The author examines the juvenile court's origins, especially noting the U.S. Supreme Court's Gault decision that transformed the juvenile court into a very different institution than that envisioned by its creators. The Gault decision held that juvenile offenders are constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings and to the privilege against self- incrimination. A comparative assessment of Gault's implementation in six States is presented (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, New York, and Pennsylvania). A detailed analysis of juvenile representation in Minnesota indicates that the differential presence of counsel is associated with differences in pretrial detention, sentencing, and case processing practices, while certain factors such as pretrial detention, offense seriousness, and prior record affect overall rates of representation. The author shows that juvenile courts vary considerably and that the presence of an attorney is associated with differences in juvenile justice administration. Further, he points out that certain social structural variables appear to affect the procedural and substantive policies of courts, even though all juvenile courts operate under the same statutes and rules of statewide applicability. Policy implications of varying juvenile court procedures and possible alternatives to the juvenile court are discussed. References and tables