The primary focus of this assessment is the noncustodial duty to warn. The author concludes that the duty to warn lacks substantive boundaries, because it requires no conduct of any particular kind by clients, and it attaches when therapists are expected to know something for which they have no valid criteria. Notably, the court adopted the holding for this duty while simultaneously citing a convincing body of literature that indicates no one, including psychotherapists, has any ability to predict violence to any reasonable level of confidence. The court's mandate to protect through nonclinical action such as calling the police or warning others requires a breach of confidentiality unconstrained by respect for the client's autonomy. "Tarasoff's" standard of predictive dangerousness contains no requirement of mental illness that might undermine the client's autonomous capacities and, thus, the right to self-determination. Further, although the court discussed threats, its holding did not require that the client verbalize a threat or evince any other behavior as a condition for the therapist to be obligated to take protective action. The absence of a conduct requirement or any other criterion of dangerousness prevents clients from regulating their own behavior in such a manner as to avoid unwanted therapist action. 49 references