rejected her and called her a nut. She
confronts him at the convenience store the next
day. In a hostile, irrational diatribe, she accuses
him of infidelity and enticing her into a romantic
relationship only to reject her cruelly. She
asserts that in payment for his unkindness to her
she will ruin his reputation and career and says
that she plans to report his infidelity to the
editor of the newspaper that employs the
sportswriter. The sportswriter notifies the police.

Case Assumptions

1. The stalking victim has no relationship,
acquaintance, or association with the stalker (the
stalker is a stranger).

2. The stalking victim's first contact with law
enforcement authorities was made after a series of
stalking incidents occurred.

3. In the stalking victim's State of residence, an
individual applying for a protective order must
live with the individual against whom the order is
sought.

Discussion Questions

1. Did the victim(s) report the stalking activity
to the police at the earliest possible time?

2. (a) Are there other individuals or agencies from
whom the victim(s) could have sought assistance? If
so, at what point should the victim(s) have
contacted these individuals or agencies? 

(b) How can police officials go about determining
the credibility of the victim(s) reporting the
stalking behavior?

o What questions should police officials ask the
victim(s)?    

o What conditions and circumstances should police
officials look for? 

3. (a) What are the stalking events in this fact
pattern?

(b) Looking back over the events listed in response
to question 3(a), would the police have been able
to intervene at an earlier  stage?

(c) What events listed in response to question 3(a)
could be used by the prosecution to build a
stalking case? How will the defense respond?

4. Assuming the sportswriter would be ineligible to
petition for a protective order, what advice should
law enforcement officials give to him if the
assistant manager is not charged or remains free on
bail?

5. What types of conditions should be included in
any pretrial release or probation orders resulting
from this case? How should violations of conditions
be dealt with?

Hypothetical Case No. 3: Supplemental Facts
 
o The assistant manager shows up at the newspaper
where the sportswriter works demanding to see him.
The security officer at the newspaper, having been
advised of the situation, refuses to admit her to
the newspaper's office. The assistant manager
leaves a message for the sportswriter with the
security officer in which she tells the
sportswriter that he will be sorry if he continues
to refuse to see her. 

o During the next few days, the assistant manager,
unobserved by the sportswriter, monitors the
movements of the sportswriter and his wife at home
and at work. A week after the assistant manager's
angry confrontation with the sportswriter at the
convenience store, the assistant manager follows
the sportswriter's wife to her place of business.
The assistant manager intercepts and verbally and
physically assaults the sportswriter's wife outside
the wife's office building, accusing the wife of
turning the sportswriter against her and stealing
his affections. The police are summoned.

o The assistant manager is charged by the police
with assault. She pleads no contest to the charge;
a no-contact order is issued by the judge and the
manager is released without supervision.

Discussion Questions

1. Could the assault on the sportswriter's wife be
used as evidence to prove stalking charges brought
by the sportswriter? 

If not, would there be enough evidence to prosecute
stalking charges brought by the sportswriter? What
would the prosecution's strategy be, assuming the
assault on the sportswriter's wife would not be
admissible evidence to prove stalking charges
brought by the sportswriter? How would the defense
respond?
 
If the assault on the sportswriter's wife were
admissible to prove stalking charges, would the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
bar a separate assault charge?

-------------------------------------
        
Appendix F

Appellate Court Citations of Stalking Cases

Appellate Court Citations of Stalking Cases

Alabama

Morton v. State, 1994 WL 529354 (Ala. Cr. App.
September 30, 1994).

California

People v. Heilman, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 422 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994).

Florida

Bouters v. State, 634 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994). Folsom v. State, 638 So. 2d 591 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Gilbert v. Florida, 639 So.
2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Huffine v.
State, 648 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994). Perez v. State, 648 So. 2d 784 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Rosen v. State, 644 So. 2d
531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Salatino v. State,
644 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). State
v. Barron, 637 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994). State v. Baugher, 637 So. 2d 384 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994). State v. Johnson, 644 So. 2d 1028
(Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1994). State v. Kahles, 644 So.
2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). State v.
Miranda, 644 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
State v. Tremmel, 644 So. 2d 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994). Varney v. State, 638 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

Georgia

Johnson v. State, 449 S.E. 2d 94 (Ga. 1994).

Illinois

People v. Krawiec, 634 N.E. 2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994).

Massachusetts

Commonwealth v. Kwiatowski, 637 N.E. 2d 854 (Mass.
1994).

Minnesota

In Matter of Christensen, 1994 WL 233616 (Minn.
App. May 31, 1994). State v. Nash, 1994 WL 705355
(Minn. App. December 29, 1994).  

Montana

State v. David, 880 P. 2d 1308 (Mont. 1994).

Ohio

Cleveland v. Walters, 1994 WL 734829 (Ohio App. 8
Dist. October 13, 1994). State v. Benner, 644 N.E.
2d 1130 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). State v. Wasmire,
1994 WL 476462 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. August 6, 1994).
State v. Wegman, 1994 WL 159517 (Ohio App. 6 Dist.
April 29, 1994). State v. Wilcox, 1994 WL 590407
(Ohio App. 5 Dist. October 14, 1994). State v.
Woodgeard, 1994 WL 167928 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. April
29, 1994).

Oklahoma

State v. Saunders, 886 P. 2d 496 (Okla. Crim. App.
1994).

Virginia

Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 47 S.E. 2d 530 (Va. App.
1994). 

------------------------------------

Notes

1. National Criminal Justice Association. Project
to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for States.
Washington, DC: U.S.

2. The following States enacted stalking laws in
1992: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 

3. The following States enacted stalking laws in
1993: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming.

4. The Illinois Appellate Court, First District-
Third Division reversed a decision by the Cook
County Circuit Court to deny bail based upon the
no-bail provision of the Illinois statute. The
appellate court did not, however, issue a written
opinion in the case. People v. Incandella, No. 1-
92-3767, Dec. 10, 1992. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice. October 1993.

5. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 

6. 636 So. 2d 591 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 

7. 449 S.E. 2d 94 (Ga. 1994). 

8. 886 P. 2d 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994). 

9. 47 S.E. 2d 530 (Va. App. 1994). 

10. 637 N.E. 2d 854 (Mass. 1994). 

11. 634 N.E. 2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).

12. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).

13. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).

14. People v. Allen, 868 P.2d 379 (Colo. 1994);
People v. Correa, 623 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1993); Buie
v. State 633 N.E.2d 250 (Ind. 1994); Eldred v.
Commonwealth, 1994 WL 587834 (Ky., Oct. 27, 1994);
State v. Fairfield, 644 A.2d 1052 (Me. 1994); State
v. Burns, 877 S.W. 2d 111 (Mo. 1994); State v.
Barker, 858 P.2d 360 (Mont. 1993); People v.
Latham, 609 N.Y.S. 2d 141 (N.Y. 1994); State v.
Mertz, 514 N.W.2d 662 (N.D. 1994); State v.
Stephenson, 878 S.W. 2d 530 (Tenn. 1994); State v.
Kurzawa, 509 N.W. 2d 712 (Wisc. 1994). 

15. Hawaii v. Lessary, 865 P.2d 150 (Haw. 1994).

16. State v. Johnson, 644 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994). 

17. State v. Miranda, 644 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1994).