NCJ Number
37448
Date Published
1975
Length
37 pages
Annotation
A MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS IS USED TO ANALYZE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DECISION TO EVADE THE DRAFT AND THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIONS IMPOSED FOR DRAFT EVASION.
Abstract
THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS PREDICTS THAT CRIME RATES WILL BE INVERSELY RELATED TO THE CERTAINTY THAT SANCTIONS WILL BE IMPOSED AND THE SEVERITY OF THOSE SANCTIONS. THE RESULTS OF SELECTED PRIOR ANALYSES OF DETERRENCE ARE SUMMARIZED AND THEIR LIMITATIONS CONSIDERED. THE PHENOMENON OF DRAFT EVASION IS CONSIDERED BY DESCRIBING THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEALING WITH EVADERS AND THE PRIMARY MOTIVATIONS OF EVADERS. A MODEL OF THE EVASION DECISION IS DEVELOPED AND THE DATA USED IN ESTIMATING THE MODEL IS DESCRIBED. A STRONG NEGATIVE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION AND THE EVASION RATE IS FOUND. FOR A TEST OF THE DETERRENCE HYPOTHESIS FOR AN INDEX CRIME, SEE NCJ-37482. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED)