The decision also reviews the status of admissibility in the other Federal Circuits. The decision disposes of the "Frye" case as outmoded. The application of the "Frye" standard to exclude polygraph evidence had been the subject of growing criticism, because of the tremendous advances that have been made in polygraph instrumentation and technique since it was handed down. The courts generally rely on three grounds for excluding polygraph tests: the lack of standardization of polygraph procedure, the unreliability of polygraph tests, and the undue impact on the jury. New empirical evidence and scholarly opinion have undercut these traditional arguments against admission of polygraph evidence, and some courts have looked again at the admissibility evidence. Three approaches to the problem have emerged. First, polygraph evidence is inadmissible when it is offered by either party. Second, some jurisdictions permit the trial court, at its discretion, to receive polygraph evidence if the parties stipulate to the evidence's admissibility before the administration of the test, and if certain other conditions are met. Lastly, some trial judges are allowed to admit polygraph evidence in the absence of a stipulation when special circumstances exist. The development of new technologies calls for flexibility within the legal system. The science of polygraphy has reached a level of acceptance sufficient to allow the use of polygraphic evidence in circumstances where the danger of unfair prejudice can be minimized. The two dissenting judges concurred with the Court's holding that polygraph evidence should be admissible when both parties stipulated in advance, but dissented with the finding that the polygraph evidence had gained acceptance in the scientific community as a reliable instrument for detecting lies. 24 notes.