Title: National Evaluation of Weed and Seed: Salt Lake City Case Study.
Series: Research Report
Author(s): Terence Dunworth, Gregory Mills, Jack Greene, Jennifer H.
Frank, and Kristen Jacoby
Published: National Institute of Justice, August 1999
Subject(s): Drug law enforcement, drug abuse prevention and education,
community policing, crime mapping, police manpower deployment, and
problem oriented policing
41 pages
97,000 bytes

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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice

National Evaluation of Weed and Seed

Case Study: Salt Lake City, Utah

Research Report

Executive Office for Weed and Seed
National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC20531

Janet Reno
Attorney General

Raymond C. Fisher
Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General

Noel Brennan
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis
Director, National Institute of Justice

-------------------------------

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov

National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

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National Evaluation of Weed and Seed

Salt Lake City Case Study

RESEARCH REPORT

Terence Dunworth, Ph.D.
Project Director

Gregory Mills
Deputy Project Director

Prepared by

Jack Greene
Salt Lake City Site Leader

Jennifer H. Frank
Kristen Jacoby

August 1999

NCJ 175700

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis
Director

Steve Edwards
Program Monitor

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Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice,
by Abt Associates Inc., under contract #95-DD-BX-0134. Points of view
or opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.

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The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

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Acknowledgments

This evaluation could not have been completed without the assistance of
Gene Robison and Colleen Minson, who were instrumental in the Salt
Lake City Weed and Seed effort. The authors would also like to
acknowledge the U.S. Attorney's Office for its valuable assistance and
insights and the Salt Lake City Police Department, especially Senior
Systems Analyst Dean Larson and Chief Reuben Ortega, for facilitating
interaction with the police.

Contents

Acknowledgments
1.0 Introduction
2.0 Case Study Objective and Methodology
3.0 Site History and Description
3.1 City Characteristics
3.2 Target Area Characteristics and Nature of the Crime Problem
3.3 Other Funding Sources
4.0 Program Structure and Chronology
4.1Formal Organization and Structure

4.2 Proposed Goals and Strategies
4.3 Budget Information
4.4 Information Systems
4.5 Site Monitoring, Reporting, and Local Evaluation
5.0 Key Implementation Issues and Interpretation
5.1 Role of Weed and Seed Site Designation
5.2 Role of Grantee Organization
5.3 Management Structure and Control
5.4 Local Politics
5.5 Approach to Weeding
5.6 Approach to Community Policing
5.7 Approach to Seeding
5.8 Operational Relationships with Other Organizations
5.9 Concluding Observations
6.0 Effects of Weed and Seed
6.1 Analysis of Crime Data
6.2 Survey of Community Residents
6.3 Seeding Program Participant Interviews
7.0 Future Directions and Degree of Institutionalization

List of Exhibits

Exhibit 3.1: Salt Lake City Weed and Seed Target Area
Exhibit 4.1: Salt Lake City Weed and Seed Funding Summary
Exhibit 5.1: Drug Arrests per Capita by Month
Exhibit 5.2: Part 1 Arrests per Capita by Month
Exhibit 6.1: Part 1 Crimes per Capita by Month
Exhibit 6.2: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents
Exhibit 6.3: Perceptions of the Neighborhood
Exhibit 6.4: Victimization
Exhibit 6.5: Police Response
Exhibit 6.6: Community Involvement
Exhibit 6.7: Perceptions of Social Services and Other Programs
Exhibit 6.8: Perceptions of the Weed and Seed Program

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1.0 Introduction

Unveiled in 1991, Operation Weed and Seed represents an ambitious
attempt to improve the quality of life in America's cities. The ultimate
goals of Weed and Seed are to control violent crime, drug trafficking, and
drug-related crime in targeted high-crime neighborhoods and to provide a
safe environment, free of crime and drug use, in which law-abiding
citizens can live, work, and raise their families. Weed and Seed,
administered by the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), is
grounded in the philosophy that targeted areas can best be improved by a
two-pronged strategy of "weeding" out violent offenders, drug traffickers,
and other criminals by removing them from the targeted area, and
"seeding" the area with human services and neighborhood revitalization
efforts. Community policing is intended to serve as the "bridge" between
weeding and seeding.

Three key objectives emphasize the government-community partnership at
the heart of Weed and Seed:

1. To develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy to control and
prevent violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime in targeted
high-crime neighborhoods;

2. To coordinate and integrate existing as well as new Federal, State, local,
and private sector initiatives, criminal justice efforts, and human services,
concentrating those resources in the project sites to maximize their impact
on reducing and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-
related crime; and

3. To mobilize community residents in the targeted sites to help law
enforcement identify and remove violent offenders and drug traffickers
from their neighborhoods and to assist other human service agencies to
identify and respond to the service needs of the target area.

Weed and Seed sites thus draw on the resources of a variety of agencies at
all levels of government, private and other public organizations, and
individual community residents.

Specific strategies and program components designed to achieve these
three objectives fall into one of four Weed and Seed program elements:

1. Law enforcement. Weed and Seed's law enforcement goals are the
identification, arrest, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of
narcotics traffickers and violent criminals operating in the target area.

2. Community policing. An objective of community policing is to
establish mutual trust between law enforcement and the public. This is the
bridge between weeding and seeding: law enforcement officials enlist the
community to identify patterns of criminal activity and locate perpetrators;
simultaneously, police help the community solve problems.

3. Prevention, intervention, and treatment. This element of the program is
intended to reduce risk factors and to enhance protective factors associated
with drug abuse, violence, and crime in the target area. Safe havens in the
target areas typically coordinate the prevention, intervention, and
treatment activities.

4. Neighborhood restoration. The goal of this element is to enable
residents in the target area to improve their community morale, their
neighborhood's physical appearance (buildings, parks, streets, lighting, and
so forth), and local economic and business conditions.

An important structural feature of Weed and Seed is the local steering
committee. EOWS requires each site to have a steering committee,
formally chaired by the U.S. Attorney for the district in which the site is
located, that is responsible for "establishing Weed and Seed's goals and
objectives, designing and developing programs, providing guidance on
implementation, and assessing program achievement."[1]

Steering committee members include representatives from key local, State,
and Federal agencies, as well as other stakeholders in the Weed and Seed
target area, such as business leaders, tenant association leaders, and
community activists. The requirement to convene a steering committee
reflects EOWS's belief that, for neighborhood revitalization to work, all
key stakeholders must participate in decisions that affect the target area.

Funded sites were divided into officially recognized sites and
demonstration sites. Officially recognized sites had implemented Weed
and Seed strategies in their jurisdiction, had submitted documentation
summarizing their strategy to EOWS, but had not yet received full
funding. After EOWS officially recognized the site, it was eligible for
demonstration status and full Weed and Seed funding.

2.0 Case Study Objective and Methodology

This case study is one of eight completed for the National Evaluation of
Weed and Seed, under the direction of the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ). In 1994, NIJ selected the following eight sites for the national
evaluation:

o Hartford, Connecticut; Las Vegas, Nevada; Sarasota and Manatee
Counties, Florida; and Shreveport, Louisiana, demonstration sites first
received funding in FY 1994.

o Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Seattle, Washington, demonstration sites
were awarded continuation funding in FY 1994.

o Akron, Ohio, and Salt Lake City, Utah, were officially recognized sites.

Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City, Sarasota/Manatee, and Shreveport also
received funds from the National Performance Review Laboratory
(NPRL).[2]

This case study documents the activities implemented under the Weed and
Seed program in Salt Lake City and assesses the program's impact at this
site. The final evaluation report compares the eight sites and presents
overall conclusions on the Weed and Seed program.

The evaluation activities undertaken for this case study include: (1) onsite
observation of program activities; (2) inperson interviews with program
staff, key law enforcement personnel, community leaders, service
providers, and participants; (3) review of program documents; (4) a survey
of target area residents; and (5) analysis of computerized crime and arrest
records provided by the local police department.

3.0 Site History and Description

3.1 City Characteristics

The capital of Utah, Salt Lake City is not only the largest city in the state,
but it is also an important urban resource for southern Idaho, eastern
Nevada, and southwestern Wyoming. Located in Salt Lake Valley, the city
covers 109 square miles in northern Utah at the southernmost point of the
Great Salt Lake and has a population of 165,835. One-fourth of its
residents are less than 18 years of age, which, along with an increasing
gang presence, contributes to a high juvenile crime rate. The rate of
serious crimes in Salt Lake City is also high, at 12,680 per 100,000
residents (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 1991). An influx of
criminal groups from California and illegal immigrants from Mexico are
reportedly responsible for an increase in drug trafficking within the city.

