Title: Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable
Series: Monograph (6 x 9)
Author: Bureau of Justice Assistance
Published: January 2001
Subject: case processing, defense services
31 pages
69,632 bytes

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
Bureau of Justice Assistance

Keeping Defender Workloads Manageable

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance 
Monograph

Indigent Defense Series #4

January 2001

NCJ 185632

Prepared by The Spangenberg Group

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street NW.
Washington, DC 20531

John Ashcroft 
Attorney General

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Home Page
www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Bureau of Justice Assistance
World Wide Web Home Page
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

For grant and funding information contact
U.S. Department of Justice Response Center
1-800-421-6770

This document was prepared by The Spangenberg Group for the Bureau of
Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The
opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National
Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
and the Office for Victims of Crime.

----------------------------

Foreword

Adequately supporting indigent defenders is critical to preserving the
constitutional rights of individuals accused of crimes. To function properly, the
criminal justice system needs all of its components, including defense, operating
effectively.

One important way we can bolster indigent defense in this country is educating
criminal justice practitioners, elected officials, and the public about the
challenges facing the indigent defense community. This series will help
accomplish that goal by addressing key issues that attorneys and managers in
indigent defense systems struggle with in their day-to-day work. 

The subject of this report, finding ways to better manage defender workloads,
is at the heart of ensuring that the administration of justice is fair and equitable.
Every day, defender offices and assigned counsel are forced to manage too
many clients with inadequate resources. Too often, the quality of service suffers,
jeopardizing one of our most important constitutional rights: the right to effective
counsel.

It is our hope that the information and recommendations provided here serve as
a valuable resource for all of us working to improve the justice system.

Bureau of Justice Assistance

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Contents

I. Introduction

II. Caseload v. Workload

o Importance of Uniform Definition of Case
o Ethical Considerations: When To Say Enough? 

III. Caseload Standards

o National Standards
o Case-Weighting Studies
o State Standards
o Statutory Caseload Provisions
o Contractual Standards
o Caseload Standards for Private Attorneys
o Performance Standards

IV. Withdrawal From Cases

o Systemic Litigation
o Malpractice Claims in State Court and Federal Immunity

V. Strategies for Keeping Workloads Manageable

VI. Notes

VII. For More Information

----------------------------

Introduction


In 1991, Rick Tessier, a young public defender working in New Orleans, was
appointed to represent Leonard Peart. At the time, Tessier was handling 70
active felonies. Peart was charged with armed robbery, aggravated rape,
aggravated burglary, attempted armed robbery, and first-degree murder.
Tessier's clients typically were incarcerated between 30 and 70 days before he
met with them. In the first 7 months of 1991, Tessier represented 418
defendants. His office had minimal investigative support and no funds for expert
witnesses. 

Tessier filed a motion to have the trial court declare, before disposition of
Peart's case, that Tessier was unable to provide Peart with effective assistance
of counsel, given his pending workload and lack of investigative and expert
resources. Tessier's motion resulted in a sharply worded admonition by the
Louisiana Supreme Court that the state legislature must take action to remedy
indigent defense in Louisiana. The situation was so bad that the court threatened
to "employ the more intrusive and specific measures it has thus far avoided to
ensure that indigent defendants received reasonably effective assistance of
counsel."[1] 

While refusing to make a blanket pretrial finding that Tessier provided
ineffective assistance to his clients, the court instructed the trial court to which
Tessier was assigned to hold individual hearings for all defendants making such
a pretrial assertion. Furthermore, the trial court was ordered to apply a
rebuttable presumption that such defendants were not receiving assistance of
counsel effective enough to meet constitutionally required standards. 

Tessier's experience conjures stereotypical images of young, overworked
lawyers juggling too many files, too many courtrooms, and too many clients at
the expense of the indigent defendants they represent. Although in many
instances this public image is a far cry from the truth, excessive workload is one
of the most pressing issues facing indigent defense programs in the United
States. 

----------------------------

About the Authors

This report was researched and written by the staff of The Spangenberg Group,
a nationally recognized criminal justice research and consulting firm working to
improve the delivery of indigent defense services. Located in West Newton,
Massachusetts, The Spangenberg Group has provided research and technical
assistance for justice organizations in every state in the nation.

----------------------------

Historically, public defenders have had little control over the number of cases
they receive. Most public defender offices began by representing a small
percentage of criminal defendants. Today, in some jurisdictions, public defender
offices are appointed as many as 80 percent of all criminal cases. As
populations and caseloads have increased, many public defender offices have
been unable to obtain corollary increases in staff. Every day, defenders try to
manage too many clients. Too often, the quality of service suffers. At some
point, even the most well-intentioned advocates are overwhelmed, jeopardizing
their clients' constitutional right to effective counsel.

The problem is not limited to public defenders. Individual attorneys who
contract to accept an unlimited number of cases in a given period often become
overwhelmed as well. Excessive workloads even affect court-appointed
attorneys. Rules of professional responsibility make it clear that every lawyer
must maintain a reasonable workload. In practice, meeting this standard has
been more difficult for lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants than
for those who represent paying clients. 

In the past decade, defender organizations, state legislatures, state courts, and
other entities have developed approaches to managing the workloads of
attorneys who represent indigent defendants. This monograph discusses these
approaches and presents strategies for keeping caseloads manageable.

----------------------------

II. Caseload vs. Workload

Many practitioners still tend to think of their caseload only in terms of the
number of clients they are assigned to represent. Yet, this captures only a
portion of their full workload. With the advent of sentencing guidelines and the
expanded use of mandatory minimum sentences, the complexity of criminal
defense practice has increased dramatically. There are fewer and fewer "easy"
cases, and with the growth of public defender programs many attorneys find
themselves spending more and more time on administrative matters. Thus, the
amount of time an attorney must spend to competently represent a client is not
accurately reflected by the number of clients alone. 

Likewise, given the different amounts of time required for different kinds of
cases, measuring caseload in terms of the number of clients is not an accurate
means of comparing the amount of work done by attorneys handling different
types of cases.


In addition to zealous advocacy in court, effective defense work requires client
contact, investigation, legal research, social work, conferences with
prosecutors, and case preparation. In the chapter "Coping With Excessive
Workload" of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Ethical Problems Facing
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: Practical Answers to Tough Questions, authors
Edward C. Monahan and James Clark set out the dimensions of competence
and quality for criminal defense lawyers as defined by the ABA in several
substantive areas:

o Legal knowledge and skill.

o Timeliness of representation.

o Thoroughness and preparation.

o Client relationship and interviewing.

o Communicating with the accused.

o Advising the accused. 

o Investigation.

o Trial court representation.

o Sentencing. 

o Appellate representation maintaining competence and ensuring quality.

