Merry's comprehensive literature review of legal pluralism shows how studies of plural normative legal ordering during the past 25 years have greatly enriched the understanding of the complexity of normative structures, their interdependence, and the ways in which these structures are involved in human agency. Her review also illustrates how little conceptual progress has been made. There is no clear understanding nor refined conceptual usage of the terms law, normative order, or pluralism. Although Merry discusses an impressive amount of the relevant material, some interesting new work (Chiba, 1986; Podgorecki et al., 1985) should have been mentioned. Van den Berghe's (1973) and Vanderlinden's (1971) treatments of pluralism/legal pluralism should also have been discussed. A certain incoherence lies in Merry's ambivalence and inconsistency concerning the conceptual and analytical issues involved. She seems attracted by the recognition of 'legal pluralism at home' and the 'rejection of the idea of legal centralism,' which it involves. She is troubled that the approach risks defining legal system so broadly that all social life can be included. In the end, however, she accepts essential elements that constitute the ideology of State/legal centralism by reasoning that State law is fundamentally different from other forms of regulation in exercising the coercive power of the state. 17 references.