Salt Lake City has a larger crime problem than its external image might
initially suggest. The city is known for its strong Mormon heritage, will
host the Winter Olympic Games in 2002, and generally enjoys a reputation
as a rather wholesome and family-oriented community. However, it has
also experienced increasing crime and violence problems, most often
associated with gang activity and illegal narcotics trafficking. Rates of
nearly every Part 1 crime (except for burglary) increased dramatically
between 1985 and 1995. According to figures reported by the FBI to the
Salt Lake City Police Department, the city's average number of Part 1
crimes during the 2 years prior to its official recognition as a Weed and
Seed site was nearly double the national average, at approximately 110
crimes per 1,000 people. According to local law enforcement personnel,
much of this increase in violence is due to a dramatic increase in gang
activity in the city. As reported by the Salt Lake Area Gang Project, gang
membership increased by 116 percent between 1992 and 1995, with an
estimated 3,104 gang members or affiliates in the greater Salt Lake City
area. It was also estimated about half of these gang members actually
reside within the city limits.

In addition to gang-related problems, the city has also witnessed a decline
in community quality of life as evidenced by increases in disorderly
behavior, specifically prostitution and graffiti. The city's typical responses
to these problems was to initiate some type of crackdown, deploying a
large number of police officers to a particular area for a limited period of
time. Issues of community quality of life were part of the 1995 mayoral
campaign, in which both candidates promised vigorous crackdowns to
address street-level disruptive behavior.

While the physical structure of neighborhoods in Salt Lake City can be
characterized as low-density residential living, there are considerable
pockets of poverty which suffer low rates of home ownership and the
attendant problems of transience. These neighborhoods have traditionally
been located on the western side of the city, often buffered from the larger
city by industrial complexes. It is within these neighborhoods, local police
argue, that crime has taken root, primarily in the form of drug sales and
distribution.

3.2 Target Area Characteristics and Nature of the Crime Problem

Salt Lake City's target area is comprised of three neighborhoods: Glendale,
Poplar Grove, and a large part of Fairpark. (See exhibit 3.1 for a map of
the target area.) Glendale and Poplar Grove were the initial areas of focus
for the Weed and Seed efforts, with the Fairpark neighborhood being
added later. The entire area is approximately 6.4 square miles and has a
population of almost 22,000 residents, 13.3 percent of the city's total
population. The target area contains 8,711 housing units, but 11 percent of
these are vacant or boarded. Approximately 62.4 percent of the homes in
the area are owner-occupied. Although unemployment in the target area is
6.4 percent, more than 25 percent of residents live below the poverty level.
More than 10 percent of the residents receive public assistance, and more
than 29 percent receive Social Security income. Approximately 20 percent
fewer students graduated from high school in the target area in 1990 than
was the statewide average for Utah.

The Glendale community has considerable home ownership and a large
upper working class and lower middle class population and is seen as
having more political power than Poplar Grove or Fairpark. Families in
the Glendale area were reported as generally "intact," and the area has also
seen a rise in single family home construction. In contrast to Glendale,
residents of Poplar Grove and Fairpark were described as more transient,
poorer, less well organized, with higher levels of gang- and drug-related
violence. However, it is interesting to note each of the three areas appear
quiet and residential to an outsider driving around the neighborhoods.
While there are individual houses in visible need of repair, much of the
area looks like a rather quiet residential area. Often the behaviors and
problems the areas report belie the environmental cues about safety and
order.

The primary crime problems in the area are complex drug processing,
storage, and distributing operations, as well as gang-related crime. A
significant number of structures in the neighborhood are used for the
illegal narcotics industry. A high percentage of the drug traffickers seem to
be illegal Mexican immigrants who are repeat offenders returning after
deportation. Police found illegal

Mexican immigrants were involved in 80 percent of the cases in which
search warrants yielded drug arrests. The main drugs in this market are
cocaine and heroin.

Salt Lake City's target area also has a disproportionately high percentage
of gang members and dangerous fugitives. The Salt Lake Area Gang
Project estimated in 1993 that 20 percent of the city's 2,143 gang members
live in the target area. Further, the Violent Crimes Task Force reported
one-third of the total number of listed dangerous fugitives were arrested in
the target area in less than a 1-year period. In one 6-month period, 62
drive-by shootings occurred, 84 percent of the city's total for the same
period.

3.3 Other Funding Sources

Salt Lake City's original Weed and Seed application in 1994 was not
funded. However, the city was selected as a National Performance Review
Lab site in that same year. The NPRL program provided $50,000 to five
communities across the United States (Salt Lake City being one of them)
to enhance neighborhood planning and grantsmanship and to increase
support for community-based interventions. The National Performance
Review Lab project had as its central goals:

o Identification of obstacles to local acquisition and use of Federal
funding. 

o Refinement of a Weed and Seed strategy for Salt Lake City.

o Measurement of local impacts.

Essentially, the NPRL effort was aimed at refining local planning to
improve the city's future chances for being selected as a Weed and Seed
site, as well as to help its communities clearly identify local resources that
might be drawn into crime reduction planning and community
improvement efforts.

Following its selection as an NPRL site, Salt Lake City was subsequently
funded under the Comprehensive Communities Program, which has
several of the community-building elements of the Weed and Seed
program. Salt Lake's Comprehensive Communities Program (CCP) began
in 1995. (For complete details on CCP see BOTEC 94.) The Bureau of
Justice Assistance (BJA) provided the city with $2.2 million for
neighborhood crime prevention activities and to suppress and intervene in
crime situations within its neighborhoods. A central feature of the CCP
program in Salt Lake City was the creation of Community Action Teams
(CAT), which were charged with neighborhood mobilization and problem
solving.

CAT membership included governmental and nonprofit agencies working
in targeted neighborhoods to address crime and public order problems.
These teams have become a central feature of Salt Lake's community
policing intervention. In addition to the CAT interventions, Salt Lake's
CCP program also included a range of programs focused on at-risk youths.
These programs typically were housed in existing youth-serving agencies
such as the Boys and Girls Clubs, local community centers, and the
schools. As will become apparent below, much of the Weed and Seed
effort has followed the model outlined in CCP.

Two funding streams (NPRL and CCP) allowed Salt Lake City to
implement elements of its Weed and Seed strategy in Glendale, Poplar
Grove, and Fairpark before it received recognition or funding from the
Weed and Seed Executive Office. As mentioned, much of the work in the
early stages of the project was concentrated within the Glendale and
Poplar Grove areas and was later expanded to include Fairpark.

In addition, Salt Lake City received a $1 million grant in FY 1997 to be a
community policing demonstration site. According to the Weed and Seed
coordinator, some of the activities funded with that grant will be directed
at the Weed and Seed target area.

In 1995 Salt Lake City was officially recognized as a Weed and Seed site
and the city's Weed and Seed efforts merged with those of the NPRL and
CCP to build stronger community alliances and improve community
cohesion. Even prior to receiving Weed and Seed funding, Salt Lake City
engaged neighborhoods in discussions about social and economic
development and community safety. Many of these initiatives are visible
within the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City, making it very
difficult to disentangle the programs and strategies associated with CCP
from those of Weed and Seed. This is primarily because the nature of these
two efforts overlap and target many of the same communities within Salt
Lake City.

4.0 Program Structure and Chronology

4.1 Formal Organization and Structure 

Formally, the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City is attached to the
U.S. Attorney's Office and overseen by a steering committee which
attempts to meet quarterly to provide the initiative with oversight and
policy direction. The committee is composed of representatives from the
U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Salt Lake City Police
Department (SLCPD), the district attorney and city prosecutor's office,
Salt Lake City Capital Planning and Housing office, Salt Lake City
Housing Authority, elected officials from the state legislature, city
recreation programs (Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Salt Lake, Utah
Crime Prevention Council, and so forth), and the community.

In addition to the steering committee, Salt Lake City has a Weed and Seed
Management Committee and a number of working committees. The
management committee meets regularly and is responsible for the
initiative's day-to-day operation. The committee consists of the U.S.
Attorney, the mayor of Salt Lake City, the police chief, and community
representatives. The city has developed working committees for each of
the four Weed and Seed strategy areas (law enforcement; neighborhood
restoration; community oriented policing; and prevention, intervention,
and treatment). These working committees involve the U.S. Attorney, the
SLCPD, and the director of capital planning, as well as representatives
from the target neighborhoods and law enforcement personnel from other
Federal law enforcement agencies. It was originally intended that a law
enforcement coordinator within the U.S. Attorney's Office would oversee
and coordinate the Weed and Seed program. However, due to personnel
shifts and the absence of a regular person in the U.S. Attorney's Office,
much of the program's oversight has centered in the city prosecutor's
office.

Functionally, the project is currently overseen by a Weed and Seed
coordinator who works with the Salt Lake City prosecutor's office and is
supported by staff from the mayor's Office of Community Affairs. The
Weed and Seed coordinator appears to have more of a record keeping and
general oversight role, while financial oversight for the project has
centered in the mayor's office. Tactically, the chief of police oversees the
weeding efforts, while the service provider (seeding) groups meet
independently to coordinate their activities. The chief of police also
oversees the coordination of police with other Federal agencies, most
notably the DEA, FBI, and INS. These efforts are also coordinated through
both the local prosecutor's office and the U.S. Attorney's Office.