Each of these facets of effective representation is compromised when caseloads
are too high. Defenders' job responsibilities extend beyond representing clients.
They consult with colleagues about their own and others' cases. They keep
abreast of recently decided cases and new laws and rules by attending training
sessions and through routine professional development reading. All defenders
must perform administrative tasks, and many have supervisory responsibilities,
often of both support staff and lawyers. In addition, public defender managers
have commitments to participate in community and policy meetings. All of these
responsibilities detract from the time a lawyer can spend on individual case
work but are essential to the functioning of an effective defender office. In short,
a defenders overall workload comprises a defenders active caseload combined
with these duties.

Many defenders who face excessive caseloads make decisions analogous to
those made by physicians in a M.A.S.H. unit. They perform triage. Defendants
facing serious felony charges receive primary attention, whereas defendants
facing misdemeanor, juvenile delinquency, or lower-level felony charges receive
much less. Too often in these cases, early investigation and regular client
communication fall by the wayside.[2]

Importance of Uniform Definition of a Case 

In developing workload or caseload standards for a given jurisdiction, it is
critical to use a common definition of what constitutes a case. The National
Center for State Courts and the Conference of State Court Administrators, in
State Court Model Statistical Dictionary, 1989, instruct court administrators to
"[c]ount each defendant and all charges involved in a single incident as a single
case."[3] In developing its standards, the National Advisory Commission
(NAC) defined a case as "a single charge or set of charges concerning a
defendant (or other client) in one court in one proceeding." Whereas it is
important for the indigent defense system (including public defenders,
court-appointed attorneys, and contract defenders) in a given jurisdiction to
count cases using a uniform definition, it is optimal when the courts and
prosecution in the jurisdiction also use the same definition. This affords the
greatest opportunity to develop and approve budget requests for the
adjudication component of the criminal justice system accordingly on a
systematic and balanced basis.

Ethical Considerations: When To Say Enough? 

The first rule in ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (as amended
through August 1998) requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to
a client.[4] Model Rule 1.3 requires that a lawyer "act with reasonable diligence
and promptness." Model Rule 1.4 covers attorney-client communication,
mandating that a lawyer keep a client reasonably informed about the situation
and promptly reply to reasonable requests for information. Model Rule 1.7(b)
prohibits attorneys from representing clients "if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client."
Many public defenders fail to acknowledge the conflict of interest that arises
when excessive caseloads force them to choose which of their clients will
receive the defense to which they are entitled.

In State v. Smith, considered by many defense practitioners to be the most
important opinion on public defender workload, the Arizona Supreme Court
found that Mohave County's contract system violated indigent defendants' rights
to due process and counsel as guaranteed by the Arizona and United States
Constitutions.[5] 

The court, placing blame for the system with the participating attorneys and the
county, reasoned that the attorneys are usually in a better position to recognize
when a contract will likely result in inadequate representation than is the county
board of supervisors. The court quoted the Arizona Rules of Professional
Responsibility, which forbids attorneys from accepting employment that cannot
be adequately performed, and cited ABA standards on delay and punctuality
(Standard 4-1.2) and workload (Standard 5-4.3). 

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense Services (3d ed.,
1992) and The Defense Function (3d ed., 1993), establish quality
representation as the benchmark for criminal defense lawyers. Standard 4-1.2,
"The Function of Defense Counsel," states that the basic duty of defense
counsel is to "render effective, quality representation." Standard 5-1.1
reinforces this principle: "The objective in providing counsel should be to assure
that quality representation is afforded."

The fact that overburdened attorneys are reluctant to stand up and say enough
is enough makes the problem even more difficult to address. Reasons for this
reluctance include ego, fear of rocking the boat in the local criminal system, and
fear of reprobation from the appropriate disciplinary committee of the governing
bar if an attorney suggests that he or she is unable to provide effective
representation. 

This fear is particularly acute for attorneys such as public defenders and
court-appointed attorneys who serve at the will of a particular judge. ABA
cautions against the potential conflict caused by such an arrangement in
Standard 5-1.3(a) of the Standards for Criminal Justice, which states:

The selection of lawyers for specific cases should not be made by the judiciary
or elected officials, but should be arranged for by the administrators of the
defender, assigned counsel, and contract-for-service programs.

Moreover, it is the primary responsibility of the judiciary to ensure that court
proceedings are fair and equitable. If a judge with responsibility for appointing
counsel in his or her courtroom recognizes that overwhelming caseloads may
jeopardize a defendant's right to competent representation of counsel, it is the
judge's responsibility to identify and rectify the situation.

In their guide to coping with excessive caseloads, Monahan and Clark explain
how attorneys should--in fact, must--deal with these situations:

A lawyer who has so much work, so many cases, so many other clients that she
is materially limited in her ability to effectively represent another client has an
impermissible personal conflict of interest and cannot assume responsibility for
an additional client.

Rules clearly establish that a lawyer cannot ethically accept another case or
other work when she has so much work that accepting another case will
preclude her from competently representing the new client or performing any
other ethical requirements, for example, communicating fully and promptly with
the client, or investigating the case and adequately advising the client.[6]

----------------------------

III. Caseload Standards

Ethical guidelines set the ultimate standard for determining when an attorney
carries an excessive caseload. However, numerical standards also play an
important role in putting concerns about excessive caseload in context. Some
standards establish a limited number of cases that a defender should not exceed
in any given year. Others are aspirational, encouraging indigent defense lawyers
to accept reasonable caseloads in accordance with professional responsibility
requirements. 

Caseload standards take different forms, including statute, court rule,
contractual terms, court opinion, and published guidelines by national
organizations. The latter--national standards promulgated by organizations
including ABA, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA),
and NAC--typically form one starting point for states and localities that develop
their own standards. The second starting point is a case-weighting study, in
which caseload/workload standards are developed to reflect the actual cases
handled in a particular jurisdiction. 

