After reviewing the watershed ruling of the early and middle 1970s, including Furman v. Georgia (1972), Gregg v. Georgia (1976), and Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), the author discusses case law and legislation that have shaped current death-penalty legal doctrine. Because the major substantive legal battles over capital punishment in the United States have been resolved, at least for the foreseeable future, the article identifies several procedural principles that must be recognized if death penalty systems are to have a claim to legitimacy in the future. One principle is that the death penalty should be reserved for a limited class of crimes and should be authorized only when necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest in deterrence or retribution. Another principle is that all persons accused of capital crimes should be represented by counsel qualified to undertake capital representation. Further, prosecutors' charging decisions in potential capital cases should be regulated and reviewed to guard against arbitrary and inconsistent decision-making. Also, the impartiality and representativeness of capital juries should not be compromised unnecessarily by jury selection procedures, including death- qualification and the exercise of peremptory challenges. Nine other principles for capital punishment legislation are also presented. 182 references