4.2 Proposed Goals and Strategies

In Salt Lake City's original application (which was not funded), the stated
objectives were to extend technical assistance for community mobilization
and to empower the target areas by sponsoring Weed and Seed activities.
In the next application, requesting funding for FY 1996, the major goals of
the program were broken down by the four major Weed and Seed program
elements:

o Law enforcement--reduce the level of violent criminal activity in the
Weed and Seed areas through joint law enforcement activities.

o Community policing--implement more community oriented policing in
the targeted Weed and Seed areas to improve and enhance relationships
between beat officers, lead community oriented policing officers, the
community, and local Community Action Teams.

o Prevention, intervention, and treatment--increase coordination and
planning associated with community economic development, employment,
and housing through the development of neighborhood revitalization
plans.

o Neighborhood restoration--reduce risk factors while enhancing social
programming for youths and families in the targeted Weed and Seed areas
through improved case management of children and families, enhanced
job training, and increased investments in a wide array of social, artistic,
and cultural programs aimed at community youths.

In the most recent application for funding, FY 1997, the city sought to
continue efforts to disrupt narcotics trafficking in the target areas. This
disruption was aimed at several levels and involves various members of
the law enforcement community. This effort strove to achieve the same
four major goals detailed in the prior application.

During the first phase of the FY 1997 plan, the SLCPD in conjunction
with the FBI, sought to:

o Purchase narcotics from dealers within the target areas.

o Engage in buy-and-bust activities.

o Conduct interviews with arrestees for gathering greater criminal
intelligence.

o Selectively target, arrest, and prosecute those most involved in these
activities within the targeted communities.

A second phase of this effort will seek to broaden police interventions
through the use of electronic monitoring, increased use of informants, and
the building of cases aimed at criminal organizations operating within the
targeted communities. In a risk assessment of these communities, local
and Federal law enforcement agents concluded a prominent form of
criminal activity in these areas "is the processing, storage, transportation,
and distribution of illegal narcotics in and from locations within the Weed
and Seed site." Further, this risk assessment concluded "the concentration
of street gangs and gang members within the Weed and Seed site is
disproportionately high compared to other areas in Salt Lake City."[3]

4.3 Budget Information

Since the sum of money received by Salt Lake City during FY 1995 was
so small ($35,000), it was used primarily to stimulate community
involvement and enhance community capacities to pursue more
substantive program funding. In fact, an impressive feature of the Salt
Lake City Weed and Seed operation has been the extent to which
participants at all levels actively pursued Weed and Seed goals despite the
relatively low levels of Federal support.

In FY 1996, EOWS awarded the city $240,000. Approximately $100,000
of the money was committed to weeding, $131,000 to seeding, and $9,000
was reserved for administration (see exhibit 4.1). These distributions
illustrate Salt Lake City's continued commitment to self-funding
throughout the Weed and Seed effort. In addition, in FY 1996, $25,000 of
the seeding money was designated to develop a Weed and Seed Family
Intervention model which never evolved, and the money was not spent.
Salt Lake's Weed and Seed coordinator has since arranged for the
redesignation of those funds to be spread among the three programs that
are funded in FY 1997.

In FY 1997 Salt Lake City remained an officially recognized site by
EOWS and received $275,000. Approximately $100,000 of the funds were
designated to weeding, $126,000 to seeding, $3,000 to community
policing efforts, and $46,000 to administration.

4.4 Information Systems

The Salt Lake City Police Department has used its information systems to
integrate calls for service data, computer mapping, crime analysis, and
feedback to area command and tactical personnel. Data management and
some analytic functions are provided to the police department through a
centralized information and data management department within city
government. Local crime analysis is conducted within the department in
the Community Support Division. Personnel assigned to crime analysis
within the division prepare crime maps and disseminate crime and call for
service information to field personnel.

The department and the city have experienced some problems in acquiring
a usable computer aided dispatch (CAD) system. In early 1997 a new
CAD system was purchased, but, during its installation, it became
apparent the system did not function properly. The new system was
subsequently abandoned, which created several problems for the
department. Staff struggled with the old CAD system while a new
provider was found to quickly fill the void created by this system failure.
The department subsequently sued the company that provided the
nonoperational CAD system.

At the same time, rank-and-file officers, concerned about the functionality
of the old CAD system, have pressured the department to quickly resolve
this problem, arguing officers' safety is affected. The complexities in the
acquisition and use of the new CAD system have implications for
community-oriented policing in Salt Lake City, as well as for the Weed
and Seed program. The CAD system should provide accurate and detailed
information to officers on the street about where criminal activity happens
on their beats.

Without this information, officers must rely on the support provided by
established neighborhood police stations across the city, the department's
district-level CATs, and the Mobile Neighborhood Watch (MNW)
program to communicate local crime and safety information. Originally
funded through the Comprehensive Communities Program, neighborhood
police stations and community policing officers provided an opportunity
for the police and community to jointly define and analyze local crime
problems and to design strategies that address those problems. In the
Weed and Seed target area, one of the neighborhood policing stations is
located within a local community center. Two community policing
programs are based out of this location, and police personnel are
permanently assigned to this center as a means of reaching out to the target
communities.

4.5 Site Monitoring, Reporting, and Local Evaluation

While the Comprehensive Communities and National Performance
Review Lab program included evaluation efforts, Weed and Seed is not
budgeted for a local evaluation. Therefore, there does not appear to be any
systematic monitoring and/or tracking of the operational components of
the Weed and Seed program in Salt Lake City. Moreover, criteria for
success are also only beginning to emerge in the Salt Lake City project.

However, many programs included within the Weed and Seed umbrella
may be evaluated in some way through the University of Utah. For
instance, several efforts associated with the Comprehensive Communities
Program have received some evaluation attention, generally through the
efforts of a particular University of Utah professor. Assessment results are
now being fed back into program development and will likely shape future
refinement of Weed and Seed efforts in Salt Lake City.

5.0 Key Implementation Issues and Interpretation

5.1 Role of Weed and Seed Site Designation

Operation Weed and Seed, with target areas identified as Glendale, Poplar
Grove, and Fairpark, was formally launched in Salt Lake City with a
public hearing in February 1993. In response to this hearing, the SLCPD
worked quickly to create a Community Support Division, which
represented the department's first effort to institutionalize community
policing in the city.

In the summer of 1993, the U.S. Attorney General visited Salt Lake City.
Her visit was interpreted by local officials as U.S. Department of Justice
approval and endorsement of local efforts. Following the Attorney
General's visit in August, Salt Lake's U.S. Attorney tried to create a Weed
and Seed strategy that could lead to Federal support.

The original Weed and Seed application was designed and written largely
as an expression of community efforts within the Glendale community.
The proposal was designed to include the four necessary Weed and Seed
components: law enforcement, community policing, prevention/treatment,
and community restoration. This proposal, however, was then reviewed
and processed through the U.S. Attorney's Office, and significant changes
were made to the proposed structure and content of the city's Weed and
Seed program; the proposal was rewritten as a legal, technical document
with less balance shown between weeding and seeding. This new proposal
focused more on law enforcement efforts and left a number of seeding
programs, which had participated in writing the initial grant request,
without funding. The revised proposal was submitted as Salt Lake's initial
application but was subsequently not funded.

Given the relatively high expectations that developed over the previous
year, this rejection was a considerable disappointment for all of the
coalitions that emerged to participate in this process. This produced
tension between the U.S. Attorney's Office, the mayor, and the police
department, as well as community organizations that invested in the
proposal and were disappointed by the outcome. Some of this tension
continued to affect the city's Weed and Seed program oversight and policy
development.

In 1995, Salt Lake City was officially recognized as a Weed and Seed site
and allocated $35,000. These limited funds were generally used for
administration and sponsorship of a small group of community-based
programs. Salt Lake City has remained an officially recognized site in
both FY 1996 and FY 1997 and was awarded $240,000 and $275,000,
respectively.

Salt Lake City's Weed and Seed site designation has complicated the ways
in which the city adopted and changed funding efforts. Because Weed and
Seed was not initially funded in Salt Lake City, community officials had
to find other funds for the efforts begun in anticipation of receiving Weed
and Seed money. Largely through the NPRL and CCP programs, Salt Lake
City mounted police and community interventions within the three target
communities. These funds and their program requirements, while aligned
with Weed and Seed programs, did not always seek the same ends. As a
result, many officials adopted the idea CCP funding was a prelude to
Weed and Seed funding and assumed the programs would simply continue
through an alternative funding mechanism--Weed and Seed. This is
perhaps more true of social programming, as opposed to the efforts of
local and Federal police in the Weed and Seed communities. Nonetheless,
the confusion and complexity of the funding has led to the writing of many
grants with overlapping objectives in the hope some of the funding will
actually be awarded. While this perhaps is an effective local strategy, it
creates significant complications in disentangling programs and their
respective impacts on communities, families, and children.

5.2 Role of Grantee Organization

The grantee organization in Salt Lake City is the mayor's office, which
oversees the implementation of the program developed by the working
committees and approved by the steering committee. According to the
Weed and Seed coordinator, this work is done in cooperation with the U.S.
Attorney's Office, which is viewed as a partner in this process.

5.3 Management Structure and Control

Salt Lake City has encountered a number of issues and problems with the
management and control of Weed and Seed efforts. The Weed and Seed
program is overseen by a steering committee that has representatives from
the mayor's office, the police department, and the community and is
headed by the U.S. Attorney. Due to difficulty in scheduling, the steering
committee has experienced frequent delays in structuring the activities of
the grant. 