Programs that have developed successful caseload or workload programs
share a common set of characteristics, including

o A sound management information system based on reliable and empirical
data.

o A statistical reporting procedure that has been accepted by the funding
sources.

o A sound managerial/administrative system.

o The ability to tie caseload standards to budget requests.

o A mechanism (e.g., a statute or court rule) that kicks in once caseloads reach
an excessive level to prevent defenders from being assigned to additional cases.

o The ability to mobilize strong local support.

Note that a caseload standard is just a beginning. Without adequate support
staff, training, and supervision, a standard will not do much to alleviate case
overload. Some jurisdictions, such as Florida and Indiana, have used unit
staffing formulas in conjunction with attorney workload standards. In such a
system, ratios of adequate support staff to attorneys are developed. For
example, for every four felony attorneys there should be one paralegal, one
investigator, and one secretary. The bottom line is that caseload or workload
standards should be viewed as one part of an overall program to ensure that
defender offices have adequate staff and resources to properly represent
clients. 

National Standards

The only national body that has attempted to quantify a maximum annual public
defender caseload is NAC, which published its standards in 1973.[7] The
commission, made up of elected officials, law enforcement officers, corrections
officials, community leaders, prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys, was
appointed by the administrator of the federal Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. In NAC's report, Standard 13.12 on courts states:

The caseload of a public defender attorney should not exceed the following:
felonies per attorney per year: not more than 150; misdemeanors (excluding
traffic) per attorney per year: not more than 400; juvenile court cases per
attorney per year: not more than 200; Mental Health Act cases per attorney per
year: not more than 200; and appeals per attorney per year: not more than
25.[8] 

NAC caseload standards have served as a benchmark for other entities. 
Commentary to Standard 5-5.3 of ABA's Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal Justice references the public defender caseload
standards developed by NAC, noting they "have proven resilient over time and
provide a rough measure of caseloads."[9]

Additionally, some state organizations, such as the Washington Defender
Association, have adopted NAC standards or standards similar to them.
Washington state law requires counties and municipalities to establish caseload
standards and encourages counties and municipalities to use the Washington
Defender Association's standards as guidelines.

In the absence of guidelines created for a particular jurisdiction, NAC
standards are an effective tool to help public defenders plan and discuss
resource needs with policymakers and budget committees. However, NAC
standards are limited to describing resource needs strictly according to the raw
number of cases for which an attorney is responsible. They do not take into
consideration administrative or supervisory work, waiting or travel time, or
professional development activities. Furthermore, they do not differentiate the
amount of time required to work on various types of cases within a case
category. For example, all felonies, whether straightforward burglary charges or
complicated child sex abuse charges, are given equal weight by NAC
standards.

Case-Weighting Studies

Several public defender offices have developed their own caseload standards,
using either the Delphi method or the time record-based case-weighting
method. Of the two methods, the latter is most reliable.

The Delphi and Case-Weighting Methods

Under the Delphi method, a sample of attorneys is given a series of scenarios
designed to reflect typical cases and clients to be found in any public defender's
workload. The attorneys are asked to estimate the time involved in handling the
various scenarios. This results in case weights based on "strong educated
guesses" about the relative time required to complete various tasks.

The case-weighting method uses detailed time records kept by public defender
attorneys over a period, typically ranging from 7 to 13 weeks. The time records
provide a means by which caseload (the number of cases a lawyer handles) can
be translated to workload (the amount of effort, measured in units of time, for
the lawyer to complete work on the caseload). In the broadest context, weights
can be given to the total annual caseload of an office to compare with the next
year's anticipated volume of cases. Assuming that records are kept of attorney
time expended in each case, the translation of projected caseload into
projected workload can be accomplished with some precision.

Colorado Case-Weighting Study

In 1996, The Spangenberg Group completed a case-weighting study for the
Colorado state public defender.[10] Since then, the Colorado public defender
has used the study's weighted caseload formula to determine staffing needs in
regional trial offices. It justifies its budget requests with the formula, which sets
out different annual caseload standards for trial attorneys working in urban and
rural offices.[11] The standards are shown in table 1.

The Colorado legislature has accepted the formula for purposes of both
budgeting and analyzing the fiscal impact of proposed legislation. As a result,
the Colorado public defender office reports that its attorney staffing levels have
been adequately funded in recent years. It believes that a critical element in the
acceptance of the study was obtaining legislative input in the initial stages of the
study's design. This involvement, together with the empirical nature of the study,
give credibility to the case-weighting study's formula for staffing needs.

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Table 1: Colorado Case-Weighting Standards

Case Type/Urban Office/Rural Office

Felony 1/6/6
Felony 2-3/80/80
Felony 4-6/241/191
Juvenile/310/305
Misdemeanor/310/598
Traffic/259/285

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State Standards

Using a combination of NAC standards and case-weighting studies as the
starting point, several states have implemented workload guidelines for public
defenders. Table 2 shows the standards used in 15 states. In reviewing the
table, note that making comparisons between various indigent defense systems
is an imperfect science, because of the many variables affecting indigent defense
services in each state.[12] Naturally, criminal practices and procedures vary
from state to state and often between jurisdictions within a single state. Despite
this caveat, table 2 illustrates how different states use workload standards.
These workload standards represent the maximum annual number of cases a
single attorney should carry if that attorney handles only that type of case. For
example, most states with misdemeanor caseload standards suggest that public
defenders handle no more than 400 misdemeanor cases in a single year, if
misdemeanors are the only type of case the attorney handles. 


Additionally, many of these states have further restrictions. To cite one
example, the Indiana Public Defender Commission's workload standards were
designed for use by indigent defense practitioners who have access to adequate
support staff, in recognition of the important role support staff play in providing 
quality indigent defense.[13] The Indiana standards in table 2 represent the
caseload standards for offices that maintain an adequate level of support staff
consistent with the guidelines listed below. 

The ratio of support staff to attorneys should be as follows:

o Paralegal
-- Felony, 1:4
-- Misdemeanor, 1:5
-- Juvenile, 1:4
-- Mental Health, 1:2

o Investigator
-- Felony, 1:4
-- Misdemeanor, 1:6
-- Juvenile, 1:6

o Law Clerk Appeal, 1:2

o Secretary
-- Felony, 1:4
-- Misdemeanor, 1:6
-- Juvenile, 1:5 

For county public defender offices that do not maintain the required ratios of
support staff to attorney, annual caseloads are reduced accordingly (to a
maximum of 100-150 felonies, 300 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile cases, or 20
appeals per attorney per year). 

