The target offenders analyzed were convicted of nontrivial offenses, were in danger of incarceration, and were too poor to pay their fines. Case data, interviews, and observation show that the two most coercive fine enforcement techniques are distress (seizure of property) and committal to custody for fine default. Fines are the courts' major alternative to imprisonment. Magistrates emphasize the severity of the offense, not always reviewing the ability of the offenders to pay, and often setting high fines, especially when the total penalty includes restitution payments. Evidence supports the basic assumption underlying the sentencing system, that fines set rationally in relation to means as well as to severity of offense can be collected. Courts using short terms for payment and those that identify nonpayment swiftly and react rapidly to nonpayment with increasing threats of more coercive techniques like distress and then imprisonment are most successful in collecting fines. Most courts do not use distress as a punishment; though it is effective, it is usually only a threat. Courts rarely exhaust enforcement options less costly and less coercive than imprisonment. To improve the fine system, English courts should centralize the responsibility for fine enforcement, set fines in relation to offense severity and offender means, use distress as an enforcement device, and expand options other than imprisonment. The study suggests ways in which American courts interested in improving fine collections may learn from English methods. 61 tables, 3 figures, 2 charts, and 4 diagrams. For executive summary, see NCJ 104329.