Further, the day-to-day coordination of the grant has changed hands since
the inception of the program and has never been coordinated by someone
whose time and effort were solely dedicated to running Weed and Seed.
Once the CCP was funded (and Weed and Seed was not funded), the
original Weed and Seed coordinator's role was shifted toward running the
CCP. The second Weed and Seed coordinator is an assistant prosecutor
within the Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office who continues to carry a
prosecutorial caseload.

In 1997, in recognition of the need for more personnel, a staff person from
the mayor's Office of Community Affairs was identified as an assistant
Weed and Seed coordinator; she had the additional role of coordinating
Salt Lake City's Youth City Government program that teaches better
citizenship to high school students. As this assistant coordinator has only
recently been closely associated with the Weed and Seed program, she has
devoted much of her time to learning its history and dynamics.

The cumulative effect of the two coordinators' additional job
responsibilities outside of Weed and Seed has led to decentralized and
compartmentalized program development and operations in Salt Lake
City. Although there is no doubt the current coordinator and assistant
coordinator work hard to manage Weed and Seed efforts, it has been
difficult to sustain clear oversight and communications between program
components.

5.4 Local Politics

Local politics has strongly shaped the nature and programming of Weed
and Seed efforts within Salt Lake City. Political problems have surfaced
between the mayor and the U.S. Attorney over the management and
direction of the program. According to the perception of many outside the
U.S. Attorney's Office, the issue of collaboration versus control seemed to
be one of the problems, with the city's efforts focused on collaboration of
local resources, and the efforts of the U.S. Attorney on controlling all
aspects of Weed and Seed. Further, according to Weed and Seed officials,
there was a distinct difference in the leadership styles of the mayor and the
U.S. Attorney. The mayor is quick to make tough decisions and implement
them, while the U.S. Attorney believes in going through a more
methodical process before making and implementing decisions. These two
styles sometimes created differences in opinion over how decisions
regarding Weed and Seed should be made.

The mayor also has an ongoing conflict with the city council, which has
resulted in several allegations of misconduct on his part. This continuing
struggle has prompted those in city agencies to closely watch the outcome
because it may affect both interagency collaboration and program support.
Although not directly related to Weed and Seed, this ongoing struggle
does affect how public policy is defined, as well as the political
atmosphere and, therefore, it ultimately affects city programs such as
Weed and Seed.

Within the Salt Lake City Police Department there is also considerable
turmoil, some of which affects the Weed and Seed program. Since the new
chief of police assumed his position, he has struggled continually with the
police union. Some of this conflict started when the new chief announced
that a union official neither would be housed in police headquarters nor
paid out of the police department budget. Further, a series of incidents in
1997 led the chief to fire members of a police unit that allegedly abused a
local citizen. This has widened the gap between rank-and-file police
officers and the chief.

Finally, the internal administration of the SLCPD was devoted to
"traditional" policing. The introduction of community policing has
effectively redistributed power within the police department, resulting at
times in internal conflicts; field officers are not always on the same page
in regard to community policing as is the captain, who is more interested
in maintaining the traditional style of policing. The line officers who
witness the benefits of community policing are more interested in slowly
moving away from the traditional approach. As a result of these
differences of opinion, some personnel have been shifted from
assignments in the Weed and Seed target areas, which further complicates
communications and program development.

5.5 Approach to Weeding

As reported in the budgets of the Salt Lake City Weed and Seed program,
much of the resources for weeding have been applied to joint narcotics
enforcement efforts between the Salt Lake City Police Department and
several Federal agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and INS. These efforts
are generally associated with surveillance, undercover work, buy-and-bust
tactics, and selective prosecution by both local and Federal prosecutors.
The funding for "softer" community policing and problem-solving
interventions employed in the Weed and Seed communities in Salt Lake
City have generally come from other resources--the department itself and
the Comprehensive Communities Program. The tactical and operational
connections between these two rather distinct efforts are undefined, and
both efforts appear to operate independently in selected Weed and Seed
communities.

The Salt Lake City weeding effort encompassed a distinct number of
initiatives, all of which were funded by the city prior to the FY 1996
award. Among the most significant of these are the Metro Narcotics Task
Force (MNTF), the Drug Abatement Response Teams (DART), and the
MNW.

The MNTF focuses primarily on high-level drug dealers and operates on a
citywide basis. Its target area activities are incidental to its primary
functions, in that the task force is not solely dedicated to the target areas
but rather pursues cases and dealers throughout the city. In many
instances, however, these investigations lead to the target area with its
historical focus on drug distribution activities. Often, drug distributors
purchase housing in the target area and then use the residence as a basis
for operations. Prior to the MNTF, this strategy allowed distributors a
relatively stable environment in which to do business. As the MNTF made
more significant inroads into their operations, however, distributors have
switched to short-term rentals, which gives dealers more operational
mobility. This police department views this disruption of drug distribution
activities as a positive development.

Salt Lake's weeding efforts in the area of drug enforcement are displayed
in exhibit 5.1, which shows the number of drug-related arrests by month
per 1,000 residents from early 1995 to late 1997.[4] In the 5-month period
before the start date of Weed and Seed--March through July 1995--the
number of drug-related arrests in the target area averaged 2.5. After Weed
and Seed's implementation--from 1996 through 1997 in a similar 5-month
block--the average number of drug arrests per month increased by
approximately 52 percent in the target area, compared to an increase of
approximately 16 percent in the rest of the city. As is shown on the graph,
the number of drug related arrests has declined in the target area since
August 1997 and has actually decreased below the rate of the rest of the
city. This suggests drug activity may have been displaced outside of the
target area.

The chief of police also established DART, with a more neighborhood-
focused approach toward drug enforcement. These teams consist of a
sergeant and six officers who focus on neighborhood-based drug activity.
DART personnel identify and rapidly respond to neighborhood drug sales
and distribution activities. The teams locate their base in the targeted
Weed and Seed areas and, either through their own surveillance or
increased neighborhood reporting, team officers react directly to local
drug-related problems. Once a residence is identified as a drug sales
center, a warrant is obtained, a search is conducted, and offenders are
arrested (if the evidentiary basis is sufficient to justify immediate onsite
arrest). If a warrant cannot be obtained, a "knock and talk" approach may
be used, providing a visible response to community surveillance and
complaints. In contrast to more lengthy processes associated with typical
drug investigations, the entire process by DART may only take 2-3 days,
thereby making it difficult for distributors to get settled into
neighborhoods. Such activities also bolster community confidence that the
police are doing something and that the community's continued
surveillance of the area can produce meaningful results.

The departmental activities have been assisted by the creation of Mobile
Neighborhood Watch teams, which were first created prior to the
Comprehensive Communities Program but grew substantially under the
CCP. Prior to the CCP, it is estimated MNW involved about 450 people.
CCP funding helped expand the program to approximately 800 people by
January 1997. CCP funding provided money for equipment, secretarial
assistance, and a community-oriented police officer to better link the
MNW to the SLCPD.

Throughout the Weed and Seed target areas, hundreds of citizens have
attended training meetings conducted by the police department for the
MNW. These community residents have received instruction on how to
get a timely police response to community observations of crime and
disorder. Community residents patrol their neighborhoods in their own
vehicles and are equipped with cellular phones to communicate with the
Salt Lake City police.

Mobile Neighborhood Watch teams are completely voluntary. Community
residents typically become aware of the MNW through local community
council meetings. Current MNW coordinators (a community volunteer)
use community meetings to recruit members. Watch participants wear a
vest designating them as a team member. These are not protective vests,
but, rather, they are used for identification purposes. A magnetized sign is
placed on the side of Watch participants' cars when they are on patrol to
increase their visibility in the community. Mobile Neighborhood Watch
members are seen as extended eyes and ears of the police and are not
allowed to intervene in situations they encounter. They simply use their
cellular phones to notify dispatch about prospective problems and/or
situations to which the police then respond. Most recently, surveillance
equipment has been provided to the MNW program to assist members in
documenting problems and/or situations warranting police attention.

Periodically communities will form a saturation patrol comprised of a
MNW team, members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), and a
Watching in Neighborhood Program (WIN) van. The WIN van is an
official police vehicle staffed with officers who are designated to work
solely with the saturation patrol for the evening. It is equipped with
sobriety testing equipment to facilitate immediate tests, results, and, when
necessary, arrests. This has been a successful strategy to discourage
drunken driving in the selected Weed and Seed communities and is seen as
a way to build public safety coalitions within these neighborhoods and
across service agencies.

