In February 1996, the United States enacted legislation to implement two international agreements it signed with the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals concerning the surrender of fugitives. The United States joined France, Germany, and at least 11 other countries that have modified their domestic laws to comply with Tribunal requests to arrest and surrender fugitives. By adapting mechanisms used in bilateral extradition practices, the U.S. approach ensures compliance with constitutional requirements governing the manner in which authority to surrender fugitives is bestowed upon the executive, as well as basic procedural safeguards that must be accorded to fugitives during the course of surrender proceedings. At the same time, recognizing the unique nature of Tribunals and the broad nature of the obligation of United Nations members to comply with requests for surrender, the United States has crafted its implementation scheme so that traditional yet not constitutionally mandated bars to bilateral extradition are not applied under the surrender framework. By eliminating most requirements normally found in extradition treaties, the U.S. approach acknowledges that surrender to supranational courts should be more streamlined than bilateral international extradition practices. The unique U.S. approach of coupling executive agreements with implementing legislation in order to meet the surrender of fugitives obligation is discussed, and constitutional implications of the surrender mechanism are addressed. 139 footnotes