The article first explicates the general theoretical model. Next, it enhances the comparative perspective as it extends a previous comparison between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States to include the experience of state socialist systems. It identifies three distinct empirical patterns of punishment dynamics, each associated with a distinct type of social organization: decentralized domination (personalistic); decentralized domination (bureaucratic); and monopolized domination (bureaucratic). Analysis of the cases of Poland and the German Democratic Republic reveals that the organization of domination and knowledge production are crucial to understanding criminal punishment under conditions of totalitarianism as well. Yet, bureaucratization does not necessarily lead to stability in punishment trends. Bureaucratization in combination with monopolization of decision-making power is likely to result in dynamic trends. Punishment under conditions of totalitarianism appears to follow immediate and strategic political rationales. Politics of punishment in such contexts also do not face the translation problems that haunt the application of political motives to control practices in systems with decentralized power structures. Figures, notes, references