The new quasi-doctrine called third-party policing refers to police insistence on the involvement of property managers and other non-offending third parties in the control of criminal and disorderly behavior; this insistence has created a de-facto new element of public duty. These police efforts may encounter many forms opposition from property owners and property managers. Much of this opposition takes place in the political arena. Individual resistance includes avoidance through denial of the problem or an offer of scapegoat alternatives, a request that the exemption not apply in a particular case, subversion or corruption, property abandonment, and cooptation. Collective resistance includes collusion through a sale to a like-minded owner, an overturn through the judicial process, and repeal through legislative action. The analysis concludes the positioning third-party policing as a crime prevention approach is perhaps the most logical approach to building a supportive coalition, but the dimensions, limits, and rationale of this new form of public duty must be clearly understood across all points of the political spectrum. Case examples in Oakland, Calif., and Minneapolis, notes, and 22 references (Author abstract modified)