Also, Indiana's experience shows how successful statewide indigent defense
commissions can be in promulgating standards and guidelines designed to
improve and ensure uniformity of practice statewide. These commissions
(currently, 31 states have a commission of some kind) provide oversight and
troubleshoot to avoid serious problems in the delivery of indigent defense
services.[14] In Indiana, the commission's noncapital standards were adopted
in 1995. By 2000, 42 of the state's 92 counties were in compliance with its
noncapital standards.


----------------------------

Table 2 is not included in this ASCII plain-text file. To view this document in its
entirety, download the Adobe Acrobat graphic file available from this Web site
or order a print copy from BJA at 800-688-4252.

----------------------------

Statutory Caseload Provisions

Several jurisdictions have public defender workload limitations written into
statutory provisions. Most do not set specific numeric limitations but include
language requiring public defenders to accept caseloads that allow them to
provide effective representation, or representation that comports with codes of
professional responsibility. At least two states' statutory provisions contain
specific annual caseload caps based on case-weighting studies conducted for
the statewide public defender organizations.

New Hampshire requires the statewide public defender program to adopt a
plan for the allocation of cases between public defender staff attorneys and
assigned counsel.[15] The purpose of the plan is twofold. First, it establishes
caseload limits for defender attorneys in accordance with professional
standards under the code of professional responsibility. Second, it provides for
appointment of assigned counsel when public defender attorneys reach
maximum caseload limits. Pursuant to the statutory requirement, a caseload plan
loosely modeled after NAC standards is incorporated into the contract
between the public defender and the state. Unlike NAC standards, the New
Hampshire plan gives some consideration to factors such as travel time and
average case processing time. 

The New Hampshire public defender does not rely on the caseload plan alone.
In fact, greater emphasis is placed on an informal, weighted caseload plan
developed over the years that guides the public defender program's internal
case assignment process. Case weights, or units, have been developed based
on summaries of time reported by public defenders on how long they devote to
individual cases.

Washington state mandates each county or city to adopt standards for the
delivery of public defense services, whether those services are provided by
contract, assigned counsel, or a public defender office.[16] Among other things,
the standards are to include caseload limits, and the standards endorsed by the
Washington Defender Association "may serve as guidelines to contracting
authorities." 


Wisconsin's statute sets out specific annual caseload standards for assistant
state public defenders that are used to help make budget decisions.[17] The
standards take into account the results of a case-weighting study conducted by
The Spangenberg Group for the Wisconsin state public defender in 1990, and
they are occasionally adjusted by the state legislature, with the input of the state
public defender, to reflect changes in practice. Wisconsin's statute also acts as a
safety valve when caseloads reach the standards set out in the statute by
allowing the public defender to seek legislative approval to assign overload
cases to the private bar.

Contractual Standards 

Like public defenders, contract attorneys can run into excessive workload
situations, particularly when they have entered into low-bid, flat-fee contracts to
handle all of the cases in a given jurisdiction for a set price. In State v. Joe U.
Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court struck down Mohave County's contract
defense system, which solicited sealed bids from private bar members for
several years.[18] In the underlying case, the defendant was represented by a
lawyer who contracted with Mohave County to represent indigent defendants
on a part-time basis. (The lawyer also had a civil practice). The court found that
the contract lawyer handled 149 felonies, 160 misdemeanors, 21 juvenile
cases, and 33 other types of cases in 11 months. 

The Arizona Supreme Court opinion established a widely cited standard for
assessing the constitutionality of a low-bid contract system. The decision cites
the NLADA Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding Indigent Defense
Contracts and ABA's Standards for Criminal Justice and concludes that
Mohave County's system did not conform with the standards and guidelines for
four reasons: (1) it did not take into account the time the attorney was expected
to spend in representing his or her share of indigent defendants; (2) it did not
provide for support costs for the attorney, such as investigators, paralegals, and
law clerks; (3) it did not take into account the complexity of each case; and (4)
it did not take into account the competency of the attorney.

In Nebraska, a statutory provision governs indigent defense contractors'
caseloads. Neb. Rev. Stat.  23-3406 (1999) states that any contract
negotiated between an attorney and a county for the provision of indigent
defense services may specify a maximum allowable caseload for each full- or
part-time attorney working under the contract. Although no specific numbers
are prescribed, caseloads "shall allow each lawyer to give every client the time
and effort necessary to provide effective representation." In addition, the statute
states that such contracts must require contracting attorneys to adhere to
minimum standards set forth by ABA and the Nebraska Canons of Ethics for
Attorneys.

Caseload Standards for Private Attorneys

At least two states' standards recognize that private attorneys who accept court
appointments are susceptible to excessive caseloads, particularly when
compensation in court-appointed cases is inadequate. In Indiana, where many
of the state's 92 counties use some sort of court-appointment system, state
standards regarding appointment of private counsel in capital cases address this
potential problem.

In the late 1980s, the Indiana Commission on Public Defense drafted standards
regarding representation in death penalty cases. The standards were ultimately
adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court in Indiana Criminal Rule 24 and went
into effect in January 1990. Under Rule 24, for the first time in the history of
indigent defense in Indiana, state funds became available for counties that
complied with the requirements of the rule in providing representation to
indigent defendants charged with crimes where the state asked that the death
penalty be imposed. Rule 24 includes qualification standards for both lead
counsel and co-counsel, maximum caseload standards (outside of the capital
case) for counsel, requirements for sufficient support staff, and compensation,
as of January 1, 2001, of $90 per hour.[19] Any county that is able to meet
these standards is reimbursed by the state for one-half the cost of
representation.

Rule 24(B)(3) of the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically addresses
"Workload of Appointed Counsel" in capital cases, stating:

(a) Attorneys accepting appointments pursuant to this rule shall provide each
client with quality representation in accordance with constitutional and
professional standards. Appointed counsel shall not accept workloads which,
by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the rendering of quality
representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations.

(b) A judge shall not make an appointment of counsel in a capital case without
assessing the impact of the appointment on the attorney's workload.

Additionally, Rule 24(J)(2) focuses on the workload of appointed appellate
counsel:

In the appointment of appellate counsel, the judge shall assess the nature and
volume of the workload of appointed appellate counsel to assure that counsel
can direct sufficient attention to the appeal of the capital case. In the event the
appointed appellate counsel is under contract to perform other defense or
appellate services for the court of appointment, no new cases for appeal shall
be assigned to such counsel until the appellant's brief in the death penalty case is
filed. 

