The major topics examined are the role of Federal judges in court administration, the role of judicial lobbying in court reform, judicial salaries, the consequences of habeas corpus reform, and systemic development in judicial bureaucracy. The author develops three perspectives. First, Federal judges shape policy and outcomes not only through formal judicial policymaking, but also through their behavior as a political interest group that seeks to shape and implement court reform in ways that maintain their own status and authority. Second, analysts must carefully examine judges' claims about the needs and "best interests" of the judicial branch, because such claims often obscure the judges' self-interested personal motivations for preserving and enhancing their own positions in the system. Third, because Congress has formal authority over court reform legislation, legislators should question judges' arguments (e.g., concerning judicial salaries), monitor the consequences of judicial decisions that affect court procedures (e.g., habeas corpus reform), and examine the consequences of judicial control over court reform implementation (e.g., judicial bureaucratization). A 36-item selected bibliography, chapter notes, and a subject index