Although HRUs have scored some dramatic rescues, three major hostage massacres in Third World countries in 1985-1986 and other bloody HBT incidents in 1988 demonstrated the high cost of using force prematurely and ineptly to resolve HBT crises. Focusing on these and other HRU failures, this study questions the American and Israeli "no ransom, no negotiation" policies in HBT situations and concludes that a more flexible approach of patiently "talking down" and "wearing down" the hostage-takers through basic hostage-negotiation techniques -- even if only as a delaying tactic -- is vital for maximizing the chances for rescuing hostages safely, whether through dialogue or force. Conversely, if authorities quickly resort to military action, hostages are far more likely to suffer casualties than to be rescued safely. Appendix and 123 notes (Author abstract)