Performance Standards

Performance standards are another important tool for attorneys facing a
work-overload crisis. When a jurisdiction adopts performance standards for
attorneys who represent indigent defendants, defense attorneys can use the
standards to explain to the court--through informal discussions with judges or, if
necessary, litigation--that appointment to additional cases will make it
impossible to properly represent their current clients. Performance standards
describe minimum requirements for competent representation by public
defenders and private court-appointed counsel. Such standards, which are in
place in several states, are designed to ensure that, among other things,
attorneys maintain contact with the client, conduct a factual investigation,
examine the complaint for legal sufficiency, file appropriate motions, and
conduct discovery.[20] NLADA's Performance Guidelines for Criminal
Defense Representation (1995) is an excellent resource for defense counsel and
a good starting point for a jurisdiction seeking to tailor performance guidelines
to local practice and procedure.

----------------------------

IV. Withdrawal From Cases

What should an attorney do when facing a caseload that she believes will
jeopardize her ability to provide effective representation? A request by an
attorney to a court to withdraw from assigned cases and/or temporarily refrain
from taking new cases typically comes as a last resort, after the attorney has
endured a mounting case-overload situation. Often, in the case of a public
defender office, the chief public defender will have made unsuccessful attempts
to secure supplemental funds needed to hire additional attorneys who can
absorb the overload. The situation typically screams "Crisis!" in the indigent
defense system. A successful motion to temporarily cut off appointments to an
individual attorney or to a public defender office can trigger ripple effects
through the entire local criminal justice system. 

In November 1991, the Knox County public defender in Tennessee moved the
four general session court judges to suspend further case appointments to the
public defender office. Excessive caseloads, as high as five times the national
standards, formed the basis for the motion. The public defender argued that
continued appointments would create a conflict of interest between present and
future clients. To temporarily relieve the situation, the general session judges
granted an order that halted all further appointments of cases to the public
defender for 60 days. A similar motion filed in criminal court resulted in
suspension of misdemeanor appointments to the public defender office so that
the attorneys could work down their caseloads to more manageable levels.

In such a situation, cases normally assigned to the public defender would
typically be assigned to the private criminal defense bar, who would take
additional case appointments until the public defender's caseload reached a
manageable level. At the time, other factors were at play that affected indigent
defense statewide, not just in Knox County. One primary factor was that
Tennessee's Indigent Defense Fund was running out of money, just 4 months
into the fiscal year. The fund is used to pay for the operation of public defender
offices, compensate attorneys in court-appointed cases, and pay for associated
expert fees in those cases.

To make up this shortfall, the state proposed to reduce the rate of
reimbursement for court-appointed cases to 25 percent of the total claim.
Rather than the $20 hourly rate for out-of-court work and $30 hourly rate for
in-court representation, attorneys' fees would be reduced to $5 and $7.50 an
hour. This proposal was unacceptable to appointed attorneys, who had
complained about the inadequacy of the $20/$30 rates that had been in place
since 1965. The proposal was not implemented.

For attorneys practicing in Knox County, news about the reduced fees came in
the wake of a new plan, announced by the General Sessions Court, to
distribute cases to private counsel during the temporary suspension of case
appointments to the public defender. The court issued notice to every bar
member in the county advising them that they would be expected to accept an
appointment to a criminal case. The mandate applied to all lawyers, regardless
of whether they were currently practicing or familiar with criminal defense.

At about the time the temporary freeze on new appointments to the Knox
County public defender office was set to expire, the Indigent Defense Fund was
almost entirely depleted. The Shelby County (Memphis) public defender office
announced that it would stop taking new appointments and begin layoffs
because of the state's inability to provide funding to the office. When the Shelby
County public defender sought an order for continued funding for his office in
federal court, the judge indicated that he did not have the authority to order the
state to provide funding. However, he noted that he did have the authority to
prevent the state from contributing directly to unconstitutional conditions in the
local jail, which was under a consent decree that included a maximum
population cap. If the public defender stopped accepting cases, it would trigger
a backlog in the criminal justice system, including the jail.

The crisis in Tennessee was finally remedied by moving funds from other
program areas to keep the Shelby County public defender office operating, and
court-appointed lawyers were paid the full $20/$30 rate.[21] The 60-day halt
in appointments to the Knox County public defender office gave the office the
breathing room it needed to make it through the fiscal year.

In the next legislative session, the Tennessee legislature appropriated funds to
increase public defender staff at offices throughout the state. The Knox County
public defender office almost doubled in size. As years passed, it became clear
that additional staff were needed. The legislature requested that the state
comptroller oversee case-weighting studies for judges, prosecutors, and public
defenders to determine the level of staff needed. 

In 1999, The Spangenberg Group conducted a weighted-caseload study for
public defenders in Tennessee that found an additional 59 attorneys were
needed statewide. Weighted-caseload studies were conducted for judges and
prosecutors at the same time by the National Center for State Courts and the
American Prosecutors Research Institute. It is expected that any state-funded
increases in the numbers of judges, prosecutors, or public defenders will be
made according to the recommendations in these studies. However, because of
fiscal restrictions, Tennessee has not yet funded additional public defenders,
prosecutors, or judges. 

These funding limitations prompted Knox County Public Defender Mark
Stephens to work with county officials to avoid a repeat of 1991. State law
now gives localities the option to adopt an ordinance requiring that 75 cents be
appropriated for the local public defender's office for every dollar of county
money appropriated for the local district attorney's office. Knox County
adopted such an ordinance. Furthermore, state law allows revenue from a local
litigation tax assessed on criminal defendants convicted in general sessions court
to fund indigent defense in Knox County. These local measures currently fund
almost one-third (7 of 22) of the attorneys in the Knox County public defender
office.

In the early 1990s, Dade County, Florida, was in a crisis similar to that faced
by Knox County. In October 1992, the Dade County public defender office,
arguing that crushing caseloads had rendered its lawyers unable to represent
criminal defendants competently, filed petitions with four juvenile court judges
to withdraw from 500 juvenile cases and to request that further juvenile case
appointments be suspended. Dade County Public Defender Bennett Brummer
called the situation "a reflection of a failure of state government. I have a
constitutional and ethical responsibility to provide effective legal representation.
I've been very reluctant to withdraw from cases. But it gets to the point where
you can't justify being a self-respecting professional and pretend you're
providing legal representation under those circumstances."[22]

At the time of the public defender's request to withdraw, Florida, like many
states, was experiencing revenue shortfalls. Brummer had requested an increase
in funding from the state legislature to hire additional lawyers but ended up with
a budget smaller than that appropriated for his office the previous year.
Meanwhile, caseloads were on the rise. Individual defenders had an average of
98 open juvenile cases, and the office was assigned to roughly 100 additional
cases each week. At that rate, attorneys were on their way to handling 400
juvenile cases apiece in 1992, double NAC standards. 