The Salt Lake City Police Department's increased enforcement activity in
the target area is shown in exhibit 5.2, which details the number of arrests
involving Part 1 crimes by month per 1,000 residents from early 1995 to
late 1997.[5] In the 5-month period before the start of Weed and Seed--
March-July 1995--the number of arrests involving Part 1 crimes in the
target area was 2.8 (or about 62 arrests per month). In a similar period
after Weed and Seed's implementation--March through July 1997--the
average number of arrests in the target area was 3.3 per month. This
change denotes an increase of approximately 18 percent in the number of
arrests made in the target area, compared to an increase of approximately 5
percent in the rest of the city during those same periods. As with the
drug-related arrest rate, the number of arrests involving Part 1 crimes
made in the target area appear to decline to a level closer to that of the rest
of the city. In fact, the graph denotes a decrease in arrests in the target area
and an increase in the rest of the city from September to November 1996.
This may suggest some of the crime in the target area has been displaced
and the Salt Lake City Police Department are responding accordingly.

5.6 Approach to Community Policing

As previously indicated, the style of policing in Salt Lake City was
typically to crack down on particularly visible and troublesome areas with
high crime rates, then return to a traditional response-oriented policing
operation. This style has yielded to a more community-oriented style of
policing over the past several years.

Beginning in about 1992, the incoming mayor began to build closer ties to
the community through outreach efforts that included the police. In 1992,
the mayor hired a new chief of police who was specifically instructed to
expand and elaborate on community oriented policing strategies and
practices within the city.

Further, in 1992 all members of the Salt Lake City Police Department
received training in "total quality management." Since that time, the
department has implemented Process Improvement Teams (PIT) and
Problem Action Teams (PAT), both of which seek to improve the
department's ability to change toward a more community focused style of
policing and to cope with the necessary organizational changes attendant
to this transition. These efforts have resulted in several internal SLCPD
programs to improve organizational and individual officer functioning.
The department has also created the Crime Analysis Unit (CAU) to
increase tactical use of crime information and thus free up officer time to
work on community problems.

As part of a growing community policing strategy, the police department
hosted weekly citywide COP meetings in 1993. These meetings were
attended by crime prevention specialists, patrol officers, vice, narcotics
and youth specialists, as well as a wide range of city agencies, and were
mostly centered around the mayor's Office of Community Affairs.
Business owners and local residents from throughout Salt Lake City also
attended these meetings. In addition, the Salt Lake City Police Department
created COP specialists throughout the department and integrated COP
functions into all sworn officers' duties and activities. The Salt Lake City
Police Department's adoption of neighborhood offices has linked COP
personnel directly with local community centers in the target areas. For
example, the Sorenson Center, which is a safe haven community center in
Glendale, is the home base for both a COP office, as well as crime
prevention and community outreach projects. All of these activities are
centered on building communications between the police department,
other city agencies, and the community at large.

In 1995, CATs were created and implemented in Salt Lake City as part of
the Comprehensive Communities Program. While criminal justice
agencies are largely represented on the CATs, so too are social service
agencies, youth and family case specialists, and representatives from the
mayor's office. As previously indicated, the CATs are designed to bring
government, particularly safety services, directly to the community for
review, critique, and joint problem solving. CCP resources also provided
more than $1 million to the department to support 14 new officer
positions, as well as their cars and necessary equipment. These funds also
supported, in large measure, the Neighborhood Mobile Watch, which was
expanded through this effort. Other CCP resources were allocated to the
office of the city prosecutor, the Salt Lake Boys and Girls Club, and the
Third District Juvenile Court and the school district. These resources set
the stage for activities that were largely CCP supported but which had
similar strategies to Weed and Seed funded community policing efforts.

5.7 Approach to Seeding

While there are considerable efforts afoot within the Salt Lake City target
area, it is not at all clear these efforts are directly tied to a systematic
seeding strategy within the city as part of the Weed and Seed program.
This may be the result of general confusion within Salt Lake City as to the
distinctions between the Comprehensive Communities Program and Weed
and Seed; the overlapping nature of programs, target areas, and clients;
and/or the divergence and complexity of the programs' strategies. Further,
as discussed, it is nearly impossible to separate the two programs at the
community level, where they are seen as promoting the same goals.

In FY 1996, the first year Salt Lake City received substantial Weed and
Seed funding, the city split the money designated for seeding among
several social service programs and efforts. Youth and family specialists
were employed in a counseling capacity by the Boys and Girls Club to
help troubled teens in the target area. These case specialists were seen as
quite successful in managing cases diverted from the juvenile justice
system and in building effective communications between youth-serving
agencies within Weed and Seed and the city's municipal government. The
Youth and Family Specialists were hired by the city as a means to stabilize
this program and as a way for the city to more directly influence the
services offered to diverted youths and their families.

In most instances, the money from Weed and Seed funds was allocated to
pay for part of a social service effort. For example, a music project run out
of Jackson Elementary School is designed to expose and teach students
how to play a number of instruments before they graduate. Weed and Seed
money paid for one-quarter of the music teacher's salary, as well as for the
purchase and repair of violins used by the students. Another example is the
provision of funds to pay for prereading materials for four classrooms at
the Guadalupe School, an early learning center in the target area. In
addition, funds were used to buy a computer to track library materials for
the Neighborhood House Literacy Project in the Weed and Seed area, and
money was given to the Urban Scouting project for supplies, equipment,
and registration fees for 100 boys who otherwise could not participate.
Finally, money was allocated to the Boys and Girls Club Inner City Sports
League to pay for equipment, uniforms, transportation, and part of a
league coordinator's salary.

In FY 1997, Salt Lake City designated its seeding funds to three special
emphasis initiatives. The following is a rationale for these initiatives,
which are still in the planning stages (as of this writing in February 1998).

o Prevention Through the Arts. Due to cutbacks in education funding,
many schools in the target area no longer offer art classes. Part of the
rationale behind this initiative, therefore, was to expose youths in the
target area to the arts. A request for proposals (RFP) was released early in
the funding cycle and the Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center was awarded the
money to conduct a pottery class in their afterschool art program.

o Jobs for At-Risk Youth. The need to help youths in the target areas find
employment was identified as a crucial need by the community. An RFP
was released, and as of February 1998, no organization had been selected
to run this vocational program. The Weed and Seed coordinator
anticipated the Boys and Girls Club would win the award and begin the
program shortly.

o Neighborhood Restoration Committee (NRC). The money designated for
NRC will be used for community improvement projects the committee
believes are necessary and are not large enough to attract other outside
funding.

In addition to funding specifically designated for seeding programs, there
are a number of social service agencies located in the Weed and Seed
target area that are aligned with seeding goals. The following is a
description of some of these agencies.

Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center (safe haven)

Success by Six, Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center. The Success by Six
program, funded by the United Way and housed at the Sorenson Center, is
a program aimed at improving the life chances of children in their
formative years (prenatal care for mothers and programs for children up to
6 years of age). The Success by Six program identifies families with small
children and/or expectant mothers in the targeted communities. The
program staff generally work with clients for 1 year. They complete a
number of home visits, identify individual and family needs, and network
with other agencies to address those needs. Sorenson Center staff are
trained by the program for about 4 weeks and then receive regular training
updates regarding early intervention strategies.

The Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center is a recreational and community
center within the Weed and Seed area that offers swimming and other
athletic activities (e.g., midnight basketball), as well as structured
afterschool programs, summer programs, parenting classes, and computer
activities. The center has primarily had a recreational mission, but its new
director aims to broaden the center's role into a full service community
center, expanding its educational and community programs and linking the
center more directly to the community. The director sees the Sorenson
Center as modeling interventions in the local area and then expanding
them to other centers citywide. By offering an expressive arts program,
counseling and family services, the center aims to fill a gap left by schools
that have cut back on extracurricular activities. The expansion to a full-
service community center is just underway, and it is unclear if the effort
will provide an array of services to a large area.

Community Peace Services, Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office

The Community Peace Center was created through the Comprehensive
Communities Program and is conducted through the Salt Lake City
Prosecutor's office to provide prevention, early intervention, and
mediation in the Weed and Seed target area.

The Peace Center collaborates with the juvenile court, police, the mayor's
office, and local community-based organizations by coordinating referrals
and distributing funding in support of the services provided.

The Peace Center aims to identify behavior problems in the schools
through prevention, intervention, and mediation programs. Prevention
programs include a teen tobacco reduction program and the HARMONY
program, designed to increase communications and coping skills in
children and their parents, for the purpose of reducing violence.
Intervention programs conducted through the Peace Center include a
YMCA Choices program that identifies and corrects negative or harmful
behaviors among young males and a citizenship skills program that
teaches participants to negotiate and control interpersonal conflict. These
programs are linked to two mediation programs, one aimed at youths using
a peer court and the other toward adult conflict mediation.

Title V, "Resilient Youth Program," University of Utah

The Resilient Youth Program is funded through Title V and is focused on
increasing problem-solving capacity and life resilience among
disadvantaged youths in the western part of Salt Lake City, which
somewhat overlaps with the Weed and Seed area. This project was
originally funded by the Comprehensive Communities Program. The U. S.
Attorney General was said to have designated Salt Lake City as an
exemplary site, in part because of this program, conducted under the
auspices of the Health Behavior Laboratory within the Department of
Health Education at the University of Utah.

This project focuses on helping youths pay attention to their "essence." It
draws from several intellectual models, each of which suggests people can
look past their differences to see some inner good in others and thereby
reduce interpersonal conflict and violence. The program incorporates 33
modules of self-reflection and coping instruction into school-based
classroom programs. It is currently implemented in two Salt Lake City
middle schools, one of which is an alternative school for troubled youths
in the Weed and Seed area. It is anticipated this training will be expanded
to parents and communities over the coming years.

Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Club (safe haven)

The Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Center was created through the
Comprehensive Communities Program as a safe haven for troubled youths
in the Poplar Grove community. The club was an abandoned property
identified by the executive director of the Boys and Girls Club that was
remodeled and opened to provide an alternative to joining local gangs
within this part of the Weed and Seed area. The first orders of business in
the club were to repel local gang members who had historically used the
building as a headquarters and to encourage youths in the neighborhoods
to attend the club (the area was perceived to be dangerous because of
drive-by shootings). The Poplar Grove Boys and Girls Club has expanded
its typical focus beyond recreational and afterschool programs to include
case management for troubled youths and families, as well as employment
counseling. The club also belongs to two CATs in this Weed and Seed
target area, affording staff added opportunities to advocate for their clients
with other agencies.

5.8 Operational Relationships with Other Organizations

Given the loose funding structure associated with Weed and Seed in Salt
Lake City and the confounding influence created from other Federal
initiatives, the coordination and integration of program elements generally
does not occur. At this writing, there are no local assessments of these
linkages or institutional analysis of their effects. An analysis of the
Comprehensive Communities Program (BOTEC, 1997) came to a similar
conclusion, noting individual programs appeared to function reasonably
well, but the coordination mechanisms for interagency decisionmaking
were neither in place nor planned for the near future.

Moreover, there has been considerable shifting in city agencies responsible
for overseeing Weed and Seed, and there is a general lack of authority
and/or time to oversee and link agency efforts. Collectively, this has
resulted in decentralized operations and program management. However,
it is important to note the Sorenson Center, a safe haven in Salt Lake City,
plans to house a number of social service programs that are interested in
integrating their services and working together. Because the center is still
relatively new and many of the programs have not officially begun
providing services, it remains unclear whether these efforts will come to
fruition.

In terms of linking the Salt Lake City Police Department with other
agencies, several task forces have been created to pursue drug- and gang-
related activity within the Weed and Seed communities. These task forces
typically involve local police and Federal agencies which target locations
and individuals for selective surveillance, arrest, and prosecution. This
process does not appear to be well integrated, if integrated at all, with the
community policing efforts identified with the Weed and Seed program.

5.9 Concluding Observations

The director of capital planning, who is the financial manager for Weed
and Seed, indicated she (and the city) felt the goals of Weed and Seed
were not clearly articulated in Washington or well separated from those of
the Comprehensive Communities Program. This led to some initial local
confusion about what the grant was to do. Had the aims of Weed and Seed
been better understood from the outset, she suggested, they could have
been more effectively integrated into ongoing city and other community-
based interventions. However, she also suggested, once better understood,
the effort was successful in causing the city to rethink and restructure local
relationships in the pursuit of a community government approach to
governing.

In addition, the Weed and Seed program had substantial effects in Salt
Lake City and its targeted communities. Perhaps the most noteworthy of
these are associated with its continuation of community-policing efforts
within the police department, as well as the continuation of community
problem-solving efforts within city government. Weed and Seed funding
has provided an opportunity for public and private agencies to rethink their
relationships with one another, while joining forces toward more clearly
defined community objectives. It has been a struggle for agencies to link
their individual efforts in the past, and this continues to be a challenge
during the implementation of Weed and Seed in Salt Lake City. However,
a climate for cross-agency communication and coordination has begun
through Weed and Seed, an initiative upon which subsequent efforts,
perhaps, can be built.

While the Salt Lake City site does not represent a dramatic program of
change and impact, it does represent one city's struggle to build a more
responsive government linked to community concerns. The overall
innovation in Salt Lake City is the process for community input and
communication which has taken several years to realize. Nevertheless,
such a linkage between government and the community affords an
opportunity for more focused interventions into communities with extant
leadership and clearly defined goals and objectives. As Weed and Seed
programs typically are located in communities that lack such community
organization and leadership, the process of converting Salt Lake City from
a response-driven community to one with a linked set of safety services is
an important and noteworthy accomplishment.

6.0 Effects of Weed and Seed

6.1 Analysis of Crime Data

In this section, police data is used to analyze trends in crime rates before
and after the implementation of Weed and Seed in Salt Lake City. At the
outset, it is important to note any observed changes in crime rates in the
target area during this period might reflect factors other than Weed and
Seed activities. For instance, changes in crime reporting may cause the
reported crime rates to rise or fall independent of any true shift in crime
incidence. Changes in the regional or national economic context may also
affect trends in local crime, favorably or unfavorably. Additionally, an
observed reduction in crime for the target area may occur through
displacement of crime to adjacent or nearby areas, where crime rates
would rise correspondingly. In addition, as noted previously, there are a
number of other initiatives in Salt Lake City, such as CCP, that may have
affected the crime rates in general.

Incident-level police data and geo-mapping methods are used to identify
crimes that have occurred in the target area and the rest of the city. The
rest of the city provides a logical comparison area, in which to monitor
possible changes in local crime reporting, shifts in local economic
conditions or other conventional factors, and the possibility of crime
displacement to other areas within the city. Target area crime data only
dates back to March 1995 which is 5 months prior to when Salt Lake City
was officially recognized by EOWS and received funding; the Salt Lake
City Police Department recently changed computer systems and does not
have data available prior to March 1995.

Exhibit 6.1 shows the number of Part 1 crimes by month per 1,000
residents from early 1995 to late 1997.[6] For the 5-month period before
the official start date of Weed and Seed--March through July 1995--the
number of crimes per month in the target area averaged 11. In a similar
period after Weed and Seed's implementation--March through July 1997--
the number of Part 1 crimes per month averaged 12.5 in the target area;
this change denotes an increase of approximately 23 percent. Although
this appears to be a large increase in criminal activity, by 1997 the number
of Part 1 crimes declined by approximately 8 percent, compared to a
decrease of less than 1 percent in the rest of the city during those
periods--March through July--between 1996 and 1997. Therefore, it
appears from these graphs the rate of Part 1 crimes is currently declining
more quickly in the target area, compared to the rest of the city.

6.2 Survey of Community Residents

Survey methods used in 1995 and 1997

In each of the eight sites participating in the national evaluation, a survey
of target area residents was conducted at two separate time intervals. From
March to July 1995, the Institute for Social Analysis conducted a total of
1,531 interviews among the eight sites. From December 1997 to January
1998, Abt Associates Inc. conducted a total of 1,995 interviews with a
separate group of residents in the same eight target areas. In the following
material, we refer to these data collection efforts as the 1995 and 1997
surveys.

General survey design and operations

The objective of the survey data collection and analysis was to measure
changes in citizens' awareness of the Weed and Seed program and their
opinions about police activity, crime, public safety, and the general quality
of life in their neighborhoods. The 1997 survey was comparable to the
prior survey through the following features:

o The geographical boundaries of the survey area were the same.

o The verbatim wording of questions from the 1995 survey was retained in
1997, with the exception of additional response categories to selected
items in 1997. For these items, care was taken in the analysis to aggregate
responses in ways that would preserve the comparability of the findings
across the two surveys.[7]

Nonetheless, there were some notable differences in the methods used in
the two surveys, due to barriers in recruiting participants, as follows:

o The 1995 survey consisted of in-person interviews, based on city-
provided address lists. The 1997 interviews were conducted by telephone,
based on listed telephone numbers for residential addresses within the
survey area.

o The 1995 survey consisted of 83 substantive items. The 1997 survey
included only a subset of these 31 substantive items. (For both surveys, the
count excludes items related to respondent demographic characteristics
and other basic interview data.) The 1995 interviews required 30 to 40
minutes. The 1997 interviews typically lasted 12 to 15 minutes.

The decision to proceed in 1997 with telephone interviewing and a
shortened instrument was based on the failure across all eight sites in 1995
to complete the targeted number of 400 interviews. The 1997 survey
design called for 300 completed interviews per site and increased the
number of cases in 6 of the 8 sites, including Salt Lake City, which
collected 91 surveys in 1995 and 300 in 1997. The final disposition of the
number of homes called and the breakdown of how many calls were ended
by a middle of the survey "break-off," how many were ended due to a
language barrier, and so forth, is represented in the table above.

Demographic characteristics of respondents (Exhibit 6.2)

The demographic information for respondents in 1995 and 1997 did not
vary considerably in Salt Lake City. As evidenced in exhibit 6.2, the target
neighborhood respondents to the Salt Lake City survey are mostly white,
nonelderly, long time residents. Seventy-six percent of respondents in
1995 and 86 percent in 1997 have lived in the target area neighborhood for
more than 2 years. Average respondent age was 46 years old in 1995 and
47 years old in 1997. Slightly more than half of respondents in both
surveys were women.

Respondents working full time account for nearly half of all those
surveyed in 1995 (46 percent) and in 1997 (50 percent). The percentage of
unemployed or otherwise not looking for work was low in both 1995 and
1997 survey years, 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively. There was a large
increase (47 percent) in respondents who identify themselves as
homemakers, probably due to differences in survey methodology.
Disabled persons made up 10 percent of respondents in 1997 and 8 percent
of respondents in 1995. In addition, the number of respondents who go to
school either part, or full time, was up from 1995.

