It is possible to defend antipornography legislation within the confines of conventional doctrine. Pornography falls within the general class of low-value expression, and the harm it produces is sufficient to justify regulation of that expression. The most troubling issue is that of viewpoint-neutrality, but other seemingly viewpoint-based restrictions are sometimes upheld by the courts when sufficient harm is present. Antipornography legislation is based on harm rather than viewpoint. To the extent that antipornography legislation might be deemed viewpoint-based, its status as such is less troubling due to the peculiar character of the method by which the pornographic 'message' is communicated. The skepticism about antipornography legislation is based on a simultaneous undervaluation of the harm pornography produces, a misapplication of conventional doctrines requiring viewpoint-neutrality, and an overvaluation of the dangers posed by generating a somewhat different category of regulable speech bound to have sOme definitional vagueness. 198 footnotes.