Although workloads were up for attorneys handling all types of cases, Brummer
reportedly withdrew from juvenile cases because they are cheaper than adult
cases for court-appointed counsel to handle and because the overload situation
was especially severe in the office's juvenile division. Brummer was granted
leave to withdraw, but that amounted to a temporary reprieve. It would not
prevent a repeat occurrence. 

In Florida, 20 elected public de-fenders provide representation to indigent
defendants at the trial level throughout the state's judicial circuits. Appellate
cases are handled on a regional basis by 5 of the 20 offices. All funds for these
programs are provided by the state, but the counties are responsible for
representing indigent defendants in proceedings in which the state public
defender withdraws because of a conflict of interest and where an excessive
workload precludes adequate state public defender representation. The Dade
County public defender's request to withdraw from cases in 1992 was not an
isolated incident. Because of their professional standards, 6 of Florida's 20
elected public defenders have found it necessary to withdraw from cases or to
seek county funds to supplement their inadequate state budgets.[23] 

Because state funds have not filled the needs for additional public defender
staff, public defenders have sought local assistance. After Brummer withdrew
from cases in 1992, the county provided an influx of special assistant public
defenders, which it continues to do. In FY 2000, the county funded 82 of the
183 attorneys in Dade County's public defender office.[24] These so-called
special assistant public defenders work as staff in the public defender office and
handle cases that otherwise would be assigned to appointed counsel be-cause
of excessive workload. The average cost per case to the county for cases
handled by special assistant public defenders is much lower than the average
cost per case for court-appointed attorneys.[25] 

In 2004, the state will assume the responsibility of funding conflict and overload
counsel. Five public de-fender offices currently receive county funds to hire
special assistant public defenders to handle what would be overload cases. For
these five offices, including the Dade County public defender, the top legislative
priority is to obtain adequate state funds for the positions before transfer of
financial responsibility for overload cases to the state. 

Public defenders in Georgia have also been forced to take action in regard to
overwhelming caseloads. In 1990, after 4 years as a public defender in Fulton
County (Atlanta), Georgia, Lynne Borsuk became uncomfortable with her
expanding caseload and its effect on her clients.[26] After consulting with the
Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Borsuk appeared in court
and requested that the judge not appoint her to any more cases. She filed a
motion stating her caseload was so overwhelming that it violated her clients'
right to effective counsel and the canon of ethics of the State Bar of Georgia.
Borsuk explained her action to a reporter: "I recognized I was no longer doing
my clients a service by keeping quiet. It was a sham. We were pretending that
we were providing adequate representation. We weren't."[27]

Borsuk's stand led to the formation of the Atlanta Bar Association Blue Ribbon
Commission to study the problem of case overload in the Fulton County public
defender office. After reviewing the bar's findings, the Fulton County
Commission appropriated additional funds to the public defender office.[28]
Borsuk, however, paid a price for her initiative. She was demoted from
handling felony cases to juvenile court and resigned shortly thereafter.

Borsuk's experience raises an important issue: Whose responsibility is it to have
an attorney withdraw from a case--the individual defender or the chief public
defender? If an assistant defender is not getting workload relief and works for a
chief public defender who does not want to create friction in the local criminal
justice system, there are few appealing options. She can resign and leave
colleagues with an even greater workload. She can go over the boss's head to
the court and ask to withdraw. Or she can attempt to build a coalition of bar,
defender, and other criminal justice system players to look at the issue, which
could take weeks or longer to orchestrate. Because these alternatives may not
be palatable or feasible for a young defender, the chief defender should monitor
the workload and take steps to ease it when it becomes excessive. 

Of course, individual defenders should not stand idly by when a workload
situation becomes untenable. Recall the example of Rick Tessier, the young
defender in New Orleans who filed a motion for relief when he felt he could no
longer provide constitutionally required standards of representation for his
clients. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the promise it made in State v.
Peart to take action if none was forthcoming from the legislature. In 1994, after
its landmark decision in Peart and a statewide study of Louisiana's indigent
defense system conducted by The Spangenberg Group, the Louisiana Supreme
Court promulgated a rule creating the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance
Board (LIDAB) (formerly called the Louisiana Indigent Defender Board).
LIDAB was given $7.5 million in state funds and charged to supplement the
budgets of local indigent defender boards, defray the costs of court-ordered
defense experts and tests throughout the local boards, and more adequately
fund counsel representing indigent defendants charged with capital crimes. 

In December 1997, the governor and legislature assumed responsibility for
LIDAB to avoid conflicts of interest arising from the judiciary's stewardship of
the program. In the 1999 legislative session, LIDAB acquired the additional
responsibility of ensuring that counsel is appointed in state postconviction death
penalty cases.

Systemic Litigation

Sometimes defenders' excessive workloads become so intractable in a
jurisdiction that seeking relief through traditional channels--promulgating
performance standards, documenting case overload and presenting the
evidence to criminal justice system officials, seeking supplemental
appropriations, requesting to withdraw from cases, and seeking to temporarily
decline additional appointments--fails to make progress. At this point, bringing
a lawsuit charging systemic deficiencies may be the only alternative. 

In the 1990s, attorneys in Connecticut's statewide, state-funded public
defender system were chronically overworked, carrying caseloads far in excess
of NAC standards. In 1993 and 1994, Connecticut public defenders each
handled an average of 1,045 cases in "geographic area" courts, where
misdemeanors and lesser felonies are tried. The average caseload for an
attorney representing juveniles was 716 cases a year.[29] The situation was
corrected through settlement of a class action lawsuit, Rivera v. Rowland,
alleging violations of the 6th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution,
violations of the Connecticut constitution and various state statutes, and failure
to provide the state public defender system with adequate funding.[30] The
lawsuit was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union against the Governor of
Connecticut, the state's public defender services commissioners, and others. 

