The article first discusses and explains the questions to be researched and then classifies the LIC literature into three broad categories, followed by an examination of LIC doctrine and the body of scholarly literature on LIC. One question considered is whether or not the United States continues to apply a standard-package prescription to insurgency, ignoring local conditions. The analysis also assesses, prior to the commitment of U.S. assistance, the prospects for success in the defeat of an insurgency. A third issue considered is whether the United States has or can acquire leverage to pressure the assisted governments to institute needed reforms. Finally, the analysis considers whether or not the United States has rectified the management problems that permitted a lack of coordination and integration between the policies of agencies involved in counterinsurgency efforts. The author concludes that although LIC scholars and practitioners recognize and have addressed many of the LIC policy factors that require modification, LIC doctrine and policy have not been revised sufficiently to correct the causes of past failure. 55 notes