This study examines the impact of issue agendas, decision rule and power balance on the quality of negotiated outcomes in small groups. Negotiation groups using package agendas were more likely to achieve higher total outcomes than groups using single-issue agendas. Negotiation groups following single-issue agendas under majority rule earned significantly fewer points than did groups following single-issue agendas/unanimous rule, package agendas/majority rule, or package agendas/unanimous rule. There was no support for the hypothesis that group members in an equal power balance condition would earn more total profits than groups in an unequal power balance condition. Also, groups with an unequal power distribution were no more likely to form coalitions than groups with an equal power distribution. The results are discussed in terms of a mixed-motive analysis of group decisionmaking. The implications of the results are examined for the effectiveness of small group decisionmaking. 3 tables, 9 footnotes, and 65 references. (Author abstract modified)