Data were obtained from samples of criminal cases begun over contemporaneous periods of 2-3 years in the late 1970's. The model underlying the mathematical equations used in the study used variables under six general headings. Three variable categories pertained to particular cases: participants' incentives to speed or slow the case, the case's intrinsic complexity, and the event sequence the case follows as a function of participants' actions. Three variable categories derived from aspects of the court and its context: general incentives derived form court structure, the structural facilitations of case processing, and the caseload. Findings show that processing times can be reduced through two broad approaches. First, reformers can shift distributions of case-specific variables; e.g., firm continuance policies can reduce processing times. Secondly, court structure can be reformed. A case track featuring heavily reinforced deadlines is especially promising. Even a nonmandatory goal of so many days per case may help. Decentralized plea negotiations may provide increased efficiency. 18 notes, 3 tables, and 29 references.