The failure of reform made confrontation between nationalism and the British Army inevitable as British policy faced the dilemma of finding a balance between force and conciliation and between reform and repression. During the period from 1972 to 1975, the British Army successfully increased pressure on the IRA; lack of operations weakened that organization allowing the British time to develop a new counterinsurgency policy which replaced internment with a system of nonjury courts; the police was reorganized as the primary force against the IRA with the Army acting in a backup and support role. The third element was the establishment of special interrogation centers designed to extract and collate information and confessions from IRA members. By the end of the 1970s, the IRA had been contained militarily, its propaganda campaign had not capitalized on Britain's political problems in Ireland, and it had been unable to establish its own political organization. In 1976, anti-IRA operations began to employ undercover squads; several years later, allegation arose concerning an unofficial "shoot-to-kill" policy. The dichotomy between containing a high level of internal dissent and protecting its democratic institutions has led the British government to engage in unofficial policies that, while ultimately counterproductive, have curbed the sharp edge of dissent. 47 notes.