Household composition across survey years remained similar. Respondent
households with no children (people less than 18 years old) in both years
made up 58 percent of those surveyed, while about 30 percent of
respondents had children living in the households, while the remaining 15
percent had three or more children. Households with one to two adults
made up 70 percent of respondents in 1997 and nearly 70 percent in 1995.
The number of households with no adults dropped 4 percent from 1995.

The racial make-up of respondents was also similar across the two
surveys, with about three-quarters of respondents being white, between 13
percent and 18 percent Hispanic, and very few black.

Perceptions of the neighborhood (exhibit 6.3)

General satisfaction with the target area neighborhood remained similar
from 1995 to 1997. Though not statistically significant, there was a slight
decrease in the proportion of respondents who indicated they were very
dissatisfied with their neighborhood as a place to live, from 14 percent in
1995 to 6 percent in 1997. Further, there was an overall increase in
respondent feelings of safety when out alone after dark and a 15 percent
drop in respondents reporting not going out at night (p<0.1). The number
of respondents who reported their neighborhood has become a safer place
to live in the past 2 years increased from 10 percent in 1995 to 19 percent
in 1997 (p<0.01).

Perceptions of drug dealers on streets or in other public places as a big
problem rose 4 percent (from 14 percent to 18 percent), but the proportion
of respondents who see drug dealers on the streets as no problem also
increased, from 34 percent in 1995 to 42 percent in 1997. The dealers may
have moved off the streets and into homes and apartments. General
respondent perceptions of crime in the neighborhood saw a significant
increase (p<0.01) in property crime, assaults and other street crime, gang
activity, drug use, and in violent crime (although the number of people
viewing violent crime as a big problem decreased 6 percent between 1995
and 1997).

Victimization (exhibit 6.4)

With the exception of home break-ins, which declined 4 percent among
respondents, reports of victimization either increased or remained about
the same from the 1995 survey. Incidents of stealing by force, or threat of
force, increased by 5 percent. The percentage of respondents and family
members who were knifed, shot at, or attacked with some other weapon by
anyone in their neighborhood remained the same in 1997 as in 1995.

Police response (exhibit 6.5)

Most respondents to the 1997 survey felt, in general, the police were doing
a good or very good job at keeping order on the streets and sidewalks in
the neighborhood, a general sentiment which is a significant improvement
over that of the 1995 respondents (p<0.1). The strongest improvement was
found in the perceptions of improvements in controlling the street sale and
use of illegal drugs in the neighborhood (p<0.01), perhaps due to a shift in
drug sales from the streets to homes and apartments. Further, the
percentage of respondents who have seen police officers chatting or
having friendly conversation with people in the neighborhood in the
month prior to the interview increased significantly, from 18 percent in
1995 to 28 percent in 1997.

Community involvement (exhibit 6.6)

Community involvement has increased dramatically in the 2 years
following the 1995 survey (p<0.01). Attendance or participation in all of
the following activities is up by at least 10 percent: antidrug rallies, vigils
or marches (up 10 percent), citizen patrols (up 10 percent), and
neighborhood watches (up 15 percent). The percentage of 1997
respondents who attended or participated in a neighborhood cleanup
project is up 24 percent from the 1995 survey.

Perceptions of social services and other programs (exhibit 6.7)

Perceptions of city services and other programs are better in 1997 than in
1995 (again significant at the .01 level on all measures). Respondents
reported higher overall satisfaction with the availability of sports,
recreation, and other programs for youths, the availability of drug
treatment services, and the availability of job opportunities in the
neighborhood.

Perceptions of the Weed and Seed program (exhibit 6.8)

Name recognition for the Weed and Seed program improved in 1997 (up
11 percent from 1995), with almost 20 percent of respondents having
heard of the program. Specific neighborhood programs have similar
recognition. Fifty-five percent are aware of the Poplar Boys and Girls
Club, 60 percent of the Sorenson Multi-Cultural Center, and 70 percent of
respondents are aware of the Mobile Watch program in their
neighborhood.

General observations on the survey findings

Although reports of victimization increased slightly from 1995 to 1997,
the survey findings show an improvement in feelings about public safety
and city services. Further, community involvement increased dramatically
from 1995 to 1997, and respondents' feelings about police response was
significantly more positive. This improvement in residents' perceptions
was coupled with a greater awareness of Weed and Seed-funded programs.

Although one could interpret each of these trends as reflecting favorably
or unfavorably on the Weed and Seed program, it would be incorrect to
attribute the observed changes to the Weed and Seed efforts alone. The
measured changes may, in part, be the result of the different survey
methods used in 1995 and 1997. Even more importantly, it is essential to
remember Weed and Seed was already being implemented in Salt Lake
City in 1995 (when the first survey was conducted). Finally, although the
observed changes in residents' attitudes may indeed have resulted from
Weed and Seed and various community changes set in motion by the
program, one could also make the case that improving economic
conditions in the United States are instead primarily responsible.

6.3 Seeding Program Participant Interviews

To gain the perspective of individuals in the community whom the seeding
programs were intended to benefit, interviews were conducted with 40 to
60 program participants in Salt Lake City. Evaluators visited four
programs and conducted interviews in groups of 7 to 10 people. These
interviews were not intended to measure outcomes of the programs that
were visited; rather they were designed to learn the perceived benefits and
drawbacks of the programs for the individuals who participated in them.

This analysis is not meant to prove causality, and, in fact, there is no way
to be certain the benefits or hindrances these people faced during the time
they took part in the program are explicitly due to their participation.
Further, the analysis is meant to present individual perceptions based on
present involvement with these specific programs; long-term affects of
these programs on the lives of the participants cannot be deduced from the
interviews.

It is also important to note the interviews were arranged by each site's
Weed and Seed coordinators. At the request of the evaluators, the site
coordinators worked with the program directors to arrange the time, place,
and group of individuals who were to be interviewed. The seeding
participant interviews, therefore, are not intended to be representative of
all participants and may involve self-selection bias; interviewees were
selected at the discretion of the program managers, based on participants'
availability and their own willingness to be interviewed.

Interviews were conducted with participants from the following Salt Lake
City seeding efforts: the Mobile Neighborhood Watch program; the Poplar
Boys and Girls Club After School Sports Program; Jackson Elementary
School Music Program; and Youth and Family Specialist clients. The
participants of these programs were therefore asked questions to elicit their
perceptions of the affect their respective seeding programs have had on
their lives. The following is a general program description followed by a
summary and analysis of the interviews.

Mobile Watch interview

The Mobile Neighborhood Watch program, made up solely of volunteers,
involves community residents patrolling their neighborhoods in marked
vehicles looking for any criminal activity. One man explained he saw his
MNW as a bridge for improving the relationship between citizens and
police officers. When the MNW was first initiated, participants reported
strained relationships with police, who were not supportive of the
program. Over time, however, MNW has gained the confidence of many
police officers patrolling the Weed and Seed target area, and this has
helped to create a stronger bond between police and the community. 

Members of the Mobile Neighborhood Watch generally felt residents were
more comfortable sharing information regarding criminal activity with the
neighborhood watch rather than trying to flag a police officer who is often
times too busy to deal with their everyday concerns. Police in many of
these target areas often must focus on violent and dangerous crimes, which
leaves them little time to focus on nonviolent problems that annoy
community residents, such as noise disturbances. MNW volunteers, on the
other hand, can spend the time that police don't have collecting data,
observing, and documenting events. Participants in this community
believe this effort has helped to adequately address communities'
concerns.

Participants also had suggestions for improvements within the program.
All of the individuals interviewed, for example, agreed that more publicity
is needed for the program, that a pamphlet or a flier should be printed that
could be distributed or posted around the community, in addition to the
volunteers' marked cars. Such publicity would enhance the program's
visibility, not only for recruitment but also with criminals who may be
deterred by the knowledge the area is patrolled. In addition, every
interviewee agreed more training is needed for volunteers in the program.
They all felt the training was their own responsibility, rather than that of
their local police department. They believed training would clarify which
events are relevant to report to dispatch and would improve the safety of
the volunteers. Finally, participants voiced concern over the high turnover
rate among volunteers. Although the individuals interviewed had all been
with the program for at least 1 year, the average time spent in the program
is less than that. One way these participants hope to combat this high
turnover rate is through more intensive training at the outset.

Generally speaking, the individuals who were interviewed believe there
had been noticeable changes in their community since the inception of
MNW. They stated they believed street prostitution had gone down
considerably, the amount of graffiti had decreased, and shots were fired
less frequently. Although they were unable to quantify the improvements,
there was a qualitative change in their communities they believe resulted
from the program.

Youth and Family Specialist participants interview

Weed and Seed funding was used to pay the salaries of two Youth and
Family Specialists (YFS), who are based in the Office of Community
Policing. They offer counseling services to young people who have been
involved with the law and their families. Interviews were conducted with a
group of individuals who had received services from the YFS.

