The article first examines the traditional reasons for regarding vehicular homicide as something less than murder, focusing on the intent. The author argues that even though the drunk driver does not intend to kill anyone, involvement in something as dangerous as driving while severely intoxicated is so risky as to evidence extreme indifference to the value of human life. It may therefore constitute the malice necessary for a second-degree murder conviction. The author also examines the counterargument that since drunk drivers who kill are often alcoholics who cannot help drinking, it is unjust to hold them responsible for their behavior and to punish them for behavior they cannot control. The author argues that although alcoholics may not be responsible for their drinking, their decisions to drink and then drive, in full knowledge of the risk involved, is sometimes so reckless as to be the equivalent of intentional killing. The author concludes by arguing that when vehicular homicide by a drunk driver meets all the legal requirements of murder, sentences should be comparable to those given for any other murder conviction based on the concept of justice independent of considerations of deterrence effectiveness. 34 footnotes.