The research rested on recognition that biological weapons have lethality comparable to some nuclear weapons, can be made in relatively small and primitive places without much specialized equipment, may avoid detection by outsiders, and thus are much more accessible than are nuclear weapons to rogue countries and terrorist groups. The first awareness of biological terrorism may be after the fact, when it is necessary to act rapidly and effectively to manage the consequences. The research on this issue consisted of a series of meetings, plus independent studies that culminated in a seminar wargame conducted in cooperation with the National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research. Results revealed that the United States is unprepared for a biological attack and that technology could significantly improve readiness. However, current technology is inadequate for biological consequence management; new technology is critically needed. Promising technologies exist in almost all needed areas, including biodetection, information systems, unconventional pathogen countermeasures, advanced diagnostics, and decontamination devices. The notable exception is in controlling panic, which might have an overwhelming role in a disaster, particularly if local plans or resources necessary to implement them are not in place. The research group set priorities for technology needs; these priorities represent the opinions of most of those who participated. Footnotes and appended list of acronyms, meeting summaries and reports, and technology resource guide