Such a lawsuit can produce good results but it can take years to re-solve,
leaving indigent defendants in the hands of overburdened public defenders.
Rivera v. Rowland, for example, spent 5 years in the court system.

Malpractice Claims in State Court and Federal Immunity

Attorneys with excessive caseloads are under an ethical obligation to remedy
the situation. Failure to do so may result in disciplinary action under professional
codes of conduct. Additionally, attorneys may be held liable for legal
malpractice. A legal malpractice suit requires proof of four elements: (1)
existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) the attorney's duty to act
according to particular standards of care, (3) failure to meet that standard, and
(4) damage to the client as a result of that failure.[31]

In a recent Illinois case, Johnson v. Halloran, a former client who was convicted
of aggravated criminal sexual assault sued his public de-fender for malpractice.
The public defender sought to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on the basis of
sovereign duty, arguing that as state employees, public defenders are immune
from malpractice claims. The Illinois Appellate Court disagreed, finding that a
public defender's duties and obligations, by virtue of his or her status as a
licensed attorney, are the same as those of any other lawyer. That status, the
court found, is independent of the lawyer's state employment.[32] 

Although the public defender in Johnson v. Halloran did not claim excessive
caseload as a defense, the holding, along with others before it, should
encourage public defenders and other attorneys representing indigent
defendants to more aggressively request relief from further assignments when
they face excessive caseloads.

Public defenders enjoy limited immunity from actions brought under section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act.[33] In Polk County v. Dodson, the plaintiffs, who
were criminal defendants in the underlying action, claimed that a section 1983
action would be proper when their court-appointed counsel's negligence led to
a denial of the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.[34] The
court rejected this argument, finding that a public defender does not act under
color of state law for purposes of claims under section 1983.[35] The court
stressed that the professional relationship and obligation of a public defender
are the same as those of any private attorney and his client and that the form of
payment to counsel does not constitute state action. However, some states
grant immunity to public defenders by statute.

----------------------------

V. Strategies for Keeping Workloads Manageable


Of all the approaches public defenders, contract defenders, and private
attorneys who handle court-appointed cases have taken to keep their
workloads reasonable, none is a foolproof approach to this persistent problem.
And, it is important to note that a defender program cannot provide quality
representation solely by developing a numerical set of caseload standards.
Caseload standards are only one component of an effective indigent defense
system. Public defender offices and individual attorneys providing
representation must also have fair and adequate compensation; adequate
support staff such as investigators, social workers, paralegals, and secretaries; a
complete law library; opportunities for continuing legal education; sufficient
funds for experts and other costs of litigation; and specialty units for unique
cases such as death penalty and juvenile transfer cases or for clients with mental
health problems. 

However, leaders of a local criminal defense bar, particularly chief defenders,
can pursue the following common strategies to prevent caseloads from reaching
overwhelming levels: 

o Develop working relationships with local criminal justice system players such
as judges, prosecutors, funders, and pretrial service programs. Hold regular
meetings to discuss common issues and work together on common projects
such as task forces or committees.

o Maintain a constant dialogue among judges, public defenders, and
prosecutors about the need for balanced funding and resources. Get to know
leaders of the private bar and the criminal defense bar. Establish ties with local
schools, churches, and community groups that provide pertinent services such
as health care, employment training, and counseling. Potential supporters of the
public defender must understand the complexities of providing effective indigent
defense representation and the vital need to uphold this constitutional right.

o Develop a case definition that your office uses uniformly. Discuss the possible
development of a uniform case definition to be used by all criminal justice
system participants in the jurisdiction. In the event that caseloads grow beyond
capacity, this uniform definition can be used to conduct an "apples to apples"
comparison with other components of the justice system.

o Develop a user-friendly system for recording case statistics and producing
regular reports on individual attorney workload, overall office workload, and
fluctuations in the mix of types of cases assigned to the office. Use these reports
for funding requests and for internal supervision. Make use of information
systems that simplify case tracking and report production, and make sure staff
are trained to use the systems.

o Create caseload standards for the office, and share them with funders,
judges, and other players in the system. Caseload standards can be developed
in various ways, ranging from a case-weighting study to adoption of NAC
standards.

o Develop a way to enforce or en-courage compliance with workload
standards, as Indiana has done.

o Document your office's excessive caseloads and inadequate staff and
resources. Begin by trying to discuss and resolve the problem informally with
judges and funders. Make it clear that you want to avoid having to withdraw
from cases but that you will do so if no other solutions can be found.

----------------------------

VI. Notes

1. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993).

2. Ibid.

3. State Court Model Statistical Dictionary, 1989: 19 (definition used by The
Spangenberg Group in its weighted-caseload studies).

4. Model Rule 1.1 states a "lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client."

5. 681 P. 2d 1374 (Arizona 1984).

6. Monahan, Edward C., and Clark, James, 1995, "Coping With Excessive
Workload," Ethical Problems Facing the Criminal Defense Lawyer: Practical
Answers to Tough Questions, Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, 331.

7. There are no nationally recognized caseload standards for prosecutors.
Research is under way by the American Prosecutors Research Institute to
determine whether such a set of standards can be produced. The project is
funded through a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance and should be
finalized in 2001.

8. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,
Task Force on Courts, 1973, Courts. Washington, DC: National Advisory
Commission, 186.

9. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Providing Defense
Services, 3rd ed. Chicago, IL: American Bar Association: Washington, DC,
1992: 72.

10. The Spangenberg Group has conducted statewide weighted-caseload
studies for public defender programs in Colorado, Minnesota, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin. Another weighted-caseload study was conducted for the New
York Legal Aid Society Criminal Defense Division in New York City. 

11. Colorado's felony and misdemeanor caseload standards establish
thresholds based on the severity of the charge and whether defenders are in
urban or rural offices. Colorado's juvenile delinquency caseload standards
establish thresholds on the basis of whether defenders are in urban or rural
offices.

12. Among the most important variables to consider in state-by-state indigent
defense comparisons are the following: whether the system is funded entirely
with state funds, entirely with county funds, or a mixture of both; whether the
system is organized at the county, regional, or state level; whether the state has
the death penalty; whether the system has a centralized organization responsible
for statewide data collection, oversight, and/or policymaking; the types and
percentages of cases handled by various providers in the state; the rate of pay
for court-appointed counsel in the state; the state population; and the way in
which programs define, and therefore count, cases (different programs define
cases by charge, indictment, defendant, assignment, and disposition).

