In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars gender-based discrimination in jury selection. In addition to reviewing the history of discrimination in the selection of women in the venire and on petit juries, the article analyzes J.E.B., details the procedures governing J.E.B. motions, and notes relevant post-J.E.B. decisions in State and Federal courts. It also analyzes the mounting tension between the Sixth Amendment ideal of a representative cross-section in the venire, which encourages diversity, and the Sixth Amendment exercise of peremptory challenges to the petit jury, which often restricts it. Finally, the article explores the J.E.B. statement that gender has no effect on the jury's verdict, a finding contrary to the results of social science and psychological studies. The article discusses stereotypes and female jurors; overt discrimination recognized in the law; J.E.B. and its progeny; impact of J.E.B. on trial practice; and the conflict between the fair cross-section ideal and equal protection. References, notes