Part I examines the current law and notes that the theoretical groundwork is already in place for application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in cases that involve domestic violence. Part II discusses the inadequacies of the current framework, and Part III proposes a per se standard of outrage and considers the advantages and possible criticisms of this approach. Under the proposed per se standard of outrage, the defendant's conduct would be outrageous as a matter of law if he violated an injunction issued for a woman's protection. Such a rule would avoid the need for a subjective, ad hoc inquiry into the outrageousness of domestic violence. Upon proving that the defendant had in fact willfully violated a civil protection order, the plaintiff would establish conclusively the most important element of the tort. Generally, the proposal would help victims shut out of the criminal justice system, either because the abuser's conduct is not criminal or because the criminal process is ineffective for domestic violence victims. Since a plaintiff can recover punitive damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the tort's punitive component can function like the criminal law, thereby discouraging violence. 261 footnotes