13. Indiana's 92 counties have the primary responsibility for funding the indigent
defense programs within their jurisdictions. Each county may choose between a
county public defender, a contract defender program, or an assigned counsel
system. The Indiana Public Defender Commission (IPDC) allocates state funds
to offset county indigent defense expenditures in counties that comply with
IPDC's standards for indigent defense services in capital and noncapital cases.
Counties that enforce these standards are reimbursed by IPDC for 40 percent
of the cost of representing indigent defendants in noncapital felony cases, 50
percent of the cost of attorneys' fees, and expert, investigative, and support
services in capital cases. Currently, 42 of Indiana's 92 counties, including
Marion County (Indianapolis), the state's largest county, are in compliance with
IPDC standards and receive funds from the commission.

14. In some states, a commission on indigent defense sets policy to ensure
uniformity of practice statewide, and a state public defender implements the
policy. In other states, either a commission but no state public defender or no
commission but a state public defender develops and implements policy. 

15. New Hampshire Revised Statute Ann.  604-B:6 (1999).

16. Washington Revised Code Ann.  10.101.030 (1999).

17. Wisconsin Statute Ann.  977.08(5)(bn) (1999).

18. 681 P. 2d 1374 (Arizona 1984).

19. Until January 1, 2001, compensation for court-appointed counsel under
Rule 24 was set at $70 per hour.

20. Two of the best state examples are the Massachusetts Committee for
Public Counsel Services' Manual for Counsel Assigned Through the Committee
for Public Counsel Services: Policies and Procedures (June 1995) and the
Louisiana Indigent Defense Board's Louisiana Standards on Indigent Defense,
Chapter 6 (1995). Performance standards can also be found for indigent
defense systems in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York City,
New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington. 

21. The state gave the public defender $700,000 from its award from the 
federal Drug Control and System Improvement Formula Grant program.

22. Viglucci, Andres, The Miami Herald, October 25, 1992, p. 1B.

23. Brummer, Bennet H., 10-3 St. Thomas Law Review/ 607, 616 See, e.g.,
In re A.S., no. 92-1607FJ13 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed October 16, 1992), In re
Certification of Conflict in Motions To Withdraw filed by public defender of
10th Judicial Circuit, 636 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 1994), and In re Order on
Prosecution of Crim. App. by the 10th Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561
So. 2d 1130 (Fla. 1990). 

24. While housed at the public defender office and trained and supervised by
the public defender, the county-funded special assistant public defenders do not
receive the same fringe benefits received by state-employed assistant public
defenders. 

25. In 1995, the estimated average fee for a noncapital case handled by a
court-appointed attorney in Dade County was $1,400 and for juvenile and
misdemeanor cases was $500. The average cost/per/case handled by special
assistant public defenders was estimated between $50 and $100.

26. Shumate, Richard, 1991-92, I Will Not Accept Any More Cases, Barrister
11 (Winter).

27. See note 26.

28. The county appropriated an additional $470,000 in 1991 and made further
steady increases to the public defender office in the following years.

29. Touchy, Lynne, "CCLU Files Suit Against State," Hartford Courant,
January 6, 1995.

30. Rivera v. Rowland, Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford-New
Britain, CT (1999) (No. CV95-545629).

31. Klein, Richard, 1988, "Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and
Representation of the Indigent Defendant," Temple Law Review 61. (4) 1191,
n. 121.

32. Johnson v. Halloran, 2000 WL 21047 (Ill. App. 1 Dist.) (No. 1-98-2365).

33. 42 U.S.C.  1983 (1982) states: "Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, or any state or territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress."

34. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).

35. However, in Tower v. Glower, 467 U.S. 914 (1984), the Court clarified
there is no immunity from liability under section 1983 for public defenders who
allegedly conspire with other state officials to deprive a former defendant of
his/her constitutional rights. See Klein, supra note 31 at 1197.

----------------------------

VII. For More Information

To receive more information about indigent defense contract systems, contact
the following organizations: 


The Spangenberg Group 
1001 Water Town Street
West Newton, MA 02465
617-969-3820
Fax: 617-965-3966
E-mail: tsg@spangenberggroup.com
World Wide Web: www.spangenberggroup.com

For additional information on BJA grants and programs, contact:

Bureau of Justice Assistance
810 Seventh Street NW., Fourth Floor
Washington, DC 20531
202-514-6278
Fax: 202-305-1367
World Wide Web: www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse
P.O. Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
1-800-688-4252
World Wide Web: www.ncjrs.org

Clearinghouse staff are available Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m.
eastern time. Ask to be placed on the BJA mailing list.

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center
1-800-421-6770 or 202-307-1480

Response Center staff are available Monday through Friday, 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.
eastern time.

To learn more about indigent defense workloads discussed in this report,
contact the following organizations:

American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section
1800 M Street NW.
Washington, DC 20036
202-331-2260
World Wide Web: www.abanet.org

National Legal Aid & Defender Association

1625 K Street NW., Suite 800
Washington, DC 20006-1604
202-452-0620
World Wide Web: www.nlada.org

----------------------------

Bureau of Justice Assistance Information

General Information

Callers may contact the U.S. Department of Justice Response Center for
general information or specific needs, such as assistance in submitting grant
applications and information on training. To contact the Response Center, call
1-800-421-6770 or write to 1100 Vermont Avenue NW., Washington, DC
20005.

Indepth Information

For more indepth information about BJA, its programs, and its funding
opportunities, requesters can call the BJA Clearinghouse. The BJA
Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal Justice Reference Service
(NCJRS), shares BJA program information with state and local agencies and
community groups across the country. Information specialists are available to
provide reference and referral services, publication distribution, participation
and support for conferences, and other networking and outreach activities. The
Clearinghouse can be reached by 

o Mail 
P.O. Box 6000 
Rockville, MD 20849-6000

o Visit 
2277 Research Boulevard 
Rockville, MD 20850

o Telephone 
1-800-688-4252 
Monday through Friday 8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m. eastern time

o Fax 
301-519-5212

o Fax on Demand 
1-800-688-4252

o BJA Home Page 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

o NCJRS World Wide Web 
www.ncjrs.org

o E-mail 
askncjrs@ncjrs.org

o JUSTINFO Newsletter 
E-mail to listproc@ncjrs.org Leave the subject line blank In the body of the
message, type: subscribe justinfo [your name]