This paper explores the development of policy which governs the relationship between intelligence and law enforcement generally, and what its impact has been at the operational level. Also considered is whether the rules should be changed, and if so, how they should be changed. The bases for the discussion are the law enforcement proviso from the National Security Act of 1947 and various subsequently issued Executive Orders. The ambiguities of the statutory proviso and Executive Orders are illustrated by the problems encountered by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's investigation of the Banco Nazionale del Lavoro case. The author of this paper argues that to clarify law and policy, a policy should be promulgated that permits or requires greater interaction between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. He supports his position by citing that increasing international character of crime in the United States and the growing and increasingly adverse effect that international crime is having on security in the United States. He briefly covers the rules of such interaction from the standpoint of the intelligence community's three functional areas: collection, analysis, and other types of assistance, overt and covert. Comments on the author's paper are provided by Elizabeth Rindskopf and John Coleman. A summary of comments by other participants at the Working Group meeting are presented. A listing of participants is provided. Also included is a list of papers available from the Working Group.