The example of Oedipus and his father Laios is used to illustrate the changes. If Oedipus had ordered one of his friends to kill Laios, but the friend decided not to commit the murder, Oedipus could not have been prosecuted according to the earlier criminal code. Under that code, instigators of an offense could be punished only if the offense was actually committed, not if it remained in the planning stages. At the same time, the criminal code provided that an abettor was to receive the same punishment as the perpetrator of the offense. The Criminal Code of 1994 has introduced some changes, although these are not radical. Under the new code, the instigator can be punished only if the offense was actually committed. Thus, under the new law, Oedipus still would not be prosecuted. However, according to Article 121-6, instigators are now to be punished as if they had been perpetrators. They are considered independent offenders and can receive a different punishments influenced by their own aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, had the murder of Laios been committed as planned, Oedipus as instigator would now be charged with aggravated murder because he was the son of Laios.