All of the individuals who evaluators spoke with had heard of YFS
through either a court order, a school counselor, or the COPS office. The
length of time they had spent working with YFS varied from 6 months to 3
years. The Youth and Family Specialists spent individual time with each
of the people interviewed. YFS have relationships with the families'
educators and leave their number with the teachers to contact them if there
are any problems.

The participants interviewed unanimously enjoyed working with YFS.
They explained YFS connected them with various resources they were
previously unaware of, such as parenting classes, afterschool programs,
and summer camps. One young woman explained her mother attended
parenting classes and now knows "how to handle" her and how to
discipline her.

In addition to connecting participants with services, Youth and Family
Specialists are also available to their clients when they are in a crisis. For
example, one young man explained his YFS was helpful to talk with and
visited him once a week to make sure he did not get into trouble. In
addition, the young man told evaluators if he felt as if he was going to "get
himself into trouble," he always beeped his YFS before acting on his anger
in the hope the specialist could help him work through his anger in a more
productive way. 

When asked if the program should be expanded to serve more families, the
participants whole heartedly said they thought it should. One mother
explained she knew many of her son's friends were not getting any help at
home or at school. If children do not get placed in the Colors of Success
program at their school (a program designed to help kids stay out of
trouble for which there is always a waiting list), then they have no
alternatives.

Music group interview

Jackson Elementary School runs a music program for its students that was
partially funded through Weed and Seed moneys. For one academic year,
Weed and Seed funded one-quarter of a teacher's salary and paid for some
instruments to be repaired. The children at Jackson Elementary attend
music class daily and learn to play four instruments over the course of
their 6 years in the school. The younger grades (1-3) play the xylophone
and the keyboard, and the older grades (4-5) play the violin and the
recorder. The children also learn how to read music and perform on stage.
In addition, the children's classroom teachers also are learning to play
these instruments through this program. Two groups of children who
participate in the music program were interviewed. 

The children told evaluators they learn how to read and write music and
how to play songs on string instruments. Over the years, they have learned
how to play four instruments: violin, keyboard, xylophone, and recorder.
One girl said she thinks "it is nice to learn music because it prepares you
for when you get older, and it sort of helps you to know what you want to
be." When asked if she had decided to work in the music field because of
this experience, she said she wanted to be a pianist. Other children then
chimed in that they would like to continue taking lessons after they leave
Jackson Elementary. Two of the children said their parents were going to
buy them a violin so they could play at home. Still others said without this
class, they would never learn to play an instrument because it is too
expensive to take lessons but "cheap to play at school."

When asked what they liked best about the program one child responded
he liked how the teachers trust him to take care of the instruments.
Another girl said she thought it was "neat how she got to learn to write and
read in a different language instead of just letters." When asked if they
would recommend this program to their friends, the answer was a
resounding yes. In fact, one girl said she told her friend she should switch
schools so she could play the violin.

Following the interview, the teacher explained she thought the program
taught the children discipline and teamwork, as well as built their
confidence every time they successfully completed a song, explaining: "It
helps kids feel like they can master something, which is something many
of these kids have not yet been able to do."

Boys and Girls Club interview

Weed and Seed moneys were used to fund the start-up costs of the Poplar
Grove Boys and Girls Club After School Sports Program. Interviews were
conducted with boys and girls ranging in age from 10 to 12 who
participated in the afterschool sports program three to four times a week.
Weed and Seed funds enabled the Boys and Girls Club to buy uniforms, a
batting machine, and other equipment that would last long after the
funding disappeared and ensured the program could remain in existence.

A number of the participants said if it were not for this program, they
would get into trouble, do drugs, or just hang around their house watching
television. Participating in this afterschool program allows them to spend
time with friends, exercise, and travel to other areas of Salt Lake City to
compete in sporting events. For many of these children, these events are
the only time they get out of their own neighborhood.

In between seasons, the kids told evaluators their coach meets them after
school and takes them to the movies or to the club to participate in the
other activities offered there, such as homework time, computer classes,
using the pool table, or playing other games. However, the children were
quick to tell evaluators there are not enough afterschool programs for
children their age in their neighborhood. They would all like to see more
places like the Poplar Boys and Girls Club that have structured activities
for them to participate in after school.

7.0 Future Directions and Degree of Institutionalization

Programs like Weed and Seed and Comprehensive Communities have
succeeded in strengthening informal processes and networks in Salt Lake
City. Weed and Seed funds have provided resources the city cannot
directly provide, such as money for leadership training for community
groups. Such resources strengthen the capacity of these groups to work
with the city to address persistent community problems. It is clear a
system for agency communications and programming is emerging from
the oftentimes frustrating experiences of those associated with planning
and operating Weed and Seed efforts in Salt Lake City. The building of
the Sorenson Center and, to a lesser extent, the Boys and Girls Club of
Poplar Grove, provide examples of this emerging communications system;
having such places now has created a desire to coordinate activities at
these sites, as well as to elaborate on the range of services that can be
brought to bear on community problems.

In addition, Salt Lake City continues to use the Community Action Teams
as its centerpiece of community mobilization and problemsolving. This is
generally coupled with the Mobile Neighborhood Watch, which actively
engages community members in coproducing order maintenance services
in the three targeted communities associated with Weed and Seed in Salt
Lake City. The Community Action Teams and the Mobile Neighborhood
Watch are important illustrations of community-directed public safety
activities. These efforts have caused the Salt Lake City Police Department
to rethink its community and problem-oriented strategies, providing an
important community platform for future interventions.

The project has created an opportunity for SLCPD to elaborate on its
neighborhood police station process, build accountability for local police
services, and reorient the supervisory and command staff toward a more
community-centered approach to law enforcement. This is a work in
progress, however. Subsequent needs within the department include
increased training, performance standards by which to judge success, and
increased linkage with other government and nonprofit agencies serving
the community. Perhaps most important is the need to increase the
department's ability to engage in serious organizational change--a
precursor to effectively institutionalizing Weed and Seed into a new style
of policing that is emerging in Salt Lake City.

These conclusions are buttressed by the fact the Salt Lake City Police
Department has successfully obtained a grant from the Office of
Community Oriented Police Services and is now designated as a
Community Policing Demonstration Center. Past learning and the infusion
of Federal funds from several sources, including Weed and Seed, have
resulted in positioning the Salt Lake City Police Department for further
pursuit of community and problem-oriented policing--strategies that form
the core of the overall Weed and Seed program.

Notes

1. Executive Office for Weed and Seed, "Operation Weed and Seed
Implementation Manual," p. 2-1.

2. The National Performance Review Task Force (now renamed the
National Partnership for Reinventing Government) designated a number of
governmental organizations or activities as National Performance Review
Laboratories (now Reinvention Laboratories) to test "reinventing
government" initiatives. These labs develop more efficient ways to deliver
government services by creating new partnerships between entities,
streamlining bureaucratic processes, and empowering organizations to
make substantial changes. The Weed and Seed Reinvention Laboratory is
designed to develop more effective mechanisms for combining and
delivering Federal, State, and local resources in Weed and Seed sites.

3. Internal report, Salt Lake City Police Department's Narcotics Task
Force.

4. Incident-level data prior to March 1995 was not available from SLCPD.
The department installed a new records management system in 1997, and
data prior to March 1995 was not brought over to the new system.

5. Part 1 crimes include violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery,
aggravated assault) and property crimes (burglary, larceny, auto theft).

6. As noted, incident-level data prior to March 1995 were not available
from SLCPD.

7. For example, in questions on "how good a job are the police doing" in
different aspects of law enforcement, the 1995 survey allowed the
respondent to indicate "a very good job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor
job." Additionally, the 1997 survey also allowed the respondent to indicate
"a very poor job." The findings below have aggregated the "poor job" and
"very poor job" responses for 1997 before comparing the pattern of
responses with 1995. 

-------------------------------

About the National Institute of Justice 

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of
Justice Programs, is the research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
amended, NIJ is authorized to support research, evaluation, and
demonstration programs, development of technology, and both national
and international information dissemination. Specific mandates of the Act
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programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated. 

o Recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local
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justice. 

o Carry out research on criminal behavior. 

o Develop new methods of crime prevention and reduction of crime and
delinquency. 

In recent years, NIJ has greatly expanded its initiatives, the result of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the Crime
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advances in technology, and a new international focus. Some examples of
these new initiatives: 

o New research and evaluation are exploring key issues in community
policing, violence against women, sentencing reforms, and specialized
courts such as drug courts. 

o Dual-use technologies are being developed to support national defense
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o NIJ's links with the international community are being strengthened
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Clearinghouse), which electronically links the institutes to the U.N.
network; and establishment of an NIJ International Center. 

o The NIJ-administered criminal justice information clearinghouse, the
world's largest, has improved its online capability. 

o The Institute's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program has been expanded
and enhanced. Renamed ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring), the
program will increase the number of drug-testing sites, and its role as a
"platform" for studying drug-related crime will grow. 

o NIJ's new Crime Mapping Research Center will provide training in
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and develop analytic software. 

o The Institute's program of intramural research has been expanded and
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